


# A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Emergencies in Correctional Facilities



**Self-Audit Checklists**  
**Resource Materials**

U.S. Department of Justice

National Institute of Corrections

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Checklists**

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## Preface

Welcome to the National Institute of Corrections' new emergency preparation manual titled *A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Emergencies in Correctional Facilities*. As the American correctional system continues to progress further into the 21<sup>st</sup> century by moving out of the COVID-era and into a more technologically advance world. It is becoming increasingly evident that the landscape of emergency preparedness and response in correctional facilities has evolved significantly since the National Institute of Corrections' (NIC) last emergency preparedness guide was created. In the early 2000s the NIC created the *Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prisons Emergencies* and the *Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies*. The self-audit checklists which have served as the backbone of the original versions have faithfully help guide correctional administrators, staff, and incarcerated individuals through numerous challenges for more than a decade. However, as the challenges that the correctional world faces have changed over time so must the tools that correctional professionals use must also change.

The goals for this new guide are to consolidate and refine the wealth of information contained in the previous self-audit checklists, ensuring they remain accessible and user-friendly, but also framed for a more modern correctional world. This updated version also aims to address emergent issues and incorporate lessons learned from recent events. The importance of modernizing the content cannot be overstated, especially given the increased frequency, complexity of, and speed of emergencies facing correctional facilities today.

In recent years, emergency preparedness audits have become a routine part of maintaining the safety and security within correctional settings. This guide's revitalized content is poised to meet the current needs of administrators, staff, and incarcerated individuals alike. By aligning with contemporary practices and emerging threats, this edition seeks to provide comprehensive guidance that not only enhances the safety and security of correctional facilities but also supports the well-being of all individuals within their walls. We trust that this updated guide will serve as an indispensable resource in your efforts to prepare for and respond to emergencies effectively.

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
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# Section 1:

## Introduction



## Major Emergencies in Correctional Facilities

Emergency preparedness is a central, even critical issue throughout the American correctional system. Today, most public agencies must have emergency plans, and even private businesses have turned to disaster preparedness and business recovery planning. Correctional facilities, however, are not like other public agencies. They are responsible for the safety of individuals who are usually confined and can neither protect nor provide for themselves in many emergency situations. Further, and perhaps ironically, the very people who are incarcerated and whose safety must be assured are sometimes the source of the correctional facility emergency situations. The first priority for each correctional facility is community protection, which means that even in the chaos of an emergency, correctional facilities must take measures to minimize the opportunity for escape.

No correctional facility is immune from a large-scale emergency. A lower custody correctional facility that houses short-term incarcerated individuals may be at lower risk for a riot or disturbance situation, but a low-custody designation is no shield against fire, earthquake, chemical spill, or staff walkout. Also, disturbances can occur at all levels of custody.

Population overcrowding, staffing challenges, interruptions in supply delivery, and other factors complicate preparing for and managing emergencies in correctional facilities. Regardless of their size, custody, or mission, the leadership of all correctional facilities face challenges from increased security threat group activities; proliferation of cell phone technologies; access to and use of drones; and opportunities to monitor both internal and external operations. As a result, most systems are in a more precarious position with regards to major emergencies than they were 15 or 20 years ago.

Another factor affecting how correctional facilities deal with major emergencies is the changing composition of the correctional workforce. Recent years have seen the wholesale retirement of staff who began their careers 25 or 30 years ago, many of whom had been through riots and hostage incidents and had demonstrated leadership under fire. Today, correctional facilities promote staff much more quickly than once was customary. A captain may have eight years of service now, whereas 20 years ago a “young” captain in the same department would have had 16 to 18 years of experience. In the absence of experience, agencies are far more dependent on policy, plans, and formal training. However, not everyone recognizes that reality.

The need to plan for and forecast potential emergencies is underscored by the long-term effect of emergencies on correctional facilities. Every administrator recognizes that a riot, a fire, or a hostage incident may be over in a matter of hours or less but may profoundly change the correctional facility and the agency forever. One of the case studies in this guide recounts the story of a small jail in which a fire resulted in 42 fatalities in less than five minutes. Both incarcerated individuals and visitors were involved. A fatal shooting at a courthouse in Atlanta, GA, and subsequent escape continue to reverberate through that community. And it appears that the name of Attica prison will remain legendary among correctional facilities.

One reason that some systems have not placed higher priority on emergency preparedness is that planning for emergencies does not seem as pressing as day-to-day problems—until there is an actual emergency. An athlete preparing for a competition will practice each individual step,

then a series of steps, then prepare for the actual event. Planning and preparing for an emergency in a correctional facility is similar; it's a crawl-walk-run training process.

Second, most people judge emergency situations by their outcomes. Did they end well? A review of emergency situations must consider causal factors contributing to the emergencies, preparedness for the emergencies, and how the situations were mitigated. Did staff perform properly? Were the right training and equipment in place? Were policies proved valid? And so forth. Each emergency drill or actual event must include a debriefing to identify lessons learned and then incorporate new systems or pieces of systems.

Third, effective and comprehensive emergency preparedness is demanding and difficult to achieve. Preparedness requires top-down expectations and front line understanding of the importance of being prepared. It is easier to prevent an emergency than to mitigate it.

### Could This Be You?

**Incarcerated individuals took control of one of your housing units** and held the staff and several other incarcerated individuals hostage. The hostage situation lasted into the early hours of the following day, ultimately resulting in the death of one correctional sergeant; injuries sustained by two correctional officers; hospital transport for one non-custodial staff member for precautionary reasons; and allegations of injuries by incarcerated individuals.

Housing units at your correctional facility are assigned security levels of minimum, medium, or high based on the custody level of the incarcerated individuals in each unit. Minimum security generally includes dormitory housing and a relatively low staff-to-incarcerated individual ratio; medium security includes cell-type housing, more-controlled movement of incarcerated individuals, and a higher staff-to-incarcerated individual ratio; and high security includes the highest staff-to-incarcerated individual ratio and close control of the movements of incarcerated individuals.

The housing unit that was involved is divided into three wings (or tiers): A, B, and C. The building was designed to house approximately 40 high-security incarcerated individuals on each tier, with two incarcerated individuals assigned to each cell, for a total capacity of 120 incarcerated individuals. On the day of this incident, the experience of your correctional staff ranged from less than one year to 16 years. One hundred twelve incarcerated individuals occupied this housing unit at the time of this incident.

As soon as the incident began, one of the correctional officers, prior to being taken hostage, used his two-way radio to send a staff-wide request for immediate assistance in your housing unit. Your command staff were notified of the incident and issued a system-wide lockdown order to prevent incarcerated individuals from coordinating a protest throughout your correctional facility.

Consistent with the emergency response plan, command staff also requested that emergency medical services (EMS) and fire resources be dispatched to your housing unit in case of injuries, fires, or other events that would require an immediate response. Command staff also followed standard security protocols and had the water and phones turned off until further notice.

•••

**A Category 2 hurricane (Cortes)** is forecast to affect your region in the next three days, and the preliminary tracking and hurricane models are not predicting that your correctional facility will be affected by this storm. Due to these predictions, your correctional facility has accepted incarcerated individuals and detainees from other correctional facilities that are in the path of this storm. As Hurricane Cortes makes progress, it begins to intensify, and ultimately it drastically changes its direction, placing your correctional facility in its path.

Your current incarcerated individual/detainee population consists of males and females who are being held as pretrial detainees, those convicted of minor municipal infractions, and individuals serving sentences with the state department of correction (DOC) and Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). Your present count is 2,700 incarcerated individuals/detainees, and your on-site correctional and support staff is 55.

Hurricane Cortes makes landfall as a Category 4 hurricane. The decision was made to shelter in place as the storm changed its track and intensity.

Upon landfall, your correctional facility sustained water levels that were four to five feet deep. Due to the water levels, your correctional facility's emergency power generators were incapacitated, and due to these electrical malfunctions, localized fires were reported in administrative and common areas. Furthermore, the automated locking systems for the holding cells and housing units are inoperable and can be opened only manually.

Requests for additional resources from local, state, and federal resources are delayed due to Hurricane Cortes and preliminary response times are between 12-24 hours before any requested assistance will arrive.

## Correctional Facility Emergencies and the National Incident Management System (NIMS)

On February 28, 2003, President George W. Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), whose purpose is to enhance the ability of the United States to manage crisis incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS).

According to FEMA, NIMS “guides all levels of government, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from incidents.” (FEMA 2025)

Part of NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS), a standardized organizational structure meant to alleviate some of the complexities imposed by jurisdictional boundaries. The use of ICS on scene allows incidents to be managed with a minimum of confusion due to the presence of multiple agencies. (USDA 2025)

Some correctional administrators are already familiar with NIMS or ICS. Both are generic, multiagency/multi-entity systems for responding to major emergency incidents (although NIMS is generally a broader approach than ICS). A brief review of NIMS, how it relates to correctional facility emergencies, and how it relates to this guide will provide important context for the guide's users.

### Background

Prior to the 1970s, there was no nationally recognized system for managing emergency incidents or natural disasters. ICS was developed by fire departments in the early 1970s as a system for coordinating the response of multiple agencies to the same wildfire or group of wildfires. The heart of ICS was a command-and-control system, and ICS was intended to overcome many of the traditional problems associated with multiple-agency responses, such as ambiguous or unclear lines of authority, incompatible communication systems, and the lack of standardized equipment and terminology. From its inception through the 1980s and 1990s,

offshoots of ICS evolved in some agencies and states. ICS was also adapted for use by law enforcement agencies in a number of state and local jurisdictions.

After the events of September 11, 2001, a primary concern of the newly established Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was coordination among agencies that would potentially respond to a terrorist event. The presidential directive charged the new department with establishing standards for a national emergency system. That system, called NIMS, is largely an outgrowth of ICS. NIMS represented a major step forward: For the first time, the nation had a unifying system for coordinating the response to incidents as diverse as a forest fire, a tornado, or a terrorist bombing.

## How NIMS Relates to Correctional Facility Emergencies

For corrections officials, and for this guide, the key question is: What is the relationship of NIMS to correctional facility emergency preparedness? The answer is that NIMS is both a help and a challenge.

NIMS is a help in several obvious ways. When a correctional agency assists in the response to a community disaster, radio frequencies of the various responding agencies are more likely to be compatible, and information about the emergency is more likely to be shared in plain English rather than in codes. Jurisdictional issues are more likely to have been worked out in advance. Coordination and planning may well have been tested during drills and exercises. The same issues of coordination, planning, communication, command/control, and logistics also apply when a correctional agency has a major emergency and needs assistance from fire, police, and other external agencies. Thus, correctional agencies should embrace NIMS and become familiar with its concepts and terms.

The challenge for corrections officials is to recognize that NIMS is a generic interagency structure; it is not procedural, and it does not speak to specific correctional issues. Nothing in NIMS tells a correctional facility how to evacuate the segregation unit of a large correctional facility (just as nothing in NIMS tells a fire department how to put out a petroleum fire). Thus, while NIMS provides important and necessary assistance in areas such as interagency coordination, resource allocation, and planning, a correctional agency still needs all of the corrections-specific expertise that has traditionally existed within a correctional emergency system.

An analogy may be in order. To compose a document on a computer, you use a word-processing software program that determines how you move text and format the document. However, you also need another software program: the computer's operating system. Although it has little to do with the specifics of composing the document, the operating system sits above the word-processing software and allows it to run on the computer. NIMS is like an operating system in that it provides the framework and architecture in which all of the corrections-specific emergency provisions reside.

A correctional agency has two alternatives regarding NIMS. It can adopt NIMS and then set about developing its own corrections-specific policies, procedures, and other emergency system requirements, tying all of that to various components of NIMS. Alternatively, it can adopt NIMS and use a comprehensive correctional emergency system within NIMS to provide the substance

and content that make an emergency system useful in a correctional facility. If it chooses the second alternative, it must take care that its emergency system is consistent with the NIMS framework.

## How This Guide Relates to NIMS

Users of this guide will find that it is consistent with NIMS. In particular, the freestanding self-audit checklists that constitute the heart of the guide (see section 4) include items that cover every aspect of NIMS, ranging from risk assessment to interagency coordination, to requirements for drills, exercises, and simulations. The checklists include additional items that are corrections specific and not part of NIMS. For example, the general emergency preparedness checklist includes many questions regarding crisis negotiation teams and tactical teams. Most of these questions are corrections specific; because NIMS is generic, it does not provide policy direction for a crisis negotiation team or direction for operating a tactical team.

In summary, this guide is consistent with NIMS, and it directly addresses a number of key provisions and concepts within NIMS. However, it is comprehensive concerning expertise about correctional emergencies and should not be regarded, directly or indirectly, as a systematic presentation of NIMS issues.

## Assessing Emergency Readiness

Effective planning plays a crucial role in preventing major emergencies and, as importantly, in containing crisis situations once they arise. With good planning, some situations—planned disturbances, some types of fires, certain types of hostage incidents—may not occur in the first place. Good planning can also result in early intervention that resolves small, localized crises before they escalate into major emergencies that threaten the entire correctional facility. The lack of effective emergency preparedness may increase the likelihood both that a major emergency will occur and that if a large-scale crisis does occur, it will be worse than absolutely necessary.

Any correctional facility that does not have the level of emergency preparedness it wants or needs may address this shortfall, and an assessment is the logical first step. Traditionally, correctional facility administrators have either asked their own staff to conduct an assessment or have contracted with outside consultants to do the job. Each approach has its own drawbacks. Involving a correctional facility's management staff in evaluating its emergency preparedness (policies, procedures, plans, equipment, and so forth) may be all the motivation the staff need to begin to improve their emergency systems. On the other hand, staff may lack the objectivity to point out areas in which they are at fault. Even if they are objective, in-house staff may not notice obvious problems because they have worked under the conditions for so long that they think of them not as problems but as the natural state of affairs. Furthermore, internal staff are unlikely to be aware of the breadth of alternative solutions available across U.S. correctional facilities. Finally, politics and personalities can compromise the integrity of an internal assessment.

A different set of problems arises if correctional facility administrators engage consultants. First, consultants cost money, and a serious evaluation may be expensive. Second, most consultants have specialized areas of expertise. Some are very good with fire prevention and firefighting

systems, others with correctional emergency response teams (CERTs) and special weapons and tactics (SWAT), and still others with training hostage negotiators, but very few consultants have in-depth experience and expertise with the entire realm of emergency preparedness issues. Third, management staff may see outside consultants as "walkthrough experts" and not take them seriously. Finally, political, rather than purely constructive motives, may govern how a correctional facility chooses to use a consultant's report.

The self-audit materials in this guide offer an alternative to those traditional methods of evaluating emergency readiness in correctional facilities. A self-audit has the obvious advantage that the price is right: There are no external costs, and a correctional facility can conduct the audit at a time that is most convenient. Although the audit is conducted by the correctional facility's own staff, the detailed and objective nature of the checklists works to overcome many of the concerns that may arise with regard to political and personality issues. Correctional facility staff conducting the audit are no longer limited to answering questions derived from their own experience or preconceived notions of what constitutes adequate emergency preparedness. For the many correctional facilities that have never attempted a rigorous analysis of their planning or preparation for large-scale crises, these materials offer a convenient, inexpensive, and practical solution.

One consideration may be to include a group from the correctional facility that consists of one or more command staff, one or more mid-level supervisors, and several officers with the required training and experience. Each group of these officers bring a wealth of knowledge about the total operations of the correctional facility, from day-to-day operations in the cell area, to supervisory and liability issues, to cost analysis and budgetary effects. These officers may partner with other stakeholders, such as fire, EMS, emergency management and local law enforcement, to assist in plan development and review.

### Characteristics of a Good Correctional Emergency Preparedness System

The hypothetical case studies in this section point to major flaws and absences in emergency preparedness systems. Regrettably, these omissions are all too common. Some correctional facilities operate with little or no emergency system in place. Other correctional facilities do have systems but know their emergency preparation and response capabilities are outdated, inadequate, or otherwise unhelpful. In both of these situations, the correctional facility needs a comprehensive emergency preparedness system, and identifying the key parameters of such a system may help. The following 12 characteristics represent the minimum criteria for an effective system of emergency preparation and response in a correctional facility.

1. **Practical:** The system must be useful to line staff, supervisors, and managers both before and during an emergency. It should not be theoretical. It should provide specific directions and procedures, tell staff what to do and what not to do, and identify choices. It is important that a plan gives step-by-step guidance to the staff to mitigate the incident. Policies tend to give an overall desired outcome.
2. **Simple:** Emergency provisions that are too technical or too sophisticated may be beyond some staff. If the emergency system is overly complex, staff may forget key elements when an unanticipated crisis occurs. Compare the following instructions for maintaining correctional facility fire doors:

*Keep all fire doors closed in any major emergency unless ordered to open specific doors to assist with the evacuation of incarcerated individuals.*

versus

*Type I and Type II doors are maintained closed in fire situations but are opened in other natural disasters and may be opened in emergencies involving violence by incarcerated individuals reaching Level Three or above. Type III doors shall be controlled by the highest-ranking supervisor on scene in unaffected areas of the correctional facility and by the Incident Commander in areas directly affected by the emergency.*

The first set of instructions is reasonably straightforward. The second set is neither straightforward nor simple.

3. **Corrections-specific:** An emergency plan must be correctional facility-specific. The characteristics of the facility will dictate the response to any event. A facility that is inside city boundaries during high traffic times will experience slow response times due to possible gridlock. A facility located in a rural area may have slowed response times due to being located farther out. No amount of discussion about who reports to whom and who controls which resources will substitute for the sound, detailed correctional practices that must be at the heart of an emergency system if it is to be effective for facilities.
4. **Generic:** A plan that addresses the specifics of the event that is occurring is recommended. For instance, some events may call for a shelter-in-place plan. Other events may require the movement of incarcerated individuals from one cell area to another, while another event may require offsite relocation of a limited number of incarcerated individuals. One plan cannot address all potential scenarios.
5. **Policy-based:** Developing an emergency plan without reference to policy is impossible. Who is in charge at the outset of a major crisis is a policy decision, not a training or planning issue. Similarly, more specific questions such as what is non-negotiable in a hostage situation and who, if anyone, is authorized to deviate from policy during an emergency, must be determined by policy decisions. Furthermore, with regard to some issues, emergency plans should differ markedly from day-to-day policies. Thus, an effective emergency system and its plans must be developed with regard to specific decisions about emergency policies.
6. **True system:** The word *system* is terribly overused, but with regard to emergency planning and response, it is appropriate and essential. To be a true system, all parts of a correctional facility emergency system—each element of planning and response—must be compatible and operate seamlessly. Each element must be developed with full awareness of all other parts of the system. For example, the policy, procedures, and training for hostage negotiators must account for and fit with tactical team operations. Both of these areas must be entirely consistent with the emergency policy on command and with training for staff at the level of shift commander and mid-level supervisors. Training must be provided to all staff to ensure a working knowledge of the response plans. If one or more of these system elements is not consistent with the training and procedures for first responders, the outcome of an emergency could be tragic.

This principle, "true system," is one of the biggest challenges in developing an effective facility emergency system.

7. **User-friendly:** The facility emergency system must be quick and easy to work with and designed primarily for on-duty staff. When a major emergency strikes, there is no time to read through lengthy instructions or research questions. If the staff on duty cannot begin to contain an emergency, it may be irrelevant that the facility has highly trained and sophisticated specialists, because they will arrive too late. Many correctional facilities have lieutenants and sergeants running day-to-day activities during evening and weekend shifts. It is important that all officers are familiar with the initial response steps to an incident and begin the notification process quickly to obtain the required assistance.
8. **Checklist-driven:** The primary method of making an emergency system user friendly, simple, and practical is to build as many of the procedures as possible into checklists. A checklist keeps staff from relying solely on memory. Checklists embody the key procedures for responding to an emergency and condense the experience and judgment of senior staff into an outline form that any staff member can follow. Checklists remind staff of the specifics in an emergency plan and of information covered in training. Later, they serve as accurate and detailed logs of what was done, when, and by whom.
9. **Agency-wide policies must be tailored to each correctional facility:** In a department with more than one correctional facility, it is essential that emergency plans be tailored to the specifics of each correctional facility while remaining consistent with agency-wide policy. For instance, a major agency in the western United States has a correctional facility in a large downtown metropolitan area and houses more than 5,000 incarcerated individuals. The same agency has eight other correctional facilities with varying incarcerated populations. One of the correctional facilities under their command has a capacity of 926 incarcerated individuals in a rural setting. The plans that are developed must be specific to the challenges that each correctional facility faces. Factors to consider are construction (multi-story vs single story), location, incarcerated individual staff, and availability of resources.
10. **Detailed:** An emergency system must be detailed, whether in describing armory checkout procedures, outlining relief of staff during an extended emergency, or in addressing hundreds of other issues. A generalized emergency system fails to prepare staff adequately and to provide direction during an actual emergency.
11. **Auditable:** A good emergency system must be subject to audit. If it is not, the agency cannot know how much of the system is in place or how well staff maintain it. A good emergency system will include audit measures and procedures. Exercises provide an excellent means to test your plans. After any exercise, it is important to include an after-action debrief and record the things that went right as well as those that went wrong. A discussion should be held to determine the best way to improve the plan going forward. This also allows an agency to record any changes to the correctional facility such as additional space added on, classification changes in housing areas, staff reduction, and so forth.
12. **Field-tested:** Field testing is not an essential criterion, but it is highly desirable. Staff do not want an emergency system that looks and sounds good but has never been tested under real-life conditions. If a correctional facility needs to develop or adopt an emergency system, it should insist on one that has been used successfully in other correctional facilities and that has been tested

through a variety of real crises and emergencies. An agency can develop the “crawl-walk-run” method of exercises. Once a plan is in place, a tabletop exercise can be run to test the plan’s effectiveness. After debriefing and corrections, the plan can be table topped again. The next phase would use officers and incarcerated individuals as role-players to conduct a limited-scale drill to further test the plan’s effectiveness. This can culminate into a full-scale drill to test the plan and personnel. Field tests should routinely involve varied and unique scenarios.

## Small Facilities and Large Facilities

Emergency preparedness is crucial for all correctional facilities, regardless of size. Small correctional facilities may face different challenges due to limited resources: equipment, budgets, staffing, training opportunities, and so forth. Yet irrespective of a correctional facility’s size, emergencies demand a strong response, from dealing with the media to attending to the special needs of staff and their families. Similarly, regardless of the size of a rural correctional facility, its external resources, such as city police and fire departments, may be different than that of a larger community, and they may not be as well-trained or equipped as its urban counterparts. Moreover, many of the staff in rural areas may also serve in the volunteer fire department or as a volunteer EMS provider and cannot function in both capacities at the same time.

This guide is designed to assist both small and large correctional facilities with self-audits for emergency preparedness. Do not be overwhelmed by the size or detail; choose the checklist that corresponds to the needs of your correctional facility.

A key question is, "What is a smaller correctional facility and what is a larger correctional facility?" The answer is a decision for the reader to make. This guide does not provide a definitive numerical answer. Clearly, a 100-bed correctional facility is smaller than a 2,000-bed correctional facility. However, for clarification, there is a difference between a small correctional facility and a small detention facility. While both small correctional facilities (minimum-security facilities) and small detention facilities serve important roles, they serve different purposes. A correctional minimum-security facility is typically designed to house low-risk individuals who are near the end of their incarceration. Their focus is on rehabilitation, preparation for successful reentry into the community, and work and vocational programs. There are less restrictive barriers and more freedom of movement both within and outside of the facility. Their number of beds may range from 100 to 400.

Small detention facilities provide short-term confinement for individuals who are serving short sentences or who are awaiting trial, sentencing, or transfer to another facility. Individuals in detention facilities have various risk levels and may include individuals with mental health or substance abuse issues. Detention facilities do not offer extensive programming or rehabilitation services. Their number of beds may range from 25 to 125.

Finally, it must be recognized that two different 500-bed correctional facilities may arrive at very different decisions about these materials, and each decision may be well justified. One

correctional facility may have extensive emergency plans and may have conducted ongoing emergency training, being generally sophisticated and current with regard to emergency preparedness. The other 500-bed correctional facility may have nothing in place with regard to emergency preparedness. Correctional facilities of similar size will differ markedly in history, culture, and preparation with regard to major emergencies, and one self-audit instrument will not be appropriate for all facilities. The National Institute of Corrections and those who participated in the development of this guide hope and intend that almost every correctional facility across the country will find something in these materials that will be of use in evaluating its level of emergency preparedness.

**Note:** The worksheets below, *I. Are You Prepared?* (page 12) and *II. Hazard Analysis Worksheet* (pages 13–14), are meant to serve as an informal gauge of a correctional facility's current level of emergency preparedness. These worksheets are also found as part of checklist *IX. Risk Assessment* on pages 74–78 of Section 3: General Self-Audit Checklists.

**I. Are You Prepared?**

For each type of crisis or emergency listed in the table below, rate how likely your correctional facility is to face that situation in the next 10 years: impossible (I), highly unlikely (U), possible (P), or likely (L). For each situation you ranked *possible* or *likely*, fill in the remaining three columns about your degree of preparation for that type of emergency with *Yes* or *No*. (For situations you rated *impossible* or *highly unlikely*, go no further.) For each *No* answer, add comments in the box below the chart.

Event	Likelihood (I, U, P, L)	Level of Preparation		
		Current Detailed, Realistic Plan	All Staff Trained to Policy/Plan	Specific Drills/ Exercises
1. Disturbance/riot				
2. Correctional facility fire or outside fire affecting your correctional facility				
3. Hostage incident				
4. Unaccounted incarcerated individual				
5. Adverse weather				
6. Staff job action				
7. Infectious disease/Epidemic				
8. Bomb/Explosion				
9. HazMat				
10. Terrorist incident				
11. Mass casualty incident (MCI) event				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

**Key:** I = impossible, U = highly unlikely, P = possible, L = likely, HazMat = hazardous materials

**Comments**

## II. Hazard Analysis Worksheet

- I. Complete the Hazard Analysis Worksheet:
  - a. Read the "Hazards" column. In the "Other" column, add any additional hazards specific to the facility.
  - b. Read across the Costs and Benefit columns.
  - c. Consider each listed Cost as it specifically relates to each hazard and assign it a rating of 1 (Low), 2 (Medium), or 3 (High).

**Note:** If you are unsure of the rating, err on the side of caution. It is better to overrate a hazard.

- II. Calculate the Total Hazard Score (THS):
  - a. Each hazard must have its own THS computed.
  - b. Add the costs together.
  - c. Subtract the benefits.
  - d. Divide by 5.
  - e. Round up at .5.
  - f. Fill in the Total Hazard Score column on the worksheet for each hazard.
- III. Convert the THS into the Risk Level:
  - a. Each specific hazard should have its own risk level assigned based on its THS.
  - b. Use the following key to determine the risk level for each hazard by finding the correct THS in the left-hand column, then matching it to the corresponding risk level in the right-hand column.
  - c. Fill in this information in the Risk Level column on the worksheet for each hazard.

## II. Hazard Analysis Worksheet (Continued)

## Special Population Groups Considerations

Emergency preparedness and plans must also consider the situations posed by populations within the correctional facility that have special circumstances. These could include medical needs; physical accommodation needs due to sight impairment, hearing impairment, or other limitations; mental health needs; and aged populations with mobility challenges. Furthermore, consideration must be given to incarcerated individuals housed in restrictive or special management units; protective custody populations; security threat groups; and any other situations that require special care and planning to protect the community, staff, and incarcerated individuals from harm other than the immediate emergency situation. Consider the following when developing emergency plans and practicing emergency responses.

Does the plan consider the following potential challenges for medical issues, mental health, age, and physical limitations?

- Populations that will need special physical accommodations for evacuation, housing, and transportation
- Physical barriers that restrict the ability to get to, into, around, and out of correctional facilities (including curbs, steps, stairways, narrow doorways, and aisles) and restrict the use of mobility devices such as canes, walkers, and wheelchairs
- Communication barriers that restrict access to signs, exit routes, lighting, sirens and alarms, public address systems, and communication devices such as phones and portable radios
- Cognitive, learning, and emotional barriers that restrict a person's ability to remain calm, solve problems, make quick decisions, and cope during an emergency
- Program barriers that restrict access to and participation in emergency and evacuation planning
- Transportation barriers that restrict access to appropriate, reliable, and accessible transportation, both public and private
- Security measures put in place following a disaster that can create barriers for people with special needs by
  - blocking areas, which prevents travel through or around a building
  - separating a person from their assistive device (wheelchair or cane), medical device (oxygen), or other required assistance
  - requiring a person with limited mobility to stand for a wand examination
- Facilities and processes identified to meet the needs of special populations in the event of relocation
- Practicing plans routinely to address the procedures necessary for these populations


Does the plan consider the following potential challenges for populations, including incarcerated individuals with PREA indicators, that need to be kept separate due to personal enemies or security threat group behaviors?

- Populations that will need special separation from other groups due to personal enemies or security threat group identification
- Populations within the correctional facility that will need special physical accommodations for evacuation, housing, or transportation

- Evacuation locations to segregate incarcerated individuals with enemies or those who have the potential of being a victim or aggressor
- Identification of evacuation locations and groups in advance and practice that includes managing the separation needs of special populations
- Routine practice of plans to address the procedures necessary for these populations

Does the plan consider the potential challenges for populations that are higher custody (maximum, close, death row) and are housed separately from the general population?

- Populations that will need special separation due to classification as predators or victims or who have histories of being predators or victims
- Separate area for evacuation, special transportation, or escort processes
- Tools such as flex cuffs to secure incarcerated individuals with potential threats during an evacuation or while they are in a relocated housing area
- Staffing plans to enhance the security necessary to ensure safe operations while evacuation, relocation, and housing are accomplished
- Process to review potential need for increased number of officers required to move higher custody populations
- Routine practice of plans to address the procedures necessary for these populations



## Section 2:

### Conducting an Audit



## Purpose of an Emergency Preparedness Audit

Conducting emergency preparedness audits of correctional facilities is important for a number of reasons. Some reasons are obvious, others subtle.

An audit validates a comprehensive emergency preparedness system. For a correctional facility, comprehensive readiness for crises, natural disasters, and major emergencies is no easy matter; it is a far-reaching effort that can take years to fully develop and can require large amounts of money, staff time, management attention, training, and other scarce resources. An audit specific to emergency preparedness makes a strong statement that all of the work undertaken to develop and maintain the emergency system has been intended, planned, reviewed, and coordinated.

Perhaps the most obvious reason for an audit is that it provides management with an objective assessment of the progress and status of the emergency system. Because a correctional facility's emergency system is necessarily large and multifaceted, nothing short of a systematic audit procedure will effectively evaluate the system. A correctional facility's emergency preparedness coordinator may be familiar with several substantial problems and may also have several initiatives awaiting funding or management commitment. However, the coordinator is inevitably too close to the system—too involved in the system and too familiar with what is in place—to serve as an independent evaluator. To varying degrees, the same will be true of the correctional facility's managers and emergency specialists, who may be quite familiar with its emergency preparedness and response capabilities. An objective and detailed audit process can surmount these limitations. For management, then, the emergency preparedness audit offers the opportunity to identify weaknesses, deficiencies, developing problems, areas of vulnerability, inconsistencies, topics for additional training, and simple mistakes in the correctional facility's emergency preparedness efforts.

The audit also provides an opportunity to evaluate or reevaluate resource allocation. For example, a correctional facility's CERT program may have become more and more expensive because of costs associated with increased training time and shooting practice, while its hostage negotiators have stopped training regularly and have not worked together for more than a year. It may be time for the correctional facility's administrators to revisit the priorities reflected in the allocation of their training resources. Such questions of resource allocation and relative priorities run throughout a comprehensive emergency system.

Relatively frequent audits can help the correctional leader identify tendencies toward complacency and “cutting corners” in critical practices. Audits can also offset the dangerous consequences of faster turnover in management and supervisory positions. Rapid turnover means a loss of knowledge and experience in important areas. Without regular audits, a correctional facility's policies and post orders may come to bear little resemblance to actual practice.

Another central purpose of an emergency preparedness audit is to verify compliance with standards and policies. Regardless of whether the standards or policies involved are at the departmental or correctional facility level, or whether the standards are external (e.g., from the American Correctional Association) or internal, the point is that the organization has adopted

them and expects them to be followed. Compliance with stated standards and policies goes hand in hand with accountability, which is essential to any management endeavor. However, even if a policy is well written, disseminated, discussed, and reinforced by training, compliance is not guaranteed. Although first-line supervisors generally carry the primary responsibility for day-to-day compliance with policies, and correctional facilities often need to reinforce an individual policy or check on how it is being followed, the best way to ensure compliance with policies, standards, and written procedures in a broad area such as emergency preparedness is to conduct an areawide audit.

An audit may also be an excellent staff development and training tool and increase staff awareness of crucial issues related to emergency preparedness. This function of the audit applies not only to the audit team members but to the correctional facility's staff at large. As the audit team reviews records, asks about emergency procedures, observes emergency responses, and focuses on the less visible aspects of emergency readiness, the correctional facility's staff receive the message clearly: management thinks emergency preparedness is important and is checking to see if things are as they should be. Inevitably, staff other than audit team members spot deficiencies as the audit progresses. In addition, when management takes corrective actions after reviewing audit findings, those actions are likely to have a greater influence because of the staff's heightened awareness of emergency issues. Further, employees who have not understood why some procedures were necessary for emergency preparedness may come to appreciate the rationale for those procedures. Finally, the audit offers the correctional facility's staff a chance to learn best practices with regard to emergency preparedness.

All of these reasons point to the same conclusion: An audit of a correctional facility's emergency preparedness system provides an opportunity to improve the system. That is the ultimate goal. If management does not subscribe to that goal, then there is little point to engaging in a vigorous, demanding, and detailed evaluation of the emergency system. (The same can be said of any kind of large-scale correctional facility audit, and this guide's focus on emergency preparedness in no way suggests that an audit in this area is more important than, or conceptually different from, a security audit or other kinds of major audits.)

## Philosophy

Protecting the community is the primary mission of all state DOCs and of the individual correctional facilities within those departments. An audit of emergency preparedness is entirely consistent with that mission. In fact, with the exception of some highly specific aspects of correctional facility operations such as perimeter security, one would be hard pressed to find an activity more closely related to protecting the public than evaluating correctional facilities' readiness to handle large-scale crises, natural disasters, and major emergencies.

Emergency preparedness audits involve philosophic considerations beyond a correctional facility's mission. If the correctional facility and the department are policy-driven organizations, then audit procedures necessarily will be philosophically consistent with that orientation. It also follows that in a personality-driven organization, or an organization that has no consistent orientation with regard to actual decision making, audit processes may be less helpful or even counterproductive.

More specifically, an audit should be a “win-win” approach to improving emergency preparedness. A correctional facility’s level of emergency readiness is what it is, and an audit should define current conditions and offer opportunities for improvement. However, if an audit becomes a kind of witch hunt (“who screwed up, and where and when?”), then it will not be a positive exercise. Worse, if administrators regard the audit as an opportunity to assign blame for the correctional facility’s shortcomings, then staff will be defensive and the audit results will almost certainly be inaccurate and incomplete. This point is critical: Sending the wrong message to staff about the purpose and philosophy of an emergency preparedness audit will invariably compromise the audit findings.

Similar considerations apply to the concept of “audit scores.” Some audits and audit procedures, such as audits of American Correctional Association standards, produce an overall numeric score for the correctional facility. Wardens and other administrators often speak proudly of such scores (“We got a 99.2%, and that is the highest score any correctional facility in our state has ever received”). For the emergency preparedness audits presented in this guide, however, such a view of scores would be meaningless or worse. Every staff member involved in these audits should understand from the outset that there is no acceptable overall score. The individual items in the self-audit checklists are not presented in any particular relationship to each other and are not of equal weight or value. In fact, different correctional facilities probably will place different weights and values on the items, and that is as it should be. Thus, an overall score or average rating is meaningless, and may be misleading or even dangerous.

Before an emergency preparedness audit begins, its underlying philosophy should be discussed and disseminated. That philosophy should include the following goals:

- To support the mission of the correctional facility in general and the correctional facility's emergency preparedness systems specifically
- To increase staff awareness of emergency preparedness and provide opportunities for staff development and training
- To provide management with rigorous, objective, detailed, professional assessments of the current status of the emergency preparedness system, with particular attention to unusual strengths and weaknesses
- To provide opportunities for recognition of innovation and excellence
- To strengthen the emergency preparedness relationship between local communities in the area of the correctional facility

## Preliminary Considerations

### Deciding to Audit

Using the self-audit materials in this guide to assess the emergency preparedness of a correctional facility will be demanding, and the results may be daunting—especially if the correctional facility has not previously placed high priority on emergency readiness. The intent of an audit is to measure the preparedness of the correctional facility for each portion or a portion of the correctional facility emergency plan. Before deciding to conduct an emergency preparedness self-audit, correctional facility leadership should first consider the implications and be ready to fully support the process, including the outcomes.

Correctional facility leadership should examine the following considerations before initiating an emergency preparedness audit:

- **What else is going on in the correctional facility?** If other activities are demanding large amounts of staff time, expecting an audit to proceed smoothly at the same time is unreasonable. The audits in this guide, though not extremely lengthy, should begin only when staff resources can be dedicated to the process. This includes staff doing the audit as well as staff who have information that is needed to facilitate the audit process.
- **What specific areas of emergency preparedness are going to be audited?** It may be that pending circumstances establish the need for a specific portion of the emergency plan to be audited. For example, prior to tornado or hurricane season, an audit of the severe weather emergency plan may necessary. The audit of emergency plans does not have to be all-inclusive.
- **How much time is to be dedicated to the preparedness audit?** This should be answered in terms of days.
- **Is there a need to ensure that each section of the emergency plan is audited for preparedness on an annual basis, a five-year basis, or another time frame?** Some portions of the emergency plan may deserve critical review more frequently than other portions.
- **Can audit team members focus exclusively on the process until it is completed?** Leadership must make the commitment that, barring some absolute emergency, the staff members assigned to the audit team will be free to complete the audit without interruption. This means avoiding the all-too-common practice of assigning staff to a project and then reassigning them before they complete the project. If leadership fails to honor its commitment of staff resources, a thorough and comprehensive audit effort will be compromised.
- **Is leadership committed to reviewing the audit findings?** Sometimes leadership tends to regard an audit as completed once the team has finished filling out the forms. The most important work in the audit process does not begin until the checklists have been completed. The single most important product of the audit process is leadership decision-making and plans of action. Audit findings must be shared, discussed, and analyzed, and a plan of corrective action must be developed that includes measurable milestones and timetables. Leaders must commit to participating in the review process. Before the audit begins, leaders must agree to the investment in the process; this

includes review of results, participating in the development of the corrective action plan, and monitoring completion through attendance at all review meetings.

## Who Should Conduct the Audit?

The audits in this guide are best performed by a team rather than by an individual. Once a team completes the general emergency preparedness audit, it may be acceptable for an individual, even the correctional facility's emergency preparedness coordinator, to conduct one or more of the specific audit sections (natural disasters and counterterrorism). However, all sections will be completed and discussed by a team.

It is not necessary that a correctional facility conduct all portions of the audit at one time. In fact, often it will be most productive to first complete the general emergency preparedness audit, identify the topics that deserve immediate attention, and then complete the remaining sections. The audit process is meant to serve the correctional facility rather than to have the correctional facility serve the audit. Further, some correctional facilities may not think certain sections such as the counterterrorism, cyberattack, or other special concern audits are a high priority, or even necessary. If so, it is critical to be able to articulate why a particular checklist is not considered necessary to the correctional facility.

Composition of the audit team is up to the leader of the correctional facility, who should consider the size, threats to emergency preparedness, and complexity of the potential findings.

Leadership should appoint one member as team leader in order to direct the process and present progress on a daily basis to the correctional facility leader or leadership team. If the correctional facility has an emergency preparedness coordinator, that individual may or may not be part of the team or serve as team leader. (Issues of ownership, defensiveness, ego, lack of perspective, and other potential conflicts are to be considered when determining the proper role for the emergency coordinator in the audit process.) The team leader must have sufficient rank or other status to have access to all relevant data and all areas of the correctional facility.

Including a member of the audit team from another correctional facility may provide an opportunity for those not working in the correctional facility daily to offer additional recommendations. This may not be practical, and it is not essential, but it does encourage differing perspectives and the sharing of information. At least one member of the team should be from the correctional facility's leadership or mid-management level. In general, team members should be chosen based on experience, credibility, knowledge of custody and security operations, ability to work as a team member and, to some extent, familiarity with emergency operations. Leadership should create an audit team composed of staff from various vantage points. It may be wise to avoid those that have responsibilities for emergency operations, such as CERT, armory, or negotiation. These subject matter experts (SMEs) will be critical to the audit process, but as sources of information and not necessarily as audit team members.

Audit team members should meet with the correctional facility's leadership team before beginning the audit. Members should clearly understand their recourse if they encounter serious resistance or other trouble as they conduct the audit(s). The goals and expectations of the audit process are shared during this initial meeting, along with communication processes should the team note concerns that deserve immediate attention. The team members should meet with the

correctional facility leader at the end of each day while the audit is in progress. They should also meet face-to-face with leadership as soon as they complete the self-audit checklists, before the leadership review meetings take place. During this pre-review meeting, the team gives top leadership an informal “read” on how the audit progressed, the most important conclusions, and any particularly surprising findings. It should be the verbal equivalent of a written “executive summary.”

## Standards for Auditors

As noted earlier, the self-audit checklists do not attempt to impose standards for emergency preparedness but rather provide criteria by which correctional facilities can measure their own preparedness. However, certain basic standards of conduct should guide the efforts of the audit team.

1. **Maintain confidentiality.** Audit findings and information are confidential, to be shared initially with the correctional facility’s top leadership only. How the findings are disseminated from that point should be determined by the administration of the correctional facility and the department.
2. **Be considerate.** To the extent possible, auditors should not interfere with the ongoing operation of the correctional facility. They should respect other staff responsibilities.
3. **Report dangerous situations.** If auditors encounter an imminent life-threatening condition or situation, they should report it immediately to the correctional facility leader.
4. **Be discreet.** When auditors find a problem or potential deficiency in an area, they should not explain it or point it out to staff in the area unless asked. However, if asked, audit team members should provide accurate, straightforward answers about what they are looking for and what they are finding. They should limit the information to the question asked and should not encourage discussion. If the issue is confidential (e.g., a plan for responding to an employee work stoppage or job action), the auditors should say that they are looking at a confidential matter and should provide no information.
5. **Be professional.** Auditors must not use their role, information, or findings to impress other staff or create dissension.
6. **Try not to single out individuals.** To the extent possible, auditors should not report in a way that singles out individual staff members. However, if the reported problem results from complacency, cutting corners, ignorance of policy, or other violations of sound practice or policy, auditors may have to cite specific people or posts in need of training or supervisory attention.
7. **Be ethical.** Auditors should not create artificial situations to detect deficiencies in practices (e.g., hide keys left lying around or tamper with documents to see how long the change goes unnoticed by staff). Instead, they should seek legitimate opportunities to evaluate practices (e.g., fire drills, emergency counts). There is an important difference between openly “testing” a policy or procedure (“Would you show me the insulin syringes so we can verify the count against the inventory balance in the log?”) and “setting up” staff (planting contraband to see if it is discovered). The former is good auditing; the latter is not.
8. **Audit rigorously.** Auditors should be rigorous and demanding. They do a disservice to the correctional facility if they assume something is acceptable without verification, gloss

over problems, or give the correctional facility a pass on an item they know to be deficient to some extent.

9. **Choose appropriate methods.** Direct observation of practices is the best way to audit individual items. Observation generally is a more reliable method than reviewing records and policies or interviewing staff and incarcerated individuals. It often is necessary to use both observation and documents to ensure that practice and policy are consistent.
10. **Maintain objectivity.** Auditors should maintain objectivity, professionalism, and perspective. No one is perfectly objective, but auditors should neither hope to find problems with almost everything nor hope for extremely positive findings. The easiest way to ensure objectivity is to focus on the evaluation criteria and not on personal preferences.
11. **Be a reporter, not an advocate.** The auditor's job is fact-finding, not decision-making. Top leadership decides what will be done concerning the audit findings. Although auditors can and should recommend and advise when they believe they have insight about a deficiency, their primary role is to present the facts as they found them. The audit team and its work product may lose credibility if top leadership perceives that auditors are advocating strongly for certain decisions and are heavily invested in what is done with the audit findings.

## Disclaimers

Before moving on to the specifics of how to use the self-audit materials in this guide, readers should be aware of some fundamental points about the nature of these materials and about correctional facility audits in general:

- This audit system does not represent advice from NIC about what a correctional facility's emergency system should or should not include. That is a decision for the correctional facility and its DOC or supervising agency.
- The self-audit checklists in this guide are not the only method for evaluating emergency preparedness in a correctional facility. One alternative is to retain consultants to perform such an analysis. Another is to conduct comprehensive critical incident reviews when serious situations occur.
- An emergency preparedness audit is not a security audit. The two types of audits should complement each other, but one cannot be substituted for the other. Both are extremely important undertakings in a correctional facility. Agencies in need of a security audit are encouraged to submit a technical assistance request to NIC here: <https://nicic.gov/how-can-nic-help/im-looking-technical-assistance-my-agency>.
- Some departments engage in policy audits, and many conduct their audits against some national or state set of correctional standards—most commonly, the American Correctional Association standards. Because such audits cover so many areas, they are not detailed or comprehensive with regard to emergency preparedness (or about the security of a correctional facility for that matter). A correctional facility may “pass” all of the emergency preparedness items on a national standards audit and yet be woefully unprepared for a large-scale crisis.
- Correctional facilities and agencies must be absolutely clear about what type of emergency preparedness audit they are conducting and must be equally clear in communicating this information to staff. Is it a policy audit, an operational audit of

practices, or both? If a correctional facility passes a policy audit, the staff may assume all is well when in fact the correctional facility has major problems with practices, procedures, and operations, which were not within the purview of the policy audit. Clarity about the purpose and scope of an audit is essential. The audit materials in this guide cover both policies and practices.

### **Audit Decisions at the Department Level**

If a state DOC simply mandates emergency preparedness audits at all correctional facilities in the state without first discussing the subject with correctional facility managers and giving them time to consider it, the audits will take place, but the timing may not be good, and the process may not be supported at the correctional facility level. An audit initiated by administrative decree from above is likely to produce resentment from facility-level leadership, and that resentment will be informally but effectively transmitted to correctional facility staff. As a result, the audit effort is unlikely to be a positive learning experience, and the results may be inaccurate and incomplete. Thus, it is prudent for department administrators to involve correctional facility leadership in the decision to conduct emergency preparedness audits statewide.

## **Audit Resources and Documents List**

The following resources and documents should be made available for the reviewing officials in preparation for an emergency preparedness program audit (self-audit, internal audit, external audit, accreditation).

1. All emergency and contingency plans as approved by the independent or identified authority (general, fire, riot, internal or external hostage situation, escape, mass evacuation, adverse weather, civil disturbance, work or food strike, transportation and escort system, pandemic, mass casualty, internal search, terrorist act, safe harbor, physical plant)
2. Signature sheets of all staff verifying their review of and annual training in all emergency and contingency plans
3. Documentation of annual review of the plans
4. Mitigation and response plans
5. Current staff roster, including date completed and name, current position, contact information, and chain of command
6. Current list of personnel possessing special skills (interpreters, ICS certified personnel, bus drivers, technical experts, and so forth)
7. Current rosters of members of all specialized emergency, crisis management, and support teams
8. Current training records of members of all specialized emergency and crisis management teams
9. Correctional facility blueprints
10. Breaching plans

11. Current list of outside agencies and public emergency services, business partners, vendors, contractors, and suppliers (food, water, supplies, transportation, and so forth)
12. Current Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) and Memorandums of Agreements (MOAs) with law enforcement, fire department, and other entities; and Mutual Aid Agreements (MAAs)
13. Equipment inventories relevant to emergency preparedness (munitions both lethal and less-than-lethal, hand cuffs, leg irons, handcuff covers, flex cuffs, riot shields, riot batons, chemical supplies, personal protective equipment, gas masks, SCBAs, first aid kits/crash carts, AEDs, fire extinguishers, and so forth)
14. Logistics inventories (mobile kitchens, sleeping cots, sleeping bags, tents, portable generators, portable lights, porta-potties, mobile towers, emergency patrol vehicles, and so forth)
15. External resources (County EMA, State EMA, Tribal EMA, Territorial EMA, and FEMA) contact list and capabilities
16. Mock exercise/tabletop exercise documentation dating back one year

## How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists

All managers who will be involved with the self-audit of emergency preparedness should read these instructions thoroughly before proceeding. (Some issues discussed in this section were raised in previous sections of the guide but bear repeating here.)

Note: The checklists are also available from NIC on the Web at [www.nicic.gov](http://www.nicic.gov).

## Overview

The intent of the self-audit checklists in this guide is to help a correctional facility or detention center evaluate its readiness to contend with a major emergency. The checklists are extensive, but they are not all-inclusive. They cannot cover every emergency preparedness-related issue and detail, and some of the issues and details that are not covered may be crucial for a particular correctional facility. The ultimate decision about what is important in emergency preparedness must be the province of each individual correctional facility.

Similarly, the fact that a correctional facility does not meet some of the criteria in the checklists does not necessarily mean that the correctional facility is wrong or in jeopardy. For example, if the correctional facility has thoughtfully decided not to purchase certain equipment or not to include certain policies or procedures, there may be an excellent reason for that decision. However, if the correctional facility has decided that certain criteria are important but has not complied with them, or if it simply has never considered some of the criteria, then the checklists may serve a useful purpose in stimulating corrective action or consideration of new possibilities.

The checklists in this guide can provide a framework for a thorough review of emergency preparedness. Before getting started, however, the correctional facility contemplating such a review should carefully consider the following points:

- If the self-audit is not going to be taken seriously and conducted rigorously, it probably should not be done at all. An audit that glosses over problems or fails to report

deficiencies can create an illusion of emergency preparedness and may be more dangerous than no assessment at all.

- The manner in which a correctional facility approaches the audit is most important. If top management expects a grade or scorecard from the audit, then that perspective will be transmitted to subordinate staff, and the audit process is unlikely to be productive. Management should emphasize that these are self-audits designed to help the correctional facility review highly important areas. The audits should be a source of ideas and constructive change, not criticism.
- If the audits are not done carefully and accurately, the results will be misleading. If auditors are unsure about an item, they should investigate it further or leave it blank. Guessing and assuming will defeat the purpose of the audit.
- Top management should schedule a meeting to review audit findings as soon as the audit team has completed the checklists. All appropriate administrators and managers should attend. During extensive field tests of the self-audit materials, review meetings were strongly correlated with the usefulness of the self-audit process to the correctional facility involved. Without such meetings, a department or correctional facility may never address the problems a careful self-audit can reveal.
- There will be redundancy in several areas, as there are multiple checklists that speak to the same concerns. It is important that those conducting the audits read through their checklists to become aware of redundancy, then ask appropriate questions and review documentation, so that they are only doing a task once. The audit lead should also be aware of all checklist items so that they may identify and coordinate checklists appropriately to ensure two auditors are not interviewing the same individuals or reviewing the same documents twice.

What will actually be needed to conduct a self-audit? Each of the audits will require two to four assigned staff (see “Who Should Conduct the Audit” above for staff qualifications). Auditors will require adequate, uninterrupted time to complete each checklist. They will need full access to all areas of the correctional facility, to staff who manage specialized functions in an emergency (e.g., the CERT leader and hostage negotiators), and to all relevant policies, procedures, and other written documents. (Access to all areas during all shifts is especially critical because, as stated earlier, it is more important to audit practices than to audit documents.) The self-audits will not require any specialized equipment or unusual resources.

## Directions

This section provides specific directions for beginning an audit, completing the audit checklists, and completing a noncompliance summary for each checklist. (Bold words are the actual terms the checklist and summary forms use to label spaces for entries.)

### Getting Started

1. The guide contains 47 assessment documents (self-audit checklists) for individual correctional facilities to use in assessing general emergency preparedness for natural disasters, hazmat situations, fire, terrorist threats, and other significant incidents. Each checklist is separate and freestanding. It is important to be sure you have the correct document.

2. Prior to conducting a self-audit, the correctional facility should ensure that any emergency response statute or expectation not covered by another audit is covered or added to the appropriate checklist. This can be done by reviewing recently revised or new policies, laws, and regulations.
3. Make as many photocopies of each checklist as needed. Retain the original, unmarked, for future reference and use.
4. Also make copies of the noncompliance summary sheet at the end of each checklist. Auditors complete this summary for use by management in reviewing the audit results. In field testing, auditors typically needed between 5 and 15 of the summary sheets for each checklist. A particular correctional facility may need fewer or more, depending on how many items are “partially met,” “not met,” or “not applicable” (see below). Note that the format of the summary sheet is the same for all checklists, but the title at the top is different for each to prevent confusion.
5. Have a copy of each checklist in a fillable PDF saved to a computer so that the summary sheets can be transcribed later. A member of the team may be assigned to do this work, or each team member may do their own.
6. One person should be in charge of the audit. That person need not conduct the entire audit alone but should direct and supervise every aspect of it. The person selected to lead the audit should be high enough in the organization to be aware of all necessary information. The selection should send the appropriate message to staff regarding the importance of the audit to the correctional facility.
7. Plan to conduct the audit without interruption, in a relatively short period of time. It should not take months to complete, and it should not stop while individual items are fixed or brought into compliance. However, as noted earlier, if the team discovers a life-threatening problem, it should report the situation to management immediately.
8. Audit team members should be polite as they are conducting the audit. They should explain their purpose clearly. Helping the staff feel at ease will encourage their participation promoting effective information gathering.
9. Before attempting to complete a checklist, read the Glossary of Terms in this guide. Every department has some unique terminology, and the same term may mean two different things in two different correctional facilities. Some ambiguity about terminology may be inevitable in these generic checklists, but the glossary should help to minimize this problem.

### Completing the Checklists

10. On the first page of the checklist, enter the correctional facility name, the audit team leader’s name, and the names of everyone on the team. Print the names.
11. Each item on the checklists has two blanks to be filled in: status and method. The items do not have to be taken in the order presented, but all items must be completed.
12. **Status.** For every item, enter a code in the status box: MC (“meets criterion”), PM (“partially meets criterion”), NM (“criterion not met”), or NA (“not applicable”). Choose just one status code for each item. Make no other entry in the status box.

*Determining status.* For some items, the distinction between MC and PM, for example, will be a difficult judgment call. In assigning status to items, try to be rigorous and consistent. Remember that an item checked MC probably will not be reviewed further.

Items checked with any of the other three status codes should, however, be subject to further discussion and review.

*Substitutes.* If the correctional facility does not have the specific item mentioned in the checklist but has something else that serves the same purpose, enter NM for that item rather than MC. The management review will determine whether what is in place is comparable to or better than what is specified in the checklist.

*Written policies.* Several checklist items ask for specific written policies. Do not check MC just because almost all staff understand something to be informal policy (even though it is not written) or just because a group of related items are scattered throughout procedural manuals (where they would be of little use during an emergency). The correctional facility may follow a particular procedure regularly, but if the checklist asks whether that procedure is “required by policy” and it is not part of written policy, then the status box should show NM.

13. **Method.** For every item, enter in the method box the code(s) for the method(s) used to determine status: OB (“observed”), DR (“document review”), SI (“staff interview”), III (“incarcerated individual interview”), or OT (“other”). You may enter more than one method. This is not like the status box, where only one entry is permissible. Enter all of the methods actually used. If you enter OT, specify the other method used.
14. **Comments.** Use this field to record notes about an item’s status or the audit process. Keep in mind that the noncompliance summary (see below) requires explanations for any items not coded MC. The comments field also provides extra space for describing “other” audit methods (OT entries in the method box).
15. When every item on a page has been completed, the audit leader should print his or her name at the bottom of the page and date it (unless another audit team member has completed all items on the page, in which case that team member should sign and date the page at the bottom).
16. **NC#.** When the entire checklist is complete, the audit team leader should fill in the NC# (noncompliance number) boxes at the far right of the form. The objective here is to create a numbered list of items subject to management review. Starting on the first page of the checklist, use the NC# boxes to number consecutively all items except those with the code MC.

### Summary of Noncompliance Items

17. At the end of each checklist is a page titled “Summary of Noncompliance Items.” The purpose of this summary is to list all items that did not fully meet criteria (i.e., all items coded PM, NM, or NA) and to explain the reasons for noncompliance. As noted above, management will use this summary in its review of the audit results. The audit team leader completes the first three columns of the summary. Entries should be transcribed to a word document or a fillable PDF. Handwritten documents used while conducting the self-audit should be retained as a supplement to the final document. The other columns are completed during the management review.
18. **Audit team leader.** Using as many copies of the summary page as necessary, list every item numbered in the NC# boxes in the checklist (i.e., every item not coded MC). First,

enter the **NC#** (entries should be in NC# order). Below the NC#, enter the **status** code and the **method** code. (Thus, for each noncompliance item, you will make three entries in the first column: NC#, status code, and method code.) Under **Item Description**, briefly summarize the item (as a convenience, so reviewers will not have to refer back to the checklist). Under **Reason for Noncompliance**, explain why the item was marked PM, NM, or NA. (Be brief, clear, and forthright. If there is no clear reason, leave the space blank. Do not invent an explanation.) At the top of each page, enter your name, the date the page was completed, and the page number.


19. **Management review.** Use the noncompliance summary to document management response for each noncompliance item. Under **Assigned To**, enter the name of the person assigned responsibility for bringing the item into compliance (leave blank until the item is reviewed and an assignment is made). Under **Due Date**, enter the date compliance is to be completed (enter a date only if the item has been assigned). The administrator responsible for reviewing the audit results should sign his or her name under **Approved By** and date the signature under **Approval Date** after he or she has reviewed and approved the corrective action. (Typically, the reviewer should not be a member of the audit team. Different administrators may review different items, or one administrator may review all items.) The responsible administrator should track the corrective action, requesting status updates as necessary to ensure the corrections are made timely.

### The Management Review Meeting: Translating Audit Results into Action

The management review meeting may be the most crucial element in the entire emergency audit process. If the meeting is not attended by the "right" people (the correctional facility's top managers) or if management's consideration of the audit results is superficial or defensive, the entire audit effort may be rendered useless. Consider an initial dialogue with executive management to address sensitive issues privately, especially those items the team might hesitate to discuss openly. This step ensures all concerns are aired without compromising the comfort level of any party.

For most correctional facilities, the management review process will be lengthy—two or more meetings may be required to complete the work. Management must be willing to consider policy and practices in detail. For any particular item, it may be tempting to conclude that "what we are doing is more than adequate." However, managers should never reach that decision without understanding why the audit instrument includes the criterion in question—i.e., specifically how the criterion relates to best practices in emergency preparedness and how the correctional facility's practices differ from the criterion.

As with so many other areas of corrections, there is no substitute for strong leadership in management reviews of emergency audit results. If the correctional facility's leadership is in and out of the review meeting and appears superficial, uninterested, or dismissive in responding to the audit team's findings, other staff will follow that lead and the results will be less than constructive. On the other hand, if the leader is clearly determined to translate audit results into action, other staff will be inspired to share that commitment.



## Section 3: General Self-Audit Checklists



## General Checklists

The ultimate goal of an audit of a correctional facility's emergency preparedness system is to provide an opportunity to improve the system. An audit makes a statement that all of the work undertaken to develop and maintain the emergency system has been intended, planned, reviewed, and coordinated. To that end, the following 27 checklists address general areas of concern for correctional facilities. They are not meant to be all-inclusive; audit teams that discover additional areas of concern are encouraged to use the Blank Checklist in Appendix A of this guide. See "How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists" beginning on page 27.

### I. General Considerations

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the correctional facility have an identified system of emergency preparation? Emergency response?				
B. Does the correctional facility have a statement of its objectives or goals in the event of a major emergency?				
C. Emergency Procedures C1. Definition: Does policy clearly establish the difference between a major emergency and a disruptive event not mandating an emergency response?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
C2. Are major emergencies categorized by type of emergency (e.g., natural disaster, fire, insurrection, walkout)?				
C3. Emergency Preparedness Coordinator  Does policy require the identification of an individual to serve as the emergency preparedness coordinator to ensure that all aspects of the emergency plans are routinely reviewed, practiced, and monitored for compliance?				
C4. Mutual Aid  Does policy require the correctional facility to maintain written mutual aid agreements with other corrections or law enforcement agencies?				
C5. Allied Agencies  C5a. Does policy require the correctional facility to maintain written interagency emergency agreements with civilian agencies such as fire departments, utility companies, and hospitals?				
C5b. Does policy specify who is in initial command of the correctional facility during an emergency?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
C5c. Does policy specify who is in ultimate (final) command of the correctional facility during an emergency?				
C5d. Does policy specify the correctional facility chain of command during an emergency?				
C5e. Does policy state any limitations on the authority of the person in command during an emergency?				
C5f. Does policy specify the process for change in command during an emergency?				
C6. Notifications				
C6a. Does policy specify that the correctional facility make notifications during a major emergency?				
C6b. Does policy specify who is to be notified during a major emergency?				
C6c. Does policy include a priority level or order in which those notifications will be made?				
C7. Physical Intervention				
C7a. Does policy differentiate between planned physical intervention and reactive physical intervention?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
C7b. If planned use of lethal force is determined necessary, does policy state who can authorize and under what conditions use such force? Does policy identify who is authorized to use the lethal force?				
C8. Public Information C8a. Does policy identify who at the correctional facility will manage response to and communication with the media during an emergency?				
C8b. Does policy indicate where media will be located during an emergency?				
C8c. Does policy specify who at the correctional facility has the responsibility to draft a media response for review, who reviews the media response, and who has the authority to release media responses during a major emergency?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
C8d. Does policy explain how media operations and releases will be coordinated between the correctional facility and other affected parties (local law enforcement, central office, other agencies) during an emergency?				
C8e. Is there an identified process for communicating with local citizens, staff families, and the families of incarcerated individuals during an emergency?				
C9. Training				
C9a. Does policy provide minimum requirements for emergency preparedness training for direct care staff?				
C9b. Does policy provide additional minimum requirements for emergency preparedness training for staff at shift command level and above?				

**Status:** **MC**—Meets Criterion; **PM**—Partially Met; **NM**—Not Met; **NA**—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** **OB** - Observed; **DR** - Document Review; **SI** - Staff Interview; **II** - Incarcerated Individual Interview; **OT** - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
C9c. Does policy provide minimum requirements for emergency preparedness training (including specialized training for hostage situations and emergency response) for identified responders and other staff specialists such as public information officers, negotiators, business office/fiscal staff, and physical plant specialists?				
C9d. Does policy specify emergency preparedness training standards and drills (such as for fire evacuation or tornado safety) for incarcerated individuals?				
C10. Deviation from Policy C10a. Does policy identify which individuals have the authority to deviate from policy and require documentation of reason for deviation in an emergency?				
C10b. Does policy outline the responsibilities of staff if they are ordered to deviate from policy in an emergency?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
C11. Evacuation C11a. Does policy establish detailed plans for an offsite (out-of-compound) total evacuation in the event of a situation requiring total relocation?				
C11b. Does policy detail offsite alternatives for services such as medical, food, and supplies?				
C11c. Does policy establish detailed plans for an onsite (out-of-buildings) relocation or temporary service alternatives for housing, food, medical, or other required service in the event of the temporary unavailability of a building?				
C12. Hostage Incidents C12a. Does policy specify that persons taken hostage have no rank or authority and that staff will not comply with orders from a person held hostage?				
C12b. Does policy provide a statement listing nonnegotiable items?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
C12c. Does policy outline a process for identifying hostage negotiators, emergency responders, and training requirements related to hostage incidents?				
C13. Employee Job Action  C13a. Does policy require the correctional facility to maintain a plan (or an appendix to a generic emergency plan) for responding to a strike or other employee job action (e.g., "blue flu")?				
C13b. Does policy require the correctional facility to plan for employee job actions confidentially and to distribute the restricted plan only to a designated group of top managers?				
C14. Counterterrorism  C14a. Does policy specify command and coordination with local law enforcement, the local health department, state police, the state emergency management agency, the FBI, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
C14b. Does policy specify which agencies to notify during a terrorism event?				
C15. Incident Command System (ICS)/National Incident Management Systems (NIMS)  Does policy require the correctional facility to maintain compliance with ICS/NIMS or similar level of nationally recognized training or certification?				
D. Emergency Tests/Drills				
D1. Does policy state the frequency that the correctional facility must conduct emergency tests/drills?				
D2. If yes, has the standard been met during the past 12 months?				
D3. Does policy require that the correctional facility conduct tests/drills on evenings, weekends, and on all shifts?				
D4. Does the correctional facility conduct unannounced drills (for fire or severe weather) in which incarcerated individuals are actually evacuated or relocated, even if on a very limited basis?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** **MC**—Meets Criterion; **PM**—Partially Met; **NM**—Not Met; **NA**—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** **OB** - Observed; **DR** - Document Review; **SI** - Staff Interview; **II** - Incarcerated Individual Interview; **OT** - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## II. Prevention of Major Emergencies

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Management Philosophy				
A1. Is prevention of major emergencies stressed at management meetings?				
A2. Do managers consistently review prevention issues with subordinates?				
A3. Do command staff regularly meet and discuss current threats to the correctional facility and the area and take steps towards prevention and mitigation of those threats?				
A4. Are the findings of those meetings shared throughout the staff levels?				
A5. Are staff members that are assigned in booking and cell areas trained to look for signs of gang affiliation or sovereign citizens?				
A6. Does command staff monitor staff/incarcerated individual communication issues?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A7. Does management aggressively monitor events/incidents in the correctional facility that may indicate the “tone” (climate) of the correctional facility?				
A8. Does each correctional facility have command staff personnel that visit and review all areas of the correctional facility at least twice per month on all shifts?				
A9. Are visits by correctional facility command staff to various areas of the correctional facility documented?				
B. Are all staff trained to recognize the traditional signs of impending trouble, such as stockpiling commissary items or more racial grouping than usual?				
C. Does the correctional facility use a critical indicator system (i.e., a statistical charting of trends on incarcerated individuals' grievances, assaults, and so forth)?				
D. Is there a correctional facility-wide formalized intelligence function (as distinguished from security threat group operations or correctional facility intelligence investigations units)?				
E. Classification E1. Is there an objective classification system for incarcerated individuals?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
E2. Is the classification system followed rigorously?				
E3. Is there a system that identifies and manages high-risk incarcerated individuals (escape risks, racists, violent psychotics, assault risks, members of security threat groups, and so forth)?				
E4. Is there an intelligence file containing the names and pictures of incarcerated individuals likely to plan serious violence or become leaders during an insurrection?				
E5. Are incarcerated individuals continually monitored and classification changes evaluated based on criteria that include incarcerated individuals' behavior and adjustment to the correctional facility?				
F. Security				
F1. Does the correctional facility do random urinalysis testing of incarcerated individuals for illegal drugs?				
F2. Is there another specified drug interdiction program apart from urinalysis testing?				
F3. Does the correctional facility define contraband?				
F4. Does the correctional facility perform cell searches for contraband?				
F5. Are these searches done randomly and regularly to enhance the security of the correctional facility?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
F6. Are these searches documented, and are the results published monthly or quarterly?				
F7. Is there a minimum standard for the number of random cell searches performed in a given time period?				
F8. Has that cell search standard been met during the last 12 months?				
F9. Is there a list of all items seized in a specified amount of time that can be used for training purposes?				
F10. Does the correctional facility perform random security inspections of cells (bars, locks, vents, and so forth)?				
F11. Is there a minimum standard for the number of random security inspections of cells performed in a given time period?				
F12. Has that cell security inspection standard been met during the last 12 months?				
F13. Is there a log for the correctional facility or for each area that lists all random security inspections?				
F14. Are day-to-day security issues monitored closely and regularly by managers and supervisors?				
F15. Are supervisors and managers required to file written reports regularly evaluating security practices?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
F16. Are staff held accountable for security lapses through the use of corrective actions, remedial training, counseling, or discipline?				
F17. Is security equipment organized and maintained in good working order as well as inventoried and inspected?				
F18. Are there inspections of the internal and external areas of each housing unit on a daily basis?				
F19. Are such daily housing unit inspections logged or otherwise documented?				
F20. Is there a standard specifying the frequency of inspections of the perimeter security checks, vehicle and pedestrian entrances, gates, sallyports, visiting areas, control centers, and administration areas?				
F21. Are all of those security inspections logged or otherwise documented?				
F22. If there is such a standard (item 20 above), has the correctional facility met that standard for the last 12 months?				
F23. Is there a security inspection or review of tool control and key control at least monthly, and are such inspections or reviews documented? Is there a list of prohibited items that officers may not possess in the housing unit?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
G. Grievance System for Incarcerated Individuals				
G1. Is there a grievance system for incarcerated individuals?				
G2. Is this grievance system shared with incarcerated individuals with details on how to use the system?				
G3. Has the grievance system been certified or reviewed and approved by an outside agency such as the U.S. Department of Justice or the courts?				
G4. Does management stress the importance of treating the grievances of all incarcerated individuals seriously and confidentially?				
G5. Does management regularly review the substance of the grievances filed by incarcerated individuals?				
G6. Is there a monthly summary of all grievances, including subject, area of the correctional facility, and numbers substantiated and unsubstantiated (or determined to be unfounded)?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

### III. Correctional Facility Emergency Plans

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the correctional facility oversight component require correctional facility emergency plans to be written in a standardized format?				
B. Is there a requirement for all management staff to review the emergency plan and certify compliance quarterly? Has this been done?				
C. Is a resource typing list available for all of the resources the correctional facility expects to have available during an emergency, including facility-provided and mutual aid resources? Note: If the correctional facility expects to recover costs after an incident, this information will be needed.				
D. Does the correctional facility oversight component have a formal approval procedure for correctional facility emergency plans?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
E. Does the approval procedure for correctional facility emergency plans include a requirement that a manager from the oversight component review and approve each correctional facility emergency plan?				
F. Does the correctional facility have a single, comprehensive emergency plan (versus individual plans for various emergencies)?				
G. Did the correctional facility emergency plan go through a formal approval procedure, and is the plan signed and dated on a set schedule?				
H. Has the correctional facility emergency plan been formally reviewed during the preceding 12 months?				
I. Does the plan include a distribution list showing locations and individuals who have copies of the plan?				
J. Is each copy of the plan identified by a unique number or letter, and is there an inventory system for the copies?				
K. Does the emergency plan include a procedure for documenting changes and updates to the plan?				
L. Checklists L1. Does the plan include an initial response (command and control) checklist?				
L2. Does the plan include procedures for specific types of emergencies?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
L3. Does the plan include job-specific checklists to be used during emergencies (emergency post orders)?				
L4. Does the plan include a deactivation checklist?				
L5. Is the correctional facility emergency plan tailored to that specific correctional facility? Are correctional facility emergency plans checklist-driven?				
L6. Do the emergency plans include an initial response (command and control) checklist?				
L7. Does the emergency plan include procedures and checklists for specific types of emergencies, including disturbances, hostage situations, fire, natural disasters, adverse weather, and so on?				
L8. Does the plan include procedures and a checklist for the aftermath of a major emergency such as incident command post deactivation?				
M. Are the correctional facility's emergency plans Incident Command System (ICS)-relevant?				
M1. Do the emergency plans specify interagency responsibilities?				
M2. Do the emergency plans specify staff recall procedures?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
M3. Are copies of the correctional facility plot plans or blueprints kept in the correctional facility Incident Command Post (ICP), and are they readily available?				
M4. Do the emergency plans include provisions for dealing with injured staff, staff held hostage, and their families during and after an emergency?				
M5. Do the emergency plans include provisions for operating medical and food service functions during an emergency?				
M6. Do the emergency plans specify the primary location for an Incident Command Post (ICP), Joint Information Center (JIC), and so forth?				
N. Do the emergency plans include procedures for emergency lockdowns and emergency counts?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## IV. Staff Specialists

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Tactical teams				
A1. Does the correctional facility have its own correctional emergency response team (CERT)/tactical team trained to respond to emergency situations?				
A2. If the correctional facility does not have its own CERT/tactical team, have clear, detailed, written arrangements/MOUs been made with an external tactical team?				
A3. Are the CERT/tactical team's structure and minimum size specified in writing?				
A4. Is the CERT/tactical team currently at or above minimum strength?				
A5. Is the CERT/tactical team currently in compliance with its written minimum training standards?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A6. Does the CERT/tactical team include an individual with medical training, such as a nurse or emergency medical technician (EMT), and a video operator?				
A7. Are there specified standards and does the CERT/tactical team's equipment currently meet specified standards?				
A8. Does the CERT/tactical team train with the correctional facility's command-level staff and negotiators?				
A9. Does the CERT/tactical team practice with a wide variety of scenarios?				
A10. Are CERT/tactical team members available by cell phone or emergency notification system?				
A11. Does the CERT/tactical team include snipers?				
A12. Are the team members' leave and vacation schedules coordinated to ensure maximum team availability?				
<b>B. Disturbance Control</b>				
B1. Does the correctional facility have a disturbance control team?				
B2. If the correctional facility does not have its own disturbance control team, have clear, detailed, written arrangements (MOAs/MOUs/MAAs) been made with an external disturbance control team?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
B3. Are the disturbance control team's structure and minimum size specified in writing, and is the team currently at minimum strength?				
B4. Are the minimum training standards for the disturbance control team specified in writing, and is the team currently in compliance?				
B5. Does the disturbance control team include an individual with medical training, such as a nurse or emergency medical technician (EMT), and a video operator?				
B6. Does the disturbance control team's equipment currently meet minimum written standards?				
B7. Are all team members current with chemical agents and other physical intervention training?				
C. Hostage Negotiators				
C1. Does the correctional facility have its own trained negotiators?				
C2. If not, does the correctional facility have detailed written arrangements (MOAs/MOU) with external negotiators who would be used in an emergency?				

**Status:** **MC**—Meets Criterion; **PM**—Partially Met; **NM**—Not Met; **NA**—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** **OB** - Observed; **DR** - Document Review; **SI** - Staff Interview; **III** - Incarcerated Individual Interview; **OT** - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
C3. If the correctional facility relies on external negotiators, do the arrangements guarantee the availability of the negotiators to service the correctional facility on a 24-hour basis and with an acceptable response time?				
C4. Are there an identified chief negotiator, assistant chief negotiator, and a specified number of negotiators?				
C5. Are there minimum standards for initial and refresher training for negotiators, and are all negotiators currently in compliance?				
C6. Is the working structure of the negotiating team specified in writing?				
C7. Do the negotiators have a portable audiotape recorder, throw phone, and preprinted negotiation log forms?				
C8. Do the negotiators train with the correctional facility's command-level staff and with the tactical team?				
D. Public Information Officer (PIO)				
D1. Does the correctional facility have an identified PIO?				
D2. Is there at least one alternate or assistant PIO?				
D3. Are minimum training standards specified for the PIO, and are they met?				
D4. Are there clear lines of authority on the release of information to media and to interested parties?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
D5. Is there a procedure for logging and returning media phone calls in an emergency?				
D6. Is there an identified site either on property or in a nearby location for media to gather, hold briefings, and hold press conferences when needed?				
D7. Are there procedures to establish a toll-free information line during an extended emergency to inform correctional facility employees and family members of incarcerated individuals?				
D8. Is the required equipment available for the identified media center during an emergency event (podium, easel, microphone and sound system, departmental seal, phone jacks, and so forth)?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## V. Training

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Do new security staff receive a minimum of eight hours of training on the emergency plan and procedures during their initial field training?				
B. How often is the training given, and how often is it updated?				
C. Have drills been documented and after-action reports completed?				
D. Have revisions to the existing plan been made based on information gathered from drills?				
E. Has the correctional facility contacted and involved other responders, such as police, fire, and emergency management, in their training?				
F. Does the correctional facility have mutual aid agreements with other agencies to assist with training and preparation for emergencies?				
G. Have staff completed <i>IS-100: Introduction to Incident Command System, ICS 100</i> ?				
H. Have staff completed <i>IS-200: Basic Incident Command System for Initial Response, ICS-200</i> ?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
I. Have staff completed <i>IS-700: An Introduction to the National Incident Management System?</i>				
J. Have staff completed <i>IS-800: National Response Framework, An Introduction?</i>				
K. Does training include hostage situations, riots, disasters, and other emergencies, as well as other incidents that are included in your risk assessment?				
L. Do new civilian (non-security) staff receive a minimum of four hours of training on the correctional facility's emergency plan and on emergency preparedness?				
M. Have all correctional facility staff at the level of shift commander and above received at least 20 hours of formal training on emergency preparedness?				
N. Have all correctional facility staff at the level of shift commander and above participated in emergency preparedness exercises and drills?				
O. Have mid-level supervisors been involved in training and drills?				
P. Have all correctional facility staff received at least four hours of training on emergency situations during the last two years?				
Q. Is this training on a recurring basis?				
R. Have tabletop exercises been conducted on a quarterly basis to test staff members' response while using the emergency plan?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
S. Has the correctional facility used role-players to conduct small-scale exercises after tabletops to test the staff and the plan?				
T. Has the correctional facility conducted emergency exercises or simulations during the last year that involved external (mutual aid) agencies?				
U. How often is (1) the plan practiced, (2) are staff drilled, and (3) exercises and after-action reports reviewed, with plan revision?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## VI. Emergency Equipment

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Is there a secure armory for storage of firearms, ammunition, less lethal munitions, and chemical agents?				
B. Is access to the armory strictly controlled and monitored?				
C. Is the armory on-site or off-site?				
D. If the armory is off-site, what is the response time of weapons to the correctional facility?				
E. Is there a comprehensive inventory of all emergency equipment?				
E1. Is such an inventory available to the command post (CP) at the time of an incident?				
E2. Is the emergency equipment inventory current within the last six months?				
E3. Does the inventory include the location of each item?				
E4. Does the inventory include shelf life/expiration dates of chemical munitions and less lethal munitions?				
E5. Is emergency equipment stored in an area accessible to staff?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
E6. Is emergency equipment secured to prevent access by incarcerated individuals?				
E7. Is there an emergency equipment testing program to ensure that all equipment is serviceable and ready for use when needed?				
F. Is there a comprehensive motor vehicle inventory for the correctional facility?				
F1. Is such an inventory readily available to the ICP?				
F2. Is the vehicle inventory updated for accuracy at least quarterly?				
F3. Are the vehicles accessible after business hours?				
F4. Is vehicle fuel available after business hours?				
G. Armory				
G1. Are there written policies and procedures for the armory?				
G2. Does policy or departmental regulation specify all approved types of weaponry, chemical agents, ammunition, and other defensive equipment?				
G3. Does policy or departmental regulation specify minimum quantities of all such weaponry, chemical agents, and other defensive equipment?				
G4. Is the armory currently in compliance with these policies and procedures?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
G5. Is the armory secure from incarcerated individuals in the event of a riot?				
G6. Are armory keys restricted from areas that incarcerated individuals have access to?				
G7. Do on-duty staff have immediate 24-hour access to the armory?				
G8. Is the armory inventoried at least quarterly or after each training where items are used, reducing on-hand inventory?				
G9. Are discrepancies in the armory inventory investigated and reconciled?				
G10. Is the armory inventory reviewed by correctional facility management?				
G11. Is the armory inspected by a correctional facility management-level staff member at least quarterly?				
G12. Is ammunition replenished after training?				
G13. Is duty ammunition replaced at least once per year?				
G14. Is there a written procedure for checking out weapons, less lethal munitions, chemical munitions, and other armory equipment?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
G15. Is there a procedure to ensure that an individual staff member is currently qualified in firearm or chemical agent use prior to issuing a firearm or chemical agent to that individual (except for training or qualification purposes)?				
G16. Chemical Agents G16a. Are there sufficient chemical agents to control a large riot at the correctional facility?				
G16b. Are pyrotechnic, blast, barrier, and aerosol formats available in both projectile and throwing grenade types?				
G16c. Are all chemical agents clearly dated?				
G16d. Are all chemical agents (except those for training use) within manufacturers' shelf life?				
G16e. Are those chemical agents designated for training use clearly labeled and separately stored as such to differentiate them from the general inventory of chemical agents?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
G16f. Has the department specified a minimum number or percentage of security staff who must be currently qualified in the use of chemical agents, and is the correctional facility in compliance with that requirement?				
G16g. Is there a policy requiring immediate medical screening and treatment for incarcerated individuals and staff who have been exposed to chemical agents?				
G16h. Are chemical agents stored in a secure location?				
G16i. Do duty staff have immediate 24-hour access to stored chemical agents?				
G17. Firearms G17a. Considering the size and nature of the correctional facility, is there an adequate supply of firearms?				
G17b. Are the types of firearms and ammunition appropriate for the nature of the correctional facility and for the location and function of armed posts at the correctional facility?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
G17c. Are all firearms cleaned, inspected, tested, and sighted on a regular schedule?				
G17d. Has the department specified a minimum number or percentage of security staff who must be currently qualified in the use of firearms, and is the correctional facility in compliance with that requirement?				
G17e. Are firearms-certified personnel distributed on each shift to ensure ready access and response?				
G17f. Do duty staff have immediate 24-hour access to stored firearms?				
H. Does the correctional facility's emergency equipment include the following?				
H1. An adequate supply of flex cuffs (four times the entire incarcerated individual population)				
H2. An adequate supply of metal handcuffs, waist chains, and leg irons				
H3. A supply of binoculars				
H4. A supply of flashlights and batteries				
H5. Distraction devices (flash-bang grenades)				
H6. Bomb blanket				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
H7. Long-handled corner (90-degree) mirror				
H8. Loud hailers				
H9. High-visibility clothing (for example, fluorescent vests)				
H10. Portable smoke ejectors				
H11. Portable emergency generator/fuel supply				
H12. Portable lighting				
H13. High-speed cutting torch				
H14. Bolt cutters				
H15. Radio with a tactical channel				
H16. An adequate supply of riot shields				
H17. An adequate supply of helmets with face shields				
H18. An adequate supply of riot batons				
H19. An adequate supply of potable water (48 - 72 hours)				
H20. Fire axes/forcible entry tools				
H21. An adequate supply of gas masks				
H22. Stun shields or tasers				
I. Emergency Keys				
I1. Are there emergency key rings for all buildings and areas of the correctional facility?				
I2. Is there a set of emergency keys outside the perimeter of the correctional facility?				
I3. Are emergency keys and locks color coded for quick identification (red for fire, for example)?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
I4. Are emergency keys and locks notched for night identification?				
I5. Are emergency key rings soldered or welded closed to prevent unauthorized removal of keys?				
I6. Do emergency key rings include a metal ring disk ("chit") stamped with (1) the name of area the ring accesses and (2) the number of keys on that ring?				
I7. Have all emergency keys and locks been tested in the last 12 months?				
J. Emergency Generators				
J1. Is there an emergency generator?				
J2. Is the emergency generator adequate to run critical areas of the correctional facility and critical equipment safely for 24 hours?				
J3. Are the critical areas and equipment powered by the emergency generator documented and annually tested to confirm that power is adequate?				
J4. Is the emergency generator secure from sabotage from incarcerated individuals?				
J5. Are staff trained to know which systems will be run on emergency power and which will be inoperable during a main power outage?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
J6. Are staff trained to run a manual system of record keeping if information technology services are down?				
J7. Is there battery-powered lighting in the emergency generator areas?				
J8. Are the emergency generators full-load tested for 10 minutes or more at least quarterly to determine that they are in proper working order, and are such tests documented?				
J9. Do all emergency generators have sufficient fuel to run for a minimum of 72 hours continuously?				
J10. Are generators in a location where refueling can be performed?				
J11. If the emergency generators must be started manually in the event of a main power outage, are there staff on duty on a 24-hour basis who are trained to start and operate those generators?				
J12. Is the diesel fuel for the emergency generators checked for mold on a regular basis?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## VII. Role of Central Office in Emergencies

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the department's central office have its own emergency plan for a correctional facility emergency?				
B. Are interagency responsibilities detailed in the plan?				
C. Does the emergency plan include a public information plan?				
D. Does the emergency plan include a resource allocation plan?				
E. Does the plan specify how the central office will communicate with unaffected correctional facilities during the emergency (if the department has multiple correctional facilities)?				
F. Does the plan outline responsibilities for communicating with the county executive/mayor's office, the board of commissioners/supervisors, or the governor's office/legislature (if a correctional facility)?				
G. Does the plan include a duty officer system or other 24-hour operation and notification method?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
H. Does the plan outline roles and responsibilities for various individuals in the central office?				
I. Emergency Operations Center (EOC)				
I1. Does the sheriff's command staff or the central office plan call for establishing an EOC during an emergency?				
I2. Is the location of the EOC specified?				
I3. Is the EOC equipped with an adequate number of telephones, radio communication devices, computers with internet access, and an open phone lines with the correctional facility?				
I4. Are current emergency plans and diagrams for each correctional facility available in the EOC?				
I5. Does the EOC have broadcast and cable television, an AM/FM radio, and a video recorder?				
I6. Does the plan outline EOC security procedures?				
I7. Is the EOC large enough for the number of individuals necessary to staff it?				
I8. Are other first responders to the event a part of your EOC?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## VIII. Emergency System Review

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Audit Procedure				.
A1. Is there a departmentally specified procedure for auditing each correctional facility's emergency system?				
A2. Does the correctional facility conduct an annual review or audit of its emergency preparedness system?				
A3. Does the review or audit team include individuals from outside the correctional facility?				
B. Emergency Tests/Drills				
B1. Is there a standard for how often the correctional facility must run emergency tests/drills?				
B2. If yes, has that standard been met during the last 12 months?				
B3. Are monitors always assigned to evaluate emergency tests/drills?				
B4. Are monitors and evaluators trained and authorized to stop an emergency exercise, drill, or simulation in the event of a safety or security problem?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
B5. Are monitors trained to evaluate tests/drills and provide both verbal and written assessment?				
B6. Do policies or procedures require monitors and evaluators to debrief staff involved in drills and exercises, pointing out strengths and weaknesses observed?				
B7. Are monitors required to provide written evaluations of every test or drill with recommendations?				
B8. Are the monitors' evaluations and recommendations of emergency tests/drills routinely reviewed and approved by someone in authority?				
B9. Does policy require that some emergency tests/drills be conducted on evenings and weekends and on all shifts?				
B10. Is there a requirement that emergency tests/drills be based on a wide variety of emergency scenarios and based on the risk assessment?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## IX. Risk Assessment

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the correctional facility's emergency plan require an annual risk assessment?				
B. Are executive staff and emergency specialists required to review the annual risk assessment?				
C. Is the section on risk assessment specific to that correctional facility?				
D. Does the risk assessment include identification of those emergencies judged most likely to occur at that correctional facility?				
E. Does the risk assessment identify correctional facility "hot spots"?				
F. Does the risk assessment include evaluation of the security of control centers, armory, emergency generators, perimeters, information technology systems, and other critical points?				
G. Does the risk assessment include provisions for mitigating those risks that could be reasonably reduced?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
H. Does the risk assessment include an evaluation of changes either current or forecast in the incarcerated population and how those changes potentially affect risk and vulnerability?				
I. Does the risk assessment involve other stakeholders, such as fire and emergency management, for their unique input?				
The charts that follow are guides to help you assess the potential effects of an emergency on the correctional facility.				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

**I. Are You Prepared?**

For each type of crisis or emergency listed in the table below, rate how likely your correctional facility is to face that situation in the next 10 years: impossible (I), highly unlikely (U), possible (P), or likely (L). For each situation you ranked *possible* or *likely*, fill in the remaining three columns about your degree of preparation for that type of emergency with *Yes* or *No*. (For situations you rated *impossible* or *highly unlikely*, go no further.) For each *No* answer, add comments in the box below the chart.

Event	Likelihood (I, U, P, L)	Level of Preparation		
		Current Detailed, Realistic Plan	All Staff Trained to Policy/Plan	Specific Drills/ Exercises
1. Disturbance/Riot				
2. Correctional facility fire or outside fire affecting your correctional facility				
3. Hostage incident				
4. Unaccounted incarcerated individual				
5. Adverse weather				
6. Staff job action				
7. Infectious Disease/Epidemic				
8. Bomb/Explosion				
9. Hazardous materials				
10. Terrorist incident				
11. Mass casualty incident (MCI) event				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

**Key:** I = impossible, U = highly unlikely, P = possible, L = likely

**Comments**

## II. Hazard Analysis Worksheet

- I. Complete the Hazard Analysis Worksheet
  - a. Read the "Hazards" column. In the "Other" column, add any additional hazards specific to the facility.
  - b. Read across the Costs and Benefit columns.
  - c. Consider each listed Cost as it specifically relates to each hazard, and assign it a rating of 1 (Low), 2 (Medium), or 3 (High).
- Note:** If you are unsure of the rating, err on the side of caution. It is better to overrate a hazard.
- II. Calculate the Total Hazard Score (THS)
  - a. Each specific hazard must have its own THS computed.
  - b. Add the Costs together.
  - c. Subtract the Benefits.
  - d. Divide by 5.
  - e. Round up at .5.
  - f. Fill in the Total Hazard Score column on the Worksheet for each hazard.
- III. Convert the THS into the Risk Level
  - a. Each specific hazard should have its own risk level assigned based on its individual THS.
  - b. Use the following key to determine the risk level for each hazard by finding the correct THS in the left-hand column, then matching it to the corresponding risk level in the right-hand column.
  - c. Fill in this information in the Risk Level column on the worksheet for each hazard.

**II. Hazard Analysis Worksheet (Continued)**

Total Hazard Score	Risk Level	Risk of Occurrence	Severity of Occurrence	Estimated Effect on Staff	Estimated Effect on Community	Estimated Effect on Supplies	Estimated Effect on Outside Assistance	Estimated Replacement Costs	Risk Level
1	Low								
2	Medium								
3	High								
<b>Hazards</b>									
<b>Health-Driven</b>									
Infectious Disease									
Chemical/Biological/Radiological									
Epidemic/Pandemic									
<b>Non-Health-Driven</b>									
Bomb Threat									
Flooding									
Explosion									
Facility Fire									
Power Outage/Loss of Utility (electric/water/gas)									
Lockdown Scenario									
Mass Casualty Incident (MCI)									
Staff Shortage									
Termination of Vital Services									
<b>Weather/Natural Disaster</b>									
Tornado/Wind Damage									
Hurricane									
Earthquake									
Flood									
Wildfire									
Winter Storm									
Volcanic Eruption									
Tsunami									
<b>Other</b>									

## X. Preparation

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Emergency Notifications				
A1. Are home phone and cell phone numbers of department heads and correctional facility leaders immediately available in the initial command post?				
A2. Are home phone and cell phone numbers available for staff specialists (public information officers, negotiators, and so forth)?				
A3. Are home phone and cell phone numbers available for local law enforcement leaders, as well as other emergency responders external to the correctional facility?				
A4. Are the general staff recall phone procedures organized by geographic proximity to the correctional facility?				
A5. Is there a procedure for who is called first in the roster—i.e., those who live greater distances away first to reduce response time, or those who reside closer to ensure quicker response?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A6. Are staff emergency notification lists (next of kin) updated annually?				
A7. Is there a requirement that staff update changes in contact information with the correctional facility?				
A8. Are special ID cards used to expedite entry of outside emergency personnel?				
A9. Is there a system in place to minimize the number of calls the control center must make in an emergency (e.g., phone trees)?				
A10. Are there phone lines that can be restricted to outgoing calls in the event of an emergency?				
B. Plot Plans				
B1. Are plot plans/blueprints for every area of the correctional facility available in the command post?				
B2. Do plot plans show the location and type of all emergency utility cutoffs (electric, water, gas, oil, and so forth)?				
B3. Do plot plans show all fire extinguishers, standpipes, fire hose locations, and secondary fire access doors?				
B4. Does the correctional facility have current video of all areas showing entry, egress, windows, door operation, and floor layout? Are these videos available in the Incident Command Post (ICP) area or adjacent to the ICP for monitoring?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
B5. Is there a mechanism to update emergency plot plans if the correctional facility is modified or renovated?				
C. Physical Plant Items				
C1. Can all pay phones for incarcerated individuals and/or outside phones be disabled quickly in an emergency?				
C2. Can staff quickly disable access to television for incarcerated individuals?				
C3. Are all roofs painted with numbers or letters for helicopter identification?				
C4. Are all buildings labeled with large letters or numbers on at least two sides for immediate identification by responders?				
C5. Are ports for deployment of chemical agents available and labelled with fluorescent identification on buildings?				
C6. Are control room, mechanical rooms, and other security sensitive areas able to be secured?				
D. Personnel Information				
D1. Is an inventory of serious staff medical conditions available to the commander during an emergency?				
D2. Is a list of staff blood types available to the commander in an emergency?				
D3. Is there medication at the correctional facility for staff who may need it during a shelter-in-place?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
D4. Is there a written plan for dealing with the family members of incarcerated individuals who may come to the correctional facility during an emergency?				
D5. Is there a plan for providing information on the status of incarcerated individuals to family members via phone during an extended emergency or evacuation?				
E. Incident Command Post (ICP)				
E1. Are there written procedures, including signing in and out during an emergency, for Incident Command Post (ICP) security?				
E2. Are there established procedures for access to the ICP?				
E3. Is the ICP equipped with the necessary number of phones, computers, office supplies, preprinted forms, emergency plans, and correctional facility blueprints?				
F. Supplies and Services				
F1. Is there a plan for operating food service and available food supplies, including bottled water and commissary items, during an emergency?				
F2. Is there a written plan for maintenance of correctional facilities engineering during an emergency?				
F3. Is there a written plan for medical operations during an emergency?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
F4. Are there sufficient numbers of restraints, both metal and flex cuffs, available to secure the incarcerated population?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XI. External Agency Agreements (MOAs/MOUs/MAAs)

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the correctional facility have written agreements for assistance during an emergency with the following external agencies:				
A1. State police				
A2. Local police				
A3. Local sheriff				
A4. Nearby correctional facilities (including jails, federal prisons, and immigration services)				
A5. National/State Guard				
A6. Local fire department				
A7. Nearest hazardous materials (HazMat) and explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) teams				
A8. Local phone company				
A9. Utility company(ies)				
A10. Local hospitals				
A11. Public and private ambulance services (ALS/BLS capacity)				
A12. Local, state, and federal emergency management agencies				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
B. Does each written external agency agreement include the following:				
B1. Emergency contact names and 24-hour phone numbers				
B2. Services the agency can provide				
B3. Equipment the agency can provide				
B4. Restrictions on assistance				
B5. Reporting (staging) locations				
B6. Command and jurisdictional relationships				
B7. Provision for annual review of the agreement				
B8. Provision for involvement of the external agency in emergency simulations and drills at the correctional facility				
B9. Provision for the correctional facility to provide assistance in the event of a community disaster				
B10. Provisions for transportation, evacuation, and housing of incarcerated individuals in the event of a natural disaster				
C. Are there specific ordinances, regulations, statutes, or verbal agreements covering interagency operations in emergencies?				
D. Within the last 12 months, has the correctional facility held meetings with all external agencies to review and update emergency plans and procedures?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XII. Locations

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Are the following locations specified in the correctional facility emergency plans: A1. Incident Command Post (ICP)				
A2. Alternate Incident Command Post (ICP)				
A3. Are both Incident Command Posts (ICP) located outside of the secured perimeter?				
A4. Media room and staging area				
A5. Staff/family support area				
A6. Area for the families of Incarcerated individuals				
A7. Staff staging/reporting area				
A8. Mutual aid staging area				
A9. External traffic control points				
A10. Mass Casualty Incident (MCI)/Triage area				
A11. Disturbance control team dressing/assembly area				
A12. Tactical team dressing/assembly area				
A13. Morgue				
A14. Heliport				
A15. Staff break areas				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XIII. Procedures

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the correctional facility have a general procedure for responding to major emergencies?				
B. Do procedures call for audio recording in the Incident Command Post (ICP) during an emergency?				
C. Do written procedures specify who will keep a log during an emergency?				
D. Do written procedures call for adding additional staff to key locations and specifying those locations in an emergency?				
E. Does procedure call for relieving staff from noncritical posts in an emergency?				
F. Are there written procedures for emergency lockdown and emergency count?				
G. Does the correctional facility use a system of first and second responders when responding to reported emergencies?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
H. Is there a procedure for controlling the initial staff response to a reported emergency to avoid a setup or distraction (as opposed to a procedure in which all available staff respond as quickly as possible to the location of the reported emergency)?				
I. At the onset of a major emergency, could the correctional facility quickly account for all staff, visitors, and volunteers and determine the identities of those not accounted for?				
J. Are emergency traffic-control procedures specified?				
K. Does procedure call for cutting off incarcerated individuals' telephones and other communication devices at the onset of a major emergency?				
L. Is there a procedure for briefing on-duty and returning staff about the nature of an emergency?				
M. Does procedure call for informing incarcerated individuals of emergency conditions on a discretionary basis?				
N. Does the correctional facility have plans, procedures, and the capacity to intervene quickly with force to stop or contain a spreading disturbance?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XIV. Evacuation

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
<i>Note: The Natural Disaster/Hazardous Material/Fire self-audit checklist also includes questions pertaining to offsite evacuation.</i>				
A. Is there an evacuation plan for all areas of the correctional facility that has been certified by an independent outside inspector trained in the application of national fire safety codes?				
B. Is the plan reviewed annually, updated if necessary, and reviewed with the local fire jurisdiction? Does every area of the correctional facility have a primary and secondary evacuation route?				
C. Are evacuation routes posted in all areas of the correctional facility?				
D. Are there battery-powered or emergency generator-powered emergency exit lights in all living, work, and program areas of the correctional facility?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
E. Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) Units				
E1. Are SCBAs available in or adjacent to all living areas of the correctional facility?				
E2. Are SCBAs stored or hung on walls in pairs?				
E3. Are SCBAs examined annually for functionality?				
E4. Are all SCBAs inspected, charge-checked, and tagged at least quarterly?				
E5. Have all staff been medically cleared to wear and use SCBAs?				
E6. Have all staff been trained in the use of SCBAs?				
E7. Does the SCBA training for all staff include donning the SCBA, achieving a seal, and then breathing for some period of time?				
E8. Are staff trained to use SCBAs in pairs?				
E9. Have all staff in the correctional facility received refresher training on SCBA use within the past 24 months?				
F. Fire Drills and Other Safety Measures				
F1. Are staff trained in fire evacuation procedures for areas currently assigned?				
F2. Are incarcerated individuals given orientation on fire evacuation procedures, and do they participate in drills?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
F3. Are fire drills unannounced?				
F4. Are all fire drills F4a. monitored?				
F4b. timed for clearing the area in which the drill was held?				
F4c. timed for clearing a count of incarcerated individuals evacuated?				
F4d. evaluated in writing by monitors?				
F5. Are fire drills conducted on all shifts?				
F6. Are there minimum standards for how often fire drills must be conducted in each area of the correctional facility?				
F7. Have all areas of the correctional facility met this standard within the past 12 months?				
F8. Are fire drill reports, evaluations, and plans for improvement reviewed and approved by management?				
F9. Are fire drill reports and evaluation records kept in one central location?				
F10. Has the local or state fire marshal inspected the correctional facility within the past year for compliance with state/local fire codes and regulations? Were there findings, and if so, has the corrective plan of action been completed?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview;  
OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
F11. Are there any areas of the correctional facility that are currently under fire watch due to equipment systems not being operable?				
F12. Has the local or state fire marshal approved the number, type, and location of fire extinguishers throughout the correctional facility?				
F13. Does this include the vent hoods in food service areas, and is all equipment in the food service area underneath the vent hood as required?				
F14. Are all fire extinguishers inspected, charged, and tagged at least quarterly?				
F15. Are all fire hoses and standpipes inspected, tested, and tagged at least annually?				
F16. Does the correctional facility know the actual response time for the local fire department?				
F17. Have fire-fighting equipment and vehicles been brought into the correctional facility to ensure the equipment can be connected and effectively used in each area of the correctional facility?				
F18. Does the correctional facility have its own fire brigade (trained incarcerated individuals or staff)?				
F19. Has the correctional facility considered training a fire brigade which would serve as a first response force until the fire department arrived?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
G. Are manual unlocking devices, backup keys, or both available onsite for unlocking all living areas of the correctional facility 24 hours a day?				
H. Do fire drills include the retrieval and use of these manual emergency keys?				
I. Is there an offsite evacuation plan?				
J. If yes, does the offsite evacuation plan include the following and include consideration of the need for accommodating special populations (addressed in <i>CT-Special Populations</i> ):				
J1. Potential destinations (primary and secondary)				
J2. Specific transportation alternatives				
J3. Security procedures during evacuation				
J4. Which records of an incarcerated individual must be moved with them				
J5. Procedures for providing medical services during and after the evacuation				
J6. Provisions for coordinating with local, county, and state law enforcement during the evacuation				
J7. Arrangements for meal service at the new location				
J8. Arrangements for identification and count of incarcerated individuals at the new location				
J9. Arrangements for housing and security at the new location				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
J10. Predetermined evacuation routes				
J11. Procedures for protection or destruction of confidential records that cannot be evacuated				
K. Are there shelter-in-place ("safe harbor") procedures, equipment, and supplies to protect the incarcerated population in emergencies when evacuation is not necessary, feasible, or possible?				
L. Have areas been designated as shelter-in-place within the correctional facility, based on the types of potential hazards or special populations identified?				
M. Are correctional facility staff trained regarding the predesignated shelter-in-place areas and the preparation needed, if any, to activate them?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XV. Organizational Structure

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the emergency organizational structure include all organizational elements defined in the NIMS/Incident Command System (ICS)? If yes, skip to L.				
B. Are responsibilities specified for managing the unaffected portions of the correctional facility during an emergency?				
C. Are supervision and direction of the cover group (staff initial response group) specified?				
D. Is supervision of perimeter staff during an emergency specified?				
E. Is the responsibility for coordinating on-duty and returning staff identified?				
F. Is the responsibility for partnering and working with external agencies assigned?				
G. Is the intelligence function during an emergency described and responsibility for it assigned?				
H. Is responsibility for the tactical function defined and assigned?				
I. Is responsibility for emergency equipment detailed and assigned?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
J. Is responsibility for briefing and interacting with the media assigned?				
K. Is responsibility for coordinating emergency staff services (ESS) assigned?				
L. Are there written guidelines (emergency post orders) available for each specialized emergency assignment?				
M. Is there an emergency checklist available for each specialized emergency assignment?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XVI. Extended Emergencies

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Is there a written plan for staffing in an extended emergency (beyond 12 hours)?				
B. Is responsibility assigned for scheduling and assignments in an extended emergency?				
C. In an extended emergency, is the length of the shift(s) identified in the emergency plan?				
D. Does the plan for extended emergencies include provision for staggered relief of key positions, including the Emergency Response Commander/Incident Commander (IC)?				
E. Does the plan for extended emergencies include arrangements for onsite sleeping quarters of key staff?				
F. Does the plan for extended emergencies include arrangements for sleeping quarters of staff on emergency call-back duty?				
G. Does the plan include medications for staff that have conditions requiring them?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
H. Are relief procedures specified for key staff during an extended emergency?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** **MC**—Meets Criterion; **PM**—Partially Met; **NM**—Not Met; **NA**—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** **OB** - Observed; **DR** - Document Review; **SI** - Staff Interview; **III** - Incarcerated Individual Interview; **OT** - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XVII. Post-Incident

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Incident Review and Damage Assessment A1. Are damage assessment procedures outlined and responsibilities assigned in the emergency plan?				
A2. Is there a procedure for assessing and reporting deaths, injuries, and escapes?				
A3. Is there a procedure for accounting for all on-duty and off-duty staff?				
B. Are report writing and debriefing procedures detailed in the emergency plan?				
C. In the aftermath of an emergency, is there a review and approval procedure for all reports?				
D. Is there a procedure for collecting all reports, audiotapes, video, photos, and logs?				
E. Is there a chain-of-custody procedure for all reports, logs, photos, video, audiotapes, and so forth?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
F. Is there a procedure for gathering staff-generated disciplinary reports of incarcerated individuals?				
G. Is there a procedure for gathering external agency reports?				
H. Is a short-term step-down procedure required before key staff are relieved of duty, and does that procedure include measures to prevent reescalation or new violence?				
I. Do the emergency plans mandate the development of both a short-term stepdown plan and a long-term stepdown plan after any major emergency?				
J. Do the emergency plans specify how key positions will be staffed and relieved in the aftermath?				
K. Are crime scene preservation procedures specified?				
L. Are criminal evidence collection and preservation procedures detailed?				
M. Is immediate partnership with criminal prosecution authorities required?				
N. Is civil liability review mandated?				
O. Does the plan include procedures for managing released hostages?				
P. Are medical and psychological screenings required for key staff or traumatized staff?				
Q. Does a Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) team check in with all staff involved in the emergency incident?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
R. Is a critical incident review mandated, and are critical incident review procedures specified?				
S. Are critical incident reviews shared with all correctional facilities in the department?				
T. Is a review of insurance issues mandated?				
U. Does the emergency plan specify developing a media relations plan as part of the aftermath activities?				
V. Do procedures specify the identification, segregation, and interviewing of incarcerated suspects and witnesses?				
W. Do procedures specify releasing information to all on-duty staff?				
X. Do procedures specify releasing information about emergency status to the incarcerated population?				
Y. Do procedures require developing a plan for communicating with the local community?				
Z. Do procedures require a plan for regularly briefing the central office, mayor, county/parish executive, and other branches of government?				
AA. Is there a procedure for establishing emergency purchasing and payroll authority in the wake of a major crisis or natural disaster?				
BB. Does the emergency plan include procedures to prevent staff retaliation?				
CC. Does the emergency plan include procedures to deactivate the command post?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
DD. Do the emergency plans specify other procedures to cope with an extended emergency?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XVIII. Emergency Staffing

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Are all staff, including non-custody staff, trained in emergency response procedures annually?				
B. Are non-custody staff used during correctional facility emergencies before using outside resources?				
C. Are non-custody staff who have the skills, abilities, or experience to do specific duties required identified, and are they used before external resources are recruited for use? Does policy identify the minimum number of staff required to safely operate the correctional facility (emergency staffing levels)?				
D. Is there an emergency staffing checklist for the Incident Commander (IC) to use in case of staffing shortages?				
E. Are programs and non-essential posts closed as an option to prevent a shift from going into emergency staffing levels? Who authorizes these closures?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
F. Is there a plan in place to identify procedures to operate essential functions during a staffing shortage (meals, showers, mail, store, phones, and so forth)?				
G. Is there a clear minimum requirement for these essential functions during an emergency, and can the Incident Commander (IC) authorize levels below this minimal level?				
H. In order to ensure that staff are obtaining levels of rest and breaks, is there a process in place for managing overtime, both voluntary and mandatory?				
I. Is there an emergency notification system in place to request additional staff at the correctional facility if needed? Is this system practiced and phone numbers verified and updated on a routine basis?				
J. After trying all internal staff options and using the emergency alert system, is there an agreement with an outside agency or agencies to assist with staffing mandatory posts?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XIX. Medical Services

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Is there a comprehensive medical plan for a correctional facility emergency?				
B. Does the plan include mass casualties incident/triage/treatment/transport?				
C. Are staff trained in airborne or bloodborne pathogen precautions?				
D. Do medical staff participate in drills and emergency response trainings with custody staff?				
E. Are supplies for safely handling blood or other body fluids provided or readily available?				
F. Does the plan include evacuation procedures for non-ambulatory or critically ill incarcerated individuals?				
G. Is a location other than the infirmary identified for mass casualties/triage?				
H. Does the correctional facility have an emergency-equipped medical crash cart?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
I. Are there an adequate number of gurneys and stretchers available for a major crisis or mass-casualty incident (MCI)?				
J. Are backup medical resources in the community identified for use in a large-scale emergency/MCI?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** **MC**—Meets Criterion; **PM**—Partially Met; **NM**—Not Met; **NA**—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** **OB** - Observed; **DR** - Document Review; **SI** - Staff Interview; **III** - Incarcerated Individual Interview; **OT** - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XX. NIMS Compliance

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Is the staff of the correctional facility trained in <i>IS-100: Introduction to the Incident Command System, ICS 100?</i>				
B. Is the staff trained in <i>IS-200: Basic Incident Command System for Initial Response, ICS-200?</i>				
C. Is the staff trained in <i>IS-700: An Introduction to the National Incident Management System?</i>				
D. Is the staff trained in <i>IS-800: National Response Framework, An Introduction?</i>				
E. Does policy require the correctional facility to maintain compliance with NIMS, pursuant to <i>Executive Order HSPD-5</i> ?				
F. Has the correctional facility generally achieved NIMS compliance?				
F1. Have all correctional facility staff completed NIMS training?				
F2. Does the correctional facility have a continuity of operations plan (COOP)?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
F3. Does the correctional facility's emergency plan include incident action plans (IAPs) for specific types of emergency situations?				
G. If the correctional facility has adopted an emergency plan that is NIMS compliant, has it been modified to make it specific to the correctional facility?				
H. If the department has adopted an emergency system primarily defined by NIMS, has it been tailored in detail to the specifics of the correctional facility?				
I. Does the correctional facility incorporate ICS forms (201-221 *excluding 220 Air Operations) for use in an incident?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XXI. Records Access and Maintenance during an Emergency

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. In the event of an emergency, has a contingency plan been developed to determine how records will be protected?				
B. Are fiscal, personnel records, incarcerated individuals' central files, and electronic and medical records included in the plan?				
C. Are records stored in an area that is safe, with restricted access for all incarcerated individuals at the correctional facility?				
D. Does policy call for staff to maintain control and confidentiality of all incarcerated individuals' records for the duration of an emergency?				
E. In the event of an evacuation, is there a policy in place to move all incarcerated individuals' records (central file and medical records) from the correctional facility as soon as possible?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
F. Does policy require a team to coordinate with records professionals and health service employees to develop a summary sheet of each incarcerated individual when a correctional facility is being evacuated?				
G. After an evacuation, does policy require the completion of an inventory of all incarcerated individuals' records at the receiving correctional facility?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XXII. Emergency Staff Services

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Are responsibilities for emergency staff services (ESS) during emergencies assigned?				
B. Are ESS resources for specialized help (e.g., trauma counseling) identified?				
C. Does the family support plan include provisions for childcare, transportation, and emergency financial assistance?				
D. Does the plan include a staff liaison assigned to each family of a hostage or injured staff member during and after the emergency?				
E. Is a staff family briefing area identified in the ESS plan, and is it separate from the briefing area for families of incarcerated individuals and the media briefing area?				
F. Does the plan include provisions for individual and group trauma counseling within 48 hours of the incident?				
G. Does the plan include procedures for rehabilitating traumatized staff?				
H. Is administrative leave mandatory for hostage or traumatized staff?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
I. Does the plan include death notification procedures?				
J. Does the plan include housing assistance for homeless staff after a natural disaster?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XXIII. Security Threat Groups (STGs)

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

**Note:** This checklist is also found in *Section 5: Terrorism-Specific Self-Audit Checklists*. The items in this version of the checklist refer to members of the general population and should not be taken to mean that the audit should be conducted twice.

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the correctional facility have an Investigations and Intelligence Unit that monitors Security Threat Group (STG) organizations and participants?				
B. Does the Investigations and Intelligence Unit have confidential informants?				
C. Is there a phone number for confidential informants to contact the Investigations and Intelligence Unit staff directly to report information?				
D. Is there a process in place to keep STG groups or individuals separated or managed when safety concerns arise?				
E. Are all staff trained to recognize STGs through language used, signs, and tattoos?				
F. Are possible threats by STGs regularly identified and monitored?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
G. Do line staff, program staff, and others monitor and report STG activities and potential recruitment activities?				
H. Are staff aware of significant holidays observed by STGs, and do they monitor activities of STG members during those times?				
I. Are the mailroom staff trained to monitor written materials for STG activity?				
J. Are STG member phone calls monitored more frequently than phone calls for incarcerated individuals in the general population?				
K. Is incoming mail for confirmed or suspected STG members monitored more frequently or more closely than mail for general population incarcerated individuals?				
L. Is there a reporting protocol established with the FBI, state bureau of investigation, and local law enforcement regarding STGs and members?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XXIV. Visitation

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

**Note:** This checklist, with minor changes in verbiage, is also found in *Section 5: Terrorism-Specific Self-Audit Checklists*. The items in this version of the checklist refer to members of the general population and should not be taken to mean that the audit should be conducted twice.

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Are visitors checked for outstanding arrest warrants?				
B. Are visitors checked against a database of formerly incarcerated individuals with ties to terrorism?				
C. Are visitors screened and approved by the local Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) prior to being placed on an approved visiting list?				
D. Are visitors of STG members or associates (as well as other high-risk incarcerated individuals) subjected to a higher level of screening and security checks than general population visitors?				
E. Are visits randomly monitored for conversation content?				
F. Are visits of high-risk incarcerated individuals monitored more frequently or more closely for conversation content than visits of incarcerated individuals in the general population?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XXV. Telephone Calls

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

**Note:** This checklist, with minor changes in verbiage, is also found in *Section 5: Terrorism-Specific Self-Audit Checklists*. The items in this version of the checklist refer to members of the general population and should not be taken to mean that the audit should be conducted twice.

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Are phone calls restricted to an approved list of persons for each incarcerated individual with ties to STG members or affiliates?				
B. Are approved persons on the phone lists of incarcerated individuals screened for warrants?				
C. Are persons on the phone lists of incarcerated individuals screened against a database of formerly incarcerated individuals?				
D. Are persons on the phone list of a high-risk incarcerated individual subjected to a higher level of security screening than persons on the phone list an individual in the general population?				
E. Is there a standard for the percentage of monitoring telephone conversations of all incarcerated individuals?				
F. Is there a standard for the percentage of monitoring telephone conversations specific to incarcerated individuals with ties to STG members or affiliates?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
G. Are the phone conversations of high-risk incarcerated individuals monitored more frequently than the phone conversations of individuals in the general population?				
H. Are all phone conversations of incarcerated individuals electronically recorded to provide a perpetual database of at least 10 days' duration?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XXVI. Mail

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

**Note:** This checklist is also found in *Section 5: Terrorism-Specific Self-Audit Checklists*. The items in this version of the checklist refer to members of the general population and should not be taken to mean that the audit should be conducted twice.

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the correctional facility have written policy and procedures in place for monitoring mail to and from incarcerated individuals identified as having ties to terrorism or security threat groups (STGs)?				
B. Is mail to incarcerated individuals with ties to terrorism or STGs monitored for coded information or information on activity related to terrorism, contraband introduction, planned disturbances, or other illegal activity?				
C. Are publications affiliated or associated with terrorist or STG groups or activities identified?				
D. Is mail for high-risk incarcerated individuals subjected to a higher level of screening than mail for individuals in the general population?				
E. Is there a protocol for reporting adverse or potentially dangerous terrorist or STG information obtained from the mail of incarcerated individuals?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
F. Do mailroom staff use safety equipment (gloves, masks) when handling the mail of incarcerated individuals?				
G. Is Narcan readily available in cases of accidental exposure to drugs coming in through the mail?				
H. Do mail room staff have a process for detecting drugs that may be soaked or hidden on incoming mail?				
I. Have mailroom staff had hazmat training or conducted a hazmat drill within the last 12 months involving exposure to dangerous substances?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XXVII. Specialized Equipment

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the correctional facility conduct annual equipment assessments specifically to determine needs and accessibility with regard to all-hazards incidents?				
B. Is emergency equipment tested on a monthly, quarterly, or annual basis, with documentation of those checks?				
C. Do staff have immediate access to personal protective equipment (PPE) in the event of hazardous material contamination?				
D. Is the staff fit tested for self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) fit in compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards?				
E. Are escape hoods used in the correctional facility? If so, are the staff trained to use them to escape rather than rescue?				
F. Have staff been trained in the use of this equipment?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
G. Does the correctional facility have explosive detection equipment or explosives detection canines available?				
H. Are magnetometers and X-ray machines used to scan packages coming into the correctional facility?				
I. Is an off-site facility used to search mail before distribution in the correctional facility to incarcerated individuals?				
J. In the case of an explosion, is search and rescue equipment readily available to the correctional facility?				
K. In case of explosion or building destruction, does the correctional facility have the contact information of local (public or private) certified confined space rescue teams that can respond?				
L. Does the correctional facility have equipment and systems that provide communication among all key external emergency organizations?				
M. Does the existing radio equipment transmit to units outside the correctional facility, or is transmission weak due to building construction?				
N. Does the correctional facility have radio frequencies that are programmed into their existing radios, or are they available for implementation to address interoperability?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
O. Does the correctional facility have an adequate supply of radios that share a frequency with local and state law enforcement and the local fire department?				
P. Does the correctional facility have cameras that have the ability to monitor the air space above recreation yards and other open areas and that can alert to the presence or use of drones?				
Q. Is equipment available to protect against unauthorized intrusion into the perimeter areas of the correctional facility to prevent contraband from being introduced into the correctional facility?				


**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** **MC**—Meets Criterion; **PM**—Partially Met; **NM**—Not Met; **NA**—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** **OB** - Observed; **DR** - Document Review; **SI** - Staff Interview; **III** - Incarcerated Individual Interview; **OT** - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_



## Section 4:

### Natural Disasters Self-Audit Checklists



## Natural Disasters Checklists

The following checklists have been compiled in an effort to assist audit teams in addressing a correctional facility's preparedness for natural disasters that may impact incarcerated individuals, correctional facility staff, and the surrounding communities. The checklists include items relating to both general aspects of natural disaster preparedness and preparedness for specific disasters. They are not meant to be all-inclusive; audit teams that discover additional areas of concern are encouraged to use the Blank Checklist in Appendix A of this guide. See "How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists" beginning on page 27.

### I. Planning

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the correctional facility conduct routine training, including drills and exercises, in natural disaster response?				
B. Does the correctional facility have emergency response plans and checklists specific to natural disaster response preparation, planning, response, and recovery operations?				
C. Does the correctional facility have a plan to operate the correctional facility with reduced staffing levels should a natural disaster make that necessary?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
D. Has the correctional facility planned for "desert island operations" (operating for an extended period without contact or assistance from outside) in the event of a natural disaster?				
E. Should extended tours of personnel be required, are there room, bedding, food, and medical supplies to support staff who remain at the correctional facility?				
F. Does the correctional facility have current copies of the local county emergency management agency's emergency operations plan, and are those copies kept with or as part of the correctional facility's emergency plan?				
G. Are staff encouraged to maintain a family emergency preparedness kit at home?				
H. Are staff encouraged to identify family relocation areas for short-term and long-term situations?				
I. Have staff been encouraged to maintain a three-day supply of their medications and an extra pair of eyeglasses onsite?				
J. Are staff encouraged to identify an out-of-area relative or friend for family phone contacts and to relay messages?				
K. Is there a staff person available who can act as a liaison or information officer between staff and families to provide relevant updates?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
L. Are there specific tornado procedures in the correctional facility's emergency plans?				
L1. Have tornado shelter areas been identified within the correctional facility?				
L2. Are there procedures for evacuating towers or other vulnerable staff posts in the event of a tornado watch or warning?				
L3. Are there procedures for bringing in outside work crews of incarcerated individuals or moving at-risk groups of incarcerated individuals to safety in response to a tornado watch or warning?				
L4. Does the correctional facility have written procedures mandating that the yard and other outside areas of the correctional facility be inspected each spring for objects or supplies that might become airborne and hazardous in a tornado?				
L5. Do incarcerated individuals receive orientation on tornado response and participate in tornado drills at least once per year?				
L6. Does the correctional facility have a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) radio with battery backup and warning alarm?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
M. Does the correctional facility have a specific response plan for earthquakes?				
M1. Are the correctional facility's maintenance plans, diagrams, and architectural records available onsite?				
M2. Has the correctional facility completed a structural engineering review of buildings potentially vulnerable during an earthquake to design potential retrofitting with foundation ties, sheer wall, foundation beams, and so forth?				
M3. Have staff and incarcerated individuals received specific training on how to respond during earthquakes?				
N. Has the correctional facility conducted a thorough risk assessment of vulnerable areas and equipment in the event of rising water?				
N1. Does the correctional facility have a plan for moving expensive or crucial equipment in the event of rising water?				
N2. Are emergency generators elevated to reduce the risk of flooding?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
N3. Is the correctional facility's offsite evacuation flood plan developed in stages, so it can be enacted in response to predetermined flood stages or by severity of warning?				
N4. Does the correctional facility's flood plan include an analysis of which access and egress routes would be rendered unusable at various flood stages, and have alternate access and egress plans for use during those flood stages been identified?				
O. Has the correctional facility analyzed the surrounding area for potential situations involving hazardous materials, including the proximity of chemical and fertilizer manufacturing and storage facilities, and transportation routes, including major highways and railways?				
O1. Does the correctional facility have interagency agreements or arrangements with a nearby hazardous materials team that is fully trained and equipped?				
O2. To what level or capability is the local hazardous materials team trained?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
O3. Has the external hazardous materials team participated in an emergency drill, exercise, or simulation at the correctional facility within the past three years?				
P. Do the correctional facility's emergency plans include specific response procedures for a hurricane?				
P1. Has the correctional facility conducted an analysis of all buildings to determine their ability to withstand hurricane-force winds?				
P2. Have staff and incarcerated individuals received any specific training on preparing for and responding to a hurricane within the past 24 months?				
Q. Do the correctional facility's emergency response plans include severe winter storms?				
Q1. If the correctional facility were to lose heat during extended below-freezing weather, does the correctional facility have a backup system or backup plan?				
Q2. Is the correctional facility dependent on perimeter electronics that would be likely to fail in an extreme winter storm?				
Q3. Is there a specific and detailed plan for managing the incarcerated population during an extended period of extreme winter weather?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
Q4. Is there a plan for transporting staff to and from the correctional facility in small groups or in pairs, for their own safety, during extreme winter weather?				
Q5. If staff are unable to travel to the correctional facility to provide relief, is there a plan to have staff shelter in place?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## II. General Considerations

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Are natural disaster shelter areas identified that will maximize protection for incarcerated individuals, staff, and visitors?				
B. Does the correctional facility have current written agreements (MOAs/MOUss/MAAs) with outside agencies to coordinate response activities during a natural disaster?				
C. Does the correctional facility have a contact list of ALL mutual aid partners, as well as a backup name and number of a contact person to access that resource?				
D. Do the specific emergency response plans and checklists include a shelter-in-place strategy for situations where evacuation may not be practical or possible?				
E. Has the correctional facility identified supplies and equipment that may be needed in a natural disaster (water, tents, portable toilets, portable lighting, blankets, and so forth)?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
F. Does the correctional facility have agreements to obtain critical equipment and supplies that are not available onsite or that may become inoperable during a natural disaster?				
G. Does the correctional facility have evacuation and relocation plans, alternative sites selected, and arrangements and agreements for natural disasters?				
H. Does the correctional facility have a plan to operate the correctional facility with reduced staffing levels should a natural disaster make that necessary?				
I. Does the correctional facility have an Emergency Staff Services (ESS) program available to respond to staff and staff family needs in the event of a natural disaster?				
J. Does the correctional facility have a public information strategy prepared in the event of a natural disaster?				
K. Has the correctional facility planned for "desert island operations" (operating for an extended period without contact or assistance from outside) in the event of a natural disaster?				
K1. Is the correctional facility prepared to maintain security and essential services for as long as 72 hours in the event of loss of power or other utilities?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
K2. Does the correctional facility have a three-day supply of potable water onsite or an alternate water supply system?				
K3. Does the correctional facility have a three-day supply of food that would not need cooking?				
K4. Does the correctional facility have a three-day supply of medications for incarcerated individuals onsite?				
K5. Is there a written agreement with other law enforcement agencies about limiting arrests that otherwise could be “cited and released” to reduce or limit the population of the correctional facility during an incident?				
L. Are staff trained in initial response procedures specific to natural disasters?				
M. Do staff and incarcerated individuals participate in severe weather drills?				
N. Do the emergency response plans and checklists for natural disasters include notification of and coordination with the department emergency operation center?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

### III. Vulnerability Analysis

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Has the correctional facility vulnerability analysis been distributed to both county, tribal, territorial, and state emergency management agencies?				
B. Does the vulnerability analysis include conditions affecting the correctional facility (understaffing, overcrowding, and so forth)?				
C. Does the vulnerability analysis cover all natural disasters for which the correctional facility is at risk and include an assessment of the degree of risk for each disaster?				
D. Does the vulnerability analysis include a historical review of natural disasters that have affected the correctional facility?				
E. Does the vulnerability analysis include an assessment of which people, property, correctional facility functions, and so forth are at particular risk with regard to specific types of disasters?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview;  
OT - Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
F. Have the vulnerability analysis and correctional facility emergency response plans for natural disasters been reviewed by the county/parish, tribal, territorial, or state emergency management agencies?				
G. Have county/parish tribal, territorial or state emergency management provided feedback on your correctional facility's emergency response plans?				
H. Have other emergency services/external agencies reviewed the correctional facilities' vulnerability analysis and emergency response plans?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## IV. Offsite Evacuation Plan

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Do the correctional facility's offsite evacuation plans account for expected civilian evacuation routes?				
B. Do the correctional facility's offsite evacuation plans include procedures for maintaining security of the correctional facility after evacuation?				
C. Do the correctional facility's offsite evacuation plans include procedures for reoccupying the correctional facility after the natural disaster has concluded?				
D. If yes, do these procedures include the following:				
D1. Testing of security systems				
D2. Testing of all lifelines (telephone, electricity, water, and so forth)				
D3. Security check of all housing units prior to re-occupation				
D4. Gradual phase-in of the incarcerated individual population				
D5. Evaluation of medical and food service facilities				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
E. Do the correctional facility's offsite evacuation plans include provisions for moving crucial records concerning incarcerated individuals with the incarcerated individual population?				
F. Do the correctional facility's offsite evacuation plans include provisions for securing or backing up the noncrucial records of incarcerated individuals that will not be moved during the evacuation?				
G. Does the correctional facility have different offsite evacuation plans for different types of natural disasters (e.g., are the plans for a flood different from those for an earthquake)?				
H. Does the offsite evacuation plan have multiple options for relocation in case the primary site is inoperable or inaccessible?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## V. Recovery Operations

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the emergency response plan have a person assigned to track and document usage/depletion of resources, as well as damage to the correctional facility, for submission to Emergency Management?				
B. Does the correctional facility have a detailed and thorough plan for conducting a damage assessment after a natural disaster?				
C. Does the correctional facility have a plan for conducting search and rescue operations after a natural disaster?				
D. Does the correctional facility have a plan for management and treatment of a mass casualty incident (MCI) resulting from a natural disaster?				
E. Has the correctional facility identified resources (internal and external) necessary for cleanup and immediate repair to barriers and security systems damaged in a natural disaster?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
F. Does the correctional facility have written procedures for working with insurance carriers; the state, tribal, or territorial government's Emergency Management Agency (EMA); or both in the aftermath of a natural disaster?				
G. Does policy specify that the correctional facility will apply to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for public assistance (PA) in the aftermath of a natural disaster, and does policy designate responsibility for submitting that application?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## VI. Tornado

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Are there specific tornado procedures in the correctional facility emergency plans?				
B. Does the correctional facility vulnerability analysis include an evaluation of each building's ability to withstand a tornado?				
C. Do the correctional facility response plans distinguish between tornado watch and tornado warning, and are staff trained on this distinction?				
D. Does the correctional facility have mandatory procedures that are enacted in response to a tornado watch or warning for the area?				
E. Are there procedures for bringing in outside work crews of incarcerated individuals and moving groups of incarcerated individuals at risk to safety in response to a tornado watch or warning?				
F. Do staff practice tornado drills at least once per year?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
G. Do the correctional facility's emergency plans include safety precautions for staff or incarcerated individuals who may be in offices, classrooms, or other areas at risk from flying glass during a tornado?				
H. Are there tie-downs for trailers and portable buildings, anchoring them to concrete foundations?				
I. Do tornado response plans include provisions for sheltering or evacuating visitors?				
J. Do tornado response plans include procedures for evaluating damage to the security perimeter and making short-term repairs as needed?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## VII. Earthquake

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the correctional facility have a specific response plan for earthquakes?				
B. Has the correctional facility evaluated its earthquake risk based on proximity to fault lines and seismic history of the area?				
C. Has the correctional facility evaluated the structural ability of each building to withstand earthquakes of various severities?				
D. Has the correctional facility evaluated the vulnerability of the following to earthquakes: D1. Emergency power generators and fuel storage?				
D2. Water supply and primary power supply?				
D3. Natural gas lines and propane storage?				
D4. Communication systems, perimeter security, armory, infirmary, emergency medical services, and so forth?				
E. Are the correctional facility's earthquake plans based on the ability to be self-sufficient onsite for as long as 72 hours?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
F. Are bookcases, appliances, and high, heavy objects tied down or anchored against walls to mitigate risk in the event of an earthquake?				
G. Have hanging objects been identified and secured or removed?				
H. Does the correctional facility have contingent contracts with structural engineers or have any other special provision for evaluating the structural integrity of buildings in the aftermath of an earthquake?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## VIII. Flood

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Has the correctional facility identified and posted county/parish emergency management agency phone numbers in control rooms and other appropriate locations?				
B. Does the correctional facility have detailed plans for a complete offsite evacuation in the event of a flood?				
C. Have those offsite evaluation plans been reviewed carefully within the past 12 months?				
D. Has the correctional facility practiced or drilled with a flood-related offsite evacuation scenario within the past 24 months at the level of the tabletop exercise or above?				
E. Is the correctional facility's offsite evacuation plan for flood developed in stages, so it could be enacted in response to predetermined flood stages or severity of warning?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
F. Does the correctional facility have access to small boats or rafts that could be used for evacuation or search and rescue (SAR) operations with rising flood waters at the correctional facility?				
G. Does the correctional facility have contact numbers for teams trained and skilled in water rescue?				
H. What is the capability of the water rescue team to move a specific number of persons in a given time frame?				
I. Do the correctional facility's flood plans include an analysis of which access and egress routes would be rendered unusable at various flood stages, along with alternate access and egress plans for those flood stages?				
J. Are there multiple offsite locations that the agency may evacuate due to inaccessibility of primary locations?				
K. Do the correctional facility's response plans distinguish between flood watch and flood warning, and are staff trained on this distinction?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## IX. Chemical Spill/Hazardous Materials Incident

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Has the correctional facility analyzed the surrounding area for potential hazardous material (hazmat) situations such as chemical factories, fertilizer manufacturing, and chemical storage or transportation routes?				
B. If such an analysis of the area has been done, does it include prevailing wind and weather patterns?				
C. Does the correctional facility have staff who have been trained in hazmat first responder procedures?				
D. Has the external hazmat team toured the correctional facility to familiarize themselves with structural and operational issues?				
E. Do the correctional facility's hazmat response plans include contact information for a laboratory that could quickly identify an unknown substance that is potentially hazardous?				
F. Do the response plans include shelter-in-place provisions?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
G. Has the correctional facility conducted tabletop exercises involving hazmat situations and shelter-in-place strategies within the last 12 months?				
H. Has the correctional facility conducted a functional exercise or full-scale simulation involving a shelter-in-place strategy with a hazmat incident within the last 12 months?				
I. Has the correctional facility set aside any supplies and equipment specifically for a shelter-in-place response to a hazmat incident?				
J. Has the correctional facility's storage and disposal of chemicals and hazardous materials been reviewed by any external agency within the last 12 months?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## X. Hurricane

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the correctional facility's risk assessment include an evaluation of the likelihood of a hurricane?				
B. Does the correctional facility have supplies and plans for reinforcing or protecting vulnerable areas such as windows?				
C. Do hurricane response plans include provisions for moving out of buildings that would be structurally unsound during a hurricane or that cannot be adequately protected?				
D. Is there a plan for managing the incarcerated population while waiting to see if a hurricane will actually hit the correctional facility?				
E. Does the correctional facility consult with Emergency Management about the path and strength predictions that are forecast?				
F. Has the correctional facility retrofitted buildings with tie-downs or other structural improvements, where possible and practical, to increase protection against hurricanes?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
G. Does the correctional facility inspect the yard and other outside areas annually, prior to the start of hurricane season, for objects and materials that could become airborne and dangerous with extremely high winds, and remove or secure such items?				
H. Do the correctional facility's hurricane plans include an assessment of potential for localized flooding?				
I. Do the correctional facility hurricane plans include an assessment of the vulnerability of various utilities?				
J. Does the correctional facility have a NOAA radio with a battery backup and warning alarm?				
K. Are staff trained on the distinction between hurricane watch and hurricane warning?				
L. Does the correctional facility have portable water pumps?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XI. Severe Winter Storm

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Do the correctional facility's emergency response plans include severe winter storms?				
B. Does the correctional facility have its own snow-clearing and removal equipment, and is the equipment heavy enough to operate in an extreme winter storm?				
C. Are staff trained in the use of snow removal equipment, and are they physically able to complete the task if assigned?				
D. Does the correctional facility have specialized clothing for staff who would need to operate snow-clearing equipment or do other outside work under extreme winter blizzard conditions?				
E. Does the correctional facility have an adequate supply of heavy jackets, blankets, and so forth for the incarcerated population during an extreme winter storm?				
F. Has the correctional facility evaluated which utilities would be most vulnerable to failure during an extreme winter storm?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
G. Is the correctional facility's primary water supply at risk in the event of an extreme winter storm?				
H. Does the correctional facility's response plan include provisions to switch to 12-hour shifts?				
I. Has the correctional facility analyzed the compound for areas and equipment that would be at risk during long-term subfreezing conditions or from the weight of large amounts of ice?				
J. Does the correctional facility keep an adequate supply of sand and salt for walkways and essential vehicle access areas?				
K. Does the correctional facility maintain a supply of tire chains for use on its vehicles during extreme winter weather?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XII. Fire Prevention and Response

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Fire Loading				
A1. Does the correctional facility have written standards for the amount of property owned by incarcerated individuals that is permissible in cells or dormitories?				
A2. Are these written standards consistent with minimizing fire loading in living areas?				
A3. Are cells and other living areas inspected at least once per month for compliance with this standard?				
A4. Is the standard strictly adhered to?				
A5. Are all other areas of the correctional facility inspected at least once per month to determine if there is excess fire loading?				
A6. If excess fire loading is discovered, is there a procedure that mandates reporting the situation to management?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A7. Does the correctional facility maintain written records of inspections for fire loading and of corrective efforts when excessive fire loading is discovered?				
A8. Is there a mandatory review of all supplies and materials ordered for the correctional facility for flammability and toxic smoke during a fire?				
B. Ignition Control				
B1. Are incarcerated individuals permitted to keep matches or lighters in their cells or dormitories?				
B2. Do incarcerated individuals have open access to matches or lighters in day rooms or other common areas?				
B3. Are electric outlets and accessible wiring in housing areas and common areas inspected at least monthly for tampering or maintenance problems?				
B4. Are housing areas and common areas accessible to incarcerated individuals inspected at least monthly to review proximity of flammable items to heat sources such as electric lights?				
C. Fire Safety Review				
C1. Does the correctional facility have a staff member in charge of fire safety?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
C2. Does the correctional facility's fire safety officer report directly to a person at management level?				
C3. Are all areas of the correctional facility inspected at least monthly to determine if fire doors are operable and fire exits and evacuation routes are kept clear?				
C4. Are written records required for these reviews?				
C5. When a problem is encountered during a fire inspection and is not immediately corrected, is there a policy or procedure that mandates bringing the problem to management attention immediately?				
C6. Does the correctional facility, on at least an annual basis, review all living units and other occupied areas to ensure that there are at least two exits in the case of fire?				
C7. Has the local or state fire marshal inspected the correctional facility within the past year for compliance with state and local fire codes and regulations?				
C8. Has the local fire department inspected the correctional facility within the past year to discover potential fire problems and to become familiar with the physical plant?				

**Status:** **MC**—Meets Criterion; **PM**—Partially Met; **NM**—Not Met; **NA**—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** **OB** - Observed; **DR** - Document Review; **SI** - Staff Interview; **III** - Incarcerated Individual Interview; **OT** - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
D. Fire Drills and Fire Evacuation				
D1. Is there an evacuation plan for all areas of the correctional facility?				
D2. Does every area of the correctional facility have a secondary evacuation route?				
D3. Are evacuation routes posted in all areas of the correctional facility?				
D4. Are there battery-powered or emergency generator-powered emergency exit lights in all living and program areas of the correctional facility?				
D5. Are staff trained in fire evacuation procedures for areas currently assigned?				
D6. Are incarcerated individuals given orientation on fire evacuation procedures?				
D7. Are fire drills unannounced?				
D8. Are all fire drills:				
D8a. Monitored?				
D8b. Timed for clearing the area in which the drill was held?				
D8c. Timed for clearing a count of incarcerated individuals evacuated?				
D8d. Evaluated in writing by monitors?				
D9. Are fire drills conducted on all shifts?				
D10. Are there minimum standards for how often fire drills must be conducted in each area of the correctional facility?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
D11. Have all areas of the correctional facility met this standard within the last 12 months?				
D12. Are fire drill reports, evaluations, and plans for improvement reviewed and approved by management?				
D13. Are fire drill reports and evaluation records kept in one central location?				
E. Fire Equipment				
E1. Has the local or state fire marshal approved the number, type, and location of fire extinguishers throughout the correctional facility?				
E2. Are all fire extinguishers inspected, charged, and tagged at least quarterly?				
E3. Are all fire hoses and standpipes inspected, tested, and tagged at least quarterly?				
E4. Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) Units:				
E4a. Are SCBAs available in or adjacent to all housing areas of the correctional facility?				
E4b. Are SCBAs stored or hung on walls in pairs?				
E4c. Are SCBAs examined annually for functionality?				
E4d. Are all SCBAs inspected, charge-checked, and tagged at least quarterly?				
E4e. Have all staff been medically cleared to wear and use SCBAs?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
E4f. Have all staff been trained in the use of SCBAs?				
E4g. Does the SCBA training for all staff include donning and doffing the SCBA, achieving a seal, and then breathing for some period of time?				
E4h. Have staff been fit tested at appropriate OSHA levels, and has the result of each test been documented?				
E4i. Are staff trained to use SCBAs in pairs?				
E4j. Have all staff in the correctional facility had refresher training on SCBA use within the past 24 months?				
E5. Are fire doors or fire door locks color coded for easy match to fire keys?				
E6. Are fire door locks and emergency keys notched for identification in dark or smoke-filled conditions?				
E7. Are manual unlocking devices or backup keys available onsite for unlocking every housing area of the correctional facility 24 hours a day?				
E8. Does the correctional facility have two or more sets of turnout gear?				
<b>F. Fire Response</b> F1. Does the correctional facility know the actual response time for the local fire department?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
F2. Does the correctional facility have its own fire brigade (trained incarcerated individuals or staff)?				
F3. Has the correctional facility considered training a fire brigade that would serve as a first-response force until the fire department arrives?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XIII. Pandemic/Communicable Disease

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
<i>Correctional facilities managed the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic event while experiencing multiple first-time occurrences. It is essential that each emergency response plan includes contingencies and plans for a pandemic or communicable disease outbreak. Protocols for practices that proved valuable during the pandemic response should be evaluated and documented to plan for any future situations.</i>				
A. Is there a Pandemic Preparedness Coordinating Committee that represents all relevant stakeholders in the event of a communicable disease or pandemic situation?				
B. Is there an Operational Pandemic Communicable Disease Plan?				
C. Does the plan delineate accountability and responsibility, capabilities, and resources for key stakeholders engaged in planning and executing specific components of the operational plan?				
D. Is the plan linked with other sections of the emergency response plan?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
E. Is the operational plan for pandemic response an integral element of the overall state, local, territorial, and tribal (SLTT) emergency response plan established under Federal Emergency Support Function (ESFs) as well as state ESFs?				
F. Are there formalized written agreements (MOAs/MOUs/MAAs) with neighboring jurisdictions that address communication, mutual aid, and other cross-jurisdictional needs?				
G. Does the plan include provisions of psychosocial support services for those affected by containment procedures in the plan?				
H. Does the plan include an information communication process to continually inform staff, incarcerated individuals, and other stakeholders of the current status of the pandemic and to address misinformation that occurs from social media, rumors, and other platforms?				
I. Are the plans scalable to the magnitude and severity of the pandemic and available resources?				
J. Does the plan include a process to investigate and contain potential cases or local outbreaks caused by a novel or pandemic strain?				
K. Is the plan tested on a routine basis using Incident Command System (ICS) processes?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
L. During exercises, is the containment operational plan that delineates procedures for isolation and quarantine tested?				
M. Do exercises of the operational plan implement various levels of movement restrictions within, to, and from the correctional facility?				
N. Does the plan include a continuity of operations plan (COOP) for essential public health department services, including contingency planning for increasing the public health workforce in response to absenteeism among public health department staff and stakeholder groups that have key responsibilities?				


**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_



# Section 5:

## Terrorism-Specific Self-Audit Checklists



## Correctional Facilities and Counterterrorism

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorism has been at the forefront of U.S. priorities and the American psyche. President George W. Bush declared a “war on terror,” and that phrase quickly became part of our national vocabulary.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was originally established with the signing of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to combat terrorism, and the department has since expanded to include federal oversight efforts for managing emergencies, securing and controlling our nation’s borders, and providing federal protective services, immigration, and customs enforcement, as well as preventing terrorist attacks. Today, there are twenty-two federal agencies within DHS. (DHS 2025)

The field of corrections plays an important role in the war on terror. Correctional administrators are faced with myriad, ever-changing challenges regarding terrorism inside correctional facilities. Radicalization efforts of incarcerated individuals, as well as communication with outside entities that could potentially lead to an act of terrorism, present an enormous threat to the orderly operation of a correctional facility.

### Defining Terrorism

Many intelligence agencies and political entities have attempted to define terrorism. However, no one definition has been adopted or officially recognized. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) definition of terrorism is “the unlawful use of force against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives.” This definition includes three elements: (1) Terrorist activities are illegal and involve the use of force. (2) The actions are intended to intimidate or coerce. (3) The actions are committed in support of political or social objectives. Also, these activities may be carried out by one or several individuals.

Housing individuals with a propensity for violent or radical extremism or ties to terrorism present correctional administrators with additional challenges. How to control communication by these individuals both inside a correctional facility and with individuals outside the confines of a correctional facility must be considered. Telephone monitoring, mail monitoring, and supervision of social visits are vital to the pursuit of this goal. Preventing radicalization as well as acts of terror is a constant concern.

Appropriate security measures must be implemented that maintain a proper balance between physical, procedural, and active security elements. Correctional facilities housing individuals with violent or radical extremism or ties to terrorism should implement a coordinated and viable intelligence system consistent with local, state, or federal jurisdiction. If available, membership in a local Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) is recommended.

## Role of Other Branches of Corrections in Counterterrorism

The other major branches of corrections have a different relationship to potential terrorist activities and threats. That relationship affects their need for counterterrorism preparedness and their role in counterterrorism response. For example, the risk of probation and parole agencies being targeted for terrorist attack is extremely low. On the other hand, those same agencies are potentially invaluable in the area of intelligence because of their detailed knowledge of a wide range of justice-involved individuals in the community and their active monitoring of the activities of many of those formerly incarcerated individuals.

All correctional facilities are potential terrorist targets, being densely populated structures that are difficult both to defend and to evacuate. In addition to being potential targets of terrorist activity, correctional facilities may be involved with terrorists in other ways. Many of the formerly incarcerated individuals monitored by probation and parole officers in the community are also occasionally arrested by law enforcement and then spend time in county jails, whether for short stays or en route to state or federal prisons. Jails also receive individuals who may be wanted for very serious offenses but have been arrested on quite minor charges. For these reasons, local and county jails are in a position to make crucial contributions to counterterrorist intelligence efforts.

## Role of Correctional Facilities in a National Counterterrorism Strategy

Correctional facilities constitute a potential target for terrorist attacks in at least three ways. First, correctional facilities are densely populated and difficult to defend against external assault. The cells, gates, fences, and other physical security barriers that keep incarcerated individuals inside also make it difficult for both incarcerated individuals and staff to evacuate quickly. An attack on a correctional facility could affect a large number of victims.

Second, unlike many other high-density potential terrorist targets, correctional facilities are symbols of government authority. As such, they represent an attractive target for terrorists seeking to create a scenario wherein the government appears unable to protect its citizens, even those within the confines of a correctional facility.

Finally, by attacking a correctional facility, terrorists have the potential to enable a mass outbreak of hundreds of high-security incarcerated individuals who would represent a grave danger to surrounding communities. The predictable widespread panic that would result might be a more important objective to terrorists than a high death count. Terrorists might well regard the death and destruction inside the correctional facility as beneficial byproducts to the central goal of mass escapes, community terror, and chaos.

The experience of foreign countries where terrorist activity has been more frequent substantiates these arguments. Correctional facilities have been targets for terrorists in the same vein as police stations. For many years, police in Great Britain have been high-priority targets of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Basque separatists have attacked Spanish police stations, and Iraqi police stations have also frequently been targeted by insurgents.

Committed terrorists may be housed among our correctional facility population and may not be easy to identify. Active terrorists may be sentenced for some crime unrelated to terrorism and go unrecognized inside a correctional facility. Such individuals may be skillful at maintaining their identities as “regular” incarcerated individuals. Incarcerated individuals who become committed terrorists while in a correctional facility, on the other hand, are much more likely to be less skilled and experienced at hiding their true philosophies and objectives, and they will typically be individuals who are well known for their extremist views. In any case, the potential for correctional facilities to identify active or committed terrorists within their own populations should not be ignored.

Correctional facilities offer terrorists perhaps the single most fertile ground in this country for recruiting new members, allies, or mercenaries. Among the hundreds of thousands of people inside our correctional facilities are many smart, tough, disciplined individuals who blame society, our laws, and our government for their predicament. Many are angry and alienated enough to be easily turned from violence for criminal purposes to violence for political or even religious purposes.

## **Counterterrorism Preparedness and Response in Correctional Facilities**

The starting point for any correctional facility assessing its capacity to prevent and respond to a terrorist attack is within its system of emergency preparedness. Unlike before, correctional facilities have well-defined emergency preparedness systems supported by substantial resources, detailed plans, specialized equipment, and extensive training. Emergency preparedness is the foundation upon which correctional facility counterterrorism efforts must be built. The small number of U.S. correctional facilities that have little or no emergency preparedness program will not be able to seriously consider how they would respond to a sophisticated terrorist attack until they sort out policy issues concerning command during major emergencies, train negotiators (or set up agreements to use external negotiators), prepare for dealing with the media during a large-scale crisis, and address all of the other components of a detailed and realistic emergency plan discussed in section 1 of this guide and enumerated in the Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist in section 4.

Counterterrorism in a correctional facility involves considerably more than basic emergency preparedness. After a correctional facility has established its general emergency preparedness plan, its staff are trained in all facets of the plan’s components, and the correctional facility has embarked on a program of drills, exercises, and refresher training, it must give further attention to the following areas critical to preparing for and responding to terrorist threats and activity:

- Intelligence Operations
- Staff Training
- Targeted Physical Plant Structure Enhancement
- Alert Systems
- Medical Services
- Procedures for Responding to Alarms/Phased Response
- Interagency Agreements
- After-Action

### *Intelligence Operations*

The core of most counterterrorism prevention efforts within a correctional facility will be intelligence operations. Existing intelligence operations in correctional facilities vary widely. Some correctional facilities have extremely sophisticated intelligence functions, while others have no intelligence capabilities whatsoever. Not surprisingly, correctional facilities with sophisticated intelligence operations in place—including monitoring incarcerated individuals' movement, mail, telephone calls, and visits—will be able to incorporate counterterrorism functions much more easily than those with less developed abilities to gather and analyze critical information.

One of the first priorities for a correctional facility seeking to develop intelligence on terrorism is to explore and understand local, state, and federal intelligence networks involving law enforcement, the military, staff from county and state emergency management agencies, federal law enforcement agencies, and other organizations. A correctional facility should work to become a full partner in such terrorism task forces.

Preventing terrorist activity is a correctional facility's responsibility, but it is also an external issue. Correctional facilities and agencies may have little control over preventing terrorist activity when the threat is external. For example, if a terrorist group is targeting a correctional facility for an attack\* but no incarcerated individuals or other individuals associated with the correctional facility are involved in the planning or with the group in any other way, the success or failure of the terrorists' plans may rest solely with national law enforcement resources, and in particular the FBI. The targeted correctional facility might not know about the plot until members of the terrorist group are apprehended or, if law enforcement intelligence efforts are unsuccessful, until an attack takes place. However, if the plot to attack a correctional facility also involves collaborators from among the incarcerated individuals or plans to free high-profile "political" incarcerated individuals, or if members of the terrorist group have infiltrated either the incarcerated population or the correctional facility workforce, then the correctional facility and its staff might have the opportunity to foil the plans through effective intelligence operations.

## Security Threat Group Operations

Many correctional facilities have a security threat group (STG) coordinator. This person may operate relatively independently, but in large correctional facilities, there may be a specialized department for this function. STGs are often defined as street gangs or correctional facility gangs, or individuals who are members or associates of criminal or terrorist organizations. The STG coordinator's job includes reviewing new admissions to identify both gang or organization affiliation and association. The coordinator may accomplish this through interviews, identification of tattoos, information obtained from other incarcerated individuals, the newly incarcerated individual's record, and information from local, state, or federal law enforcement agencies. Typically, once a gang member or associate is identified, he or she is entered into the STG database and then tracked and monitored throughout their length of stay in the correctional facility.

A good STG operation will have safeguards against practices such as overloading a housing unit or work detail with too many members of one particular group, allowing relatives of members of one gang to cross-visit at the correctional facility, and permitting the identified gang member to make phone calls to known gang members on the outside. Phone conversations of gang members may be monitored or recorded and archived. The correctional facility will monitor and attempt to stop criminal efforts to recruit within the incarcerated population and to control housing assignments, work assignments, religious group facilitator assignments, recreational activities, commissary items, or other potential sources of power. The elements of a well-developed STG operation—early identification, suspect databases, tracking and monitoring procedures, and the capacity to monitor mail, phone, and visits—are equally applicable to correctional facility counterterrorism intelligence operations.

## Staff Training

The biggest difference between gangs and terrorist organizations inside correctional facilities may be sophistication. While some of the larger, longer-established security threat groups are reasonably sophisticated, with constitutions, bylaws, and well-defined organizational cultures, even these gangs are a far cry from the sophistication of most terrorist organizations. Most correctional staff, like most law enforcement officers, have little experience with groups of incarcerated individuals who are smart, well-funded, highly trained, and disciplined. Correctional facility staff are accustomed to working with incarcerated groups that plan poorly, do not follow through, and have trouble maintaining secrecy. Few staff in correctional facilities have any concept of the level of planning, training, resources, secrecy, and commitment to cause that is required for an event like the September 11 attacks. It follows that staff training on terrorism is one of the most important and earliest steps in building counterterrorism capabilities into an existing correctional facility emergency preparedness system.

The lack of awareness of an appropriate frame of reference and of specific knowledge about terrorism on the part of correctional facility staff is not limited to intelligence operations or other prevention efforts. The need for staff training specific to terrorism is equally relevant to planning and preparation as it also applies to building response capabilities for possible terrorist attacks on correctional facilities.

## Targeted Physical Plant Structure Enhancement

Once a correctional facility has increased its level of operation in response to a terrorist threat, specific activities and procedures fall into several categories. The first is the enhancement of the targeted physical plant structure, or *target hardening*. Target hardening includes a wide range of steps that most correctional facilities can initiate to increase security against outside assault. As noted above, almost all correctional facilities are designed from the inside out, so many correctional facilities are extremely well designed to prevent escape; however, many correctional facilities do not have security systems that are effective against external threats.

Examples of target hardening include the following:

- Establish vehicle or traffic-control checkpoints at a feasible distance from the main facility.
- Change procedures or erect barriers at vehicle sally ports.
- Tighten or restrict the movement, mail, telephone, or visitation procedures for incarcerated individuals.
- Institute background checks and positive identification requirements for delivery truck drivers, vendors, contract employees, and visitors.
- Increase armed external vehicle patrols (if the correctional facility has towers, either permanent or portable, consider staffing those with armed staff).
- Increase night lighting for areas outside of perimeter fences.

The list will vary substantially depending on the nature of the particular correctional facility and the level of the perceived threat.

One of the greatest assets available to administrators seeking to identify opportunities for target hardening is the expertise of their tactical teams. Many administrators have never analyzed their correctional facility's degree of vulnerability to external assault. It is a challenging exercise, and the results are often disturbing. Many of the risks found will have been previously unrecognized, and some may be obvious and severe. The leader must recognize that the more alarming the information, the more valuable the exercise.

## Alert Systems

The term *alert system* refers to a method for placing a correctional facility in a higher stage or level of readiness in response to a heightened threat level. Each correctional facility should incorporate its own security threat level system, and all staff must be trained in the system. Each staff member should also be familiar with the role that each other staff member will play during each level.

There is no single type of correctional facility alert system that must be used. Because experience with alert systems in correctional facilities is limited, it would be difficult to make a case for the number of stages of readiness a correctional facility alert system should have.

There is a good deal of room for creativity and varied approaches in designing a correctional facility alert system. However, effective alert systems have at least one element in common: They are true systems with specific plans and measures in which staff have been trained. The importance of planning and training cannot be overemphasized. Correctional facilities cannot

expect to figure out how they will respond to a threat after a serious threat appears. Without thorough planning, training, and practice, it is an unfortunate certainty that under threat and time pressure, the correctional facility will make avoidable mistakes and forget obvious procedures.

The information leading a correctional facility to activate its alert system may come from intelligence sources within the correctional facility or from law enforcement or other external sources. Similarly, the target of the threat identified in the intelligence may be the correctional facility itself, but it is also possible that the correctional facility may have to respond to threats to a nearby city or the surrounding geographic area.

Responses to declaring alert status or raising the threat level, if the alert system has stages or levels, include but are not limited to the following:

- **Activating emergency command procedures.** The correctional facility may need to ensure that one of its top managers is either onsite or available in relatively close proximity 24 hours a day.
- **Initiating target-hardening measures.** As an example, if intelligence points to the possible use of a truck bomb, concrete barriers might be erected in front of vehicle sally ports, and a traffic control point might be established at a distance from the correctional facility and staffed around the clock. If the intelligence points instead to a biological threat, the processing of mail and packages might be moved to a location outside the correctional facility's perimeter.
- **Marshalling additional resources, either through activation or standby status.** Intelligence personnel may need to increase their operations, and the correctional facility's administration may need to cancel vacations for members of emergency teams, crisis negotiators, or other staff with critical roles during emergencies. Crisis negotiators and teams may need to be placed on standby.
- **Activating interagency agreements.** Intelligence-sharing activities may be intensified.
- **Developing an initial media strategy if the correctional facility's response comes to the media's attention.** If the intelligence information received is confidential or is Limited Official Use (LOU) only, the correctional facility will need some acceptable public explanation of security measures such as traffic controls, the reduction in visiting, and increased staffing. The same explanation may need to be given to staff and the incarcerated population as well via staff recalls and town hall meetings.
- **Modifying operations in ways that mitigate exposure to the threat.** If the threat is an attack involving an explosive device intended to kill people within the correctional facility and allow mass escapes, reduced programming and some degree of lockdown may mitigate the risk of mass escape.

The range of options a correctional facility must consider in response to a credible threat of a terrorist attack is broad. This brief summary of some of the more obvious actions should illustrate that it is too late to build that response after the threat is received.

## Other Benefits of Alert Systems

An alert system, even if developed specifically as part of a counterterrorism plan, has the potential to serve the correctional facility well in the more traditional kinds of emergencies. Most correctional facilities operate in two well-defined modes: (1) normal day-to-day operations, and (2) crisis mode, which usually goes into effect in response to any major emergency. Correctional facilities may also incorporate levels of operation anywhere between normal operations and crisis mode. Modified levels of operation can be established depending on the type and severity of incident presented to correctional facility administrators. Modified operations can include a change in visiting and telephone access, food service operation, recreation and religious services, and so forth.

## Medical Services

Whether a terrorist attack at a correctional facility involves automatic weapons, a bombing or explosion, or the release of chemical or biological agents, the potential for mass casualties is very high. Consequently, a medical services plan developed as part of the correctional facility's overall emergency preparedness procedures may be insufficient to respond to a terrorist incident. Medical services plans for correctional facility emergencies are usually given the same priority as emergency food services plans or emergency facilities and maintenance plans. The medical services plan developed for response to terrorist incidents must be far more detailed and must envision the possibility of very large numbers of people, including both staff and incarcerated individuals, being dead or injured. The most obvious needs will be for a large mass casualty triage center and an alternate location should the primary location be unavailable or disabled because of the nature of the incident itself. The correctional facility should scrutinize its existing interagency agreements with community hospitals and ambulance services, as these agreements will likely need to be expanded when involving a large-scale terrorist attack.

## Procedures for Responding to Alarms

Correctional facilities should examine their procedures for responding to alarms and reported emergencies. Those that already use some form of first responder system will have an advantage in this regard. Any system that controls staff response to an alarm should offer some level of protection against a well-planned diversion designed to bring all available staff into one area of the correctional facility, so that the primary crisis emergency can take place in another area of the correctional facility. Incarcerated individuals are known to create a diversion for the purposes of committing criminal activity somewhere else in the correctional facility. When focusing on counterterrorism capabilities, correctional facilities should carefully examine even a well-defined first responder system, particularly with regard to the training of first responders themselves.

How many staff who respond initially would recognize a chemical agent situation and know they should stop further staff response and attempt to isolate and seal off the area? If on-duty staff at a correctional facility found people sick or dying, and a suspected chemical or biological contaminant were present, would any of them know how to contact the nearest hazardous materials (hazmat) team? Does the correctional facility have protective clothing or other safety equipment available for first responders and other correctional facility staff if a biological or

chemical terrorist incident is suspected? If a potential bomb was discovered in the correctional facility, would staff know not to move or handle it? Has the correctional facility conducted drills or simulations for responding to a chemical or biological attack? A suspected explosive device? Are there specific procedures that would help staff in these kinds of emergencies?

“Shelter-in-place” strategies—remaining in the correctional facility and coping with the crisis rather than evacuating—also deserve attention. Many terrorist scenarios could require a shelter-in-place response. With the exception of correctional facilities in areas at high risk for tornados, few correctional facilities place a premium on planning for or practicing shelter-in-place strategies. However, if a terrorist attack is sudden and produces death and chaos, the nature of the attack may not be clear, nor may it be clear which direction represents safety and which represents increased danger. When the risks to community safety resulting from the unplanned movement of large numbers of incarcerated individuals are added to the equation, a shelter-in-place response may be the only viable alternative. This rationale suggests that shelter-in-place strategies may need considerably more attention and practice than they have received to date inside correctional facilities.

### Interagency Agreements

Interagency agreements with hospitals, ambulance services, fire departments, hazmat teams, supply vendors, and other agencies are indispensable to a correctional facility’s counterterrorism preparedness. For most correctional facilities, however, the most crucial interagency agreements in many types of terrorist incidents will be those with law enforcement. If a correctional facility has not yet found a need for detailed and comprehensive written interagency agreements with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, focusing on potential terrorist activity should provide the necessary motivation. Jurisdictional issues must be carefully considered and worked out in advance, rather than argued about in the midst of the response to an attack. The use of correctional facility staff outside the boundaries of the correctional facility and the use of law enforcement officers inside the correctional facility should be considered with regard to questions such as arrest powers, authority for use of force, reporting relationships, and extent of authority. After law enforcement, other very high-priority interagency agreements would include those with county and state emergency management agencies, many of which already include correctional facilities in their planning, and the National Guard.

#### **Interagency Agreements Necessary to Correctional Facility Counterterrorism Planning**

- Local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies
- County and state emergency management agencies
- Hospitals
- Local utility companies
- Ambulance services
- Fire departments
- Other correctional facilities or agencies
- Hazmat teams
- FBI Correctional Terrorism Initiative
- American Red Cross
- Vendors and suppliers

Developing realistic and comprehensive interagency agreements is a substantial amount of work. However, the good news is the work can be accomplished beforehand and roles can be established and known before an emergency arises. Agreements are fully developed, and maintaining and updating those agreements are relatively easy. Both agencies should review the agreements annually for changes or necessary revisions. Agreements must be clear, concise, and realistic.

### After-Action Measures

A correctional facility's general emergency plan should include detailed policies, procedures, and resources for dealing with the aftermath of an incident. Most of these measures will be equally effective if the incident in question is a terrorist act rather than, say, a hostage-taking by an incarcerated individual. There are several key differences, however:

- In a terrorist incident, most of the investigation and prosecution will be in the hands of federal entities rather than state and local agencies.
- The correctional facility will have much less control than it does after a "traditional" emergency. For example, even after the incident is over, a great deal of information will likely remain highly confidential or Limited Official Use (LOU) only, and such information will be unavailable to the general public and the media. This situation can create strong tensions between the media and the correctional facility as well as between the correctional facility and its own staff and incarcerated individuals, even though the rules are not of the correctional facility's making.
- Because the incident involves terrorism, its newsworthiness will likely be magnified to a degree that correctional facility staff may find unimaginable. The coverage of the event will be international, and the scrutiny will likely continue for months rather than hours or days.
- The involvement of elected political officials will likely increase, both at the local, state, and federal levels at the correctional facility.

These circumstances will strain the correctional facility's resources and its emotional stability at a time when it is trying to return to normal operations and can ill afford additional pressures, tensions, or other internal or external risk factors. For a correctional facility attempting to recover from a high-profile terrorist incident, the following areas and functions will be critical:

- A sophisticated long-term public information operation
- Ongoing emergency staff services (ESS)
- Frequent and scheduled communication with staff and the incarcerated population
- Stepdown planning (returning the correctional facility to normal operations)

- Critical incident review (an analysis of the nature of the incident and identifying lessons learned)
- Assessment and repair of damage to the correctional facility

## Drills and Exercises

Without drills or exercises, counterterrorism measures will be largely useless, as is true for other types of emergency planning if drills or exercises are not conducted. All staff must receive training, and testing of procedures and other measures that are developed is vital to ensure a correctional facility is prepared. Part of the reason for testing is to help staff become comfortable and familiar with procedures and measures. The other primary purpose is for administrators to determine whether these procedures and measures can be put into practice under realistic conditions and, to the extent possible, whether they are effective in accomplishing their goals and objectives.

One warning must be added. It is easy to design a terrorism scenario or exercise that is overwhelming and frightening rather than challenging and realistic. Terrorism is inherently a dramatic and compelling topic for most people, especially correctional staff, who are likely to find themselves on the front lines in the event of a terrorist attack. However, the point of exercises and drills is to test individual components of a counterterrorism system and build staff confidence through success. A practice scenario that begins with a tactical nuclear weapon exploding in the main dining room of a large correctional facility is unlikely to test anything worthwhile or advance staff confidence.

Almost every issue listed in this section is a vital element of a correctional facility's general emergency planning, and an effective emergency preparedness system must be the foundation of any correctional facility's counterterrorism plan. It makes little sense for correctional facilities with almost nothing in the area of emergency preparedness, or those with emergency plans and procedures that are outdated or ineffective, to embark on a counterterrorism initiative that will be demanding of time, money, effort, and other resources. The end result would be a narrowly designed system that is only prepared to respond to terrorist activity, the probability of which at any correctional facility is extremely rare. For correctional facilities that neglect emergency planning, the threat of terrorism should serve as a wake-up call to begin developing comprehensive emergency preparedness systems that also incorporate counterterrorist planning.

Correctional facilities offer many opportunities for assisting with national security efforts, including in intelligence gathering, participation in JTTFs, and being prepared in the event of a terrorist attack on a correctional facility. As such, correctional facilities have the potential to function as an important and major component of the nation's counterterrorism response.

## Terrorism-Specific Checklists

See "How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists" beginning on page 27.

### I. Consideration of Terrorist Strategies

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Have the department and correctional facilities planned for the possibility that correctional facilities might be targeted for a terrorist attack?				
B. Have the department and correctional facilities planned for and analyzed the potential for terrorists to target correctional facilities for mass escape?				
C. Have the department and correctional facilities planned for and analyzed the potential for terrorist groups to recruit "soldiers" from the incarcerated population and correctional staff?				
D. Have the department and correctional facilities planned for and analyzed the potential for a security threat group (STG) composed of incarcerated individuals to affiliate with a terrorist organization or to plan terrorist activity on its own?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
E. Have the department and correctional facilities assessed the presence of domestic violent extremists that may be housed in their correctional facilities?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## II. Emergency Plans

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the correctional facility have specific emergency plans for responding to a physical assault from outside the correctional facility?				
B. Does the correctional facility have emergency plans for responding to a biological attack on the correctional facility?				
C. Does the correctional facility have emergency plans for responding to a biological attack in the community?				
D. Does the correctional facility have emergency plans for responding to a chemical attack on the correctional facility?				
E. Does the correctional facility have emergency plans for responding to a chemical attack in the community?				
F. Does the correctional facility have emergency plans for responding to a suspicious package or substance received by an individual staff member or inside the correctional facility's mailroom?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
G. Does the correctional facility emergency plan specify how to isolate and treat staff who may have been contaminated?				
H. Do correctional facility emergency plans specify how to preserve crime scenes and protect evidence?				
I. Does the correctional facility have emergency plans which describe steps to take in the event of a mass casualty emergency?				
J. Does the correctional facility have emergency plans which specify how daily operations will be carried out during a utility failure?				
K. Do the department's central office and the correctional facility have plans for responding to a cyberattack?				
L. Does the correctional facility have emergency plans for responding to bomb threats?				
M. Does the correctional facility have emergency plans that specify how to respond if an explosive device is found or detonated?				
N. Does the correctional facility emergency plans specify where incarcerated individuals are to be evacuated, if necessary, in the event of a terrorist attack?				
O. Do correctional facility emergency plans specify what will be done regarding staff families in the event of a terrorist attack in the community?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
P. Do correctional facility emergency plans specify how to respond to an aircraft or vehicle impact or explosion?				
Q. Do the central office and the correctional facility have a plan for operating with reduced staffing levels if a terrorist attack in the community prevents staff from reporting to work?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

### III. Mitigation

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Do post orders specifically require perimeter officers to monitor the exterior of the correctional facility to detect unusual activities?				
B. Are staff trained to report unusual activities on the exterior of the correctional facility?				
C. Is there a policy that explains how to respond to unusual activity or trespassers on the exterior of the correctional facility?				
D. Are specially selected and trained counterterrorism staff assigned to armed posts?				
E. Are food and water storage areas secured and protected from outside tampering?				
F. In the event of an emergency, is there a 72-hour food and water supply for both staff and incarcerated individuals? If not, have arrangements been made with an outside source?				
G. Have arrangements been made for critical equipment and supplies (sanitation stations, portable toilets, portable showers, and so forth) in the event of an emergency?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
H. Are deliveries closely inspected and screened before they enter the correctional facility?				
I. Are vendors and contractors required to submit to background checks before they enter the correctional facility?				
J. Are staff and visitor ID badges checked and are searches conducted at entry points into the correctional facility?				
K. Are contractors required to sign for blueprints and site plans and return them to the correctional facility after projects are completed?				
L. In an emergency when there is a loss of power, is there enough fuel on hand to run emergency generators for 72 hours?				
M. Are emergency generators and regular power and water supplies outside the perimeter secured from public access?				
N. Is there a plan for staff to be available to operate the power plant emergency generators and water supply in an emergency?				
O. Are the front entrances and vehicle sally ports monitored by video cameras? Has the correctional facility analyzed its vulnerability to car bombs or vehicle intrusion and erected vehicle barriers to mitigate high-risk threats?				
P. Does the correctional facility have onsite explosive detection and X-ray equipment? If not, is there a written agreement with an outside agency to provide this service if needed?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
Q. Are National Crime Information Center (NCIC) checks conducted on all new staff and on a recurring schedule thereafter?				
R. Is staff parking separated from visitor parking?				
S. Can the staff parking area be readily secured under emergency conditions?				
T. Are procedures for the escort or travel orders of high-risk incarcerated individuals reviewed annually?				
U. Are visitor vehicle license plates checked at random periodically for outstanding arrest warrants?				
V. Do the site plans show the correctional facility "as built" rather than "as designed"?				
W. Does the correctional facility have video or photographs of each building, with indications of square footage, distances, utilities, entry and egress points, keys, phones, and so forth?				
X. Do staff check visitor areas (including lockers) before and after each visitation period?				
Y. Does the correctional facility update its staff emergency notification and information sheets at least annually and keep staff photos current?				
Z. Are staff encouraged to maintain a personal emergency preparedness checklist in their home?				
AA. In the event of an emergency, are utility shut-off locations available to responding staff, police, fire, and utility company staff?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
BB. In the event of an emergency, are correctional facility staff trained to shut off the utility?				
CC. In the event of an emergency, do authorized personnel have 24-hour access to building plans?				
DD. In the event of an emergency, are special ID cards available to expedite entry of outside emergency personnel?				
EE. In the event of a heightened terrorism alert, are there plans for increased perimeter security patrols?				
FF. In the event of a heightened terrorist alert, are there plans to provide special armament and equipment to perimeter patrol staff and traffic checkpoint staff?				
GG. Does equipment for these staff members include rifle, shotgun, sidearm, aerosol chemical agent, flashlight, lantern, fluorescent vest or jacket, protective vest, and handcuffs or flex cuffs?				
HH. Are there at least four pairs of flex cuffs for each incarcerated individual?				
II. Are driver photographs, driver license numbers, and truck license plate numbers for regular delivery vehicles available to correctional facility staff at extended traffic control checkpoints?				
JJ. Is an area identified for offloading deliveries and supplies outside the correctional facility's secure perimeter, and is there a plan to use this area if necessary?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
KK. Does the correctional facility's inventory of vehicles include license plate numbers, and is it updated at least annually?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** **MC**—Meets Criterion; **PM**—Partially Met; **NM**—Not Met; **NA**—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** **OB** - Observed; **DR** - Document Review; **SI** - Staff Interview; **III** - Incarcerated Individual Interview; **OT** - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## IV. Security Threat Groups (STGs)

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

**Note:** This checklist is also found in *Section 3: General Self-Audit Checklists*. The items in this version of the checklist refer to incarcerated individuals with ties to terrorism and should not be taken to mean that the audit should be conducted twice.

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the correctional facility have an Investigations and Intelligence Unit that monitors Security Threat Group (STG) organizations and participants?				
B. Does the Investigations and Intelligence Unit have confidential informants?				
C. Is there a phone number for confidential informants to contact the Investigations and Intelligence Unit staff directly to report information?				
D. Is there a process in place to keep STG groups or individuals separated or managed when safety concerns arise?				
E. Are all staff trained to recognize STGs through language used, signs, and tattoos?				
F. Are possible threats by STGs regularly identified and monitored?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
G. Do line staff, program staff, and others monitor and report STG activities and potential recruitment activities?				
H. Are staff aware of significant holidays observed by STGs, and do they monitor activities of STG members during those times?				
I. Are the mailroom staff trained to monitor written materials for STG activity?				
J. Are STG member phone calls monitored more frequently than phone calls for incarcerated individuals in the general population?				
K. Is incoming mail for confirmed or suspected STG members monitored more frequently or more closely than mail for general population incarcerated individuals?				
L. Is there a reporting protocol established with the FBI, state bureau of investigation, and local law enforcement regarding STGs and members?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## V. Visitation

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

**Note:** This checklist, with minor changes in verbiage, is also found in *Section 3: General Self-Audit Checklists*. The items in this version of the checklist refer to incarcerated individuals with ties to terrorism and should not be taken to mean that the audit should be conducted twice.

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Are visitors of incarcerated individuals with ties to terrorism checked for outstanding arrest warrants?				
B. Are visitors of incarcerated individuals with ties to terrorism checked against a database of formerly incarcerated individuals with ties to terrorism?				
C. Are visitors of incarcerated individuals with ties to terrorism screened and approved by the local Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) prior to being placed on an approved visiting list?				
D. Are visitors of STG members or associates (as well as other high-risk incarcerated individuals with ties to terrorism) subjected to a higher level of screening and security checks than general population visitors?				
E. Are visits involving an incarcerated individual with ties to terrorism randomly monitored for conversation content?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
F. Are visits of high-risk incarcerated individuals with ties to terrorism monitored more frequently or more closely for conversation content than visits of incarcerated individuals in the general population?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## VI. Telephone Calls

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

**Note:** This checklist, with minor changes in verbiage, is also found in *Section 3: General Self-Audit Checklists*. The items in this version of the checklist refer to incarcerated individuals with ties to terrorism and should not be taken to mean that the audit should be conducted twice.

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Are phone calls restricted to an approved list of persons for each incarcerated individual with ties to terrorism or STG members or affiliates?				
B. Are approved persons on the phone lists of incarcerated individuals with ties to terrorism screened for warrants?				
C. Are persons on the phone lists of incarcerated individuals with ties to terrorism screened against a database of formerly incarcerated individuals?				
D. Are persons on the phone list of a high-risk incarcerated individual with ties to terrorism subjected to a higher level of security screening than persons on the phone list of an individual in the general population?				
E. Is there a standard for the percentage of monitoring telephone conversations of incarcerated individuals?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
F. Is there a standard for the percentage of monitoring telephone conversations specific to incarcerated individuals with ties to terrorism or STG member affiliates?				
G. Are the phone conversations of incarcerated individuals with ties to terrorism monitored more frequently than the phone conversations of individuals in the general population?				
H. Are all phone conversations of incarcerated individuals with ties to terrorism electronically recorded to provide a perpetual database of at least 10 days' duration?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## VII. Mail

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

**Note:** This checklist is also found in *Section 3: General Self-Audit Checklists*. The items in this version of the checklist refer to incarcerated individuals with ties to terrorism and should not be taken to mean that the audit should be conducted twice.

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the correctional facility have written policy and procedures in place for monitoring mail to and from incarcerated individuals identified as having ties to terrorism or security threat groups (STGs)?				
B. Is mail to incarcerated individuals with ties to terrorism or STGs monitored for coded information or information on activity related to terrorism, contraband introduction, planned disturbances, or other illegal activity?				
C. Are publications affiliated or associated with terrorist or STG groups or activities identified?				
D. Is mail for high-risk incarcerated individuals subjected to a higher level of screening than mail for individuals in the general population?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
E. Is there a protocol for reporting adverse or potentially dangerous terrorist or STG information obtained from the mail of incarcerated individuals?				
F. Do mailroom staff use safety equipment (gloves, masks) when handling the mail of incarcerated individuals?				
G. Is Narcan readily available in cases of accidental exposure to drugs coming in through the mail?				
H. Do mail room staff have a process for detecting drugs that may be soaked or hidden on incoming mail?				
I. Have mailroom staff had hazmat training or conducted a hazmat drill within the last 12 months involving exposure to dangerous substances?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## VIII. Response to a Terrorism Incident in the Community

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the correctional facility have a plan for supplying the community with food and other provisions when the correctional facility has not been directly affected?				
B. Does the correctional facility have a plan for loaning out staff in response to a community terrorism incident when manpower is available but not yet needed at the correctional facility?				
B1. Does the correctional facility have a plan to supply medical staff or equipment to the community that may not be needed imminently at the correctional facility?				
B2. Does the correctional facility have a plan to send specialized teams such as CERT to assist in a community terrorist incident should those teams not be needed at the correctional facility?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
C. Does the correctional facility have a plan to make suitable incarcerated individuals available to the community to assist with cleanup?				
D. Does the correctional facility have a plan to make transportation available to the community if needed?				
E. Do the correctional facility's emergency preparedness specialists train with the local and state emergency management agencies at least annually?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## IX. Correctional Facility Intelligence Function

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the correctional facility have an identified intelligence operation?				
B. Have intake officers been trained to detect visual cues, such as tattoos or markings, which may indicate gang involvement or affiliation?				
C. Are tattoos and markings photographed, and are the photos shared with gang intelligence personnel assigned to your correctional facility or other local agencies who may have a designated unit?				
D. Are your intake personnel trained and skilled to interview newly admitted incarcerated individuals?				
E. Is information that is obtained at the intake or cell block level forwarded up the chain of command to ensure action is taken?				
F. Does department-level policy or procedure specify coordination of correctional facility intelligence operations?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
G. Have staff assigned to the intelligence function received training in identifying gang-affiliated incarcerated individuals, sovereign citizens, and possible terrorists or domestic violent extremists?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## X. Response to Notification or Suspicion of Terrorist Threats

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Does the correctional facility have different levels of alert (or readiness) related to terrorist threats defined in policy?				
B. Does the correctional facility have different levels of alert (or readiness) related to terrorist threats specified in its emergency plans?				
C. In responding to notification of a credible and serious terrorist threat, does the correctional facility have emergency policies/plans which specify the following: C1. Security for correctional facility parking areas?				
C2. Methods to increase screening of delivery vehicles?				
C3. Methods to increase security of mail and package delivery and storage?				
C4. Provisions for increasing security of vehicles on correctional facility grounds?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
C5. Procedures for identifying or locating abandoned packages, suitcases, and so forth?				
C6. Procedures for verifying staff and visitor identification?				
C7. A plan to reduce access control points to the correctional facility?				
C8. A plan to increase requirements for admittance to the property?				
C9. A plan to increase inspections of all internal and external physical premises?				
C10. A plan to arm (or increase the arming of) the perimeter security patrols?				
C11. Provisions for erecting temporary vehicle barriers?				
C12. Procedures for informing staff families (if staff housing exists) about receipt of suspicious packages or mail?				
C13. Provisions for increasing liaison communication with local, tribal, state, or federal law enforcement?				
C14. Plans to move vehicles, crates, large trash receptacles, and other things that could conceal explosives or weapons away from buildings and critical areas?				
C15. Provisions for increasing external security patrols?				
C16. Plans to place emergency specialists on standby?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
C17. Plans to suspend the programs of incarcerated individuals, outside work details, onsite construction, and so forth?				
C18. Plans to notify contractors, vendors, or visitors of restricted or cancelled access?				
C19. A plan to move into hard lockdown conditions?				
C20. A plan to establish a traffic control point (or to move it further away from the correctional facility)?				
C21. A plan to increase information technology or computer security?				
C22. A plan to increase security checks of vehicles, visitors, packages, staff, and so forth?				
C23. A plan to notify staff and staff families (if staff housing exists) of higher alert levels to reduce rumors and family anxiety?				
C24. A plan to add security for and decrease access to critical resource areas?				
C25. A plan to discontinue all transfers in or out of incarcerated individuals, and a plan to transport incarcerated individuals to community hospitals and courts only in emergency situations?				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
D. Is there a protocol established for reporting and communicating relevant terrorist information to local, state, or federal law enforcement?				

**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## XI. Response to a Cyberattack

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A. Have the correctional facility's and the department's central office analyzed vulnerabilities to cyberattacks?				
B. Have the correctional facility and the central office identified crucial records and crucial databases?				
C. Have the correctional facility and the central office designated "hot sites" (locations with an operating computer system that can accept and maintain software or database information from a disabled site) distant from their own locations?				
D. Are all crucial databases and records within the department backed up offsite?				
E. Are there detailed plans for data recovery?				
F. Are there detailed plans for operating with primary servers, databases, and programs disabled?				


**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_



# Section 6:

## Summary of Noncompliance Items



## Summary of Noncompliance Items

The purpose of this summary is to list all items that did not fully meet criteria and to explain the reasons for noncompliance. Management will use this summary in its review of the audit results.

**Title:** \_\_\_\_\_

Auditor: _____	Page _____ of _____
Date: _____	

NC #	Item Description	Reason for Noncompliance	Assigned to	Due Date	Approved by	Approval Date
<b>Status:</b>						
<b>Method:</b>						


NC #	Item Description	Reason for Noncompliance	Assigned to	Due Date	Approved by	Approval Date
<b>Status:</b>  <b>Method:</b>						
<b>Status:</b>  <b>Method:</b>						

NC #	Item Description	Reason for Noncompliance	Assigned to	Due Date	Approved by	Approval Date
<b>Status:</b>  <b>Method:</b>						
<b>Status:</b>  <b>Method:</b>						

NC #	Item Description	Reason for Noncompliance	Assigned to	Due Date	Approved by	Approval Date
<b>Status:</b>						
<b>Method:</b>						

**Review of all items on this page completed? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_**

Name: _____	Date: _____
Signature: _____	



# Appendix A:

## Blank Checklist



## Blank Checklist

**Directions:** The selection of self-audit checklists included above is not meant to be exhaustive. A correctional facility may have emergency preparedness needs beyond what this guide presents, or additional topics may occur to an administration. With this in mind, the blank checklist below has been provided, with the same fields as those above, so that by following the instructions in *Section 2: Conducting an Audit*, an audit team may address additional emergency preparedness topics.

## Type of Checklist: \_\_\_\_\_

Correctional Facility: _____	Department: _____
Team Leader: _____	
Audit Team: _____	

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
A.				
B.				
C.				
D.				
E.				
F.				
G.				
H.				

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Criterion	Status	Method	Comments	NC#
I.				
J.				
K.				
L.				
M.				
N.				
O.				
P.				
Q.				
R.				
S.				


**Note:** After completing the checklist, refer to the Summary of Noncompliance Items (Section 6). Instructions for completing the Summary of Noncompliance Items are found on pages 30–31.

**Status:** MC—Meets Criterion; PM—Partially Met; NM—Not Met; NA—Not Applicable

**Evaluation Methodology:** OB - Observed; DR - Document Review; SI - Staff Interview; III - Incarcerated Individual Interview; OT - Other (specify)

**NC# Boxes:** See Section 2: Conducting an Audit, How to Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 16.

AUDITOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_



## Appendix B: Resources



## Resources

### External Link: Leadership During a Crisis

Michael E. Saltz's master thesis, [Crisis Leadership and Complex Crises: A Search for Competencies](#) (2017), examines leaders' actions and decisions during crises involving multi-agency responses.


### NIMS/ICS Resources

NIMS Guide: [National Incident Management System \(fema.gov\)](#)

FEMA Incident Action Planning Guide: [Incident Action Planning Guide Revision 1 / July 2015 \(fema.gov\)](#)

It is highly recommended that staff be trained in the following NIMS/ICS core curriculum courses, some of which can be completed through the FEMA Emergency Management Institute's (EMI) Independent Study (IS) program. Others will need to be completed through in-person training sessions.

- [IS-100: Introduction to the Incident Command System, ICS 100](#)
- [IS-200: Basic ICS for Initial Response, ICS-200](#)
- [E0300: Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents](#)
- [G0400: Advanced ICS for Complex Incidents](#)
- [IS-700: An Introduction to the NIMS](#)
- [IS-703: NIMS Resource Management](#)
- [IS-706: NIMS Intrastate Mutual Aid – An Introduction](#)
- [IS-800: National Response Framework, An Introduction](#)
- [E0191: Emergency Operations Center/Incident Command System Interface](#)
- [G0402: NIMS Overview for Senior Officials \(Executives, Elected, & Appointed\)](#)
- [E/L/G-2300: Intermediate Emergency Operations Center Functions](#)
- [Senior Leader Toolkit | FEMA.gov](#)
- [National Disaster & Emergency Management University](#)
- [Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program | FEMA.gov](#)



# Appendix C:

## Glossary of Terms



## Appendix C: Glossary of Terms

**After-action report:** See *critical incident review*.

**Chain of command:** A hierarchical order of authority from line level staff up to the highest level of management in which authority and communications flow. It outlines levels of authority and responsibility with each level reporting to the next.

**Chain of custody:** Procedures and documentation that verify who is in possession of evidence, the location of the evidence, and the integrity of the evidence at every point in time.

**Central office:** Also referred to as sheriff command or headquarters, it is a centralized location outside of the correctional facility or detention center where administrative, operational, and decision-making functions are coordinated and managed during emergencies in support of an emergency at a correctional facility. It serves as a hub for communication, resource allocation, and strategic planning to ensure effective incident management and response.

**Command post:** The location from which the emergency operation is directed and controlled. It is almost always in or at the correctional facility experiencing the emergency and is the place from which the incident commander works.

**Contingent contracting:** Also known as a memorandum of understanding (MOU), it is a formal agreement for crucial services that may be required only during or after an emergency. Typically, the agreement includes either an annual retainer or a rate of compensation that is substantially above market to guarantee that the correctional facility will receive highest priority for the services or equipment in an emergency.

**Correctional emergency response team (CERT):** See *tactical team*.

**Cover group:** A group of staff sent to the location of a reported emergency, with responsibility for isolating and containing the emergency.

**Critical incident review:** A comprehensive and factual review of a major emergency, with emphasis on lessons learned. Also referred to by some agencies as an "after-action report."

**Critical indicator system:** A mathematical or other analytic procedure that produces a summary of the frequency of certain events and the trend of those frequencies over time. Such events may include grievances per month, assaults between incarcerated individuals per month, disciplinary actions placed on incarcerated individuals per month, or percentage of incarcerated individuals in protective custody by month.

**Deactivation checklist:** A list of actions and procedures to be followed immediately after the resolution of a major emergency. See also *stepdown plan*.

**Disturbance control team:** A sublethal force team or riot squad that is trained to clear a yard or retake a cell block when there is a disturbance by incarcerated individuals. A disturbance control

team usually trains with shields, batons, and chemical agents. It is distinguished from a tactical team that trains with firearms.

**Emergency operations center (EOC):** A physical location—a situation room or "war room" set up and staffed to provide high-level administrative support in an emergency, usually at a headquarters or a sheriff's administrative office. The EOC is distinguished from a command post, which is usually set up onsite to direct emergency operations.

**Emergency post orders:** A job description for a specialized function that exists only in an emergency or for a function that is different during an emergency than it is day-to-day.

**Emergency staff services (ESS):** A planned operation providing comprehensive support and assistance to traumatized staff members and families of staff during and after an emergency. Emergency staff services should include, but not necessarily be limited to, psychological screening, post trauma counseling for staff, assistance for staff families, and aid in filing for insurance and other benefits.

**Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA):** The federal agency charged with building and supporting the nation's emergency management system. By law, each state must maintain a state emergency management agency that coordinates with FEMA.

**Fire loading:** The amount of potentially combustible material available to contribute to the growth of a fire. In correctional facilities, this term is often used to refer to the amount of personal property (magazines, clothing, and so forth) that incarcerated individuals have in their cells, but it also includes material in corridors, storerooms, or anywhere else a fire might reach.

**First responder system:** A system in which specific staff are designated as initial responders to an alarm, fight, or other such incident and other staff are held in reserve as second responders. First responder systems include a variety of methods other than the old and traditional approach that calls for every available staff member in the correctional facility to drop everything and run to the incident as soon as an alarm goes off.

**Hazardous materials (hazmat) team:** A team that is trained to deal with toxic gas releases, chemical spills, and so forth. Hazmat teams may be public or private and vary widely in training and capabilities.

**\*Incident Command System (ICS):** A standardized on-scene emergency management construct specifically designed to provide for the adoption of an integrated organizational structure that reflects the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. ICS is the combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure, designed to aid in the management of resources during incidents. ICS is used by various jurisdictions and functional agencies, both public and private, to organize field-level incident management operations.

**\*Incident Commander (IC):** The person responsible for all incident activities, including the development of strategies and tactics and the ordering and release of resources. The IC has

overall authority and responsibility for conducting incident operations and is responsible for the management of all incident operations at the incident site.

**Initial response checklist:** Also known as "command post checklist." A prioritized list of actions to be taken by the initial commander at the onset of an emergency. The checklist should include columns for initials and time next to each item. It is generic rather than specific to a particular type of emergency.

**Intelligence function:** In day-to-day operations, a person or persons in charge of coordinating information about certain types of security threats and problems for the entire correctional facility. In an emergency, the intelligence function is an operation designed to help resolve the situation by developing information about motives, plans, and identities of the incarcerated individuals or victims involved.

**\*National Incident Management Systems (NIMS):** Provides a systematic, proactive approach that guides government agencies at all levels, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations to work seamlessly to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, to reduce the loss of life or property and harm to the environment.

**Planned use of force:** The use of force in a situation where time and circumstances allow some degree of planning, marshaling of resources, and supervisory or management review and direction. The opposite of *reactive use of force*.

**Plot map:** Also called a "plat map" or a "platte map." For a correctional facility, a map or diagram of the grounds or compound showing buildings, fences, and other developments to scale. "As-built" plans and diagrams often differ from "initial design" plans and diagrams; current, as-built plans and diagrams are preferable for almost all emergency purposes.

**Risk assessment:** An examination of a correctional facility's relative exposure to various types of emergencies. Determines which emergencies are most probable and which areas of the correctional facility are most vulnerable. See also *vulnerability analysis*.

**Safe harbor:** See *shelter-in-place*.

**Shelter-in-place:** Also called *safe harbor*. An alternate strategy to mass evacuation of a correctional facility to another location, used when time and circumstances make mass evacuation impractical. This strategy differs with type of emergency but usually involves concentrating incarcerated individuals and staff in the easiest locations to defend and then further mitigating risks with equipment, supplies, or specialized procedures.

**Special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team:** See *tactical team*.

**Stepdown plan:** A plan for how a correctional facility will return to normal operations after an emergency. A stepdown plan may last for days, weeks, or even months. See also *deactivation checklist*.

**Sublethal force:** Force that is not reasonably expected to produce death or permanent bodily injury. Sublethal force includes use of chemical agents, pain-compliance holds, batons, electronic immobilizing devices, water hoses, and so forth. Also referred to as "less than lethal" or "less lethal" force.

**Tabletop exercise:** A planned activity in which a small group of correctional facility staff is presented with a simulated emergency situation. The exercise is conducted either verbally or with paper and pencil in an office setting; it does not involve role-playing, use of actual correctional facilities, or resources from external agencies.

**Tactical team:** A weapons team trained for situations such as hostage rescue and firearms assault. Distinguished from a *disturbance control team* or *sublethal force team*. Many tactical teams are called SWAT (special weapons and tactics team) or CERT (correctional emergency response team) or are referred to by some similar acronym.


**Tone:** The "climate" or interpersonal atmosphere of a correctional facility, sensed by experienced staff when walking through the correctional facility.

**Turnout gear:** Outer clothing worn for firefighting, typically a jacket and pants, worn with a hat and high boots. Key characteristics are a waterproof or water-resistant outer fabric and the ability to protect the skin from burns and blistering due to radiant heat.

**Vulnerability analysis:** A detailed review of a correctional facility's areas, functions, people, equipment, procedures, and so forth to determine relative risks and the attractiveness of various targets. This term is commonly used with regard to counterterrorism activities, whereas *risk assessment*, a similar concept, is more frequently used with regard to general emergency preparedness and natural disasters.

\*ICS-300: Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents (Student Manual) Version 2.0, April 2008

U.S. Department of Homeland Security; FEMA



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Saltz, Michael E. 2017. *Crisis leadership and complex crises: a search for competencies*. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, December. <https://archive.org/details/crisisleadership1094556798/crisisleadership1094556798/>.

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