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ENERGEIA: The activity in which anything is fully itself.

ή . . . νοῦ ενέργεια ζωή . . . (Aristotle's *Metaphysics,* 1072b)

Energeia is a non-profit, student magazine which is published three times a year and distributed among the students, faculty, alumni, and staff of St. John's College, Annapolis. The *Energeia* staff welcomes submissions from all members of the community—poems, stories, essays, artwork, photographs, original math proofs, and the like.

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Before First Seminar

Beth Cross ('88)

The evening from solid stone
rises so sure of itself
that our footsteps only echoe,
the blue that does not stir
with out passing words.

In the twilight our ideas
fold into themselves,
their impression forms
silent curves in the conversations
held under the twinkling sillhouettes
of locust leaves.

What we cover in our eyes
what is hidden from our gaze,
the night already knows
as if whispered far out at sea
where the tide unbridled
decides its heaving weight
in favor of the shore---
a balance,
returning

We are returning
to each other's talk
to the quiet of well-lighted rooms
where behind straight back chairs
black rectangles of night
hang listening.

We bend
with intent and pending breath
to the voyage.

Penthesilia: —A Love Affair With Achilles— Belonging and Happiness in the World

Catherine Irvine ('87)

My essay is concerned with finding happiness in the world. In The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle tells us, "all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness" (Bk. I, Ch. 3: lines 13-21). He goes on to say that the nature of happiness, however, is not so easily agreed upon. I can only offer a personal thought: happiness is a contentment which is achieved when an individual is in harmony with himself and has gained the things he deems are important for him. I may perhaps be forgiven for the vague character of my definition, since it is not happiness that I want to explore. I would like to show that the ability to be happy depends upon an important relationship: an individual's feeling of belonging in the world.

It is my impression, and I readily admit it stems from personal experience, that in the modern world we lack a sense of place. It is a world in which the laws governing behavior are constantly shifting, and the notions of the 'the good' are always changing. No doubt these things were true in Aristotle's world also, but I think that without a sense of place in the configuration of the whole, it is much more difficult to come to be happy in the world than it has been in the past.

In support of this notion that we lack belonging in the world and that this affects our ability to achieve happiness, I will compare two characters from literary works.[1] The first is Homer's Achilleus. The second is Penthesilea, Queen of the Amazons, from a play of her name. It was written by the early nineteenth century playwright Heinrich von Kleist. The premise I go on is that the nature of an artist's work reflects, in some measure, the consciousness of the people of his time. The time gap between these two works will then allow a comparison of how a classical individual and a modern individual each feels in relation to his world, and, based upon that, a sense of whether or not he can come to be content in the world.

The choice of these two characters from these particular works is not a random one, nor does it rest entirely on the fact that they were produced in such different times. Penthesilea purposefully invites comparison with The Iliad. The most general way in which the two works are connected is in the action of the play: it takes place during the Trojan War, after Achilleus has killed Hektor. Kleist makes use of the myth that the Amazons, led by Penthesilea, went to the battle at Troy as allies of Priam. Kleist also plays upon the story that Achilleus slew Penthesilea and fell in love with her as she died at his feet. But the interesting thing about Penthesilea is that Kleist alters these myths. In the play, the Amazons are allied with no one, and it is not Achilles who kills their Queen, but Penthesilea who kills her beloved, Achilles, in a maenad-like frenzy that calls to mind Euripides's Bacchae. The similarities between the works connect them closely, but it is alterations like these that make it intriguing to try to discover what Kleist intended to convey in the play.

Kleist brings to bear his interpretation of Achilleus in his treatment of his own characters, Penthesilea and Achilles. Penthesilea reflects certain aspects of Achilleus, while Achilles takes on other characteristics of the great hero. Penthesilea displays many of the striking feature of Achilleus. For example, she too

seeks fame, the fame gained through conquering the most renowned figure in The Iliad. She says, "Once more the battle calls me to the field./ That young, defiant war-god - I will tame him./ My friends, ten thousand suns melted into one/ Vast heat-ball seem not half so bright to me,/ So glorious, as victory over him" (Scene 5: p. 186). She is also protrayed as splendid, decked out in "war's rich panoply" (Scene 1: p. 168), and thirsty for the clamour of battle. Odysseus describes his first sight of her in the following way:

> as the dawn comes creeping up the sky
> Amazement seizes us...
> For there in the wide valley at our feet
> Fiercely engaged with all the Trojan force
> We see the Amazons! Penthesilea,
> As storm winds sweep and rend the scudding wrack,
> Tumbles the fleeing Trojans down the vale
> As though her only though across the Hellespont,
> Ay, off earth's orb itself, to scatter them.
> (Scene 1: p. 168)

Penthesilea, like Achilleus, is the child of an immortal and a mortal, Ares and the Amazon Queen Otrere. She also has about her the air of haughtiness that Achilleus possesses.

There is another important respect in which Penthesilea and Achilleus resemble each other. Just as Achilleus must weigh his two fates against one another, Penthesilea must struggle with the way in which she should live her life: as a woman or as a warrior who thrives on the violence of battle. Achilleus, once Patroklos has died, moves in fury towards the end of his life and the glory that will be his. So too does Penthesilea strive after the fall of Achilles, because of the good she thinks this act will bring her.

Achilles resembles his namesake in less striking and less flattering ways. He falls short of the image one has of Achilleus, for the depth of spirit and strength of character that Achilleus displays in The Iliad are transferred from his character into that of Penthesilea. For example, Achilleus's refusal to participate in the fighting following his conflict with Agamemnon is interpreted by Kleist as an insensitivity to the needs and desires of his fellow Greeks. In the play, when Agamemnon orders his forces to stop fighting senselessly with the Amazons, Achilles disregards the orders and instead pursues his own personal goal, which is to capture Penthesilea and have his way with her. He says,

> Fight then like eunuchs, if it pleases you.
> A man I feel myself to these women,
> Though alone of all the host, I'll stand my ground.
> ...All's one to me; by heav'n you have my blessing,
> If you would creep away to Troy again.
> ...In short, go off. I'll follow you to Troy;
> I'll soon have had my way with her. But though
> I had to woo her many long months through -
> Ay, years - I will not guide my chariot there
> ...Nor once again see Ilium's tower'd heights,
> Until I first have had my sport with her.
> (Scene 4: p. 185)

Here Kleist's contempt for the cause of Achilleus's anger, the abduction of Briseis,

is revealed. He makes Achilles involved only in satisfying his own desires, which in this case involve no high goal of honor, but simply the bedding of a woman.

Kleist also protrays Achilles as dishonest and manipulative. In Scene 11, he walks into the Amazon encampment completely unarmed and speaking words of peace. Yet he comes accompanied by men who are armed, and he feels no compunction at ordering them to kill the women who threaten him. This is Kleist's reading of what Achilleus does in Book IX of The Iliad: he presents himself as being moved by things that inspire his desire for a swift return to Phthia, when he is actually moved by pride and bitter anger against Agamemnon.

One thing that Kleist does do, however, is to give the character of Achilles the epithet 'god-like.' No other character in the play is consistently given such an epithet. In line with this, Kleist retains the Homeric image in the clear way he describes Achilles:

> Radiant he stands upon the rising ground,
> Cased all in steel his steed and he; sapphire
> Nor chrysolite cannot throw back such rays!
> The earth herself, the gay, flower-sprinkled earth,
> Wrapped now in thunder vapors' blackest gloom,
> Lies but a dark background, a murky foil,
> To make his flashing glory brighter yet!
> (Scene 7: pp. 198-199; First Girl)

This passage calls to mind the image of Achilleus standing upon the ditch and screaming, helped by Athena who drapes the aegis about his shoulders and sets him all ablaze with fire (Iliad, Bk. XVIII: lines 203-206). Yet it is nothing but a description that has a resemblance to that scene. It lacks the power Achilleus wields in that moment and the sorrow that has engulfed his heart. Kleist's Achilles is incapable of such depth of emotion.

Though both Achilles and Penthesilea share aspects of the Homeric hero, nevertheless it is Penthesilea who captures the attention. It is her on whom I will concentrate with respect to Achilleus. Because my purpose is to examine how a feeling of belonging is crucial to finding contentment in the world, I will first lay out the natures of the worlds in which these two characters live. Then, I will examine whether or not they belong in their worlds. Finally, I will present my analysis of how both characters come to contentment and of whether their contentments are compatible with their worlds. In each case, I will first put forth the Homeric situation and then contrast Penthesilea's situation with it.

The world that Homer puts before us in The Iliad is a sharply defined one. Each thing has its proper place and mode of being, and each is portrayed in a detailed, clearly described manner. The most striking element in this carefully outlined world is the presence of the Olympian gods. They are introduced fully formed, and rather than being unearthly in character they are potent forces, supernaturally and physically. We see their strong presence in the very first pages of The Iliad when Apollo angrily strides down from Olympos to punish the Achaians for their treatment of Chryses (Bk. I: lines 43-52).

The gods are often the inspiration for men's actions. In almost every way that a man can be moved to do something, the gods are found to be the cause. Zeus, for example, is the reason for Hektor's extraordinary valor as he makes his way unhesitatingly toward the Achaian ships in Book XV. This is a case in which the spirit of some emotion or physical attribute is instilled into men by the gods. There are also instances in which the gods introduce notions into the minds of men. In the beginning of the poem, it is mentioned that Achilleus called the Achaians to assembly be-

cause the thought was "a thing put into his mind by the goddess of the white arms, Hera" (Bk. I: line 55). Agamemnon's experience with Zeus's deceptive dream (Bk. II: lines 20-47) is another example of how the gods put ideas and courses of action into the minds of men.

The gods even appear physically and attempt to make mortals do their wishes. In one memorable case, Athena appears to Achilleus and grasps him by the hair in order to stop him from attacking Agamemnon (Bk. I: lines 194-214). In a later passage, the river Skamandros, angered at Achilleus's slaughter of the Trojans, sends his flooding waters out to hold Achilleus occupied with saving himself rather than with killing men (Bk. XXI: lines 235-272).

Given the unavoidable presence of the gods in their lives, the men of The Iliad put great stock in communication with the deities. Achilleus's response to Athena's words of counsel is this:

> 'Goddess, it is necessary that I obey...[you].../angry though I
> am in my heart. So it will be better./If any man obeys the gods,
> they listen to him also.' (Bk. I: lines 215-218)

Achilleus feels the necessity, and the advantage, of dealing with the gods in much the same way as he would with men. It is not simply that the gods are more powerful and capable of bringing disaster down upon men. It is also because the influence of the gods in the lives of men is just as immediate as the influence that men have upon men.

Libation, prayer, and sacrifice are therefore integral parts of the Homeric man's life. He seeks to know the will of the gods by observing natural phenomena, and he seeks to preserve his well-being through prayer and the rendering of proper respect. He knows that, just as men, the gods like to be shown favor. Phoenix's advice to Achilleus, when he warns of the danger of such immovable anger, captures this principle of communication with the gods:

> The very immortals/can be moved; their virtue and honor and
> strength are greater than ours are,/and yet with sacrifices and
> offerings for endearment,/with libations and with savour men turn
> back even the immortals/in supplication. (Bk. IX: lines 497-501)

These words bring to light another aspect of the relationship that men have with the gods: the gods exceed men in all things, yet these things are shared in the natures of both. Indeed, all parts of the Homeric world reflect one another. Natural phenomena reflect the mood of the gods, and men are compared to both the gods, as in 'god-like Achilleus,' and to animals in nature. For example:

> So these lords of the Danaans killed each his own man/...as
> wolves make havoc among lambs or young goats in their
> fury,/catching them out of the flocks. (BK. XVI: lines 351-353)

Yet the connection between man, god, and nature goes further than this. All three are intimately tied together. There is a thread of commonality running through them. Rivers and winds are gods, men are children of the gods, and even the gods and the animals may love and produce offspring (Bk. XX: lines 215-225). Thetis, mother of Achilleus, is a good example of this merging of different beings into one another. She is a goddess, but her realm is not mystical. It is utterly natural: she is of the sea. And though she is a goddess, she was given in marriage to a mortal and bore a son from that union.

Though the world of The Iliad is held together by the meeting and mixing of its parts, nevertheless it is a world of war. This means that it is a world in which all things are opposed to one another. All the parts, while overlapping into one another, remain distinct and struggle to maintain that distinction. Thetis through her association with Peleus does not forfeit her immortal status, and when she bears a son he is not a hybrid of god and man. Achilleus is human and subject to all the laws that other humans are subject to - most significantly, death. Although having a goddess for a mother endows him with privileges (such as knowing what his fate will be), Achilleus belongs to one specific mode of being, and that cannot be changed.

One of the taboos that prohibit the attempt by a being of one kind to place himself among the ranks of another kind is the ban upon a warrior forbidding him to battle with a god. Zeus's comforting words to Aphrodite, when she suffers from an attack by Diomedes, reveal this ban:

> 'It was the godded Athene who drove on this man/against you; poor fool, the heart of Tydeus' son knows nothing/of how that man who fights the immortals lives for no long time.'
> (Bk. V: lines 405-407)

And Achilleus too, despite his fury, stops pursuing Apollo when he discovers he is chasing a god:

> Deeply vexed Achilleus of the swift feet spoke to him:/'you have balked me...most malignant of all gods, /when you turned me here away from the rampart, else many Trojans/would have caught the soil in their teeth...Now you have robbed me of great glory, and rescued these people/lightly, since you have no retribution to fear hereafter./Else I would punish you.'
> (Bk. XXIII: lines 14-20)

Striving to maintain one's proper place reveals itself internally among the separate beings and it takes its form in self-assertion. There is, for instance, a constant struggle between Zeus and the other gods. Zeus finds himself compelled to proclaim his superiority over and over again, since the other gods are always thinking of ways to circumvent his commands. Many of the descriptive passages linking men to animals also illustrate this self-assertiveness. The passages not only show how man and animal come into conflict (like the wolves who attack man's livestock) (Bk. XVI: lines 351-353), but they also depict animals battling one another in an attempt to prove themselves the stronger (Bk. XVI: lines 823-829).

Among men, this self-assertiveness is displayed in vaunting. The warriors meet, hurl threats at one another, and when one falls or flees from fear, the other immediately begins to declare his dominance. Diomedes's fear of Hektor's boasting grasps the importance that this assertiveness has for the men of The Iliad:

> 'this thought comes as a bitter sorrow to my heart and my spirit;/for some day Hektor will say openly before the Trojans:/"The son of Tydeus, running before me, fled to his vessels."/So he will vaunt; and then let the wide earth open beneath me.'
> (Bk. VIII: lines 147-150)

The strong presence that the past has for both gods and men contributes to the significance of autonomy in the Homeric world. The closeness felt to the people and events of the past causes men and gods to be acutely aware of their own being and position in the world. The value that is placed upon genealogies illustrates the

weight which the past carries. When Glaucos and Diomedes face one another in Book VI, they give up any hostile stance as soon as they discover the friendship that had existed between their fathers (Bk. VI: lines 119-231).

Connected to the proximity that the past has to the present is the power of fate in the world. Just as all that has occurred has a strong influence on the way that men and gods behave, so too does fate bring them close to the world in all its forms. It gives all their actions an important and immovable place in the patterns of their lives, and this in turn gives their lives a definite place in the pattern of the whole. Despite the opposition between groups and within them, everything is once again connected by a thread of commonality through fate.

Fate exists externally to all things. It operates from the outside, reaching into the world to tie it up into a whole. No one, not even a god, has the ability to evade it. Zeus has the power to direct the course of events and set the mechanism of fate in motion. He looks far ahead to see what must occur in order that all the elements in the cosmos (actions, emotions, etc.) may come together and bring destiny to fulfillment. He tells Hera,

> 'let Phoibos Apollo stir Hektor back into battle,/breathe strength into him...Let him drive strengthless/panic into the Achaians, and turn them back...Let them be driven in flight and tumble back onto the benched ships/...And [Achilleus] shall rouse up Patroklos/...And glorious Hektor shall cut down Patroklos/...In anger for him brilliant Achilleus shall then kill Hektor.' (Bk. XV: lines 59-68)

Although from passages like this it might seem that Zeus can arbitrarily arrange what is to take place, it must be remembered that behind all the scheming lies the general question of Achilleus's destiny and the manner of its fulfillment. It is not simply the accomplishment of Thetis's request that Zeus grant her son glory, it is also that Achilleus must die if he is granted that glory. If he kills Hektor, then he will die. Even Zeus must work under the dictates of fate. His own wishes are irrelevant. He cannot save Sarpedon from death (Bk. XVI: lines 433-457), and when Hektor finally faces Achilleus, Zeus must check his golden scales if it is truly the right moment for Hektor to die (Bk. XXII: lines 208-212).

The world of The Iliad is hence very ordered. There are certain laws which operate in specific ways, and each object has its own place in the scheme of things. It can be looked at alone, clearly outlined by the things around it, or it can be seen as a distinct unit that goes into the structure of the whole. The world of Penthesilea could not be more different from the Homeric one. The comment that best describes it is uttered by a Greek man whom the Amazons have captured. He asks, "was ever dream so crazed as this reality?" (Scene 6: p. 197).

Penthesilea's world is full of confusion. It consists of a swirling mass of circumstances which do not come together in any coherent whole. There is nothing in the play which can be looked at in its own right without reference to other things, things both in the play as well as those brought to it by the reader. For instance, the memory of The Iliad is present throughout; Euripides's Bacchae, in its most horrifying moment, is reproduced in Achilles's death; Phaedra's consuming passion for Hippolytus is clearly present in Penthesilea; and the myth of Actaeon's death, his punishment for looking upon Artemis while she bathed, is also woven into the tale.

The descriptive passages bring to a focus the confusion which is prevalent in the play. The dust which the armies raise up as they wage war obscures the vision, so that those looking on cannot see what is happening:

> One great dust cloud,

With flashes here and there of arms and armor:
The eye is helpless, strain how it will to see.
A struggling mass of maids - and horses too -
All in a jumbled welter. Chaos' self,
The aboriginal, had more of order.
(Scene 3: p. 180; Dolopian)

The contrast between The Iliad and Penthesilea is pointed out descriptively by Kleist himself. There is a vision of Achilles rising over the top of a hill, clearly visible in every part:

Look! Look! Do you not see? Above that ridge
A head appearing, plumed and helmeted?
And now the neck - the massive neck beneath?
The shoulders now, the arms in flashing steel?
Now! Now! - The mighty, deep-set chest; oh see!
...His horses now, their white-starred foreheads - See!
His chariot's steeds; still but their legs - their hooves
Are hidden by the summit of the ridge.
Ah, now! Clear-cut against the sky behold
The whole equipage, blazing like the sun
That rises jubilant in his early spring.
(Scene 3: p. 177; Myrmidon)

Yet within a very short time, a cloud of dust billows up in pursuit of Achilles:

But, look! Behind him - !
... At the mountain's foot -
Dust -
Dust, uptowering like a thundercloud
And like the lightning sweeping on -
(Scene 3: p. 178)

The world of confusion in Penthesilea is pursuing the clearly delineated figure from the Homeric world.

The first clue in the action of the play pointing to the confusion in this world is provided in the opening scenes. The Greeks and the Trojans have no idea why the Amazons have burst into the midst of their conflict. Each thinks that Penthesilea must have come to fight beside one or the other, but she quickly disabuses them of this idea. The Amazons' are at Troy for their own special reason: to reap a crop of magnificent warriors to take back to Themiscyra as future fathers of their children.

The Amazons' independence in this war between the Trojans and the Greeks spreads confusion. The sensible way in which the war was being waged, Greek against Trojan, is disturbed. The antagonists find themselves allied against the warrior women. Odysseus says in bewilderment,

Each force in Nature, creates its opposite
And fights with this; no room for any third.
What quenches fire will not make water boil
And turn to steam; likewise the opposite.
Yet here appears a deadly foe of both,
That makes fire doubt: should it not flow like water?
And water; should it haply burn like fire?

The hard-press'd Trojan, fleeing the Amazon
Shelters behind a Grecian shield; the Greek
Defends him from the maiden's blade, and both
Trojan and Greek are almost forced, despite
The rape of Helen, to hold each other friends
And join to fight a common enemy.[2]
(Scene 1: p. 170)

Among the Amazons themselves there is much confusion. Penthesilea is thrown into confusion at her first sight of Achilles (Scene 1: p. 169; Ody.), and from that point on her disturbance communicates itself to her army. Bent upon pursuing Achilles, she ceases to pay careful attention to her role as leader of the Amazon host. As a result, none of her people knows exactly what is going on. Penthesilea also ultimately causes the physical disbandment of her army. She orders that no one other than herself may harm Achilles. Hence, when he comes marching into the Amazon camp no one can stop him. Penthesilea refuses to leave, and the army must abandon her and flee leaderless in many directions.

In this world of confusion, nature, so communicative in Homer's Iliad, is hostile. The landscape is hard and cold, full of dust and rock. Indeed, it serves only as a landscape, a place in which human action is staged.[3] Through its lifeless dust it clouds the sight, and with its rocks it hinders human progress, unrelenting in the face of human advances (Scene 2: p. 175-176). We see young Amazon girls eargerly seek for roses in the plain, but the land is not bountiful. It will not serve their need, but keeps itself protected from interaction with them:

'tis harder far to win
Roses upon these fields than prisoners.
Though on the hills around the bounteous harvest
Of Argive youths stand rank on rank and wait
Only for reaping by the eager scythe,
Yet in these vales so sparingly, believe me,
And so well-fortified the roses bloom,
That it is lighter work to hew through lances
Than break a way through their entwined thorns.
(Scene 6: p. 194; Second Girl)

In this world no river god, not even in anger, would raise its voice to speak with a mortal in the way that Skamandros spoke to Achilleus (Iliad, Bk. XXI: lines 211-221).

Just as nature is devoid of communicative life, so too are the gods far away. This is seen in many ways, and it is even said by Prothoe, queen Penthisilea's closest companion: "what thy eyes behold,/It is the world, our transient, brittle world,/On which the gods look down but from afar" (Scene 24: p. 261). When the gods are present, it is in name only. They do not speak, they do not come down from Olympos to aid or to hinder, and they send no omens or dreams. A good example of the distance that the gods have from the lives of men is found in Penthesilea's relationship with her father, Ares. Whereas Achilleus always has close contact with Thetis and hears what his fate will be from her lips, Penthesilea never comes into contact with her father. Though she does hear from him that she is to lead the Amazons against the men at Troy, it is her mortal mother Otrere who tells her this. Another sign of man's alienation from the gods is the presence of a priesthood. Although there are priests in The Iliad like Chryses and interpreters like Kalchas, these do not play as great a role in the lives of men as the gods themselves do. But in Penthesilea, the priestesses of Diana serve as mediators between the goddess and her people. Diana's words and Ares's words come through the mouths of mortals (Scene 7:

p. 199; High Priestess).

It is not, however, quite correct to say that the gods have disappeared altogether. In their external manifestations, the way we know them from The Iliad, they are gone. But they reappear in Penthesilea in different form. They are stirrings within the individual. They belong to the human soul. Penthesilea is the character through which we see them. She often speaks of the powerful presences that are with her, but these presences are companions of her emotions, not the causes of the emotions. In her passionate haste to bind Achilles to her on the battlefield, Penthesilea feels the presence of the furies, and when she believes she has conquered him she feels beneficial deities joining her. She tells Prothoe,

> Let my poor heart
> Like a dirt-dabbled, happy child, sink deep
> One wondrous moment in the stream of joy.
> With every splash in those exultant waves
> A stain is washed from my sad, sinful breast.
> They flee at last, the dread Eumenides;
> I feel the approach of godlike presences
> And I would join my voice to their happy choir.
> (Scene 14: p. 221)

These furies are not of the same kind as those who pursued Orestes, seeking vengeance for his matricide. They are not given external form. They are tools with which Penthesilea describes the nature of her own passions and desires. These 'furies' push Penthesilea in the same way the Eumenides drove Orestes to Apollo's sanctuary, but they push from within. There can be no such statements as "He [Apollo] spoke, and breathed huge strength into the shepherd of the people [Hektor]" (Iliad, Bk. XV: line 262) in Penthesilea, for such stirrings belong entirely to the soul. Penthesilea also says, "Man can be great in grief, ay, even a hero,/But only in happiness is he a god" (Scene 14: p. 222). What she is conveying through these words is that the clear boundaries between man and god that exist in The Iliad are lacking in her world. The gods have moved from Olympos into the human heart, and man himself can, upon achieving happiness, become a god. He is not 'god-like,' he is god, and he can be ruler over all things, not just over other men. Penthesilea, in her one moment of joy commands, "Out then and seek o'er the fields! And if/The niggard spring refuse me roses, breathe,/Breathe on the plain and it will burgeon for me!" (Scene 14: p. 220).

Since the gods no longer are in their own right, there are no ceremonious attempts to be in harmony with them.[4] There are no libations, no hecatombs, and the only time something like a prayer is uttered, it is in a call of desperation - a cry that begs for the aid and presence of the gods in a world that is empty of them: "Thee, Ares, I invoke, thou terrible one!/Thee, awful founder of our house, I call!/Oh! Swiftly send me down thy brazen car" (Scene 20: p. 246; Penthesilea).

In the same way that the gods have lost their own forms and have become[5] part of human heart, fate loses its external power to pull the world together in a grand scheme. It is changed into an extension of the human will. When Penthesilea refuses to flee from Achilles and his henchmen who come to raid the Amazon camp, Prothoe tells her, "Then, as thou wilt!/ If thou canst not, wilt not - good! Dry they eyes./ What thou canst not achieve: the gods forbid/ That I should ask it of thee" (Scene 9: p. 206). And when the High Priestess remarks contemptuously, "Cannot!/ Though nothing holds her, no fate binds her here/ Only her infatuate heart!" (ibid), Prothoe retorts,

> That is her fate!·
> You'd say steel fetters are unbreakable,
> Would you not? I say: she could break them, perchance,
> But never this feeling you treat so lightly.
> What darkly stirs within her, who can say?
> A riddle is every heart's deep-flowing tide.
> (ibid.)

Penthesilea's world lacks the nicely constructed pattern of Achilleus's world. The rules are harder to understand, since both the power of the gods and of fate have been transported into the individual. Penthesilea must bear all responsibility for her thoughts and actions. She cannot say, as Agamemnon can, that her anger comes from Zeus (Iliad, Bk. XIX: lines 76-138). In addition, Penthesilea lacks the security of knowing that her actions are fated to be as they are and that they are leading her toward a definite and unavoidable end. She must also bear the burden of choice: she governs the direction that her life will take. Again, the High Priestess says of her, "Oh, she runs steeply down to the abyss!/ 'Tis not to Achilles she will fall, when he/ Encounters her, but to this inner foe" (Scene 7: p. 200).

The world of Penthesilea is turned upside down. Though the play takes place in the same world that Homer described, nothing is as it was in The Iliad. Order has become confusion. The next question is to see if the relationships that these two characters have with their worlds undergo the same reversal: is Achilleus at home in his world while Penthesilea is not?

The first thing to notice about Achilleus is that he does not doubt his world. He does not question what he sees or hears, and he does not doubt his own judgments about what is around him. For instance, he accepts Athena automatically when she descends to stop him from raising his sword against Agamemnon:

> The goddess standing behind Peleus' son caught him by the fair hair,/ appearing to him only, for no man of the others saw her./ Achilleus in amazement turned about, and straightway/ knew Pallas Athene and the terrible eyes shining. (Bk. I: lines 197-200)

To someone not comfortable in the Homeric world, it seems incredible that Achilleus does not think he is seeing things when he turns to see a mighty goddess at his back. But if we take Homer at his word, then we must say that Achilleus not only sees Athena, but faces her without a qualm. A similar thing occurs when Skamandros speaks in anger to the manslaughtering warrior on his banks (Bk. XXI: lines 211-213). It is no surprise to Achilleus that a river should be holding a conversation with him, nor is he shocked when his horse, Xanthos, given voice by Hera, prophecies his death (Bk. XIX: lines 404-424).

In the same vein, Achilleus is always capable of telling a friend from an enemy. Once he has decided that Agamemnon is against him, he never wavers in his distrust and dislike for the lord of the Achaians. Even when Achilleus 'unsays' his anger, he indicates that he must force himself to do so, to push away from his mind the anger "'sweeter...by far than the dripping of honey'" (Bk. XVIII: line 110).

> 'We will let all this be a thing of the past, though it hurts us,/and beat down by constraint the anger that rises inside us.'
> (Bk. XIX: lines 65-66)

Achilleus judges friend from enemy on the basis of behavior. If he finds that their sympathies are not truly with him, then he will put no trust in men. For instance, when Agamemnon sends Phoenix, Aias, and Odysseus to Achilleus to try to lure

him back into the fighting with gifts, Achilleus responds with aloofness. This indicates that he feels, and rightly so, that the embassy is working towards Agamemnon's benefit rather than his own. Achilleus does not believe that the embassy comes to him because Agamemnon has truly acknowledged his value. He knows Agamemnon sent them from fear. His response to Odysseus in particular revels his skepticism:

> 'Son of Laerties and seed of Zeus, resourceful Odysseus:/without consideration for you I must make my answer,/the way I think, and the way it will be accomplished,that you may not/come one after another, and sit by me, and speak softly./ For as I detest the doorways of Death, I detest that man, who/hides one thing in the depths of his heart, and speaks forth another.'
> (Bk. IX: lines 308-313)

Achilleus also has conviction in his fate. This is shown in the way he takes action based upon what he knows, from Thetis, of his fate. For example, Achilleus's decision to kill Hektor following the death of Patroklos, though it certainly stems from grief and a desire for revenge, is also influenced by his knowledge that after Hektor dies he too is doomed to die. It may sound odd for a man to wish for his own end, but Achilleus knows that if he dies young he will achieve everlasting glory - and he wants this glory more than anything else. Thus, Achilleus intends not only to kill Hektor, but to do so in as spectacular a way as possible:

> 'Now I shall go, to overtake that killer of a dear life,/ Hektor; then I will accept my own death...Now I must win excellent glory.' (Bk. XVIII: lines 114-121)

Although Achilleus does have moments in which he doubts that his fate will come about exactly as his mother has promised, the most striking of which occurs when he is trapped by the swirling waters of Skamandros (Bk. XXI: lines 273-278), he generally is sure that his fate will take place as his mother has foretold. He takes her words seriously. This is shown when he sends Patroklos out to drive the Trojans from the Achaian ships. Achilleus later reveals that he suspected, or perhaps even knew without a doubt, that Patroklos would die:

> 'May the gods not accomplish vile sorrows upon the heart in me/in the way my mother once made it clear to me, when she told me/how while I yet lived the bravest of all the Myrmidons/must leave the light of the sun beneath the hands of the Trojans./Surely, the, the strong son of Menoitios has perished.'
> (Bk. XVIII: lines 8-12)

This passage explains why Achilleus so urgently warns Patroklos to return once he had driven the Trojans from the ships. Achilleus knew in his heart that he was sending Patroklos to his death, but because he wanted the accomplishment of his fate, for which he knew Hektor must die, he sent Patroklos out while warning him strongly:

> 'You must not, in the pride and fury of fighting, go on/slaughtering the Trojans, and lead the way against Ilion,/for fear some one of the everlasting gods on Olympos/might crush you.
> (Bk. XVI: lines 91-94)

His next statement truly indicates that Achilleus knows much more about what will happen than he lets on. Though he has, "deeply troubled," told Patroklos, "'I have

no prophecy in mind that I know of'" (Bk. XVI: line 50), he now tells him, "'Apollo who works from afar loves these people/dearly. You must turn back once you bring the light of salvation/to the ships'" (Bk. XVI: lines 94-96). And indeed it <u>is</u> Apollo who brings about Patroklos's destruction (Bk. XVI: lines 786-792).

The serious way in which Achilleus treats his fate suggests that he has an understanding of how his world works, and this in turn indicates that he is at home in his world. The shield which Hephaistos fashioned for him is a tribute to Achilleus's belonging in the world. Though we do not see him experience all the different facets of life on the shield, he is the one who carries it, and he is the only one who can look upon it:

> The goddess...set down the armour on the ground/before Achilleus, and all its elaboration clashed loudly./Trembling took hold of all the Myrmidons. None had the courage/to look straight at it. They were afraid of it. Only Achilleus/looked.
> (Bk. XIX: lines 12-16)

Achilleus belongs in his world. Penthesilea, however, is displaced in the already twisted character of her world. There are individuals in the play, like Prothoe, who do belong in that world. That means that it is possible to be comfortable in that world, though it is not the case with Penthesilea.

The Amazon way of life and character in itself isolates and displaces Penthesilea from the world at large. The Amazons live in a secluded community, in the company only of women. When they do leave the confines of the community, it is only to go on raids to win men from whom they can continue their race (Scene 15: p. 232-233; Penthesilea). Strict rules maintain that they can only gain these men as lovers by conquering them in battle. Penthesilea tells Achilles,

> Son of the dread sea-goddess! Not for me
> The common arts of gentler womanhood!
> ...I may not, as do your maids, chose my love
> And draw him to me with shy downward eyes
> Or with bright wanton nosegay
> ...I may not in the dark-leaved orange grove,
> ...Sink on his breast and tell him it is he.
> No, on the bloody field of war must I go seek him,
> That youth my heart has chosen for its own,
> And clip him to me with harsh arms of brass.
> (Scene 15: p. 228)

The Amazon tradition of only coming into contact with men through war, and their custom of searing off one breast to facilitate use of the bow, set them apart from the usual mode of being for women. The Amazons inhibit the female inclination to love and be loved by men, and they only allow for it in the warped context of agression and dominance. Achilles asks Penthesilea, "But whence can spring, how ancient is that law,/Unwomanly, forgive me, nay, unnatural,/A custom strange to all the tribes of men?" (Scene 15: p. 228).

Yet even more unnatural than this style of life and approach to the female constitution is the Amazon ability to mix together both the feelings involved in aggressive conflict, feelings of hate, with feelings of love and affection. Once the maiden warriors have gained their prize, they let their warlike feelings fade away, and they cultivate feelings of love from which they can unite with their prisoners to produce offspring. There is a passage in which this odd reversibility of the Amazon character is protrayed: a group of Amazons tries to approach their Greek prisoners

with love. But the prisoners, just recently confronted with these women in battle, cannot comprehend this friendly behavior. To make the situation even more bizarre, the Amazons cannot understand why their prisoners do not realize that they intend them no harm, but would like to treat them like kings in the lap of luxury. One Amazon asks, "Strange-mooded men! What gnaws thus at your hearts?/ Now that our arrows sleep within the quiver,/ How can the sight of us affright you still?" (Scene 6: p. 196).

Penthesilea is therefore not in harmony with the world because of this Amazon duality: the ability to one moment feel the hate necessary to wage war and the next moment to feel love. It is as Odysseus remarked: "Should [water] haply burn like fire?" (Scene 1: p. 170). The Amazons not only completely alter their perceptions and emotions, but they do so towards the same individuals.[6] But Penthesilea is displaced in this already odd situation. For the Amazons, these feelings of love or hate should only accompany the suitable circumstance of war or victory and peace. Penthesilea cannot keep these feelings apart. She wants to conquer Achilles in battle, and the same time she has chosen[7] him out specifically because she is infatuated with him and wants to become his lover.

When Penthesilea looks upon Achilles, she is beset by both her emotions of love and hate:

> I long to see him grov'lling at my feet,
> This haughty man, who in this glorious
> And gentle field of arms, as no man yet,
> Sows strange confusion in my warlike heart.
> ...Do I not feel - ah! Too accursed I -
> While all around the Argive army flees,
> When I look on this man, on him alone,
> That I am smitten, lamed in my inmost being,
> Conquered and overcome - I! Only I!
> (Scene 5: p. 186-187)

The High Priestess points out how strange a thing it is to have among the Amazons a woman, especially a Queen, so overcome with love:

> The Queen, you say? Impossible my friend!
> Pierced by love's shaft? How can that be?...
> She who doth wear the girdle of diamonds?
> The daughter of Mars, who lacks even the breast
> Where Cupid's poison'd shafts may strike and lodge?
> (Scene 7: p. 200)

Because Penthesilea cannot untangle her aggressive feelings from her softer, yielding ones, she finds it impossible to see anything in a unified way. Unlike Achilleus who puts much trust in what he sees other men do, Penthesilea cannot judge others. Her own thoughts and emotions make it hard for her to see what people are actually doing. For example, she has both admiration and affection for her Amazon people, yet she swiftly turns against them in anger:

> Curses upon this beastly, wanton haste!
> ...A curse on lusts that in my Amazons'
> Chaste hearts like unleashed dogs do howl and quite
> O'erwhelm the trumpet's brazen-throated voice
> And all the leaders' cries of shrill command.
> Victory - is that yet won, that you should thus

> In fiendish mockery pluck triumphal garlands?
> (Scene 9: p. 204)

Penthesilea herself has given the order for the plucking of the roses, and she herself is the one who longs for love while the battle still rages on. But in her distracted state she is not aware of these things, and she sees those who are merely carrying out her orders as ridiculing her and as trying to take away her last chance of winning Achilles in battle. This is anger against herself, but the anger is so potent that it infects her ability to see objectively. Therefore, she strikes out at friends as though they were enemies.

Penthesilea's displacement both in the world and in the Amazon environment does not just show itself in her projected anger or in her conflicting emotions. She is in real doubt about her world and herself in that world. Compared to Achilleus who is sure of himself, Penthesilea is a lost individual. She questions what the rules are that govern her behavior. She wonders if it is right to try to win her beloved through battle:

> Is mine the fault that I must woo him thus,
> Here on the field of war must force his love?
> What is it I long for, when I strike at him?
> Is it to send him headlong to the shades?
> I long - ye gods above! I only long -
> To this warm beast I long to draw him close!
> (Scene 9: p. 203)

And she wonders if it is not, rather, right to give way to her womanly feelings and yield herself to Achilles as any other woman would. Her questioning of Amazon law reveals itself in her discussion with Achilles:

> like the fiery hurricano's blast,
> We sweep into the forest of the menfolk,
> Snatch up the ripest of the fallen fruit -
> ...And bear them with us to our native plains.
> ...Here we conduct them in Diana's temple
> Through many a solemn rite...
> ...The seed is sown, and when the crop is up,
> We heap on them full measure of glorious gifts;
> On steeds richly caparisoned we send
> Them home. The Feast of Fruitful Mothers this,
> In sooth a festival of little joy.
> Ah, son of Thetis! Many a tear is shed,
> And many a heart, fast gripped by dreary grief,
> Must ask itself: is Tanais The Great[8]
> For every binding word so praiseworthy?
> (Scene 15: p. 233)

Penthesilea does not just question, however. She actually loses all ability to recognize things for what they are. When she sees herself reflected in Achilles's armour, she is not sure who she sees (Scene 5: p. 186-187). And though she is very dependent on Prothoe, at one time she believes Prothoe to be working for her cause, while at another time she thinks her friend wants only to thwart her (Scene 5: p. 189-193). This is because Penthesilea is never positive about what her cause is: is it the well-being of her host, or is it her own satisfaction?

Am I selfish? Is it my desires
Alone that call me back into the field?
Is it not my people, threatened by the fate
That even in the maniac flush of victory
With audible wingbeat hastens from afar?
...These captive youths that you have taken in fight.
You'll never lead them to the fragrant vales
Of our homeland...
...Lurking in ambush, crafty, insatiate,
I see him everywhere - Achilles, ready to spring
Upon your happy train and scatter it.
(Scene 5: p. 188)

Even when Achilles is before her Penthesilea wonders if he is really the man she has heard so much about:

Achilles!
That man that slew old Priam's greatest son
Before the walls of Troy - Say! Was it thou?
And didst thou truly, thou, with these thy hands
Pierce his fleet ankles, then behind thy car
Drag him headlong around his native city?
(Scene 15: p. 225)

At times, so bewildered and immersed in her powerful emotions is Penthesilia that she does not know where she is.[9] In her joy at discovering that Achilles is her prisoner, though this is a deception,[10] she is so elated that she thinks herself in Themiscyra (Scene 14: p. 221), and when she wakes from her final madness she thinks she is in Elysium (Scene 24: p. 261).

Finally, Penthesilea herself embodies that strange Amazon duality of love and hate. She feels in extremes: joy, bitter sorrow, anger, or all three synthesized into one blinding emotion. In her physical appearance, too, she brings together the conflicting elements of the duality. She is very beautiful, and her eyes have enough allure to draw any man to her.[10] She is soft and delicate, the epitome of a yielding woman. Yet her beauty is encased in war gear, and she seems indestructible. Antilochus says of her, "A foaming-jawed hyena! 'Tis no woman!" (Scene 2: p. 176).

In embodying this duality, Penthesilea is not at home in the world. She is made up of teeming opposites. Though Achilleus also has conflicting elements within him, he belongs in his world and because of this is able to bring those conflicting parts together - to achieve a resolution. Penthesilea, who has no firm ground to stand upon, cannot find resolution in the world. She does attain a kind of harmony with herself, but when she does so she must do it in madness, and when it is over she cannot remain in the world. Achilleus, on the other hand, comes to a resolution which endows him with a fulness of character that is truly great in the world.

I will now examine how each of these characters comes to a resolution, and what those resolutions mean.

Achilleus belongs in the world, but he is dissatisfied with the way it treats him. His criticisms of Agamemnon suggest certain things about the way Achilleus thinks about himself. He becomes angry at Agamemnon's behavior over Chryseis, and he accuses Agamemnon of being, in effect, childish in his attachment to his prize (Book I: lines 122-129). This suggests that Achilleus is sensitive to an ignoble side of Agamemnon's character. The Achaian men are dying because of Apollo's anger, and Agamemnon will not give up the girl to rectify the situation. Achilleus is astounded that such a man would be considered a kingly leader:

'O wrapped in shamelessness, with your mind forever on profit,/how shall any one of the Achaians readily obey you/either to go on a journey or to fight men strongly in battle?'
(Book I: lines 149-151)

Achilleus, with his genuine desire to halt the crisis and find a way to placate all concerned, thinks himself a better man than Agamemnon.

The accusations that follow, however, point to an envy that Achilleus has long harbored for Agamemnon:

"Never, when the Achaians sack some well-founded citadel/of the Trojans, do I have a prize that is equal to your prize./ Always the greater part of the fighting is the work of/my hands; but when the time comes to distribute the booty/yours is far the greater reward.' (Book I: lines 163-167)

At this moment it is evident that Achilleus is resentful because he is not given the kind of recognition he thinks he deserves. He knows himself to be the 'best of the Achaians,' and he cannot endure the thought that another man, whom he considers both less noble and less warlike, should receive more honor simply because he is lord over many men.

Taking into consideration Achilleus's knowledge of his two fates, it is possible to reconstruct the way he must have felt about the enterprise at Troy, in order that this disappointment over Agamemnon be so bitter for him. Knowing that in Troy he faced death, but also everlating glory, Achilleus must have envisioned a splendid career in the Argive host. But though he is recognized as the mightiest warrior among them, Achilleus is never treated as well as Agaemenon is . He finds himself continually dominated by Agamemnon. He is disillusioned. When Agamemnon threatens to take Briseis, Achilleus can no longer control his envy. This the ultimate dishonoring, and he is furious because instead of being honored as he had dreamt of being, he has been humiliated. He says,

'the heart in me swells up in anger, when I remember/the disgrace that he wrought upon me before the Argives,/the son of Atreus, as if I were some dishonored vagabond.' (Bk. IX: lines 646-648)

Through the course of the story, however, a change takes place in Achilleus. At the start, he is acutely aware that his desires are not being satisfied. But from the moment that the entreats Thetis to plead with Zeus on his behalf (Bk. I: lines 393-412), he sets in motion a chain of events that not only results in the fulfillment of his desires, but also causes a growth in his understanding of himself in the world.

The death of Patroklos is the pivotal point in this process. Hence, an examination of Achilleus's attitudes towards himself and towards what will make him happy, both before and after the death of his companion, will afford a view of what this change in Achilleus entails. In Book IX, Achilleus is a young man with a dream of glory. He is drawn to the warrior's life and the fame that accompanies excellent deeds, but he does not have any notion of what that dream will be when it is translated into reality. Achilleus concentrates on the glory which is foretold, and he does not give much thought to the death that is involved.

On one hand this is odd, since as a warrior Achilleus has been faced with death many times, and he is at home on the bloody battlefield. On the other hand, Achilleus sends Patroklos out into the fighting even though he knows that his friend will die. Achilleus does this for the sake of his fate. He knows that he is sac-

rificing Patroklos. Yet, despite prior knowledge of the event, Achilleus experiences real agony over his friend's death:

> the black cloud of sorrow closed on Achilleus./ In both hands he caught up the grimy dust, and poured it/ over his head and face, and fouled his handsome contenance,/ and the black ashes were scattered over his immortal tunic./ And he himself, mightily in his might, in the dust lay/ at length, and took and tore at his hair with his hands, and defiled it. (Bk. XVIII: lines 22-27)

Thus, though Achilleus knew he was to suffer a great loss, he was thinking more towards what that death would accomplish than towards the death itself.

Neither does Achilleus feel the force of fate, its completeness and its finality. He accepts fate as a given in his life, but he does not comprehend the range over which it operates, that it brings together many events and emotions in order to come to its accomplishment. he concentrates so much on the end result that he pays no attention to what must happen and what he must experience in order for that end of glory to be gained.

Achilleus's withdrawal into the fate which promised a long but obscure life illustrates that he is not truly in touch with what life is. Because of his disappointment with the way the Achaians have treated him, he persuades himself that he wants the long life undisturbed by the turmoil of war. it is clear, however, that Achilleus has no inclination toward that life: he is an aggressive man who craves the opportunity to prove himself the bravest and the strongest of all men. He is not a man who would be happy in the confined and unchallenging world of Phthia.

In Book IX, when Achilleus puts forward his reasons for wanting to return to the land of his fathers, he is speaking out of frustration. He is striking out at the Achaians because he feels hurt by them. It is a real moment for Achilleus, but he does not believe what he is saying. He explains:

> 'For not worth the value of my life are all the possessions they fable/ were won for Ilion... Of possessions/cattle and fat sheep are things to be had for the lifting,/ and tripods can be won...but a man's life cannot come back again, it cannot be lifted/ nor captured again by force, once it has crossed the teeth's barrier.' (Bk. IX: lines 400-409)

This is a profound statement, but Achilleus does not know what it means. he has already revealed the real reason for his threat to return the Phthia: his anger at Agamemnon.

> 'Go back and proclaim to him all that I tell you,/ openly, so other Achaians may turn against him in anger/...I will join with him in no counsel, and in no action./ He cheated me and he did me hurt...Let him of his own will/ be damned...I hate his gifts. I hold him light as the strip of a splinter./ Not if he gave me ten times as much...not if he gave me gifts as many as the sand or the dust is,/ not even so would Agamemnon have his way with my spirit/until he had made good to me all this heartrending insolence.' (Bk. IX: lines 369-387)

There is only one way in which these words about the value of his life come from any genuine motivation. It is true that his anger does not stem from the stingy way Agamemnon has treated him. Achilleus will not now accept all the magnificence

Agamemnon offers him because he cares no longer for gifts. He wants complete and utter recognition of his superiority. He will accept nothing less than Agamemnon's subordination beneath him.

Achilleus hungers for transcendence over others, and his eyes look only toward the brightness of his fate. This is why his threat to leave for Phthia is nothing more than a threat. He intends to stay at Troy and be present for the unfolding of his destiny:

> 'I shall not think again of the bloody fighting/ until such a time as the son of wise Priam, Hektor the brilliant/ comes all the way to the ships... slaughtering the Argives, and shall darken with fire our vessels.' (Bk. IX: lines 650-653)

Achilleus's lack of understanding of the force his fate will have upon him indicates that he is not quite in touch with himself. He has a splendid vision of what he wants to be, but he has not yet found out who he is. He has not come into his own.

Following the death of Patroklos, however, Achilleus is forced to confront the world that exists outside of his dreams. He tells Thetis,

> 'My mother, all these things the Olympian brought to accomplishment./ But what pleasure is this to me, since my dear companion has perished,/ Patroklos, whom I loved beyond all other companions,/ as well as my own life. I have lost him.' (Bk. XVIII: lines 79-82)

Now, instead of being like the king on the shield Hephaistos wrought for him, who contentedly watches the reapers bringing in his crop (Bk. XVIII: lines 550-560), Achilleus suddenly finds himself deeply involved in the work itself. All this time, from his ships, Achilleus has watched the events paving the way towards accomplishment of his fate, and now his fate has reached out and pulled him into the midst of it. The shining goal of glory seems as nothing compared to the sorrow and the desire for vengeance.

Achilleus is also forced to confront himself, not in the terms he had done so before, thinking only of his own hurt and what he wanted from those who had hurt him, but in terms of how he affected other:

> 'I must die soon, then; since I was not to stand by my companion/ when he was killed. And now, far away from the land of his fathers,/ he has perished, and lacked my fighting strength to defend him./ Now...since I was no light of safety to Patroklos, nor to my other/companions, who in their numbers went down before glorious Hektor,/but sit here beside my ships, a useless weight on the good land,/ I, who am such as no other...in battle...why, I wish strife would vanish away from among gods and mortals,/ and gall, which makes a man grow angry for all his great mind,/ that gall of anger that swarms like smoke inside of a man's heart/ and becomes and thing sweeter to him by far than the dripping of honey.' (Bk. XVIII: lines 98-110)

Though there still lurks, in the background, the memory of an Achilleus who works steadily towards the gain of glory - that same Achilleus who knew Patroklos would die - here there is an Achilleus who recognized he lived for more reasons than the achievement of glory. He realizes that there are things dearer to him than he

had thought. He reassesses his judgments about what it means to live. As he confronts himself, he must also contemplate what his own death will mean. He had said that no possessions could equal the value of his life. With Patroklos's death, Achilleus sees that there is one possession for which he would gladly sacrifice his life: the companionship of a beloved friend. With this recognition, Achilleus feels the completeness of fate. He sees that it is not a dream far removed from the immediate experience of living. He knows now that it touches him in every way, and that it takes away from him things that he values.

The ruthlessness with which he pursues Hektor is not, then, simply inspired by desire for vengeance. It is also inspired by a need to clear himself of his guilt in Patroklos's death. He loathes himself - even to the point of guaranteeing his own death. He tells his mother,

> 'there must be on your heart a numberless sorrow/ for your son's death...since the spirit within does not drive me/ to go on living and be among men, except on condition/ that Hektor first be beaten down under my spear.' (Bk. XVIII: lines 88-92)

Achilleus refuses even to eat or drink until he has both atoned for and avenged his companion's death (Bk. XIX: lines 319-321).

When it is all over, and Achilleus has taken the life from Hektor and may turn to the burial of Patroklos, we see a different man emerge. He resembles neither the fiery youth of the first sixteen books, nor the man consumed by murderous rage. Achilleus still suffers moments during which his rage controls him and he drags Hektor's body furiously around Patroklos's tomb. But these moments do not deny him his new character; rather, they show that he is not yet secure in it.

During the funeral games, Achilleus acts with the same kind of grace and courtesy he gave a hint of when he received Agamemnon's embassy in Book IX (lines 185-198). Here, however, there is more substance to his behavior. Achilleus is not merely pleasing his heart with music, dreaming of mighty warriors and deeds of fame. He is taking part in the interaction between such men. He carefully treats with the feelings of each one, and having learnt of the dangers of quarrelling, he says during a dispute, "'No longer now, Aias and Idomenus, continue/ to exchange this bitter and evil talk./ It is not becoming'" (Bk. XXIII: lines 492-493).

The consideration and civility that Achilleus exhibit during the games extend to the time when Priam comes alone to him in supplication. Achilleus is following the commands of Zeus, yet he treats Priam with genuine sympathy and respect. He takes him in, and together they mourn their losses. Achilleus is honestly moved by this man who has wielded so much power, but who has suffered such devastation in the war with the Achaians. he sees Priam as a fellow human being who has been granted by the gods both joy and misery and who is worthy of admiration (Bk. XXIV: lines 542-551).

Even when Achilleus responds warningly to Priam's request to see Hektor's body, he does not indicate that his sympathy was simply an act. He warns Priam because the freshness of his grief is still with him, and he does not want his rage to come to the fore.

> 'You must not further make my spirit move in my sorrows,/ for fear, old sir, I might not let you alone... suppliant as you are, and be guilty before the god's orders.'
> (Bk. XXIV: lines 568-570)

Achilleus does not want to disobey Zeus, and this is strong reason for his restraint. Yet, he could have complied with the gods without showing the consideration and reverence that he does show Priam.

By the end of the poem, Achilleus has come into his own. Despite the rage that still smolders beneath the calm exterior, Achilles has discovered who he is in the world. The dream has been translated into reality: he has all he wished for. Achilleus has achieved great fame, and he has achieved dominance over Agamemnon. Throughout the funeral games, Agamemnon defers to Achilleus's wishes, and Achilleus says to Priam, "'(The Achaians) keep coming/ and sitting by me and making plans, as they are supposed to'" (Bk. XXIV: lines 651-652).

Achilleus acknowledges that consideration for others is important. He is like Aristotle's 'proud man' (Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. IV: Ch. 3) who is secure in himself and magnanimously recognizes the value and worth of others. Now Achilleus extends to Agamemnon the respect he deserves as lord of the Achaians because Achilleus is no longer threatened by Agamemnon. The sense that one has at the end of The Iliad is also that Achilleus is far more aware of the value of his companions Automedon and Alkimos than he was of the value of Patroklos. They serve him, but he does not take them for granted.

Achilleus, because he has a place in his world, is able to come to contentment in that world. penthesilea has a very different path to her resolution. it is full of tension, and the only way for it to be resolved is through madness. Certain passages in the play indicate that Penthesilea, unlike Achilleus, is not inclined to the warlike way of life. While he causes himself sorrow by abstaining from the war, Penthesilea suffers because she is in a state of war that she does not want to be in.

While in Themiscyra, though Penthesilea was undoubtedly given military training, she was kept from engaging in real war with real opponents. She tells Achilles that until she was twenty-three, she had not gone to war with the Amazons (Scene 15: p. 234).[11] She also tells him that she was so overcome with grief at her mother's death that she could not find any interest in taking her own place in life:

> Long, long I wept, a whole grief-laden month,
> At my dead mother's grave, neglecting still
> The crown that lay beside me masterless,
> Until at length the oft-repeated cry
> Of the people, who, eager for joyful war,
> Impatient, lay encamped around my palace,
> Dragged me by force to mount the throne.
> (Scene 15: pp. 235-236)

This suggests that Penthesilea was more inclined to her life at home, in the protection of her mother's power, than she was to going out and proving herself among the Amazon people she is destined to rule.

In addition, Pentesilea is remembered as being a girl rull of compassion and grace:

> Oh, such a virgin, Hermia! So modest!
> So deft in all the arts of women's hands!
> So lovely when she danced or when she sang!
> So full of wisdom, dignity, and grace!
> ...The mottled worm that sported in the dust
> Before her delicate feet, she would not crush;
> She would recall the shaft ere it could pierce
> The savage wild boar's shoulder, and his eye,
> Glazing in death, could drag her to her knees
> Before him, melted quite in soft remorse.
> (Scene 23: pp. 254-255; First Priestess)

Penthesilea does not fit into her Amazon environment. She is dependent on her mother, and gains from her a false sense of belonging in the Amazon community. Her strange nature among these women who clamour for battle can be seen when her situation is compared with the feelings of a young amazon girl who appears in the play:

> Another time when all the Amazon host
> Marches to war with cymbals and with drums,
> We will go too, and not - oh promise us! -
> Only to grace the mother's victory
> With rose-plucking and winding toilsome wreaths!
> My arm here - look! - can hurl the javelin,
> And from my sling the stone flies swift and true.
> Why not? Why not? I am no more a child.
> (Scene 6: p. 195; First Girl)

Penthesilea is reluctant to go to war, just as she is reluctant to kill any living thing. She does not care for the dominance that her position as Queen would give her. She is also, perhaps, frightened of assuming the throne, since she feels alone and vulnerable in a community which thrives on self-assertion. When the priestesses come to tell her that Ares has called her to war, Penthesilea begs, "Oh, let me stay beside thee, Mother!/ Use it once more, thy royal dignity,/ - For the last time - and bid these women go" (Scene 15: p. 235). She wants to stay beside her dying mother because she cares for her, but she is also afraid to leave her nest of security.

As the host travels to Troy, Penthesilea begins to be filled with warlike feelings. These are not, however, natural to her. She describes them as though they were a new experience, and exhilirating for that reason. Her feelings are fueled by two things, neither of which stem from her own nature: her desire to fulfill her mother's last wish (Scene 15: p. 235; Penth.) and her hope that in overcoming Achilles she will achieve a sense of belonging in the Amazon community. She says,

> Nearer I drew to old Scamander's stream,
> And every vale around through which I swept
> Echoed the clash of battle before Troy,
> So did my grief abate, and my wide soul
> Drank in the universe of joyful war.
> To myself I said: if they should all together,
> The mighty moments of the daedal past,
> Return for me, if all the company
> Of heroes whom the songs of minstrels sing,
> Should step down from the stars, I should not find
> Not one more excellent to crown with roses,
> Than that man whom my mother chose for me -
> So dear, so wild, so sweet, so terrible -
> The slayer of Hektor!
> (Scene 15: p. 236)

The importance that conquering Achilles has in Penthesilea's mind is seen in Scenes 14 and 15 when she believes she has won him. Up until this point, Penthesilea has been wracked by indecision and frustration, but here she falls easily into the role of Queen. She begins to think of preparations for the hosts' return to Themiscyra, and she has an air of confidence about her (Scene 15: p. 227)

The surety and joy Penthesilea gains from the belief that Achilles has been taken by her illustrates Penthesilea's notion of who she should be in the world. her ideal is an Amazon one: to be completely detached from any submissive, loving, feelings and to be physically capable of subjecting any man to her will. In taking Achilles, she will have proved to herself, and to her people that she is truly Amazon and that she deserves her Queenship.[12] Her happiness is thus dependent on her winning of Achilles. She explains to Prothoe the unhappiness she has suffered prior to this supposed capture of Achilles:

> They say misfortune purifies the soul,
> But I...have never found it so.
> Bitterness still, rage against gods and men,
> Unseeing passion are its fruits in me.
> With strange perversity I then have hated
> On others' faces every mark of joy;
> The blithe child playing in its mother's lap
> Seemed but conspired to mock my sullen grief.
> (Scene 14: p. 221)

She was a woman who felt her displacement among her people and who did not have the means to fulfill her natural inclination to be loved. The capture of Achilles would then have given her both the love she craved and her place among the Amazons.

While she experiences those warlike feelings on the way to Troy, however, Penthesilea incorporates her own nature into them. She builds up so great an image of Achilles that she becomes intoxicated with him. He fills all her thoughts:

> O thou son of Peleus!
> Ever my single thought when I awoke;
> Ever my dream in sleep wast thou! The world
> Lay stretched before me like a patterned web,
> And in each glorious, wide-gaping mesh
> One of thy deeds with craftsman's skill enwoven;
> Upon my heart, as on silk white and fine,
> I burned each deed with colours steeped in flame.
> (Scene 15: pp. 236-237; Penth.)

As a result, when she sees Achilles, she falls passionately in love with him (Scene 15: p. 237; Penth). Her problem of trying to make a place for herself among the Amazons is hence made even more difficult - and the solution even more important - because while she tries to establish herself, her own inclinations towards love pull her in the opposite direction: towards succumbing to Achilles. Such an act would, of course, automatically dishonor her in the eyes of her people.

At the opening of the play, Penthesilea is in this state of tension. Achilles stands before her as the shining key which will give her both happiness and belonging in the world. The path she takes is one of frantically trying to capture Achilles on the battlefield. His capture will make her what she wants to be. In this respect - of having a bright goal to strive for - Penthesilea is like Achilleus. But whereas he looked for his own ability and splendor to be recognized by the world, Penthesilea looks for this through another: through Achilles, as though his brilliance might be incorporated into her.

Penthesilea tries in every way to reach her goal, but she is hindered by several things. Nature itself seems to put itself up as a barrier between Achilles and herself. At one point, she is near enough to reach out and grasp him, but he swerves and she falls as her horse stumbles on a rock.[13] By the time she recovers, Achilles is far beyond her (Scene 3: pp. 178-179). Penthesilea's feelings of love also hinder

her from striking at Achilles in battle. At crucial moments she stays her hand and Achilles goes unscathed (Scene I: pp. 171-172). Finally, as Achilles again and again eludes her, Penthesilea begins to feel desperate. She is overcome by doubts that she can gain him at all. She also worries that in her headstrong pursuit of Achilles she is endangering her host. This worry in itself undermines her ability to be the leader she yearns to be.

It is in Scene 9 that Penthesilea comes to terms with the futility of what she is trying to do: work against her own nature. She has pushed herself to make one last attempt to conquer Achilles, and she herself has fallen in the confrontation. She feels then how much she does not want to meet Achilles in the context war. She is stunned that he could treat her with such aggression:

> So crush and bruise this breast! - How could he do it?
> Oh Prothoe! It is as wanton-cruel
> As though I were to rive the innocent lyre
> That hangs in the night breeze, whispering my name.
> At the bear's feet I would cower, nestling close,
> Would stroke and fondle the blotch'd panther, who
> Approached me with such feelings as I him.
> (Scene 9: p. 203)

Penthesilea now abandons her hope of establishing herself among the Amazons, and of finding love with Achilles. She admits,

> The utmost I have done that human strength
> Is able - I have tried the impossible -
> I have staked all upon one throw - all that I have.
> The fateful die is cast - it lies before me:
> And I must understand - that I have lost.
> (Scene 9: p. 207)

She also strikes out at those who have helped her think that she could ever reach her Amazon ideal:

> That hand I curse that decked me for the fight
> This day, and that deceiving serpent-word
> That told me I should conquer. Accursed! Accursed!
> Oh, how they stood around me with their mirrors -
> Flatt'rers! - on either hand and praised the form
> Divine of my smooth limbs, molded in steel!
> Pestilence smite you with you tricks of hell![14]
> (Scene 9: p. 206)

Penthesilea regains this state of mind in Scene 15 after she discovers that Achilles has, in fact, taken her in battle. The urgency of her request that he come with her anyway to Themiscyra is a sign that one final time she is trying to achieve place among the Amazons, and love with Achilles, in the context of Amazon thought (Scene 15: p. 240; Penth.). But when Achilles leaves her, Penthesilea abandons any agressive stance. She accepts the shame of her un-warlike nature, and indeed, she feels she can do so since she has been legitimately conquered in battle. In anger she says:

> Was I not his by every use of chivalry,
> By fairest chance of war his lawful prize?

> When man on man makes war....
> ...Show me the law - I say, show me! - which then
> Permits the prisoner who has yielded him
> To be set free again from his captor's bonds.
> (Scene 19: p.241)

Penthesilea, now trapped in an unsolvable situation, refuses to act at all. In shame she says, "I must bury me in endless night!" (Scene 19: p. 243).

There is, however, a hint that Penthesilea expects Achilles to return and take her for his own. That would be the only way in which she might escape her present alienated situation among the Amazons. In Scene 20, when she hears that a herald comes from Achilles, she says in anticipation, "'Tis from Achilles! - Ah, what shall I hear?'" (p. 243). And though she follows this remark with a command to bid the herald leave, she is merely feeling the impossibility of her situation. Penthesilea wants nothing more of the Amazon life. She wants only to follow her inclinations towards love. Now that she has heard from Achilles's own lips that he loves her, Penthesilea is willing to leave behind the world she knows for another foreign one in the arms Achilles.

This fragile reconciliation is doomed to be disrupted. Achilles is himself the agent. He, assuming that Penthesilea is comfortable in her world, and that she would never think of coming to without first taking him in battle, challenges her to single combat. He intends to make a farce out of their confrontation, fall to her, and to go with her Themiscyra (Scene 21: pp. 248-249). But Penthesilea, having rejected the warlike stance and having reconciled herself to her womanly inclinations, cannot accept - or comprehend - that Achilles approaches her in terms of war:

> He, he, who knows I am too weak by far,
> He sends this challenge, Prothoe, to me?
> My faithful breast here moves him not a whit
> Till he has crushed and split it with his spear?
> Did all I whispered to him touch his ear
> Only with the empty music of the voice?
> (Scene 20: p. 244)

Penthesilea feels betrayed. This challenge reawakens all the tensions that had been present before she came to terms with her lack of belonging in the Amazon world. In their rebirth, they are much more powerful. Penthesilea, experiencing the re-emergence of all these tensions at once, is in agony in her awareness of them. She retreats into madness and accepts Achilles's challenge: "Now I do feel the strength to stand against him: Now he shall down and grovel in the dust" (Scene 20: p. 244).
And Penthesilea goes to meet him, calling the gods down to witness her deed:

> with maniac tread among her hounds
> With foam-flecked lip she goes and calls them sisters,
> Who howl and howl; most like a Maenad she,
> Dancing across the fields, her bow in hand,
> She urges on the pack that pants for blood
> Around her, bidding them seize the fairest prey
> That ever, so she tells them, ranged the earth.
> (Scene 22: p. 251; High Priestess)

In this Bacchic frenzy, Penthesilea kills Achilles, who means her no harm. As he hides in the boughs of a fir tree, she brings him down with an arrow[15] and then

proceeds to tear him apart, in the same way that Agave destroyed Pantheus, her son. It is a scene of horror and insanity. The Amazon who witnessed the act reports, like the messenger who looked into the hidden chamber where Oedipus put his eyes out before Jocasta's hanging body:

> Oh you, Diana's holy priestesses,
> And you, Ares' chaste daughters, hear me speak:
> I am the Afric Gorgon, and to stone -
> Behold! - Your bodies' warmth I freeze at once.
> (Scene 23: p. 252; Meroe)

This madness, despite its existence in the realm of abomination, does resolve all of Penthesilea's tensions. In her madness she destroys them by killing that which brought them all together for her: Achilles. In killing him, Penthesilea proves beyond a doubt that she <u>is</u> Amazon and that she is worthy of descendence from Tanais. Penthesilea had earlier assured Achilles that despite her lack of a breast,

> Here in this left breast (all youth's tenderest, sweetest
> feelings) have take refuge
> And are, by threat much, nearer to my heart.
> Not one shalt thou find lacking, friend, in me.
> (Scene 15: p. 231)

But now, as Tanais symbolically tore her breast from her body at the founding of the Amazon race, Penthesilea has wrenched out of her very being the feelings that that breast symbolized. As Penthesilea drops the great bow of the Amazons at the feet of the High Priestess, the priestess says,

> Great Queen and lady! Oh, forgive, I pray!
> Diana is full well content with thee.
> I see thou hast atoned; her wrath is turned.
> The mighty founder of our women's realm,
> Tanais' self, I cannot well deny,
> She did not wield the bow more worthily.
> (Scene 24: p. 258)

Penthesilea also resolves the tension she has felt between being true to her Amazon upbringing and therefore taking Achilles in battle, and being true to herself and hence taking him in love. She takes him in war, and yet in her tearing of him she is dissolving the barriers between herself and Achilles. She is joining with him in the most literal of ways.[16]

When Penthesilea wakes from her frenzy, she feels the peace which release from tension brings: "I am so happy sister! More than happy!/ Quite ripe for death, Goddess, I feel myself" (Scene 25: p. 261). She senses that she has achieved all that she could have wished for in life. She is ready for death because there is nothing more she can accomplish. And although she is horrified when she discovers what she has done, she finds that she can account for it:

> Surely I kissed him? Or did I tear him?...
> ...So - it was a mistake. Kissing - biting - [17]
> Where is the difference? When we truly love
> It's easy to do one when we mean the other.
> How many a girl, her soft arms fast entwined
> About he man's neck, says that she loves him so

> Beyond words she could eat him up for love.
> And then, poor fool, when she would prove her words,
> Sated she is of him - sated almost to loathing.
> Now, my beloved, that was not my way.
> Why look: when my soft arms were round thy neck,
> I did it word for word; it was no pretending.
> I was not quite so mad as they would have it.
> (Scene 24; pp. 265-266)

But in her realization of what she has done, Penthesilea also realizes that she does not have an understanding of herself <u>in</u> the world. She had tried to compromise: to think of what she ought to be, and then to think of what she could be with Achilles. She never actually dealt with what she was. After her murder of Achilles, Penthesilea has no context to put herself in. She has rejected the Amazon life, even though she has now proven herself in it (Scene 24: p. 266; Penth.), and she has destroyed Achilles, so that she cannot find belonging in him either. She can therefore, perhaps hoping to find her place in another realm, only assert her presence in the world through her death:

> now I will step down into my breast
> As into a mine and dig a lump
> Of cold ore, an emotion that will kill.
> This ore I temper in the fires of woe
> To hardest steel; then steep it through and through
> In the hot, biting venom of remorse;
> Carry it then to Hope's eternal anvil
> And sharpen it and point it to a dagger;
> Now to this dagger do I give my breast:
> So! So! So! So! Once More! Now it is good.
> (Scene 24: p. 267)

And Penthesilea dies.

It can already be seen that there is a great difference between Achilleus and Penthesilea. He finds himself in the world, and though he is fated to die, it is not necessary, by the very <u>nature</u> of his relationship to that world, that he die. Should he have lived, Achilleus would have been the most glorious product of the homeric world. Penthesilea finds herself and asserts herself. But she does this through the aberration of madness. That in itself shows what an impossible thing she wanted to do. She cannot, like Achilleus, consciously experience her coming into her own in the world. Thus, when she has <u>forced</u> a resolution, she cannot remain in the world when she returns to consciousness.

In order to spell out the distinction between these two characters, an analysis of the acts that facilitate their resolutions will be helpful. Achilleus wants glory, and in order to gain it he must kill Hektor. Penthesilea wants to find love and place in the world. In order to gain it she must kill Achilles. The ways in which they kill, and the motivations for the killing, are very different.

Achilleus treats Hektor with utter disregard for Hektor's own glory and worth as an idividual. So full of rage and purpose is Achilleus that there is no escape for Hektor. In the typical manner portrayed in <u>The Iliad</u>, Achilleus and Hektor face one another and hurl threats at one another: they assert themselves. And when Hektor falls, Achilleus vaunts:

> 'Hektor, surely you though as you killed Patroklos you would
> be/safe, and since I was far away you thought nothing of me,/ o

> fool, for an avenger was left far greater than he was,/ behind him and away by the hollow ships. And it was I;/ and I have broken you strength; On you the dogs and vultures/shall feed and foully rip you; the Achaians will bury Patroklos.'
> (Bk. XXII: lines 331-336)[18]

There are two things to notice in this boast. Of the greatest importance is Achilleus's use of 'I.' He uses it emphatically three times, and what he is conveying to Hektor is this: I am the greater man. You are nothing in comparison. Here Achilleus reveals his need to dominate, to stand alone as the most glorious of all men. The next thing of interest is Achilleus's juxtaposition of Hextor's doom to be devoured by carrion with Patroklos's imminent burial. Achilleus is stressing that while Hektor will receive no funeral rites and will thus never gain access into Hades, Patroklos, the man Hektor had dominated, will. Achilleus therefore not only supercedes Hektor by taking his life, but he further impresses his dominance upon Hektor by threatening to annihilate Hektor's individuality in death. In being consumed, Hektor will be split into many parts, and he will be distributed among many. To make his point strongly , Achilleus says,

> 'I wish only that my spirit and fury would drive me/ to hack you meat away and eat it raw for the things that/ you have done to me. So there is no one who can hold the dogs off/ from your head.' (Bk. XXII: lines 346-349)

For Achilleus, this is the supreme statement of dominance: a threat to destroy the individuality of another by ingesting it into one's self. Achilleus's treatment of Hektor's body is in the same vein. He abuses it and tries to mar it in every way. His wish is that its unique form and beauty be destroyed.

What Achilleus wishes he had spirit and rage enough to do, Penthesilea carries out. But Penthesilea's treatment of Achilles stems from motivations that are not the same as those of Achilleus. This changes the meaning of the act. Penthesilea's desire to conquer Achilles does not primarily come from a need to dominate. She acts with tremendous agression, but it is not directed a supercession. It is directed at absorption of Achilles.

> She moved to meet that youth whom she so loves,
> ...In the confusion of her youthful senses
> Aiming with all the horrid terrors of war
> Her hot desire to seize and possess him.
> (Scene 23: p. 252; Meroe)

Penthesilea does not want to destroy Achilles. She wants to merge with him completely. Her deed demonstrates not a contempt of Achilles, but a valuing of him as a special individual. She would go to any lengths to grasp him, and she is so blinded by her eagerness that she does not realize that what she is doing destroys the very thing she seeks. The Homeric Achilleus wishes to comsume Hektor, but he cannot do it because in that he would be bringing himself into the closest of contacts with Hektor. What he wants to do is separate himself from Hektor as much as possible. Achilleus must hence content himself with abusing the body in the dust behind his chariot. Penthesilea, having inadvertently marred Achilles in her killing of him, treats the body with love (Scene 24: p. 266).

Having seen the different meanings that the deed has for Penthesilea and Achilleus, it is possible to gain clear insight into how very opposed these characters are to one another. For Achilleus, who belongs in his world, assertion of his

individualtiy is the most important function in his life: the glory he will gain ensures his shining dominance over men even after his death. For Penthesilea, who has no place in her world, assertion of her individuality has no meaning until she finds belonging in the world. She tries to find this through another individual: Achilles. And because she put her goal in the being of another, her resolution in the world became, with his destruction, only something which destroyed her also.

There are many ways in which Penthesilea's love affair with Achilles and the end in which it results can be read. Return for a moment to the idea introduced at the beginning of this paper that Kleist's Achilles and Penthesilea represent two sides of Achilleus. Looking at the two characters as parts of a whole, the play becomes Kleist's interpretation of how Achilleus finally comes into his own in The Iliad.

Achilleus is a divided man. Part of him has great depth of feeling and great splendor, and the other part is calculating an manipulative. This part looks only to the end it desires. It will sacrifice anything to bring that end to realization. Through the course of the story, both sides of Achilleus are at work, and he is not in harmony with himself. But through the events that are fated to be, his emotional side and his calculating side are forced to merge with one another. In the death of Patroklos and Achilleus's resulting rage in which he destroys Hektor, these two parts are synthesized. Achilleus becomes whole. That is what makes his youthful death tragic: he has just recently become a mighty man.

Kleist's Achilles and Penthesilea try to come together in the same way that the sides of Homer's Achilleus do. There is great conflict between them, and there is much conflict in the character of Penthisilea that represents the part of Achilleus that passionately desires and must feel the pain which the actions of that other, colder side cause. In this, Penthesilea and Achilles are like Artistophanes's hermaphrodites. the female half, Penthesilea, and the male half, Achilles, want desperately to come together. This accounts for Kleist's portrayal of Penthesilea as a Phaedra who, without the love of Hippolytus, cannot live her own life and wishes only to fade into death. It also accounts for why Kleist make Penthesilea an Amazon: being one half of Achilleus, she must have both a female yearning to be united with the male half and the ruthless rage of a warrior who blooms in battle.

Penthesilea's killing of Achilleus in the way Achilleus wished to kill Hektor is very elegant, for it is in that moment, standing over Hektor, that the passionate side of Achilleus is fused with the calculating side: at Hektor's death Achilleus's glory is ensured, and he also atones for the sacrifice of Patroklos. Penthesilea, the passionate half of this split entity, does away with calculating Achilles in the same way the Achilleus loses his calculating side into a unity with his emotional side when he kills Hektor.

It is also appropriate that Penthesilea must die. Just as it is tragic that Achilleus must die, it is tragic that there is nothing more she can do in the world. And as part of a whole, once Achilles is dead, Penthesilea cannot live. Prothoe says of Penthesilea (and this applies to the Homeric Achilleus also),

> Her blooming was too proud and glorious!
> Vainly the gale will shake the withered oak,
> But with a crash he flings the living down,
> Grasping with ruffian hands her copious locks.[19]
> (Scene 24: p. 268)

Yet there is more to Penthesilea than this connection to one aspect of Achilleus's character. Recall Keist's portrayal of Achilles with all the distictiness that the figure is given in The Iliad. With this in mind, Penthesilea can be read as a contrast between the classical Achilleus and a modern one: Penthesilea. Kleist has worked the classical account of a man's struggle to come

into his own in the world into a modern context.

The world of Penthesilea and that character's difficulties in the world represent Kleist's perceptions of the world of his time and the problems he saw hindering an individual from finding contentment. The sense of existing in a world where the individual struggles alone to find himself is Kleist's evaluation of modernity. He purposefully incorporates The Iliad (and things like Racine's formulation of Pahedra'a character) into his play in order to make explicit the difference he saw between the modern individual and the classical one. He then relies upon what the reader knows of the classical tale to make his meaning clear.

Penthesilea captures for Kleist the tensions a modern individual experiences. Given a lack of place in the world, the individual desires both to assert himself and to lose himself by attempting to find belonging through other individuals. The importance that Kleist gives to the power of love[20] (which is an unusual occurrence in classical works - only in Euripides's Phaedra do we see such a consuming emotion) suggests that love in this unbounded, blinding mode has become, in the modern world, the answer to this lack of belonging. Keist's opinion seems to have been that the classical individual, because he had definite place in the world and rules that governed him in that place, had no need for such passion. In line with this, Kleist's Achilles does not have the same kind of love for Penthesilea as she has for him. He is fascinated by her, he wants to share his life with her, but he does not want to be utterly merged with her.

Penthesilea's madness is Kleist's judgement[21] of what a modern individual must do if he insists upon achieving harmony with himself in the world. He implies that it is impossible to do such a thing naturally. It requires a madness that is monstrous. Penthesilea's death, achieved by drawing out of her soul an emotion that is powerful enough to kill, is the only thing Kleist sees as glorious and beautiful about the individual. He aggrandizes human mortality by depicting the human self at its greatest height when it rejects its world. It is not just her Amazon world that Penthesilea rejects; in destroying Achilles, she also rejects the shining image of that classical individual who does belong in his world. She has forced even glorious Achilleus to acknowledge the mightiness of her pure being which is uncluttered by things of the world.

I think, however, that there is a more positive side to Kleist's analysis of the modern situation. Penthesilea can also be read as an allegory of romantic approach to Achilleus: the idealization of, and fascination with, that heroic figure. Penthesilea then represents the modern romantic who is infatuated with Homer's Achilleus. The love affair between the two characters is hence a description of how people like myself, as readers of The Iliad, become intrigued with Achilleus. We, like Penthesilea, chase after an image which exists in thought, wishing to overtake him, wishing to discover his tantalizing secret, wishing to assimilate into ourselves his secret that we might become like such a man.

This interpretation of the play makes several things clear. Kleist may have made use of the Amazon character - the love/hate duality - to illustrate the relationship that the lover of Achilleus has with the splendid image. He both idealizes him and yearns to be like him, and yet he feels that Achilleus outshines him. He therefore envies Achilleus. The romantic wants to unveil Achilleus's secret because he does not want the image to loom so far above him.

In the light of this idea, much of the disjunction between Penthesilea and Achilles is made understandable. If one tries to imagine actually meeting the Achilleus whom one has idealized, the situation would certainly be full of misunderstandings, and perhaps full of some disappointments as well, when the man did not live up to his image. Penthesilea day-dreams about Achilles, and when she meets him she is overcome by that vision out of the 'daedal past' that stands before her.

Yet when she talks with him, she is shocked because the man she is speaking with does not seem to be the one she imagined. She asks him if he is really that man who with such a heart of iron abused the body of Hektor. Achilles, too, does not know how to understand Penthesilea. She fills him with wonderment. At one point he says to her, "I was wond'ring/ If thou wert come down to me from the moon" (Scene 15: p. 232).[22]

The inability, therefore, that Penthesilea and Achilles have of coming together and understanding one another is an indication that they embody two completely different consciousnesses. Achilles is very much himself. He is in his proper environment. Penthesilea is misplaced both in his environment and in her own. She admires his stability and harmony in the world, while he is drawn to her literal unearthliness:

> O thou, who with soft, heavenly radiance,
> As though the realms of light had open their doors,
> Descendest on me, strange beyond with: Who art thou?
> How do I name thee?
> (Scene 15: p. 226; Achilles)

That it is impossible, however, for these lovers to come together except in the frenzy of Penthesilea's madness, suggests that this play is a bitter comment on Kleist's part, resulting from disillusionment with such romantic idealization of Achilleus. The black nature of the play may imply that Kleist thought this 'looking back to the past' and searching for the secret of being a whole individual is not the answer, that it could, in fact, be dangerous. It could go beyond all bounds and leave the modern individual floundering in an image that is truly imaginary. Just as Penthesilea is doomed to fall as she reaches out to grasp Achilles, in looking backwards too fervently the romantic is bound to fall.

The presence of the myths concerning voyeurism - Pentheus peeking at the maenads, and Actaeon watching Artemis bathe - might suggest that in delving so deeply into the images of the past one is trying to see what is best not seen. In this attraction, the romantic could become an Oedipus, drawn almost against his will towards an end that is horrifying.

The element of punishment in these two myths might also be important with respect to this reading of Penthesilea. Although exact parallels cannot be drawn, it might be that Penthesilea is being punished for refusing to work on understanding and belonging in her world. Actaeon was punished for trying to gain access into a world of the goddess that was forbidden to him. Pentheus denied Dionysus. Agave's fault was much the same as his, though not as extreme. She refused to believe that Semele had lain with Zeus and was bringing forth into a world a new kind of god. Both Pentheus[23] and Agave resisted working on understanding how the new god would change their lives. Penthesilea, like these people, took refuge in something other than what could give her place in her world. She tried to find place through another, Achilles, who is not only a completely distinct individual from her, but who comes from another world altogether. It is possible that Kleist felt that looking back to the past was good thing, as long as it did not involve idealization. He might have felt that the approach that idealized would result in an eclipse of what is great in the modern individual.[24]

I said earlier that this interpretation of Penthesilea as an allegory of the romantic idealization of Achilleus was more positive than the preceding interpretation. It is so because it does not make the modern situation impossible. It does not suggest that death, and glorification of that death, are the only acts available to the displaced modern individual. If Kleist's message is to be careful not to lose what is great in the modern individual in looking back to the past, then

Kleist would also advocate careful observation of the modern world: trying to see it clearly without having the vision blinded by images of the past.[25]

Perhaps Kleist never meant the play to be read as an allegory. Nevertheless, I find such a reading helpful. As I prepare to leave behind the images that have filled my thoughts for the past four years, I wonder about that world that lies beyond St. John's College, and I wonder how happiness can be found there. I have learnt from Kleist that, despite my own tendency to idealize the images of the past and search fervently for their secrets, I must look for what is splendid in modernity also. And though I do not feel at home in that world, I take Kleist's advice to work at finding a place in it. There is much that the images of the past have taught me, but I must hold myself back from turning blindly to them. They can give me a sense of comfort, because of the stability they convey to me, but through them I will not find belonging in my own world. Those images can guide me, since the past remains embedded in the present, but they cannot replace the present.

ENDNOTES

1. I shall use Achilleus to refer to the character in The Iliad. Since he also appears in Penthesilea, this will help to distinguish between the Homeric individual and Kleist's Achilles.

2. Kleist is undoubtedly making fun of Homer's 'crafty Odysseus' in this speech.

3. Penthesilea is divided into twenty-four scenes. There are no acts which hold it together. Thus, the play is itself like this landscape in which events simply occur.

4. At least, no ceremonies that we see in the play.

5. It could be said that even the gods of The Iliad represent movements in the human soul. But they are not depicted as such, and I am concerned with the ways in which these things are described by the authors.

6. This is unlike Glaucos and Diomedes, who exchange armor as a sign of friendship. They meet as general foes, but in discovering the specifics about one another, they agree not to fight, though they fight others in the enemy camp.

7. The Amazon law also forbids that a woman pick her man. She is supposed to take whomever the god sends her (see Scene 15: p. 235). Thus Penthesilea, in her love for Achilles, is out of line in her Amazon world.

8. Tanais was the first Queen of the Amazons and the founder of their traditions.

9. The scenes in which this deception occurs correspond to Books XIV and XV of The Iliad in which Hera deceives Zeus. Both texts describe a love scene. Hera is able to alleviate, for a time, the dire circumstances Zeus has put upon the Achaians, and in the play Achilles's deception also, for a short time, keeps Penthesilea away from her tensions and the end they will bring her to.

10. According to myth, the look in Penthesilea's eyes as she died from Achilleus's blow made him fall in love with her. In the play, her gaze as she falls before him in battle drives away all thoughts of violence that Achilles had towards her.

11. Penthesilea may have accompained the host, as the young girls who pick roses do in the play, but she would not have engaged in battle. In order to participate in the Feast of Roses, an Amazon must have conquered her man in battle. Since Penthesilea has not taken part in the Feast of Roses, she cannot have battled with any man.

12. What is initially taken to be a desire from fame (see p. 2, this paper) now turns out to be a desire to gain place in the world. Thus, though she and Achilles seem to be pushed by the same motivations, they are not.

13. Diomede says to Achilles, concerning this well-timed swerve,

> Yet all that I have seen convinces me
> That thy so masterly retreat was not constrained
> But of free choice. One might indeed suppose
> That with the crack of dawn....
> Already thou hadst marked that lucky stone
> O'er which the Queen should stumble....
> With such sure course, by the eternal gods,
> Didst thou entice her to this very stone.
>
> (Scene 4: pp. 182-183)

Kleist, therefore, responded to the character of Achilleus in much the same way this I did, seeing him as manipulating his way to his gain of glory and seeing him as willing to sacrifce Patroklos for this goal. Kleist also saw the greatness inherent in Achilles. But he gave that greatness to Penthesilea.

14. This is the moment in which Penthesilea most resemble Phaedra. It is interesting, however, that she is most like Racine's Phèdre:

> Que ces vains ornements, que ces voiles me pèsent!
> Quelle importune main, en formant tous ces noeuds,
> A pris soin sur mon front d'assembler mes cheveux?
> Tout m'afflige et me nuti, et conspire à me nuit.
>
> (Larousse - Act I, Scene 3: lines 158-161)

Kleist copies this passage almost exactly. It is significant, I think, that he chooses the modern interpretation of the character over Euripides's portrayal of her in Hippolytus (this passage can be found in Scene 1: lines 198-202). In his reinterpretation of the character of Achilleus through Penthesilea, Kleist uses a reinterpretation of the character of Phaedra.

15. Here Kleist mixes the story of Actaeon, who was changed into a stag and devoured by his own hounds, with the story of Pentheus hiding in the boughs of a tree in order to peek at his mother and the other maenads.

16. In Euripeides's Bacchae, the mother, Agave, destroys the separate individuality of her son, the being to whom she had given that individuality. In her consuming of him (though that section of the text is now missing), she and her offspring become one again. Pentheus returns to whence he came. In calling forth The Bacchae, Kleist is emphasizing the oneness of Penthesilea and Achilles at this moment.

17. In the German this reads: So - it was a mistake. Kisses (Küsse) - bites (bisse) [They rhyme]. When we truly love/It is easy to grasp one instead of the other.

18. Penthesilea's killing of Achilles also occurs in the twenty-second part of the play, though it is not described in full until later.

19. The German reads: But with a crash it flings the living down/ Because it can grasp the crown of the tree.

20. There are also many Christ images present in the play. Achilles is, for example, crowned with a wreath of laurel thorns by Penthesilea after she has killed him (Scene 24: p. 260; Penth.). She also offers to sprinkle water upon his head, which has overtones of baptism. Penthesilea herself comes back from her deed crowned with thorns (Scene 24: p. 235; First Amazon). This connects Kleist's use of Phaedra and her love with the emphasis that is put upon love in the Christian religion. It also makes sacrifical beings - saviors - out of both Penthesilea and Achilles. These images too, as copies of the maenad frenzy in The Bacchae, suggest the presence of Dionysus: the breaking down of all rational barriers and the freedom of the individual to forget his isolated individuality for a time through the gift of wine. Thus, merging with others and finding salvation through that merging, are clearly issues the Kleist wanted to include.

21. Kleist himself committed suicide on November 21, 1811.

22. When the play is read in this way, it becomes much less dark. Some of the interactions between the characters, and especially between Penthesilea and Achilles, become very funny. They reveal a sharp humour in Kleist.

23. Though the names Pentheus and Penthesilea exist separately in myth, since Kleist wove Pentheus's story into Penthesilea's he must have connected the two together - both because their names begin similarly and because he had some notion, whatever it might have been, which connected them together in his mind.

24. Penthesilea, as Kleist's portrayal of a modern individual, has within her the splendor of Homer's Achilleus. But she, in her love for Achilleus, does not acknowledge her own splendor. Kleist is suggesting, I think, that in modernity the human soul is (καλὸν) just like that of Achilleus, and it should be cultivated and put into its own context.

25. The dust which is predominant in the play might also be a sign of the way our eyes are blinded by the grandeur of the past. The dust clouds the vision of those who are looking at Penthesilea's mad pursuit of Achilles, and we, as readers of the play, see through the eyes of those who are looking. We, then, become confused by the confusion inherent in that pursuit.

The texts I have used in the paper are as follows:

1. Homer, The Iliad; Trans. R. Lattimore.
   Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
   Phoenix Edition: 1961.

2. Kleist, Penthesilea; Trans. H. Trevelyan.
   The German Library: Vol. 25, pp. 167-268.
   New York: Continuum Publishing Co.: 1982

The passages which I quote are marked beneath by Book and line for The Iliad, and by Scene and page (and if necessary, speaker) for Penthesilea.

If a passage is pointed out in the text, this indicates that the passage supports the argument, and may be referred to if desired.

On the Sonnet

Daniel Hoh ('88)

Is it mere waste, a trap made just to bind,
An ill command, or prison, made to hold
One's words as fettered to an ancient mold,
Denying freedom to the poet's mind?
With ornament and pretty meter lined,
So that the tongue into a ball is rolled
And meaning in the poem be annulled:
Is such the cost when poets are confined?
Look closer though, and read the words with care,
For in such bars are worthy thoughts held fast.
And though its stature's small and strict its frame,
It says far more than words of order bare:
A frame of words, which wood or gold outlast.
And if a trap, let beauty be the game.

Conversation #4

Brian Cole('91)

Scattered corners of important papers
like clanging leftover pennies or
smoldering contortions of some emotion-
In trust they remained safe,
under rusty snaps in jacket pockets.
Until challenged by the middle-aged librarian, who,
speaking through her doctor's mask
claims they should be numbered under plastic-
Laminated to last a lifetime.
I make my reply gently, asking
Why do you wear stockings to cover your shaven legs?
And why haven't you really looked at the colours
in a rainbow?
They too seem desolate and unorganized,
but combine in blinding whiteness,
She swore by her sterile scalpel that one day
I would have to stop asking questions,
But I know then I would just be left with answers.

Untitled

Dwayne Rodgers ('90)

One hundred twenty-fifth street lies prostrate and still.
Having spiralled down a gaping till,
Crudely smothered in flat black paint,
Not "Sam I am," but "No I ain't"
Is spattered on concrete walls,
Loudly slanged from tenement stalls
Where a screaming man, formerly of four Skid Row,
Showers the gasping boys below
With "smelling salts for a wasted land!"
Where etherized phantoms drown in sand.

Night whispers, seducing the day,
Like a line of verse might say.
But useless are poetic wisdoms of the universe
When the boys glimpse a woman's beckoning purse,
Glimmering beneath a cracked lamplight
In the midst of this late summer's night.
They take the purse with stiffly intent fingers
Where the spectre of the whimpering woman lingers,
Where my grandfather jazzed to Coltrane's tune,
Drowsily dying and coming soon.

Where nubile girls with needle tracks
And peach fuzzed boys are laid on their backs
In graves shovelled by their own hand
Where etherized phantoms drown in sand.
Where the screaming man places his wreath,
Streaming from his dangling sheath.
"Smelling salts for a wasted land!"
And more trickles down his hand
Onto the foot of a grieving mother
Whose whimpering spectre grieves another.

Dwayne Rodgers

Iocasta's Song

Rachel Duel('89)

Ah Oedipus, my sweet, my center; what was Laius compared to you? Naught but a shade, like you in form but in substance lacking! You entered my life like a king, by nature splendorous, and saved our city from the dreaded Sphinx. A young and strong monarch you then became, strong where he was weak, giving where he'd been immovable. Thinking back, you were much like him in features; but I don't wonder it escaped me, so different were you in kind. You and he may have resembled one another, but our souls were akin and I had eyes for this only. And what is it to me now that I've offended the gods with my impure love for you? You are my reason for living; while I tremble to remember Laius' passion when he learned that I had borne him a son, I tremble even more to think that I endeavoured with him to bring about your destruction. I glory in a fate that allowed you to survive and to achieve the greatness that was truly your heritage, and one that allowed me great, all-consuming love! For I love you in all ways, as my son, as my self, as my lover. Oh that god is jealous who tries to destroy this passion by exposing it to the corrosive air. Does it really matter how our love came to be if it is in itself pure? Oh Oedipus, I love you more than life itself for you are my existence! I cannot bear to think that you who have truly known me will shudder with revulsion to have done so. By the god of the flames I am shredded up inside. Your inquiry has forced my hand and I sacrifice myself, not to Apollo but to you, my self augmented!

On Mechanics, Geometry, and Newton's Concept of God; or, an Attempt to Read the *Principia* as a Philosphical Work

Jana Giles ('88)

Newton begins his Principia with a discussion on the differences between mechanics and geometry and their relation to philosophy. He concludes the Third Book with the necessity for a Supreme Being to exercise dominion over the world. Between these two very general statements that describe his intentions, and perhaps his motivation for writing the Principia, lie his mathematical principles and propositions which collectively allow him to apply his universal law of gravitation to the phenomena in his world. He describes the way he associates mathematics and philosophy in his Preface to the First Edition:

> Therefore I offer this work as the mathematical principles of philosophy, for the whole burden of philosophy seems to consist in this- from the phenomena of motions to investigate the forces of nature, and then from these forces to demonstrate the other phenomena. (Preface, p. xvii)

To understand his "experimental philosophy" requires an understanding of his distinction between mechanics and geometry. He describes mechanics as corresponding to motion and matter, and geometry to the magnitude of that matter. Mechanics describes the existence of bodies and their motions, while geometry allows us to analyze the qualities of those bodies and to attempt to explain how they move and affect each other:

> The description of right lines and circles, upon which geometry is founded, belongs to mechanics. Geometry does not teach us to draw these lines, but requires them to be drawn, for it requires that the learner should first be taught to describe these accurately before he enters upon geometry, then it shows how by these operations problems may be solved. To describe right lines and circles are problems, but not geometrical problems. (p. xvii)

Mechanics would seem, then, to correspond to that part of us which is immediately affected by the physical world. His definition of practical mechanics as that to which all the manual arts belong indicates that we use practical mechanics in the art of drawing a line or in seeing the motion of an object, or in being hit by a moving object. However, practical mechanics has no self awareness. A hand is capable of drawing a circle, but it has no knowledge as to whether that which it has drawn is indeed a circle or is instead a right line. This requires the first purpose of geometry: to define a described circle as a circle, both in itself and in contrast to a right line. While mechanics presumes the application of the relations of the mind of--for example, resemblance, cause and effect, and contiguity in space and time (to use Hume's terms)--geometry analyzes the action that the mechanical artificer has performed, and distinguishes between the different relations. We then can apply the second faculty of geometry: the ability to rearrange those objects and relations and

to synthesize new combinations. This is merely an interpretation of this statement: "Therefore geometry is founded in mechanical practice, and is nothing but that part of universal mechanics which accurately proposes and demonstrates the art of measuring" (p. xvii). Notice that he describes that art as that of measuring and not of measurement. It is important to recognize that he is speaking about actions and motion, rather than a static state. For, as was explained above, mechanics is concerned with motion, and geometry with the analysis of that motion. But to analyze something already requires that one stop the motion in mid-movement and examine its distinguishable features: matter, position, time, speed, etc. Yet even more confounding is the fact that the act of abstraction is just that: an action. To abstract we must remove the burden of specific examples, locate the essential suppositions, and reunite these in a more general form. To synthesize we must see resemblances in different objects, actions, or ideas, we must be able to divide these into parts, and we must substitute similar parts from different things so as to create new ones. Therefore, geometry is, paradoxically, the act of describing a dynamic action in static terms.

If practical mechanics is the original description of objects, and geometry is the demonstration of the act of that description, then rational mechanics is the explicit joining of the two. In Newton's understanding: "Rational mechanics will be the science of motions resulting from any forces whatsoever, and of the forces required to produce any motions, accurately proposed and demonstrated" (p. xvii). This procession from practical mechanics to geometry to rational mechanics seems analogous to Newton's "burden of philosophy" cited above. This becomes even more apparent when noting the organization and presentation of the Principia. He begins by presenting a few universal laws and definitions taken from the general phenomena he observes. In formulating these definitions, he is applying the first use of geometry to mechanical objects. From these first premisses, he moves on to combine these general definitions and laws with each other and with new mathematical objects to create the propositions that lead him to the universal law of gravitation. And in Book III he reintroduces the phenomena to support his conclusion.

This brings us to the General Scholium at the end of Book III of the Principia. Evidently Newton has found the harmony and coherence of his own argument so conclusive that he is moved to assert:

> It is not to be conceived that mere mechanical causes could give birth to so many regular motions...This most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being. (p. 544)

Indeed, Newton's endeavour has been tight, fluid, and powerful, to say the least, but these attributes have never been the standard of judgment for the truth of the existence of God. Whence, then, this conviction?

Newton's reasoning in this regard sounds something like St. Anselm's: God is that which nothing greater than can exist. If we examine Newton's statements closely, we see that his argument for the existence of God is much like a geometrical deduction, for he has based it on the regularity and universality of his final general laws of gravitation and centripetal force. As has been elucidated above, these laws came from propositions formed using geometry, which in turn arose from the original definitions based on practical mechanics. Here we see the root of the problem: where is the origin of practical mechanics? The trouble is that we cannot answer this question using geometry since it presupposes mechanics. And we cannot understand the forces involved in mechanics without geometry to define objects and relate ideas. Therefore Newton's argument for the existence of God is based on phenomena that he fundamentally cannot explain. Did Newton see this problem and

finding himself in a circular argument simply posit God as a final cause? Did he abstract to the concept of God from his own experience? Or was his God based on a different understanding, which either he did not describe, or I have failed to apprehend?

If the case is the first, then God is merely a figment of Newton's imagination inspired by a fit of desperation. It adds nothing to the credibility of his project. If the case is the third, then this essay has been to no purpose. The second seems more likely, and also gives me an opportunity to go on with this endeavor.

To assist him in his theologico-philosophical search, Newton presents four rules for reasoning in philosophy. They are as follows:

> Rule I: We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearance.
>
> Rule II: Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes.
>
> Rule III: The qualities of bodies, which admit neither intensification nor remission of degrees, and which are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever.
>
> Rule IV: In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions inferred by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions. (pp. 398-400)

Allow me to clarify these using Hume's relations of the mind:

Rule I assumes that our mechanics are accurate, that we observe carefully, that we make proper use of the relations of cause and effect, and that we are able either to immediately apprehend or extract the ideas of sufficiency and simplicity from natural things.

Rule II assumes that we are able to observe cause and effect, to see resemblances among specific effects, and from these to generalize regarding causes, and then to reapply these to the specific examples.

Rule III assumes that we apply the concept of resemblance to qualities of specific bodies, and that we generalize to all bodies, justified by the consistency of the observation of those qualities.

Rule IV assumes that both our mechanics and our geometry are perfectly accurate.

He then applies these rules to his concept of God in the General Scholium:

> Every soul that has perception is, though in different times and in different objects of sense and motion, still the same indivisible person. There are given successive parts in duration, coexistent parts in space, but neither the one nor the other in the person of a man, or his thinking principle; and much less can they be found in the thinking substance of God. Every man, so far as he is a thing that has perception, is one and the same man during his whole life, in all and each of his organs of sense. God is the same God, always and everywhere. (p. 545)

In this statement he is assuming that the soul's perception of phenomena is accurate and continuous, and he applies the simplicity of Rule I and the resemblance of Rule

II to posit the thinking substance of God. For although Newton clearly states that God has no substance, he is abstracting from the existence of the thinking principle of man to the thinking substance of God, and therefore the rules are applicable. God is not the thing itself, but the being of it:

> He is not eternity and infinity, but eternal and infinite; he is not duration or space, but he endures and is present. He endures forever, and is everywhere present; and by existing always and everywhere, he constitutes duration and space. (p. 545)

One can see that these assumptions present problems to those who see Newton's reasoning as circular. But perhaps his understanding of God as an action rather than an object might bypass these problems. This brings us back to the conflict between mechanics and geometry. To illustrate this further, I would like to introduce an example. Lemma I of Book I states: "Quantities and the ratios of quantities, which in any finite time converge continually to equality, and before the end of that time approach nearer to each other than any given difference, become ultimately equal" (p. 29). Lemma I is essentially about motion. It is a substitute for the theory of division that presented so many problems to Zeno. The unending convergence to equality of quantities in a finite time is analogous to the continuous division of a quantity into smaller discrete quantities in a finite time. In the case of division, if we divide our quantities into rational halves, theoretically we will never reach a single point since there will always be left something to divide. The problem with division is that it is based on an abstraction, on a static geometrical analysis in which each piece of matter is examined and defined individually. When the pieces get too small, however, it becomes impossible for human perception, or mechanics, to distinguish one from another. Newton expresses this observation himself in Rule III:

> Moreover, that the divided but contiguous particles of bodies may be separated from one another, is a matter of observation; and in the particles that remain undivided, our minds are able to distinguish yet lesser parts; as is mathematically demonstrated. But whether the parts so distinguished, and not yet so divided may, by the powers of Nature, be actually divided and separated from one another, we cannot certainly determine. (p. 399)

Lemma I would seem to obviate this problem by appealing directly to mechanics and the phenomena of motion as it is presented to the human mind, being an expression of "...the person of a man, or his thinking principle..." (taking "thinking principle to mean that which perceives and is capable of the geometrical act of abstraction). When Newton says that "there are given successive parts in duration, coexistent parts in space...", he is referring to division, to the abstract idea of dividing time into discrete particles. But just as the act of division does not explain how one may arrive at a single point, neither does the dividing of time explain how one is living in only a single present moment that is passing by so rapidly that it cannot be defined nor distinguished from the moment immediately before it (this being one abstract understanding of time).

The implication of all this is that although man's thinking principle is capable of abstraction, it cannot explain the thinking principle itself by means of abstraction because abstraction is contained within it as an operation of it.
Hence this reflection on God on p. 546:

> We have ideas of his attributes, but what the real substance of

> anything is we know not. In bodies, we see only their figures and colours, we hear only the sounds, we touch only their outward surfaces, we smell only the smells, and taste the savors; but their inward substances are not to be known either by our senses, or by any reflex act of our minds; much less, then, have we any idea of the substance of God. We know him only by his most wise and excellent contrivance of things, and final causes...by way of allegory, God is said to see, to speak, to laugh, to love, to hate...for all our notions of God are taken from the ways of mankind by a certain similitude.

It is obvious from the above statement that Newton's concept of God is indeed an abstraction that derives its credibility from the presupposed Rules. This is an assumption on the part of Newton that, although substantiated by much evidence, cannot hope to be accepted because of the lack of a criterion of truth.

Although we may remain dissatisfied with his proof for the existence of God, perhaps his motivation for presenting such an idea in the context of his mathematics, and his awareness of the limitations of his "experimental philosophy" can be understood in his regard for the geometrical act of abstraction, or generalization, as presented in Rule III as "the foundation of all philosophy". And perhaps this sheds some light on his conclusive statement in the General Scholium: "And thus much concerning God; to discourse of whom from the appearances of things, does certainly belong to Natural Philosophy" (p. 546).

Cartesian Equations for Rectilinear Figures

Kim Paffenroth

In the sophomore mathematics tutorial, we were shown that all our beloved conic sections - the circle, ellipse, hyperbola, and parabola - could be expressed by algebraic equations. We then found out that all these equations had the same general form, a form that came to be known as the general equation of the second degree:

$$Ax^2 + Bxy + Cy^2 + Dx + Ey + F = 0$$

Any conic section could be expressed in the form of this equation, and anything in the form of this equation was a conic or a degenerate conic (line, pair of lines, or point), if it was anything at all. The object of this paper is to see if we can find similar equations, which will likewise share the same general form among themselves and which will also represent rectilinear figures roughly equivalent to their conic brethren.

Now, let's not jump right to the general equation. Let's start rather with the most basic conic section, the circle, with the simplest equation, $x^2+y^2=r^2$. This will, of course, be a circle with center at the origin and a radius of r. Looking just at the algebraic equation, forgetting the figure for a moment, what properties suggest themselves as bridges of similarity between conic sections and rectilinear figures? The first property that suggests itself to me is that there are two values of x for each value of y and likewise two values of y for each value of x, except when x or y equals ±r, in which case the other variable must equal zero; these points are, of course, where the circle crosses the axes. The other property is that there are cetain limitations to the values I can assign to x and y, namely, that neither can be less than -r nor greater than +r; this is, of course, because a circle is a closed figure.

Now, what rectilinear figure will display these properties of a circle, and what equation can we use that will also display these properties while representing a rectilinear and not a conic section? After some thought, the two answers occur almost simultaneously: a square with its center at the origin and its vertices on the axes, represented by an equation which includes absolute-value signs, as below.

$$|X| + |Y| = F$$
$$F > 0$$



Now we have the rectilinear equivalent of a circle centered at the origin, along with its equation. And if we just think of how we can change the first simple equation of a circle centered at the origin to represent first other circles, then ultimately all the other conic sections, we will be able to similarly alter our equation of a square to represent other squares and then other rectilinear figures.

How does one move the center of a circle to different coordinates? By adding or subtracting a number from the x and/or the y value before squaring it. Similarly, if we wish to move our square, we will add or subtract a number from our x and/or our y value before we take the absolute value of it. And how does one change the size of a circle? By changing the radius and/or changing the coefficient of x^2 and/or y^2, as long as the two coefficients remain equal. Similarly, if we wish to change the size of our square, we will change the value of F and/or change the coefficients in front of our absolute-value signs, being sure to keep the two coefficients equal to one another. Thus, we have as the most general equation of a square,

$A|x-D|+C|y-E|=F$

$A=C$

$F>0$



We have now arrived at an equation that looks very much like an unexpanded form of the general equation of the second degree:

$$A(x-D)^2 + C(y-E)^2 = F \qquad \text{(see footnote)}$$

This equation represents a circle if A=C and an ellipse if A does not equal C, but they are of the same sign. Similarly, I saw that if we wanted to turn our square into any sort of rhomboid, we could do the same thing we would have done to turn a circle into an ellipse: make A and C unequal, but keep them of the same sign. The center and vertices of our rhomboid will be at the points shown in the diagram above, since these are general for any square or rhomboid.

Now, if we wish to fold our square or rhomboid outward to make a pair of angles opening outward to infinity, we do the same we would have done to make an hyperbola: we make A and C of different signs. Thus---



$A<0$

$F>0$



$C<0$

$F>0$

And finally, to make only one angle opening to infinity, we observe that a parabola, the equivalent curvilinear figure, has only one squared term in its equation. Thus we remove one pair of absolute-value signs, our rectilinear equivalent of squaring, and our rectilinear equation becomes---

$A|x-D|+Cy=F$ OR $Ax+C|y-E|=F$

$F>0$ $F>0$



Equivalent degenerate sections can also be made. Setting A or C equal to zero makes a pair of parallel lines, unless F=0, in which case there is only one line. Removing both pairs of absolute-value signs gives us of course the familiar equation of a straight line. And setting F=0 will give us either a point, a line, or a pair of crossed lines.

Footnote -- This form has almost the same properties as the general form, namely: 1)it represents a circle if A=C; 2) it represents an ellipse if A does not equal C, but they are of the same sign; 3) it represents an hyperbola if A and C differ in sign; 4) it represents a parabola if one of the terms is not squared. The manual points this out on p. 16 (Eq. 12), p. 22 (Eq. 26), p. 33 (Eq. 42), and p. 19 (5th Eq. down), but it is easy enough to see, for if we go from the expanded to the unexpanded form, or the other way, for that matter, A and C do not change their values or their signs.



The Bus Ride

Jennifer Mischer ('91)

As number 23A turned down *Avenue de la Liberte*, I stepped into the circular light of the street lamp so that the driver would be sure to see me. I dreaded these late rides home from track practice at the stadium. The little town of Monastir, Tunisia folded up at seven o'clock and didn't reopen until dawn. The large red bus slowed to an unsteady stop in front of me. Stepping up into the nearly empty bus, I missed the security of the sweaty, molten mass of bodies which had oozed on and off earlier at lunch.

I chose to sit on the long cushioned seat, universally known to bus riders, in the front. Across from me sat the bus's only other passenger--a robust woman, completely engulfed by her sari, as these Arab women often were, so that only eyes and nose were visible. Two corners of the large white sheet were crossed and tucked under her powerful armpits, while the other corners had been pulled down over her head and were clenched between her brown, crooked teeth. Fat and round, she seemed as if she might roll more easily than walk. Hooked on her left elbow was a faded milky-green plastic basket filled with treasures from shopping at the open-market *souk*. A new lipstick, a bottle of dried garbanzo beans and a roll of mauve lace topped the basket. Her left hand clutched a newspaper cone of jet black sunflower seeds which she skillfully shelled with her right hand and ate without dislodging the corners of her sari.

"Billet," said the ticket man, swaying in front of me to keep his balance.

"Carte," I responded, surprised that he had failed to recognize me in my schoolgirl *tablier* which clearly identified me as a Tunisian student who could ride with a student pass.

The bus slowed, pulled right and stopped at the curb. Two teenage boys boarded. Their rowdy talking interrupted the meditative silence of the bus. The broken ceiling lights inside the bus flickered on and quickly off as the bus jolted forward. The boys bought tickets to Sousse and took the front double seat on my side. They obviously recognized me, and I was poignantly reminded of my instant identity as the girl from America.

"You like Tunisia?" asked the tall lanky one, in confident English.

I sat stony, staring out the window above the woman's head.

"Come and sit on my lap," said the second boy in Arabic spoken so fast that I could barely decipher the words. "We can have some fun. All right?"

"Oh, she won't talk to us," said the first to the second. "We're too low for her. Aren't we, pretty miss?"

"Will you make love to me? Come on. Let's make love."

I studied the window glass, memorizing the dusty patterns and the clear glass streaks of its surface, aware of the images of the familiar dark streets as they passed through its frame. The boys were silent now. I lowered my gaze to the floor. I was surprised that my neck muscles had become stiff.

The bus turned left onto the long straight section of the route before reaching Skannes. The white wall guarding Monastir's furniture factory came into view. The carved bold letters in the wall, spelling MONASTIR MEUBLES, could just be seen in the moonlight. The flat land extending beyond the wall seemed empty without its laborers. I was anxious for the bus to turn into Skannes, nearer my house.

"That's a nice tablier you're wearing," called one boy.

"Show us what's under your tablier, lady."

My school tablier had always been my camouflage. I pushed my fists into its navy blue pockets. I was frightened. My eyes were fixed on the window. I dared not look away from the window.

"Take off your tablier and show us your pretty clothes" taunted the shorter one, who had bad acne.

My heart raced. I began to perspire. The long sleeves of the tablier stuck to my damp skin. I managed to swallow. As I turned from the window the piercing eyes of the woman across from me met mine for a moment.

The boys moved quickly to sit on either side of me. My mind and body were paralyzed. Only my eyes could cry for help.

"Let's make love," cried the tormentor to my right.

The woman moved forward. She took the corners of the fabric of her sari from her mouth with her right hand and held them in the air about an inch from her chin. "You boys are disgusting," she hollered in an authoritative voice. "Look at her. She is not a tourist. She wears a tablier. She goes to *lycee*. We see her on the bus. You stop your nasty talk."

The boys recoiled to the back of the bus in silence, temporarily shamed by her disapproval.

Still paralyzed, breathing very softly and shallowly, I looked directly at my defender. We looked at each other intently, sharing a rare moment of understanding, possible only when there is common respect.

The bus turned into Skannes. I stood to get off at the next stop. I did not look back at the woman. I knew she would not be looking at me.

I stepped down out of the bus, breathed deeply, and let myself cry.

The Passion

Ange Mlinko ('91)

Wood softens in this air, my nails
leaving carvings of despair upon
the table. But I am unseen.
The walls swell and the paint peels
the floor gives where you walk
                swallowed moans

the outside breeze slakes off water
showered to the ground
    lighted squares across backyards
black & drenched, fuming with rose.
        The moment sticks
like windows at wrong angles to the sills,
or like people's faces here snagged between
a grin and a gag, watching the street
from the vantage of their door
where, closely pressed, they sense the thing
that crowds their antique foyers
and nails them to the frame.

The Death of Romeo

Erika Wilson ('88)

But, soft! What whisper doth escape thy lips?
Nay, 'tis but a dream departed
E'en as my heart now faintly trips,
Its amorous leapings thwarted
By Death's cuckolding embrace.
And now I rush to fill his arms,
Mine own grown weak that I must brace
Myself with stone to behold thy charms
One last lingering time.
For I feel the cold steal over me,
And hear the church bell chime
The heartbeats I have left with thee.
O! Mine eyes grow dim, by night caressed,
And I bow my head that I might press
My bitter lips to thy marble breast.
Yet, soft! And warm, that one might guess
A living heart to beat within!
Beneath my incredulous cheek I feel the wings
Of a bird once caged, eager to win
Its freedom from the deadly whisperings
Of marble tombs and silent stone.
O my love, my life, I say goodbye
For we both shall wake alone.
You to grieve and wonder why
'Tis I who lie upon this stony bed
Not warm and sweet and welcoming,
But cold and still and wrongly dead,
Betrayed by love to prick myself with Death's destroying sting.
Once more, I vow, while strength is mine,
To take from you a lover's right
And rob your lips of their sweet wine
And feast upon the rich delight
That lights your eyes with fierce desire.
But no, I feel the bony hand of Death,
And so with him retire.
I leave to you my last faint breath,
And with my whisper soft upon your lips
I feel you stir and answer me,
Even as my life so very gently slips
Into the midnight sea.

Ariadne Ashore

Claudia Probst ('88)

Gravel sand biting into the soles of her small feet,
Ariadne shifted from side to side,
cast wild blossoms onto the receding waves.
And the waves, expelling her offering,
flung the sodden flowers,
which lay then beyond their reach
like frail ruined mollusks on the sand.
She stood, one hip hitched up
like a crane dancer, revolving slowly on her heels,
and, resting a hand on her matted, golden hair
she remembered Theseus, who had once cherished her,
worked out the knots in her tresses
with patient fingers and scented oil.
"My lord and love" she cried
"why did you forsake me here,
on harsh Naxos, when for you I betrayed my father?"
But he had gone, and taken with him her only ambition,
to die beloved, and her words were lost,
in the rhythmic mocking slap, slap of the waves
and the the blood was flowing freely down her thigh
to her ankle and seeping
into the sand, her womb's small life lost while
the wind plucked her dress delicately away, unstained.
How would she die,
she on the island beach,
her chapped lip chatter skipping time with the waves?
No trees stood near to chop and heave and plane,
no boards would appear from under the sand,
nor the bleached ribs of an abandoned boat,
which, restored and launched into the waves,
might yet save her.
Home the last night had been a shallow cave
that she had scratched out towards evening,
and slept in, bloodied hands folded across her chest.
She had no fire, and no other person to address
would have welcomed a strayed gull's mew,
or a feral dog's bark, sounds she would have gathered
and nurtured, during the dark hours,
within her thin sandpiper breast.

Conversations With the Moon

Beth Cross ('88)

I

Spine White
and whittled away
tooth
sunk into the dark's heart
I too
am salted down
to my narrow self
shouldered against
my dreams.
We stare at each other
in a stalemate
without stakes.

II

Like the cutting of wisdom teeth
you are not there
but the hardness hiding
is felt.
Like the things about a day
I dream instead of remember
you bite.
In the inside turning of sleep
where the wings whir stirs
darkness journeys.
There, was it there that I saw you?
Flying like a wild thing
while abscent from on high?
For why do I recognize the smile
which you wear
as you regain the sky?

III

The odd shape
that begs the question
what is to be done with you--
become?
Vexed sharpness
not quite concave
oblong, off balance,
what shall I call you?--
who are not ready to be named
or taken from.
Out of my upturned palm,
shallowed from footprints,
half-formed intent--
of these
are you the echo
or impetus?

IV

Pearl or seed
awash in all else
that is salt brine,
knot, pit
knuckled in around yourself,
so sure
of your circled shape,
your obstinance is full--
Predecessor to my heart,
white as you are
and so cold
as to glow blue,
you are not hollow.

V

On a long journey
you follow in the clouds
their veil across your face
mimicking the quarters
you race through in a month.
The rails count the seconds
in which I watch you,
You, taunting--
"Remember?
The time at full?
and where were you
as I slid to half?
and he?
What did my shadowed side
hold for you?
remember?
Can you ever be as swift as I?
Time carries--
and you?"
The rails click
in syncopation
with the swooping telephone lines
outside the window.
"Will you ride with me tonight?
---out, alone---
complete and evanescent
in ourselves."

Reflections on Leibnizian Substance

Robert DeMajistre ('88)

Unless great care is taken, the system outlined in Leibniz's "Monadology" may seem unintelligible. He seems to hold the most difficult and contradictory opinions of both the Cartesians and the Schoolmen. He asserts that the universe is composed exclusively of living creatures, yet, on the other hand, that it is meaningless to refer the motion of bodies to the causes proper to the "souls" of these creatures. Upon reflection, however, one finds that the reconciliation of such seeming contraries as these would be very valuable, for although they oppose one another, the force of the arguments offered by either of these two schools of thought is nearly inescapable. In dealing with these arguments, Leibniz is attempting to navigate through the most treacherous areas of philosophic endeavor. For this reason, his work, whether successful or not, is of the utmost importance. Because of its importance and the extreme care needed to interpret the "Monadology," I have undertaken the following detailed examination of some of the issues raised in this work.

Since the "monad," or simple substance, forms the basis of the "Monadology," I believe it most advisable, in seeking to understand the work, to formulate a general explication of substance, as well as of the relations between different substances. As a result, this paper will be divided into four parts: 1) substance in general, 2) God and substance, 3) the interrelation of simple substances, and 4) extension and substance.

I. SUBSTANCE IN GENERAL

Questions relating to the being and qualities of a class of entities understood to "stand under" things have challenged philosophers for centuries. Such a challenge is no doubt based on the observation that though things are capable of change through time, most changes seem to be gradual and proceed according to a rule. In the smallest perceptible time, a person undergoes a change, yet he rarely changes so much as no longer to resemble himself. If nothing "stands under" such changes, the person's identity is a mere illusion; yet if such a "standing under," i.e., substance, is posited, it must be admitted that a thing is not the same as itself, at least in some respect. Further, once substance is allowed, more questions arise, such as the scope of its permanence and its ability to be affected by other entities. It will be the purpose of this paper to explore Leibniz's answers to this second order of questions, for he clearly asserts the being of substance. First, it will be necessary to give a general description of his concept of substance, his ideas on simple and composite substances, and his "detail of changes."

In the first few lines of the "Monadology," Leibniz separates the class of substances into the simple and the composite. Although the idea of composite substance is very important to Leibniz's teaching (indeed, its meaning will be discussed subsequently), our discussion of substance will be directed toward simple substances or "monads." According to Leibniz, these monads are determined by the following limitations: 1) they have no extension, 2) they can be neither created nor destroyed by natural means, and 3) they cannot be naturally altered from without. He also asserts

that monads are the "elements of all things" ("Monadology" #3) and that the "souls" of men and animals are examples of simple substances. There are at least two questions to be asked at this point. If monads have no extension, and they are the building blocks of all things, the manner in which extension arises is unclear. This problem will be dealt with in chapter IV of this essay. The second question seeks the possibility of sensation and death in Leibniz's system. Leibniz's response to this question involves the idea of "detail of change." As stated earlier, an explanation of this detail will be given shortly.

Before dealing with those difficulties mentioned immediately above, we should enquire into the meaning of composite substance. What can it mean for a substance to be an aggregate of other substances? At this point, it may be helpful to look at a similar division of the class of substance offered by another philosopher. Aristotle also admits two classes of substance.

> Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject...But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are included. (Categories Ch. 5, #1)[1]

These secondary substances are also, though in a different sense, collections of primary substances. A relation between the two concepts of secondary substances yields an important observation. Both thinkers assign the term "substance" to entities which do not have the properties of their respective simple substances, but have similar functions. The species man is predicated of "this man," though for most other relations, man may function as the subject. Similarly for Leibniz, the composite, e.g., an animal, can have extension, and/or can be altered or destroyed. Yet it forms a whole that is generally subordinate to a single monad and for this reason is reflective of the same dispositions as this monad, though it is not clear as to the manner of this reflection (see Ch. IV). Thus, the relation between simple and composite substances differs from the relation of the individual to the species in that a composite substance receives its unity through relation to a single simple substance; whereas the unity of a species is supplied through the definition of that species.

We have now to consider the manner in which alterations such as sense perception or death arise in the monad. First, it is not entirely clear how a unity such as a simple substance may be altered at all. For any gradual change assumes a multiplicity (one part endures while another passes out of being), and any sudden and complete change destroys the substance, as nothing can "stand under" this complete disjunction. Leibniz himself uses this argument ("Monadol." #7) to show that it is impossible for a monad to be moved by another natural entity. He then asserts that monads must have some distinguishing qualities or everything would be indistinguishable. The term "quality" must be taken here in a semi-logical manner, that is, used to signify the contents or the predications of the substance viewed as a subject at a certain time. This interpretation allows for the impossibility of efficient causes affecting the monad (for a quality of a substance could not change a quality in another, because neither has existence outside its respective substance) ("Monadol." #7), without eliminating the possibility of alteration, as these alterations are "accidental" rather than "substantial." Since nothing can change a simple substance, and alteration occurs, the substance must change itself. Leibniz calls the basis or "desire" for this alteration "appetition" ("Monadol." #15), and the qualification of appetition that distinguishes one substance from another, the "detail of changes" specific to each monad ("Monadol." #12). He then calls each state of this change "perception." Such perceptions vary in distinctiveness from

monad to monad, and those simple substances that have "feeling," i.e., sense perception, have the most distinct perceptions. Since monads are indestructible, and in order to be, they must be perceiving (for without perception they are indistinguishable and thus identical or non-existent),[2] monads must always have perception. It is clear then, that sleep or death may be explained as a time of indistinct perception. Since distinctiveness is an individuating characteristic of the perceptions of a monad, therefore it must be determined by the detail of changes. Thus, this detail of change in the qualities of a substance may explain seeming alterations in the simple substance such as sensation and death.

This, then, shall suffice as an overview of the Leibnizian idea of substance in itself, that is, considered without relation to other substances or entities. This explanation is, however, clearly incomplete. Without an account of the interrelation of these monads, any regularity or common perception in the universe must go without explanation. Further, it would seem impossible to say that a monad has perception of anything, as the monad has no faculty for being altered by any object. Thus, it would be impossible for us, being monads, to classify any parts of our perception as substances. A relational account is therefore more than necessary. The first step toward such an account is an explanation of the role of God in Leibniz's system.

II. GOD AND SUBSTANCE

As shown above, some necessary connection is needed in order for simple substances to relate to one another in the way in which we commonly believe them to. Leibniz supplies this connection through deducing a transcendental cause of perception for all monads. Once such a cause is found and determined to be a unity, a causal interrelation of monads will have been demonstrated. This transcendental causality Leibniz attributes to God. Since he deduces God, at least in part, by means of a causal argument, it will be necessary to explore briefly some of the technical aspects of Leibniz's methods of reasoning. The first section of this chapter will be dedicated to such an exploration. We shall then proceed to explicate the two proofs of God given in the "Monadology," the one a posteriori and the other a priori. After these arguments have been given, it will then be necessary to fill out Leibniz's idea of God by a short description of the extent of God's power as required by the proofs.

It is commonly observed by students of the physical sciences, such as Leibniz himself, that there are two basic classes of truths: those that are mathematically or logically determinable and those that transcend mathematical or logical determination. That a body which falls with a uniform acceleration describes a parabola is a truth of the first order; that bodies near the surface of the earth move with such an acceleration is second order truth. Leibniz refers to the first order truths as truths of "reason" and those of the second order as truths of "fact" ("Monadol." #33). From these two classes can be deduced two principles for discovery of truths: "that of contradiction," and "that of sufficient reason" ("Monadol." #30, #31). Since the principle of contradiction had been overtly employed several centuries before Leibniz, no more need be said of it here. The principle of sufficient reason, however, is more obscure and merits further study. Though Leibniz is clearly not the first to use this principle, he is the first to place it on a par with the principle of contradiction. Leibniz presents a formulation of this principle in a fragment: "that every true proposition which is not known per se, has an a priori proof, or that a reason can be given for every truth" (Wiener, p. 94). Further in the same fragment he writes, "These [same] reasons are founded on the principle of contingency, or of the existence of things, i.e., on what is or appears the best among several equally possible things." And in another fragment, (Wiener p. 95), the meaning of "the best" is clarified: "nothing ever happens without the possibility that an omniscient mind could give some reason why it should have happened rather than not."

From this, one can infer that contingent truths must be consistent with some omniscient intelligence. It can also be observed that the principle of sufficient reason, like that of contradiction, is very limited in its ability to produce true propositions by itself, for it seems only to point to the existence of some unknown cause and provides little aid in determining this cause. Let us now, having the necessary tools, proceed to the proofs of God.

The first proof is demonstrated almost completely through the principle of sufficient reason. First, Leibniz points out that the determination of the causes of anything "might run into a detail without limits" ("Monadol." #36). Further, each one of the causes that have been determined must have a cause. Thus, no final determination of cause is possible within the series of contingents. The final reason (required by the principle of sufficient reason) must then have caused the entire infinite series from without ("Monadol." #37). Leibniz then concludes, "and thus it is that the final reason of things must be found in a necessary substance, in which the detail of changes exists only eminently, as in their source; and this is what we call God." ("Monadol." #38). As stated above, the application of the principle of sufficient reason is the critical step in the proof. One of two interpretations of this step may be offered: 1) since the principle of sufficient reason presupposes an omniscient and in order to effect completely its designs - omnipotent intelligence, the argument is circular; 2) this argument is merely an analysis of the principle of sufficient reason, setting out to determine such presuppositions. Because there is no indication as to which interpretation is preferable, for the sake of the argument we shall adopt the second. We do so on the assumption that Leibniz could neither allow, nor be ignorant of such an error in such an important section of the work. Once adopted, this second interpretation itself gives rise to one or two observations: 1) this argument undermines the priority of sufficient reason, for if it were a principle, it should presuppose nothing; 2) since it is impossible to determine whether God is contained in the principle or the principle is contained in God, they may in fact be coincident. That is, this may be either a very improper application of the principle or it may be a very effective application, for the proof of the existence of the cause of the regress suffices to demonstrate the proof. I am in no position to give preference to either of these interpretations.

Leibniz calls the above argument an a posteriori proof because it proceeds from contingent beings ("Monadol." #45). He then offers a proof a priori. This proof is almost wholly contained in paragraph 44 of the "Monadology":

> For, if there is a reality in essences, or possibilities, or indeed eternal truths, this reality must be founded in something existing and actual, and consequently in the existence of the necessary being, in whom essence involves existence, or in whom it is sufficient to be possible in order to be actual.

Understanding of this proof is, at least partially, facilitated by another fragment (p.92 Wiener) where Leibniz asserts that possible essences "strive" for existence and can exist only through being "grounded" in something actual. God is then the absolute actuality on which the existence of any essence or eternal truth is based. This proof is based on a sort of formal causal regress while the former proof was based on an efficient causal regress. This formal regress however need not be infinite. Yet, unless something is posited to provide unity to the being of these possibles, the regress soon becomes unintelligible.[3]

From the above arguments we have come to understand God as a necessary substance which provides the final reason for both efficient cause and the existence of essences and truths. Since God stands outside the chain of efficient cause, and is the

source of all existence, he must be completely unlimited ("Monadol." #41, #45). This follows because there can be nothing that could have cause to limit him. Leibniz ascribes to God absolute "Power", "Knowledge", and "Will" ("Monadol." #48). Power must be interpreted as the ability or necessity to be and corresponds to the "subject" of the created monad, that is, the very "substantiality" of the simple substance. Knowledge, or omniscience, corresponds to the "perceptive faculty" or the "detail of changes" in created monads. Will is similar to the appetitive faculty. Thus, all monads are indeed created in the image of God. This points to a third power of God, for not only is he the architect and the builder, but he is also an infinite prototype of the elements of his creation. No direct argument, however, is given for the unity of these powers. There seems to be no proof of one God as opposed to three. Yet one might argue that Leibniz thought multiple necessary substances to be absurd past mention, for each would limit the other.

Since we have found that the details of changes of all monads are caused and supported by a single simple substance, a basis for their relation has been established. We also have found a tool with which to determine the origins of extension. As the final cause of all contains infinite intelligence, and we may apply the principle of sufficient reason, in the course of our explorations we should find nothing unintelligible or lacking a reasonable account. We shall, however, often be unable to account for that which transcends our own intelligence. Indeed, all our reasoning henceforth shall depend on the principle of sufficient reason, for only through this principle have we been able to infer the existence of God. All our reasonings will thus stand or fall by this principle.

III. RELATIONS BETWEEN MONADS

The above account has furnished us with the principle by which a monad is related to entities external to itself. It is now necessary to determine its specific relations with such entities. We shall begin by examining the "connections" between simple substances. Since these monads cannot be externally affected by anything except God, any relation between monads must be given in terms of a harmony. That is, perceptions in each monad must be synchronized with the perceptions of all others to which it is related. The particular organization of monads will be described in the first part of this chapter. Leibniz also recognizes that it may appear to some that monads are in some way limited by other monads. This appearance arises from the fact that though the appetitive faculty provides desire within the monad, this desire is rarely, if ever, attained, i.e., it does not achieve the perception to which it tends ("Monadol." #15). This will be explained under the head of activity and passivity in the latter part of this chapter.

Since the relations of monads depend completely on God, Leibniz finds it necessary to consider the intent of God and then to deduce the order of monads according to this intent. In one of the fragments cited above (Wiener p.91), Leibniz asserts that of all possible series, the one that exists contains the most possibles. This assertion, combined with that in paragraph 54 of the "Monadology," gives us a comprehensive formulation of the necessary state of the universe. This formulation is as follows: the existent universe is composed of the series of possibilities containing the maximum possible capacity of positive reality, that is, the series composed of the greatest number of more perfect things. Obviously, this existence is brought about by the choice of God, for this is the best possible configuration. This argument is based on two assumptions: 1) that the perfection of one possible tends to limit other possibles; 2) that a universe with the most reality is the best. The first assumption seems to be based on a presupposition of a sort of "conservation of perfection," where the lack of boundary of one possible causes boundaries to arise in

others. The second assumption seems reasonable, for if a universe of a smaller degree of perfection were created, this lack of perfection would impose unnecessary bounds on creation, and therefore on God - and a bounded God is never as good as it could be. All objections aside, this proposition of maximum perfection will provide us with a means to deduce the necessary organization of monads.

It must be pointed out here that Leibniz does not seek to account for the entire perfection of the universe merely through the relations of monads. Such a quest would involve a study of the perfections of monads in themselves, while the present task is a description of the organization of monads that is able to contribute the most perfection to the whole. According to Leibniz, this maximum potential for perfection is brought about by allowing each monad to express, more or less distinctly, the perfections of all other monads. This leads him to conclude that a monad is a "perpetual living mirror of the universe" ("Monadol." #56). This relation enables the perfection of each monad to be reproduced to a greater or lesser extent in all the monads that perceive it. Indeed, it seems impossible to conceive of any other possible configuration that admits of a greater possible perfection, (aside from an amplification rather than a simple reflection - though such a model, if not meaningless, depends on the details of changes in individual monads, and therefore is not relevant to the argument). This model yields some rather pleasing consequences, particularly for those engaged in metaphysics or the physical sciences. In perceiving more clearly the perfections in nature and beyond, we increase our own perfection, as well as the perfection of the entire universe.

Having described the relation of monads in general, we proceed to the said appearance of activity and passivity. Leibniz asserts that a creature is acting on another as far as it accounts a priori for what takes place in the object of its activity ("Monadol" #50). This a priori account he attributes to distinctness of perception ("Monadol." #49). In other words, one creature acts on another insofar as it can account beforehand for a change in the other. In order for the argument to be intelligible, this account must be rooted in the desire or appetitive faculty of the actor. Otherwise, a meteorologist could be said to act on the weather. Since a monad can have no direct effect on another, however, these activities must be indirect or "ideal" ("Monadol." #51), for in all cases, God is the true actor. In the ideal interaction of monads, God judges between the appetites of the monads and determines which, if any, should predominate (presumably according to the principle of the best). Insofar as each appetite attains its desire it is considered active. It must be observed, however, that activity and passivity must be restricted to monads in certain relations. With few exceptions, one member of such a relation must be a composite containing or directly related to extension. Otherwise it would be possible for me to change your mind without mediation. This should be a sufficient explication of activity and passivity.

Thus, the relations between monads have been explained through God and the principle of the best. It seems impossible that Leibniz could have discovered any other relation since he himself is a simple substance, some "reflectivity" must be assumed in order for him to have knowledge of other substances. If he were unable to reflect any substance, he could not have deduced this substance and would not have included it in the universe. For one who includes himself in a plenum, this conclusion seems inescapable.

IV. RELATION OF SUBSTANCE TO MATTER

In Leibniz's "New System of Nature" (#3) he reveals that the idea of monads, or "formal atoms", was originally formulated by him in order to account for insufficiencies encountered in mechanical explanations of nature. It is clear from this that monads bear an extremely important relation to matter and extension. Yet the

"Monadology" lacks a basic explanation of the principles of this relation. It does, however, proceed as if the reader already has some understanding of them. No doubt Leibniz has assumed that those approaching the "Monadology" have read some of his other essays where the monad has been employed as an explanation of natural phenomena. As a result, reading the "Monadology" without textual perspective may give rise to questions regarding the origins of extension, since monads are said to be the "true atoms of nature" yet are not themselves extended. For this reason, the preliminary explication of the relation between monads and matter will draw on sources other than the "Monadology" more heavily than the previous chapters. We shall begin with an elucidation of the manner in which extension may be explained in monadological terms. The character of some particular relations between monads and matter will be dealt with briefly. Then a description of the general relations will be given. Finally, the problem of the connection of the soul to the body will be discussed in terms of this general relation.

Because the basis for the connection of monads to matter is described by Leibniz in works mainly concerned with the science of dynamics, it will be necessary to approach the problem in a manner different from that previously employed. This tack involves assuming matter and deducing monads. In one essay (Wiener #100), Leibniz argues, against the Cartesians, that the actions of bodies cannot be described simply through extension and impenetrability. He asserts there that a metaphysical principle, that is, substance, is necessary in order to explain the behavior of bodies. In the "New System" (#3) Leibniz argues for the need for simple substance. He asserts that since no atomic unity could be found in a purely material body, i.e., since extended bodies can always be divided, at least in thought, and a continuum is not composed merely of points, something non-material must provide the unity in bodies. He calls this non-material unity a "formal atom," and this simple substance he later calls a monad. From this it follows that Aristotle's "prime matter," that is, presubstantial, would consist of pure, undifferentiated extension. We may conclude, then, that monads are the origins of the unity in, and the characteristics of, bodies. In this way, Leibniz joins multitude (monads) and magnitude (extension) in order to synthesize an intelligible interpretation of nature. Monads are, thus, the true units or "atoms" of nature. We have, then, the basis for the relation of monads and extension. Since the arguments given above have been presupposed by Leibniz, this method of deduction should be permitted.

There is a great danger that must be avoided at this point. If we accept the fact that every body in the universe has its own unique form or "soul," each possessing an appetitive faculty, experimental physics is clearly at risk. There may be no necessary consistency between experiments conducted on two similar bodies, or perhaps on the same monad at different times, governed by two distinct monads. This absence of necessary consistency is particularly dangerous in view of the fact that monads themselves have been deduced, at least partially, from the conclusions of experiments. Leibniz recognizes this danger and takes provisions against it. In "Specimen Dynamicum" (Wiener #122, #123)", he distinguishes "primitive force" from "derivative force." The former he defines as the substance in its basic sense, or substance considered by itself. Derivative force, however, is a limitation of primitive force which can be observed only when substances come into relation to one another. This latter type of force is only concerned with local motion, and is wholly quantifiable. The quantifications to which these forces are subject are commonly referred to as the natural laws of motion. This distinction must be based on the fact that though monads cannot affect one another directly, God constrains the perceptions of substances in respect to certain qualities (most notably, the quality related to position). From these limitations arise the laws of nature. In this manner, the basis of natural science is saved, and consequently, that of monadology also.

This distinction between primitive and derivative force yields some peculiar

consequences. There arise from these two principles two separate chains of causality. The realm of cause assigned to primitive force is referred to as "final cause" and that of derivative force as "efficient cause." Since the appetitive faculty of any created monad is unable to cause motion, and, conversely, monads are unchangeable by natural means, the perceptions of any given monad must be "synchronized" with the chain of efficient causes in which it is directly involved. In the "Second Explanation of the System of the Communication of Substances" (Wiener #118, #119), Leibniz states that this synchronization must be explained in one of three ways: 1) mutual influence, 2) constant intervention of God, or 3) pre-established harmony contrived by God. The first of these alternatives has already been eliminated. The second choice seems to require a miracle at every point in time. The relation between final and efficient causes, thus, is determined by a pre-established harmony. Though such a harmony seems highly improbable, it could be very valuable to the natural philosopher. Not only are natural events predictable a priori through final causes, such as the deduction of the principle of least time found in the "Discourse on Metaphysics"; this harmony is able to shed light on deeper questions, such as the connection of the soul to the body.

The question of the soul's relation to the body has puzzled philosophers for centuries. This puzzlement is rooted in the lack of definite connection between these two substances. As a result, many have denied any connection at all, and in this denial, have required themselves to discard one of the two systems of cause. Those such as Hobbes have affirmed only efficient causes and found themselves facing questions involving the origins of consciousness and unity in animals. Thinkers like Hume, on the other hand, discard efficient cause and must seek some sort of subjective cause for perception. These thinkers find problems in determining the cause of the consistency of perception or the reality of things outside themselves. Under Leibniz's system, the connection between the soul and the body does not rest in the animal, so no direct connection needs to be sought; the difficulties faced by the other thinkers mentioned here are easily avoided. These problems, however, have been faced and more or less accounted for before this particular question was asked. It is therefore necessary to study this system carefully and determine its truth or falsity as far as possible.

The relation between the monads and matter has been, for our purposes, sufficiently explained. If accepted as Leibniz has explained it, this relationship represents some very important natural and metaphysical advances in philosophy. It allows for an extensive study of efficient causes, without direct regard to final causes, while preserving the metaphysical integrity of the system. It also allows for the limited application of final causes in natural science, such as the above-mentioned deduction of Snell's law. Such applications of final cause yield valuable principles such as laws of conservation, e.g., the conservation of energy or "vis viva," without necessarily admitting a "black box" into the system. The advantages to metaphysics furnished by Leibniz's system have already been partially demonstrated in the above section on the connection of the soul to the body. Further, this system may conceivably give rise to a new study where metaphysics is conducted through experiments relating to efficient cause.

CONCLUSION

If the basic assumptions are allowed, the "Monadology" would appear to answer some of the most important questions of philosophy. The elegance of the system can do nothing but reflect positively on its plausibility. Leibniz not only makes a clear separtation between physics and metaphysics, eliminating the error resulting in their confusion, but establishes a ground for their relations. Thus the science of dynamics may stand upon firm metaphysical grounds, an accomplishment unparalleled by

most natural philosophers at the time. He even shows that the curiosity that provides the impetus for the sciences is rooted in a tendency to increase the perfection of both the student and the universe. It must be observed, however, that this system is almost entirely based on the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of the best. For this reason, Leibniz may be assuming much more intelligibilty in the universe than he ought, thereby rendering his conclusions empty.

1. Though the word translated in this passage as substance (ousia) has no direct etymological connection to the thought of "standing under," since it is used by Aristotle to signify a thing that serves only as a subject to modifications, such a meaning may be inferred. For since it is not able to function as a predicate, it is impossible for it to be changed in itself, though its function is to bear attributes that may be altered.

2. Leibniz asserts that absolutely indistinguishable entities are either one and the same thing, or utterly non-existent. He justifies that proposition by arguing that such repetition is not consistent with the perfection of God.

3. e.g., a body near the surface of the earth falls in a parabolic path because it is uniformly accelerated; it is uniformly accelerated because it is pulled toward the center of the earth over a small distance; why is it pulled thus?

At Calvert Cliffs

Gretchen Berg ('75)

We play below chalk cliffs
embossed with fossils,
forming a ring in the water
with our pants rolled up.

The constant flux erodes us:
even as we shout, salt
cuts and wind culls
and we are stuff for eons.

Untitled

Anne Carpenter ('91)

This is a lovely kind of night,
that plays with your untucked shirt,
wafting.

Sparkle of the charcoal road
and fireflies mingle,
like expensive scented powder,
and the pebbles dent the flesh
of your bare toes.

Drink the milk the stars are pouring
while bubbles break repeatedly,
and sweet divine,
sleeping cleopatra,

with your frayed edges,
remind yourself,
of the strands of gold ahead,
the pearly glow of patience
weaves around your head.

This is a lovely kind of night
This is a lonely kind of night

turn off your eyes of light
and bow your henna head.

The Conversation

Adam Eggers ('91)

God said to Adam
"My son
come to me my first, most sorrowful son
for we must talk"
"Yes, Father" Adam replied
And God spoke again
"But my son
do not come to me
If you have any hope for mankind
any dreams of love between peoples
The belief that one man can make a difference
Come speak to me
when you know what I have just said
is true
Come talk with me and we can discuss
my most wondrous, tragic experiment,
Man"
And
adam answered, most somberly
"I am not ready
Yet."

Bridge

Tequila Brooks ('91)

by a grandmother
and two aunts

with the promise
that-we're only
going to look-

the salesgirls

aches with her eyes
at the sight
of mounds of brightly
colored clothing which
surround her in the
blurr of the dressing room
and she

whimpers
on dry tears
beseeches the ceiling
paneled sky with
pounding screams
in the echoless
bounds of her mind

she tells a lie
exits with pillow-tongued
-i'll take this one

Flanked

by the cowboy
and his sons

she enters

neck in the noose
of a skinbiting
bit of lasso rope

And

the cowboy's daughters

look on with
such sympathetic in their eyes
that

Dizzily,
forlornly
she

stampedes
the pulls tighter
her tongue strains
at the opening
of her throat
pounding hooves
beat the grass-stained dirt

chokes

breaks free desperately
eyes wild with fright
front hooves nicked by
stones and grass and the
sting of scorpions in her
flight

until

she hurls
headlong into a
grinding tangle of barbed wire

now and then
she walks with
cowed eyes
boring holes in the ground directly
behind her.

A Discussion of Justice and its Evolution in Aeschylus' *Oresteia* Trilogy

Kenneth Paradis ('90)

So much blood is spilled on so many hands of the house of Atreus that one shudders to speak of the tragic events of the Oresteia as having kinship with justice. Yet, each pair of bloodied hands fashions for itself an image of justice to justify their heinous acts of vengeance. Aeschylus exposes the wretchedness of justice based on retribution and offers a resplendent vision of justice based on deliberation through the acts of the bitter house of Atreus.

The litany of the Oresteia is the evolution of justice. From "bloodshed for bloodshed" to "grace for grace" (Eumenides 982, 984), the barbaric past of vindictive retribution concedes to a future of civilized clemency and temperate judgement. Old justice has a narrow, individualistic scope which only concerns itself with the benefits of the avenger and the punishment of the offender, whereas new justice is grounded in a pluralism in which judgements are made for the benefit of the whole. One crucial aspect of justice's triumphant evolution is its transformation from personal vengeance to societal reason. Through the course of the Oresteia, Aeschylus demonstrates the dangers of the old violence, in this case through the words of the chorus:

> Here is anger for anger. Between them who shall judge lightly? The spoiler is robbed; he killed, he has paid. The truth stands ever beside God's throne eternal: he who has wrought shall pay; that is law. Then who shall tear the curse from their blood? The seed is stiffened to ruin. (Agamemnon 1560-66)

If the principle of justice is so limited as to be merely a matter of taking life for life, the danger is not only that the seed of the house of Atreus is "stiffened to ruin," but also that the seed of mankind is doomed to fail. For if this justice is "eternal" truth, mankind is doomed to eternal violence.

How then does mankind escape this ruin? There are no inviolable standards of justice by which to assess the actions of mankind because the role of the gods in justice is in a state of becoming as is the ethic itself. Old justice has the intervention of the gods within its confines, and this does not lend stability to the system. In fact, the gods and mortals are both on trial in the Oresteia, and the gods need an end to the discord and chaos old justice is wreaking as much as the house of Atreus does. The gods are only one manifestation of the opposing forces that clash to forge this new justice, not the controlling element that one might expect. The violence of old justice has wrought similar conditions of social and political upheaval in the world of the gods and in the world of the men.

The Oresteia frees mankind from the whimsical wills of the childish gods. A second aspect of justice's evolution is that it becomes a system based on the authority of the gods, but practiced and maintained by mankind. Ridding mankind of the gods' interventions and their passions for vengeance is a necessary step in expelling the mortals' penchant for the same ugliness. As we shall see, both Clytaemestra and Orestes believe their actions are divinely inspired and authorized - Clytaemestra, through an interpretation of the laws stemming from Zeus, Orestes, through the intervention of Apollo who shoulders the will of Zeus. In both cases, atrocities are committed, and the end result is more bloodshed - not resolution. The gods are ineffectual in fostering true justice and are committed to cultivating vendettas and hatred.

The marrow of human action lies within the act of decision. Therein lies mankind's power of self-determination. Furthermore, it is by the merits of an individual's decisions that he is judged, that he seizes a preparedness for the future and an understanding of the past. Old justice not only strips mankind of his trait of deliberation, but it also seeks to discard basic emotions like compassion and love. These characters labor under the duress of dilemma because old justice is pitting pristine emotions against each other. Love and justice are irreconcilable. The Oresteia spotlights this struggle.

"Justice so moves that those only move who suffer" (Ag. 250), says the chorus of old justice. Along with Clytaemestra, Cassandra, Electra, and Orestes, the reader suffers the travesties of vengeful justice. As the reader grapples with the characters' decisions, they become his own; thus he experiences and understands justice's evolution.

The clambering and struggle of each individual to fulfill his need for justice's company leads to the ugly atrocities of the old justice. Since its place is such a fundamental one, the struggle for justice can feed the ugliness of man's hatred and anger or nourish the compassionate and beautiful aspects of his nature according to the orientation of its laws. The plight of the house of Atreus is an extreme case, an absurd example, in which the thirst for personal retribution overshadows love between family members and honor toward the people the royal house rules. The plight of the house of Atreus demonstrates the inability of old justice to be a viable ethic and lends credence to the justice of deliberation, moderation, and clemency.

The scope of this trilogy is expansive, and the themes are so closely interwoven that all of the aforementioned aspects of the plays must be considered to relate a somewhat comprehensive account of Aeschylus' commentary on justice. Therefore, let us examine this evolution of justice - the role of the gods and mortals and its meaning for mankind - in terms of the decisions of the characters who are guided by the entangled forces of the curse, fate and free will, pride and acquiescence, mortal and immortal will, and love and hate in the context of the trilogy.

> Much I have said before to serve necessity, but I will take no shame now to unsay it all. How else could I, arming hate against hateful men disguised in seeming tenderness, fence high the nets of ruin beyond overleaping? Thus to me the conflict of ancient bitterness is not a thing new thought upon, but pondered deep in time. I stand now where I struck him down. The thing is done. Thus I have wrought, and I will not deny it now. (Ag. 1372-80)

These are the first haughty Clytaemestra dispatches to the chorus as she stands over the dead bodies of Agamemnon and Cassandra in Agamemnon. She flaunts a hatred simmered over a long period of time, and peppered with treacherous tenderness. She proudly admits to the murder and the insidious premeditation that was involved to insure its successful completion. The idea of a curse implies an involuntary affliction which debilitates its victims like a disease. Yet, Clytaemestra claims she "pondered deep in time" on the "ancient" bitterness" of the curse, which leads one to wonder if the act was prideful choice based on more than fated action. Does this passage imply that the curse is a course of action which can be voluntarily decided upon and that Clytaemestra embraced her role in perpetuating the curse? Is this curse a mad dog on a leash?

At this point, the reader is offered two views on the curse. Cassandra, armed with a seer's wisdom, sees the house of Atreus as a place pervaded by a tangled evil,

a sickness that she and every member of the house is doomed to catch. From Thyestes' one voice, a choir of "vengeful spirits" has raised its voice "drugged to double fury on the wine of men's bloodshed" (Ag. 1188-90). Clytaemestra would lead the reader to believe that the curse is not such a disease. Like the fire signals from Troy, it grows stronger as the "watchers" awaken at every flaming post to feed the blaze and "kindle another beacon vaster than commanded" (Ag. 301). She sees the curse as hatred kindled by the individual. Clytaemestra arrogantly sees the curse as her weapon.

Perhaps both women are correct, in that the members of the house of Atreus display a propensity for violence that could be fate through an inherited character. The members of the house may be like the waiting watchman with his "watchtime measured by years" lying "elbowed upon the Atredae's roof dogwise" (Ag. 3). They cannot control the curse's appearance on the horizon, but they are prepared for it and are impelled to build on the hatred and nurture its beacon. Clytaemestra's changing justifications tend to make the reader wary of adopting her view of the curse and the validity of her choice.

Clytaemestra first appeals to the justice of the divine to justify her actions. She states that when Agamemnon was down after having been struck twice with her sword, she "struck him a third blow, in thanks and reverence to Zeus the lord of dead men underneath the ground" (Ag. 1385-87). With these words, the authority of Zeus and his justice are evoked in the defense of her actions to the chorus and the reader. The reader has no reason to believe that Zeus advocates or demands the death of Agamemnon other than allowing the justice of "anger for anger" to exist among mankind. Aeschylus offers a deluded Clytaemestra in her understanding of divine endorsement. Her pride leads her to believe that she may call upon their gods' laws for justification and that the authority of the gods themselves will be within those laws. She is judged by the gods, and to them she offers her reasons. Clytaemestra does not see a need to explain her actions to the people of Argos, for their judgements are not her concern. Clytaemestra refers to Zeus only to the extent that she envisions the avenging of Iphigenia's death as an act that would be judged righteous in Zeus' eyes and perhaps even necessary for the restoration of justice. Agamemnon deserves his fate in her opinion -

> Were it religion to pour wine above the slain, this man deserved, more than deserved such sacrament. He filled our cup with evil things unspeakable and now himself come home he has drunk it to the dregs. (Ag. 1432-34)

- and his sacrifice is indeed necessary:

> By my child's Justice driven to fulfillment, by her Wrath and Fury, to whom I sacrificed this man, the hope that walks my chambers is not traced with fear. (Ag. 1432-34)

Clytaemestra is so firm in her conviction that her actions are just to the gods that she does not fear the judgement of the chorus. She brandishes her old justice "rights" with words that are as bitter as the wine of her vengeance. There is not acquiescence to the will of the gods in her words, just prideful seizure of the gods' ugly justice through vengeance. Thus, the reader finds himself back in a "discussion" of fate and free will and their relationship to Clytaemestra's pride. Whether or not she chooses to do so, Clytaemestra discards the roles of wife, queen, and mother. Does the fate of the curse cause her to shirk these roles and adopt such hatred? She revels in her deed. Clytaemestra is seen by the chorus as unabashedly proud of the act of murder itself. "Standing above the corpse, obscene as some

carrion crow she sings the crippled song and is proud." (Ag. 1472-74).

The chorus also foresees the end that awaits Clytaemestra: "still fate grinds on yet more stones the blade for more act of terror." The old men of the chorus, having witnessed one of the prophesies of Cassandra reach fruition, anticipate in a cryptic fashion the atrocities of the house to come. Both Clytaemestra and the chorus agree that Clytaemestra committed the murder of her own volition. Up to this point, they differ as to the "justice" of the incident and what the results of the action will be, but not as to her responsibility.

"Can you claim that I have done this?" (Ag. 1497) asks Clytaemestra of the chorus. She adds that in her shadow stands the "old stark avenger of Atreus" and that "his revel of hatred struck down this man" (Ag. 1502). Does this offer a refutation of what she said earlier about committing the crime? Has the pride she displayed over the murder disappeared? Is Clytaemestra claiming that her crime was fated for her and that she was merely an extension of the curse and not responsible for what occurred? Her decision is still valid, and her intention could be to add emphasis to her contention that the murder of Agamemnon is a just act of retribution, a sacrifice for the death of Iphigeneia. She may not be denying her free will in the killing of Agamemnon, but rather making the point that she did so as a willing extension of the "justice" of the curse. On the other hand, she may be completely denying responsibility and contradicting her earlier statements. In either case, Clytaemestra is searching for justification.

Clytaemestra might also be readying the reader for the entrance of Aegisthus by uttering in this selfsame passage the ambiguous line, "speak to me nevermore as the wife of Agamemnon" (Ag. 1498-99). This passage could be construed to mean that Clytaemestra is noting a loss of identity in becoming an avenger of the old avenger of hatred. The passage could also mark a change in identity, in becoming the wife of the newest avenger who seethes with hatred and makes it his trade. At this point, the reader finds himself wondering about the role of Aegisthus in Clytaemestra's decision. Perhaps Aegisthus played on Clytaemestra's sorrow over the death of Iphigeneia and turned it to hatred for her once-beloved Agamemnon. Once Aegisthus had gained enough of Clytaemestra's trust to allow him to share her bed, sharing his hatred was a step easily taken.

> O splendor and exaltation of this day of doom! Now I can say more that the high gods look down on mortal crimes and vindicate the right at last, now that I see this man - sweet sight - before me here sprawled in the tangling nets of fury, to atone the calculated evil of his father's hand. (Ag. 1577-82)

This is a bold and brazen Aegisthus that appears at the end of Agamemnon. He speaks as if the injustice he was subjected to has finally been corrected. He judges that the gods in creating this atonement have restored the justice that existed before his father's rancid feast. Aegisthus may have been the one who told Clytaemestra that retributive justice was the will of Zeus and instilled a pride in her hatred for Agamemnon. He certainly sees himself in a position to judge the gods' actions. Aegisthus used Clytaemestra for his own ends; she was an instrument of his will. This exposes the true nature of the curse in that Clytaemestra was susceptible to being coached into thinking she had chosen to perform the act.

Aegisthus is not concerned with justice, not even in the barbaric sense of retribution, but with something even more loathsome. The chorus threatens Aegisthus by stating that the people will not stand for his actions and Clytaemestra's and that they will retaliate with "stones of anger" aimed at his head (vengeance does not seem to be a sickness limited to the house of Atreus). Aegisthus reacts by first berating

the chorus and then stating, "still with money I shall endeavor to control the citizens. The mutinous man shall feel the yoke drag at his neck" (Ag. 1638-40). Thus, we see that Aegisthus' intentions are insidious and beyond simply avenging his siblings' deaths. He seeks the power of the kingship of Argos and the potential to make of it a vile tyranny.

At this point in the play, Aegisthus and the chorus are about to draw their swords to end the heated argument which has arisen over the murder of Agamemnon. The reader is prepared to witness the ends old justice offers, more bloodshed. Aegisthus claims that he is not afraid of death as he puts his hands on the sword hilt, and the chorus states its resolve to test his fears and to "take up the word of fate" (Ag. 1653). Who is it that speaks to stop more bloodshed and more violence?

> No, my dearest, dearest of all men, we have done enough
> no more violence
> Here is a monstrous harvest in bitter reaping time.
> There is pain enough already. Let us not be bloody now,
> honored gentlemen of Argos, go to your homes now and
> give way to the fate of stress
> and season. We could not do otherwise than we did.
> If this is the end of suffering, we can be content
> broken as we are by the brute heel of destiny.
> (Ag. 1653-60)

The vengeance and anger of Clytaemestra have been replaced with an understanding of the situation and a resignation to claim responsibility for the action taken. She displays a reason that seeks to end the bloodshed. She refuses, at this point, the image of justice she acted upon earlier. Lurking in Clytaemestra's words is the understanding "that the brute heel of destiny" will repay her for her actions. Is she seeking an end to the bloodshed now? Is this sudden wish to end violence motivated by a fear of old justice claiming her life as well? If this curse was ever on a leash, it is absurd for Clytaemestra to think she can constrain it after she let it loose. For, as she said earlier, "before this old wound heals, it bleeds again" (Ag. 1450). Driven by fate, destiny, and the curse, the old system of justice is always hungry for more blood.

So where is justice in this stage of its evolution? Justice is primordial. Clytaemestra's actions do not yield an end to this inward hatred, but its perpetuation. She ends the bloodshed between Aegisthus and the chorus, but her husband's blood still flows beneath their feet. Only momentarily, in one instance, does she see the futility of righting violence with more violence, of trying to reclaim a life by seizing another. Clytaemestra and her justice still wear carriage-horse blinders.

Clytaemestra's thirst for personal vengeance leads to more than her love turning to hatred, it convolutes her loyalties and concern for the state of which she is queen. Clytaemestra has not only stained the throne of the king (Zeus' representative), but also allows tyranny to enter the state Argos - which the chorus perceives as worse than death.

If the purpose of justice is to restore the proper order of good after a wrong has been committed, her actions were more than fruitless; they were unjust. The imbalance of order that the curse has created becomes more severe as the bodies of Agamemnon and Cassandra are added to the vengeance end of the scales. This justice has a limited vision of individual concern which not only obscures the concerns of society and the wisdom of pluralism in decision making, but also fails most fundamentally in aiding the individual. Old justice momentarily mollifies seething hatred and feelings of betrayal, and then, as the reader witnesses, repays the avenger in the currency of twofold hatred and death. As the reader turns his eyes and

expectations toward the inevitable homecoming of Orestes, the words of Cassandra are remembered:

> We two must die, yet die not vengeless by the gods. For there shall come on to avenge us also, born to slay his mother, and to wreak death for his father's blood...for this is a strong oath and worn by the high gods. (Ag. 1278-85)

The anger of the house in the Libation Bearers now manifests itself by terrorizing the sleep of its inhabitants and most acutely Clytaemestra's. The chorus graphically describes the state of the house of Atreus and the despair of ever resolving the curse. Only new blood-guilt with deeper stains is brought on by Agamemnon's death; at this point, "all the world's waters running in a single drift" cannot wash out the stains. Yet, as the chorus stands before the grave with Electra offering prayers to placate the angry spirit of Agamemnon, the women beseech Electra to ask for more death as a means of attaining a just solution. In the midst of the cacophony of voices filled with the prideful and angry timbre of vengeance, one voice, Electra's, defies the chorus by introducing a crucial distinction. As she asks the old women of the chorus how to appeal to her dishonored father, she entreats Agamemnon's spirit to pay back Clytaemestra for the evils she has committed. Yet, when the chorus tells Electra to ask for a body of men to ensure that her wish is fulfilled, Electra makes a distinction not seen up to this point: "to judge them, or to give them punishment?" (Lib. 120).

In this passage, Electra recognizes that there is a difference between reaching a judgement on a situation and inflicting punishment. She also imagines a judgement rendered by a body of men, not by an individual. The chorus tries to persuade Electra into simply asking for a life to be taken to honor the corpse of Agamemnon, as if she is foolish and deluded to ask such a question and make such a distinction. Electra also asks whether her appeal for more violence would be considered just in the eyes of one panel of judges, the gods. The chorus responds by simply quoting the law that it is obviously "right to strike back when struck first." Amazingly, Electra does not respond as if entranced by a curse that strikes at an inward penchant to do evil. She asks for temperance. Although she asks for the justice of vengeance, she admits that it is an evil prayer. Electra is not blind to moderation in discerning good from evil and is aware of her brother's and deceased father's welfares, not just vengeance. The curse is not an involuntary affliction in Electra's case, for she does not assume the destiny of bloodshed. With this recognition, the hope of justice's evolution resides.

> And for myself, grant that I be more temperate of heart than my mother; that I act with purer hand such are the prayers for us; but for our enemies, father, I pray that your avenger come, that they who killed you shall be killed in turn, as they deserve between my prayer for good and my prayer for good I set this prayer for evil: and I speak against Them. (Lib. 140-46)

Enter Orestes. After confirming his identity to Electra and being exalted by her as "hope of the seed of our salvation" (Lib. 269) and the recipient of all the love her sister, father, and mother would have received, Orestes explains his situation. The tone of his statements is not fraught with pride and blind conviction, but with doubt and deliberation. He outlines to Electra and the chorus the "big strength of Apollo's oracle" (Lib. 269) with as much intention to convince himself of the power of Apollo's words as his audience. Entering into his deliberation is the welfare of others and an understanding of the vengeance that he thinks must also be acted out

to appease Apollo's "justice" and the wrath of his father.

> Shall I not trust oracles such as this? Or if I do not trust them, here is work that must be done. Here numerous desires converge to drive me on: the thought that these my citizens, most high renowned of men, who toppled Troy in show of courage, must go subject to this brace of women. (Lib. 297-04)

Clearly, Orestes is not void of anger, but he is not a vessel of blind rage, overweaning pride, and a thirst for blood. He recognizes the concerns of others and examines his situation. Clytaemestra acted with less of an appeal to reason and without consideration for others. It must be said on behalf of both that the chorus is the only voice singing the thredony of vengeful justice joyfully. Yet, both Electra and Orestes still speak the vernacular and annunciate the laws of old justice. Both still seek revenge and never contradict the enthusiasm of the chorus. Electra, for all her wanting of temperance, still wishes to "smash their heads" (Lib. 395), and Orestes asks to "take her life [Clytamestra's] and die for it" (Lib. 438). But this reader tends to find it easier to sympathize with the words that follow from Orestes and the mitigating circumstances and motives behind his actions than with Clytaemestra. In lines 554 through 585, Orestes relates the plan of treachery that Apollo spelled out for him and asks for that god to guide his actions.

Orestes proceeds with the plan and when he tells his mother of his own death through the use of a stranger's tongue, she blames the curse for cutting down her son. Clytaemestra is not relieved that her possible avenger will not have the capability of killing her now. She laments the death of Orestes. After the chorus follows through on Apollo's plan by informing Clissa to tell Aegisthus not to come with bodyguards, it offers a prayer of supplication to Zeus and asks the "gods of sympathy" to "wash out the blood in fair spoken verdict - let the old murder in the house breed no more" (Lib. 802). The chorus sees sympathy in vengeance. The women add that they want the gods to guide Orestes' hand in the "innocent murder." The chorus seems to think that this bloodshed will cause an end to bloodshed.

First Orestes kills Aegisthus, and then he confronts Clytaemestra. He still is doubtful of what should be done. He first asks his friend Pylades, "what shall I do, Pylades? Be shamed to kill my mother?" (Lib. 899). From this point onward, we see that Orestes is more a victim of fate and destiny than Clytaemestra ever claimed to be. We see again in the coming responses that Orestes is not a blind agent of fate. Pylades' response exposes the role of the gods (in this case Apollo) in determining justice. He reminds Orestes that the oracles compel him to take Clytaemestra's life. "Count all men hateful to you rather than the gods" (Lib. 902), remarks Pylades. Clytaemestra, hearing this, probably realizes that compassion has not left Orestes' heart and reminds him that she is his mother. Orestes' response is simple. He asks how he could ever live with the woman who killed his father. She now changes the position she held after the murder of Agamemnon by saying, "destiny had some part in that my child" (Lib. 909). Orestes responds with, "why then, destiny has wrought that this shall be your death."

Clytaemestra then reminds Orestes of the Furies that will haunt him if he carries out his deed and of the evils of Agamemnon's acts. When that fails, she retorts that he is responsible and that he just wants to kill her. Orestes responds, "no, it will be you who kill yourself. It will not be I" (Lib. 923). Clytaemestra again reminds him of the Furies. Undaunted, another motivation for having to kill his mother emerges: "how shall I escape my father's curse if I fail here?" (Lib. 925). Orestes then takes her life. One must wonder if he would have taken his mother's life had not this mandate come from Apollo's and Agamemnon's avenging spirits. Personal revenge and pride do not figure in his decision as they did in

Clytaemestra's.

At this point, the chorus and Orestes seem to have an inkling of the coming trial. The chorus explains that it thinks Orestes is right in his actions because he was blessed by the gods, and that ceremonies will "wash clean and cast out the furies" (Lib. 968). They see a time when the remaining members of the house of Atreus will be free from the curse. Unlike his mother, Orestes publicly explains his actions to the people of Argos. He shows concern for them and respect for their opinions by offering this explanation. Orestes asks Zeus to "look on my mother's sacrilegious handiwork and be a witness for me in my day of trial how it was in the right that I achieved this death" (Lib. 986-88).

The pride Clytaemestra displayed after the murder of Agamemnon is not present in Orestes' words, but his concern for others' interests is: "I grieve for the thing done, the death and all our race. I have won; but my victory is soiled, and has no pride" (Lib. 1016-17).

The reader then has a second murder which involves an individual who is not fueled with hatred and bloodlust, a man who is compelled by the god Apollo and his father's curse. He is not proud of his action or under the sway of a lover and is concerned with the welfare of the kingdom as well as his own, unlike Clytaemestra. The reader may venture to say that this is a more "just" murder, considering the circumstances. Justice has evolved in its intentions but not in its ends. The act is still wrong, and as even the chorus realizes, is not the answer to the end of bloodshed.

> The children were eaten: there was the first affliction, the curse of Thyestes. Next came the royal death, when a man and lord of Achaean armies went down killed in a bath. Third is for the savior. He came. Shall I call it that, or death? Where is the end? Where shall the fury of fate be stilled to sleep, be done with? (Lib. 1068-76)

The voice of old justice in the Libation Bearers whose strong words and frequent quotation of "blood stroke for the stroke of blood" ironically speaks of the futility in regaining peace and saving the royal house through this harsh, barbaric law. Perhaps the reader can find more sympathy for Orestes because of his circumstance, but he killed his mother and that is unjust. The role of the gods and fate in his actions may clear Orestes of responsibility, but an atrocity still has been committed. The fact that Orestes appears to have little or no choice in taking his mother's life incriminates the divine will that forced him into that situation. The gods are not capable of being judges because they are merely criminals who use old justice as an instrument of their whims.

Driven out of the house of Atreus by Clytaemestra's bloodhounds, the Furies, Orestes seeks refuge in the sanctuary of Apollo's temple at Delphi at the beginning of the Eumenides. After Apollo acknowledges responsibility for the crime, he sends Orestes to Athens to appeal to the wisdom of Athena in this matter. The sides are formed: one is the ghost of Clytaemestra and the Furies, who seek the perpetuation of vengeance; the other is Orestes and Apollo, who want an end to the bloodshed and the haunting Furies.

The two sides represent more than vengeance and clemency. The chorus (the Furies) points out that Apollo is a "young god" who has "ridden down powers grey with age" (Eum. 150) and that his acts spite tradition. Thus, the reader can also sense that the argument of the Furies will be based on the authority of conventional justice and a fear of losing their role in that justice. They think a new distribution of power which includes mortals in justice will not include the Furies. They thus accuse Apollo: "he made man's way cross the place of the ways of god and blighted

the age-old distribution of power" (Eum. 171-72).

Armed with their fears, the Furies insist incessantly that they have a right to their justice. They claim that it is an integral aspect of the divine order. Apollo responds by speaking of the ugliness of this justice of vengeance and stating, "the gods spit out the manner of that feast that your loves lean to." This, the reader could imagine, is a preparation for the outcome of the trial. Despite what the reader has witnessed of the gods using this justice in the past two plays, Apollo makes it clear that now the gods find such justice repugnant. The Furies have not a chance, for the gods are vindicating themselves, even if through contradiction.

Apollo begins by facing the Furies' objections that kindred blood is more sacred than a blood bond within the oath of marriage. This they see as a way of making Orestes' act more foul than Clytaemesta's. Apollo sees the relationship of a married man and woman as guided by "right of nature" (Eum. 218). The two sides represent the sides of blood bonds being the stronger and convenant oath bonds as the stronger. Since the bond between a citizen and a state is one of oath, not blood, the justice which is created to suit a society must be made with this distinction addressed. Apollo seems to be concerned with keeping his oaths and promises to Orestes for fear of the wrath Orestes will exercise if wronged. The reader witnesses the role of the gods changing because mankind has a power which holds even the gods accountable; perhaps it is man's appeal to justice. "But I shall give the supplicant help and rescue, for if I willingly fail him who turns to me for aid, his wrath before gods and men, is a fearful thing" (Eum. 232-34).

Yet, both Apollo and the Furies are appealing to a false understanding of their authority, like inept parents. Apollo wants to claim that he "speaks justly" because of his seer's wisdom and favored position with Zeus. The Furies see their "right to office" as license to "conspire to steer men's lives" (Eum. 310-11) with their song of frenzy and fear. But the dangers of justice based solely on the authority of those involved have already been shown. There is a difference between the two appeals though, in that the Furies see as a right of their office a justice that ignores circumstance. "We hold memory of evil; we are stern nor can men's pleadings bend us" (Eum. 383), say the Furies. Yet Apollo asks Orestes to be cleared on the basis of the reasons for his actions. Amazingly, both parties allow the court the right to judge their case despite their contentions that their station makes their actions right. Therefore, not only will the court of mortals be judging the actions of a man, but they will also be asked to assess the offices of the divinities that are in opposition. No more unconditional smiting, hunting or haunting will be afforded the gods. They are being held accountable - being judged. The gods will no longer thrive on executive privilege.

The court is assembled. Twelve honored citizens of Athens shall strive to find truth. All evidences are admissible and deliberation is recognized as essential. The reader readies himself for an exciting stage of evolution. He pushes onward through the pages anticipating a triumph, an end to the madness.

> Litigants, call you witnesses, have ready your proofs as evidence under bond to keep this case secure. I will pick the finest of my citizens, and come back. They shall swear to make no judgement that is not just, and make clear where in this action the truth lies. (Eum. 485-89)

At the outset of the trial, the Furies show the inconsistency and lack of foresight that old justice affords. They first comment on a valid concern, namely, that the precedent that could be set by freeing Orestes of responsibility would lead to a chaos of matricide, claiming the lives of many. The Furies' concern for themselves and for their role as representing the authority of tradition emerges. Because in

the following stanza the Furies feel "parents shall await the deathstroke at the hands of their children" (Eum. 498), they warn that they (the Furies) will "let loose indiscriminate death" in order to punish mankind (Eum. 502). Thus, they do not seem to be sincerely concerned with the welfare of mankind, but with the honor of their office. For if it were a legitimate concern of theirs that this act of acquittal would lead to the chaos of children killing parents, why would they have mankind atone for this wrong by wreaking indiscriminate death? The Furies also must sense the fall of the "house of Justice" in the process of deliberation itself, as well they should. After all, as they argue, the only things that instill respect for the laws are fear and pain. They doubt that fury would have any place in a justice of deliberation and reason.

Within the Furies' questioning of Orestes, another fault of old justice is exposed. When Orestes speaks of the dishonor his mother Clytaemestra committed, the chorus retorts, "of this stain death has set her free, but you still live." One must pay for his dishonor with death in the old justice.

Orestes asks Apollo to help him at this point because he does not have a refutation of the Furies' claims. He does not scramble for contradictory justifications like his mother, but courageously takes responsibility for his actions. Once again, his affinity for deliberation comes to the fore. Orestes asks Apollo to answer the Furies and adds, "but was the bloodshed right or not?" Apollo's response is another appeal to authority in that what was done was commanded by Zeus. The gift of kingship is a gift given by the hand of Zeus and through his own kingship. Apollo claims to act on behalf of a dishonored Zeus. The murder is justified as a correction of this dishonor.

In an attempt to prove Zeus a poor character witness, the Furies remind the jurors of how Cronos was enslaved by him. The Furies claim this is proof that a stance based on the divine stature of kings as unassailable is one of contradiction for Zeus. Thus, the reader sees two additional sides being drawn. Apollo responds to this attack by calling the Furies "foul animals" and stating that death, unlike enslavement, is an irreversible end. The Furies do not imagine any effective and fair implementation of justice as being anything other than dealing out rations of death.

In such a childish fashion, the proceedings move along. The divine elements in the play concoct bigger and better threats to sway the citizens of Athens. Neither Apollo nor the Furies argue righteousness from any stance other than that of authority. They do not bait one another into serious discussions based on the motivations of Clytaemestra and Orestes, the debacle of Argos, or the ends to which this justice is leading them.

The citizens show integrity and thought in that their decision of half advocating acquittal and half not reflects the evidence that there are good reasons to judge in favor of either the ghost of Clytaemestra or Orestes within the old justice. They are stalwart in their resolution and unaffected by the threats of the gods. The citizens also do not think the fact that Athena was born without a mother is an important consideration in the case. That fact has nothing to do with the case before them. Yet, in another display of frivolous, benighted divine judgement, Athena decides to cast her deciding vote for Orestes because she feels she is living proof that the role of the father is necessary to the creation of life and the mother is not. She judges Orestes' life or death on the basis that one kind of murder is less offensive than another, namely that matricide is not as evil as patricide.

Orestes wins. Despite the bickering and the childishness of Apollo and the Furies and the limited wisdom of Athena, the bloodshed finally ends. The brooding Furies are placated with a new name and station; they become the passion to be treated justly. Thus, Athens is not blighted with a famine and the world has a new resplendent justice. The bloodshed ends. Mankind has a future.

Along with Orestes, mankind wins this case because he can now free himself from

the pathetic litigants of this case. The gods' authority is imbued in the court, but they no longer preside as judges. The gods have been escorted out of the courtroom to adorn the steps outside with their marble images. This one aspect of justice's evolution reaches fruition.

Another crucial aspect of its evolution is that it moves from individualistic vengeance to pluralistic reason. The preservation of the kingship and order of Argos reflects a societal concern. The pluralism of the jury and the presence of the court will not be obscured with cloudy, subjective thinking. The jury can offer clemency and compassion and can consider circumstances for mankind's benefit. The future of his laws and their interpretation is finally out of the hands of the selfish, fickle gods. Man now has mastery over his fate; he has the power of true justice.

Mankind's justice now has the capability to reflect and foster the beautiful aspects of his nature: compassion and reason. Now hatred and justice are not irreconcilable. The chorus, which throughout the trilogy has been the voice of old justice, offers the reader the prayer of man's new justice in the conclusion of the Oresteia:

> This is my prayer: Civil War fattening on men's ruin shall
> not thunder in our city. Let not the dry dust that drinks
> the black blood of citizens through passion for revenge
> and bloodshed for bloodshed be given our state to prey upon.
> Let them render grace for grace. Let love be their common will;
> let them hate with single heart. Much wrong in the world thereby
> is healed. (Eum. 976-87)

All textual references are taken from Richmond Lattimore's translation of the Oresteia printed by the University of Chicago Press in 1953.

A Letter from an Alumnus

The following letter was written by a graduate of St. John's College and addressed to a current tutor. The New York Times Book Review article that is referred to in the letter is entitled "What's Left Out of Literature" and was written by Charles Newman.

Summer 1987

Dear Tutor,

Here's the article from the NY Times Book Review that I mentioned. He occasionally gets carried away with the literary criticism lingo, but most of it seems coherent, and I think he is very accurate with many of his arrows/observations. The musing in the final paragraphs about the "why" of it all relates to, gee, the debate about liberal education--a debate that has perhaps subsided but the conclusions of which, nevertheless, people don't really want to face. I think the "cultural weightlessness" this fellow speaks of is very much at the heart of the contemporary educated person's disposition towards the world. It receives expression not only in the literature, which a lot of people don't like, but also in the music and certainly in films, each of which are, in contrast to the literature, very popular. I think this makes a certain amount of sense in that there is little to distract one from the emptiness of a novel or short story, while there is plenty of distraction to be had in music and at the movies. Recent NY "art films," like Jim Jarmusch's Down by Law and David Byrne's True Stories (which you've seen), and also the summer's Hollywood smash, The Untouchables, are weightless in the extreme, to my eye, and for the most part I do think this was the intention of the filmmaker. I am friends with the assistant editor of Down by Law, and was at the opening of True Stories, where Byrne came out afterwards and fielded questions for an hour. He made it clear that the irony of the movie was intended as detail and comic relief, and that the general expression was one of approbation. It was the judgement of a sophisticated New Yorker that the small town scene in Texas is okay too and that whatever one does and must do to find happiness has to be considered fine-- what basis for criticism exists, after all? We all want to be happy. Byrne then was intending to lecture the sophisticated New Yorkers a bit, in this odd way. I for one wish he had not been so generous. For better or worse, I don't think that "whatever" is "fine." Too many nights listening to conversations of Happy People in a taxi has left me with this sour state of mind.

My roommate and I had something of an argument about The Untouchables. She works in video, is a movie person more or less, and, like most of the NY movie people I know, thought it was a great film. I saw it with four movie people, and all they could do was rave about the cinematography, the "sepia tones," the campy (but so what?) performances of de Niro and Connery, and, above all, the director's "quotations" from Hitchcock, and of the famous baby-carriage-on-the-steps scene from the classic Potemkin. On and on. All the while ignoring-- that is, accepting with no qualms-- the comic book treatment of the theme. The theme was law and order, for it's the story of the treasury agent Elliot Ness, who was imported into Chicago to try to nail Al Capone. Every character in the film was a caricature. No attempt was

made to defend with development any of the pertinent cliches.

A high-priced NY playwright did the script (David Mamet), and I have to assume he had his reasons for restricting himself to the comic book approach. I can even think of a good reason, to wit, to force a pseudo-sophisticated audience to face the cliches and acknowledge their simple truths, for the modern audience has seen everything. There is no surprising or shocking it, and its sole critical activity has become the activity of recognizing and filing away the familiar formulas. In doing so, it assures itself that whatever is being aired has been seen and presumably deconstructed before and requires no direct consideration. I am not saying this very well, but I think its one of the most important things to note about the way contemporary, educated people approach expressions of all sorts, about the way they approach the world. I listen to it all the time in the cab, and this is really one of the main reasons I took to recording taxi conversations; what I would call social considerations seem to rule 90% of all discussions, regardless of content. It is most important to have something to say immediately, to say it, to be agreed with, and to pass on the next thing. That is, the aim is to dispense with whatever has been said, and if there's to be any dissecting at all, it's accomplished with stupid cynicism and pseudo-sophistication. Entertainment remains as the only value-- how entertaining, for whatever reason, was the film/play/book/painting/person, and more importantly, how entertaining is the blithe discussion in which it/he/she is recognized and filed away? For Mamet, then, to write a screenplay about law and order that is no more sophisticated than a Dick Tracy cartoon is to provide the audience with very little entertainment of the latter sort, for the bare cliche is dispensed with the barest amount of entertaining after-theater conversation.

The problem with this tack is that people simply ignore the theme altogether. Especially when the movie's director, Brian de Palma, is obsessed with film history and technique, and is notorious for making movies that say nothing. If it was Mamet's intention to try to make people face the simplicity of the cliche truth, it didn't work well, at least not with the sophisticated NY audience, not with the NY movie people. As to whether it matters that the theme gets no better treatment than it does in a comic book-- to ask such a question is to invite embarassed silence. My movie roommate finally said, in exasperation, that it's not necessary that the movie say anything important. I replied that, of course, it's not necessary, but for that matter movies period are not necessary. Necessity has nothing to do with it. What one would like to see, rather, is the question. What one likes, finds interesting, worthy of attention, worth the time. In considering this, I said that a multi-million dollar project that says nothing more than a thirty cent comic book seems less than what one should be satisfied with, and that during this summer America has fallen in love with Oliver North and similar people who seem to have less of an understanding of the complexity of the law and order questions than one would wish in men working in the White House. When I made these admittedly simple and glib sort of suggestions about what I would have preferred The Untouchables to be, my roommate said "I get very uncomfortable when I feel I'm being lectured," implying that when something makes her uncomfortable she dispenses with it. Her meaning was that a "serious" treatment of the law and order theme was not only unnecessary but was not at all to be desired, would be declasse, something NY movie people, and perhaps sophisticated audiences in other cities too, would not put up with. Further it would be an insult to their intelligence. But these might well be the words of Ollie North, and Poindexter, and who knows who else. In any case, the attitude that an attempt to state a developed position, one in which certain values are seriously defended or attacked, is something that should not be made is the serious underlying attitude of the sophisticated audience. I do think it's pseudo-sophistication, and I think the article here is talking well about this sort of thing. In the end, as the fellow suggests, its a sign of an ignorance, "a king of a quiet nervous breakdown," due to

the fact that "we don't quite know what has happened to us." To admit to such a state would be quite paralyzing for people with a conscience.

Most of the contemporary music is trash. I've always thought Springsteen an exception, of course, and there are others I consider great poets and great protesters. The two needn't necessarily go hand in hand, but they seem to these days. This is something from a lecture Albert Camus gave in Paris, in 1957, a year before I was born:

> On occasion art may be a deceptive luxury...For about a century we have been living in a society that is not even the society of money (gold can arouse carnal passions) but that of the abstract symbols of money. The society of merchants can be defined as a society in which things disappear in favor of signs. When a ruling class measures its fortunes not by the acre of land or the ingot of gold, but by the number of figures corresponding ideally to a certain number of exchange operations, it thereby condemns itself to setting a certain kind of humbug at the center of its experience...There is no reason for being surprised that such a society chose as its religion a moral code of formal principles and that it inscribes the words "liberty" and "equality" on its prisons as well as on its temples of finance...Is there anything surprising in the fact that such a society asked art to be not an instrument of liberation but an inconsequential exercise and a mere entertainment? Consequently, a fashionable society in which all troubles were money troubles and all worries were sentimental worries was satisfied for decades with its society novelists and with the most futile art in the world, the one about which Oscar Wilde, thinking of himself before he knew prison, said that the greatest of all vices was superficiality.
>
> In this way the manufacturers of art of middle-class Europe, before and after 1900, accepted irresponsibility because responsibility presupposed a painful break with society (those who really broke with it are named Rimbaud, Nietzsche, Strindberg, and we know the price they paid). From that period we get the theory of art for art's sake, which is merely a voicing of that irresponsibility...The more art specializes, the more necessary popularisation becomes. In this way millions of people will have the feeling of knowing this or that great artist of our time because they have learned from the newspapers that he raises canaries or that he never stays married for more than six months. The greatest renown today consists in being admired or hated without having been read...
>
> Consequently, there is nothing surprising in the fact that almost everything worthwhile created in the mercantile Europe of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries-- in literature, for instance-- was raised up against the society of its time. It may be said that until almost the time of the French Revolution current literature was, in the main, a literature of consent. From the moment when middle-class society became stabilized, a literature of revolt developed instead...
>
> There is no need of determining whether art must flee reality or defer to it, but rather what precise dose of reality the work must take on as ballast to keep from floating up among the clouds or from dragging along the ground with weighted boots. Each artist solves this problem according to his lights and abilities.

> ...The loftiest work will always be, as in the greek tragedies, Melville, Tolstoy, Moliere, the work that maintains an equilibrium between reality and man's rejection of that reality, each forcing the other upward in a ceaseless overflowing, characteristic of life itself at its most joyous and heart-rendering extremes. Then, every once in a while, a new world appears, different from the everyday world and yet the same, particular but universal, full of innocent insecurity... That's just it and yet that is not it; the world is nothing and the world is everything-- this is the contradictory and tireless cry of every true artist, the cry that keeps him on his feet...

Much is missing here between the last paragraph and the bulk of what I've typed before it, mostly a discussion of social realism and of romanticism. The debate comes to this ambiguous, uniting conclusion. Whatever its merits, the idea that "weightlessness," that a value-neutral literature, a literature of silence, can be reputable, seems something Camus would argue against, and something that itself calls for protest. This hasn't been a very clear transistion from the stuff above about movies, but... Here is a Springsteen lyric. It eventually, at the end, touches on out theme. It isn't a poem proper, but is a lyric to a song only a piece of the Piece, but--

JUNGLELAND

(somewhat quietly, with piano and flute in background)

The Rangers had a homecoming
In Harlem late last night
And the Magic Rat drove his sleek machine
Over the Jersey state line
Barefoot girl sitting on the hood of a Dodge
Drinking warm beer in the soft summer rain
The Rat pulls into town rolls up his pants
Together they take a stab at romance
And disappear down Flamingo Lane

Well the maximum Lawmen run down Flamingo
Chasing the Rat and barefoot girl
And the kids round here look just like shadows
Always quiet, holding hands
From the churches to the jails
Tonight all is silence in the world
As we take our stand
Down in Jungleland

(crashing rock and roll)

The midnight gangs assemble
And pick a rendezvous for the night
They'll meet 'neath that giant Exxon sign
That brings this fair city light
There's an opera out on the turnpike
There's a ballet being fought out in the alley
Until the local cops

Cherry tops
Rip this holy night

The street's alive as secret debts are paid
Contacts made, they vanish unseen
Kids flash guitars just like switchblades
Hustling for the record machine
The hungry and the hunted
Explode in a rock and roll band
Face off against each other in the street
Down in Jungleland

In the parking lot the visionaries
Dressing in the latest rage
Inside the backstreet girls are dancing
To the records that the DJ plays
Lonely-hearted lovers struggle in dark corners
Desperate as the night moves on
Just one look, and a whisper,
And they're gone

(breakdown in beat, turn to a long,
jazzy saxophone instrumental that
eventually dies down to the long piano,
sounding exhausted, lost)

Beneath the city two hearts beat
Soul engines running through a night so tender
In a bedroom locked in whispers of soft refusal
And then surrender

In the tunnels uptown
The Rat's own dream guns him down
The shots echo down them hallways in the night
No one watches as the ambulance pulls away
Or as the girl shuts out the bedroom light
(rising)
Outside the street's on fire
In a real death waltz
Between what's flesh and what's fantasy
And the poets down here
Don't write nothing at all
They just stand back and let it all be
And in the quick of the night
They reach for their moment
And try to make an honest stand
But they wind up wounded, not even dead
Tonight in Jungleland

It's the silence, noted in the first two stanzas and then returned to in the last, that made me think of this right now. The crazy struggles take place, oddly, surrounded by silence, and there's a protest here that some people, perhaps the "kids just like shadows" but clearly the "poet," should say something. They have an obligation to say something. I think there's a reference to the very first important

song written by Paul Simon, back in 1967, entitled The Sounds of Silence.

Jungleland seems to me far from a naive or romantic view of several different strains of struggle, by the way. It adopts a cartoon hero form, but then turns on itself: the black hero/dreamer dies ignominiously, in a sense a suicide, indeed; his girl has no choice but to just turn out the light; the worshipping youth are conned into a stupid war, eventually setting their world on fire, uncertain of what is real and what is not, uncertain of the value of reality and fantasy. This is something like the uncertainty that Newman writes about in his last few paragraphs perhaps; Newman begins his piece by complaining about the silence of the poets in the face of all this, whereas Springsteen ends his with the same complaint. But each suggests that the poets are wounded, something quite different than the controlled silence of Minimalist art of the seventies, for instance.

I really had no intention of writing all this. I have very little in the way of organized things to say. Concerning my alleged novel, I have an impossible time trying to judge it, whether it is silent and empty. Or do I -- I guess I don't worry that it's empty. I do worry that no one will, nevertheless, care enough about such a character to read it. It is written from a depressed view of life, certainly. Today such an attitude is not in vogue. I had not adopted the attitude; it was/is something I have to contend with. The hero is not a cartoon character. He has to be both strong and weak. There have to be reasons for people to care about him, as the narrator does. At the same time, there have to be given the secrets of his failure, which the narrator has only barely come to understand as he begins to wonder if he, the narrator, isn't really the better man. That's something he was always sure wasn't so, having always been sure of his inferiority. But then is he the better man, or merely better suited for life? Is viability the only criterion? If so, the question of what happens to a good man in a bad city never gets aired. For such a scenario to exist there must be other criteria to allow for the unviable organism to be nevertheless deemed good. Without other criteria the environment is always the measure, cannot be deemed bad. Without other criteria, the bad city is a phantasma, impossible. It is a woman, the dead hero's old girl and the narrator's new love, who suggests to the latter that the hero was no hero, in that he was an unviable organism, suggesting then that no other criterion exists. And, given the new love, the narrator has good reason to agree, to dispense with the rival (dead but still a rival). The post-mortem, then, takes place subjected to all sorts of pressures, and is important in that it is an evaluation of how one evaluates life. Why live, why not die?

I hope this isn't so vague it is rubbish for you. I've been feeling better the past two weeks, but am still in the process of recovering. I've had little energy all summer, and this has been, I guess, an attempt to bash through and think about the task of painting this character. I've been writing very little, really afraid of doing it while my mind is slowed by the medical problem. I am feeling better, but it's disturbing to feel less than what I know I am. The boundary between the physiological and the psychological, of course has long been blurred. "Know thyself"--no mean thing.

I hope all is well with you.

Alla prossima,

St. John's Alumnus

ENERGEIA

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