THE COLLEGE

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The College

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The College is a publication for friends of St. John's College and for those who might become friends of the College, if they came to know it. Our aim is to indicate, within the limitations of the magazine form, why, in our opinion, St. John's comes closer than any other college in the nation to being what a college should be.

If ever well-placed beacon lights were needed by American education it is now. By publishing articles about the work of the College, articles reflecting the distinctive life of the mind that is the College, we hope to add a watt or two to the beacon light that is St. John's.

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

In the July Issue:

Noun and Verb*

By EDWARD G. SPARROW

I. Introduction

This lecture is the fruit of reflecting on form in language. Some of the questions I have asked myself and tried to answer in this lecture are these: 1) What status do the entities and distinctions traditionally used by grammarians to explain form in language really have? I am referring here to such entities as nouns and verbs, subjects, predicates, and objects, and to such distinctions as those between transitive and intransitive verbs and direct and indirect objects. 2) If these entities and distinctions do not exist in and of themselves, can any account be given of form in language at all? 3) If so, how should such an account be framed?

This lecture has three parts: a neutral part, a constructive part, and a conclusion. The neutral part is an investigation of verbal communication and a spelling out of some consequences, destructive as well as instructive, that are the results of that investigation. The constructive part is an attempt to build on the results of that investigation. The conclusion considers the meaning of the word "ungrammatical" and briefly examines one relation between the semantic and the grammatical.

Let me apologize in advance for my use later on of familiar words with unfamiliar meanings. They were the best I could find. Please believe my fervent hope that the context and the definitions I give of them will clothe them with intelligibility.

II. Neutral Part

A. *An Investigation of Verbal Communication*

The words we speak do not carry their meanings with them. This is an obvious remark, but a very important one. Words may be winged, but they are not carrier pigeons. This is to say that when one hears a word, he does not hear a meaning along with the sounds he hears. Nothing is transmitted from speaker to hearer in speech except sound waves. This remark is so important and fundamental that I must repeat it. Nothing is transmitted from one person to another when they talk to one another except sound waves. This means that there is not, nor can there be, any *transmission* of "information," that no "communication" *passes* from one person to another, and that no "messages" can ever, as we say, *get across* in any spatio-temporal sense.

If this were not the case there would be no such thing for us as a new word. The meaning of the new word would be borne into us along with its sound. This would, in turn, eliminate the gap between meaning and sound. But this gap cannot be eliminated, for it is to it that we refer when we say, "What does such and such mean?" when we hear a new word. Since all of us have had the experience of hearing new words, therefore, words do not carry their meanings with them.

Let me add that it is a good thing that this is the case. Teaching would be admittedly easier if a teacher could form the minds of his students just by speaking meanings. But in the first place, the price would be high: a student completely at the mercy of his teacher. And thus, in the second place, anything would have to be as true as anything else.

But people do communicate with one another by means of words. And so, if words do not carry meanings, there must be another account of verbal communication. There is such an account, and it is psychological.

Communication consists of shared meanings. But since the meanings which the hearer comes to share with the speaker cannot proceed from the speaker into the hearer, as we have seen, we must say that these meanings must be already in some way in the hearer and brought to his consciousness through association with the sounds he hears. The effect of speaking and hearing words must somehow be to stir up these meanings within the hearer so as to have them come to his consciousness. Speaking words is the production of sounds for the hearer to associate with meanings. It is the making of occasions for the coming to the consciousness of the hearer of the same meanings as those which were, and still remain, in the mind of the speaker. Thus words, as words, and not as sounds merely, are born twice: once in the souls of speakers when they enunciate sounds which they have associated with their meanings, and once again in the souls of hearers

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when they have associated those same sounds with the meanings they already possessed.

And so we say that human beings signify and that sounds do not. Men, in other words, and not discourse, are significant. The human activity of signification, word-birth, is the association of the meanings which we already have within ourselves with the sounds that habit and convention have put at our disposal. And thus although words *in themselves* are indeed nothing but sounds, they do become words *in us* when we associate them with the meanings in our possession.

But what are these meanings in our possession? Are they all of the same kind and comparable with one another? When we think of what a meaning is, we may tend to think more or less clear and distinct ideas such as are named by the sounds "dog" or "anthropos," each of them with what one might call a determinate notional content, a "whatness." However, when we reflect on some of the prefixes and suffixes of English, or on the multiform endings, reduplications, augments, or internal changes in the words of synthetic languages, it becomes evident that elements such as "-ness" in English, or the "-s" characteristic of the third person singular of the verb, or such sounds as "*-οιμι*" or "*-οντα*," are also associated with some kind of meaning. That is, he who hears these sounds associates them with something. But the meanings which come to mind with such suffixes, etc., are somewhat different from those which come to mind with such sounds as "dog" or "anthropos." They seem to lack the determinate notional content, the "whatness," that is to be found in meanings such as "dog."

I should like to mention a few of these special meanings, all of them very familiar to you, in order that our understanding of verbal communication may become somewhat enlarged. I shall merely list them here according to the different kinds of sound elements (or lack of sound elements), with which they are usually associated.

Some of them, paradoxically, have no special sound element associated with them at all, but instead hover, as it were, under and around the edges of the ordinary meanings. For example, if we think the meaning *dog*, we will find that under or around it there are at least two other meanings present. First, that a dog is a being; and second, that a dog can somehow be thought of as by itself. I shall call *meanings* that can be thought of as by themselves by the word "subjects" from now on this evening. Hence when you hear me use the sound "subject" in this lecture, you are not to think of "subject" in the sense in which we sometimes speak of the subject of a sentence or the subject of a predicate, on both of which occasions we say that a given word is a subject. I am speaking of *meanings*, not words, when I speak of subjects. This is of absolutely central importance for understanding this lecture.

Similarly, if we consider the meaning named by "runs" we will find that under or around it also there are other meanings present. It, too, is a being; unlike "dog," though, it cannot be thought of as by itself; rather, the action of "runs" can only be thought of as in a runner, a subject; and it is an action-meaning, that is, the sound "runs" names an action. From now on I shall call meanings that can be thought of only as in subjects "adjects." Adjects are not to be confused with "adjectives." "Adjective" is something that is usually said of a word; for example, "Blue is an adjective" we would say in parsing. But I am speaking here, as above, when I spoke of subjects, not of words but of *meanings*, specifically meanings which can only be thought of as in subjects.

The same holds true if we consider the meanings named by "blue," by "five," and by "between." Each of these meanings is a being, each one is an adject, and the first is a quality-adject, the second a quantity-adject, and the third a locality-adject.

But commonly special meanings are not hidden under ordinary meanings but are rather associated with special sounds which occur before or after the ordinary meaning sounds, i.e., prefixes and suffixes. The Greek augment is a sound associated with a distinct meaning in the meaning of the sound to which it is attached. What is meant by "love" in "They love," differs from what is meant by "loving" in "Loving is suffering." In the example of "loving" the special meaning of subject has replaced the special meaning of adject which was in the meaning of "love." This change was accomplished by the addition of the sound "-ing." It so happens that that sound, in this context, is associated with the special meaning of subject in the sound to which it is added.

A change within the sound itself, as in the so-called "subjunctive forms" of certain Greek words, the lengthened *ω* or *η*, can be associated with the different desires a speaker might have in speaking to his hearers.

The order of sounds, also, as in the case of interrogation, can be associated with a distinct special meaning. "You do love me" means something different from "Do you love me?" and word order has turned the trick. Similarly, "John loves Mary" means something different from "Mary loves John," and it is the difference in the word order that is associated with the difference in the meaning.

Even separate sound elements, with which no ordinary meaning of their own is associated, are often associated with having another ordinary meaning appear under a special aspect. Thus one who hears the English sound "than" comes to view the subject named after it in the light of its being the standard to which the subject named before it is compared.

Still other separate sounds are associated with these special meanings only, and thus not only are themselves not associated with ordinary meanings, but are also not even associated with having the ordinary meanings of the words around them appear under a special aspect. Thus in English, and in other languages to a lesser extent, the sounds called "relative pronouns" are only associated with

the special meanings of subject, or object, and number. The hearer's memory and the context must provide further intelligibility.

Tone of voice may be associated with interrogation. It may also be associated with negation of the totality of a meaning, as in scarcasm.

So much for a very partial first glimpse at these special meanings and at the means by which they are signified. As we shall see, there are many groups and kinds of them and, like "ordinary" meanings, they exist in the minds of all of us, waiting to be brought to consciousness by hearing the sounds or other elements with which they are by custom associated. There is no way to put them into our minds if they are not there already, for they seem to be prior to experience and are surely prior to language. As we grow in maturity, we gradually learn to associate them with all the vocal devices mentioned above plus a good many more, such as accent, melody, gesture, clothing, etc. Thus we may say that a given language bears the same relation to the network of ordinary and special meanings which communicants have at their disposal, that a given amount of grains of sand bears to the network of vessels and tubing in which it happens to be located. All that is formal in language pre-exists language and is foreign to it. But more of this later.

I should like to call these special meanings "dimensions" of meanings or just "dimensions." I pick this word "dimensions" because it usually suggests something which, without impinging on the integrity of something already existing, yet can change or expand it in some way. I am aware of a danger that a dimension of a meaning may, in the case of subjects and adjects, be a part of the meaning of those subjects and adjects and not, as I have been suggesting, something separable from them. However, it seems to me on balance that the subjectness or adjectness of a meaning is sufficiently external to it, or distant from it, to allow the use of the term. I am moved to this decision by the fact that these special meanings can, in English and other languages, be independently signified by the addition of such sounds as "–ness," "–al," "–ize," or "–ly" to the sounds which are associated with the ordinary meanings.

The use of the word "dimension" may be more difficult to justify where it is used to identify such things as sentences, predicates, and objects. However, as we shall see later, this usage is not altogether far-fetched. When we call a group of sounds a sentence, a predicate, or an object, we are referring to something, to some meaning which comes to consciousness when we hear those sounds. This meaning is altogether different from the ordinary meanings of sounds such as "dog" or "anthropos." Yet it is what allows us to recognize those sentences, predicates, or objects as sentences, predicates, or objects.

I am taking as a necessary, though not sufficient, test of the presence of a dimension the futility of asking a question such as "What is such and such-ness?" about a given significant linguistic element. Such and such can be any significant linguistic element, from the suffix "–ing" to mere word order, as in "John loves." Thus the futility of asking "What is '–ing-ness'?" or "What is the position of 'John' before 'loves' –ness?" is a sign for me that the linguistic elements "–ing" and the position of "John" before "loves" are associated with dimensions of meanings rather than with ordinary meanings.

B. *Some Important Consequences*

There are some important consequences of the two positions affirmed so far for the study of form in language. The two positions are 1) that communications take place by the association of sounds with meanings, and 2) that meanings include the whole range of dimensions of meanings as well as ordinary meanings.

First, it becomes apparent that nothing stable or permanent can be said about words except insofar as they are sounds. We may, that is, speak about the length of words, their mellifluence, the number of their syllables, and their similarity to one another, all of them spatio-temporal predicates. But since they only become words in us and never are such in themselves, we cannot say anything about them that would be based on their being things in themselves apart from sounds. Hence we cannot ascribe to them natures as so-called "part of speech." We cannot say that they have "histories." They are incapable of entering into relationships. They cannot act in any way, i.e., they cannot "mean," "designate," "modify," "describe," or "point to." And they cannot be classified except into spatio-temporally defined classes. Thus they cannot be classed as "nouns," "adjectives," or "verbs," "finite," or "non-finite," "transitive," or "intransitive." Nor can they be identified as "subjects," "predicates," or "objects" or spoken of as grammatical or ungrammatical, acceptable or unacceptable. The activity of parsing, therefore, as it is usually understood, is necessarily an exercise in futility and frustration.

Thirdly, it is evident that any explanatory power or understanding which conventional grammatical categories had, and that any future attempt at making sense of form in language will want to have, must be rooted not in word classes but in classes of meanings and of dimensions of meanings. For words in themselves are nothing but sounds: their own proper being is to be articulated sound. Therefore there is not, nor can there be, such a thing as the science of grammar, if such a science be understood as something different from a science of meanings and dimensions of meanings. But the name of *that* science is logic.

III. Constructive Part

In this part of the lecture I should like to begin to clean up the *débris* by discussing what a study of this branch

of logic might begin with. I shall be concerned with the dimensions of meanings only, as a study of the meanings themselves would necessary involve a study of the deepest things, and, as we shall see, it is in association with the dimensions of the meanings more than with the meanings themselves, that form in language is grounded. I shall proceed *a priori* since what we are studying is not given in experience. I shall make a very rough ordering of the different dimensions and discuss a few.

Dimensions are dimensions of meanings, and are associated by convention with human vocal sounds. But human vocal sounds associated with meanings are speech, and speech is communicating something. Hence there are two main kinds of dimensions, those related to *communicating*, and those related to *something*. The ones related to something are related to meanings *as such* whereas those related to communicating are related to meanings *as communicated*, i.e., to meanings as brought by a speaker successively and deliberately to the consciousness of a hearer.

The dimensions related to meanings *as such* I divide into those like subject and adject, where a mere inspection of the meaning reveals the dimensions, and those related to meanings taken with reference to other meanings. A discussion of those in the first group would investigate subjects and the dimensions appropriate to them *as subjects*. For example, it would treat of that in subjects by which they do or do not admit of plurality. Some subjects cannot be pluralized, for example, *triangularity* and *courage*. Why? It would also investigate the different dimensions appropriate to the different classes of adjects. It would treat of that in quality-adjects that allows them to have degrees and of that in action- and passion-adjects that allows them to be differentiated with respect to time. It would provide the ontological basis for the possibility that in some languages what are called "adjectives" and "nouns" "agree" with one another. This whole discussion would savor strongly of Aristotle's *Categories*, but I will not embark upon it now.

The dimensions related to meanings taken with reference to other meanings concern, among others, the objective dimension and the attributive dimension. I will have a word to say about both of these. Both of them arise only when two or more meanings are present and considered in relation to one another. The first concerns only subjects, the second mostly subject-adject combinations.

First, the objective dimension. There is an intricate network of relations which all possible subjects bear to a given subject. The most fundamental of these relations, one which every subject bears to every other subject, is that of being other than those others. The German word *gegenstand*—stand over against—suggests this posture which every subject individually bears to all the others. Each is over against every other. Now the word *gegenstand* is, in German, associated with the same meaning that we associate with the word "object" in English, and I am going to suggest now that once a speaker thinks a subject as such, all other subjects become for that subject and speaker fixed in their relation to that one subject as *gegenstander* or objects. This is not to say that they are any longer subjects in their own right—far from it. But it is to say that vis-à-vis the subject the speaker has chosen, all the other subjects have become permanently placed into an object status. I call the object status of a subject its objective dimension. Let me make this clearer by an example.

In the words "John loves Mary," "John" names a subject. The position of "John" immediately before the adject-name "loves" tells the hearer that its meaning is the subject which the speaker wants him to unite with the adject "loves Mary." Now "Mary" names a subject also. But she acquires the objective dimension now because another subject, John, has been designated as the subject in the speaker's mind. Mary, in other words, has the dimension of object because she is not thought of as simply by herself—she is not a pure subject, that is—but she is thought of only as a subject in a relationship, i.e., as an object.

But Mary remains a subject nonetheless, and so she may in turn find herself as a secondary subject in a relation to a third subject. Thus if the speaker should go on to say "John sees Mary in the garden," Mary becomes the subject for the adject named by "in the garden." The subject named by "garden," in turn by its relation to Mary, has acquired the objective dimension. This kind of "subject-hopping" can go on indefinitely.

We may say, incidentally, on the basis of these remarks, what "case," as such, is. Subjects that have acquired the objective dimension have this status, in Greek and Latin, associated with small changes in their names. Such changes are called "case" endings. There are as many "cases" in a language as there are categories into which speakers of the language see fit to divide the objective dimension. But whether there are no case endings in a language or as many as fifteen, each case ending, as case ending, is associated with the objective dimension. Whether an object is called a "direct object," an "object of a preposition," or an "indirect object" makes no difference at all.

Hence we may say that the ancient grammarians were right when they declared that there was no such monstrous absurdity as the "nominative case." The name of a subject, as subject, is, as it were, its natural name or the name of the subject by itself. "Cases" only arise when the subject, as has been said, becomes an object in addition to being a subject, i.e., when there is a declension from its proper self-sufficiency. It is, in such a case, entirely appropriate for the name of the subject to change in order to reveal the changed status of the meaning.

It is also, therefore, quite appropriate, where there are two subjects but no objects, i.e., in the case of the identity of a subject with itself, under another name, as in "John is a lover," that the subject name remain a subject name on the other side of the identity statement. In other

words, there is good reason why there should be, in the language of the vernacular, "predicate nominatives."

The other dimension related to meanings taken with reference to other meanings is the one I call the attributive dimension. A speaker may, in the course of speaking, want to signify a subject-adject combination which he thinks the hearer has either already made for himself or else will readily, upon hearing it, concur in. For example, if I say to you that I met your lovely sister last night, I seem to be assuming that you have already made, or will readily accept, my combination of loveliness with your sister as well as my combination of you with a sister. This desire of a speaker requires that there be sounds or other conventions available for his use which a hearer will associate with the fact that the speaker thinks that there are some subject-adject combinations which are not in question between them. In other words, the hearer must be able to receive signals from the speaker from which he will know that unions of meanings are being made without his being asked to notice them or question them. I call the dimension of such a tacit combination of a subject with an adject the attributive dimension.

In English the attributive dimension is associated usually with the placing of the adject name before the subject name. Thus the "running boy" or the "blue book." This is sometimes known as attribution. Where one subject is identified with another, the attributive dimension of the second subject is associated with placing the second subject name immediately after the main subject name. "John, a lover, is faithful." This location is known as apposition.

I should now like to turn to the dimensions related to meanings as communicated. I shall mention three of these but discuss only one.

Communication, as we have seen, consists of shared meanings. But we have also seen that simple meanings and their dimensions are already shared, and that there are some combinations of meanings which a speaker thinks he either already shares with his hearers or else judges that his hearers will not question. Hence, the unshared meanings of communication, those for the sake of which communication exists at all, must be combinations of meanings which speakers do not think they already share with their hearers and which they want to share with them. Speakers speak for at least three purposes. They mean to indicate to hearers the actual or possible union or separation of subjects and adjects; or they mean to have hearers examine and indicate whether a subject and adject belong together; or they mean to move hearers to action. Hence, when a speaker wants to communicate, not only must he make sounds which he trusts the hearer will associate with the same ordinary meanings he has. He must also use other and distinct conventions for letting the hearer know whether he means the hearer to unite those meanings, whether he wants him to examine and indicate whether they belong together, or whether he wants him to act. For communication to be possible, in other words, there must be linguistic conventions by which what a speaker says to a hearer reveals to the hearer what he, the speaker, means him to do.

But the hearer too, for his part, must have an *a priori* knowledge of what a speaker might have in mind in speaking, which knowledge he can then associate with the linguistic elements in a speaker's words when they come at him. There must also, in other words, be the same meanings or dimensions pre-existing in the hearer and waiting to be brought to consciousness by the hearing of the sounds that by convention the speaker has associated with his particular desires. There are, then, three necessary dimensions of meanings related to communication present in the minds of speakers and hearers prior to any language. They are those dimensions in us which make us know that speakers expect things from us and the presence of which predispose us to recognize, or, better, to reach out in anticipation for, meanings we shall later categorize as sentences, questions, or commands in the words of speakers to us. They are what prevents us from being either recording machines or mere sounding boards vis-à-vis the speech of others. Specifically, it is the indicative dimension in us that enables us to categorize some of the sounds we hear as sentences. It is the interrogative dimension in us that enables us to categorize other sounds as questions. It is the imperative dimension in us that enables us to categorize still others as commands.

The indicative dimension is usually associated in English with placing the adject name as soon as possible after the subject name, i.e., "John loves." Sometimes, in addition, the indicative dimension is associated with the insertion of a special sound, such as "am," "are," and "does." Where one subject is combined with another, the indicative dimension is usually associated with both position and special sounds, e.g., "John is a lover," "John is my son," although sometimes position alone suffices, as in "Finders keepers, losers weepers."

The indicative dimension is also associated with those sounds which, in addition to being associated with ordinary meanings of contrast, concession, etc., are associated with the speaker's asking the hearer to combine the combinations of meanings he has in mind. These sounds are the so-called "conjunctions,"—"and," "although," "or," "if," "since," "unless,"—and the so-called "adverbs,"—"only," "yet," "however," "nonetheless," "notwithstanding," and many others. It may sound surprising, but the juxtaposition of a dependent and an independent clause is as much of a verb as "loves."

Discussion of the interrogative and imperative dimensions and of the conventions with which they are associated is probably unnecessary at this point.

It follows from what has been said that groups of sounds with linguistic elements associated with the dimensions of a subject and an adject, simple or complex, that has the indicative dimension, are what are usually

called "sentences." Those with the interrogative dimension are called "questions," and those with the imperative dimension are called "commands." It also follows that sounds associated with simple or complex adjects that have the indicative dimension only and in which the subject is ignored are what are usually called "predicates." Furthermore, sounds associated with simple adjects that have the indicative dimension only and in which the subject is ignored are what are usually called "finite verbs." Needless to say, sounds associated with subjects are usually called "nouns" when one is looking only to their subject character. But those very same sounds are also called "subjects" when one is distinguishing them from sounds which are usually called "objects."

If we bear in mind these new definitions of the familiar terms "noun," "finite verb," "predicate," "subject," "object," "sentence," "question," and "command," we will be in a position to answer many questions which before seemed, at least to me, to offer no hope of solution. I refer to such questions as "What is a subject?" "What is the difference between a noun and a subject?" "How do we know the subject of a sentence is the subject of that sentence?" "Why is not 'dog' a sentence, since it is a complete thought?" "How can we know that a given group of sounds makes a sentence?"

Within the dimensions related to meanings as communicated, then, the indicative, the interrogative, and the imperative seem to me to be the most important. There are others, such as the subjunctive and the optative, but I will not speak about them. I submit that the necessities which these dimensions entail, and the necessities which are entailed by the dimensions related to meanings as such, underlie, and, indeed, constitute, whatever order, form, or regularity of pattern can be discerned in all the vocal sounds produced by human beings.

IV. Conclusion

I should like to conclude with some remarks about what is called ungrammatical speech and about the possibility of meaningless but grammatical sentences.

Just what does it mean to call some speech "ungrammatical"? I will only give a definition without comment: ungrammatical speech is speech that is at first apparently nonsensical but which has later been resolved by a hearer into a matter of merely unconventional usage of sounds.

As to meaningless but grammatical sentences, let me just say this. Since grammarians talk only about dimensions of meanings but not about meanings directly, it becomes possible for them, in thought at least, much like the logicians with their empty forms of propositions, to try to separate the grammatical component of speech from the semantic. Hence we are exposed to such gems as Mr. Chomsky's "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously," or Lewis Carroll's "The slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe." It is fun to make up these things—"The scale of C sharp minor reads sweet potatoes." Many persons will assert that these three groups of sounds are all sentences, all grammatical, and all nonsensical. That they are in large measure nonsensical, I agree. But I say that they are (to that extent) neither sentences nor grammatical. They look like sentences because all the English conventions associated with the dimensions related to meanings as such and to meanings as communicated are rigorously observed. Thus Lewis Carroll's utterance begins with "the," a sound associated with an adject meaning mutually known determinateness in the subject about to be named; next comes the use of a sound ending in "-thy," a sound associated with a quality adject. Next comes "toves," a word ending in "-es," suggesting the dimension of plurality in a subject. The very proximity of the sounds "the," "slithy," and "toves" to one another is associated with the attributive dimension of a subject-adject combination. And next come the words "did gyre and gimble," all of which together become associated in our minds, through the sound "did," with the dimension of an action-adject that has the indicative dimension. Similar things can be said about "in the wabe." Hence we have presented to us sounds usually associated with the dimensions of subject and adject with the indicative dimension, i.e., what is usually called a sentence. And so we say that the sounds make up a grammatical sentence.

But we should be more careful. For the dimensions we have been discussing are dimensions of meanings, and hence when the meanings are either not present, or, as in this example, merely flirted with, or when they are incompatible, as they are in the case of Mr. Chomsky's "colorless green ideas," the dimensions are necessarily absent also. And so the sounds usually associated with the dimensions can only become dead and dry husks, having less relation to the dimensions than the discarded skin of an animal has to the animal. And just as the discarded skin means no animal, so the presence of merely dimensional signals, or dimensional signals in conjunction with incompatible meanings, means no sentence. In short, the examples are not grammatical because they are not even sentences.

Edward C. Sparrow, Jr. received his B.A. degree from Harvard College and his LL.B. degree from the Harvard Law School. He then served for a time with the New York Legal Aid Society. In 1957 he received his M.A. degree from Teachers College at Columbia University. A Tutor at St. John's College in Annapolis since that year, he served as Acting Director of the Integrated Liberal Arts Curriculum at St. Mary's College, California, from 1964 to 1966.

Hell: Paolo And Francesca*

By ROBERT S. BART

This is the Dead End of our Dead Week. We have all been in Don Rags and perhaps it is not inappropriate that we are going to spend this evening in Hell. And yet it is my hope that it will not be Hell for us. In fact, looking forward to our discussion together in the question period, I am confident that it will not be Hell. How is it possible that we can be in Hell, and yet not be there, too? You know the answer of course: we will be in Hell by virtue of our imaginations, for images are both what they are and not what they are.

The world is full of images, images of all kinds. Shadows and reflections are images. Some people look alike. All men look more like one another than they look like fish or flowers. But not only do we find images around us, we make them. A portrait, for instance, is an image of a man: it looks like a man. If we were to point to a picture of a man and ask a child, "What is that?", it is likely that he would say, "A man." I know I would. It is so easy to accept the fact that the being of any specific image is the being of what it images.

The picture is a man, and yet it is not. We do not mistake it for a man; we do not respond to it in the same ways that we respond to a man. We do not think of talking to it, or embracing it. We examine it, we study it, as we examine and study no man. Suppose, for example, we walked into the living room at home and found the beautiful Olympia stretched out nude on the sofa, just as she is in Manet's picture. We would, I assume, beat a hasty retreat in confusion. And, I guess, Olympia would not remain unaffected by our entrance and continue to present herself so totally, so completely without reserve to our contemplation and study. If she could seem to, she would be putting on an act.

Thus, although man is the proper study of man, no man can approach another man with the same liberty that he can approach the image of a man. That liberty is felt as a freedom from the respect, the reverence, even the love which is owed by us to all men. It is rude to stare at your neighbors, or to make personal remarks about them. But everything in a picture is there to be seen and commented on. Pictures have no embarrassing secrets and we need have no modesty or courtesy about asking them to yield up all their truths: it is not a matter of impertinence. All that is needed is to know how to let the questions take shape and grow from one another, and all from what is before our eyes.

Moreover, unlike the real world, images do not require immediate action of us: they only ask our understanding. Since they only have a borrowed being, we need not react to them as we must to what they image. In a picture we can behold the Crucifixion or the Massacre of the Innocents, free from the summons to active participation. That is a relief, and an opportunity. Were we presented with the events themselves, there is some probability, is there not, that we would be confused by the situation, as others have been, and play the fool, the coward or the knave? But since the pictures are but shadows, we are spared the responsibility of immediate action: we can cast away the crutch of prejudice and acknowledge that our opinions are but opinions, while we search the pictures freely for what they mean.

I do not mean, however, that this detachment is dispassionate. If what we beheld in imagination did not talk to us about our lives and the real world we live in, it could not move us and involve us in its illusion. It would be more remote from us than the animals in the zoo. If, for example, in Giotto's Massacre of the Innocents, the long pointed sword levelled at the helpless child did not sear our souls and all but make us catch our breaths, we would not have seen the picture. Yet that motion of the soul is utterly different in its kind from any we would experience if we were present. Whether emotions of horror, fear, or rage possessed us, we would never let our hungry eyes search every detail of the scene for the mere sake of knowing it completely. The special gift of the imagination is that it lets us for a moment separate acting from what we feel and think. Through the distance it provides, we can bear to behold what we might otherwise find unendurable, whether it is the beauty of life or its terror. Furthermore, if we are willing to reflect on what we have felt and thought as we watched, we may learn things about ourselves hidden from us when we act. How we respond to an image is not irrelevant to how we respond when face to face.

The imagination then can be an instrument for learning. If I should read you all of Dante's *Hell*, we would fancy ourselves together in the vast scene that his words present, though we would hear no sighs, feel no heat, no blast

* A lecture given in Annapolis at St. John's College in February, 1967.

of wind or burning sand and ice. Hell would be before us and yet we would not be in it. We would be immobile, and yet we would be moved. We would feel strange feelings, shadows of real feelings, for they would not prompt us to action as real feelings do. We would not be so much paralyzed or chained, as at rest from initiating action, at leisure, our minds alert and questioning, our wills not asleep but at play, as we apprehend and respond. We would be perplexed and amazed, and again, satisfied with the delight of understanding; we would judge, too, liking this or that character, approving and disapproving this action or that word, praising and blaming as we went along.

But as it is, I shall only read a tiny part of the whole, the fifth of thirty-four cantos. I shall read this canto so that we may have it in common to discuss together. Understanding is our unique goal. Just as we may rejoice in the illuminating way that horror is presented in a play like *Oedipus*, because the truth, even in the small parts of it that we can grasp, is always a joy, despite the distress with which we have had to seek it and the disillusionment we have felt when we have mistaken it, so the truth about sin, if we can but find it, and know it when we have found it, will be for us a light in the darkness, even though sin itself is the only darkness in the luminous splendor of creation. If we are in Hell tonight, it will be above all because our minds are taken up with Hell, and our discourse, now and in the question period, will all reflect one particular image of it.

Dante and his guide, the poet Virgil, have entered the gate of Hell with its terrible inscription: You that are entering, abandon every hope. They have crossed the river Acheron, passed through the first circle and visited the noble castle, the eternal dwelling of great poets, heroes and philosophers. Now they come to Minos the judge, in the second circle.

> Thus I descended from the first circle down into the second, which bounds a smaller space and so much more of pain that goads to wailing. There stands Minos horrible, snarling, examines their offences at the entrance, judges and dispatches them as he girds himself; I mean that when the ill-born soul somes before him it confesses all, and that discerner of sins sees what is the place for it in Hell and encircles himself with his tail as many times as the grades he will have it sent down. Always before him is a crowd of them; they go each in turn to the judgment; they speak and hear and then are hurled below. .
>
> "O thou who comest to the abode of pain," Minos said when he saw me, leaving the business of his great office, "Look how thou enterest and in whom thou trustest; let not the breadth of the entrance deceive thee."

And my Leader said to him: "Why dost thou make an outcry? Hinder not his fated journey. It is so willed where will and power are one; and ask no more."

Now the notes of pain began to reach my ears; now I am come where great wailing breaks on me. I came to a place where all light was mute and where was bellowing as of a sea in tempest that is beaten by conflicting winds. The hellish storm never resting, seizes and drives the spirits before it; smiting and whirling them about, it torments them. When they come before its fury there are shrieks, weeping and lamentation, and there they blaspheme the power of God; and I learned that to such torment are condemned the carnal sinners who subject reason to desire. As in the cold season their wings bear the starlings in a broad, dense flock, so does the wind blast the wicked spirits. Hither, thither, downward, upward, it drives them; no hope ever comforts them, not to say of rest, but of less pain. And as the cranes go chanting their lays, making of themselves a long line in the air, so I saw approach with long-drawn wailings shades borne on these battling winds, so that I said, "Master, who are these people whom the black air so scourges?"

"The first among those of whom thou wouldst know" he said to me then "was Empress of peoples of many tongues, who was so corrupted by licentious vice that she made lust lawful in her law to take away the scandal into which she was brought; she is Semiramis, of whom we read that she succeeded Ninus, being his wife, and held the land which the Soldan rules. The next is she who slew herself for love and broke faith with the ashes of Sychaeus, and then wanton Cleopatra; see Helen, for whose sake so many years of ill revolved; and see the great Achilles, who fought at the last with love; see Paris, Tristan—" and he showed me more than a thoussand shades, naming them as he pointed, whom love parted from our life.

When I heard my Teacher name the knights and ladies of old times, pity came upon me and I was as one bewildered.

I began: "Poet, I would fain speak with these two that go together and seem so light upon the wind."

And he said to me: "Thou shalt see when they are nearer to us, and do thou entreat them then by the love that leads them, and they will come."

As soon as the wind bent their course to us I raised my voice: "O wearied souls, come and speak with us, if One forbids it not."

As doves, summoned by desire, come with

Minos . . . examines their offences at the entrance.



wings poised and motionless to the sweet nest, borne by their will through air, so these left the troop where Dido is, coming to us through the malignant air; such force had my loving call.

"O living creature gracious and friendly, who goest through the murky air visiting us who stained the world with blood, if the King of the universe were our friend, we would pray to Him for thy peace, since thou hast pity on our evil plight [*mal perverso*]. Of that which thou art pleased to hear and speak we will hear and speak with you while the wind is quiet, as here it is. The city where I was born lies on the shore where the Po, with the streams that join it, descends to rest. Love, which is quickly kindled in the gentle heart, seized this man for the fair form that was taken from me, and the manner afflicts me still. Love, which absolves no one beloved from loving, seized me so strongly with his charm that, as thou seest, it does not leave me yet. Love brought us to one death. Caïna waits for him who quenched our life." These words were borne from them to us. And when I heard these afflicted souls I bent my head and held it down so long that at last the Poet said to me: "What are thy thoughts?"

When I answered I began: "Alas, how many sweet thoughts, how great desire, brought them to the woeful pass!" Then I turned to them again to speak and began: "Francesca, thy torments make me weep for grief and pity, but tell me, in the time of your sweet sighing how and by what occasion did love grant you to know your uncertain desires?"

She answered me: "There is no greater pain than to recall the happy time in misery, and this thy teacher knows; but if thou hast so great desire to know our love's first root, I shall tell as one may that weeps in telling. We read one day for pastime of Lancelot, how love constrained him. We were alone and had no misgiving. Many times that reading drew our eyes together and changed the color in our faces, but one point alone it was that mastered us; when he read that the longed-for smile was kissed by so great a lover, he who never shall be parted from me, all trembling, kissed my mouth. A Galeotto was the book and he that wrote it; that day we read in it no farther."

While the one spirit said this the other wept so that for pity I swooned as if in death and dropped like a dead body. [Translator, John D. Sinclair]

Pity overcame Dante. He tells us:

> While Francesca spoke, Paolo wept so that I swooned for pity, as though I had died, and I fell down like a dead body.

Again, at the beginning of the sixth canto, he speaks of the return of thought

> which had shut itself up in the face of the pathos
> of the two, the brother and sister-in-law.

What stirs this pity? The terrible plight of the two lovers, buffeted by the black wind, blown about forever in the dark, without hope of rest, tossed on the blast lightly, like feathers or leaves, they lighter than all the rest. They are infinitely weary, weary of the motion and the noise. Francesca knows no greater means to express her appreciation for Dante's first kind greeting than to say that if she could, she would pray for Dante's peace. She fancies the whole world is as weary as she is, so that when she is describing her home as situated near the mouth of the Po, she is naturally led to speak of the river and its tributaries as seeking peace in the open sea, an end to the rushing of turbulent waters. If only she could find peace, too!

The pathos of the lovers is heightened by their gratitude for the hint of commiseration in Dante's greeting. He, a visitor, with a poet's imagination, knows what they feel and he says to them:

> O wearied souls, come talk with us.

He has but to speak these words and Francesca calls him gracious and kind, regretting that they cannot invoke the blessing of peace on him. She welcomes his pity. Now pity, I think, tends to imply a superiority to the person pitied. We pity those who are worse off than ourselves, those who are poorer, weaker, sadder than we are. We pity the sick, the helpless, the young. We feel pity for suffering and deprivation. But when we suffer ourselves as much as others, we tend to withdraw our pity; and when we are in immediate fear of what they are suffering, we may shut up our hearts and even do violence to those who might otherwise command our pity. The plague of Athens shows us such terrible scenes. Any panic may, as when a ship sinks, or fire breaks out in a crowd. Thus, to a calculating soul, pity is a luxury, an indulgence reserved for the rich, for the fortunate, for those whom life has favored. Pride may even reject the offer of pity as an intended humiliation.

Not so Francesca: her quick response to Dante's pity opens the way for ours. She reveals at once how much she longs to talk, and her gratitude shows her goodness as well as her need. Our pity for the suffering of good men is deeper than the promiscuous sentiment which embraces from a distance all the victims of a general disaster. We prefer to like those whom we pity.

Without prompting, Francesca interprets Dante's request as an invitation to recount their grief. It is the story she tells which places the greatest claim on Dante's pity, and ours. In it she and Paolo appear as victims, victims of forces beyond themselves that are responsible for their undoing. It is not, it seems to me, that Francesca is seeking to justify herself and Paolo. Nothing she says makes me feel that she thinks their acts need justification. Did they not give themselves to love? Could there be a higher commitment? Nevertheless, they have been subjected to violence, and they are deeply aware of their own pathos. Paolo cannot get his fill of weeping. They express gratitude to Dante just because he has pity on what Francesca calls "our perverse misfortune." He shows himself thereby a friend. If only the king of the universe were their friend! But he is not, as she says; and she shows it by her story.

She tells that story in three swift stanzas:

> Love, which is swiftly kindled in a gentle heart,
> seized this man with the beautiful body which
> was taken from me; and the manner afflicts me
> still.
>
> Love, which absolves no one who is loved
> from loving, seized me so strongly with his charm,
> that as you see, even now it does not leave me.
>
> Love led us to one death: Caïna waits for him
> who quenched our life.

The word *Love* begins each of the three stanzas. Love dominates the whole story. First it seized on Paolo, using her beauty as its means. And then it seized on her, using her delight in him. Finally it led them both to one death. Love is the protagonist. Love did this to them. They were acted on by it: in themselves they were essentially passive. Consent is not even mentioned. This is perhaps the the most pathetic aspect of their tale. We are pitied for what happens to us even more than for what we do ourselves. We pity the helpless, and we pity Paolo and Francesca as helpless, helpless in the face of their passion. The word *passion* derives from the same roots as the word *passive*, from the words in Latin and Greek that mean to suffer. Perhaps we are inclined to think of ourselves as most active and alive when we are moved by passion, but does that not disregard the distinction between what prompts us from without and what we originate of our own? Francesca makes it clear that their love was passion in the sense of something that seized upon them, that found them as a passive material. A gentle heart is swiftly fired with love: let it but meet with beauty and it is inflamed.

In Francesca's account the word *Love* is made the subject of verbs of force and violence. Later on she says of Lancelot, too:

> We read how love constrained Lancelot.

And of their reading about that ill-fated lover, she says

> Many times it drove our eyes to meet, but it
> was just one point which conquered us.

Love itself leads, seizes and constrains; even the reading about love drives and conquers.

I think we all know just what she means. Virgil did when he showed Dido burning with unrestrained desire for Aeneas, contrary to prudence, her country's interest and her own solemn vows. But Venus is a goddess whose might is not to be scorned. Whatever her correct name and the nature of her power it is something not subject to our command, something whose impact we acknowledge at once and often praise, but also fear. For we must not confuse the loveliness of Aphrodite, or her fondness for youth and beauty, with her ways, which are not, it seems to me, always gentle or kind. In the *Symposium* Agathon calls Eros tender, because he associates with the tender. But that is bad logic. Most of us have known moments of violence in love, and sooner or later, in ourselves or in others we have seen how ruthless Aphrodite can be, how implacable. She tells us so herself in the beginning of the *Hippolytus*:

> Mighty am I among mortals, and not without a name; and so it is too among the gods.

If we have any doubt what she means, that play shows us. Francesca, too, proclaims the power of love. She says,

> Love, which absolves no one who is loved from loving, seized me so strongly with his charm, that as you see, even now it does not leave me.

Love, she argues, begets love by its very nature. Imitation is the natural response of the beloved. Love cannot pardon that heart which turns away from it: it is a force, a force more overwhelming than beauty, for it has the power to condemn:

> Love . . . absolves no one who is loved from loving.

Beauty appeals to the gentle heart, but it is not a god. Love is, and thus is inescapable. It is death not to return love. On the other hand, love returned has eternal life. Francesca says:

> Even now it does not leave me.

Yet love led them to death together. Mere spirits now in Hell, in the world above they had their place in the public eye. Paolo was an able and attractive man, Captain of the People in Florence when Dante was 17, shortly before the murder took place. Dante knew Francesca's nephew well. He was the lord of Ravenna and Dante lived as his guest during the last period of his long and bitter exile from Florence. Theirs is a shocking story, virtually unknown except for what Francesca tells us. She herself speaks of her beauty, and yet she was married to the deformed or crippled son of the ruler of neighboring Rimini, presumably for political reasons. She and her brother-in-law Paolo fell in love. Francesa's tale leads us to infer that her husband surprised them and killed them together. She says he will be in Caïna when he dies. Caïna is named for Cain: it is a part of the lowest depths of Hell, a frozen pit where Dante finds fixed in the ice those who are guilty of betraying their relatives.

Terrible were the consequences of their following the rule and the logic of love, Paolo responding to Francesca's beauty, she to his love and his beauty. They paid love all its rites, and now they find themselves in Hell. That is what they mean by their "perverse misfortune": the whole world was ordered against their love. Theirs is a tragic pathos. Love imposed itself on them and they gave themselves to its high laws wholeheartedly. They risked everything to give it life. But that love was only a challenge to the world as it is ordered, a moving defiance not destined to bring them a joy as lasting as the love itself. They were fated to a tragic end. Part of their nobility is that although they weep in Hell, they do not whine. They do not protest. They are dignified in defeat, not humiliated by their condition as outcasts. Unlike others Dante will meet, they do not demean themselves with obscene and empty protest. They speak of the power arrayed against them with the formal respect that sovereigns show who have fallen out and gone to war, but maintain the tone of former relations. Their enemy is still a king to them. If only they did not happen to be his enemies, they would sue to him for Dante's peace. They have something of the fierceness of the ancient heroes, too, when they think of the man who quenched their life: there is a quiver of deep hate and satisfaction at the revenge which his destiny will provide. That is almost the last word in Francesca's account; it is brief, final, as cold as the pit where he will be found.

Their love is tragic precisely because the king of the universe is not their friend. They do not have in their hands the power to control the world, nor does the love to which they gave themselves. The basis of the tragedy is that there are many gods, and no justice. The only justice they can find in the world is that their murder will be revenged; but they too must endure the endless frustration and darkness of Hell. Dante may have pity on them; the king of the universe will not. Whatever name we give to him, Zeus, Fate, Necessity, he is indifferent to the things we cherish most.

We have come to the low point of our study, to the dark valley in which the tragic view of the world has us in its chilling grip. There is no consolation to be seen beyond the splendor of noble and dignified resistance to the ruler of the universe, who is no friend of love. Our pity has developed and revealed its close alliance with fear. We pity while we think we are exempt or superior; we only begin to fear when we see we are in danger ourselves. As we come closer to Paolo and Francesca, our pity

The hellish storm never resting, seizes and drives the spirits before it.

is not exempt from a shudder of terror at their fate. Who is safe from the catastrophe of love, whether it come by way of a disastrous commitment like theirs, or by way of resistance or renunciation like Hippolytus'? If love has the power to command and yet leads to Hell, what justice is there? Is it only by chance we can hope to escape? Is the king of the universe a friend of ours? If not, are we prepared to resist nobly? Do we want to? These questions press us hard, too. If the whole world is arrayed against love and yet encourages and even constrains us to be lovers, we must indeed search ourselves to know what part we can and should sustain in the tragedy, be it that of the hero or the nurse, of the chorus that weeps or the one whose choice makes the catastrophe inevitable.

* * * * *

But there is a prior question: granting that Francesca sees their story as a tragedy, is there no alternative to her view? Let us not hasten to her fearful conclusion. Let us beware of the seduction of the imagination, of the impulse to adopt the tragic pose, to sound the pathetic lament. So far we have listened to the story as Francesca intends us to hear it, and even the translation, not to mention the original, shows her to be an accomplished poet. Now if poetry and the imagination, as I have claimed, have powers that can lead to understanding and right action, it is also the case that the abuse of those powers can lead to confusion and sin. Poetry, like love, may invite imitation, but the invitation cannot be accepted uncritically. I wonder if the poet Dante does not intend us to find out things about Francesca that she in her tragic abandon cannot see and only reveals involuntarily. Her poetry is contained within his. She speaks from Hell.

Dante the poet contrived his encounter with Francesca among the damned. Why is she there? Is Hell only, as she imagines, the place where a triumphant tyrant thrusts his vanquished opponents? Or is there something damning about Francesca that works to withdraw her from our pity, no matter how appealing her figure may be?

The premise of our pity for Paolo and Francesca is not only their suffering, but its injustice. We feel an immediate pity for the frustrated love of two beautiful people, who respond to one another with sensitivity; we feel revulsion at the disproportion between Francesca's beauty and the deformity and violence of her husband Gianciotto. But that pity would be transformed entirely, it might even disappear, if their suffering were felt to be just. It seems to me that if we are to find anything but a pagan tragedy in the story of Paolo and Francesca, it will have to be by finding some reason to question the assumption they make that they are the victims of injustice. It may seem unjust that they who fit so well together should be barred from the union they so desire, barred, as some may say, by convention. But are they in Hell only because they committed adultery? Dante is silent about their crime. That might be because they were such prominent figures in his day that he could take it for granted it was well known to his readers. But there are adulterers in his Heaven: no less a person than King David, for one. Dante's silence, as well as Francesca's, invites us to seek in her own words for a deeper source of her losing her way and becoming forever lost. Can we see misdirection even in what she says about love? If we could, we would see adultery as a mere symptom of a more fatal disease, a symptom Dante himself need not mention by name, since he reveals the malady itself.

This is not a simple task and I may easily make mistakes in carrying it out. Even where I do not err, it may not be easy to follow: our prejudices are deeply involved. But Dante expected that: in fact, here on the threshold of Hell, he has done his best to involve them directly in order that we may become aware of them and know them for what they are. I hope that in trying to follow him we may come to agree at least that it is not necessary to share the tragic view of those whom he pictures as doomed to spend eternity in Hell.

The fundamental question is the question of justice: is there a just proportion between the lot of Paolo and Francesca and the love they have given themselves to? But first, what is that love? Let me take as a clue the following question: why are Paolo and Francesca so pleased by Dante's affectionate appeal, that they leave their place in the long file of souls and swoop down with the combination of tenderness and eagerness that Dante remembers in the dove returning to its nest, just before it alights, while with wings outspread it glides to rest where its hearts directs it.

If they are all in all to one another, what need have they of him? Are they not still together? Certainly that is the very first thing we are told about them:

Poet [says Dante] I would gladly talk with those two that go together. Is it not a consolation that they are companions forever, a compensation for what was denied them in life? Francesca exults in the fact: it is the measure of the love she has aroused in Paolo. When she describes their first kiss she says,

> When we read that the longed-for smile was kissed by so great a lover, he who shall never be parted from me, all trembling kissed my mouth.

The kiss of Lancelot, immortalized by the poet, is imitated by the kiss of Paolo, which is an eternal bond between him and Francesca.

But they are even more intimately together than at first appears. Francesca says:

> I will be like one who weeps and speaks.

In fact, however, that task is divided between the two of them. Paolo weeps while Francesca does all the speaking. She says,

> We will listen and speak to you

but only her voice is heard: Paolo's weeping is a constant accompaniment. Yet Dante regularly speaks as though the colloquy were with them both. When Francesca stops for the first time, he says

> When I heard these afflicted souls

as though he had heard them both. Yet only Francesca had spoken. Again, though he says a few minutes later

> I turned back to them and spoke

he actually begins,

> Francesca, thy torments

and yet he means the torments of them both.

They are before him in an indissoluble unity, much as in that tragi-comic fable Aristophanes tells at the banquet at Agathon's, when the absurd half-men that we are in that myth, clinging together in longing, beg Hephaistos to weld them finally into one great round body again, to go skipping and tumbling nimbly on four feet and four hands, forgetting their distress for one another.

> Now supposing [says Aristophanes] Hephaistos were to come and stand over them with his tool bag as they lay there side by side, and suppose he were to ask, Tell me, my dear creatures, what do you really want with one another?
>
> And suppose they didn't know what to say and he went on, How would you like to be rolled into one, so that you could always be together, day and night, and never be parted again? Because, if that is what you want, I can easily weld you together, and then you can live your two lives in one, and when the time comes, you can die a common death, and still be two-in-one in the lower world. Now what do you say? Is that what you'd like me to do? And would you be happy if I did?
>
> We may be sure, gentlemen, that no lover on earth would dream of refusing such an offer, for not one of them could imagine a happier fate. Indeed, they would be convinced that this was just what they'd been waiting for, to be merged that is, into utter oneness with the beloved. [Translator, M. Joyce]

Paola and Francesca have achieved what Aristophanes' lovers desire.

Let me take another image, one that Dante himself suggests when on the mount of Purgatory he again encounters the sin of lust. There one of the bands of sinners says by way of explanation that their sin was hermaphroditic. As the context shows, he means that it was between man and woman, but without regard for human law and proportion. Why does he call that lust hermaphroditic? Paolo and Francesca give us the clue. As Ovid tells the tale in his *Metamorphoses*, Hermaphrodite was a beautiful young man, the son of Hermes and Aphrodite. One day a water nymph, Salmacis, saw him and at once fell in love with his beauty. He refused her advances.

But then, as he was swimming in a pool unawares, she flung herself about him in a tight embrace. He struggled to escape her grasp. But she called on the gods in prayer:

> Let no day divide him from me, or me from him.

And the gods granted her request: the two grew into one so that, as Ovid says,

> They were not two but a double form . . . neither and both they seemed.

This is the two-in-oneness Paolo and Francesca have achieved. Even their death was one, as Francesca says; and they subsist in death as one, remembering with tears the day when love bound them together forever. Francesca says of her companion,

> This man who will never be divided from me;

just as she says that her love for him

> still does not abandon her.

They are together forever with the same love they always had. Why is that not enough for them?

Need I ask, with the wind blowing them about in the darkness, mere wraiths unable to give one another the comfort and joy of their bodies, that were torn from them when they left the sweet bright light above?

But is it only because they lack bodies that they turn to Dante? Do they not in that motion reveal a hunger which the body can never fill? Aristophanes said no lovers could imagine a happier fate than to be together, as Paolo and Francesca are together, in life and in death. But that is not the experience of Paolo and Francesca. We cannot forget the pathos of their haunting figures. Dante cannot hear them speak without being moved to tears. He faints at the end. They frankly claim his pity with their tears.

What can his pity be to them? Does not Paolo provide for Francesca a sympathy that is complete because his case is identical? No, apparently not. What is it that is missing in Paolo? Is he not the perfect listener? He weeps throughout, and no one better than he can appreciate every nuance in what Francesca says. They are so close that she can speak for him; he can listen for her; his tears are her tears. But, by a simple and drastic substitution we may say: she is talking to herself, he is listening to himself, weeping for himself, weeping the tears of self-pity. Like everyone else in Hell, Paolo and Francesca are sorry only for themselves, each for himself. Their union has destroyed their individual integrity and their being together is a dazzling deception.

Their predicament is parallel to that of Ovid's Narcissus, who fell in love with his own image, when he saw it mirrored in a spring. On discovering his plight he says:

> I am burning with love for myself; I kindle the fire and I feel its heat. What am I to do? Shall I entreat, or wait to be entreated? But what shall I ask for? What I desire is with me. My riches make me poor. O that I could secede from our body. It is a novel prayer for a lover, but I wish that what we love were not here.

Like self-love, self-pity is hard to understand. If it were not a familiar fact, I would hesitate to propose anything so strange. Pity is something we seem to feel for another; it tends, I think, to be felt for someone suffering what we are exempt from. It implies a detachment from the actual experience of the sufferer. How then is self-pity possible? Perhaps it is by virtue of the imagination. I notice that I seem to feel pity most readily for characters in a movie, or a book. Perhaps then self-pity is possible just because we think of ourselves as figures in a story. That happens especially when we make poetry of our sufferings in telling them to someone else. We detach ourselves from ourselves by the imagination, as though we were watching ourselves in a play, and in that attitude we behold ourselves in fascination, imprisoned in passivity by our being spectators. We cannot act as long as the trance of self-pity endures, any more than we can at the theatre. But does our pity for the self we imagine bring consolation? I think not; for pity sees its object as helpless and weak. Self-pity rivets attention on what has been suffered, on the past, on defeat; it annihilates hope and the possibility of action. Yet it is only in action that men can find happiness. Self-pity arrests action in the beholder, encourages despair in the self beheld. In itself it is infinite. It gives neither the joy of consoling nor of being consoled. It is a form of self-abuse and we rightly feel humiliated by it. Meanwhile we have exhausted our capacity to love what is not the self, by turning it back reflexively through the imagination on the self. Love and self-pity are incompatible. What pity can Paolo have for Francesca, or she for him, that is not drowned in the great sea of pity each feels for himself?

But is it really pity Francesca wants? Pity implies distance, superiority, condescension. Pity is even compatible with stern judgement. Francesca wants the solidarity that comes from sharing what one has been suffering alone. She wants sympathy. What is the difference? Sometimes we use the word pity ambiguously as though it were a synonym for sympathy; sometimes, even, we accept expressions of pity for those of sympathy, especially if they echo our own self-pity. But if pity implies that the one who pities is not experiencing what the sufferer is, then it can easily be distinguished from sympathy, which always feels exactly what the sufferer feels. Yet sympathy is a relation between two distinct persons: if

Dante: "Poet, I would fain speak with these two that go together."



self-pity is monstrous, self-sympathy is impossible. Sympathy is like a musical octave: two different voices sounding the same tone. Its form is duality, the ratio 1:2. By contrast pity is like a concordant interval, two voices sounding different but intimately related tones. Self-pity, as distinct from pity, is not any interval at all, not even unison. For if unison is an interval, it still requires two voices to sound, while in self-pity there is only the one voice, and its wearisome echo.

Perhaps I can illustrate the difference I intend between pity and sympathy by two episodes from Herodotus. When his vast army and fleet were gathered at the Hellespont

> Xerxes wished to look upon all his host; so, as there was a throne of white marble upon a hill near the city which they of Abydos had prepared beforehand by the king's bidding, for his especial use, Xerxes took his seat on it, and, gazing thence upon the shore below, beheld at one view all his land forces and all his ships. . . . And now as he looked and saw the whole Hellespont covered with the vessels of his fleet, and all the shore and every plain about Abydos as full as could be of men, Xerxes congratulated himself on his good fortune; but after a little while he wept.

His uncle was perplexed and Xerxes explained:

> There came upon me a sudden pity, when I thought of the shortness of man's life and considered that of all this host so numerous as it is, not one will be alive when a hundred years are gone by.

Xerxes pities man for the shortness of his life: it is a generic pity far from any sympathy for an individual soldier. For just a few pages earlier we read of Pythius the Lydian, who won great favor with Xerxes by offering him all his vast treasure of money. Yet when Pythius asked Xerxes to spare one of his five sons from service so he could remain at home, Xerxes was enraged and commanded his men

> to seek out the eldest of the sons of Pythius and having cut his body asunder, to place the two halves, one on the right, the other on the left of the great road, so that the army might march out between them.

Thus he granted Pythius' request. This savage jest may illustrate how far his pity was from any sharing in the sufferings of other men. His pity depended on the height of his throne above the scene that moved him to tears.

Francesca longs to share her grief. If she is to get beyond the sterility of self-pity, there must be someone else besides herself, a listener who will see independently, and

yet agree with her and respond as she does. Making poetry out of her suffering is not enough: through its means she wants to bring Dante, and all the world, to share what they have experienced. The tyranny of her relationship to Paolo excludes him as that listener: Paolo's words are her words, and as such have no power to refresh her. None of the rest of the spirits are any better. Men are made to live together, but in Hell everyone is alone. Even though the spirits in this circle flock together, they are like starlings and cranes, mere birds that feel no affection for one another. They move as a bunch, all subject to the same rule, all blown by the same wind, but that bunch is made of heartless individuals, each unmoved by the other. From this circle on down Hell is a city without citizens; no one acknowledges a bond with anyone else. They are all caught in the loneliness of indifferent and often degrading company. Below Limbo what speech they exchange can give them no joy, no relief. No one listens. There is no one to talk to.

Dante on the other hand is alive. The first thing Francesca says is: "O living creature." Being alive, he can still feel sympathy. He can listen, and understand and care. In all that company he alone can weep with them: all the rest are deaf.

What does she say in the last words of hers that will reach a living ear? She tells him about their love, beginning each time from a universal proposition and moving to their particular case.

> Love [she says] . . . is quickly kindled in the gentle heart.

Now there is a famous sonnet of Dante's that begins, in much the same way:

> Love and the gentle heart are one.

Dante wrote a commentary on his sonnet to show that he meant that the heart is a material whose proper form or act is love, just as the eye is material to the act of sight. The act of love is the proper form of the gentle heart. The Italian word can mean more than gentle, tender or soft; it suggests that delicacy and rightness of feeling which is cultivated by education and training, a combination of goodness of manners and goodness of heart. A heart that is what a heart should be, will act in love. Beauty, the sonnet says, is what brings it to this activity.

The words of Francesca are similar. But there is ambiguity about what they mean. They may mean that a heart disciplined by philosophy and the arts, religion and good manners is easily moved to act in love, for that is the natural mode of the heart set free by all those means and guided by the truth they instill. The love may be a love of wisdom or the state, the love of the home or the arts, the love of a parent or the love of a man for a woman, but it will be gracious and graceful, human action at its best: easy, effortless, spontaneous and joyful. But by the gentle heart Francesca seems to mean one that falls quickly in love and is easily inflamed with desire, prepared by reading and other occupations to welcome and cultivate appetite. Such would seem to be the case of Lancelot, and of Paolo and Francesca. The gentleness of heart she is thinking of is mere intensity of feeling and passion, not the fruit of reflection and art. The beauty which moved her and Paolo, she tells us, was physical beauty, and the activity was that of ungoverned sexual desire.

Dante put it another way when he wrote the sonnet that begins:

> Love that in my thoughts discourses,

the sonnet which the musician Casella sings just after the souls land in Purgatory. Love discourses, or reasons, as the Italian puts it, using reason and discourse synonymously, just as Greek uses *logos* for both rational thought and speech. Love discourses. Animals, on the other hand, feel the power of sexual desire without discourse. But since reason is interwoven with our very being, we are incapable of this separation. There is always the question of consent for us. A dog or a pig has not the privileges and responsibilities of consent to what he experiences as an uncontrollable drive. We, in consenting or refusing consent, acknowledge a principle of good, or disregard it, in every act. That is the role of reason in our actions. When we make the distinction between love and sex, it seems to me that we mean that love, unlike sex, is always in easy communion with reason and discourse. I do not mean that love is always talking, though lovers usually talk a lot. I do not mean to underestimate the love that expresses itself in silence. But an account can be given of love, an account which aims to make sense and show how it is good. Reason is the connection between action and the good. When we give the reason, we show how it is good.

Now to give an account of a love is to show its order with respect to the whole. Sexual pleasure is only one of many goods: obviously, we need not condemn sex to prefer something else to it in a given moment, or in a given relationship. When love discourses, it includes the whole world in its discourse. In the ceremony of marriage and its vows a certain kind of love is ordered to the family, to society, and to God. The discourse of reason is universal; it is open to all who can understand it. Paolo and Francesca's "love," on the other hand, is entirely secret and private. That is not merely because it is illegal or dangerous. Neither Paolo nor Francesca seems to me so timid or so conventional as to give weight to the law or to danger beside the great fact of their will and their desire. Their love is private because they see it as concerning them alone. They think it is their business and no one else's. The look which they exchanged on that fateful day included nothing but themselves; it excluded

While Francesca spoke, Paolo wept so that I swooned for pity.

everything beyond their consent to one another's desire.

Naturally, then, Francesca's tale makes no mention of her adultery as such. When she speaks of their region in Hell, which is designated by Dante as the place of

> carnal sinners who subject reason to desire,

Francesca says that Dante is visiting those

> who stained the world with blood.

For her the salient feature of her fate is the violence of her death, not that it was the outcome of disorderly lust. When she says of her violent death, "the manner of it afflicts me still," I wonder if she does not have in mind the shocking and terrible way in which their sweet secrecy was invaded by an alien and external world, in the person of her husband. Their nakedness was exposed, their privacy was outraged and profaned by what in her opinion had no place in it, no right to intrude. Love for her is entirely exclusive.

It is a striking thing that Francesca does not mention her husband except as "the one who extinguished our life." When she does mention him, she gloats that he will pay for his violence with torments worse than what they themselves are enduring. She does not hint of her marriage, nor Paolo's, nor the children which each of them had. They do not figure in her tale. In framing her account of love, its power and its requirements, Francesca succeeds in hiding from herself, and perhaps from us, any other obligations she may have. The supremacy of her love for Paolo is unquestioned. It leaves no room for her to remember anything else.

But is love something we can restrict thus to ourselves? What did their love do to the lives they touched on? We may guess by looking at their companions in Hell, for their lives are recorded in poetry and history. Paris and Helen we know well, Helen "for whose sake so many years of ill revolved," as Virgil says to Dante. Think for a moment of the horrors Homer tells: the spear in the throat or the bladder; the severed head rolling between the legs of the men as they fight; the tug of war over Patroclus' body. See Helen, Virgil says to Dante. And wanton Cleopatra dressed Antony in her own clothes, while she played with his sword. In the end she drove him on to make the fatal choice between love and empire, setting up the private in open conflict with the public. At Actium the battle was joined for the whole world, with her and Antony on one side, and cold Octavian on the other. The battle was still undecided when she deserted her lover, and he followed in her wake.

> Here it was [says Plutarch] that Antony showed to all the world that he was no longer actuated by the thoughts and motives of a commander or a man, or indeed by his own judgment at all, and what was once said as a jest, that the soul of a lover lies in someone else's body, he proved to be a serious truth. For, as if he had been born part of her and must move whereso-ever she went, as soon as he saw her ship sailing away, he abandoned all that were fighting and spending their lives for him . . . to follow her that had so well begun his ruin and would hereafter accomplish it.

Semiramis, as Virgil says,

> was so corrupted by licentious vice that she made lust lawful in her law, to take away the scandal into which she was brought.

While the private individual only subjects reason in himself, though the consequences may be wider, a queen has the power to overthrow reason's expression in the law. Semiramis subverts the whole order of society to conceal her disorder and escape censure. But lust cannot serve as law; knowing no order or restraint itself, it can only destroy the order of the family and the peace of the state. The making of such a law brings law itself into disrepute. If law and lust are synonymous, nothing is left but tyranny and the war of every man against every other.

Like Semiramis' love, Dido's undid the city she ruled. When Aeneas comes to Carthage, as the *Aeneid* says, he

> marvels at the gateways and hum of the paved streets. The Tyrians are hot at work to trace the walls, to rear the citadel, and roll up great stones by hand, or to choose a place for their dwelling and enclose it with a furrow. They ordain justice and magistrates, and the august senate. Here some are digging harbors, here others lay the deep foundations for theatres, and hew out of the cliff vast columns, the lofty ornaments of the stage to be . . . "Happy they whose city already rises!" cries Aeneas.

But Venus intervenes. Dido falls in love with Aeneas.

> Stung to misery Dido wanders in frenzy all down the city, even as an arrow-stricken deer, whom . . . a shepherd has pierced and left the flying steel in her unaware. . . . No more do the unfinished towers rise, no more do the people exercise in arms, nor work for safety in war on harbor or bastion; the works are broken off, vast looming walls, and engines towering into the sky.

When Dido achieves the union her frenzy craves, the poet says:

> That day opened the gate of death and the springs of ill. For Dido recks not of eye or tongue, nor sets her heart on love in secret; she calls it marriage, and with this word shrouds her blame.

Aeneas, recognizing a higher duty than that to his love for Dido, abandons her, and she calls down curses on him and the city he will found:

> Let no kindness or truce be between the nations [she cries] . . . I invoke the enmity of shore to shore, . . . sword to sword; let their battles go down to their children's children.

In writing this Virgil intends us to see the Punic wars as the fulfillment of Dido's curses. Carthage fought three wars with Rome within 120 years and the strife only ended with the utter destruction of Carthage. All the living inhabitants were sold as slaves.

This ruin is the background of Dante's description of Dido as the one

> who slew herself in love and broke faith with the ashes of Sychaeus.

When Dido first felt the sting of desire for Aeneas, she swore a solemn oath of eternal faithfulness to her dead husband Sychaeus. Her sister urged her to reconsider, asking

> Do you think the ashes care for that, or the ghost within the tomb?

Dido is inflamed by her sister's words, her passion grows and soon she breaks her vow. Dante's words emphasize that the consequence of Dido's lust is not in any harm to Sychaeus, since he is dead, but in her going back on her own word, undermining the integrity of her speech. What can words mean when promises are made void at pleasure? The next step from the attack on reason in speech is the triumph of unreason in her suicide.

Paolo and Francesca belong to Dido's troop. They too sinned in breaking faith, the faith plighted in marriage. That broken faith is the start of the disorder which their lust brought on the world and themselves. Some of its consequences we can name: a husband turned murderer, children orphaned; the community shocked and perplexed, all the more so because the lovers stood out from other men by their position and their gifts. It is an illusion that the private can be marked off completely from the public, when the very nature of man is rational and social. His acts can hardly be so private that they do not have some effect on the realm of public order, of mutual trust and of speech. Semiramis called lust law; Dido called seduction marriage. It is what Francesca does to the word love that reveals most clearly how radically she rebells against reason. We have already seen her confuse love and desire once; what else is she doing when she says

> Love . . . absolves no one who is loved from returning that love.

Under these highsounding words, does she not mean she had a duty to return Paolo's love? And is she not suggesting delicately that her desire was the proper return for his? She cannot quite say she had a duty to give her

self to Paolo merely because he desired her. Yet the words seem to be an acknowledgment of the fact that that is what she did. Is this an account of love? To me it seems an abuse of words that have very different meanings in fact.

It is true that love absolves no one who is loved from returning that love. In Dante's view God is love and the whole pity and terror of his Hell is built around the fact that God's love cannot be refused with impunity. God cannot pardon the failure of Paolo and Francesca to return his love. He cannot without violence put himself in their hearts. They have so set their wills toward one another's desire and against God's love, that they have finally shut Him out of their hearts. God's greatest gift to them was liberty, the freedom to reject Him and His world. That rejection is Hell.

They have set out like gods, to build a private world of their own. In Greek the word for a private man is *idiot*. A private world is a world from which reason is banned: idiocy reigns. In Paolo and Francesca the rejection of God is at first a kind of moral laziness. They are all too ready to think that Aphrodite is an irresistible goddess. They elevate their passion into a god and are passive before its demands. At first they submit with enthusiasm. But the passivity of their love wearies them; it makes them weary of each other. In giving themselves up to it, they lose contact with reason, the common bond between men; reason, that by its habit of looking to the good provides a basis on which we can consent in one another's acts; reason, that is the basis of understanding and love. But these are acts, and love for Paolo and Francesca is nothing but wearying passivity in one another's company, without thought of any other opportunity or obligation. And that is Hell.

Thus it is that, without being told, Dante immediately understands as soon as he sees the torment, that this is the circle of those who sinned carnally. The sinners are in endless, restless motion at the mercy of contrary winds. They long for peace, but peace for them can only mean annihilation. Hell for Paolo and Francesca is to love one another always exactly as they did in life; to be led forever by love in the sense that they were led by it in life. Virgil says to Dante:

> Implore them by that love which leads them.

Yet Dante's call to them is all in terms of their fatigue and their loneliness, and they respond at once. Love is not recreation for them, not art, not grace, not act; it is to be blown about forever by a dark blind wind that blows at random, they the lightest of all on the blast. Their love is Hell. It leaves them even more lonely than the solitary spirits which surround them. Whatever comfort Francesca derives from her eternal coupling with Paolo, it cannot take the place for her of an appeal to a living heart for its heartfelt sympathy. Had they their bodies, it would only be superficially different. Were they alive and free to love as they pleased, they would still have to face that loneliness in themselves, their isolation from the community of men.

Yet there is a difference between even the worst of lives in this world and the sinners' existence in Hell. As they pass through the Gate of Hell, it commands: Abandon every Hope. In Hell they are in utter hopelessness, something which is never the case in our life. Life without hope is unthinkable. Therefore the spirits in Hell are in a significant way different from us: they have died the death that is the death of the spirit. That is the Hell which is in their souls and of which, as I have suggested, the wind of the second circle is only a specific outward manifestation.

Hope is the hope of something good. It is an anticipation of good. It is based on some knowledge of good. If all knowledge of good has been extinguished in a soul, what hope remains? Only the hope of exchanging evils for one another. Such is the state of the souls in Hell. Virgil explicitly says they have lost the good of the intellect. The good of the intellect is the truth, but in choosing this name for it, Virgil emphasizes the goodness of truth. Truth is not merely the goal we seek in learning, it is the cause of good in the measure in which it is known. We are apt at times to think of the truth as something like fact, information which implies nothing about its use for good or for evil. Gorgias tries to argue that a teacher of rhetoric, like a teacher of boxing, need teach nothing at all about its use. But what the souls in Hell have lost is the power of the truth as a guide that will lead a man straight, whatever his road, as Dante says of the Sun in the first canto.

Thus the visual manifestation of what has been lost is the darkness of Hell. There is no sun, no light there. Virgil says when they set out into the first circle,

> Now we are descending into the blind world.

For the darkness which is all about them thereafter, the black and murky air, is only an outward sign of the blindness of all the inhabitants of Hell. They are deprived of light, deprived of sight. They can see no good to hope for, though otherwise they see well enough. But what good is such sight? Just as the mind of a clever criminal may function intelligently, so their souls have all their mere powers intact, but the very principle of action is lost to them forever.

Let us watch them as they come before Minos the judge. He asks no questions. Each sinner on his own acknowledges all his sins. What makes it possible for him on arriving in Hell to know himself and confess his sins as never before? I think it is his blindness, his loss of the truth, of the good of the intellect, How is it that the loss of truth can make a soul truthful? The answer lies in an ambiguity in the notion of truth. The sinner

has nothing to hide, when he has lost all sense of the evil of sin; his truthfulness omits the central fact of all: that what he has done is wrong. At most he knows that other men do not approve. But without the light which gives goodness and life to things, what has he to hide? In the dark all cats are grey. He can be honest as never before: in Hell, even the dissemblers tell the truth about themselves.

This same blindness means that whatever sense there is in the world below will be eternally invisible to the sinner. The justice of Hell is a cruel mockery to its inhabitants. In the *Aeneid*, Minos is a silent, majestic judge. In Dante's *Hell* he has been transformed into a grotesque and repulsive monster. He growls like an angry dog, grinding his teeth in inarticulate rage. He has a voice, but as he pronounces judgement, he wraps his long tail around himself as many times as the sinner must go down circles in Hell. In his appearance and manner there is no vestige of the rational order which in fact he represents. His metamorphosis is an image of the blindness of the sinners: they cannot see that he is the agent and minister of divine justice.

When Francesca says,

> If the king of the universe were our friend,

it is as though it were a matter of whim or chance that the powers that control the world are on the other side, as Hippolytus might regret that he could not placate both Aphrodite and Artemis. The enmity of Francesca to God leaves no hope of reconciliation, because she has no longer any notion that she might be wrong. Even when she is glad that Minos will plunge her husband into the frozen abyss, it is not, it seems to me, the justice of it that occasions her fierce delight, but the satisfaction that revenge gives her pride.

Above all it is Francesca's utter lack of regret for what she has been responsible for that shows her distance from us, the mark of the dead soul: life and responsibility go hand in hand. None of the consequences of her love seem to trouble her: not her husband brought by her adultery into a temptation to which he was unequal; not Paolo who, in sharing eternity with her, shares Hell; not her children left to grow up in the shadow of the crimes of their father and mother; not her family and her state, plunged in the agitation of scandal. Her dignity and reserve, her pride is touched in no way by an admission that she has done wrong. It is all only the perverse evil of a malignant world. She has turned the whole world upside down.

Now we too have known moments of this kind of Hell ourselves. Those moments in us are the basis of the allegorical interpretation of Dante's *Hell*. We recognize something of ourselves in the lost souls. But if we strain our imaginations to suppose that Francesca never at all thinks or feels differently, we see how vastly any analogy we frame differs from what she experiences in their literal Hell. She is set in the state of her heart and mind; we, I trust, are not. For in us there resides conscience, and in her it is gone. The metamorphosis of Minos from the stern and noble legislator of tradition to a snarling demon, may be an image of the sinner's transformation of conscience from a reasonable guide to a hateful executioner. It is conscience above all which is the avenue of the good of the intellect to our souls, conscience which in its impregnable resistance to all outer and inner pressures proclaims its integrity, and in proclaiming that integrity, that liberty, proclaims that it is the voice of Another and not our own. Conscience, as its name implies, is a species of knowledge: it is knowledge shared with another. It is interior to ourselves; yet it commands our assent, try as we may to deny it. It is intimate, but it is no more in our power to alter than the propositions of Euclid. Its presence in us declares that there is a judgement not of our own making by which good and evil are distinguished. It is the reflection in us of the eternal and original light. It is not merely the passing judgement we are obliged and willing to make on all sorts of persons and affairs; it is not shame, which can be induced by education and habit, or by pride and fear of the opinion of others. It is that awareness in ourselves that we are watched by a Judge whose judgement is infallible, the only Arbiter of good.

At its best it is the knowledge that we are not alone, but have our place equally with all men in an all-embracing vision. As such it is the basis of our loving one another, and, I think, the only abiding one. To see men in the light of conscience is to see them all as ourselves, all sinners, all children of the Father, all worthy of love. There are no exclusions for conscience; it allows no ultimate privacy. It establishes an all-inclusive community, for in it all men are seen as brothers. In its harsher form, more familiar from ordinary speech, conscience is the arbiter of our guilt, a standard from which there is no appeal, a guide when we have fallen. But I would rather emphasize that by the light we gain from it, we give form to whatever is well-formed in what we do.

It seems to me that while we acknowledge all that is pathetic in Paolo and Francesca, we must admit that they show no signs of conscience whatsoever. If that is so, it seems to me that they pass across a barrier through which our sympathy cannot reach: that barrier divides us forever, however pitiful it may be that human beings of such grace as theirs should have isolated themselves from all human affection. In revealing their lack of conscience, they reveal that they are dead, dead to what gives us life and hope, the possibility of learning and love.

Let us return briefly to our opening theme, poetry and the imagination. My discussion has taken Dante's poem as an occasion for reflection on the questions of the life and the death of the soul, on love and human fellowship. I assume that such reflections may have their natural

consequences in action. In making such a use of poetry I intend to share with Dante the understanding of poetry that dictated his choice of the poet Virgil as the proper guide on his way to the earthly paradise. Why did he not choose Aristotle, "the master of those who know," as Dante calls him? Because poetry has powers of persuasion that Aristotle does not.

Immediately before the beginning of the fifth canto, Dante and Virgil are met in Limbo by the souls of four great poets whose leader is Homer. The poets lead them to the noble castle, where famous heroes and thinkers live, models of the active and contemplative lives. Thus poetry is presented as a guide to the best in life and Virgil as well as Dante rejoices when Dante is taken into that select company as a sixth among equals. Poetry at its best embodies reason at work and is one of the noblest of human activities, sharing and reflecting the light gained from the highest contemplation. The triumph of poetry, its special ordering in relation to moral and intellectual virtue, exalts Dante briefly. Yet he cannot think it worth very much to be even the best poet in Hell.

Poetry is dangerous. Its very powers of persuasion can be abused. Right after his encounter with the poets, we find Dante demanding to know from Francesca the occasion of their making the first step on the road to sin, when conscience was thrust aside by the discovery that their secret desires were shared and companionship in guilt made its seductive appeal over against the possibility of companionship in love. Her answer is that it was the day when they were reading together "for pastime." Whether that step would have been taken without the book, no one can say. That the book was in fact the occasion Francesca makes perfectly plain in full detail. As she answers Dante we see how step by step each of them was encouraged by the book to commit himself to the relation which was so rich in sweet thoughts and full of desire in the beginning but which in the end led to the woeful pass.

> We read one day for pastime of Lancelot, how love constrained him; we were alone and had no misgiving. Many times that reading drove our eyes together and changed the color in our faces; but one point alone it was that mastered us.

As Francesca recounts that solitary hour, she makes sweet poetry that dallies with the memory of its sweetness. But in her final words she passes a sentence of damnation on the author of that book as harsh as the one she had passed on Gianciotto her husband:

> A Galeotto, that is, A Pander was that book and he who wrote it.

The poet must bear the guilt of what he wrought in providing the dear occasion of their making the first fatal step.

All they did was to follow the book's example.

> When we read the longed-for smile was kissed by so great a lover, he who shall never be parted from me, all trembling kissed my mouth.

It was the tale of the adultery of Lancelot, the famous lover and hero of poetry, which became the inspiration and sanction of the adultery of Francesca and Paolo. Can what seemed so magnificent in poetry be wrong in life? Of course it can, not only wrong, but sordid and bitter. Poetry is dangerous. It is easy for poetry to set a bad example and make the worse appear the better course.

What else had Dante done himself, when he wrote his earlier love poetry? It is Dante himself who is the censor of that poetry. In Purgatory, when Dante quotes his own sonnet, Cato the Censor is angry with the spirits who delay the great work of life, which is to purify themselves, while they linger over the lovely occasion of passive delight as Casella sings of love in Dante's words. Here in Hell Dante is an even more severe judge of poetry and his own poems. Francesca speaks in the famous New Style which Dante helped to establish in his youth. It is the form in which Francesca naturally casts the account of the love which destroyed the life of her soul. She all but quotes another of Dante's sonnets. On his conscience as Dante hears her speak is the burden of having published poetry himself, whose theme and style nourished, if they did not directly inspire, the kind of love that Paolo and Francesca are condemned to act out forever. Francesca, in pronouncing her judgement on the author of the Tale of Lancelot, shows how great are the responsibilities of the poet. At the beginning of a poem which Dante plainly hopes will open the road to Heaven, it is his duty to show how poetry and a certain poem, even his own poems, may open the way to Hell.

Robert S. Bart received a B.A. degree from Harvard College in 1940 and a M.A. degree from St. John's College in 1957. From 1940 to 1941 he was a Sheldon Traveling Fellow from Harvard University. He joined the faculty of St. John's in Annapolis in 1946.

NEWS ON THE CAMPUSES

Items of Musical Interest

The performance of music found new expression on the Annapolis campus this past year. First, a fifteen-piece chamber music orchestra, composed of Tutors and students, was established. Tutor David Stephenson was director, assisted by student directors Alan Plutzik ('71) and James Carlyle ('73). The orchestra hopes to become a permanent activity, rehearsing weekly during the academic year.

In addition to the orchestra, concerts by student performers were started this year. Leslie Epstein ('74) and Tutor Douglas Allanbrook performed a concert for recorder and harpsichord on May 1st. A composition by Mr. Epstein was featured. On June 6th, Mark Schneider ('73) gave a piano concert. It is hoped that two or three student concerts can be scheduled each year.

Also during this past year Mrs. E. Malcolm Wyatt (Martha Goldstein '61), Music Librarian, has been conducting an informal bureau of student performers. Through her auspices folksingers have entertained at homes in the area, and at least one very successful birthday party puppet show was performed. In this way residents of the area are recipients of top-notch entertainment, while the students can earn some extra money.

It should also be mentioned that there are at the College highly-qualified students who are anxious to teach music. Again, Mrs. Wyatt has information about these students, and will be available after the College reopens in September.

Annapolis Provost Paul D. Newland throws out the first ball of the Spring 1971 baseball season. *Photo: Thomas Parran, Jr.*

Exhibits Include Work of Indian Artists and Award-Winning Santa Fe Photographer

Exhibits in the St. John's Gallery in Santa Fe this spring included work by young artists of the Institute of American Indian Arts and award-winning photographer Laura Gilpin.

More than fifty students and former students of the IAIA participated in a Graphics show of prints and drawings from April 11th to May 7th. The artists represented many tribes, from Nez Percé to Navajo.

Miss Gilpin, who has been a photographer for sixty years, is best known for her photographs of the Southwest and Indians, which have been published in her books, including *The Enduring Navaho*. This year she received the first Fine Arts award of the Southwest Industrial Photographers Association, which described her as "a great lady who stands alone as a photographic documentarian of the American Indian."

Campus Notes

Mr. and Mrs. *Laurence Berns* and daughter Anna Elena will spend Mr. Berns's sabbatical year in Cambridge, England, where he will be an Associate of Clare Hall at Cambridge University. Tutor *Malcolm Wyatt* will assume Mr. Berns's duties as editor of *The College* magazine during the sabbatical leave.

Treasurer *Charles T. Elzey* and Business Manager *James E. Grant* represented St. John's College in Annapolis at the annual meeting of the Maryland Association of College Business Officers in Baltimore on May 13th.

St. John's College was the recipient of a special award in the May Basket Contest sponsored by the Garden Club of Old Annapolis Towne, thanks to the efforts of Miss *Charlotte Fletcher*, Librarian, and Mrs. *LaNece Lomonte*, Admissions Office secretary. Their flowers adorned the front door of McDowell Hall.

Tutor *Harry L. Golding* delivered a lecture entitled "What is a Liberal Arts Education?" at Shimer College, Mt. Carroll, Illinois, on March 24th.

Annapolis Dean *Robert A. Goldwin* was the conference leader of the Public Affairs Conference Center at Kenyon College from April 29th to May 2nd for a conference on "Violence and Civil Disorder." The participants were several members of Congress, elected officials from state governments, law enforcement officers, private attorneys, psychiatrists, and academic people from several disciplines.

Mr. Goldwin will present a paper at the American Political Science Association meeting in Chicago on September 8th for a panel on "Politics, Education, and Philosophy."

Michael Ham, the new Director of Admissions in Annapolis, took a recruitment trip with the Capitol Region Colleges and talked with high school counselors in Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey. He states St. John's College's greatest force for becoming known "is through our students and alumni. Many of the counselors learned of us from students at St. John's who carried the word back home."

Tutor *Bryce Jacobsen* will teach February freshmen during the summer sesions in Annapolis.

Santa Fe Tutor *David Jones* will be on sabbatical leave for 1971-72.

John S. Kieffer is Director of the Summer Program in Annapolis this year.

Tutor *Aaron Kirschbaum* and his wife will spend the summer in Copenhagen visiting former Tutor *Brian McGuire*. The Kirschbaums will be moving to Santa Fe where he will become a member of the southwestern campus faculty.

Annapolis Provost *Paul D. Newland* gave a speech before the Public Relations Society in New York City on March 10th. The organization includes the top fifty industrial public relations executives.

Mr. Newland was the alumni luncheon speaker in Annapolis on February 12th, and the alumni dinner speaker in Washington, D. C., on May 23rd.

Tutor *John Sarkissian* is teaching in the Graduate Institute in Liberal Education in Santa Fe this summer.

Student Serves as Cantor

Douglas Cotler, a Santa Fe summer senior, has been appointed Cantor of Temple Beth Shalom in Santa Fe. Cotler received his training from his father, who sings at the temple in Lafayette, California. Douglas Cotler studied in Israel in 1966-67 at the Institute for Youth Leaders from Abroad.

Santa Fe Tutor Named Vice President of California College

Thomas J. Slakey, a Tutor in Santa Fe, will become academic vice president of St. Mary's College of California during July.

Mr. Slakey graduated *magna cum laude* from the Christian Brothers's liberal arts college in 1952. He first joined the St. John's College faculty in Annapolis in 1959. He came to Santa Fe as one of the original group of faculty in 1964.

Following his graduation from St. Mary's, Mr. Slakey attended Laval University in Quebec and earned his M.A. degree in philosophy there in 1953. In 1960 he received his Ph.D. degree in philosophy from Cornell University. He was a teaching assistant at Cornell from 1955 to 1958.

Zollars Chosen President-Elect of College Admissions Counselors

The Rocky Mountain Association of College Admissions Counselors has chosen Gerald F. Zollars of Santa Fe ('65) as President-Elect of the seven-state organization.

One of Zollars's responsibilities will be to plan the association's 1972 annual conference at Albuquerque, New Mexico. He also is on the committee to arrange the National ACAC Conference in San Francisco this fall.

Monitor Reporter Tells of Experiences at St. John's Summer Graduate Institute

"Socrates and I went back to college together last summer and he was such a companionable fellow I think we'll do it again," is the way Jack Waugh began his article in the May 14th issue of *The Christian Science Monitor*. Waugh, a writer for the *Monitor*, and his wife Lynne attended the 1970 session of the Graduate Institute in Liberal Education held each summer at St. John's in Santa Fe.

"I found myself in the section on philosophy and theology seated between an atheist from Baltimore and a theist from Gallup, and armed with the single rule laid out by example centuries ago by the ironic deflater himself, the admirable and kindly Socrates: Follow the argument wherever it leads."

In the article Waugh commented on the difference between the form expressed in most classroom arguments and the dialectic dialogue which St. John's tutors and students practice or attempt to practice.



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GRADUATION 1971

Graduation 1971 on the Santa Fe campus of St. John's College was held on Sunday, June 6, and on the Annapolis campus on Sunday, June 13. A total of 71 students were graduated with Steven Michael Moser in Santa Fe and Holly Ann Carroll in Annapolis receiving the Silver Medal from the Board of Visitors and Governors. The medal is awarded to a senior on each campus who has achieved the highest standing. Six seniors graduated *magna cum laude;* seven received degrees *cum laude.*

Guest speaker in Santa Fe was Ivan Illich, Director of the Center For Inter-Cultural Documentation in Mexico. Stringfellow Barr, President of St. John's College in Annapolis from 1937 to 1946, addressed the Annapolis seniors.

Other graduation week activities included a meeting of the Board in Santa Fe, class day exercises, baccalaureate, and a reception for graduates and guests at the home of President and Mrs. Weigle.

Santa Fe

Magna Cum Laude: Gail Hartshorne; *Cum Laude:* Steven Michael Moser, James Fredrick Scott, and Donald Hugh Whitfield; *Rite:* Sheila Bobbs, Jonathan Lippitt Brewer, Paul Futrall Bustion, Catherine North Carroll, Maya Narayan Contractor, Stuart Roy Deaner, Sally Lee Dunn, Paul Gordon Eitner, Ralph David Esdale, Amanda Skouras Fowler, Bonnie Louise Gage, Margaret Edith Jacobs, Laura Joyce Kelly, Vicky Manchester, Linda Norton, Gerald Pickard Peters III, Dennis Patrick Plummer, Donald Malden Stillwell, Dolores Ann Strickland, Lloyd Chockley Westbrook, Edward Bradley Whitney, and Leslie Kenneth Wilson.

Annapolis

Magna Cum Laude: Holly Ann Carroll, Jeremiah Andrew Collins, Richard Delahide Ferrier, Jeffrey Coleman Kitchen, Jr., and Rachel DuBose Sullivan; *Cum Laude:* Shire Joseph Chafkin, James Arthur Cockey, Andrew Alexander Fleming Garrison, and Judy Gail Kepner; *Rite:* Douglas Hathorn Bennett, Dennis Dean Berg, Marcia Jones Berg, Perry Jack Braunstein, Duncan MacRae Brown, William H. Buell III, Thomas Gridley Casey, 2nd, Diana Love Collins, Dennis John Dort, Thomas Leonard Dourmashkin, George Henry Elias, Jr., Marie Kathryn Erickson, Joanna May Fitzick, Robert Fenton Gary, Jay Alexander Gold, Jane Sarah Goldwin, James Kent Guida, James Ross Hill, Katherine Elisabeth Jackson, Diane Palley Joseph, Martha Jo Kaufman, Christopher Lee, Clifford Alan Martin, Ronny Stephen Millen, Jocelyn Lloyd Moroney, Alan Roth Plutzik, Lynn Carol Smith Pomerance, John Robert Scow, Barbara Sherman Simpson, Jeffrey Sonheim, James Stewart Spirer, Harold Samuel Stone, Leila Adams Straw, Daniel James Sullivan, Victor Michael Victoroff, and James Francis Villeré, Jr.



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

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1) Five seniors take a final look as students from the Peterson Student Center balcony in Santa Fe.

2) Santa Fe graduation ceremonies ring the Nina Garson Memorial Pool.

3) Annapolis senior Holly Ann Carroll receives her *magna cum laude* degree from President Richard D. Weigle and her hood from Provost Paul D. Newland. Miss Carroll also was awarded the silver medal from the Board of Visitors and Governors.

4) Steven Michael Moser graduates *cum laude* in Santa Fe. He received the silver medal from the Board, and the Margo Dawn Gerber Memorial Prize for writing the best senior essay.

5) Vice-President J. Burchenal Ault leads the procession from the Peterson Student Center to the Commencement site.

6) The center of attention is Gail Hartshorne, the only *magna cum laude* graduate in Santa Fe. *Photo: Robert Nugent.*

7) President Richard D. Weigle listens to a graduation address.

8) Parents and guests applaud (and photograph) Ivan Illich, speaker in Santa Fe.



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

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College Chamber Orchestra Presents Concert with Guest Pianist

The St. John's College Chamber Orchestra and guest pianist, Mrs. John W. McHugh of Santa Fe, presented a concert at Santa Fe on April 14th.

The performance included the first movement of the London Symphony by Haydn with Tutor Samuel E. Brown as guest conductor. Schubert's "Double Cello Quintet," first movement, was presented by five players from the orchestra, which is made up of students and local musicians. Mrs. McHugh was soloist for Beethoven's Piano Concerto in C Minor, first movement, with Tutor Richard Stark conducting the orchestra.

New Board Chairman Elected

J. I. Staley of Wichita Falls, Texas, will head the Board of Visitors and Governors of the College for the 1971-72 year.

Mr. Staley was elected chairman at the recent meeting of the Board at the southwestern campus. He succeeds Mrs. Walter B. Driscoll of Santa Fe.

The board also named Mrs. Duane L. Peterson of Baltimore, Maryland, as eastern vice chairman and former New Mexico Governor Jack M. Campbell of Santa Fe as western vice chairman. A St. John's College alumnus, Bernard Fleischmann, of New Jersey, was re-elected secretary.

Mr. Staley is the president of the Staley Oil Company in Wichita Falls and owns a ranch near Las Vegas, New Mexico.

He has been interested in St. John's since 1940 when he read an article in *Life* magazine about the new great books program initiated on the Annapolis campus by Stringfellow Barr and Scott Buchanan. His interest was renewed when St. John's opened its Santa Fe campus in 1964. He served on the board from 1965 to 1970 and was reappointed at the same meeting he was elected chairman.

Mr. Staley received his B.A. degree in sociology from Stanford University in 1935 and his D.J. degree from the University of Texas Law School in 1938. He has been on the Santa Fe Opera Board of Directors since its inception and is now its vice-chairman. He is also a member of the Stanford Associates, the Texas Legal Foundation, the Wichita Falls Museum and Art Center, and the Wichita Falls Symphony Orchestra.

New members elected to the Board of Visitors and Governors are: John S. Greenway, Tucson, Arizona; Jac Holzman, New York, New York; Mrs. Everett H. Jones, San Antonio, Texas; Mrs. Louise Trigg McKinney, Santa Fe, New Mexico; John Murchison, Dallas, Texas; and Mrs. Duane L. Peterson, Baltimore, Maryland.

Santa Fe Seniors Sponsor Benefit Showing of War and Peace; Present Gift to College

The Santa Fe campus of St. John's College received a gift of $4,957 from the members of the Class of 1971.

The gift includes $2,380 which the senior class raised through a showing of the six-hour Russian film version of Tolstoy's *War and Peace*. This amount was matched anonymously. About $88 was raised with a number of "15-minute parties" given by students on Wednesday evenings throughout the school year.

The class stipulated the money should be used to diminish the principal of the debt owed by the College in Santa Fe to the endowment fund of the Annapolis campus.

"We have two things in mind in wishing to give this amount toward the repayment of the Annapolis endowment debt," the statement accompanying the gift noted.

"First perhaps, it can in a small way express our thanks to Annapolis for helping this campus to come about with its own critical funds, not to mention the men and experience it gave.

"Secondly, this gift is given in the hope of continuing and yet finer achievements, through books and discussions, by all members of the college."

Representatives of the senior class made the presentation at the recent board meeting in Santa Fe. President Weigle and the board members expressed their appreciation of the gift and commended the students for their support of the College.

President and Mrs. Weigle Travel on Danforth Foundation Grant

President and Mrs. Weigle enjoyed several weeks of travel on a grant from the Danforth Foundation during the first half of 1971. The grant was in conjunction with a Danforth program of short-term leaves for college and university administrators who have served with an educational institution for at least five years.

During January and February the couple toured in South Africa, Rhodesia, Tanzania, and Kenya, stopping to visit universities in Johannesburg and Pretoria, and Rhodes University in Grahamstown. In the interior of Tanzania the Weigles visited Morogoro Teachers College. In addition to viewing Victoria Falls, they also spent time in the game reserves at Amboseli and visited the treetops in Kenya and the Kenya National Park at Nairobi.

In March the Weigles joined eighty other educators for a tour of Budapest, Bucharest, Moscow, Novosibirsk, and Warsaw. They visited secondary schools and universities in all centers and saw Academic City in Siberia, a concentration of research institutes and library facilities located 2,000 miles east of Moscow.

In April and May Mr. Weigle was a Visiting Fellow at Clare College of Cambridge University in England. The couple stayed with Tutor Elliott Zuckerman who is currently a Fellow at the College. Mr. Weigle explored the early relationships between St. John's College in Cambridge and St. John's College in Annapolis. During the last week of the trip to England the Weigles visited with Tutor Samuel Kutler and his wife who were on a sabbatical.

New Admissions Director in Annapolis

Annapolis Provost Paul D. Newland recently announced the appointment of Michael William Ham as Director of Admissions of the Annapolis campus effective July 1st.

Mr. Ham served as an assistant to Mr. James M. Tolbert, retiring Director of Admissions, in April, May, and June. Mr. Tolbert, at his request, has resumed full-time duties as a Tutor at the College.

Following graduation *cum laude* from St. John's in 1961, Mr. Ham attended Dartmouth College on a teaching fellowship, and received his M.S. degree in mathematics from the University of Iowa in 1968. He taught mathematics at the Key School in Annapolis from 1965 to 1966, and assisted in planning the secondary school mathematics curriculum there.

Michael W. Ham

Mr. Ham was Coordinator of Data Processing for the American College Testing Program in Iowa from 1967 to 1969 when he joined the Westinghouse Learning Corporation as a system analyst in Project PLAN's Computer Systems group. He was Manager of PLAN Systems Analysis and Programming at the time he left.

Mr. Ham is married to the former Mary Lou Ryce, also a St. John's College graduate, and they have three children, Cecelia, Greta, and Ethan.

ALUMNI ACTIVITIES

Welcome Aboard

Both as an alumnus of St. John's and as president of the Alumni Association, let me welcome the Class of 1971, and the members of earlier classes who graduated last month, to the ranks of the Alumni of St. John's College. We are pleased and proud to have you join us, and hope that you will want to participate actively in the life of the Association.

There are a number of ways in which you can be an active alumnus, but they all require some sort of involvement. It may be as simple as participating in meetings of local alumni groups, or it may be as complex as organizing a telephone session as part of the annual giving campaign. It certainly means attending Homecoming when you can, and voting in the various and sundry elections as they occur. It could also mean serving as a volunteer in the Admissions Assistance or Career Counselling programs which the Association sponsors. And it also means supporting the College with such financial help as you can afford.

In whatever ways you choose, be a part of the Association, the organization through which alumni participate in the life of the College. As an alumnus, you will always be a member of the St. John's community. Exercise your membership.

Again, a hearty welcome to each of you, and the best of luck in your after-college life.

William R. Tilles '59

Association Activities

Board of Visitors and Governors:

Philip I. Bowman '31 and *W. Bernard Fleischmann* '50 were elected to second consecutive terms on the Board of Visitors and Governors in May. An election, conducted by mail, was necessitated when *Steven Shore* SF '68 was nominated by petition. This springtime election was the first under the provisions of the new College Polity and Association By-Laws.

News-sheet:

The Association directors have started an informal news-sheet to supplement material which appears on

David F. Crowley, Jr., '28, was one of the 27 alumni volunteers who helped with the Baltimore telethon during this year's Alumni Annual Giving Campaign. Telephone appeals were also made in Annapolis and Washington, D. C. Gifts in response to the calls amounted to almost $5,000.

these pages. Scheduled for publication four times a year, the *News* will alternate with issues of this magazine. The directors anticipate that this plan will permit more timely communication with all alumni about Association activities.

Programs:

During the coming year the Association will concentrate its efforts to help the College on three principal areas: the Counselling and Placement Service, the Admissions Assistance Program, and fund raising.

Fund raising is an increasingly important fact of life for St. John's as for other colleges. Alumni involvement, both as workers and as givers, will be more critical than ever over the next several years. If the performance of the past few years is maintained, however, there will be no lack of alumni support for the College.

A program to help the Admissions officers on both campuses has been in operation since early 1968. To date it has consisted primarily of referring inquiries to certain alumni for follow-up and possible interview. (If you were a volunteer for this program and have not had names sent you, there simply have been few if any inquiries from your area.)

Thanks to the efforts of *Temple G. Porter* '62 and a committee of other directors, alumni help with admissions work is about to enter a new phase. A kit for volunteers, developed by Mr. Porter with the cooperation of both Directors of Admissions, will be made available during the summer to alumni volunteers. Designed to help alumni seek out and interview prospective students, the kit has been acclaimed by officers of the College. It should prove invaluable to alumni as they become more deeply involved in finding able students for both campuses.

Plans are now being drawn up for the Counselling and Placement Service. In the past year there were three main counselling sessions held, on graduate schools, on law, and on careers in business and government, but little was done in the way of placement. Similar sessions will be continued next year, and ways are being sought for the Service to function more actively as a job placement center. Suggestions would be most welcome.

Chapter News

Annapolis: On May 14th *T. Herbert Taylor* '44 assumed chairmanship of the chapter, replacing *Frank B. Marshall* '45. The local group plans to continue the monthly luncheons next year, but would like to have an occasional night-time or week-end activity. This would permit attendance of local alumni who cannot attend luncheons.

New York: The New York group held a meeting on Tuesday, May 25th, with Jacob Klein as guest speaker. Mr. Klein conducted an informal seminar on Plato.

Washington: Under the co-leadership of *Carol (Phillips) Tilles* '59 and *Cynthia (Siehler) White* "66, the chapter held a dinner meeting on May 23rd. Annapolis Provost Paul D. Newland was guest of honor and principal speaker.

Award of Merit

The Alumni Award of Merit, first presented in 1950, may be awarded annually at the discretion of the Board of Directors of the Alumni Association. In June, 1970, the directors voted to increase the number of Awards from one to not more than three annually.

The Award is made to an alumnus for *"distinguished and meritorious service to the United States or to his native state or to St. John's College, or for outstanding achievement within his chosen field."*

Association President William R. Tilles asks that confidential letters of nomination be sent to him no later than August 15th. Each letter should contain sufficient information about the nominee to permit thorough evaluation by the Board of Directors. Letters should be sent to Mr. Tilles, c/o Alumni Office, St. John's College, Annapolis, Maryland 21404.

Reunions

This is the year in which the classes of 1911, 1921, 1931, 1941, 1946, 1951, 1961, and 1966 should be planning some sort of special get-together for Homecoming. Those are the special reunion classes, those who are passing another milestone, whether it be the 5th or the 60th anniversary of the graduation of the class. The Alumni Office will help in whatever way it can: lists of classmates, reservations at motels or hotels, special tables at the dinner. We want to help you have a good time; please give us a chance.

Anniversary Homecoming

While the Alumni Association really does not trace its origins back to King William's School, St. John's College certainly does. For that reason, the College this year will celebrate the 275th anniversary of the founding of the School.

As you can read elsewhere in this issue, the celebration of the big event will take place in the fall, starting on October 12th, and terminating on Homecoming Day, October 16th. We encourage all alumni to attend as many of the activities during that period as they can; we believe you will find them stimulating and very worthwhile.

Details of Homecoming itself will be published later in the summer, although a few events are now in place. Alumni seminars will probably be held on Saturday morning, the Annual Meeting following luncheon, and the annual reception and dinner in the late afternoon and night, respectively.

Make your plans now to join us, at least for the 16th, and better yet, for three or four days. We think you will enjoy the experience.

CLASS NOTES

1900

Louis Baer, who must be our oldest living alumnus, celebrated his 92nd birthday on May 29th.

1907

A nice note from Mrs. E. S. Bushong of Boonsboro, Maryland, informs us that her father, the Rev. *Walter B. McKinley*, celebrated his 90th birthday this past spring. Although emphysema prevents his walking, he is "otherwise in good shape," to quote Mrs. Bushong. Our congratulations to Mr. McKinley.

1912

We hear through *Philip L. Alger* of *Spencer D. Hopkins*, now fourteen years retired from the General Motors Corporation, where he worked for forty years. Mr. Hopkins keeps busy helping manage a home for the aged and helping run a club for retired GM executives. He makes his home in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan.

1922

William R. Horney, a member of the SATC unit at St. John's in 1918, and a retired judge of the Maryland State Court of Appeals, was ordained a deacon of the Episcopal Church on January 16, 1971. Mr. Horney serves as assistant to the rector of St. Paul's Church in Centreville, Maryland.

1928

Louis L. Snyder, professor of history at the City College of the City University of New York, delivered the first talk in the current "Ideas" series for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation on April 12th. Professor Snyder's subject for the CBC network was "The Ideas of Nation and Nationalism."

1931

Wilbur R. Dulin, an Annapolis attorney and former State Senator, helped make medical history recently. After suffering with spinal pain for several years following a cancer operation, Mr. Dulin became the forty-first person in this country to be fitted with a dorsal column stimulator (DCS). The DCS, implanted under the skin, relays radios impulses from a special transmitter controlled by Mr. Dulin; the impulses set up interference which cancels pain signals moving to the brain.

1933

In March *William A. Ziegler* retired from Bethlehem Steel's Sparrows Point plant. An All-American lacrosse player as well as football end and basketball center at St. John's, Mr. Ziegler was General Foreman, Plate and Flange Mills, upon his retirement.

1935

Walter F. Evers informs us that *Joseph Novey* lost his wife last fall. We join Mr. Novey's classmates in sending belated condolences.

1938

Jack D. Englar, former vice president of plant operations for McCormick & Co., Inc., and more recently manager of economic development of the Greater Baltimore Chamber of Commerce, in March was named vice president and general manager of the technologies division of Tate Industries.

1939

On July 1st *Frank A. White, Jr.*, was promoted to vice president at Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Company.

1943

On the night of January 1-2, 1971, the hopes and dreams of the Bay Country School and of its founder and headmaster, *Ogden Kellogg-Smith*, disappeared in $70,000 worth of smoke and flame. The school's first building, literally built by the brawn and sweat of students, parents, and faculty over the previous eighteen months, was destroyed by a fire of unknown origin. Founded in 1962, the School has served a unique and useful purpose in Anne Arundel County by offering an opportunity to the student who did not fit the conventional mold. Now the School faces the gigantic task of replacing its loss. Any of Mr. Kellogg-Smith's former classmates or other friends who wish to help should address Mr. Robert Jenkins, Bay Country School, Arnold, Md. 21012.

This was an auspicious spring for the *H. Willard Stern* family: in April Mr. Stern and his wife had a son, Darrell David, and one month later, Mr. Stern received his Ph.D. degree from Rutgers, The State University. His dissertation was entitled: "A Philosophical Analysis of the Use of 'Comprehension' In An Educational Context."

1944

Carl S. Hammen was promoted to professor of zoology at the University of Rhode Island on July 1st. Mr. Hammen holds master's degrees from Columbia University and the University of Chicago, and a Ph.D. degree from Duke University.

In March *James W. Poe, Jr.* received the Writers Guild 1971 Laurel Award, symbolizing the writer "who has advanced literature of the motion picture through the years." Several years ago Mr. Poe won an Academy Award for his movie screenplay "Around the World in 80 Days." He is the father of *Lorna Poe* '67.

1945

John L. Lincoln's son Jack '74 politely called our attention to a misplaced item in the April issue. It should have been in the 1945 Notes instead of those for 1950: it was Jack's uncle, *C. Ranlet Lincoln*, who was in the class of 1950, not his father. Apologies to all the Lincolns.

1950

Dean *Robert A. Goldwin* had a special interest in the commencement exercises this year, since his daughter, *Jane*, was a member of the graduating class. Miss Goldwin will go to London for a year, and has been accepted in a Master of Arts in teaching program at Goucher College for the following year.

James H. Riggs writes to Miss *Miriam Strange* that he will be entering the study of psychology this coming fall at West Georgia College, Carrollton, Georgia.

1953

Have you ever wanted to chuck everything and get away from it all? Singer *Glenn R. Yarbrough* has apparently decided to do just that at the end of this year. Last February he announced that he will abandon his musical career and head to sea in his sailboat, *Jubilee*. With his wife, Anne, and their small daughter, Holly, Mr. Yarbrough will cruise the world for five years or more, to "read and think and travel . . . as an ordinary person."

1956

The Reverend *J. Donald Libby* has been rector of Christ Church, I.U. Parish, near Lynch, Maryland, and rector of North Sassafras Parish in lower Cecil County, since May 1st. Before moving to the Eastern Shore, Rev. Libby was rector of Severn Parish, near Crownsville. The Libbys and their three children make their home in Earleville.

J. Jay Wase, since January a senior assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City, is the author of "The Federal Gun Laws and You," published this past May.

1960

Richard S. Dohanian, who married the former Linda Powell in April, 1970, is now a restaurant owner in South Newbury, N.H.

1961

Michael C. Haley since February has been specializing in the sale of commercial and investment real estate with an Albuquerque, New Mexico, firm. Mr. Haley and his wife, the former *Linda Levitt* '64, have lived in Albuquerque for several years.

Michael W. Ham joined the staff of the College on April 19th as an Admissions Officer, and on July 1st he replaced James M. Tolbert as Director of Admissions in Annapolis. (See article elsewhere in this issue.)

Theodore B. C. Stinchecum, now performing professionally as Theo Barnes, toured with the Broadway Theater of Northeastern Pennsylvania this past winter in the title role in "Hadrian VII."

1962

Judith (Levine) Gerberg writes that she is on the National Committee of the Professional Women's Caucus. The letter which she sent explains that "PWC is a national organization of professional persons in all fields working for a social environment that stresses the full development of human potential before sex role stereotypes."

John F. Miller was one of 24 museologists and graduate students who attended the thirteenth annual Seminar for Historical Administrators in Williamsburg, Virginia, last month. Mr. Miller is a candidate for an M.A. degree in Architectural History/Art History at the University of Maryland.

1963

Mr. and Mrs. *Robert K. Thomas* are the proud parents of Miss Rebecca Marie, born March 24, 1971, in Beirut, Lebanon. Mr. Thomas is with the USIA.

1964

Stephen Fineberg writes that he is now at Stanford University working on a dissertation, "though officially still a Texan."

Sara (Hobart) Homeyer and husband Charles recently announced that their son Peter has been joined by an adopted sister, Martha Jean, who became a Homeyer on April 26th. Our congratulations to the new parents.

Neal O. Weiner now holds the rank of professor at Marlboro College in Vermont.

1965

The Harvard-Radcliffe Chapter of Sigma Xi has announced the advancement of *Bruce Collier* from associate member to member. Sigma Xi is an honorary organization for the encouragement of scientific research.

Carlos Pereira is now Director de la Escuela de Cursos Básicos del Nucleo de Bolivar, Universidad de Oriente, Cuidad Bolivar, Venezuela. The school, organized by Sr. Pereira, has 36 teachers and 700 students, and offers the first two years of college. During those two years the students are selected to enter the different fields of study offered by the University.

1966

For the past year Dr. *Jonathan D. Korshin* has been serving his medical internship in Tucson at the three hospitals affiliated with the University of Arizona School of Medicine. Dr. Korshin received his medical degree in May, 1970, at Downstate Medical School, State University of New York. According to information received during the spring, he expected to move back to the East Coast in July, 1971.

1967

David C. Dickey was selected in May as the Republican nominee for commonwealth's attorney for Greene County, Virginia. Mr. Dickey has been practicing law in Stanardsville since his graduation from the University of Virginia law school in June, 1970.

Congratulations and a large vote of appreciation are due *Arthur Kungle, Jr.*, and a large crew of volunteers whom he recruited, for the outstanding job they have done in beautifying the Annapolis campus. Gardens of annual flowers, a large bed of rose bushes, and many small trees on the back campus are the results of their labors. Their efforts have given us an even more beautiful setting in which to work.

1968

A letter from *Bettina Briggs* (SF) this spring reveals that she expected to receive her J.D. degree in June from Boston University. After that she will "tackle the Massachusetts Bar Examinations," in order to join the law office of Benjamin A. Friedman in Taunton. While at the University, Miss Briggs has worked on the staff of Cambridge Legal Services, helping impoverished clients, and with the Long Range Planning Department of Tufts-New England Medical Center. In this latter position she was particularly concerned with the inadequacy of existing mass transit systems for the handicapped and elderly.

The Army's loss apparently will be the legal profession's gain, as *Keith C. Covington* has completed his military service and plans to enter law school in the fall.

Elizabeth Dobbs writes that she finished work in April on her master's degree in the English Department of the State University of New York at Buffalo. She will be starting soon on her dissertation on medieval English.

In May *Jinna (MacLaurin) Rie* received her M.Ed. degree from Goucher College in Baltimore.

In March there were sergeant's stripes for *Jonathan Zavin* as he graduated from the Non-Commissioned Officer Candidate School at Ft. Benning, Georgia. Sgt. Zavin was selected for the course under a specialized program that grants rapid promotions to outstanding individuals.

1969

Linda E. Davenport has been teaching school this past year in Chester, Vermont.

In Memoriam

1906—Richard H. Hodgson, Salisbury, Md., March 7, 1971.
1908—J. Graham Shannahan, Sr., Baltimore, Md., June 2, 1971.
1913—Robert A. Tennant, Oakland, Cal., May 7, 1971.
1917—R. Hammond Elliott, Annapolis, Md., May 3, 1971.
1920—Robert E. Coughlan, Jr., Baltimore, Md., March 5, 1971.
1923—Douglas R. Bowie, Cumberland, Md., 1969.
1928—Samuel T. Jones, Prince Frederick, Md., May 16, 1971.
1930—Ferdinand Fader, South Orange, N.J., April 20, 1971.
1933—Stanley R. Mitchell, Guilford, Conn., August 17, 1970.
1936—John W. Sullivan, Millington, Md., May 13, 1971.
1937—J. Trenholm Hopkins, Charleston, S.C., February 2, 1971.
1938—Lee N. Baker, Pikesville, Md., April 10, 1971.
1938—John W. Cook, Frostburg, Md., August 11, 1970.
1938—Peter T. Simmons, Portsmouth, N.H., March 11, 1971.
1943—Richard S. Spencer, Jr., Baltimore, Md., January 28, 1971.
1970—Mitchel A. Green (SF), February 23, 1971.

275th ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION

Calendar of Events

Tuesday, October 12
Concert: Juilliard String Quartet

Wednesday, October 13
Seminar on Plato's *Meno*
Panel: Literature and Language

Thursday, October 14
Panel: Politics and Society
St. John's College Regular Seminars

Friday, October 15
Panel: Mathematics and Science
Tutor Jacob Klein: The St. John's College Seminar
Tutor Douglas Allanbrook: Harpsichord Concert
Alumni Receptions

Saturday, October 16
Meeting of the Board of Visitors and Governors
Alumni Seminars
Alumni Business Meeting
Academic Convocation
Guest Speaker: Dr. Martin Meyerson, President
The University of Pennsylvania
Alumni Reception for Faculty and Seniors
Alumni Dinner and Presentation of Award of Merit

275th Anniversary Celebration

October 12 - 16, 1971
Annapolis

See Inside Back Cover for Calendar of Events

The College
St. John's College
Annapolis, Maryland 21404

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