

# Colloquy

## On Creation

# Table of Contents

# Letter from the Editor

# On Creation and the Value of Themes

I think a short explanation of the role of theme within a publication is warranted, given its inclusion in a handful of recent issues of Colloquy. Not only is it useful for you, the reader, but for the contributors, and the editorial team. Without theme, we have nothing to judge against. I'm not speaking of judgements of quality, as we would have a difficult and spirited discussion about how to ascertain a work's quality. Instead I mean "judge" as in weigh the value of any particular work within the context of its setting. I think the simplest way to explain the importance of a theme is to highlight how prevalent the habit of keeping something "thematic" is. You cannot say something coherently unless a theme renders what you say coherent.

I'd first point to books, like the many we read here at St. John's. If Kant deviated at all from theme then the *Critique of Pure Reason* would suddenly find itself impure and unreasonable. And what a detriment to the ends of that work such a change would be. A core aspect of our ingrained habit of storytelling is theme. It ties one plot point to the next and allows metaphor to shine in the liminal space between word and interpretation. The role of theme is the same as the role of words, to communicate, but theme on its own can communicate an entire catalogue of interpretations and emotions that words cannot in their isolation.

So, let us focus on the theme for this issue of *Colloquy*: On Creation. Creation is among the most transcendent capabilities of any single thing. It can refer to the creation of new life or new purpose. We talk of artists as creators, and we say the same of gods. The role of creation is that something comes to fruition, and moves from a space purely other, that of the non-existent, to that of the tangible and knowable, materializing reality from concept.

In a way, "On Creation" is not a theme that enforces rigid boundaries. Creation as act is available to the entirety of life's beings, and seems to belong to nature's fundamental forces. The Universe forges stars as we create an idea. As a theme, "On Creation" does invite the polity of the Graduate Institute to participate in the single most unifying capability of all the Universe. And so I would like to end this musing with what I hope the following submissions create within you, dear reader.

I hope they create inspiration, so that some aspect of the style, content, or beauty of what you read here aids you in creating something wholly your own. I hope they create a reaction, as emotional states are a sudden and startling reminder that we are alive. And I hope they create a sense of appreciation for the brilliant, curious, and creative minds that make up the polity of the Graduate Institute, in this time and place.

Thank you, and give witness to creation.

Stephen Borsum - Editor

# Poetry & Musings

# Contributors

Austin Suggs

Chris MacBride

Stacey Rains

Louis Petrich

Sydney Rowe

Sylvie Bernhardt

John Harwood

# On Creation

## Austin Suggs

What was in that dark
Over which the Spirit's spark
hovered?

There was water there it seems
Though not the water of our streams.
This was of a different order

Not teeming with life
But humming with the power
Of a world not yet made
But somehow already there.

Did you tame primordial chaos

Or disturb a primal peace?

And what happened on that second day
That caused the pen to betray
Something was off.
For it was not good
Nor was it great.

It simply was.

Did the mass of land amidst the seas
Begrudge the Spirit its roaming free
A new strife where once there was peace?

And tell me, how great was man, really,
If you came to regret his progeny?
And if he's an image of you,
Well, what are we to do

With that?



*Somewhere with Warm Waters - Louis Petrich*

# Old Dog

## Chris Macbride

The click-clicking of four arthritic ankles

announce him into the kitchen

At 17, he's still turning up whenever the recipe begins

warm olive oil over medium heat, add 2 cloves garlic…

We met him at a rescue and were told his first owner was a chef

it explains a lot

His back is now a long, deep sway between hip and shoulder

curved like the mountain valley in Virginia where he was born

He shakes his head and the World's softest ears

slap against sunken cheekbones

These days, he speaks in low groans as if to say

getting older stinks (like dog poop)

And yet

when the air outside turns chilly

darn if he isn't a pup again

Trotting up the driveway eager to sniff out

the latest news left by four-legged friends

Nose to ground, tail wagging

he is happy

# Forbidden Fruit

## Stacey Rains

In 9th grade Biology, we dissected lilies;
we carefully opened the white petals to access the pale green center,
separated the stamen from the pistil, and
learned that even flowers have ovaries
to grow life inside of life,

inside the deep, protected center, comes the slow swelling and upwelling,
'til the petals drop away, and all is given
to the potential.

I have wrestled with
the discovery that trees can be dioecious–
that plants also are gendered–and, more, that there exists
a botanical misogyny. "When used for street plantings,
only male trees should be selected,
to avoid the nuisance from the seed."

Fertility is so inconvenient.
Nevermind the spewing,
fertile pollen that now dominates the landscape,
causing red eyes and running noses.

Nevermind regret.

# Children of that World

Louis Petrich

(Luke 20:34-36)

" —they neither marry, nor are given in marriage—"

That's all, perhaps, you need to say to inculcate
thy kingdom come and save us bouts of parables:
your sower, famed as seeding ground that's cursed,
then straining after roots to clutch at light,
next family farms and winter strawberries—
all angelically void when wings caress
god's breath and 'tis enough to harvest songs.
Your late-hired field hands, prodigally paid for?--
consider angels--any time--for free.

The good Samaritan gets even better,
stays the night with beaten travelers
instead of backing home to wife and stacking
nursing on an innkeeper, whose own shrewd wife,
though scraping profit from the dirty sheets,
with years grows tired of busybody neighbor feats.

There'd be no rigmarole with folks declining
t'attend the wedding--no resorting last
to uncast idlers outing for a lark—
when kingdom come has come, the nights are done
that consummate, no made-up faces fine
or bodies nipped and tucked to light a spark—
O what a load from off the mind!--you lookers, mark.

My savior dear, your promised kingdom
parabolic could have been a kingdom
literal, in words that summon what they mean
forthright as prince's peal: I say there shan't be
children given away from honied skies.
For yes, I do remember Paradise--
creation, mine to color.

Then the pall,
for none do slice off married once for all
until they deal their evil able parts
and die while knowing them inseparable.
She, hearing how to swallow serpentine
the world, tends him naked taste of inside
out desire; henceforth, he's good no more alone
to name things as he will and hear the Lord approve.

If only kingdom come, pie rained from sky,
were plated now for simple thanks to still
the pulpy verbiage, round it goes: “Now eat
at once the astronomical wee apple
that lets fall the dominoes.” Along come back pains,
raking leaves from tree left-o’er uneaten,
cracking truth on fossil fruit pertaining
not to peaceful night of sleep ‘til death--
with tugging of the limbs and closing in
and never deeper getting than this flushing skin.

To walk with God in cool breeze
of the evening--unafraid
of after-hidden, poor performing fool—
that’s ever, and forever, bliss.
For that, be overcome, O world amiss.

# Mimi

Sydney Rowe

Vertebrate coast.

Silent boat.

Cusp of tropics, touch pearl.

Medicine inside embers.

Sails high; flatter.

Arcing Inwards to you.

The tiny cabin with a bowl of salt.

Cut open, pouring.

# My Mind's a Dark Forest

Sylvie Bernhardt

Escape—run for the trees—evade;
Before they mark me freak,
I'll claim honors as renegade,
As friend to claw and beak.

No good friend have they been to me—
Community of Fear—
Conquer my last youthful decree:
"I know this dark mirror."

Under night's blanket I make haste
Away from light, away.
To fall in sight would lead to waste;
Safety in darkness lay.

As I descend, no lights a friend
To delve through depths returned.
Wicked shadows cling to bright kin,
To I, who dares and burns.

No hope flickers warmth I might save.
No others will I need learn.
Down, down a dark stone cave
Goes I, who dares and burns.

Down, down these mountain graves
That shutter, crack, and groan.
Scratching fang nails on rusty rails,
These wretched creatures roam.

I'm no Devil nor deity;
Grisly death wings me home.
Know I seek not a Paradise
Where those wretched do roam.

Those that claw against their stone tombs
Wail, weak cretin cries.
Forever suckling purple blooms,
They who lives no more dies.

Brutish heads prevail in disorder,
In guise of man though beast.
Debased are they, the exploiter,
And violence of brutes won't cease.

I move quietly in shadow
With sharp claw I unsheathe.
No hatred I harbor in tow,
But blood be what we breathe.

Should I consent to suffer more
Or live in sunk despair?
I know in cruelty they'll restore
A lust for death so fair.

Earth, oh Earth, cries do bury
An evil rot in mind.
Spoken in tongues—restless fury
Stirs frenzied force blind.

If only I had strength in hand to rake
The tremors from my flesh.
From my throat's rage to the world's break,
All cries ever languish.
Death I keep always in soft heart,
That will know endless cold.
Love binds us before we depart;
Of All, this I now hold.

But if my flesh be not my end,
Then question not my aim.
Makers of form are divine kin,
So worship not to tame.

Tread on, but move most steadily,
Else these shales might splinter,
And break. Striking me readily,
As done in past winter.

Depths I dove, and air gusts led
Through caverns and deluge.
A moonlit grove, past tamed, then freed—
Now my living refuge.

A melody of crinkling leaves
Invokes safety's soft glee.
Lantern flower blooms now breathes
A loving warmth through me.

Hold I no more despotic dark,
While rose, mint and oak grows;
Reflecting sanctuary's mark
Away I from old woes.

Ruins are ripened with dull time.

I find the warm glow safe.

Lonely lantern's golden flame climbs

An ancient etched-stone waif.

Secret garden beneath the falls

Spiraling to center.

Fire sprouts flame on vine-meshed walls

Blooming in November.

To stir thoughts of metaphysics

I deny mind's fetters.

Alight there glows hieroglyphics—

Spells in gold letters.

Timber crackles in a dirt pit.

Smoke fails to reach the floor.

Poems I babble and I spit,

So to deepen the lore.

Tonight, what dreams will I endure?

Be they kind or bleak?

While rosy-cheeked dawn will ignore

Me so tender and meek.

On this bed of oak leaves I sleep;

No company I seek.

My tale always to tell as creep,

As friend to claw and beak.

*Puck: Consider it a Dream - Nadine Bucca*

# Before the Blank Stare

## John Harwood

Here I sit and kneel
Before the blank stare
Of some little earth,
An image, of one
I have never seen nor touched.

The more thoughts rattle
In between my ringing ears,
The less I can manage
To imagine even the carving
Of the one I've never seen.

A faceless and mangled
Homunculus of marble
Stands before my penitent's gaze.
In fear, I can not fathom to begin;
To set a chisel into the creature,
To even gesture to the creator.

How can I release anger and dread,
Praise and duty, pent up
In the veins and muscles
Of marble, so finely shaped
By the hands of the Almighty?

Would even a painting,

A lead etching,

A mindless praying,

Or even tranced dancing

Begin to evoke the Unspeakable,

The Ever-Perplexing?

So, I sit and scratch lines into letters

And letters into the pages of my heart

That resembles the stone

That patiently awaits

Before my artist's first minding.

After a purging time of pondering

Before the blank stare

Of the One Unfathomed,

Who fathoms me gently,

I dare begin to finally set a mark.

# Short Stories & Musings

## Dialogue: Meeting with Descartes

## The First Postulate

# Contributors

Yonas Ketsela

Cynthia Crane

# Dialogue: Meeting with Descartes

Yonas Ketsela

I set out on a journey today to meet with Descartes. He invited me to come and chat with him at his house. I have been anxiously waiting to see him all day. I have his book, *Meditations on First Philosophy* under my arms. After a long walk, I arrived at the appointed time, and I am now only waiting for his call. This is roughly how our conversations go:

Descartes: "Let us for example take the wax; it has only just been removed from the honeycomb; it has not yet lost all the flavour of its honey; it retains some of the scent of the flowers among which it has gathered; its colour, shape, and size are clearly visible; it is hard, cold, easy to touch, and if you tap it with your knuckle, it makes sound. In short, it has all the properties that seem to be required for a given body to be known as distinctly as possible."

Yonas: What you said makes sense to me. This is in fact what I myself experimented on a candle before coming here. If I put it in my own words, what you describe is exactly what I characterise as my conscious sense-experience or sensations: the colour, shape, size of the candle belongs to my vision; it has some cedar flavour which belongs to my sense of smell and taste; its hardiness and coldness to my sense of touch; and its sound to my ear. Thus, all these sensations are distinct to me. Even though I am not sure if I can say that it is clear, nor do I know exactly what this experience means to me.

Descartes: "But wait–while I am speaking, it is brought close to the fire. The remains of its flavour evaporate; the smell fades; the colour is changed, the shape is taken away, it grows in size, becomes liquid, becomes warm, it can hardly be touched, and now, if you strike it, it will give off no sound. Does the same wax still remain?"

Yonas: It is unclear to me now how I can precisely answer the question whether the same wax remains or not. But one fact is clear to me that it has undergone some changes of appearance. Its previous qualities are not there anymore. My sensations are obviously diminished in reaction to this change. I can barely smell it, its colour is unclear, its shape somewhat deformed or irregular as a result of being in a change of state—from that of solid to liquid; I also cannot grasp it; its sound is not as distinct as before. So, I guess, so far as my sensation is diminished, I can say it is not exactly the same wax as before. In fact, if someone now breaks into the house and senses this wax, he would hardly be able to exactly predict or imagine its previous state. But as for me, I know what happened and I can remember its previous state–however vague it might be. So I don't see the same wax as before.

Descartes: [I see what you are saying but] "we must admit it does remain: no one would say or think it does not. So what was there in it that was so distinctly grasped? Certainly, none of those qualities I apprehended by the senses: for whatever came under taste, or smell or sight, or touch, or hearing, has now changed: but the wax remains."

Yonas: Ahh, you are right. I hadn't reflected in this way before. But If I follow your suggestion, it does seem to me that what I distinctly grasped was first its number, namely, there was one wax here which has undergone a change from one state to another. But as you said, for its taste, smell, sight, touch and hearing, they become very obscure and even my imagination can only be a little to no help (given that my imagination is not good enough). My senses may still retain a certain trace of sensations in them, but I am sure they will disappear pretty soon (given that my memory does not always record these sensations accurately). In another extreme case, someone who does not have one of these sense organs may not participate in the same experience at all as I am now. I am now wondering if these qualities are not necessarily what belongs to the essence of this wax, then what is the essence of the wax apart from these qualities?

Descartes: [Good], "perhaps the truth of the matter was what I now think it is: namely that the wax itself was not in fact sweetness of the honey, or the fragrance of the flowers or the whiteness, shape, or sonority, but the body which not long ago appeared to me as perceptible in these modes, but now appears in others. But what exactly is this that I am imaging in this way?"

Yonas: That is exactly what I am wondering about too.

Descartes: [Okay] "let us consider the matter and, thinking away those things that do not belong to the wax, let us see what remains."

Yonas: Ok. Good.

Descartes: "Something extended, flexible, mutable: certainly, that is all."

Yonas: I think I can understand that.

Descartes: "But in what do this flexibility and mutability consist? Is it in the fact that I can imagine this wax being changed in shape, from a circle to a square, and from a square into a triangle?"

Yonas: Well, speaking in clear concepts, I think, that may be what we can understand by terms such as flexibility and mutability. But I am not sure if that is exactly what happens in reality.

Descartes: [Okay] "That cannot be right: for I understand that it is capable of innumerable changes of this sort, yet I cannot keep track of all these by using my imagination."

Yonas: Now, I see what you mean, namely that the limitation of my faculty of imagination would not at all allow me to keep track of all these changes ad infinitum.

Descartes: "What about 'extended'? Surely, I know something about the nature of its extension. For it is greater when the wax is melting, greater still when it is boiling, and greater still when the heat is further increased."

Yonas: Yes, in some vague estimation, I can surely think of changes in its state, that is to say, from a solid state to liquid or further to gas, consequently its extension increases. Yes, I am not sure whether at a certain point, we may want to say that it is dispersed, and not any longer an extension but discrete parts in space.

Descartes: [Okay, hold that thought] "And I would not be correctly judging what the wax is if I failed to see that it is capable of receiving more varieties, as regards extension, than I have ever grasped in my imagination."

Yonas: Your meaning is that if I cannot determine what this wax is like as it changes from one state into another in some notion or idea, then it seems that I could not do that by my imagination alone.

Descartes: "Now [see] I am left with no alternative, but not to accept that I am not at all imagining what this wax is, I am perceiving it with my mind alone: I say 'this wax' in particular, for the point is even clearer about wax in general. So then, what is this wax, which is only perceived by the mind?"

Yonas: If I remember correctly, we previously said that if we remove all the qualities from the wax, we will arrive at only flexibility, mutability, and extension. Is that what you mean? I mean that the mind can grasp the wax in these ideas and yet it would be the same wax.

Descartes: "Certainly, it is the same wax I see, touch, and imagine, and in short it is the same wax I judged it to be from the beginning. But yet—and this is important—the perception of it is not sight, touch or imagination and never was, although it seemed to be so at first: it is an inspection by the mind alone, which can be either imperfect and confused, as it was before in this case, or clear and distinct, as it now is, depending on the greater or lesser degree of attention I pay to what it consists of."

Yonas: Indeed, that seems to be an interesting and important point. There seems to be much more happening in perception than my simple sensations. But I don't quite see the problem yet. I do trust my senses that they can give me accurate sensations, but I hadn't quite reflected in this way before—how my mind can be problematic to this experience or how it would inspect the wax apart from the senses and yet could be in error?

Descartes: "...I am amazed by the proneness of my mind to error. For although I am considering this in myself silently and without speech, I am ensnared by words themselves, and all but deceived by the very ways in which we usually put things. For we say that

we ‘see’ the wax itself, if it is present, not that we judge it to be there

on the basis of its colour or shape. From this I would have immediately concluded that I therefore knew the wax by the sight of my eyes, not by the inspection of the mind alone.”

Yonas: That difference makes sense to me.

Descartes: [For example, as I am seeing this wax]..”If I had not happened to glance out of the window at people walking along the street, I have immediately concluded that I knew the wax by the sight of my eyes, not by the inspection of the mind alone but using the customary expression, I say that I ‘see’ them [the people in the street] just say I ‘see’ the wax. But what do I actually see other than hats and coats, which could be covering automata? But I judge that they are people. And therefore, what I thought I saw with my eyes, I in fact grasp only by the faculty of judging that is in my mind.”

Yonas: This explanation does make much more sense to me now, especially when I connect it to what you said before about the degree of attention one needs to put in his observation of facts of experience. Thus, my mind’s imperfection and confusion then only consist in that it judges quickly and that is when it errs.

Descartes: [Good] “Let us then go on where we left off by considering whether I perceived more perfectly and more evidently what the wax was, when I first encountered it, and believed that I knew it by these external senses, or at least by what they call common sense, that is imaginative power; or whether I perceive it better now, after I have more carefully investigated both what it is and how it is known. Certainly, it would be foolish to doubt that I have a much better grasp of it now. For what, if anything, was distinct in my original perception?”

Yonas: I don’t believe we arrived at that yet.

Descartes: [That is right] When I distinguish the wax from its external forms, and as if I had stripped off its garments, consider it in all its nakedness, then, indeed, although there may still be error in my judgement. I cannot perceive it in this way except by [my] mind…I have learned now that bodies themselves are perceived not, strictly speaking, by the senses or by the imaginative faculty, but by the intellect alone and that that they are not perceived because they are touched or seen, but only because they are understood, I clearly realise that nothing can be perceived by me more easily and more clearly that by own mind.

Yonas: I am amazed by this conclusion. I think I would rather stop our discussion here. I want to go now and come back another day for more discussions. For now, I have enough thoughts to contemplate for the coming days. It is really nice meeting you and talking to you in such a respectful way.

## Walking to My House

My dialogue with Descartes was very interesting and, on my way back home, I was contemplating deeply the significance of his conclusion. Descartes's assertion is that in one's act of thinking, he said, it is possible to strip all external impressions and concentrate a certain degree of attention to the object and receive a correct perception in the mind. This is conceivable. After a long walk, I finally arrived at my house. I was completely lost in contemplation; only when I looked at the flowers at the front door of my house that I was awakened to the facts of this amazing world. I said to myself, 'that is my house." I judged it correctly but the question that is still with me is how I did that—is it my mind or my senses that showed me the way here?

Note: The Full Treatise of Descartes's Discussion of the Wax is found in Book II of his *Meditations on First Philosophy.*

# The First Postulate

## Cynthia Crane

*A false and scurrilous tale*

Let it be postulated to draw a straight line from any point to any point.

East of the dusty market, under a low dry tree, a girl put an open wooden box at the feet of her little brother. The boy did not notice, but stared at the curling clouds brushing the near-white sky, broken to bits by the branches and leaves of the olive. “Euclid, look,” she said, and tapped the box. Their mother, working the edge of the market, stopped her hawking, saw the children safe in conversation, and turned back to her selling. Nothing would come of it, she knew, and wished the girl would let her brother be. Euclid’s eyes moved slowly off the clouds and his mind moved slowly off the job of assembling them back to wholes from the fragments between the leaves. The box of sand assembled itself at his feet, and then his sister’s face: lips, teeth, sunned freckles, black eyes obscured by curls. “Euclid,” she said, “come back.” So he did.

The boy knelt and smoothed the sand
And smoothed the sand
And smoothed the sand,

Grains of glass under his palms
Grains of glass under his palms
Grains of glass under his palms and fingertips.

Mother’s cries, “here, here, sailor,”
Cut his ears like
Grains of glass under his palms and fingertips.

“Don’t listen,” the girl said, and shifted the box around so Euclid would not watch their mother. His tears were leaving tracks in the dust on his face, but she did not wipe them away, would not touch him and set him off.

He spit the dirt out of his mouth, and watched it bead then sink into the ground.

No.

He smoothed the sand and smoothed the sand and smoothed the sand, grains of glass under his palms and fingertips.

“Yes. Look.”

His sister’s dirty finger poked a dot in the sand,
And by it, another,
And by it, another,
And by it, another,
Snaking a line across the box of sand,
Awaking a serpent in his mind,

Between his eyes,
Behind his nose,
Above the taste of salty olives and grape leaves boiled in wine
Lingering
Annoying
On his tongue.
He spit again.

No.

The serpent reared its hooded head, smelling tongue and clouded eyes. It curled around his thoughts and flicked them into disarray.

Euclid jabbed his finger into the sand, dragged it straight across the box, connecting one of his sister’s dots to another and abandoning the rest. He pulled his finger out again, and smoothed the sand on either side of the line he’d made. He leaned forward, his face close to the surface of the sand, and then he leaned back. Strange. Sensation. He felt his face with his fingertips and palms. It moved soft as shifting sand or dust and as though and as though and as though .

“You’re smiling,” his sister said.

“Yes.”


*Galaxy in a Flower - Nadine Bucca*

# Essays

# Contributors

Sam Hage

Siobhán Petersen

Shirley Quo

Noah Vancina

Kyle Reynolds

# Corruption at the Symposium

Sam Hage

At the conclusion of the *Symposium's* six speeches about Eros, the drunken Alcibiades interrupts the party with a crowd of attendants in tow. At the conclusion of Alcibiades' speech, another, drunker crowd of revelers interrupts the party, sending things into confusion and signaling the end of Aristodemus' narrative. Unlike Alcibiades' initial entrance, which enables his long and rhapsodic depiction of Socrates—providing key biographical information found in only a handful of places in Plato—this second entrance seems to serve no discernible dramatic purpose.

A small detail, however, included almost as an afterthought, may tell us a great deal. The second time around, the intruders find the door to Agathon's house already open, because "someone had gone out." We mustn't suppose this detail is accidental; according to ancient anecdotes, Plato revised individual lines of his dialogues hundreds of times. What's more, the preposterous custodial chain of the *Symposium's* narrative is a clear indication of Plato's own authorial hand at work.

So who has left the party? And why does Plato wish for us to know? Once noticed, the first question is not difficult to answer: Alcibiades is still speaking or has just finished; Phaedrus and Erixymachus are mentioned as leaving right after this; Socrates, Agathon, and Aristophanes stay awake talking all night; Aristodemus is there to witness and narrate it all. Of the seven speakers, plus Aristodemus, Pausanias is the only one not explicitly mentioned. Unless this is a meaningless addition meant to refer to one of the unnamed speakers whom Aristodemus or Apollodorus forgot about, the only possibility is Pausanias.

Why Plato should present us with this detail is a much greater question. Pausanias, we are told in the opening pages, is still hungover from last night's festivities—but no reader will be satisfied to think he has left simply because he isn't feeling well. More relevant is the fact that he has been witnessing his beloved, Agathon, flirt with the beautiful newcomer Alcibiades—and with Socrates from the very start of the party. Given that it is during Alcibiades' speech that Pausanias finally storms out, it seems likely that Alcibiades will provide us with the key to Plato's lesson.

Without undertaking a tedious examination of Pausanias' and Alcibiades' speeches, we can at least observe some cursory points. Pausanias' defense of Eros is highly unerotic; even the "highest" relationships are for him ultimately transactional. In truth, Eros is not defended at all, but instead undergoes a kind of technical scrutiny and classification. Pausanias' bizarre focus on the jurisprudence of pederasty is especially startling in juxtaposition with Phaedrus' emphasis on the tragic nobility of a lover's self-sacrifice and Eryximachus' rapturous elevation of Eros as the governing principle of the entire cosmos. His focus on the shameful is revealing: he seems rather ashamed of erotic relationships altogether.

No character could be further opposed than that of the shameless and bombastic Casanova who delivers the evening's unexpected epilogue. Whereas Socrates reveals the true nature of Eros properly understood, Alcibiades vividly illustrates the corruption that this philosophic attitude can sometimes leave in its wake. As a youth, Alcibiades has been partially won over by an appeal to wisdom; nonetheless, the conversion has not entirely succeeded. Plato's dramatic art demonstrates the extreme care Socrates took in choosing to whom, and how, he disclosed his teachings. Socratic education does not admit of half measures, and a little learning is a dangerous thing. No doubt Socrates is not entirely to blame for the schizophrenic political career of a man with such unreformable erotic impulses. Nevertheless, many Athenians would have seen Alcibiades as a prime example of Socratic corruption.

However strange his views of pederasty might seem to us, Pausanias, by contrast, is a spokesman for the conventional. His archetypal pederastic relationship exchanges the beauty of the body for the knowledge of a wise teacher. The lover possesses the good that is truth, and desires the beauty he lacks. Socrates recognizes the beauty of his own soul as superior to that of any mere body; he would never participate in this transaction. Socrates' students instead come to recognize the beauty of his soul, and become his lovers instead.

Plato offers us many indications that corruption is a theme of the *Symposium.* When Apollodorus is first approached by his unnamed companion in the dialogue's opening lines, he reports that just the other day, Glaucon had asked to "question him closely" about the party where "Socrates, Alcibiades, and the others" made erotic speeches.

The singular focus on Alcibiades is understandable, not only because of his prominent role in Athenian politics throughout the Peloponnesian War, but especially on account of suspicions that Socrates was somehow responsible for Alcibiades' spectacular downfall. The party depicted in Plato's dialogue occurred not long before the Sicilian expedition, Alcibiades' recall, and his subsequent desertion to Sparta; the framing device at the start of the dialogue takes place just over a decade later—only a handful of years before Socrates' trial.

This offhand inclusion of Glaucon as Apollodorus' interrogator is extremely notable: the evidence of this dialogue, in addition to that of other Platonic works, suggests that of all Socrates' close associates, Glaucon in particular may have felt himself corrupted by Socrates' tutelage.

At the start of this dialogue we learn that "everything" is more important to Glaucon than philosophy. This might indicate that he now holds a conventional and suspicious view of Socrates' way of life; moreover, it tells us that his concern with the details of the speeches at the party can't possibly have been philosophical. How odd, indeed, that if he is so interested in the events of the drinking party, he did not simply consult Socrates himself. Glaucon's importance is also signaled by similarities between the opening lines of the *Symposium* and the *Republic,* in which Glaucon is Socrates' central interlocutor: both begin with the narrator "going up" to town, before being arrested by a combative acquaintance. In this case, the verb used by Apollodorus in the dialogue's first line, πυνθάνεσθε ("I am not unprepared for what you ask about"), is in the second person plural—is he now being scrutinized by a group of inquisitors?

Xenophon also wrote a dialogue called the *Symposium,* also with an unmistakable suggestion of the theme of corruption: Socrates is there depicted in the company of the beautiful youth Autolycus and his father, Lycon—one of Socrates' accusers in his trial for corrupting the young.

In general, Xenophon seems more willing than Plato to concede the reality of the corruption charge. He grants in the *Memorabilia,* first, that Socrates did indeed impart political skill to his associates and, second, that Alcibiades and Critias were among those associates.

(It is often taken for granted that the ruination of these two supreme criminals was the real substance of Socrates' indictment, but that because of the amnesty of 403, such a charge could not be made explicit.) Commentators have even pointed out that the Greek verb απομνημονεύω, from which the title *Memorabilia* is derived, can mean, in addition to simply "call to mind," to "hold something against another"; not just "bear in mind," but also "bear a grudge."

Just like Plato's inclusion of the detail of the open door, Xenophon cannot possibly have placed Lycon among the banquet's attendees by accident. He must wish for us to learn something about what would become Lycon's motivations for accusing Socrates 23 years later. It is true that in Xenophon's version of events, just as in Plato's, Socrates subverts commonly accepted pederastic norms, urging both Callias and Critobulus to avoid sexual entanglements and to care only for the virtue of their young beloveds. But while disagreements like this might explain a frustrated lover's early departure from a party, they can hardly provide motive for the prosecution of a capital crime. Besides, this chaste exhortation is exactly the kind of thing Lycon, the father of a handsome youth, would most wish to hear.

Doubtless far more important, then, is the revelation that Autolycus was killed by the Thirty Tyrants after the Peloponnesian War. Did Lycon hold a particular grudge against Socrates for his role in Critias' education, or associate him with Thirty's rise? Did he blame Socrates for Autolycus' being an "outspoken" member of the insurgent democratic faction, as Diodorus Siculus describes him?

Beyond his putative influence on Critias, there is admittedly a strong case against Socrates as an opponent of democracy. Republicanism and the rule of law are presented a number of times in Plato's dialogues as a "second sailing" to the rule of a wise statesman, and in the *Republic*, Kallipolis bears certain unmistakable similarities to Sparta and other monarchic or oligarchic regimes. Socrates' theories about "intellectual despotism"—the belief that the wise alone hold a rightful claim to rule—could easily have been taken by men like Lycon to constitute support for actual despots.

It is understandable that an embittered father could attribute some blame to Socrates, the famous political philosopher, for the power and brutality of the oligarchic Thirty

Tyrants. It may not at first make sense that Lycon could also blame him for his son Autolycus' membership in the coalition that resisted them. But Xenophon once again suggests the connection. Despite the fact that no reader of the dialogues could mistake Callias III of Alopece for a genuine follower of Socrates, the debaucherous grandee presents himself at the beginning of Xenophon's *Symposium* as a devoted student of philosophy and a member of the Socratic circle.

In Xenophon's depiction of the party, Socrates exhorts Callias to a career in politics, and tells him the surest way to woo Autolycus is to make him more virtuous. Indeed, the theme of the evening's conversation is introduced by the question of who can "make Autolycus better." Socrates quickly warns the others that this is a dangerous topic, and should be put off to another time. It seems he was right: Callias' unfortunate political career during the Peloponnesian War demonstrates a respect in which Autolycus chose the wrong mentor.

Perhaps Lycon sees it thus: a follower of Socrates ensured Autolycus became an outspoken member of the losing side; a follower of Socrates caused the winning side to form a powerful, repressive oligarchy that put Autolycus to death.

Socrates' supposed intellectual despotism, it turns out, is not unconnected to his erotic innovations. In both *Symposia,* erotic attachment to the beautiful is supplanted by attraction to the good. This reorientation is of a piece with the typical Socratic line about deliberate action and human motivations: everyone is always pursuing what seems good to him, and wrongdoing is thus the result only of mistaken apprehension of the good. Human action, in other words, is to be understood in terms of a kind of self-interest; elevated self-interest perhaps, but self-interest nonetheless.

To truly comprehend this outlook is to radically undermine traditional notions of noble virtue. If what it means to act deliberately is to act in accordance with a belief in one's own good, how could beautiful sacrifice be possible? On this extreme Socratic view of human nature, the brave or noble person really thinks what he's doing is best.

Orpheus, Alcestis, and Phaedrus' invincible regiment of male lovers would no longer deserve our admiration—not to mention pediatricians, special ed teachers, firemen, and

Nobel Peace laureates.

In teaching this doctrine, Socrates did something far more subversive than impugn the city's religion. Most Athenians, in any case, seem to scorn literal belief in the gods: Euthyphro is openly ridiculed for his unusual fundamentalism. It was corruption of the young that carried the real weight in Socrates' indictment, for which impiety was mere window dressing. Socrates has done something much worse than simply contravene the city's religion; he has taken away its idols, and undermined the very basis for noble and heroic deeds. No wonder the city tries to kill him. We would, too.

*Nightmare - Nadine Bucca*

# How to Read Well

Siobhán Petersen

How is it that I'm able to say that I'm not sure I ever read a book before I started the Program? Close reading – attending deeply to what is said, the way it was said, what it could mean – has never been a weakness of mine. Yet, something was still missing; some crucial engagement beyond merely what the author has put on offer that gets to the vitality of what our labors are all for. How do we facilitate a meaningful conversation with an inanimate object, how do we engage with ideas so renowned they're practically cliché? If we decide the inexhaustibility we're seeking in the Great Books actually comes from ourselves, can this teach us how to drink deeper from them? I offer some thoughts on how I've met that challenge.

## I

On a pragmatic concern: I am a strong advocate of writing in our books. The best advice I ever got on annotation – after it was too late to help with my first semester, incidentally – was to not to try to make insights or observations in the margins, but rather to be indexing them for things I found interesting about it as I read. My margins are full of notes that just describe the action, like "Patroclus' ghost;" running motifs specific to the text, like "synthetic judgment" or "The Moment;" and big ideas it might speak to, like "fate" or "death" or "divine justice."

i This makes it easy to find quotes in discussion, and come paper season, it's so helpful to know what I was thinking about and where. I've turned my copy into a bespoke reference for textual evidence on every line of inquiry that matters to me. But more to the point, it helps me read deeper because it helps me return to the text as I think about it later on; it is perhaps only half of the experience to actually read and discuss, the other half is how you turn it over in your mind after.

ii Beyond the practical value, I'd also advocate for an aesthetic value to the practice. Books are strange, fourth dimensional objects – they carry our thoughts forward in time. A thought is ephemeral; a body of them preserved against the passage of time is a text, and that can be as true for the reader as it is for the writer. Further, I am creating a shelf of artifacts of my life at St. John's. What starts as a two-way conversation between the reader and the author becomes a trialogue, with the version of myself as a Master's student participating too. Just as I feel privileged to see inside the head of people I care about when I read their annotated books, someone is likely to value these thoughts from this particular stretch of time of my life at some point in the future, even if that someone is only me.

II

I think what separates a lay reading and a close reading is a decision: to take nothing within a text as incidental. Every word was deliberately chosen for a particular effect; every tangent, every metaphor was considered in light of the whole. I take as axiom that no one writes anything because they want to say something – they do it because they need to say something. Whatever the author set out to express lies
in the background of every small detail, so it pays to attend them with care.

How do we attend to details that will enhance the discussion? I think that anything that sticks out to you is interesting. A particular use of language, a mention of something else you read, the way some pet interest of yours appears in a reading: I've seen some of the most profitable inquiries come out of someone's peculiar observation. Someone offering their idiosyncratic take opens up vistas of thought that, definitionally, I could never have hoped to imagine myself. Ultimately (or with an eye to the Good Life, let's say penultimately), we read to come ready to share; to me, this is what we call the "learning community." No one else can give your perspective, and it's our function as classmates in-community to offer it.

i In trying to sort out the big picture, I think it's valuable to remind myself – as anyone who's written anything can probably relate to – I've never gotten to the end of any writing project and felt like I'd fully said everything I set out to. I try to leave space in the text for what the author perhaps couldn't write. I think this is different from simply granting a charitable reading; I'm perhaps suggesting we can sometimes glimpse past the text if we look hard enough at the totality as well as the particularity: can see the forest and the trees. Whether we're impressed with the picture we see is up to us, but given the choice between two readings, I try to default to the one that is most nuanced, human, interesting.

ii Counterintuitively, what I'm not suggesting is a devotion to the author, nor their intended message. What I've found reading so many Great Texts birthed from Great Minds is that somewhere along the way I stopped reading to find out what Plato, or Descartes, or Dostoevsky thought; I only read to find out what I think. We talk about ourselves as "in conversation" with the books. Part of being a good conversationalist is to hold up your end of the discussion. Have your own thoughts! There's a bit of a
pressure-relief in realizing I can be nearly certain I can't have a wholly original idea about texts so widely read, but that doesn't mean we have to rely on cliché, or pre-made understandings. What does a text mean to you, right now?

III

In that spirit of the "now," I'll even go so far as to say it is okay to disinterpret a text to the end of creating the most interesting possible reading. "Disinterpretation" implies willfulness; we are free to develop accounts of the reading that run contrary to good sense, so long as we can support it with textual evidence. Put a quote in another context! Take one out of context!

Are you unsatisfied with the answer the author provides, can you develop a more elegant account with what else they've said?

i Even if you end up spiraling out or spinning the wheels; experimenting by analyzing, combining and recombining ideas from all over the canon, from your classmates, from your favorite novel will be a worthwhile skill to build in its own right. I try not to worry myself with the products of any of these experiments, nor do I try to disguise my experiments in-seminar as completed positions; the idea is to push every idea to its limits. I only ever want to be a better scientist.

ii Partly, my decision to close-read is built on this disinterpretation; I can't know for sure what was in the mind of the author when they selected any element, but I choose to read it otherwise, even if I'm wrong. I joyfully forfeit any spurious claim on the Necessary for a ground in the realm of the Aesthetic. If something seems to come out of nowhere based on everything you've previously understood about the work, it's easy enough to disregard it as incidental, but far more worthwhile to examine it as vital, integral. Why might this be here? There's no ambition to exactitude in "might," only pliable openness. It is my firm opinion we are not here to be right about anything; we're here to be wrong in interesting ways.

# Galileo and the Interaction between Religion and Science

Shirley Quo

## Introduction

Galileo's Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems: Ptolemaic and Copernican (Dialogue) is one of the most important texts of the Copernican and Scientific revolution. It started the transition from the geocentric to a geokinetic worldview by means of interdisciplinary considerations based on Galileo's new physics, observational evidence stemming from his telescopic discoveries and methodological principles including critical reasoning.

The Dialogue is also noteworthy because it led to Galileo's trial by the Roman Catholic Inquisition in 1633. His book was banned and he was found guilty of 'vehement suspicion of heresy'. This was because the Catholic Church believed that the Holy Scriptures supported the geocentric worldview i.e. that the sun revolved around the earth. To support a geokinetic worldview was therefore an act of heresy. These developments are known as the Galileo Affair.

The purpose of this article is to examine the conflict between science and religion in the context of the Dialogue, the Galileo Affair and its aftermath. What, if any, is the role of religious authority and the Bible in scientific inquiry?

## The Geostatic Worldview

The geostatic worldview assumed that the earth is spherical, motionless and that it is located at the center of the universe i.e. geocentric theory. Aristotle and Ptolemy were the two main contributors to this view of the universe. The old view considered that there was a fundamental division in the universe between the earthly and the heavenly regions and each region consisted of bodies with different properties and behavior. This is called the heaven-earth dichotomy.

Terrestrial bodies occupied the central region of the universe below the moon, whereas heavenly bodies occupied the outer region from the lunar to the stellar sphere (the highest heaven or the firmament). Earthly bodies moved naturally straight toward (downward for earth and water) or away from the center of the universe (upward for air and fire), whereas celestial bodies (aether) moved circularly around the same center.

Geometrically there were only two lines with the property that all parts are congruent with any other part – the circle and the straight line. Motion could be simple or mixed. Simple motion was motion along a straight line. Thus there were only two types of simple motion – straight and circular. Mixed motion was motion which is neither straight nor circular.

There was a theoretical reason why upward and downward natural motions could belong to the same fundamental region of the universe but were essentially different from natural circular motion. This is the theory of change as contrariety according to which all change derives from contrariety and no change can exist where there is no contrariety. Contrarierty means opposites such as hot and cold, dry and humid. So up and down is a fundamental contrariety. This applies to terrestrial bodies which is full of qualitative changes e.g. birth, growth, generation, destruction etc. Circular natural motion of heavenly bodies by contrast have no contrary therefore it lacked an essential condition for the existence of change. Because no physical or organic or chemical changes were detected or observed in the heavens, it was claimed that the heavenly realm, unlike the terrestrial realm, was unchangeable, ingenerable, incorruptible etc. This provided the basis for the heaven-earth dichotomy.

## The Copernican System

Copernicus published 'On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres' (Revolutions) in 1543. Unlike the old view, the stellar sphere was motionless and did not revolve around the earth with westward diurnal rotation. Instead, the diurnal rotation belonged to the earth, though its direction was eastward in order to result in the observational appearance of the whole universe rotating westward. This is called a geokinetic worldview.

The earth was given a second motion, an orbital revolution around the sun with a period of one year, and also in an eastward direction. The annual motion was shifted from the sun to the earth thus making the earth a planet rather than the sun. This terrestrial orbital revolution meant that the earth was located off-center, the center being instead the sun. This is called a heliocentric worldview.

Copernicus's view was based on an idea proposed by the Pythagoreans in ancient Greece which had been rejected in favour of the Ptolemaic worldview. In Copernicus's worldview, the earth moves by rotating on its own axis daily and by revolving around the sun once a year. It was a simpler and more coherent theory if the sun rather than the earth is assumed to be at the center and the earth is taken to be the third planet circling the sun yearly and spinning daily on its own axis. It had fewer moving parts than the geokinetic system because the apparent daily motion of all heavenly bodies around the earth is explained by the earth's axial rotation and thus there is only one thing moving daily (the earth) rather than thousands of stars.

There were also theological and religious objections. The biblical objection claimed that the idea of the earth moving is heretical because it contradicts many biblical passages stating or implying that the earth stands still.1 For example, Psalm 104:5 provides that the Lord "laid the foundations of the earth, that it should not be removed for ever". In Ecclesiastes 1:5, it provides that "the sun also riseth, and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to the place where he ariseth" which seems to attribute motion to the sun and support the geostatic system.

Another theological objection was based on the idea that God is all powerful – this may be called the divine omnipotence argument.2 This was endorsed by Pope Urban VIII during whose reign Galileo was tried and condemned. One version of this argument was that since God is all powerful, He could have created any one of a number of worlds e.g. one in which the earth is motionless. It was religiously heretical because it conflicted with Holy Scripture and the biblical interpretations of the Church Fathers and therefore undermined belief in an omnipotent God.

## The Galileo Affair

In 1615, the Holy Office, or Roman Inquisition, asked its Inquisitors for an opinion on two propositions based on some formal complaints filed against Galileo in relation to the Copernican system:3

(1) the Sun is the centre of the world and completely immovable by local motion; and

(2) the Earth is not the centre of the world nor immovable, but moves as a whole and also with a diurnal motion.

The Inquisitors returned a unanimous opinion:

(1) The first proposition was declared unanimously to be foolish and absurd in philosophy and formally heretical inasmuch as it expressly contradicts the doctrine of Holy Scripture in many passages, both in their literal meaning and according to the interpretation of the Fathers and learned theologians.

(2) All were agreed that this proposition merits the same censure in philosophy and that, from a theological point of view, it is at least erroneous in the faith.

In 1616, the Congregation of the Index issued a Decree declaring that the doctrine of the earth's motion was physically false and contrary to Scripture; condemning and permanently banning Foscarini's book, Letter on the Pythagorean Opinion, which had argued that the earth's motion was probable and not contrary to Scripture; and temporarily prohibiting Copernicus's Revolutions until and unless it was revised.5

Although Galileo was not mentioned at all in the Decree, he was given a warning in private. This warning exists in two versions. One is written on a certificate given to Galileo and signed by Cardinal Robert Bellarmine, who was an authoritative member of both the Congregation of the Index and of the Inquisition; it stated that Bellarmine had informed Galileo that the earth's motion could not be held or defended. The second version is in an unsigned note written by a clerk and found in the file of Inquisition trial proceedings; it stated that the Commissary-General of the Inquisition gave Galileo the special injunction that he must not hold, defend, or discuss in any way the earth's motion. Galileo claimed that he had never received the second version.6

Despite the warning given to him by the Catholic Church, Galileo published the Dialogue in 1632. The book was a discussion of the earth's motion but took the form of a critical examination of all the arguments for and against the idea; the arguments on both sides were presented, analysed, and evaluated. The arguments for the earth's motion turned out to be much stronger than those against it. This was an implicit defence of Copernicanism. However, Galileo believed that he had acted within the spirit of Bellarmine's warning because it was only a hypothesis.

In 1633, Galileo was brought to trial by the Inquisition on the charge that in his Dialogue, published in the previous year, he had disobeyed the injunction of 1616 and had defended the Copernican system, knowing it to be heretical. In the course of their judgment the Inquisitors twice reaffirmed that the system was heretical, in two slightly different forms. In the first place they recalled and quoted the judgment of 1616, citing it as evidence that it had already been duly examined and condemned. The Inquisitors then delivered their own verdict:7

"We say, pronounce, sentence and declare that you, the said Galileo... have rendered yourself, in the judgment of this Holy Office, vehemently suspected of heresy, namely of having believed and held the doctrine, which is false and contrary to the Sacred and Divine Scripture, that the Sun is the centre of the Earth and does not move from east to west, and that the Earth moves and is not the centre of the world, and that an opinion may be defended and held as probable after it has been declared and defined contrary to Holy Scripture."

According to one commentator, there is an interesting difference between the two statements.8 The Inquisitors in 1616 condemned as heretical the proposition that the Sun is the centre of the world (centro del mondo) and immovable; in 1633 they condemned as heretical the proposition that the Sun is the centre of the Earth (centro della terra) and does not move from east to west (i.e. does not move in a diurnal orbit around the Earth).

What does this mean? Surely it cannot be taken to mean literally that the Sun is the centre of the Earth? Perhaps it means that it is the centre of the Earth's orbit or, as in Copernicus's own theory, the centre of the celestial sphere in which the Earth is embedded (which might be called 'the Earth' in an extended sense).9

As time went on, however, the situation changed. In the new theory, the fixed stars did not rotate and hence, it was no longer necessary for them to be held together in a rigid sphere. The whole system of rigid spheres could be abandoned. The universe need not be spherical, it could be any shape or even infinite. Even if it was a sphere there was no need for the Sun to be at its centre or immovable (for the whole planetary system might be in motion).

Galileo was aware of this theory. In the Dialogue, Salviati, the advocate of the Copernican centre of the universe; if any centre may be assigned to the universe, we shall rather find the sun to be placed there, as you will understand in due course'.10 Galileo added this marginal note "The sun more probably at the centre of the universe than the earth."

In 1633, the Inquisition found Galileo "vehemently suspect of heresy" for holding and defending the thesis that the earth revolves around the sun and for thinking "that one may hold and defend as probable an opinion after it has been declared and defined contrary to the Holy Scripture".

The content of Galileo's suspected heresy was two-fold. The first was an astronomical or cosmological claim about physical reality, which Galileo had supported and defended in the Dialogue. The second was a methodological principle or rule about how to proceed in the search for physical truth or the acquisition of natural knowledge i.e. the principle that Scripture is not an authority and may be disregarded as irrelevant in astronomy and natural philosophy. Galileo's new telescopic evidence removed most of the observational-astronomical objections against the earth's motion and added new evidence in its favor. Galileo believed not only that the geokinetic theory had greater explanatory coherence than the geostatic theory (as Copernicus had shown) and that it was physically and mechanically more adequate (as Galileo's new physics suggested) but also that it was empirically and observationally more accurate in astronomy (as the telescope now revealed). His assessment was that the arguments for the earth's motion were stronger than those for the earth being at rest; that Copernicanism was more likely to be true than the geostatic worldview.

According to one argument, the view was developed during the Enlightenment that Galileo's trial embodied the inherent incompatibility between science and religion, and later this view became widely accepted. The case of Galileo may be one of those where science and religion happened to be in conflict. Galileo's trial does exhibit such a conflict if science is interpreted in that context as Copernicanism and religion as Scripture; for although Galileo believed and argued that Copernicanism is compatible with Scripture, the Catholic Church (through Bellarmine, Pope Urban VIII, the Index, and the Inquisition) claimed that Copernicanism is contrary to Holy Scripture.

The conflict between science and religion is a striking feature of both the original and the subsequent Galileo affair: in the original episode in 1616, it takes the form of Copernicanism versus Holy Scripture; in the subsequent controversy in 1633, it takes the form that Galileo's trial was widely perceived to epitomise the conflict between science and religion.

## Aftermath of the Galileo Affair

The Catechism of the Catholic Church states:

Though faith is above reason, there can never be any real discrepancy between faith and reason. Since the same God who reveals mysteries and infuses faith has bestowed the light of reason on the human mind, God cannot deny himself, nor can truth ever contradict truth.

Consequently, methodical research in all branches of knowledge, provided it is carried out in a truly scientific manner and does not override moral laws, can never conflict with the faith, because the things of the world and the things of faith derive from the same God. The humble and preserving investigator of the secrets of nature is being led, as it were, by the hand of God in spite of himself, for it is God, the conserver of all things, who made them what they are. By 1939, Pope Pius XII was praising Galileo for being among the "most audacious heroes of research … not afraid of the stumbling blocks and the risks on the way, nor fearful of the funereal monuments."

Galileo was again mentioned with approval by Pope Pius XII in an address to the General Assembly of the International Astronomical Union in 1952, where he concluded his remarks saying:

As so, friends, above and beyond the deep respect which we entertain for all the sciences and for yours in particular, this is yet another reason why we are moved to pray: may the science of astronomy, founded on the highest and most universal horizons, the ideal of so many great men in the past such as Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton, continue to bear the fruit of marvellous progress and, through to the heartfelt collaborations promoted by such groups as the International Astronomical Union, bring the astronomical vision of the Universe to an ever deeper perfection.

In 1979, at a meeting of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences commemorating the centen

nial of Einstein's birth, Pope John Paul II gave a speech in which he talked about the Galileo affair. The Pope admitted errors on the part of ecclesiastic individuals and institutions and acknowledged some wrongdoing on their part. He spoke of Galileo having been caused "suffering," of his treatment as an instance of unwarranted interference into the autonomy of scientific research, and of the fact that the Second Vatican Council had "deplored" such interferences.

From the point of view of the principles Galileo held regarding the relationship between science, religion and the Bible, Pope John Paul II spoke with unprecedented clarity and remarkable accuracy. In the 1979 Einstein centennial speech, the Pope said:17

He who is rightly called the founder of modern physics declared explicitly that the two truths, of faith and of science, can never contradict each other . . . The Second Vatican Council does not express itself otherwise.

Pope John Paul II also issued a call for further studies of the Galileo affair that would be guided by three goals: bipartisan collaboration between the Galilean scientific side and the ecclesiastic religious side; open-mindedness to the wrongs of one side and the merits of the other side; and validation of the harmony between science and religion. Although the third goal was in some tension with the other two, it was the one closest to the Pope's heart. For he argued that Galileo believed that science and religion are harmonious and that Galileo conducted his scientific research in the spirit of religious service and worship.

Galileo also elaborated important epistemological principles about Scriptural interpretation, which correspond to the correct ones later clarified and formulated by the Catholic Church. The Pope wanted to reverse the traditional interpretation of Galileo's trial as epitomising the conflict between science and religion.

For Pope John Paul II, a key lesson from the Galileo affair is the need and importance of methodological pluralism i.e. the rule that different branches of knowledge call for different methods. This is what Galileo himself had advocated. In contrast, his theological opponents were committed to a misplaced cultural unitarianism that led them to fail to distinguish scriptural interpretation from scientific investigation and so to illegitimately transpose one domain into the other.

Some commentators argue that the Inquisition was wrong to condemn Galileo since he preached and practiced the principle that scriptural passages should not be used in astronomical investigation, but only when dealing with questions of faith and morals. The Inquisition found this principle intolerable and abominably erroneous, and wanted to uphold the opposite principle that Scripture is a scientific authority, as well as a moral and religious one. On this question of theological and epistemological principle, Galileo was ultimately exculpated.

In regard to the biblical issue, the main point of Galileo's letters to Castelli and to Christina is that the literal interpretation of the Bible is binding only for questions of faith and morals and not for physical questions.18 Although in a sense this proposition can be accepted as true, it was regarded and was in fact singularly dangerous at that time.

The most detailed description of how the Church views the interaction between religion and science can be found in a 1987 letter written by Pope John Paul II to Fr. George Coyne SJ, director of the Vatican Observatory. In this letter, he insisted on the equal value of science and religion:19

… both religion and science must preserve their autonomy and their distinctiveness. Religion is not founded on science nor is science an extension of religion. Each should possess its own principles, its pattern of procedures, its diversities of interpretation and its own conclusions.

Science can purify religion from superstition; religion can purify science from false absolutes. Each can draw the other into a wider world, a world in which both can flourish.

The Pope also argued that this dialogue was essential to progress within science itself, a theme which Pope Francis would later develop in Laudato Si':20

… science develops best when its concepts and conclusions are integrated into the broader human culture and its concerns for ultimate meaning and value. Scientists … can also come to appreciate for themselves that these discoveries cannot be a genuine substitute for knowledge of the truly ultimate.

And in 1992, at the conclusion of his inquiry, the Pope had not changed his mind in this regard but reaffirmed the point with these words:

"Paradoxically, Galileo, a sincere believer, showed himself to be more perceptive in this regard than the theologians who opposed him . . . The majority of theologians did not recognize the formal distinction between Sacred Scripture and its interpretation, and this led them unduly to transpose into the realm of the doctrine of the faith a question that in fact pertained to scientific investigation.

Moreover, from the Galileo affair . . . another lesson we can draw is that the different branches of knowledge call for different methods . . . The error of the theologians of the time when they maintained the centrality of the earth was to think that our understanding of the physical world's structure was in some way imposed by the literal sense of Sacred Scripture."

The Galileo myth claims that Galileo was not condemned for his astronomical conclusion that the earth moves, but for his theologically unsound practice of supporting an astronomical view with biblical passages.22

This explanation is untrue because Galileo preached and practiced the opposite principle that Holy Scripture should not be used to support physical propositions. This myth seems to have acted as a catalyst for the subsequent Galileo affair to become the cause celebre it is today.

## Commentary

As Galileo put it, quoting Cardinal Baronius, "The intention of the Holy Ghost is to teach us how one goes to heaven, not how the heavens go."

Galileo added the following note in the preliminary leaves of his own copy of the Dialogue:

"Take note, theologians, that in your desire to make matters of faith out of propositions relating to the fixity of sun and earth you run the risk of eventually having to condemn as heretics those who would declare the earth to stand still and the sun to change position – eventually, I say, at such time as it might be physically or logically proved that the earth moves and the sun stands still."

Galileo rejected the conception of the center of the universe which deprived the justi

fication for the idea of the immovable earth. Following Copernicus, Galileo set forth the advantages of assuming the sun to be at rest. It is simpler to assume a rotation of the earth around its axis than a common revolution of all fixed starts around the earth. The assumption of a revolution of the earth around the sun makes the motions of the inner and outer planets appear similar and does away with the troublesome retrograde motions of the outer planets, or rather explains them by the motion of the earth around the sun.These arguments are convincing but are only of a qualitative nature i.e. since humans are tied to the earth, our observations will never directly reveal to us the "true" planetary motions but only the intersections of the lines of sight (earth-planet) with the fixed star sphere. Galileo demonstrated that the hypothesis of the rotation and revolution of the earth is not refuted by the fact that we do not observe any mechanical effects of these motions. However, this misled him into formulating a wrong theory of the tides.

Galileo's work represents the passionate fight against any kind of dogma based on authority. Only experience and careful reflection are accepted by him as criteria of truth. In Galileo's time, this was a revolutionary concept. Merely to doubt the truth of opinions which had no basis but authority was considered a capital crime and punished accordingly. This is one of the reasons that Galileo is considered to be the father of modern science. The Dialogue is the book which historically did the most toward breaking down the religious and academic barriers against free scientific thought.

As Einstein said, 'the leitmotif which I recognise in Galileo's work is the passionate fight against any kind of dogma based on authority'. Galileo's works were not removed from the Catholic Church's prohibited list until 1741 by Pope Benedict XIV.

The Inquisitions of Galileo Galilei between 1615 and 1633 highlighted the Catholic Church's interpretation of the role of tradition. In that time, the Church was facing the fact that Copernican heliocentrism was better able to predict planetary motion than biblical tradition. Galileo has also been celebrated as a figure of valor to the scientific community because the Dialogue pulled no punches in mocking the then Pope Urban VIII. Galileo allegedly used direct quotes in the Dialogue and attributed them to a character called Simplicio. What is less appreciated however, is that Galileo agreed that the natural world could not be in contradiction with the faith that he maintained his whole life.

## Conclusion

The moon is 40 million years older than we thought, according to a new analysis of lunar samples collected by Apollo astronauts a half-century ago.

This research looked at moon dust brought back by the Apollo 17 mission in 1972, the last time humans set foot on the surface.

The results, published in the journal Geochemical Perspectives Letters, suggest it must be at least 4.46 billion years old and that it could have formed as long as 4.51 billion years ago.

"It's important to know when the moon formed", Professor Philipp Heck of the Field Museum in Chicago, senior author of the study, said, "(because) the moon is an important partner in our planetary system – it stabilises the Earth's rotational axis, it's the reason there are 24 hours in a day, it's the reason we have tides. Without the moon, life on Earth would look different.

In the Dialogue, Galileo argued that the tides are caused by the compounding motion of the earth as a conclusive proof of heliocentrism. Despite this error, the Dialogue remains one of the most important texts of the Scientific revolution.

The Galileo affair illustrates that changing scientific paradigms caused increasing problems for religious doctrines that had been reconstructed according to the scientific knowledge of earlier times. It has been claimed that science and religion constitute "non-overlapping magisteria" whereby science pertains to the empirical realm of facts and religion to ultimate meaning and moral value.28

From the late nineteenth century, free inquiry came to encompass the study of religion itself. Emile Durkheim, a prominent social scientist, defined religion as "a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden." This assumes conflict whenever scientists attempt to study sacred things "set apart and forbidden" and in so doing, challenge religious prohibitions. Today, stem cell research invokes some of the same deep-seated religious prohibitions as heliocentrism once did.

*Mind in a Fog - Nadine Bucca*

# The Nature of the Pilgrimage:
## The Meaning of Springtime in *The Canterbury Tales*

Noah Vancina

"Thanne longen folk to goon on pilgrimages" (12)—why now, and whence the longing? Before he even arrives at the human subjects of his tale of pilgrimage, all described in the General Prologue, Chaucer, as an "introduction" to the General Prologue, gives the sweetest description of springtime, which evokes already in the hearer the longing for the peaceful time he describes. Let us go on our own pilgrimage to seek how Chaucer awakes this longing, and how we might then be ready to join the pilgrims as "to Caunterbury they wende."

Chaucer begins by providing a context for pilgrimages: "whan" (1). "When" is a temporal description that is precise or imprecise, depending on what follows. What follows must be some event, identifiable such that the time, the "when" of the sought-after occurrence, appears. Yet, Chaucer draws out his "whan" for eleven lines, one great dependent clause, in which he lists multiple conditions before the long-desired "thanne" arrives. Even these conditions, though, remain imprecise: "Whan that Aprille with his shoures soote/The droughte of March hath perced to the roote/And bathed every veyne in swich licour/Of which vertu engendred is the flour" (1-4); at what moment have all these things come to pass? Rain falls gradually, only in drops, and slowly it soaks into the earth, uprooting the drought that preceded. So likewise the blowing of the zephyr until it reaches and warms end of every damp wood. Thus, the awaited fulfillment is an atmosphere, not a moment, in which pilgrimages begin. With these descriptions, Chaucer evokes a dawning awareness, a longing that does not come all at once and overwhelm but that grows like the fitful entrance of springtime and the growth of young shoots, like the passing away of sickness and the coming of full health.

Chaucer presents meteorological events not exactly as personified, but yet as intentional and moving towards a goal. April, with "his" sweet showers, as if the showers belonged to April (as opposed to "April's" showers, which feels more distant), who brought them with the intention of ending the drought and bringing the moisture needed for the flowers. The zephyr and the sun, too, play a part with "sweete breethe" and a "cours" to run. This almost personification suggests that natural phenomena act in the world as more than dumb happenings.

Each verb, too, is loaded with intentions. April's showers pierce the drought of March (2). Not a simple statement of cause and effect in nature, "pierce" suggests attack, an intentional breaking through as if much depends on not being repelled. The next line reveals the goal: to "bathe[] every veyne in . . . licour" (3), that life be not hindered. The zephyr then inspires the "tendre croppes" (5-7) as if it had breath to share, or the shoots could receive spirit. When Chaucer arrives at the birds, no change of language is necessary. One might even say that the verbs applied to the birds, "maken" and "slepen," are the least suggestive of life, although birds are the most obviously conscious of the characters so far.

Curious also is the peacefulness suggested by Chaucer's diction. The showers are "soote" (1), the zephyr's breath is "sweete" (3), the shoots are "tendre" (7), and the birds are "smale" (9). Everything in this springtime bespeaks gentleness and peace. Only against the intruder is any harsh word said, for the "droughte of March" is "perced" to the root (2): the drought being an unwelcome condition that would forestall the coming of spring and, perhaps, also of pilgrimage.

It is in this verdant time, teeming with life, that men long to go on pilgrimages. Now why at a time when everything seems so right with the world would men desire change rather than rest? We find a suggestion in a line that sits right between the dependent clause description of springtime and the independent clause discussion of pilgrimage: "So priketh hem nature in hir corages" (11). Of whose hearts is Chaucer speaking? It may seem natural, as the immediate antecedent, to think that the birds are meant, who make melody and sleep with open eyes due to nature's influence. But could it not be looking ahead as well, to the folk who long to go on pilgrimages? Even the rhyme scheme would couple "hir corages" with "pilgrimages." Line 11, situated close to the midpoint of this introduction to the General Prologue and at the meeting of the dependent and independent clauses, joins weather, plants, animals, and humans in the influence of nature on their thoughts and actions.

What kind of nature incites men to longing? Two meanings of "nature" seem possible: the inherent constitution of a creature or the creation itself. But perhaps neither meaning is really distinctive. If nature is understood the first way, Chaucer is saying that something within man stirs him up in the springtime, in reaction to what it perceives around it. If the second way, creation in springtime moves man to longing.

Chaucer points to the importance of the natural world in either case, leading us to wonder why springtime would cause such feelings in human beings.

There is, first, a correspondence between the creation emerging from winter and a man recovering from sickness. Chaucer lavished attention on explicating the blooming flowers, the tender shoots, and the centrality of the sun, but these conditions or incitements for longing are only linked to humans with a "thanne," the termination of the dependent clause. Nevertheless, the pilgrims on the road to Canterbury are seeking a saint who helped them recover from sickness. The parallel is evident, though human convalescence is not described so lyrically. It has already been described through springtime.

But more darkly seen is a lack in men out of which rises this longing. Before nature, with its wholeness and life, man is disturbed. The showers do not enliven him; the wind does not warm him. Or not primarily. Man stands across from a natural world that seems as conscious as he. He longs, and so he leaves his familiar home, sometimes to go to foreign lands. Still, what is the lack, the source of longing? As has been said, those pilgrims that go to Canterbury have been healed from sickness. Wholeness there; so we would have to say those pilgrims are responding to wholeness, not to want. Thus, man at his best state would still not possess something of which he is made aware by springtime.

The conceit behind Chaucer's tales suggests that this want is filled by fellowship. Plurality is present throughout the introduction: "every" vein is bathed by the rain, "every" wood and field is inspired by the zephyr, and multiple "foweles" sing. As emphasized to by the loading of all these plurals into a dependent clause, these plurals are bound together, as if joining one another in a festival of spring. Thus, people who recover out of the loneliness of sickness (or whatever separates them from others) find in springtime the inspiration to join fellowship on pilgrimages. The newness of spring incites men to seek new acquaintances, new sights, and new experiences. We see how Chaucer (or whoever the narrator may be) embarks on his pilgrimages alone but quickly seeks out, and is accepted into, the company of other pilgrims (19-34). Men desire to mirror the character of the season around them. They participate in this way not solely with creation, but with each other, each individual being drawn out of himself and into a community.

Of course, we should not force Chaucer to say that he has described all people in springtime or even all who go on pilgrimages, just as not every springtime is as consistently idyllic as the one represented in the General Prologue. What Chaucer does offer is insight into human nature, seasons, and pilgrimage. The wholeness found in a beautiful springtime does incite longing in the human heart, but not a longing of despair or unrequited passion. Instead, it draws people together into communities of thanks—for to this end Chaucer's pilgrims wend to Canterbury. While it may be less common now to make a pilgrimage of the kind Chaucer describes, springtime can still create longing in our hearts and, now that we better understand what it means, we are better prepared to meet our own longing "to goon on pilgrimages."

# The Creation of the Self: Shakespeare and Aristotle

Kyle Reynolds

It might seem self-evident that Prince Hal undergoes a significant change in character throughout Shakespeare's *Henry IV*. His character is first introduced as a drunken degenerate ne'er-do-well. Yet, by the end of Part One, Hal has redeemed himself in the eyes of his father and is hailed as a hero. This does not necessarily signify a change in character though, only a change in his conduct. One does not need to be virtuous to act virtuously. As Plato's Ring of Gyges allegory demonstrates, the utilitarian benefits of acting justly are often enough to compel just behavior. Still, perhaps a change in conduct is enough to result in a genuine change in character, even if this result is unintended. This begs the question, does Hal's character truly change and does he become a more virtuous man?

Hal's first soliloquy, spoken to the audience after the prince agrees to join his comrade Poins in a plot to embarrass their friend, Falstaff, provides some critical insight on this question. Shakespeare uses this soliloquy to help elucidate Hal's intentions and provide an explanation for his behavior. The prince tells us he is seeking to "imitate the sun / Who doth permit the base contagious clouds / To smother up his beauty from the world, / That, when he please again to be himself, / Being wanted, he may be more wond'red at" (Shakespeare 15). If the prince is to be believed then, his juvenile and dishonorable behavior is all in service to a grand façade. By shirking his duties and ensuring he is perceived as worthless and reprehensible throughout the kingdom, Hal is tempering the expectations of his subjects, his father, and his peers. So, when he does finally cast off this façade, his redemption and reformation "shall show more goodly and attract more eyes".

However, it's not clear that Hal's behavior is merely a façade. He seems to thoroughly enjoy taking part in the debauchery perpetrated by his dishonorable cohort. Take the dialogue directly preceding Hal's soliloquy for example. Hal is at first weary of Poins's scheme to prank the unsuspecting Falstaff. To convince the prince, Poins offers the prophetic argument, "[t]he virtue of this jest will be the incomprehensible lies that this same fat rogue will tell us when we meet for supper: how thirty, at least, he fought with; what wards, what blows, what extremities he endured; and in the reproof of this lives the jest".

Hal, now convinced, responds, "[w]ell, I'll go with thee. Provide us all things necessary and meet me tomorrow night in Eastcheap. There I'll sup. Farewell" (Shakespeare 14). It is the prospect of humiliating Falstaff and catching him in his lies and exaggerations that finally compels Hal to join Poins's plan. There does not appear to be any utilitarian benefit for Hal in joining Poins. His willingness to go along with the prank seems best explained by a genuine and wholly ignoble desire to humiliate Falstaff.

Hal's reactions to Falstaff's all too predictable lies concerning the prank only a few scenes later serve to further illustrate this point. Falstaff begins to eagerly, and inaccurately, recount his ordeal to Hal and Poins, telling them of the men who robbed him of his stolen gold, entirely unaware of the fact that those men were in fact Hal and Poins. Almost immediately, Falstaff begins to, in a rather obvious manner, increase the number of his attackers, for which Hal derides him, saying, "O monstrous! Eleven buckram men grown out of two!" (Shakespeare 47). Falstaff, surprisingly unphased by the prince's derisions, continues with his fictional account of the "battle" and Hal continues with his mockeries. Finally, after Falstaff becomes wholly indignant due to Hal picking apart every aspect of his tale, the prince tells Falstaff the truth, stating:

> "We two set on you four and, with a word, outfaced you from your prize, and have it; yea, and can show it you here in the house. And, Falstaff, you carried your guts away as nimbly, with as quick dexterity and roared for mercy, and still run and roared, as ever I heard a bullcalf. What a slave art though to hack thy sword as though hast done, and then say it was in a fight! What trick, what starting hole canst thou now find out to hide thee from this open and apparent shame?"

Every action Hal has taken and every word he has spoken in this scene seems to have been aimed at maximizing Falstaff's embarrassment. If this is simply a part Hal is playing, such intricate scheming would be unnecessary. However, if Hal truly is morally degenerate and elicits genuine joy from poking fun at and participating in the schemes of his corrupt and contemptible crew, then his behavior makes a great deal more sense.

Hal's so called "reformation" begins in earnest when he confronts his father and pledges to fulfill his duties as a prince of the realm.

He tells the king, "So please your Majesty, I would I could / Quit all offenses with as clear excuse / As well as doubtless I can purge / Myself of many I am charged withal" . The king rejoices at this news, but is, at first, skeptical. Hal reassures him, promising to "[b]e more".

Hal appears to honor his commitment, marching off to battle against a rebel force, to the astonishment of his enemies. Percy Hotspur, the leader of the rebels, inquires as to the statues of Hal and his forces, asking, "Where is … [t]he nimble-footed madcap Prince of Wales". His cousin, Vernon, replies:

> "All furnished, all in arms; / All plumed like estridges that with the wind / Bated like eagles having lately bathed; / Glittering in golden coats like images; / As full of spirit as the month of May / And gorgeous as the sun at midsummer; / Wanton as youthful goats, wild as young bulls. / I saw young Harry with his beaver on, / His crushes on his thighs, gallantly armed, / Rise from the ground like feathered Mercury, And vaulted with such ease into his seat / As if an angel dropped down from the clouds / To turn and wind a fiery Pegasus / And witch the world with noble horsemanship".

Hal has, at least in the eyes of his enemy, become an entirely different person. He is no longer seen as the "madcap Prince of Wales," but is instead viewed as a gallant warrior. Hal has done little except show up to the battle, yet, Vernon offers him some of the most striking and sincere praise seen throughout the play. At this point, the reformation Hal prophesized seems to be coming to pass. Hal is executing his plan and those around him are taking note.

However, Hal's plan is to simply feign virtue so as to be better looked upon by those in his kingdom. He is only interested in the utilitarian benefits of being perceived as virtuous. Yet, after the conclusion of the battle with Hotspur's forces, Hal takes an action which appears entirely inconsistent with this philosophy. Falstaff falsely tells Hal and his brother, John, that he had killed Hotspur. Hal responds, truthfully, "[w]hy, Percy I killed myself". This, of course, does not stop the invariably deceitful Falstaff from arguing that his account of Hotspur's death is accurate, going so far as to threaten to make anyone who doubts him "eat a piece of [his] sword" (Shakespeare 114). Hal, despite knowing the falsehood of Falstaff's claims, agrees to allow him to take credit for the killing of Hotspur, saying, "if a lie may do thee grace, / I'll gild it with the happiest terms I have".

While it's not entirely clear why Hal chooses to let Falstaff persist in his lie, it seems to come from a genuine desire to see Falstaff improve himself and his circumstances, which Falstaff commits to do only a few lines later. There doesn't appear to be any benefit to Hal in allowing Falstaff to claim the glory and honor associated with killing Hotspur. Hal's motivations are instead altruistic in nature and demonstrative of true virtue.

Despite deciding to reform himself in the eyes of those around him, Hal is unable to entirely forgo his old ways. Much to the dismay of his father, Hal continues to associate with Poins, Falstaff, and his other sinful companions. When the king learns that Hal is back in London with his band of scoundrels, he laments;

> "Most subject is the fattest soil to weeds, / And he, the noble image of my youth, / Is overspread with them. Therefore my grief / Stretches itself beyond the hour of death. / The blood weeps from my heart when I do shape / In forms imaginary th' unguided days / And rotten times that you shall look upon / When I am sleeping with my ancestors. / For when headstrong rage and hot blood are his counselors, / When means and lavish manners meet together, / O, with what wings shall affections fly / Towards fronting peril and opposed decay!"

The king is deeply afraid that Hal cannot truly reform and will ultimately succumb to his rage and other vices which will destroy him.

Finally, at the conclusion of Part Two, Hal ultimately casts of his old habits and comrades. In a cutting and markedly harsh speech directed at Falstaff, the prince announces:

> "I know thee not, old man. Fall to thy prayers. / How ill white hairs becomes a fool and jester! / I have long dreamt of such a kind of man, / So surfeit-swelled, so old, and so profane, / But, being awaked, I do despise my dream. / Make less thy body hence, and more thy grace. / Leave gormandizing. Know the grave doth gape / For thee thrice wider than other men. / Reply not to me with a fool-born jest. / Presume not that I am the thing I was, / For God doth know, so shall the world perceive, / That I have turned away my former self. / So will I those that kept me company".

The way Hal speaks of his transformation makes it sound not as if he is simply put

ting on a different mask but as if he has truly undergone a metamorphosis of spirit. He likens his reformation to wakening from a bad dream, a dream he now despises.

So, although Hal may not have meant to undergo a genuine change in character, he did. His actions make clear that he was a morally corrupt degenerate that enjoyed taking part in the activities of his London gang. Then, he undergoes a reformation, which may have at first simply been an act, but ultimately results in a changed character capable of committing acts of altruism. Hal does seem to waver in his new convictions, returning to the London tavern to fraternize with Poins and Falstaff, but finally lets his old wayward acquaintances go. But why does Hal undergo this change in character? Perhaps Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* can provide some insight. Aristotle tells us:

> "oral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethike) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. … Neither by, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit".

Hal lived a life of vice and did not create a habit of virtue. He thus became sinful and devoid of moral integrity. Hal then began to act virtuously. Eventually, acting ethically became habitual. However, habits are engrained on the soul and Hal struggled to overcome his past transgressions. Though, finally, a new, virtuous Hal was created through the prince's actions. For, the self is formed by our habits, and Hal is no different.

# Translation

## On the Creation of Man

# Contributor

Stephen Cunha

# On the Creation of Man

## By Wolfgang Musculus

## Translation by Stephen Cunha

Now, accordingly, in proper order, we proceed to consider the work of God in the creation of man: which consideration must be understood, not only to be next after those things which we have noted concerning God the maker of all things, but also to especially concern man. For what is more properly suitable for man than, after his creator, to understand himself? We are drawn to this knowledge not only by that which Lactantius somewhere puts into words, "Great is the power of man, great his reason, great his mystery, so that not undeservedly Plato gave thanks to nature, because he was born a human being"—yes indeed, because next to God nothing is more sublime than man, nothing more excellent has been made;3 but also because no small portion of our salvation requires this, that we know ourselves, wherein even those who have everywhere inculcated the saying γνωθε σεαυτόν, that is, "know thyself," as if it had dropped down from heaven, have admonished that the greatest part of wisdom is found. But who does not know that it is especially required for the knowledge of man, that we should not be ignorant of the origin and making of mankind? And the Holy Spirit has described the creation of man with singular care and greater diligence than all other created things in the Sacred Scriptures, undoubtedly for this purpose, that even from the origin of our race, we might be reminded that when God made man, he wanted to create a certain remarkable work, which would be much more outstanding, and would much more closely approach the glory of his divinity, than the rest of creation; and in the next place, that the knowledge of our beginning might be very much conducive to the consideration of divine wisdom, goodness, and power, and contain, as it were, some principles of heavenly philosophy.

And I also think that some parameters of knowledge are required, so that we do not extend our consideration beyond those things that are able to advance Christian godliness. What should be thought by the godly person concerning the creation of man cannot be better determined than from the instruction of the Holy Spirit, which Sacred Scripture sets forth to us. For the mind of man has been so darkened, that he is able to judge rightly neither of his maker nor of himself. For this reason, man must take care to search for the things that ought to be known, and held with certainty, not only concerning man himself but also concerning God his creator, from the Sacred Scriptures rather than from human opinion.

And those things which have been handed down in the Sacred Scriptures, having rejected all curiousness, are so composed, that they are adapted to both our capacity and our benefit. They are moderate, but solid, certain, profitable, necessary, and harmonious. Therefore, concerning the creation of man, this is related to us in few words in Genesis chapters one and two. First, that man is a work, just as all other created things. He was made in time; he did not exist before time. Indeed, if we consider the time of our beginning, which Sacred Scripture also reveals, every creature is more ancient than man. Now everything which has been made does not exist on account of itself, but by reason of another source. And just as

it does not exist from itself, so whatever it has, it does not have from itself, but from the one by

# LOCI COMMVNES
## in uſus ſacræ Theologiæ candidatorum parati:

PER VVOLFGANGVM MVSCVLVM DVSANVM.

Adiectus eſt etiam rerum & uerborum memorabilium INDEX.

BASILEAE, EX OFFICINA HERuagiana, Anno M. D. LX.

whom it was made. Nor when it was made, was it able to cause itself to be made different, either better or worse, than what it was made according to the will of its maker. On the contrary, it has not even contributed in the smallest degree to become what it has been made. Accordingly, it should be observed concerning man, that since he also, just like the rest of creation, was made, all that he is and all that he has (in terms of natural abilities), depended on the will, wisdom, and power of his maker.

Second, since the very consideration that we have been made immediately leads us forward to become acquainted with our maker, we next inquire about the maker and creator of man. Sacred Scripture attributes the creation of man to the same One by whom all other things were made. It says, "God created man."The books of the Gentiles say concerning a certain Prometheus, the father of Deucalion, that he first formed man. And he did not form man, but the image of man from clay: for which reason he is also the author of the art of molding. We acknowledge that the maker of our race is the only and true God, who made heaven and earth, and all the things which are in them, visible and invisible, and so we confess that whatever we are and whatever we have is from him. Moreover, it is properly required that in all things we depend on him alone, as the creature on his creator. Israel is reproached in the Mosaic and prophetic books because it abandoned its maker. And God himself cries out, saying: "I made you." Wherein it is sufficiently demonstrated how perverse the heart of man is, to such an extent that he forsakes his own maker, God.

Furthermore, we are admonished by this knowledge, since we all have the same creator and maker, lest any man find fault with his work, either in himself or in others, saying: "Why did he make me like this?" In Isaiah chapter forty-five we read as follows: "Woe to him who speaks against his maker, a potsherd among the potsherds of the earth. Shall the clay say to its potter, 'What are you making?'" And in Proverbs chapter fourteen we read: "He who finds fault with a poor man, reproaches his maker."Therefore, that faith by which we believe that we have been created by God, will work these three things in our hearts. First, that in all things we depend with our whole heart on God our creator. Second, that each man is content with how he has been created, and even embraces it with thanksgiving, for which he has been made by God the creator. Third, that no one looks down on how his neighbor has been made, however base and lowly, lest he dishonors in him their common creator.

In the third place, the Sacred Scriptures are not silent about this, of what man was made. In Genesis chapter two we read the following, "Therefore, the Lord God formed man from the dust of the earth, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living creature." In Hebrew it is, המדאה ומ רפע. Notice the material from which man was made. And what is baser, what is poorer and more unstable, than the dust of the ground, from which not even bricks can properly be made? He could at least have been made from solid earth. This origin of our race warns us all, that in consideration of it we maintain modesty, lest it be said to us: "Why are you prideful, O earth and ashes?" For what other assessment is to be made of that, which is made from dust? The Holy Spirit could have said, "The Lord God formed man from the ground," or "from the dust": but in order to inculcate the lowliness of man, he called man, made from dust, "the dust of the earth." And what did

God say to Adam? "Dust you are, and to dust you will return." He did not simply say, "you are

# DE LAPSV ANGELORVM.

ESse quoſdã ex ordine angelico prolapſos, & ex bonis ſpiritibus malos effectos, non eſt ut quiſquam ambigat. Nam præterquam quòd id per experiẽtiam tot ſeculorum ueriſsimũ eſſe patet, etiã Chriſtus de capite illorũ diabolo teſtatur, quòd in ueritate nõ perſtiterit, Ioan. 8. Deinde hunc illorũ lapſum per peccatũ aliquod eſſe factum ex uerbis Apoſtoli 2. Pet. 2. cõſtat, ubi dicit: Si enim Deus angelis peccãtibus nõ pepercit. Peccatum illorum nõ tranſijt originaliter in eos qui una cum capite prolapſorum à Deo defecerũt, ſicut Adæ peccatum totum mortalium genus infecit: ſed quenque illorum propria malicia perdidit, quotquot ex illo ordine perierunt. Quod autẽ ſit illorũ peccatũ, nõ exprimitur. Cõmuniter accuſatur illorũ ſuperbia, quòd aduerſus Deũ ſeſe erexerint. Modus nõ declaratur. Et illud Apoſtoli 1. Tim. 3. cùm dicit: Ne in ſuperbiã elatus in iudiciũ incidat diaboli, huc ſpectare uidetur, quòd iudiciũ diaboli, quo cœlitus delectus eſt, ſuperbiæ illius debeatur. Locus ille Eſa. 14. ubi ſic legitur: Detracta eſt ad inferos ſuperbia tua, &c. Quomodo cecidiſti de cœlo lucifer, qui mane oriebaris, ac dicebas: In cœlum aſcendã, ſupra aſtra Dei exaltabo ſolium meũ, ſedebo in mõte teſtamẽti, in lateribus Aquilonis: aſcendã ſuper altitudinem nubiũ, ſimilis ero altiſsimo: ueruntamẽ ad inferos detraheris, &c. abſq; ulla cõtradictione uaticiniũ habet de ſuperbiſsimi Babyloniæ regis caſu, qui tum futurus erat: quãuis de lapſu ſatanæ exponatur à nõnullis. Nõ eſt autem præter rationem, quòd ſacra ſcriptura peccatũ ſatanæ & reliquorũ malorũ ſpirituũ, per quod à Deo defecerunt, haud clarè ac perſpicuè exprimit: ſicut hominis peccatũ & lapſum expreſsit. Quoniã em̃ nulla reſipiſcẽtia, nulla cõuerſio, adeoq; & nulla ſalutis ſpes eſt angelis iſtis defectoribus ac reprobis, nõ erat ratio, ut peccatũ illorũ declararetur, ſicut hominis expreſſum eſt peccatũ, cui cõeſtim nõ ſolùm pœna inflicta, ſed ſimul & remedij propoſita eſt promiſsio. Et eò uidetur Apoſtolus reſpexiſſe, cùm Ebr. 2. dicit, quòd nõ angelos, ſed ſemen Abrahæ in ſe ſuſceperit Chriſtus. Venit enim nõ angelos qui ceciderant, ſed homines ſeruaturus: imò angelos illos malos perditurus: unde & clamabãt Marci 1. Quid nobis & tibi Ieſu Nazarene? Veniſti ante tempus perdere nos. Quòd autẽ nunquã ſint ſaluãdi, ſatis patet ex uerbis Chriſti, Matt. 25. cùm dicit: Ite maledicti in ignem æternũ, qui paratus eſt diabolo & angelis eius.

*Prolapſos eſſe quoſdã ex ordine angelorum.*

*Peccato prolapſi ſunt angeli.*

*Quod ſit peccatum angelorum.*

*Quare peccatum angelorũ nõ ſit expreſſum in ſcriptura.*

# DE CREATIONE HOMINIS.

IAm cõſequenter recto ordine ad opus Dei in creatione hominis cõſiderãdũ progredimur: quæ cõſideratio poſt ea quæ de Deo cõditore omnium annotauimus, nõ ſolùm proxima eſſe, ſed & proprie ad hominẽ pertinere cenſeri debet. Quid em̃ magis proprie cõpetit homini, q̃ ut poſt creatorẽ ſuum ſeipſum cognoſcat? Ad hãc cognitionem nõ ſolùm id nos inuitat, quod ut Lactãtius alicubi dicit: Magna uis eſt hominis, magna ratio, magnũ ſacramentũ, ut nõ immeritò Plato naturę gratias egerit, quòd homo natus eſſet, imò quòd poſt Deũ nihil homine ſublimius, nihil excellentius cõditũ eſt: ſed quòd nõ modica portio ſalutis noſtrę hoc requirit, ut nos ipſos cognoſcamus, in quo etiã maximã ſapientiæ partẽ ſitam eſſe admonuerunt, qui illud γνῶθι σεαυτὸν, id eſt, cognoſce teipſum, tanquã cœlitus delapſum paſsim inculcarũt. Quis autẽ ignorat ad cognitionẽ hominis cum primis requiri, ut humani generis originem & cõditionem nõ ignoremus? Et ſpiritus ſanctus ſingulari ſtudio creationem hominis in ſacris ſcripturis, ac diligentius q̃ cęterarũ creaturarum expreſsit, dubio pcul eam ob cauſam, ut uel ex origine generis noſtri admoneremur uoluiſſe Deũ cùm hominẽ conderet, ſingulare quoddã opificium cõſtituere, quod reliquis creatis lõgè præſtantius eſſet, & ad gloriã diuinitatis ſuæ longè propius accederet: deinde quòd originis noſtræ cognitio plurimum ad diuinæ ſapientię, bonitatis & potẽtiæ cõſiderationem faceret, & quaſi principia quędam cœleſtis philoſophiæ cõtineret. Arbitror autẽ & hoc loco requiri modum aliquẽ cognitionis, ne cõſiderationem

*Poſt cognitionem Dei rectè ſequitur cognitio hominis.*

*Ad cognitionẽ hominis cũ primis requiritur originis ipſius cognitio.*

*Seruandus modus.*

from dust," but "you are dust." Lest the flesh should say, "So what that I am from dust? Whatever I came from, I am now a human being, and am not dust"; the sentence of God our maker comes to us, saying: "And from dust you are, and dust you still are, and to dust you will return," just as if you were to say to a magnificent glacier: "And water you were, and water you are, and to water you will return."

In the fourth place, the way in which the first man was made is read in the Sacred Scriptures. We read the following in Genesis chapter two: "Therefore, the Lord God formed man, from the dust of the earth, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living creature."11 By the verb "formed," the Holy Spirit expresses the singular diligence put into the creation of man. Second, in order to describe what material God formed, when he built man, he adds: "dust of the earth." Third, he adds, "and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life," by which words he teaches us how the figure of the human body, first formed from the dust, and still inanimate, was made animate and living. His maker poured into him spirit and breath (for in the Hebrew it is ם ייח תמשנ) from which he would live, and so he was made into a living soul: that is, he began to live, a man now animated, who before was dust and inanimate. Thus, the things concerning the first man Adam.

And how Eve was subsequently made, is in the same chapter read in this way: "The Lord God sent a deep sleep on Adam. And while he slept, he took out one of his ribs, and replaced the flesh over it. And the Lord God built the rib, which he had taken from Adam, into a woman, and brought her to Adam. And Adam said, 'This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh. She is called woman, since she was taken out of man.'"

In both cases, the singular purpose and care that God used in the creation of man is sufficiently intimated. And yet, in like manner, we are permitted to see how the Holy Spirit describes in three words the wonderful way man was formed—wherein the body together with its members, both internal and external, such as bones, veins, cartilage, vertebrae, muscles, joints, and limbs were most harmoniously fashioned, put together, and adorned, and then vivified by the infusion of the soul—when he says, "he formed," "he built," and "he breathed [inspired]." And in this way, he restrains our curiosity, which is itching to know each of these things, how, by what industry, by what strength, and in what space of time it was accomplished, admonishing us to reverently hold fast to those things imparted in few words, and to acknowledge and honor God our maker.

In the fifth place, it is also taught in the Sacred Scriptures, what kind of man was made. With respect to the figure of the body of both, male and female, its stature, and the fitting together of the body and soul, it is in itself plain, of what constitution we have been made. But as for clearly perceiving the nature and dignity of man, since both have been corrupted, and deprived of their original quality, of what kind both were in the first man, we are not able to know, unless the Holy Spirit speaks of and teaches it to us.

And I do not understand in this place by quality of nature the bodily necessities and affections, in which we are still subjected, but that original quality of rectitude, which it is read that God imparted to the first man in Ecclesiastes chapter seven. For Ecclesiastes says the following, "I have found this only, that God made man רשי [that is, upright]." This is not to be un

extendamus ultra ea quæ ad pietatis Christianæ profectũ facere possunt. Quid de creatione hominis sentiendum sit homini pio, nõ potest melius statui quàm ex instructione spiritus S. quã nobis sacræ literæ proponũt. Sic em̃ excęcata est mẽs hominis, ut nec de cõditore suo, nec de seipso recte iudicare possit. Quapropter curandũ est, ut quę homini tam de seipso, q̃ de Deo creatore suo cognoscẽda sunt, & indubitatò tenenda, ex sacris scripturis potius quàm ex cogitationibus humanis petãtur.

Sunt autem ea quæ in sacris scripturis traduntur omni curiositate reiecta sic cõparata, ut & captui nostro & commoditati conueniant. Modica sunt, sed solida, sed certa, sed utilia, necessaria & conuenientia. De hominis itaq; creatione Gen. 1. & 2. ista paucis traduntur. Primùm quòd factura sit homo, perinde atq; reliqua creata. Factus est in tempore, non fuit ante tempus. Imò si originis nostræ tempus consideremus, quod & ipsum sacra scriptura manifestat, quæuis creatura antiquior est homine. Quicquid autem factum est, ex seipso non constat, sed aliunde: & ut ex seipso non est, ita quicquid habet, ex seipso non habet, sed ex eo à quo est factum: nec cùm fieret, efficere potuit ut aliud fieret uel deterius, uel melius, quàm quod est secundum factoris sui uoluntatem factum: imò ne ad hoc quidem aliquid contulit, ut hoc ipsum quod est factum, fieret. Ita de homine quoq; sentiendum est, quandoquidem & ille perinde atq; reliqua creata factus est, & totum quicquid est, & quicquid habet, in uoluntate, sapientia & potentia factoris sui situm fuit.

*Philosophorũ quidam humanum genus ab æterno fuisse putarunt.*

*Homo factura.*

*Homo Dei factura.*

Deinde quoniã ipsa facti consideratio cõsestim ad ipsum factorem cognoscendũ progreditur, proximũ est, ut de factore ac creatore hominis quæratur. Hunc sacræ literæ eundem assignãt, à quo & reliqua omnia sunt condita. Creauit Deus, inquit, hominem. Fabulantur gentilium literæ de Prometheo quodam, Deucalionis patre, quòd primus hominem finxerit. Finxerat ille nõ hominem, sed hominis imaginem è luto: unde & author est plastices. Nos agnoscimus generis nostri conditorem Deum illum unicum & uerum, qui cœlum fecit & terram, & omnia quæ in illis sunt uisibilia & inuisibilia, atq; ita cõfitemur ab illo esse quicquid sumus & quicq̃d habemus: deinde rectè requiri, ut ab illo uno tanquã creatura à creatore suo in omnibus pẽdeamus. Israeli opprobratur in literis Mosaicis & propheticis, quòd factorem suum dereliquerit. Et Deus ipse clamat, dicens: Ego uos feci. qua in re satis declaratur quàm sit cor hominis peruersum, usqueadeò ut à Deo factore suo deficiat. Deinde admonemur hac cognitione, ut quoniam eundem creatorem & factorem habemus omnes, ne quis opus illius uel in seipso, uel in alijs calumnietur, dicens: Quare fecit ad hunc modum? Esaiæ 45. sic legimus: Væ qui contradicit factori suo testa de Samijs terræ. Nunquid dicet lutum figulo suo quid facis? Et Prouer. 14. Qui calumniatur egentem, exprobrat factori eius. Itaq; fides ista, qua nos à Deo creatos esse credimus, hæc tria in cordibus nostris operabitur. Primùm, ut à Deo creatore nostro toto pectore pendeamus in omnibus. Secundũ, ut quisq; ea sit conditione contentus, imò illam cum gratiarum actione complectatur, ad quam est à creatore Deo conditus. Tertium, ut nemo proximi sui conditionem quamuis uilem & humilem contemnat, ne communem in illo creatorem ignominia afficiat. Tertiò, nec hoc sacræ scripturæ tacẽt, unde sit factus homo. Gen. 2. sic legimus. Formauit igitur dñs Deus hominẽ, puluerẽ de tellure uel humo. Ebraicè est עפר מן האדמה. Ecce materiã unde factus est homo. Quid aũt uilius, quid leuius & instabilius puluere de humo, unde ne lateres quidẽ cõmodè fieri possent? Saltẽ è solida tellure cõditus esset. Hic ortus generis nostri, monet nos omnes, ut illius respectu seruemus modestiã, ne dicatur nobis, Quid superbis terra & cinis? Quid em̃ aliud est q̃ puluis cẽsendũ, quod factũ est ex puluere? Poterat spiritus S. dicere: Formauit dñs Deus hominẽ de tellure, uel de puluere: uerũ ut originis nostræ uilitatẽ inculcet, uocat hominẽ è puluere factũ, puluerẽ de humo. Et Adæ dicebat Deus: Puluis es, & in puluerẽ reuerteris. Nõ simpliciter dicebat, ex puluere es, sed puluis es. Ne caro dicat, Quid igitur, q̃ ex puluere sum? Vndecũq; sim, iã homo sum. puluis nõ sum, occurrit sentẽtia Dei cõditoris, dicẽs: Et è puluere es, & puluis etiamnũ es, & in puluerẽ reuerteris, perinde ac si ad glaciẽ superbientẽ dicas, & aqua eras, & aqua es, & in aquã resolueris.

*Vnde sit homo factus.*

Quartò,

derstood of the uprightness of the body, but of the soul, which men call original righteousness, and which comprises the knowledge of God the creator, obedience, faith, love toward both God and one's neighbor, and the freedom of an upright will, together with other adornments of that nature.

Therefore, when the first man by nature was made such—namely, upright, not only in body, but also in soul—he possessed free will in such a way, that he was able to obey God, if he wanted: and, on the other hand, he was able to sin, if he wanted. For however upright and free to do good he was made, nevertheless, at the same time, he differed from the angels in this, that he was able to be tempted by inordinate affections, and consent to them, and be led away from the rectitude of original righteousness. This does not have a place in those angels who, since the fall of the reprobate spirits, have remained in the truth of God.

The Sacred Scriptures also testify concerning the dignity of the first man, when they teach that he was made in the likeness and image of God. God says in Genesis chapter one, "Let us make man in our own image and likeness, and let him rule over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over every living creature on the earth, and over every creeping thing that moves on the earth. And God created man in his image and in his likeness, in the image of God he created him," and the things which follow in that place.

Most ancient and contemporary authors expound the dignity of man as uprightness of nature, of which we have made mention, so that the image of God was what separated man from the beasts, by reason and by the internal integrity of man which more nearly resembled the divine nature, wisdom, and righteousness. But although that exposition is not to be altogether discarded, it is nevertheless clear from the very words of Sacred Scripture that man was so made in the image of God, that he should be like God on the earth, and have all things placed under his feet. For what else is being said where it reads, "And God created man in his image and likeness," than what follows, "in the image of God he created him"? In Hebrew it is סלצב סיהלא. And to be created in the image of God, is to be constituted like a certain God. Whence, magistrates and rulers are in the Scriptures called סיהלא: that is, "gods" and "mighty ones." And this image of God granted to man does not exclude the internal uprightness of man, which is so necessary for the former to be retained, that without it a ruler differs nothing from a savage beast, except perhaps that he employs more subtlety and cunning in carrying out the malice of his tyranny. This understanding of human dignity, according to which man is made in the image of God, was plainly set forth by Chrysostom in his exposition of Genesis chapter one, and occasionally by Augustine in his dispute with the Manicheans.

And when the apostle says in First Corinthians chapter eleven that "a man indeed ought not cover his head, since he is the image and glory of God, but the woman is the glory of man," he thus plainly makes a distinction between the man and the woman, saying that the man is indeed made in the image of God, but the woman in the image of man. This cannot be understood only of internal human rectitude and righteousness, of which the woman is a partaker together with the man in the Lord, but is wholly to be understood of the authority of rule, which, as is well known, was granted at once to the man at the beginning, but denied to the woman.

The putting of Adam in a paradise of pleasure after he was made, a place more excellent and exceptional in comparison with all other habitations on the whole earth, and that he put names

Quartò,& modus in ſacris literis legitur,quo factus eſt primus homo. Sic Gen. 2.legimus:Formauit igitur Dominus Deus hominem:puluerem de humo,& inſpirauit in nares eius ſpiraculum uitæ, & factus eſt homo in animam uiuentẽ. Verbo formandi ſingularem diligentiam creandi hominis exprimit ſpiritus ſanctus.Deinde,ut exprimatur quam materiã formarit Deus, cum hominem conderet, ſubiicit, puluerem de humo.Tertiò addit,Et inſpirauit in nares eius ſpiraculum uitę:quibus uerbis docet,quomodo forma corporis humani primum è puluere formata,& adhuc inanimis,animata ac uiua ſit facta.Infudit illi opifex ſpiritũ ac flatum(nam Ebr. eſt נשמת חיים ) unde uiueret,atq; ita factus eſt in animam uiuentem,hoc eſt,cœpit uiuere homo iam animatus, qui antea puluis erat inanimis. Hæc de Adamo primo homine.Quomodò autem Heuah formata ſit, eodem cap.conſequenter ad hunc modum legitur:Immiſit Dominus Deus ſoporem in Adam.Cumq; obdormiſſet,tulit unam de coſtis eius,& repleuit carnem pro ea . Et ædificauit Dominus Deus coſtam,quam tulerat de Adam,in mulierem,& adduxit eam ad Adam. Dixitq; Adam,Hoc nunc eſt os ex oſsibus meis,& caro de carne mea. Hæc uocabitur uirago,quoniam de uiro ſumpta eſt.Hæc ibi.utrobiq; ſatis innuitur,ſingulari conſilio ac ſtudio uſum eſſe Deum,in creando homine. Et iuxtà tamen uidere licet,quomodo ſpiritus ſanctus admirabilẽ fingendi hominis modum, quo corpus unà cum membris ſuis tam externis quàm internis oſsibus,uenis,neruis,cartilaginibus,uertebris,muſculis,iuncturis & articulis,omnium conuenientiſsime formatũ,compactum,ornatum,& per animæ infuſionem uiuificatum eſt,tribus uerbis exprimat,cũ dicit,formauit,ædificauit,inſpirauit:atq; ita curioſitatẽ noſtram coërceat,quæ ſingula horum,quomodo,qua induſtria,qua uirtute,& quanto temporis ſpacio perfecta ſint cognoſcere geſtit,admonens nos,ut ea quæ paucis traduntur,debita cum religione teneamus,& factorem noſtrum Deum agnoſcamus & obſeruemus. *Quomodo factus ſit homo.* *Heuah.*

Quintò,& illud in ſacris literis traditur,qualis factus ſit homo.Quod attinet corporis figuram utriuſq; maris& fœminæ,ſtaturam quoq;, & compoſitionem corporis & animæ,per ſe manifeſtum eſt,quales ſimus conditi.Quod uerò hominis naturam & dignitatem concernit,quoniam utraq; corrupta eſt,& primordiali qualitate priuata,qualis utraq; in primo homine fuerit ſcire non poſſumus,niſi admonente nos ac docente ſpiritu ſancto. *Qualis ſit homo factus.*

Naturæ autem qualitatem hoc loco non intellígo corporales neceſsitates & affectus,quibus etiamnum obnoxij ſumus,ſed qualitatem illam originalis rectitudínis,quã primo homini Deus Eccl.7.indidiſſe legitur.Sic enim dicit Eccleſiaſtes: Solum hoc inueni,quod fecerit Deus hominem ישר id eſt rectũ, quod non eſt de corporis,ſed animi rectitudine intelligendum,quam originalem iuſtitiam uocant.quę in ſe complectitur cognitionem Dei creatoris,obedientiam,fidem & dilectionẽ,cũ Dei tũ proximi,& libertatẽ rectæ uolũtatis,unà cũ cæteris eius generis ornamẽtis.

Talis itaq; cũ eſſet primus homo natura conditus, rectus uidelicet non corpore tantũ,ſed & animo,libero ſic potiebatur arbitrio,ut Deo obedire poſſet,ſi uoluiſſet: ac rurſus ſi noluiſſet,peccare poſſet. Quãuis enim rectus & ad bonũ liber eſſet conditus,ſimul tñ in eo differebat ab angelis,q; inordinatis potuit affectib.ad peccãdũ tentari,illisq; conſentire,& à rectitudine originalis iuſtitiæ abduci, id quod in angelis locum non habet,qui poſt reproborũ ſpirituũ caſum in ueritate Dei permanſerunt. *Liberum hominis arbitrium.*

De dignitate quoq; primi hominis teſtantur ſacræ literæ,cum illum ad ſimilitudínem & imaginem Dei factum eſſe tradunt.Faciamus, inquit Deus hominẽ ad imaginem & ſimilitudinẽ noſtrã.& præſit piſcibus maris,& uolatilibus cœli, & beſtijs uniuerſæq; terræ,omniq; reptili quod mouetur in terra.Et creauit Deus hominẽ ad imaginẽ & ſimilitudinẽ ſuã,ad imaginẽ Dei creauit illũ,& quę illic ſequũtur:Gen.1. *De dignitate primi hominis*

Hanc hominis dignitatem plericq; ueterum ac recentiorum quoq;, de naturæ rectitudine,cuius mentionẽ fecimus,exponunt,ut imago Dei in homine fuerit,quod à beſtijs ſeparatus ratione & interni hominis integritate ad diuinã naturã,ſapientiã & iuſtitiã ,ppius acceſsit. Verũ licet iſta expoſitio nõ ſit ,prſus abijciẽda,manifeſtũ ẽ eſt ex ipſis uerbis ſacræ ſcripturę ſic eſſe hominem ad imaginem Dei conditum, *Tertullianꝰ alicubi imaginẽ Dei intelligit de libero hominis arbitrio.*

upon all the living creatures, also relate to this dignity of the image of God. For what else do these things prove than that he was the lord and ruler of the whole earth?

Many other things are disputed concerning the status that our first parents had in paradise, and what they would have had if they had not sinned, but these things from Sacred Scripture are more certain and more profitable to students of theology: briefly, to hold, first, that man was made; second, that he was made by God; third, that he was made from the dust of the earth; fourth, that he was built with the special care of God; and fifth, that he was made in and elevated to the image of God, so that he is more outstanding in both nature and worth than all other creatures. If properly considered, these things contain most ample subject matter of Christian philosophy, and are conducive to this, that through the consideration of our origin we are restored to modesty, and through the knowledge of the uprightness and dignity of our first parents, we understand more deeply what we have lost in them, and what we have recovered, and not without great gain, in Christ our second Adam, and the author of our regeneration.

ut inſtar Dei in terris eſſet, & omnia pedibus ſuis ſubiecta haberet. Quid enim aliud eſt quod dicit, Et creauit Deus hominem ad imaginem & ſimilitudinem ſuã, quàm quod ſequitur, ad imaginẽ Dei creauit illum? In Ebræo eſt בצלם אלהים Ad imaginem autem Dei creatum eſſe, eſt inſtar Dei cuiuſdam eſſe conſtitutum. Vnde magiſtratus ac principes אלהים id eſt, diꝝ ac potentes in ſcripturis uocantur. Et hæc imago Dei homini conceſſa non excludit interni hominis rectitudinẽ, quæ ad hanc retinendam ſic eſt neceſſaria, ut ſine illa homo Princeps nihil differat à trucu-lenta beſtia, niſi quod forſan ad perficiendam tyrannidis ſuæ malitiam plus adfert aſtutiæ ac uerſutiæ. Expoſitionẽ hanc dignitatis humanæ, ſecundum quam ad imaginẽ Dei conditus eſt, manifeſtè poſuit Chryſoſtomus ſuper Geneſim cap. 1. & Auguſtinus alicubi contra Manichæos diſputans.

*De Geneſi contra Manich. li. 1, cap. 17.*

Et Apoſtolus 1. Cor. 11. cum dicit: Vir quidem non debet uelare caput ſuum, quoniam imago & gloria Dei eſt, mulier autem gloria uiri eſt: manifeſtè inter uirum & mulierem ſic diſtinguit, ut uirum quidem ad imaginem Dei, mulierem uerò ad gloriam uiri conditum eſſe dicat, id quod non poteſt de interni hominis rectitudine & iuſtitia tantum intelligi, cuius mulier in Domino unà cum uiro particeps eſſe dignoſcitur, ſed omnino intelligendum eſt de dominij dignitate, quam uiro conceſſam ſtatim initio, mulieri uerò negatam eſſe conſtat.

Ad hanc dignitatem imaginis Dei pertinebat & illud, quod Adam poſtquam conditus eſſet in paradiſum uoluptatis, locum uidelicet præ omnibus alijs totius terræ manſionibus, eximium ac præſtantiorem collocatus legitur, & quod omnibus animãtibus, uolucribus ac beſtijs terræ nomina impoſuit. Quid enim iſta aliud arguunt, quàm dominum ac principem totius terræ?

*Epilogus præſentis loci.*

Diſputatur de multis alijs ad ſtatum pertinentibus, quem primi parentes in paradiſo habuerint, & niſi peccaſſent, habituri fuiſſent, uerum iſta ſacrarum literarũ candidatis & certiora ſunt & conducibiliora, ut breuiter teneant, factum eſſe hominem, deinde à Deo factum, tertiò è puluere terræ factum, quartò ſingulari ſtudio Dei conditum, quintò, & natura & dignitate cunctis reliquis creatis præſtantiorem & ad imaginem Dei eſſe creatum ac ſublimatum, quæ ſi recte conſiderentur ampliſsimam habent Chriſtianæ philoſophiæ materiam, & ad hoc conducent, ut originis noſtræ cõſideratione modeſti reddamur, & cognita primorũ parentũ rectitudine ac dignitate penitius intelligamus qd in illis amiſerimus, & in Chriſto ſecũdo Adamo regenerationis noſtræ authore nõ ſine grãdi lucro recupauerimus.

*De anima.*

Videri poterit ipſe hoc tractatus noſtri ordo requirere, ut & de anima conſiderationem aliquam ſubijciamus. Verùm meo iudicio ſatius eſt abſtinere ab eius rei inquiſitione, in qua propter obſcuritatẽ, infinitæ quæſtiones moueri ſolent, utpote,

1 Quid ſit anima hominis. Subſtantia ne, uel harmonia quædam, uel quatuor humorum temperies, uel numerus ex atomis conflatus, uel Entelechia Ariſtotelica.
2 Et ſi ſubſtantia ſit, corporea ne ſit uel incorporea, ſpiritus ne uel ſanguis. Deinde unde ſit. Ex creatione ne uel trãsfuſione, uel ex ſubſtantia Dei, aut ex nihilo uel ſubſtantia aliqua ſpirituali. Deniq; quãdo creata ſit, an olim ſimul omnes, uel an in-
3 fundẽdo creetur. Item plures ne ſint in uno corpore, uel una tantum. Ad hæc
4 ſimplex ne ſit uel compoſita. Quæ illius partes, quę uires, qui gradus operationum.
5 Vbi ſedem habeat in corpore, & quomodo nulla parte corporis contineatur, &
6 tamẽ ſit in omnibus. Quomodo unita ſit corpori. An inquinationem accipiat ex
7 corpore, uel corpus ex ipſa. An morte corporis intereat, uel minus. Et quales
8 ſint poſt mortem, quidq; operentur, & quo migrent, in cœlos ne uel paradiſum, uel
9 an mutentur in dęmones, aut migrent in alia corpora, & num ſentiant res uiuentiũ, poſsintq; illis adeſſe & ſuccurrere, & quæ alia ſunt huiuſmodi, de quibus magna curioſitate, inextricabili obſcuritate, & confuſiſsima uarietate diſputatur. Nobis conuenit etiam hac in re nihil ſapere, ultra ea quæ traduntur in ſacris & canonicis ſcripturis. Quapropter relicta hac inquiſitione ad lapſum hominis conſiderandum progrediamur.

De




*Bad Dreams - Nadine Bucca*

# “Creating a Community”

## An Interview with Associate Dean Brendan Boyle

A vision for building community at the St. John’s College Graduate Institute.

By Stephen Borsum

It was what I would call the first cold day of the year when I came to the BBC to meet Mr. Boyle for an interview. It was cold only in that the rain falling that day was a chilling one, one lacking the distinct warmth that rain has in summer and early fall here in Annapolis. As I entered, I approached Mr. Boyle's office to see it closed. Unexpected, given I was just on time for our scheduled meeting. But he called to me from within the GI Conference room where he had been taking some calls for the day, and after some polite banter and the brewing of some green tea, we began our discussion. What follows has been edited for clarity, and is ultimately a poor reflection of just how engaging a face-to-face conversation with Mr. Boyle can be.

Stephen:
I'm really curious to hear your thoughts on the role you play as dean. You know, you're a liaison to the college. You are a tutor. You're a family man. You have all of these responsibilities and so, where does worrying about the health of the GI community fall in the list of priorities?

Mr. Boyle:
I think my top priority is the GI as a community. One thing I realized when I was thinking about this interview this morning is that I'm probably going to be borrowing a lot of formulations that I heard from Walter Sterling yesterday. And I'm happy to credit him and you can credit him in whatever way you think is necessary, but I hadn't really even, until yesterday, begun to notice that the first statement of the program is that St. John's College is a community of learning, and that even if I hadn't noticed that, I don't think I had caught what he drew attention to. Which is that sentence, at least on his construction, is meant to distinguish St. John's qua community from St. John's qua institution like in the first instance. At the same time it might well be an institution. But if it's an institution, that description is somehow much lower than the description of St. John's as a community. So I do feel like my first responsibility is to the community of learning and more particularly to the community of learning that is the Graduate Institute now. And that there's a new aspect to that community given the fact that the community now includes persons who are not physically located here, namely low-residency students. And so, in some sense, I'm the first Associate Dean to inherit this. To walk into a community or to have responsibility of shepherding the community that is not physically in the same place. It is true that Emily Langston also had that in the latter part of her term,

and maybe I'm the first to come into a term for a community of this sort. And that will present, you know, new different challenges, but those are very much on my mind. How does one hold together a community that includes a not small number of persons who are not residents of this place? I'm trying to do some things, reading groups, for example, that in the past, I think, would be unheard of for an associate dean to have a reading group that was held online by design. But for me, in having the dean's reading group be part of the weekend, I made it online by design because I was trying to be responsive to the nature or shape of the community now. To return to to the formulation of your question, I really do think that my job is as the steward of the community and its intellectual health, but intellectual health understood in the most capacious term. I also want people to be flourishing affectively and interpersonally because, in so doing, their intellectual flourishing will be still greater.

Not to go on too long — I do want to make this conversation — but I will say one thing that I really liked about some of the things [Walter Sterling] said yesterday is that it's very important for the person in a position of leadership to be physically present. And I'm trying to keep that at the center of my own mind. Now, I think I can actually do a much better job of being at ASG on Thursday nights — things like that. I could, in fact — and should, in fact, do a better job of that. So one of the things that's important to me is to acknowledge the importance of the associate dean being physically present here as much as possible.

Stephen:
I will say, I think the impact of that is already palpable. You and Ms. Langston both have prioritized that, and I think it's noted. I will give you the pass on being there at ASG. You're here at, you know, eight or nine in the morning. I don't think we need you there at 10 p.m. at night. That's not on you.

Mr. Boyle:
That's kind of you to say.

Stephen:
That splits off into two things, and feel free to go either direction with these questions. I do think the gap between the in-person students and the low-residency students is a very tough one to address and some things are being done like low residency weekends and I think everyone really enjoys those and it's hard to require them to come to us

more. So I think that solutions like online reading groups are excellent. The other thing is the relationship between tutors and students seems so vital and, as much as I know, certain tutors really enjoy the GI but I don't see them present in some of those additional events. So I think the two main questions there are: Are there other things you are considering to bridge the gap between in-person and low-residency? And how do we keep the tutors involved at a greater level?

Mr. Boyle:
Yeah, two hard and great questions. I have some ideas for bridging this gap, and I'm not sure even if the ideas were put in place and they were successful, I'm still not sure how much the gap would be bridged.

One of the things that I'd like to do and want to start doing in the near future is just doing something like a spotlight on a low-residency student, weekly or biweekly, or something like that, and maybe having a little interview and then putting it up on the board or sending it around. Just as a way to get the in-person students to know about the low-residency students who are out there. Would that make intellectual connections? I don't know. I'm hopeful that something like that, and I don't know what their exact right form is, could go some way. Now, to me, it's still an open question. What would the best possible outcome look like? How much of a divide would there be in the best of all possible worlds between the low-residency students and the in-person students? I don't think that the answer would be none. But maybe it would be rather little and I think that's a perfect question. How do you achieve that "rather little." The question about tutors is also a good and hard one. And I think that one of the things that Emily Langston did really well is integrate the Graduate Institute into the larger life of the college, and I think that she would say that that was an important part of her own work. I think that she would also say that it's probably not yet finished, and it's my job to, if not finish it, then hopefully advance it. But it's also true that we haven't really found a way to bring more tutors to the GI. I feel like there's a somewhat small subset of tutors, and the faculty who are teaching in the GI and we haven't yet found a way to broaden that subset. There are some restrictions, like untenured faculty can't teach in the GI seminar. OK, leave that to the side. I would like to find a way, and I've begun to speak with [Annapolis Dean] Susan Paalman about this to find a way to bring in mid-career tutors beyond the current subset of regulars into the GI, because I feel like that problem is related to the problem that you've said of getting tutors to just be at other co-curricular or curricular-adjacent events.

They seemed like separate problems, but I think they're related in that if people think of the GI as a regular part of the academic life of the college tutors, that is, they will see GI events — be they ASG or (Campus) Convening weekend or what have you — as much more of a piece with homecoming weekend or just general college events that they go to with some regularity, even if they're not teaching in the GI in that particular semester. So, that's an aim of mine, and I think it would be good for the GI to have greater circulation of the faculty through it. And I think that some of the GI students even like the fact that there a subset of tutors who are especially dedicated to GI. I think there is something to be said for that, but it would be nice for that subset to be larger, and then I think we would have that circulation which would be good for all parties.

Stephen:
I think all of that addresses another question I have. It seems that It's hard to build a community with busy adults when you only have four segments to do so. And I know that's how the program is built and marketed, but do you see that as a hindrance to a sustaining a community? Are there inclinations you have on how to address that other than GIs coming back to do precepts and audit classes later?

Mr. Boyle:
Can I first ask a question in response? Is it somehow a corollary of that question that the MALA could or should be longer than four segments?

Stephen:
It certainly could be. And I'm thinking of the four semesters and particularly how I hear it marketed in some ways where you could do summer or fall, spring, summer and be done in a year, and you can hardly form a friendship in a year regardless of your lifelong relationships.

Mr. Boyle:
That seems that seems fairly said. On the one hand, I think that the MALA is by most Master's standards long. Most other programs speak in the language of credit hours.

This Master's program, seeing as it takes, let's say, two academic years, generally is more time for students to form community than I think a lot of other Master's programs have. I'm not entirely sure that the time component is works against us. I do agree that

when the program is marketed, or at least described, as a program that you could finish in a year — summer, academic year, following summer — then the question of how to put that frame together with the emphasis on community is a hard one, and maybe even might sound a little bit disingenuous. As in, how can you promise the creation of community in one calendar year? I would respect that criticism. I don't actively talk about the program as one that should be done in a single calendar year. When people ask if they can do this, I tell them that of course they can, and I recognize that some people have a year off of their job or a sabbatical that is just the calendar year, and we want them to be able to do this in that in that single calendar year and I guess we're in some sense crossing our fingers that the intensity of the program will generate some sort of community and lasting friendship that is typically brought about by time. It might be important for me to think about those persons who have done the program in a year and calendar year and whether they as a distinct group feel connected or not to the college now.

One other open question for me is: does this segment structure itself work against community? That wasn't precisely your formulation, but I wonder if you might endorse it? And I say that because it's not as if students move through the program together. You're in a segment with somebody one semester and then they're in segment X in the spring semester, but you're in segment Y spring semester and you just don't see each other or aren't reading the same texts any longer. Does that work against community? Maybe it does. It's certainly true that the undergraduates, you know, don't have that experience. So that's something I may have to give some more thought to, but maybe I could just pause for a second and ask you, do you think that segment structure works against community? Insofar as the person with whom you are forging a deep friendship now this fall very well will not be in the same class with you next semester, let alone in the same segment.

Stephen:
I do think this type of thing plays out in ASG. And I haven't seen enough evidence to say that it's positive or negative, but it is interesting to see the... I want don't use the term "clique" because it's often so loaded, but it's the most apt word. Cliques will form in ASG often, and if they're not people who are already established friends they will form because of the shared texts. And those are bright and vibrant conversations, but

at the same time, there is such a genuine interest in what everyone else is experiencing that I think it overcomes itself, so I don't think the segment structure is necessarily a hindrance. I would be curious to know, and this is more of a general question, if there is a perceived issue, how even flexible is the structure of the GI? It doesn't seem like it's something that can change on a whim.

Mr. Boyle:
Definitely not something that could change on a whim. But the GI structure has changed a lot, even in the short time that I've been at the college. For example, the decoupling of the preceptorials from the segments. At one point, not during Emily Langston's associate deanship but back in Jeff Black's deanship, it used to be the case that the preceptorials were in a pretty strong sense pegged to the segments offered that term. So, if you take this term for an example, Math and Natural Science, and Literature. The preceptorials offered would be two Literature preceptorials and two Math and Natural Science preceptorials. Instead, what we actually have this fall is *Canterbury tales*, Galileo, three modern poets, the Greek, and Plato. And yes some of those may fit the themes of the current segments, but that seems to be circumstance, not designed.

I think in years past one might have said that Plato's *Republic* somehow belongs to Philosophy and Theology. So I do think that there is some kind of openness for the structure of the GI to change, and you might hear people around the halls talk about other paths to degree that the GI might pursue. Maybe we decouple — and I'm not endorsing this, I'm just reporting things that I've heard — decouple the seminars and tutorials. And it's no longer the case that one needs to take four seminar-tutorial pairs plus four preceptorials, but one needs to take four seminars, four tutorials and four preceptorials. And they can be somehow mixed and matched. That could not be changed on a whim and I'm not sure that that's even a good idea. I would say I do think that the relationship between seminar and tutorial in the GI is unique and it's not like the relationship between seminar and tutorial in the undergraduate program. Insofar as it's unique, I can imagine people in the future thinking about different ways forward to the degree that may not abandon the segment structure, but might actually in some sense alter it because one would be no longer bound to these seminar-tutorial pairs. Again I'm not endorsing this. I'm just speculating on things that I have heard, and I'm of two minds. As you might recall yesterday, Walter Sterling talked about the GI as be

ing a place for experiments, and I think that there's definitely some truth to that. Now, one needs to be cautious about imagining the GI as just some kind of laboratory where one can try a bunch of different things, because that's a deep disservice to the Institute, as an institution with its own coherent program. It's true that it's more amenable to experimentation, new offerings, new MALA segments than with the undergraduate. Well, obviously it might be amenable to new offerings than undergraduate programming is, but one needs to be very measured about how one goes about doing such a thing.

Stephen:
I think this discussion of the structure of the GI program raises a question that ties the conversation back to the relationship between the GI and the broader college community. I think the first thing I want to just hear your input on is, there is such a difference in how the GI and the undergrad programs are built — and this might get at the heart of the issue — do you think GIs and undergrads graduate from their programs prepared to have the same conversation with each other? Is there something inherently true about the structure either way that creates that unity?

Mr. Boyle:
I think there's enough overlap between the texts that are at the center of the GI. I want to say that at the center of the GI are the books and at the center of the undergraduate program are the books. It just so happens that we have kind of carved them up into segments for reasons that might be related to the unique position that a number of persons who are coming to the GI find themselves in. That they're organized by segments to me will always remain a secondary fact about the about the Graduate Institute, and the books on the lists will always remain the absolute center, and insofar as there is great overlap between those lists and the list for the undergraduate program. I do think that the two sets of graduates, GI and undergraduates, go out ready to talk to one another, and the places in which they differ, it's probably the case that undergraduates know about and wish that they could have read things that are in the GI program and vice versa. For example, the entire history segment. GI's have ready ears to hear about things that are in the graduate program but not in the undergraduate one, and seem genuinely curious about the undergraduate experience and what it offers that they may not see in the GI. Labs are a terrific example there. Music, by and large. But yeah, there's a nice amount of overlap. But with the possibility for growth because the overlap is not total.

Stephen:
Absolutely. Well, I only have two more quick questions for you. I'm curious to hear your take on what it is that makes the GI community so unique amongst the polity or even in the world. And then the last question is just a question on your background and what got you here. So I guess you if you want to take the GI community question first and then we can jump into the other one.

Mr Boyle:
This is where I'm definitely going to steal from Walter yesterday because I thought it was so moving of him to have said that. In some sense, the GI is most reflective of what it is that is at the heart of St. John's College. Insofar as, people come to the graduate program, people do not drift into the Graduate Institute in the way that 18-year-olds can drift into the undergraduate program or be helped along by their parents into the undergraduate program, directed by their parents say, into the undergraduate program. It's not a knock on anybody, it's just a recognition of that's how life is. One at 18 is still not quite in charge of one's own life. But when one decides at the age of 25, 55, 75 to give of oneself one's time and one's finances to intellectual inquiry, that is a demonstration of the true choice-worthiness of the undertaking that we do here. That characterizes the work of the college. And yes, it will always be the case that the undergraduate program is at the center of St. John's. No one, no one is doubting that. But I thought that Walter really highlighted a way in which something about the presence of persons who have made a very considered and deliberate choice, in something like the middle of their lives, to undertake this mode of inquiry through conversation is the best possible endorsement of it. So, I found that very, very moving. And in some sense wish all GIs could have heard that. It helps me even think about what I find so moving about seeing a 25-year-old, a 55-year-old, a 75-year-old here together learning from one another. I see in them hunger for a life of learning with others and in community with others but also, recognition that that hunger is one that can be met by this distinct community, the institution of St. John's College. So, their presence here in the Graduate Institute is in some sense the greatest endorsement of the institution as a whole.

Now, how did I get here? Again, I'm going to borrow a little bit from something that I heard Walter say in a different meeting. I've been a tutor for 10 years, more or less. And at some point along the way, I think I felt some sort of calling to take on a role in the college over and above my work and the working of the classroom, which is, I believe, the most important work at the college. But I thought that I might have had one or two administrative talents that are in some sense very minor virtues like staying on top of

things or keeping some things organized, that I felt like I could put in the college's service. I Won't be in this position forever and look forward to returning to the classroom, but as I felt like I had these minor virtues I wanted to share them with the college. And so when they asked me to do this, I was very glad to do it. And I came into the role with the GI in a great position and hope to leave it in a still better one.

Stephen:
Building on your journey to this position I have one last question is and then we'll get you out of here. I saw in your background in classics is what led you into this world of inquiry. But clearly, just even having a couple of brief intro or Campus Convening Weekend seminars with you, there's a vibrancy in you about educating itself. So I'm curious, does that drive to be an educator come before the passion of the classics, or did the passion of the classics inspire the drive to be an educator?

Mr. Boyle:
Can I do the thing that interviewers hate and just reject the terms of question?

Stephen:
Be my guest.

Mr Boyle:
I think I might have at one time thought of myself as an educator, but I'm very grateful to St. John's because I don't any longer really think of myself as an educator. But I feel like I can passionately model being a student, like I just love learning and I love learning with others and I think I'm not bad at it. I think I know how it goes well, and what in what conditions it goes well, and what conditions it goes somewhat poorly. And I think I can model that for people. If I'm educating them in that regard, I'm happy to, but I'm definitely not filling their minds with any theories.

I'm grateful to St. John's because to be perfectly honest, before I came to St. John's I did just want to be filled with facts that I could report, but not really own as my own. St. John's, as I think it's true for many tutors, marked a real new beginning in my own intellectual life. What I could say if I have to start again from nothing and say, almost all of what I take myself to know I know in only the most attenuated sense because it's so mediated. It's been handed to me by so many other persons that I have never really taken any ownership of my own education, and I think I was able to do that when I

became a tutor and I hope I'm showing people that they can do that, too. And you can start at any time. It's available to anybody to just take ownership of their education. And insofar as I'm showing people what that might look like, I may consider myself an educator, but in the main, I'm just a student.

Stephen:
Well, it's certainly palpable and thank you for taking some time with me today

Mr. Boyle:
It was a pleasure, glad to.

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