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Scienzia Nuova

We shall try to interpret the lecture more or less strictly as we thought the lecturer intended it, without attempting to make this review a medium for the expression of our personal idiosyncrasies or metaphysical views of the universe at large.

The Scienzia Nuova belongs to a whole family of books which say in brief, that human actions, institutions, and government move in cycles, which like Grecian tragedies present to the spectator a unity consisting of definite archai, meloi, and teloi. What laws, they ask, govern the rises and falls of history? One cannot avoid historicizing; man by nature desires to know the causes of all the natural phenomena which he observes, even those which he himself produces, i. e. history.

At this point, even sooner than to the other sciences, the question is put, is it not blasphemous so to justify the ways of God before men? Suppose it is, one can answer, yet who can avoid hearing stories about what happens? Is it blasphemy to tell jokes on the Truman administration or to record a conversation that the Melians once had with the Athenians? Surely not. And if not, why can't it be asked whether the stories are really true, or whether they are just stories? If this distinction can be made at all, other questions inevitably follow. Such as: What kind of truth is it that can turn a story into a history? Is there but one such truth, or . . 4 . . MAL . .
are there many? What pre-ordained pattern lies behind and guides the otherwise confusing mass of human data? Not many more middle propositions have to be filled in before we have to return to this fundamental question. (Mere factual meticulousness or "prolificacy" seem to have nothing to do with the truth of history or with the greatness of history writing, as evidenced by the comparison of piddling 2 x 4 writers with giants like Gibbon or Thucydides).

History-writing will therefore fall into two distinct categories, first of those who record events in a narrative manner, and secondly of those who assign causes to such events, and in general attempt what Mr. Barr called a poetics of history. It must be remembered of course that these distinctions are only analytical; there can be no narrative historian who does not select his material on some causal basis, or no critical historian who does not use narrative material to derive his causes from. But in general definite intentions are carried out in one direction or the other.

Vico clearly belongs to the latter kind. Having received his education in the classics, and later in law, Vico writes on jurisprudence, including the so-called social sciences. The laws which he finds operating in human society are three in number, as follows:

(1) The perpetual recurrence of religion, which consists of man's relations with God.

(2) The same of matrimony, which seeks to give divine sanction to the procreative act.

(3) The same of burial, with its omnipresent antithetical themes of death and immortality.

These laws do indeed seem to stand as apodictically given. The fact that they can be stated in other than propositional form helps to classify them as facts rather than, or perhaps as well as, laws. If they are laws, they are of the descriptive kind that physicists are so fond of. It is not clear to us (the reviewers) whether they are of a purely metaphysical and non-temporal order, or whether they also, or exclusively, occur in evolutionary sequence.

The three stages of Vico clearly do follow one another temporally. They are as follows:

(1) The barbaric age of divinity. The gods walk among and teach men directly (Jehovah, Prometheus).

(2) The heroic age of irritable men, of timocracy (Achilles, David (?)).

(3) The human age of rights and duties, law and order (Solon, Pericles, Solomon (?)).

We shall here beg our own question and try to make appropriate connections between the laws and the stages, so called. The first pair need no comment. For the second pair, Matrimony was certainly the early prerogative of the timocrat or patrician. Formal marriage was one of the distinctions that set him apart from

the plebeian, and gave him priority on the privileges and benefits of the state. The "sacraments of nature" business carried on by the plebeian was a sure excuse for ostracizing him from decent society. Here we are on safe ground, as this was unmistakably a point raised by the lecturer. The correspondence between burial, and humanism is not quite as clear, but a case could perhaps be made for the mellowing influence caused by the loss of friends or family, and the reflection caused by remorse or regret. The death of Njal might be a case in point. Whether this is what Vico or the lecturer meant is not clear from our ever inadequate notes.

Neither is it clear whether these stages are invariably successive. Christ and His teaching, for example, surely belong to the first and third ages at once. Also from what has been said so far, albeit inadequately, it does look as though the three laws transcend and are present in each of the three stages. Religion is present in every age, and a little thinking will convince us that not much of a state is possible without the dual rites of marriage and burial. (Observe the curious opposition between these two). The reviewers apologize to their readers at this point, and humbly acknowledge that they would have helped to enliven the question period considerably had they known that such formidable questions were going to raise themselves at a later date.

To write his book (on law, remember) Vico takes philosophy for his form and philology for his matter, according to the lecturer. There is room for further speculation about this, too. At any rate, the three ages have definite philological and legal aspects. The language of the barabric age is poetical, heavily symbolic, even hieroglyphic. Little of it or of the literature written in it is likely to have survived. We guess that this would include the Theogony or the Pentateuch from both of which we learn that God or gods are the source of law, either directly, or by divination, oracle, and prophecy. This is not by any means to be taken for the mythical Golden Age, with which Vico seems to have some quarrel, i.e., as to its existence. The second or heroic age has much of the linguistic qualities of the first, and mostly consists of formal and stylized poetry, e.g., the epic poem. Some of the pictorial or graphic element of the previous state will have been lost or dropped, but Achilles' shield, for example, and heraldry in general would typify its surviving vestiges. Formality again, and legalistic ritual constitute the jurisprudence of the second age, as exemplified in the relations which the Homeric heroes have to each other in combat or in the assembly, in chivalric duels and trials by combat, and in the "lawsuits" of Burnt Njal. In the third age, language becomes vulgar and articulate. Science, logic, and morals arise and overwhelm irritability and other noble inclinations to capriciousness. Questions are raised about natural equity, and laws are adjusted to justice as far as human nature will permit.

Are these stages more or less mutually exclusive? and where and what is God's plan or providence? are our own unanswered questions. What should we do when these stages have run their gamut? seems to be Vico's question as well as ours. He has no definite answer for this, except to say that when vice and decadence have so far eclipsed the last age, nothing worthwhile remains. The divine age, with its simple and austere, albeit barbaric virtue will and must return and reorder the chaos of soul and polity. This is the case at the end of the Roman imperium, where barbarism descends out of one quarter, and religion envelops from another. For one decree of Providence is that those who are best fitted to rule will always do so, just as in Darwin only the fittest survive. If we are unable to govern ourselves, we must submit either to Augustus or at length to some invader or other. But the moral question remains. How shall we decide for ourselves who in our age is best fitted to rule? If we do not make the right decision, we or our choice will come out second best. Shall we wait until the tyrant heel is on our necks before we act, or shall we trample down the germinating seeds of a renascent peace with our ill considered haste? Neither, we hope, but the risk of running this dilemma haunts every thinking man who lives in the twilight of a humanistic age. Truman administration and Student Polity, please take note.

Our readers we advise to read Vico. We promise to do the same as soon as the University of California Press unleashes a translation.

J. G. & I. V. M. A.

For Gordon McNamee

Romance is that beauty might have lain
down foreign roads we did not follow.
Romance is the future of the slain.
This acre actual
to us is beauty lying fallow,
full of weeds, tangledly factual,
awaiting labour seed and rain
to ripen her by ritual.
Romance is that speed might gain
what earth would seasonably mellow.
Romance is the hunger, not the grain.

—TED TOWNSEND.

The Fine Arts

"The Fine Arts contain the most imposing set of disciplines that have established themselves and survived in the modern world by claiming independence from the liberal arts." So reads the official statement of the St. John's Program.

Mr. Thornton, in his article "Mona Lisa's Smile," has used this statement as a starting point to bring forth the argument that this unifying job does not seem to have been done. Many reasons were given for such a state of affairs. This article is merely an attempt to add another reason. I shall use the trivium as a common denominator between the Fine Arts and the Liberal Arts.

In the Liberal Arts, as I believe it has been very strongly pointed out, the first step of the trivium is the logic. This is the idea in very abstract and unrealized terms. Then comes the grammar, the tools to use in the expressing of this idea. The third is the rhetoric. This would seem to be the ability to choose the correct grammar and then to express or use that grammar well.

In the Fine Arts these same three terms can be used with about the same meaning. The change comes in their relationship. First there is logic. The abstract idea is very definitely connected with the Liberal Arts. The grammar is again the tools or the language which the artist is using. The rhetoric however means only the ability to get the idea across using the grammar well. It does not mean the selection of the proper grammar. This then does away with any bridging of the logic with the grammar. One can not connect two things that are essentially one. For the logic and the grammar in the fine arts must be one.

A painter in conceiving a work of art sees his idea in the grammar. That is necessary. Thus when he conveives his idea, it is as a visual image, containing all the necessary techniques that fall in the major category of painting. Spacial relationships, line, form, color are all members of this single grammar. If he does not see the painting in such a unity, the idea is out of its realm and would probably be more successful in another medium—the medium in which it was conceived. If a composer thought in terms other than the final movement of sound, then he would have a piece of music that is actually a translation of an idea into another medium. Each of the Fine Arts must be thought of in the terms of the grammar to be used in the final work. If it is not thought out in these terms, the work will be less successful. This does not mean that on this quality alone the worth of a work of art can be decided. Rather it is a very important part that will, with other parts, decide the worth of the whole.

As is surely evident from the preceding brief and rather disjointed analysis this is not a complete survey of all the aspects of the problem. It was not meant to be. Rather it was intended to give a reason, other than that which Socrates uses, as an answer to the problem of why the fine artist cannot explain his work successfully.

Socrates says that "there is hardly a person present who would not have talked better about their poetry than they (the poets) do themselves." The reason Plato gives for such a sitution is that "not by wisdom do the poets write poetry but by a sort of genius and inspiration. They are like diviners and soothsayers who also say many fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them."

It seems most logical that the poet cannot talk of his poetry, or for that matter, the composer of his music, or the painter of his paintings. First it is inconsistent if they can explain their art in another medium successfully. It is also unnecessary. Everything that the artist had to say he has said in the grammar of that idea with the best rhetoric he was able to use. Since all this has been done in that grammar, it should be understood in that grammar. This is a problem for the layman, however. The work has been stated by the artist completely in its own terms; and since the layman can never truly enter the artist's mind to follow that ap,proach, he must base everything on the completed work of art. As he approaches them

he finds there are certain truths that hose work which seem to stand as peaks of their art have in common. These theories can then be used to a certain extent in judging other works. But such rules come after the works themselves. The composer does not think in terms of ratios and proportions as he works, nor the artist in terms of theorems. These are the products of the works themselves. It has been said that any great work of art can break any rule that came before if it does so successfully—thereupon making a new set of rules. The pattern seems to be: the Fine Artist does things, arranges them, and then reasons about them; the liberal artist reasons, arranges, then does.

—JOSEPH ABLOW.

A Note On Teyte

Some twenty people who otherwise would have been in lecture a few Fridays ago, got away from "what we are doing here" and were in Baltimore instead, listening to Maggie Teyte. Since this number is only slightly lower than the attendance at College Meeting, and only slightly higher than that of the usual Polity meeting, it would seem to merit some comment from this column.

We shall begin in a rather schoolmasterish way by recalling what an Englishman once told us about the difference between England and America. In England, he said, if you told somebody you were going to a concert, they would ask you what you were going to hear, and in America, who. The moral would have something to do with our hope that such artists are admired for their artistry and are not a vogue engendered by enthusiastic but literal readings of the *New Yorker* and *Time*.

If that was sticking out neck out any (and you may wonder how come "we" have only one neck), we hastily draw it back in, adjust our spectacles, and note that the voice is in a remarkable state of preservation, showing some sign of strain only occassionally in the upper register. Aristotle may well have said somewhere that only a fool would deny the evidence of his senses, and we shall trust ours and refuse to believe that she is fast approaching seventy. Probably her voice never was of the lush sort. It is rather dry, like dry sherry. Her phrasing and diction are subtle and impeccable, and were enhanced by a free use of dramatic gesture. Her repertoire is refreshingly unhackneyed.

The Liar

The Cretan, Epimenides, said, "All Cretans are liars." But Epimenides is a Cretan, therefore he is a liar, and consequently his assertion is false. Therefore Cretans are not liars—thus Epimenides did not lie but spoke truly. Therefore—

It was the investigation of this paradox of the Liar and its simplified and condensed form —if I say that I am lying, do I lie or speak the truth—with which Mr. Koyre was concerned in his lecture. His conclusions were highly interesting since he attempted to show that the first form of the paradox, the Epimenides form, is a self-contradictory judgment and not a paradox or antinomy while the second form is no judgment at all but meaningless. Thus the Epimenides form of the paradox is equivalent to saying "I am dead" or "I am silent," while the second attempts to make a judgment about itself and is hence meaningless. It is the consideration of the second type which presents the greatest difficulty since, according to Mr. Koyre, there are some judgments which can be applied to themselves. However, this reviewer is unclear as to what these judgments are and must therefore pass over this problem and content himself with examining Mr. Koyre's study of the two forms of the paradox of the Liar given above.

In the first form we must assume that the judgment made is logical and not moral. Thus the meaning of the statement "All Cretans are liars" must be "All Cretans lie always," i.e., all judgments or assertions made by Cretans are false. This judgment made by anyone but a Cretan is not paradoxical; but when made by a Cretan, it seems to be paradoxical. But let us examine it carefully in a syllogistic manner. If all Cretans lie always and Epimenides is a Cretan, then Epimenides lies always. But if Epimenides lies always and Epimenides makes the assertion, "All Cretans lie always," then the assertion is false. But that the assertion, "All Cretans lie always," is false is equivalent to the assertion, "Not all Cretans lie always," i.e., not all statements that Cretans make are necessarily false. This implies only that some Cretans speak the truth, not that all Cretans speak the truth. Hence we cannot conclude that Epimenides has spoken the truth but that since Epimenides has made a false assertion he is undoubtedly a liar. Therefore the entire proposition, "Epimenides, the Cretan, says, 'All Cretans are liars'," is necessarily false. It is false because it contains incompatible members, sub-assertions which cannot be true together and at the same time.

In considering the statement, "I am lying," the paradox only arises when the judgment is made of itself. But it is self-evident that a judgment cannot be made of itself because of this impossibility: to say "I am lying" as though I were making a judgment is meaningless since the judgment in this case is its own subject.

Mr. Koyre's claim is that all the so-called logico-mathematical paradoxes break down when subjected to the type of study indicated above. His annoyance with Bertrand Russell and others who have attempted to identify logic and mathematics stems from the fact that in symbolic form the true meaning of propositions is easily overlooked. Hence paradoxes are declared to be true paradoxes which in truth are either meaningless or simply false when investigated without translation into symbols and provided that the meaning of terms and phrases is not allowed to vary during the course of the argument.

The Great Void

The essentials of AVC's program are simnapolis Chapter of the American Veterans Committee is a part of that organization's nation-wide campaign to enroll a million members. In this article I shall examine the potential significance of such a form of organization (I shall call it a "popular political pressure group") to the political problem as a whole, and then examine AVC's particular potentialities.

The essentials of AVS's program are simple. It furnishes forums for the expression and formulation of honest, unselfish and, if possible, expert thought on the problems, chiefly political, of the community. It builds up political pressure (through expansion and the achievement of respectability) which it uses to see that its political aims are accomplished. For example, it makes it clear that a Congressman's support of its national program will pay off in the votes of AVC members and their friends. The best guarantee that this program is a community program is found in AVC's motto, "Citizens First, Veterans Second"—a simple way of stating its conviction that community prosperity and well-being is a condition of veterans' prosperity and well-being. The sense of the motto is evident when one realizes that fifteen years hence (save the atom bomb) the head of every third family will be a veteran.

It seems to me that the real significance of this or another people's political pressure group lies in the possibility that it may fill the awful space between the ballot box and the Congress—a democratic problem that becomes more acute as governments the world over find that they have become positive rather than balancing forces in society. This problem is a compound of the fact that most citizens know almost nothing of what goes on in their various governments, and the fact that those who do, for any other than professional reasons, are without an effective means for expressing themselves as citizens, rather than as veterans, wheat farmers, investment bankers, etc. In sum, each of the latter groups has its pressure group and modern democratic government is positive only in response to the sum of these pressures, balancing them against each other, but especially against, and at the expense of, the citizen as citizen.

Democracy's need for popular pressure groups has been evidence for some time. The efforts of Good Government Leagues and reform movements have failed because they were interested only in honest government—which meant cheap, non-interfering government. There are the endowed community councils, promising in conception but fruitless in fact, because they dared not touch the real problems of the community (e.g. they would not actively support a just strike). Much more vital are the political arms of the labor unions. Though effective and popular in the (important) numerical sense, these pressure groups are still limited by the fact that their interest is primarily a selfish one. The cooperatives have yet to come into their own in America and they have not yet entered the political arena in any significant sense. But, though they are as essential to a broad democracy as labor unions, their viewpoint is similarly limited, since, for example, it is in their immediate interest to pay low wages to their employees. None of these groups, then, fit the prescription implicit in our title.

At present there are, I think, but three candidates for the role—a role which may be of essential importance to, and even necessary to, the survival of democracy in the future. They are—AVC, the National Citizens Political Ac-

tion Committee, and certain "Peoples' Organizations" which are springing up in the Chicago area. All were born of discontent. More specifically, each arose as it became evident that the Democratic party organization could not continue to give Roosevelt his tremendous 1936 majority—the minimum majority with which he could govern, since the Southern fifth of Congress continued to be Democratic in name and conservative in fact.

However that is not to say that these groups will have no "raison d'etre" when, and if, the South splits into liberal and conservative camps. This is the case even though that action, making possible the execution of a Democratic party platform, would, take it on faith, assure the election of any presidential candidate the Democratic party would care to nominate—even the incumbent.

Thus the Chicago groups (see Saul Alinsky's "Reveille for Radicals") sown in the fertile fields of the slum poor, find that their problems are solved as much, and more significantly, by direct relations with groups in the community as by pressure on the three or four levels of government which affect them. If Congress and Mayor Kelly refuse to subsidize slum clearance, the "People's Organizations" have their own ways of making it clear to an owner that the entire community would like a change, later that it demands a change. It takes little imagination to realize the power of twenty pickets when the pickets are the people's pickets.

These "People's Organizations" are organized on a system of group representation—of church societies, labor union locals, business associations, in fact, all of the interested groups in the community. Representation is according to total membership of the group represented. If there is any vitality in the organization its steering committee, made up of these representatives, soon attracts the natural leaders of the community. It is the political abilities of these men, with their workshop or neighborhood following of ten or two hundred, which the "People's Organizations" exploit. Through these men the people can and do positively articulate their desires. Through such sounding boards democracy becomes meaningful and dear to them. Without using a vehicle such as the People's Organization, the people tend to speak only on a Tuesday in November. And, while they have the blessed privilege of saying "No" to the incumbent, in many significant respects this negative power is no more fruitful than the "Ja" of the Germans under Hitler.

The National Citizens Political Action Committee (NCPAC) though on a larger scale, is another answer to the problem of the political vacuum between the voter and the Congress. In that it tries to embrace the whole of a community, it is similar to the other two. Its insight into organization is basically a mathematical one: that in most Congressional Districts there are a few thousand fence voters who can swing an election into the progressive or popular column; and that a decent presentation of the issues by a strategic force of local people in each of a hundred doubtful Districts can have national repercussions. If NCPAC is wise it will stress institutionalization, i.e., locally, headquarters will become a social club for the politically interested, which, taking a great interest in immediate community problems, will become an important and a respected factor in community life. Obviously it might meet the Chicago groups halfway and join with them.

Actually all three organizations have mushroomed, and in more normal days one of them, or a combination of them, might, in a short space of time, become a permanent part of our democracy. The silent or negative treatment in most of the press is to be expected. NCPAC, with potentially the widest appeal, has a Communist cancer which already threatens to wreck it on the question of the Baruch plan. AVC put down the CP at its Des Moines Convention but still finds many locals in CP hands. While its truly liberal leadership gives it a much better chance to survive, it has thus far failed to drown the Communists by numbers. I think this failure is a direct result of its refusal to stress the only practical means for putting its membership into millions—all out institutionalization—potentially a much easier job for it than for NCPAC.

Its crucial, and niave dilemma is as follows. The typical member wants all veterans to join AVC. He realizes that paying three to seven dollars a year for the privilege of talking politics on odd Thursday nights in a rented hall hasn't a mass appeal. However he feels it somehow indecent to meet his less politically articulate friends halfway by going all out for the necessary chapter home and bar at the first meeting. But these perfectly civilized adjuncts of fellowship and good talk are conditions of the million members goal. And since membership is not representational, in Alinsky's sense, AVC will need a million members before it can swing its potentially tremendous weight in the national arena. Its current membership is approximately 100,000—an elite too small to become respectable in the thousands of communities where it is bound to get less than fair treatment in the local press.

AVC's program and its persuasive leaders have cut into the ranks of the intellectual atomist, the young men who think they must intellect the perfect republic before they can begin to act politically in groups. AVC suggests that young men have a temporal civic duty to get their hands into the dirt of politics and to work—say five hours a month—as effectively as possible—for what their daemon tells them is right. Probably the veterans are more susceptible to such reasonings because they found themselves fighting, knowing that they should fight, but only vaguely knowing why they should. However political lesson number two, that the earthy (?) people with whom they lived and fought are as neccessary to the success of AVC as they were to the Army's—is taking a much longer time to sink in.

In miniature fashion the Annapolis AVC chapter faces the same practical problems and has the same significant possibilities as has AVC nationally.

At another time I should like to inquire into the possible inter-relationships between such people's political pressure groups as AVC and the adult education and world government movements.

—o—

Sports

Nov. 9. The Sophomores held tenaciously to their slim margin to capture the football championship this week, despite two ties with Junior 3 and the Freshmen. It is somewhat regrettable that the margin of victory comes from three wins by forfeit, two of them over teams which the Sophs could not beat in competition; but the fact that they were undefeated against such teams as Junior 3 and the Frosh provides sufficient consolation.

Following is a resume of games played since our last issue:

Junior 3, 2; Junior-Senior 2B, 0. (Forfeit.)

Sophomores, 2; Junior-Senior 1A, 0. (Forfeit.)

Sophomores, 31; Junior-Senior 2B, 0.

The Sophs demonstrated a powerful running and passing attack and scored at will against an underdog Junior-Senior combination paced by Wilson and Dean Neustadt. Morray registered the first touchdown on a pass, followed by three touchdowns registered by Marshall, all on passes. The final tally was made by Harris.

Junior 3, 19; Frosh, 13.

A powerful Freshman aggregation moved into high gear to give the high scoring Juniors a close contest. Whetstone tallied first for the Juniors on a pass from Gallup, but one play after the kickoff, Freshman Frame, following excellent blocking, went over his right tackle to score from midfield. Shortly after, the Juniors took the lead again as Camponeschi carried the ball across. Gallup to Bounds scored again for the Juniors, but the Freshmen tallied again in the closing minutes on a pass from Frame to Short.

Sophomores, 0; Junior 3, 0.

With the championship at stake, the Sophomore and Juniors battled for 60 minutes in a scoreless tie that saw three scoring opportunities missed. The Sophomores drive to the Juniors' 1-yard line early in the game, with first down and goal to go. An attempted buck lost one yard and on the next play Gallup intercepted a pass to end the threat. Both teams missed on long passes which were bobbled in the end zones.

Freshmen, 7; Junior-Senior 1A, 0.

A game but outclassed Junior-Senior combination was handed another defeat by the Freshmen, who scored their lone touchdown on the last play of the first quarter on a pass from Frame to Widder. Another pass from Frame to Dobreer added the conversion. A deceptive reverse play from Frame to Herrod in the second half gained 30 yards for the Frosh but the Junior-Seniors rallied to prevent another score. Later, a series of screen passes brought the Junior-Seniors into scoring territory but the Frosh line tightened and held for four downs.

Sophomores, 13; Freshmen, 13.

In the final game of the season, the Frosh nearly knocked the Sophomores out of the championship by holding them to a 13-13 tie. The Freshmen tallied the first score on a pass from Frame to Thomas. Marshall evened the score by tallying for the Sophs and went over again for the conversion to put them in the lead. Neustadt came back to score for the Frosh on a

pass from Frame, and Jackson converted on another pass. Marshall then came back to tally for the Sophs but the conversion attempt failed.

Final standings:

	W.	L.	T.	Pts.	OP.	Ave.
Sophomores	5	0	3	70	32	.813
Junior 3	5	1	2	120	47	.750
Freshmen	3	3	2	65	55	.500
Junior-Senior 2B	1	5	0	19	78	.167
Junior-Senior 1A	0	5	1	30	92	.083

Still More Spengler

A close reading of Mr. Morgan's cheerful note on my essay leads me to believe that I have not indeed drawn the whole picture of St. John's in a Spenglerian world—hence this footnote to a note.

The Aeneid is very embarrassing to a good Spenglerian—it must also have been a stumbling block to The Master, for I am unable to find a reference to it in the 1035 pages of his magnum opus. The Aereid was written in that late era of the Greco-Roman Culture when no great book could be written; therefore the orthodox Spenglerian can either say it is not a great book, or that it, together with other isolated facts of history which contradict the Theory, are not of sufficient weight, compared with the Theory and the multitudinous facts of history which support it, to tip the scale. If the latter opinion is held, one must admit the possibility of a new Aeneid's being written by a St. Johnny.

In order to answer Mr. Morgan's second point, it is unfortunately necessary to poke around in the murky depths of Spenglerian concept. It is really not fair to jerk it from its Teutonic twilight into the sun—it becomes knobby, amorphous, and truculent, out of its proper environment, like a finny, bloated deep sea beast hauled up to the air by an impious fisherman. But with Mr. Morgan's gun in my ribs.

Each Culture, like each man, has its own character or individuality or (to use Spengler's term) its own Soul. Its Soul is its attitude toward the world. The Soul of each Culture is different from the Soul of every other Culture in essence, or true inwardness, and consequently the Cultures, the manifestations of the Soul, are essentially different. Thus the mathematics, arts, sciences, philosophy, technology, politics, ethics, finances, theology, plumbing, etc., of one Culture, the parts of that Culture, differ in essence from those of another Culture. Furthermore the thought of one Culture is true only for it, and is fundimentally incomprehensible to men of another Culture.

Spengler does, as Mr. Morgan observes, say that a unification of knowledge can, must, and will be accomplished by men of twentieth century West-Europe and America. He means by this (1) that the exact sciences of the Western World, which have the same essence or true inwardness, will be united into one great science, and (2) that correct (that is, Spenglerian) histories of the parts of a Culture will reveal their unity - through - participation - in - the - Culture's - Soul. Neither of these seem to be on the agenda of the St. John's Unionists.

The basic assumption of the St. Johnnies is that the thought of diverse Culture's in a certain field, for example all mathematical thought, is essentially the same, and eternally true. "I grant," one might say, "that the Greek concept of number differs from the European concept, but—I take it European mathematics is built on Greek mathematics, in some way, and so they are the same, in a certain sense." Whether or not they are really the same and eternally true is not, of course, the question here. The question is whether or not knowledge can be unified in the St. John's way in a Spenglerian world. Any Spenglerian worth his salt would see that the St. Johnnies are picking out two or possibly three of the eight or ten Cultures of the world, saying that their thought is the true thought, presumably the only true thought, and (this is really scandalous) that an American can penetrate the thought of a Greek to its core, that the thought of the one is essentially the same as the thought of the other—or in some way the same. That "in some way" is rather tricky, it leaves a lot of loopholes, but it is clear that whatever the way is, it is not the Spenglerian way—and so, Mr. Morgan, beware of excommunication, for you are speaking heresy against the Prophet. These St. Johnnies who aim at the unity of all knowledge are anathema, and he who defends them by saying they are acting in accordance with the laws of the Prophet, is also suspect.

—GENE THORNTON.