

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The Epistemological Elements of the Special Theory of Relativity. Confirmations of the Theory

[Mr. Kiley has permitted us to print such excerpts of his doctoral dissertation entitled The Metaphysical Foundations of the Epistemology of Albert Einstein as would be appropriate for the Collegian. We have chosen Chapter I, Section D, which seemed to be both fundamental to his argument and generally accessible. We would like to point out that this selection represents a small preliminary part of a thesis built up over four detailed chapters, namely, "that there is no main Einsteinian epistemological doctrine which does not receive, in a completely natural and undistorted manner.....support by way of an essential explanation within the relevant metaphysical and psychological position of St. Thomas Aquinas".

E. B.]

The Special Theory of Relativity appeared for the first time as a monograph by Albert Einstein in Annalen der Physik 17 in 1905 and was entitled, "On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies". Considering the Newtonian-type revolution it would produce in man's view of his universe, it is remarkably brief, running to no more than thirty small pages.[115]

In the opening paragraph Einstein reviews a fact of nature regarding the behavior of magnets and their conducting coils. He briefly describes the fact as follows:

> If the magnet is in motion and the conductor at rest, there arises in the neighborhood of the magnet an electric field with a certain definite energy, producing a current at the places where parts of the conductor are situated. But if the magnet is stationery and the conductor in motion, no electric field arises in the neighborhood of the magnet. In the conductor, however, we find an electromotive force, to which in itself there is no corresponding energy, but which gives rise - assuming equality of relative motion in the two cases discussed - to electric currents of the same path and intensity as those produced by the electric forces in the former case.[116]

He then goes on to say that "examples of this sort suggest"....[117] (certain principles of physical nature to him) which escape the "customary view".[118] In the case of the relationship of magnets to a coil he says "the observable phenomenon here depends only on the relative motion of the conductor and the magnet, whereas the customary view draws a sharp distinction between the two cases in which either the one or the other of these bodies is in motion".[119]

Now, this above-noted fact (together with its subjective interpretation) is an example of the sort of thing, says Einstein, which when taken "together with the unsuccessful attempts to discover any motion of the earth relatively to the light medium, suggest that the phenomena of electro-dynamics as well as of mechanics possess no properties corresponding to the idea of absolute rest. They suggest rather that, as has already been shown to the first order of small quantities, the same laws of electro-dynamics and optics will be valid for all frames of reference for which the equations of mechanics hold good".[120]

Here attention must be given to this word used by Einstein, viz., "suggest". There has been seen in the previous sections Einstein's epistemologic insistence that (a) the scientist must start with experimental facts and that (b) these facts do not function as deductive but rather as suggestible material.

Writing much later in his career, Einstein is to reemphasize this beginning of Relativity theory in empirical fact. Thus:

> The general theory of relativity owes its existence in the first place to the empirical fact of the numerical equality of the inertial and gravitat-

> ional mass of bodies, for which fundamental fact classical mechanics provided no interpretation".[121]

These "facts" as Einstein calls them, must be scrutinized for their meaning, however. According to ordinary usage the fact that a magnet induces electric current in a closed coil, when the former is moved is what is commonly called a "fact". A typical "fact" is one which has the power by itself to overthrow a theory.

> Newton's fundamental principles were so satisfactory from the logical point of view that the impetus to overhaul them could only spring from the imperious demands of empirical fact. Before I go into this I must insist that Newton himself was better aware of the weakness inherent in his intellectual edifice than the generations of scientists which followed him. This fact has always aroused my respectful admiration, and I should like therefore to dwell on it for a moment.
>
> I. In spite of the fact that Newton's ambition to represent his system as necessarily conditioned by experience and to introduce the smallest possible number of concepts not directly referable to empirical objects is everywhere evident, he sets up the concept of absolute space and absolute time, for which he has often been criticized in recent years. But in this point Newton is particularly consistent. He had realized that observable geometrical magnitudes (distances of material points from one another) and their course in time do not completely characterize motion in its physical aspects. He proved this in the famous experiment with the rotating vessel of water. Therefore, in addition to masses and temporally variable distances, there must be something else that determines motion. That "something" he takes to be relation to "absolute space". He is aware that space must possess a kind of physical reality if his laws of motion are to have any meaning, a reality of the same sort as material point and the intervals between them.
>
> II. The introduction of forces acting directly and instantaneously at a distance into the representation of the effects of gravity is not in keeping with the character of most of the processes familiar to us from everyday life. Newton meets this objection by pointing to the fact that his law of reciprocal gravitation is not supposed to

> be a final explanation but a rule derived by induction from experience.
>
> III. Newton's teaching provided no explanation for the highly remarkable fact that the weight and the inertia of a body are determined by the same quantity (its mass). The remarkableness of this fact struck Newton himself.
>
> None of these three points can rank as a logical objection to the theory. In a sense they merely represent unsatisfied desires of the scientific spirit in its struggle for a complete and unitary penetration of natural events by thought. This short account is enough to show how the elements of Newtonian theory passed over into the general theory of relativity, whereby the three defects above mentioned were overcome.[122]

Einstein now tells us what the postulates of his special relativity theory are and gives a description of the first of them.

> The special theory of relativity is based on the following postulate, which is also satisfied by the mechanics of Galileo and Newton.
>
> If a system of co-ordinates K is chosen so that, in relation to it, physical laws hold good in their simplest form, the same laws also hold good in relation to any other system of co-ordinates K moving in uniform translation relatively to K. This postulate we call the "special principle of relativity". The word "special" is meant to intimate that the principle is restricted to the case when K has a motion of uniform translation relatively to K, but that the equivalence of K and K doesnot extend to the case of non-uniform motion of K relatively to K.[123]

At the same time he proposes a joint postulate that of the constant definite velocity of light completely independent of motion. The special theory will need only these two postulates, furthermore, as the basis of a satisfactory electro-dynamic theory using Maxwell's theory for fixed bodies as a point of departure. In addition, the postulates will assume nothing at all about a luminiferous ether since the theory will attempt to

overcome the need for an absolute immobile space which he, of course, referred to as an empirically defective "fact" cited in the previous quotation under heading one.

> We will raise this conjecture (the purport of which will hereafter be called the "Principle of Relativity") to the status of a postulate, and also introduce another postulate, which is only apparently irreconcilable with the former, namely, that light is always propagated in empty space with a definite velocity which is independent of the state of motion of the emitting body. These two postulates suffice for the attainment of a simple and consistent theory of the electro-dynamics of moving bodies based on Maxwell's theory for stationary bodies. The introduction of a "luminiferous ether" will prove to be superfluous inasmuch as the view here to be developed will not require an "absolutely stationery space" provided with special properties, nor assign a velocity-vector to a point of the empty space in which electro-magnetic processes take place.[124]

Einstein uses the word"conjecture"in referring to his first postulate. He is not yet dignifying it with the name of a theory: something arrived at by sufficient consideration of the arbitrarily chosen objects of "rigid bodies, clocks and electro-magnetic processes" and in an atmosphere of novel and unprecedented reflection (free association).

> The theory to be developed is based - like all electro-dynamics - on the kinematics of the rigid body, since the assertions of any such theory have to do with the relationships between rigid bodies (system of co-ordinates), clocks, and electro-magnetic processes. Insufficient consideration of this circumstance lies at the root of the difficulties which the electro-dynamics of moving bodies at present encounter.[125]

Einstein, in the opening sentence of his original paper on Special Relativity referred to these difficulties known to be inherent in the application of Maxwell's

equation to moving bodies:

> It is known that Maxwell's electro-dynamics - as usually understood at the present time - when applied to moving bodies, leads to asymmetries which do not appear to be inherent in the phenomena.[126]

The facts, then, have suggested the problem: the interpretations are made and postulated, the postulation is then completed and now the definitions need to be supplied before the deductive process can begin.

Since the whole deductive process is going to be based on two postulates viz. on the principle of relativity and on the constancy of the speed of light, Einstein immediately supplies the definitions for them:

For the Principle of Relativity:

> 1. The laws by which this state of physical system undergo change are not affected, whether the change of state be referred to the one or the other of two systems of coordinates in uniform transitory motion.

For the Principle of Light-Speed Constancy:

> 2. Any ray of light moves in the "stationary" system of coordinates with the determined velocity c, whether the ray be emitted by a stationary or by a moving body. Hence:
> velocity = light path time of interval
> where time interval is to be taken in the sense of the definition in part 1.[127]

We are now ready to begin the logical deductive process. The important fact to remember about the significance of this deductive process is that from this point on it is a purely logical one and as a result of this fact, the conclusions or theorems of the Special Theory of Relativity will merely reveal what have been assumed

in the postulates even though the gain to us (viewed psychologically) may be immense. Thus, as Carl Hempel of Yale writes:

> It is typical of any purely logical deduction that the conclusion to which it leads simply reasserts (a proper or improper) part of what has already been stated in the premises. Thus, to illustrate this point by a very elementary example, from the premise, "this figure is a right triangle," we can deduce the conclusion "this figure is a triangle"; but this conclusion clearly reiterates part of the information already contained in the premise. Again, from the premises, "All primes different from 2 are odd" and "n is a prime different from 2," we can infer logically that n is odd; but this consequence merely repeats part (indeed a relatively small part) of the information contained in the premises. The same situation prevails in all other cases of logical deduction; and we may, therefore, say that logical deduction - which is the one and only method of mathematical proof - is a technique of conceptual analysis; it discloses what assertions are concealed in a given set of premises, and it makes us realize to what we committed ourselves in accepting those premises; but none of the results obtained by this technique ever goes by one iota beyond the information already contained in the initial assumptions.
>
> Since all mathematical proofs rest exclusively on logical deductions from certain postulates, it follows that a mathematical theorem, such as the Pythagorean theorem in geometry, asserts nothing that is objectively or theoretically new as compared with the postulates from which it is derived, although its content may well be psychologically new in the sense that we were not aware of its being implicitly contained in the postulates.[128]

Einstein demonstrates this character of the logical deductive process of revealing what is implicit in the postulates to give us a "new" truth, in the following way. He first presents an imaginary experiment involving two systems, a stationary one and one moving uniformly to it in a parallel translation. Thus:

> Let there be given a stationary rigid rod; and let its length be l as measured by a measuring rod which is also stationary. We now imagine the axis of the rod lying along the axis of x of the stationary system of co-ordinates, and that a uniform motion of parallel translation with velocity v along the axis of x in the direction of increasing x is then imparted to the rod.[129]

Einstein tells us we must now determine the length of the moving rod. Since this is an imaginary experiment we must ascertain this length by two imaginary operations. Thus:

> We now inquire as to the length of the moving rod, and imagine its length to be ascertained by the following two operations:
> (a) The observer moves together with the given measuring rod and the rod to be measured, and measures the length of the rod directly by superposing the measuring rod, in just the same way as if all three were at rest.
> (b) By means of stationary clocks set up in the stationary system and synchronizing in accordance with 1, the observer ascertains at what points of the stationary system the two ends of the rod to be measured are located at a definite time. The distance between these two points, measured by the measuring rod already employed, which in this case is at rest, is also a length which may be designated "the length of the rod".[130]

The measuring operation involves (a) the process of superimposing the measuring rod on the rod to be measured by the observer in the typical way it is done and (b) the measuring of the length of the stationary rod and the conputation of the time it took to measure it.

Now Einstein says:

> In accordance with the principle of relativity the length to be discovered by the operation (a)—we will call it"the length of the rod in the moving system" - must be equal to the length l of the stationary rod.

> The length to be discovered by the operation (b) we will call "the length of the (moving) rod in the stationary system". This we shall determine on the basis of our two principles, and we shall find that it differs from l.[131]

In other words, the measurement of the length of the rod in the moving system ascertained by imaginary operation (a) since it does not involve the second postulate, viz. that of the constancy of light must be equal to the length of the stationary rod. However this cannot be true of operation (b) because the second postulate is also involved.

Einstein tells us that the mistake is in assuming the lengths of (b) operation to be equal:

> Current kinematics tacitly assumes that the lengths determined by these two operations are precisely equal, or in other words, that a moving rigid body at the epoch t may in geometrical respects be perfectly represented by the same body at rest in a definite position.
>
> We imagine further that at the two ends A and B of the rod, clocks are placed which synchronize with the clocks of the stationary system, that is to say that their indications correspond at any instant to the "time of the stationary system" at the places where they happen to be. These clocks are therefore "synchronous in the stationary system". We imagine further that for each clock there is a moving observer, and that these observers apply to both clocks the criterion established in §1 for the synchronization of two clocks.[132]

In other words, the tendency is to think that the clocks of the stationary and of the moving system are synchronous and since the measurement of length requires the calculation of the lapse of time that, since synchronization between the clocks is assumed that the lengths will be the same (following the relativity principle of classical mechanics).

This, however, Einstein says is a fallacy for the following reasons (again making use of an imaginary experiment):

> Let a ray of light depart from A at the time ta, let it be reflected at B at the time of tB and reach A again at the time t'a taking into consideration the principles of the constancy of the velocity of light we find that $T_B - T_A = \frac{r_{ab}}{c-v}$ and $T'_A - T_B = \frac{r_{ab}}{c+v}$ Where r_{ab} denotes the length of the moving rod measured in the stationary system. Observers moving with the moving rod would thus find that the two clocks were not synchronous, while observers in the stationary system would declare the clocks to be synchronous.[133]

In other words, according to mathematical calculations based on the light speed-constancy postulate, from the vantage point of the stationary system, the clocks give the same time while from the moving system they do not. There can be only one conclusion, based on such deduction, a conclusion implicit as was said in the postulate when they are joined together. And it is the one that Einstein immediately makes, viz., that of the relativity of simultaneity:

> So we see that we cannot attach any absolute signification to the concept of simultaneity, but that two events which, viewed from a system of coordinates, are simultaneous, can no longer be looked upon as simultaneous events when envisaged from a system which is in motion relatively to that system.[134]

It is not within the purposes of this thesis to present in any detail how the ideas of Einstein led to the development of his whole mathematical structure within either the Special or General theories of Relativity. Suffice it for our present purpose, - to show the actual workings of the epistemology of Einstein in order to expose the elements of empirical

suggestion, free invention of the postulate and a small part of the deductive analytical process (only a part of which, it should be noticed was mathematical reasoning as distinct from non-mathematical or ordinary) as it occurred historically in the presentation of the special theory of relativity by Einstein in 1905 and which all led up to the confirmation of its theorems.

Regarding observational tests, de Broglie has the following to say about the Special Theory of Relativity:

> As soon as Albert Einstein had laid the foundation of the special theory of relativity, innumerable consequences of great interest flowed from these unusual ideas. Some of the chief consequences were the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction, the apparent retardation of moving clocks, the variation of mass with velocity among high-speed particles, new formulas containing second-order terms (termes supplementaires) for aberration and the Doppler effect, and new formulas for the compounding of velocities, yielding as a simple consequence of relativity kinematics the celebrated formula of Fresnel, verified by Fizeau, specifying the light-wave-trains (l'entrainement des ondes lumineuses) of refracting bodies in motion. And these are not merely theoretical notions: one can not insist sufficiently upon the fact that the special theory of relativity today rests upon innumerable experimental verifications, for we can regularly obtain particles of velocities approaching that of light in vacuum, particles in regard to which it is necessary to take account of corrections introduced by the special theory of relativity. To cite only two examples among many, let us recall that the variation of mass with velocity deduced by Einstein from relativistic dynamics, after having been firmly established by the experiments of Guye and Lavanchy, is verified daily by observation of the motion of the high-speed particles of which nuclear physics currently makes such extensive use; let us recall that some of the beautiful experiments of Mr. Ives have made possible verification of the relativistic formulas of the Doppler effect, and thus, indirect verification of the existence of the retardation of clocks of which they are a consequence.[135]

Minkowski referred of course, to a conclusion of special relativity which he tells us was not at first seen by Einstein himself,[136] and which at a later date provoked the formulation of the General Theory of Relativity. One important concern of General Relativity was to demonstrate the physical validity of Minkowski's prediction about the fading away of "space-in-itself and time-in-itself in favor of a space-time unity".

> The modification to which the special theory of relativity has subjected the theory of space and time is indeed far-reaching, but one important point has remained unaffected. We shall soon see that the general theory of relativity cannot adhere to (its) simple physical interpretation of space and time.[137]

Instead, the physical interpretation of space and time as having their own separate physical meaning must be abandoned, Einstein says. In classical mechanics there was a physical separation of space and time obtained by physical measurements involving the use of fixed rods and standard clocks.

> In classical mechanics, as well as in the special theory of relativity, the co-ordinates of space and time have a direct physical meaning. To say that a point-event has the X1 co-ordinate x1 means that the projections of the point-event on the axis of X1 determined by rigid rods and in accordance with the rules of Euclidean geometry, is obtained by measuring off a given rod (the unit of length) x1 times from the origin of co-ordinates along the axis of X1. To say that a point-event has the X_4 co-ordinate $x_4 = t$, means that a standard clock made to measure time in a definite unit period, and which is stationary relatively to the system of co-ordinates and practically coincident in space with the point-event, will have measured off $x_4 = t$ periods at the occurrence of the event.[138]

These unconscious habitual tendencies of physicists and

people in general, must be put aside in favor of the postulate of general relativity which cannot be carried through otherwise:

> This view of space and time has always been in the minds of physicists, even if, as a rule, they have been unconscious of it. This is clear from the part which these concepts play in physical measurements; it must also have underlain the reader's reflexions on the preceding paragraph (2) for him to connect any meaning with what he there read. But we shall now show that we must put it aside and replace it by a more general view, in order to be able to carry through the postulate of general relativity, if the special theory of relativity applies to the special case of the absence of a gravitational field.[139]

At this point, we see the operation of the rule of simplicity for Einstein, for it is this very rule which demands this change in our view of nature's physical structure since there is no other way to achieve a simple formulation of the laws of nature except by abandoning the attempt to directly and individually measure spatial and temporal coordinates by ordinary rods and standard clocks.

> We therefore reach this result: In the general theory of relativity, space and time cannot be defined in such a way that differences of the spatial co-ordinates can be directly measured by the unit measuring-rod, or differences in the time co-ordinate by a standard clock.
>
> The method hitherto employed for laying co-ordinates into the space-time continuum in a definite manner thus breaks down, and there seems to be no other way which would allow us to adapt systems of co-ordinates to the four-dimensional universe so that we might expect from their application a particularly simple formulation of the laws of nature. So there is nothing for it but to regard all imaginable systems of co-ordinates, on principle, as equally suitable for the description of nature.[140]

Thus we are led to the postulate of the General Theory

which requires that:

> The general laws of nature are to be expressed by equations which hold good for all systems of co-ordinates, that is, are co-variant with respect to any substitutions whatever (generally co-variant).

This postulate Einstein calls the "requirement of general co-variance (invariance)" and it is this which takes away from space and time the last remnant of physical objectivity.[141]

For Einstein, as has been seen, a point of criticism for certain physical theories is that they have not been "natural"; that they have not accounted for the facts "in a natural way" etc.... In fact, it was the very unnaturalness of Newton's theory of action at a distance which gave the "impetus to overhaul it".[142] Similarly, in his early part of the exposition of the General Theory, Einstein showed his pre-occupation with "naturalness" as an aim in the development of his theory.

> It is not my purpose in this discussion to represent the general theory of relativity as a system that is as simple and logical as possible, and with the minimum number of axioms; but my main object is to develop this theory in such a way that the reader will feel that the path we have entered upon is psychologically the natural one, and that the underlying assumptions will seem to have the highest possible degree of security.[143]

This statement of purpose had just followed a rather lengthy argument for the "naturalness" of the principle of general co-variance involving the reduction of events to the motions of material points whose meetings alone are observable in terms of coincidences, such as between the hands of a clock and points on the dial. Now the systems of references are just devices for facilitating the description of these coincidences. Thus he says:

> As all our physical experience can be ultimately reduced to such coincidence, there is no immediate reason for prefering certain systems of co-ordinates to others; that is to say, we arrive at the requirement of general co-variance.[144]

In summary, the epistemology of Albert Einstein then breaks down into four main tenets: 1. The requirement of inductive beginnings; 2. the invention of the primary concepts; 3. the deductive process with its governing rules of naturalness and simplicity and finally; 4. the confirmation of the theorems. The detailed features pertaining to each of these tenets have been traced through both the properly epistemological as well as the mathematico-physical writings of Einstein. An essential point that must be reemphasized, in summary, is the fact that Einstein, uniquely among scientists, took the trouble to develop a full-fledged epistemological doctrine which became a powerful investigative method in his scientific work. And it is clear that the insights he was to achieve into the nature of physical reality were the result of attention to both science and philosophy. Indeed, perhaps it was precisely because Einstein had seen the problem of space and time as something more than a merely experimental one, that he was able to break out of the futile search for an ether and approach it in a new way. In any case, he had the wisdom to see that more adequate epistemological methods would have to be fashioned.

It is necessary now to undertake an investigation of the Einsteinian view of reality, a view which must bear heavily on and even determine the kind of approach that would be made in Einstein's investigations into the material universe.

John Cantwell Kiley

FOOTNOTES

113a. On this point, see the relevant remarks on scientific as opposed to "historical" causality by Ernst CASSIRER in his Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory on Relativity, New York, Dover, 1953, p. 226 n, ff.

114. A. EINSTEIN, "Autobiographical Notes", AEPS, p. 13.

115. "The views of space and time which I wish to lay before you have sprung from the soil of experimental physics, and therein lies their strength. They are radical. Henceforth, space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fall away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve a independent reality." Opening remarks of H. MINKOWSKI, addressing 80th Assembly of German Natural Scientists and Physicians at Cologne, September 21, 1908, in Principles of Relativity, New York, Dover (no date), p. 75.

116. The Principles of Relativity, New York, Dover, p. 37.

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid.

119. Ibid.

120. A. EINSTEIN, Op. cit. pp. 37-38.

121. A. EINSTEIN,"On the Theory of Relativity", pp. 50-51.

122. A.EINSTEIN, "Mechanics of Newton", pp. 34-35.

123. A.EINSTEIN, "The Foundation of the General Theory of Relativity", Principles of Relativity, p. 111.

124. A. EINSTEIN, "Mechanics of Newton", p.38.

125. A. EINSTEIN, Op. cit., p. 38.

126. A. EINSTEIN, Op. cit., p. 37.

127. A.EINSTEIN, Op. cit., p. 41.

128. C. HEMPEL, "Geometry and Empirical Science", The World of Mathematics, Vol. 3, pp. 1637-1638.

129. A. EINSTEIN, "Mechanics of Newton", p. 41.

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid.

133. A. EINSTEIN, Op. cit., p. 42.

134. A. EINSTEIN, Op. cit., pp. 42-43.

135. Louis de BROGLIE, "A General Survey of the Scientific Work of Albert Einstein"(translated from French manuscript by Forrest W. WILLIAMS) AEPS, pp. 114-5.

136. Lorentz called the t' combination of x and t the local time of the electron in uniform motion, and applied to physical construction of this concept, for the better understanding of the hypothesis of contraction. But the credit of first recognizing clearly that the time of the one electron is just as good as that of the other, that is to say, that t and t' are to be treated identically, belongs to A. Einstein.* Thus time, as a concept unequivocally determined by phenomena, was first deposed from its high seat. Neither Einstein nor Lorentz made any attack on the concept of space, perhaps because in the above-mentioned special transformation, where the plane of x, t, an interpretation is possible by saying that the x-axis of space maintains its position. One may expect to find a corresponding violation of the concept of space appraised as another act of audacity on the part of the higher mathematics. Nevertheless, this further step is indispensable for the true understanding of the group Gc, and when it has been taken, the word relativity-postulate for the requirement of an invariance with the group Gc seems to me very feeble. Since the postulate comes to that only the four-dimensional world in space and time is given by phenomena, but that the projection in space and in time way still be undertaken with a certain degree of freedom, I prefer to call it the postulate of the absolute world (or briefly, the world-postulate).

*A. EINSTEIN, Ann. d. Phys., 17, 1905, p. 891; Jahrb d. Radioaktivität und Elektronik, 4, 1907, p. 411. H. MINKOWSKI, "Space and Time", The Principles of Relativity, p. 83.

137. Cf. supra.

138. A. EINSTEIN, "The Foundation of the General Theory of Relativity", The Principles of Relativity, p. 115.

139. Ibid.

140. A. EINSTEIN, Op. cit., p. 117.

141. A. EINSTEIN, Op. cit., p. 117.

142. Cf. Supra, p. 63.

143. A. EINSTEIN, Op. cit., p. 116.

144. A. EINSTEIN, Op. cit., p. 118.

Out of the delightful drawings done by the many gifted members of the group, the choice of these four could hardly have been more arbitrary and was dictated as much by their suitability for reproduction as by other considerations. I regret that I could not afford to have a larger and more representative number reproduced, but I consider these quite worth while.

The artists represented in order of appearance are: Judy Milspaugh, Ted Stinchicum, Brett Fields, and Richard West.

James Gilbert

Charles G. Bell's The Married Land: A Review

"I interest myself in the background of my friends."
The Married Land, p. 108.

In this case the best way to praise Charles Bell's recently published book will be to exhibit briefly the questions it raises in its arrangement and thought. But I confess it is difficult to know where to begin with a book in which form and the run of thought which leads to the determination of form so closely modify one another.

It is to be assumed that at some point the reader will ask himself, "What kind of book is this?" If one compares it with a novel like Tom Jones (held as a model in the Preface), one notes the absence of any direct adventures. Whereas in Fielding's book a multitude of encounters are narrated from beginning to end, here the movement is for the most part one of reflection; these are the memoirs of Tom Jones in middle age. The purpose of Jones's long journey, to win the hand of a virtuous young woman, involving the discovery of a suitable parentage, is externally already accomplished here. What is left to perform is the "winning" of the wife by the understanding through form.

To be sure, there are also journeys in this book. It is a fresh event which provides the occasion for reflection, although it is suggested that this event is only one of many possible from the past and future. The routine of Daniel and Lucy Woodruff Byrne on their farm in Maryland is broken by phone calls which call each away to a sick relation, the husband to a hospitalized aunt in Mississippi, the wife to her Quaker uncle in Pennsylvania, stricken with a heart attack. At the end they return, no death on either side. There again, it is not what happens in the ordinary sense that matters, but rather how they make sense of the meaning of their journeys. For this reason what happens becomes extended in imagination into a characteristic

event in which, on the one hand, the pair are driven to North and to South in the persistency of their families and past environments and through which, on the other hand, the past by being examined reveals the basis for a successful return. The mythic reenactment of their lives gives clarity to their present selves and also to the characters, living and dead, who shaped their pasts. Thus, to give examples, the husband attempts to clean out the rubbish of souvenirs and decay that clutters the aunt's house, and the wife comes upon a missing section of her father's journal. Towards the beginning of the book the task is stated generally:

> Daniel faced the day with three questions-- The first arose from the image of the spring, that mystery of water out of earth; it was addressed to the heart: How to bring clarity from the dark house, the opening of its dens? The second was asked of the mind, and followed from the first: In the face of all the dens would reveal, how had a bridge been possible from Woodruff to Byrnes? The third, neither the heart nor the mind could answer, but only time: When would he be with Lucy again?
>
> (p. 25, author's italics)

The relative unimportance of the third question -- not, to be sure, of its outcome -- shows the way in which matters of time (history) are subordinated to matters of heart and mind (poetry and philosophy perhaps).

This is not to say that the writer was not concerned with the novelist's problem of time, that is, with plotting. The time scheme by which the book is arranged is quite difficult, but nevertheless explicitly intentional; and it sustains the relationship between happening and significance which is the book's major intellectual problem. At first it would seem that past and present events are jumbled indiscriminately, but by following closely the sequence of tenses the reader is able to make sense of the scramble.

It then appears that basically the book describes the husband's thoughts and activities in the last day and a half of his stay in Mississippi, together with the flight back north in the afternoon of the second day. The hero spends the morning of the first day, I think, going for groceries, visits his mother in the afternoon, and during the next morning measures the family plot in the graveyard and finds the aunt's will. This I should like to call the metabolic level, owing to a preponderant amount of time spent in the supermarket. However, above this limited span of time there is the level of the organism, which persists by means of habit, stable environment, and memory. The recollection which took place the previous day of the father's death is thus still vivid and gives the impression of having occurred in the basic time of the novel. Similarly the time of the visit to the grocery store is deceptive: because it is a repetitive task, it could have happened almost any time during the three week stay. For the same reason it does not demand any attention, and the protagonist is free to recollect the past. These recollections occupy the first half of the book (through Chapter IX, "The Meeting"). In this part of the book the events of the flight south are recounted in the order they occurred, though with breaks. Between the flight north and the remembered flight south we have all that happens in terms of motion. Beyond this, on the way to Mississippi the protagonist has recalled his first marriage and second wedding. Along side of the narrative of the husband, there is some account of the wife's simultaneous stay in Pennsylvania; but this is for the most part seen reflected in the husband. On the most general level of time major anecdotes in the history of the two families are told. These are not necessarily in chronological order, and any but the praise-worthy reader who writes as he reads will find the relationships difficult to follow--

they are probably given more as background than as historical fact.

It might be objected that in the first half of the book the wandering of memory takes a little too long. Certainly the most excellent moments in the book come in the second part, in which the description of the characters of the husband's parents and the wife's father are given sharper definition by being connected directly with present objects: a revolver, a visit, a diary. There the remembered (and future) time lives in the present. Otherwise the disjunction between what is at hand and what is thought may be amusing -- as when the husband looks at the airport flight plan and begins arranging the Quaker relatives into columns -- but it is clearly intended. The effect aimed at is stated in a parenthesis:

> The encounter of day, reconnoitered in waking; foreseen and remembered as real as the deed. There past and future merge, smeared in present: To make the actual conditional, and the conditional actual, to blur the distinction.
>
> (p. 4, author's italics)

The effect has its justification:

> ...in the world of mind, which is where we live, the road of his marriage had to be discovered, and he searched for it frantically as if in fact there was no other way to reach Lucy again.
>
> (p. 221)

But again the "world of the mind" is, I venture to say, nothing other than the world, and the flights of ratiocination rest on particular fact.

The broken time scheme of the book exhibits the difference between history and fact. One might suppose that past history is the determining cause of the present fact. On the historical level the book is without doubt a novel, although one arranged in a curious way, with sequences

placed on top of one another. However, this arrangement invites one to question the sufficiency of usual historical narrative. If events can be juxtaposed out of order, if, for example, the taking off of an airplane can be given simultaneously with a description of southern Aunt Betsy's uncontrolled driving, one is led to ask what is common in the pieces of history. In the example given, it is suggested the key is that disparate events are driven by a common wave of energy. Thus one is led to ask what is constant in the connection of historical facts. That is still perhaps a question for an historian. What is remarkable about this book is that it passes on to non-historical questions, that is, that it has a metaphysics.

It is the fact that the book occupies itself also with problems which are not strictly narrative -- e.g., with the hierarchy of memory and change -- that leads one to suspect in a certain mood that this is not so much a novel as an allegory in the form of a novel. But this suggestion is advanced cautiously. For whereas the Divine Comedy instructs in a theology which is detachable from the poem (n.b.: the instruction itself is not separable), here the world view depends on the particular part of the world selected. Were another marriage given, the analysis of its basis in the nature of things would also differ. The terms chosen for the analysis are of only partial universality. Thus the notion of the four elements is very often employed to give pattern. It is one of the joys of the book to read how, as in an allegory, the elements are given varying description in natural images. One is invited, for example, to consider the lower Mississippi curling about the Delta like a dragon, and the efficient rush of an Appalachian stream. Such considerations, it should be emphasized, are not in the case of this book simply decorations on the cake. It is aimed to see the necessary reason for apparently accidental differences in

husband and wife, for the husband believes that it is only the discovery and understanding of this which will make the marriage stable.

The earnestness with which the intellectual pattern is investigated distinguishes the book. The pairs of opposites such as active-passive, masculine-feminine, North-South must be considered seriously if the book is to make any sense. The fact, for example, that husband and wife come from disharmonious parts of the country leads to an exploration of the characteristics of those regions. As the couple discover their need for one another, it is suggested that the North and the South have an analogous mutual dependency. In general the South is presented as the genteel anarchy to which the stable Eastern colonial America is liable. Here perhaps the intellectual order of the book weighs more heavily than it should. It begins to look as if the capitulation of Mississippi to numbskulls were a prophecy of some Untergang des Abendlands, which all action were futile to reverse. It would, however, be facetious to deny, in the shadow of the enormous stupidity of the human animal, that the solution suggested, content with the "private good", is not worth earnest consideration. The assumption that geographical environment is liable to produce differences in character is also worth looking at. For example, would not one be moved naturally to different sorts of thought in the garden of an old, established town and in the desolation of a mountainous desert?

But it must not be forgotten that action and contemplation also make a pair of opposites. It is the author's opinion that an individual can transcend his environment. It is not necessary, then, that a social pattern become stagnant. Or rather, even if the society is on the decline, some individuals may escape from it. Generalizations about a customary way of life give way to descriptions of character.

But on the other hand the characters are not just anybody off the street; they are heightened by the pattern in which they are grouped. The heavy emphasis on pattern leads to one difficulty: the characters, although related in idea, do not, except for the husband and wife, talk to one another. Nevertheless, as the characters are seen taken up in the protagonist's consciousness, they are admirably large and vivid.

They are of two kinds: those who define their society and those who, whether or not consciously, cannot live within society's bounds. The Quaker Uncle Steward and the Southern Aunt Betsy are examples of the first type. Neither really realizes his limitations. I myself rather liked Uncle Steward, although the narrator accuses him of understanding tragedy. Aunt Betsy has a tendency to veer off into caricature. That is a danger in this kind of writing, as is a way of dropping from ideas to jokes without any intervening moral level.

The husband's father did comprehend tragedy in his life. He had the energy and the ideals to become a great center of renewing action, but was caught up in the net of a corrupt society, incessantly involved in debt, and confused by an odd set of parents. Unable to break free, he took his own life. The husband's mother and the wife's father are more successful. The mother, except for one very brief incident, is portrayed most delicately. The beauty of this miracle from the Kentucky hills is quite moving. She is the prototype of the wife. The activity and complexity of the wife's father contrasts with the gentle Southern woman. The opinionated and high-spirited account in his own words of his peculiarly rambunctious pacifism in the First World War is very much fun to read. I wasn't able to tell from the Preface whether his journal entries are quotations from an actually existing manuscript, but in any case they and the

many different kinds of letters and speech patterns show that the author has a fine taste for variations in style.

It is the husband who is the most difficult to grasp. The wife is seen objectively, on the practical level, but the husband appears, as it were, from within. Thus we cannot determine just what it is he does for a living. It seems that he is at the same time writer and painter, but we rarely see him working; more often we hear him loudly voicing his own opinions. But it is his attempt to order what he sees, hears, thinks, and remembers that provides the main viewpoint from which the book is written; in other words, the book is the one which the protagonist intends someday to write.

One should, however, distinguish the author from the protagonist. To those who know him, the author reveals himself on every page. Whoever has seen the sharp eyes and heard the brilliant shifts of his conversation will recognize at once the intellectual passion which is so striking in this book. There are not many writers who take ideas so seriously. One imagines, for example, that Sir Charles P. Snow's scientists talk about nothing but big business in their off hours. But Charles Bell never tires at any time of exploring the cliffs and caverns of the human intellect, which exploration is as well one of life. We learn in the Preface that the characters have their sources, not only in the requirement of a pattern, but also in fact. It would seem then that the author manifests, as did Goethe, that singular and accurate Glück in which "everything happens at the right time".

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INNOCENCE AND WAR

First Prize Sophomore Essay, 1962

by

Mary Louise Biggar

Introduction Distrust of great books as a distrust of convention in hope we are natural creatures.--Great books speak in common of a war of good and evil, but the state of innocence sees in the same world no such war.--The fatal greyness arises in allowing ourselves to distrust and desert each because of the other.--And in fact each makes the other ridiculous.--We must attempt to define each.--Because the two are entirely unrelated, we cannot balance them, only follow each in the entirety of its demands.

We do not know how to use these great books, nor how to regard the commitments and conventions they demand. The great books and their great commitments - e.g.the stands of the tragedians, the philosophers, and the Christians - are in our own minds in conflict with what we not long ago believed to be natural. We believed men were creatures at peace with the things about them, who might follow their hearts peacefully to the attainment of knowledge and excellence. We have an instinctive hatred of conventions, for we hope men are not so great strangers in the world as to need them. The books say that we are strangers, to some degree not as natural as the things we see about us: though the authors may go to any length to prove otherwise, that is their fundamental postulate. The nature of commitment is a war which despises the merely natural. These books outline a war between a darkness and a light in which we are not yet certain we believe. They demand we acquire the knowledge of good and evil, and that we spend the entirety of our lives in unceasing commitment to the good, not generously now and then as we do when we half believe it, but without rest and at any price. We who are young not long ago laughed at them as futile and ridiculous, for we lived for the most part in a state of being which saw the same world in a fashion irresolvable with theirs. That state of being is the state of innocence.

This would not be of particular interest except for one thing. The meeting of innocence with the interpretation of the world in

terms of good and evil - out of which there can arise only an endless war - is most often fatal to the human spirit. Uncertain, we become vague. We are distant, finally, from both the sight held in innocence and the sight of good and evil. I know we pretend to accept everything. We speak of good and evil and justice and truth most earnestly, and we also say knowingly that the Meaning of Life is Life. Actually we have no notion of good, and evil, or we would do more than speak of them; we would,if we knew anything of them, make some stand exactly and without questioning where we are standing. If we would still believe in life as naturally as we once believed in it, we would not make such foolish statements about it, for they really imply resignation. We have lost each for the sake of the other. The fact is, the majority of us continue to live like pigs, and with the uncomfortable semi-consciousness of doing so. In short, these books and their commitments, which are so full of life, become a contradiction to it if we do not allow them to seize us as entirely as they demand.

If the state of innocence were what most people feel its definition must be - that is, the state of ignorance - the problem would be at worst the problem of teaching fools wisdom. But that is not all the question, as far as I have been able to tell. The innocent are not fools. It is true that innocence in any human is concommitant with certain delusions, and that they are delusions characteristic of innocence, but it is equally true that there are certain delusions characteristic of those who have forced themselves out of that state, which I shall later enumerate. The innocent see the same world, and they see as much of it as the non-innocent. They simply do not see a conflict in it: neither between light and dark, nor <u>what is</u> and <u>what should be</u>, nor humanity and the inhuman forces. While they do act, they act well or badly simply in accordance with <u>how much</u> they see; that is, the fact that they see the world through the innocent state has little or nothing to do with the excellence of their actions. Why is this? It is discomforting,

at least. Issee two reasons, primarily. First, although they do not see in terms of conflict, and perhaps just because they do not, they have a great love of what is, and on that account they are tender of it. Secondly, although they do not see in terms of light and dark, they too feel the desire to be more themselves.

I suppose the best and simplest metaphor for the two states is this: the innocent sees in colors; the warrior sees in black and white. Those are common metaphors, but useful. Both color and black and white separately may cover the world. He who sees in terms of color, will say his higher self is somehow more colored, and he will understand that statement as the vague and the committed never can. He who sees in terms of black and white will say his higher is more full of light and stronger for the battle. Neither can understand the other.

Beside the belief that most people hold that innocence must be equated with ignorance, lies a second, closely related, that in innocence we hold the world to be good, and the loss of innocence is the discovery of evil. Here innocence is again equated with ignorance, and again the problem would be delightfully simple if it were merely one of teaching the other (evil) side of life. But Genesis is the paradigm, and it firmly states that the end of innocence is the discovery of good and evil. We can hold this second delusion concerning the nature of innocence only in our vagueness. The source of this definition of innocence as "knowledge merely of good things" is quite interesting. I shall elaborate upon it later. Briefly, in that fatal vagueness where we see neither colors nor darkness against light we cannot even bear to see that the two states have no resolution, although it is the very fact that they have no resolution which has left us vague and without a sense of life. We forget the colors for the memory of which we distrust the other sight. We also flee from the other sight, for any responsible examination of the great stands would yield the information that good of the type evil can work

against (that is, not The Good) is never seen except as evil is also seen. But we mistranslate everything, and think thereby we understand what it is all about, for we have deserted both posts and are no longer torn between them. By calling our former colored state "belief in the goodness of everything" and the second as "discovery of evil," we have an excuse for the greyness (for obviously, white has been tinted with black). This sorry excuse for thinking allows us the most abominable excuse for vitality, for we may boast melodramatically that our greyness is the product of the discovery of truth, and furthermore is the reality. There is an entire kingdom of students and philosophers launched proudly out on this discovery.

Greyness is, in short, the great problem. I believe it cannot arise in the conflict of light and darkness, for they have no intermediate shades and the nature of perception of them demands war; in greyness there is no war. I believe it arises in the conflict within our own minds of the entirely separate and incomparable views held in innocence and in commitment to war against darkness. Seeing how each makes the other ridiculous, we become vague, and that vagueness is fatal to the spirit. The books subtly lie in pretending that all will be well once we gain knowledge. Innocence is not ignorance. It will always be impossible to see by the two states together, for they deny one another in our own minds. The fact is, that they have nothing to do with one another, but also the fact is, that just by pretending we do understand that they are disparate, as well as by pretending we understand they are one, we become vague. We must plot out the territory of each, which we are for the sake of each afraid to do. But the great books and the great stands must be granted life, that they should not yield death. The undertaking is immense. The axiom underlying both states is that something is important, and that something is not merely our ability to feel. That is impossible to prove, but we cannot live and believe otherwise. In both states,

we do honor something. In the midst of the greyness, we still would honor something; that is our great hope. For the sake of that hope we must not be vague.

I shall attempt to draw the problem, which I cannot draw, in this fashion. First, the state of innocence must be marked out. If I define it somewhat more largely than it is defined elsewhere, you will forgive me if you will admit some memory of a state having all such characteristics at once, and will allow me to call it "innocence" for the sake of simplicity. Its loss must be marked also. We must then determine the nature of the stands, the commitments and conventions opposing innocence and expressed in the great books. I hold that once there is vagueness, we are committed to war also - that because the two states are entirely separate, we cannot stand and attempt to balance them, but we must answer the greatest demands of each.

The state of innocence -- Genesis as the paradigm of innocence and its loss. -- The innocent: loves the seasons, which negate the possibility of tragedy or nobility. -- out of wonder at being, sees all things as equally important. -- loves what is, not what should be. -- perceives the world subspecie aeternitatis -- in short, forgives everything because he does not see that there is anything to forgive. -- The narrowing of our territory as origin of the desire to act. -- The subsequent loss of innocence.

Innocence is primarily that state in which we see the world in its wholeness, and not in terms of good and evil. It is secondly the state in which we (from the Latin innoceo) "do not harm", or, more likely, believe we do not harm. The paradigm of innocence and its loss is of course found in the book of Genesis. Adam and Eve are placed in a garden by God, who in his love allows them to love all things. For them as for Plotinus only beauty has being, and all being is beautiful: it is not a beauty to which ugliness can be opposed, then. But they desire god-hood and they acquire the knowledge of good and evil.

> Ye shall be as gods, then: your eyes shall be opened, knowing good and evil.

Still in the garden, they re-interpret the same things which had been given before. And so what is the outcome of their new knowledge? A rather picayune kind of shame, the shame of being naked, a petty morality of which it is obvious neither God nor the writer approves. (We must also be careful at this point not to say - "Oh well, that is some mere law or custom, evidence of a perversion of the knowledge of good and evil." The writer gives it as exactly the product of that knowledge. - We have no right to assume it is a perversion.) But they are driven out of the garden and forced to act in a world in which there are curses and commandments.

The pattern is this. The desire for godhood is followed by the knowledge of good and evil, for we need that knowledge in order to master others, if not ourselves. Once we attain it, our life narrows, and we are forced to act by this new knowledge as well

as see. In attaching importance to right action, we are shown our mortality. This makes sense, for good and evil can exist only in time: if we wish knowledge of them, we must accept the fact that we can be masters only in time. Following soon upon the intellectual loss of innocence is the time in which we harm. Cain kills Abel because Abel has pleased God more. At this time there is a second curse, the curse of God upon Cain, that we are somehow strangers from this time forth.

> What hast thou done? The voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto me from the ground. And now thou are cursed from the earth; when thou tillest the ground, it shall not henceforth yield unto thee her strength, a fugitive and a vagabond shalt thou be in the earth.

This harm is of a particular kind, a kind which makes us strangers to the rest of the world. We harm because we wish revenge for a mistake we made about what would be good. No other creature is capable of such lies, or is so proudly determined to be "good" that he commits himself to it over the body of his brother, and does not so much <u>honour</u> the good as demand that he <u>be</u> it. No other creature destroys because he cannot bear imperfection. God himself will destroy for just that reason in the flood. Long after that, He will have learned a commitment higher than to his own perfection, and He will make a covenant of acceptance of life.

> And the Lord said in His heart, I will not again curse the ground for man's sake, for the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth.

The whole story of innocence, the desire to act like gods, which requires the knowledge of good and evil, the consequent narrowing of our lives and the ugly proof (though the theorem be glorious) that we are not natural lies in this book. Written out, too, is the

acceptance of commitment to the good, no matter how much less it seems than what we once had (Adam), the perversion of commitment which arises out of pride (Cain), and the final commitment which is to allow life to continue and somehow to forgive.

The innocent is, he feels, in his entirety in being both part of and about the seasons. By the seasons, I mean the vicissitudes about us, and within us, the cycles of birth and generation and death, and the resolution of death and pain into the great oneness of life. He who sees purely in terms of the seasons cannot conceive of tragedy, for to stand by one thing when all things are running through one appears ridiculous, a deluded act which nature will resolve. He understands mourning and grief and ecstasy, but not nobility. Before he is required to act, he has a marvelous flexibility. He has not classified in terms of importance, for all things are equally wonderful and important. Since all things are sources of wonder and are of equally great importance - since they do not have to be otherwise, until he becomes determined to act rightly - he thinks of the world about him not in terms of "it" but in some subtle terms of "you". He sees things simply, because there is no requisite for him to put them together. This will be lost with the loss of innocence, when it becomes vagueness. It is an integral part of the innocent state. It is the perception of a single thing, without the use of words. As we come to believe in darkness and light and the necessity for action we will have to put things together , and in becoming means rather than ends, they will become "it"! If we are vague we will become locked in a state in which we cannot

see anything simply but only as a means to an end, or in relation to other things.

Thus a child may love a fairy hero, a snail, a sailboat, and his father with equal intensity. Is he not correct? When he passes out of innocence into vagueness he will not dare, and will be nervously looking about for the right thing to love. But in the innocent state he trusts the importance of what is given. He does not demand that the things he loves be intellectually aware or even particularly alive, nor that they be useful to him in his search for "higher" knowledge. Standing in his first season, he views every season as potentially his. He has the first and perhaps greatest view of the whole, and he demands everything in it, simply because he sees them as well as participates in them. Not feeling truly involved yet, he does not see that he has harmed and may harm; he had one kind of clear sight. It is in some sense easier to see clearly a battle you are noting. He feels he is not yet in the battle. Everything seems available to him. How is not yet a question. But we can easily see here a source of the loss of innocence. Man is both part of and about the seasons. That is, he both participates in them and sees them. But the sight of everything breeds the desire to be everything. Seeing so much, the fact that we are but a part of nature with a part to play escapes us. We would believe we have the power to be anything. We do in a certain sense have that power, but the fact that we are one part necessitates choice and the determination of how. It is in choosing and in attempting to answer how - that is, in painfully compounding the limitations of our physical nature with

our sight - that we enter upon the battle.

In the innocent state we love what is, and do not see what should be. But how else should we ever love what should be -- we would not care enough for what is to dream of what should be, and even if we could dream of what should be without love of what is, we could never understand the task of creating what could be, which is of course the whole point. At any rate, this original love of what is is necessary. If we do not recall the history of ourselves, and love something of ourselves rather than only what we might be, there is no use in our attempting to be better, for who is attempting to be better? Nothing and nobody. What is alone can contain the secrets of what should be, and that for the sake of what could be. Loving what is in our innocent state we are uncritical, and able to live in and care for one single world at a time. We do not compare worlds as better or worse, and we are difficult to bore. The analogies so necessary for managing at life have not yet become strong enough to provide satires, those twisted mockeries of what is, used in the name of what should be but in fact directed against existence itself.

So, in innocence, we love what is for its own sake, and not yet because we feel ourselves missionaries about to bring the heathen to the light. That is, we do not love it merely for the sake of what should be. If there is anything concerned with what should be in our love, it is simply our sight of how much of that is contained in what is. But there is, I believe, more to this love of what is than love for its own sake: we love through a mediator. In the case of Adam the mediator was God. In childhood it is the love of our family - their desire that the child should be happy makes him contented to be so, and

their love at once of him and of what they may give him enchants the world. And innocence is given again and again, not only to Adam and to children. The first stages of love are innocent, rapturous sights, in which we see a person without dividing him into good and evil parts, and in which we dream of a love in which there will be no harming. That is, in first loving a human being we love him for his existence and are lost in wonder at it. Good and evil have no place in the higher fact of his being. We love him for what he is and for what he contains of what we had thought before should be, but the two merge into one. We have a dream of not harming, and we wonder that we so greatly and consciously wish not to harm. Any man on first showing his love of something to another, gives the state of innocence, for he demands not action but sight, and does not demand that we enter upon the world we have been shown. Without some original loving mediator there is no innocence, but only the blind struggle for survival. The importance of what has been given is not seen instinctively. It is passed on by one who has seen it.

The innocent state is one in which we perceive the world <u>subspecie aeternitatis</u>. In the first place, as I stated above, we believe vaguely we might have or be anything and everything, for we are in our first season (of life, or of a new world, as above) and do not feel the pressing of mortality upon our hearts. We see eternity and our own immortality at one, and we play. If we are not mortal, and if we are loved, we do not believe there is any real motion.

The seeking of a philosophic, comprehensive, and coherent truth is foreign to that state of being. In innocence we believe in the essence of the moment - we recall our childhood in terms of still pictures, our futures generally in terms of actions without essences but only ends. Thus a child understands a tree without classifying it and the feeling he has concerning it is the essence of the present. He does not conceive of it as having another higher truth, nor again does he demand it have a meaning, or relation to other things. He senses glory. If I speak vaguely, I can only ask that you refer to poems concerning the memory of childhood, or even to your own memory. The sense of glory in being is not moral glory, not a glory of war. It is sensed newly in the essence of each present moment. In this we view eternity, which is without war, and most like the present.

It is in fact generally only in recalling the essences of various moments that we take pleasure. Even we who are not innocent will assent (if we will not see) that the rightness or wrongness of action, which is the great question for the future, is nothing divorced from the thing it generates . What it generates will be certain essences. These essences are enough truth for the innocent. If even a grown man is not frightened or angry, he may look for and listen to the voice of the present child within him and receive through it eternity. When we lose this ability and become vague, we become unable to see anything except good and evil. Good and evil, as I said above, require motion to exist, for obviously they cannot conflict in eternity where there is no motion. We chase a phantom we shall never catch when

we are pleased with nothing except as a means to some good end. Whereas innocence, perceiving under the aspect of eternity and in terms of seasons, forgives everything because it does not see that there is anything to forgive, in the vagueness following its loss, and even in the commitment to light in a war between dark and light, it seems impossible to forgive. But of that I shall speak more later.

In summary then, it is characteristic of innocence to believe all things of equal importance, to love what is exactly as it is, to believe exclusively in seasons, and to perceive the world subspecie aeteritatis. Would you deny that such a state containing such characteristics exists? But if you have ever honoured the essence of a moment present without wondering first whether it was worthy of honour, and have felt a wonder at existence due to this essence, you have approached the state of which I speak. Later, most likely, you will attempt to evaluate that moment - you will weigh it, determine its cause and its consequences, and be uncomfortable if you cannot find any large significance in it - portents of tragedy, of evil, of creation. Still in attempting to evaluate it you will again be uncomfortable for you will wonder how it was you then saw and felt so much whereas now, naming the things larger than the essence, you know no truth. Finally you will ignore it, as though it were delusion. By the very fact that you in your vagueness cannot accept that state of being, you have underlined that it is a state of being, and one impossible to deal with when we are so dull. I do not assert that anyone exists absolutely in that state at any time. There are within it always intimations of war. If there were not, we should hold within

it a very high knowledge. There is always unsurety: that is the human estate. Again, if the state of innocence were absolutely as I describe it we would not be likely to fall into the vagueness. But we know the other side was somehow always with us, that we always somehow doubted. Because of that we doubt now.

Nor do I maintain that the state of innocence is a necessary part of childhood. I cannot conceive of savages as innocent, and neither can I conceive of a child who was never loved as innocent. Innocence is passed on from man to man. To be innocent one must not need to wage war for one's existence, for such a war obliterates sight. One must also be free and unperverted - those who have none who love them cannot be so, for the law will turn them into its perverse slaves because there are none to forgive them above and beyond it. In the New Testament, which urges some return to innocence, in order that they may become innocent men are first freed from the law by love. There must be one who loves our lives - in loving our lives, he must love life itself. The love of life can exist only in forgiveness of it. Life cannot be truly forgiven except as it is first seen in light and dark. But in forgiving (which again cannot be an absolute act - we have seen some who were forgiven more truly than others) he gives us the freedom to love anything, and that is the background of innocence.

I have previously suggested some of the factors which lead to the loss of innocence, and hence to the greyness. Primarily innocence is lost when we discover the incommensurability of sight with the limitation upon personal action. There is change, but in narrowing what was we cannot but desire to preserve it. We have not only sight but also memory. Eventually we note not only change in the world but also in ourselves. The magnificance of what we have seen becomes increasingly impossible to realize in ourselves as we grow older and as our territory diminishes. It is less and less likely that we shall be a companion to Socrates, that we shall live upon a certain mountain, that we shall be as great as we saw in the broad view of the first season was possible. We begin in horror to see that the seasons not only take our loves, but that far worse they may mark upon our faces merely the lines of time. We grow desperate. We must somehow seize and twist the natural flow of the seasons that they should not merely flow, and that we should become at least some part of all we saw in the early vision a man might be. We must act, but to act becomes unnatural, for we no longer know by instinct how to become more ourselves. Glimpsing mortality and having lost the vision of eternity because of that glimpse, we desire to become masters or gods, of the temporal in the time left us.

To <u>become</u> a master is to make some kind of a stand, for if we are not born masters (and we are not, as we see in the seasons will mark upon us more time if we let them, and leave us with nothing), we must employ a convention to become so. Any convention demands division of a whole into two parts, by one of which

we stand. The world must be divided at least into good and evil of some variety, however vague, and we must stand by the "good", however vague.

In order to act now we must be more than natural creatures, as we should see. We are past the beginning and in the middle. The beginning was mostly vision, and unable to guide us successfully even this far, for we sense that we are less both than we would and might be. Something in us which is unnatural must lead us. By marking out good and evil it will mark out the law. It will set limits upon us because we have asked for action rather than sight. We cannot help sensing a falisity in the limits. But we desire to be everything as well as to have sight of everything, and the limits and divisions are the price that we may be anything.

Now we have lost that innocent state of being. What now is our state?

The state of vagueness -- Distrust of the importance of what is given -- consequent wasteful destruction -- Disinterest in what is -- If we give blindly after seeing need, we are refusing even to see the disparity between what is and what should be -- But if in the state of vagueness we deny that everything is demanded, we shall never leave it.

But do I truly need to describe this state of greyness which arises out of our weakness in not examining the territory of both the innocents and the warriors? We study the great books and hear of great commitments, but something in us says that all this is unnatural, and that any "real" love is either instinctive or false, and that reality cannot be defined in other terms than "existence". On the other hand suppose we wish to understand or have knowledge of a certain medieval room: we cannot do this either, because we are not plotting out good and evil in this mere perception, and are not engaged in the eternal war. We are left "between the devil and the deep blue sea."

Having lost innocence, we cease to trust the importance of what is given. We are so dull that we cannot conceive of any state different than our own. Seeing how dull we are, and caring, except instinctively, very little about ourselves, we cannot see that anyone else matters either. This delusion of a universal greyness co-existent with our own greyness even seems, when we are so deluded, to be verified by the books. They speak of the suffering of one man, the great man of whom they speak, if they speak of it at all. He suffers because he sees. Because his

sight is so deep, it appears not to be concerned anymore with the emotions of individuals. He has put the things of the world together, and has risen above them. We feel we can do the same thing. Everything is neutral but the sight of great men, we feel. Out of this delusion of neutrality we destroy. It is true, Shiva rules. But we destroy wastefully, indiscriminately. While death is necessary, such destruction is not.

I stated earlier that reason (in its lower sense), classification according to descending importance, and the perception of patterns are necessary mainly for action. They are also natural human faculties. They will take innocence if the consciousness of good and evil does not, for they will take wonder. For having employed these faculties long enough, we are no longer in a state of wonder. How absurd it is, the grey state of half-wonder. We come to wonder at fewer and fewer things, and those things are only ones we have found difficult to deal with by means of these faculties. Either we should wonder at everything, or nothing. But we feel life growing dull because we see its patterns. "La Roux is going to die." "Well "(wisely)" everybody dies sometime. I've seen it happen again and again." To combat this trading of innocence for nothing at all, we trust some equivalent of the great books, some knowledge of the great stands. To act merely in accordance with our perception is merely to survive; to act merely in accordance with our love of the great things may not be to act at all, for we must be able to apply that specifically, and not to charge blindly through, waving it over out heads. Those faculties must be combined with some knowledge of the great stands.

But suppose we do have the great commitments, and some sight of the great things, before us. What is the product in terms of action as well as feeling? Exactly what you already know, although concentrating on those things themselves, you ignore it. Finding what should be, we cannot forgive what is for being what is. We cease to love what is. We know very well that youths return from their education with a considerable loss of respect for their very vulgar parents. While Confucius suggested that we ought first to be good sons, good husbands, and good brothers, and then if we have any time pursue our studies, we pursue studies first. We see human fallibility and cease to trust. Just because we are not just, we rant against injustice, exactly as Jesus predicted. It is the mote in our own eyes which makes us so self-righteous. Yet can we help it? Standing by the light, we are not yet it. To merely stand by a thing makes one anxious, nervous, irritable. To guiltily half-stand by it makes one more so.

Once we saw the large and the small things inextricably connected. That is, I suppose, the only way we could love either. But now we separate them. That is really only to say that we see what should be in the same things we saw before. But what should be affects everything. We can divide it into parts, and abstract these parts from what is, but in doing so we are lying. The original sight of what should be cannot come from anything else than from what is: it must penetrate every portion of what is: it is somehow an image of what is. We are discontented with every part of every thing, but we are not brave enough or do not see enough to admit that. The actual thing is vibrant with potential, as Aristotle said. The

actual never exists without the potential. Perhaps to see this potential is unbearable: at least for me it has been at times nearly so. We must find words for it, divide and abstract it. Abstracted, it is more comfortable to deal with. I mean by this that it is more comfortable to think of perfect love than to realize that everything is demanded of a friend, not only that he should love in whatever greatest way he could love(which is certainly different than the vague idea of perfect love we have abstracted from books and the love of friends) but also that he should walk gracefully, and finally that he should demand everything of us. But because we do not see the dependence of what should be on what is, we grow vague. If we saw how at one they are we might love each for the sake of the other. But conceiving of them as seperate, we cannot love either one because it seems so foreign to the other.

Again, we have always conceived of the human gifts as free. The dignity of man seems to demand it. We have always seen a humanity grandly and freely bestowing the gifts of love and of giving and thereby creating a heaven. This heaven that poets speak of we have thought was the human glory. But when we see need, we see that the gifts are not free. In the narrowing of our season, duty becomes evident. We answer dutifully, with a sense of pettiness. Many of us cannot truly respect anyone we suspect needs our love. Again, I submit only what you must have already observed: that is, the general if disguised selfishness and disrespect shown by most students to those elders whose need becomes evident more, as it is answered less. On finding that love in the common life is not free, but must answer and is willfully destroyed by every man, we tend to flee to places where there seem

still to be free and grand gifts. How many years it will take most of us to learn what now I can only state - that the human gifts are most free because they are not free, and because need is so seldom answered - I do not know. In the books concerning great men, the gifts again appear free. We may give nothing at all because we are not answering what is needed, and by vague giving we may destroy. The dignity of man is underlain by the most groveling and helpless need, and in that need he seems unclean. The great men have seen need clearly and answered clearly, answering not the deluded needs but the original ones. In this, they may have done the only real asserting of the dignity of man. Great men appear to stand alone and untouched in clear air and give great things, while we feel that we are almost smothered in a crowd in which there is nauseating constant, mutual, pulling and tripping. The reason for the disparity between ourselves and themselves and the fact that their gifts are free not of need but of vagueness, for the most part escapes us.

And so out of vagueness we waste the gifts. This is not to say that they shrivel within us. The instinct for giving remains. But whereas, even if we do recognize that in the great books that instinct is turned to answer the greatest needs, the answer of <u>how</u> to do that escapes us. Good-hearted souls, we merely imitate the gifts given by great men, but we are vague out of the conflict between the small duties which annoy us and the desiredto give within us. We do not know what to give or to whom. Witness <u>The White Duck</u> in which a young man searched for truth, the greatest gift, and at once desire to give it: yet because he was overwhelmed with books he was vague - he did not

carry his search far enough to discover the truth of a man's reaction to the trugh he was about to state, and so he destroyed. Thus in pretending that our desire to give in combination with our sight of some of the great things which may be given automatically yields a gift, we become vague. In the blindness of wishing to give, we pretend that what we have given will be received exactly as we wished. We refuse to see that on account of need we cannot give purely because we desire to do so. We refuse to see that everything is demanded, not merely the things we can think of at the moment to give. The greater the things, the more impossible to give, and in refusing to see that our pain ceases and our life stops.

To see need at all is no longer to be innocent, for need defines an imperfection in the world. To wish to give as grandly and clearly as the great men gave, and to be disgusted with the need about us is to become vague. To become vague is to hide ourselves from the fact that everything is demanded. And to hide from the fact that everything is demanded is the most fatal thing of all, for then we not only, as before, uncomfortably fail to truly love either <u>what should be</u> or <u>what is</u>, but lose sight of the disparity between them. The sight of the terrible disparity between them is the sight by which all great men have lived, and the sight is pain. To lose a part of our love for <u>what is</u> when we have seen <u>what should be</u> is a terrible price, but perhaps it is one which must be paid. But to lose actual sight of the disparity between them (which we will never admit to having lost aloud, but which is evidenced by our avoidance of the fact that everything is demanded)

is to acquire the fatal version of the disease I have called greyness. Seeing that we cannot have or be everything, and that we must act to have or be anything, we must still see that everything is demanded, however little is possible. It is a pain from which we shall not escape. But only the acceptance of it can take from us the fatal vagueness.

The Three Great Stands -- We must chose one, although a lie or convention is required to do so-- otherwise we will fail, out of confusion -- the Platonic stand of reason -- the Christian stand with the infinite and the irrational -- the tragic committment to an extreme.

I maintain that you do not believe in good and evil, and are yet in a state of greyness, unless you see that everything is demanded, and I maintain that the sign that you have seen that everything is demanded is, first, that you feel sick and desperate, and second, that you shape your powers to answer specifically very specific needs. I further maintain that in order to see that everything is demanded and to live, you must employ a convention, and committ yourself to one of the great stands. Not to do so is either to be already wise beyond reason or to become - simply and undramatically - confused. The despair which arises out of confusion is incapacitating. Each stand cannot help but lie and we cannot help but see that, not only from studying different stands, but from comparing their postulates and conclusions with our own simple observances. Is this not reason enough to reject all of them? Yes, but for one thing. Those men saw more deeply into life than we: if we do not stand beside them, we shall not see anything except a certain glory about the fact that they did see. If each of them twisted something, what have we, committed shallowly to The Truth, better than their depths? To make sense of the world demands a lie, but not to make sense of it means not to see it, and to substitute a series of feelings for sight. We can judge those books aloofly but they will colour our views. If we do not master one of them, together

they will master us. The same event cannot be interpreted from a vaguely Christian, vaguely Platonic, vaguely tragic viewpoint without dissolving the event into a meaninglessness about which we only feel something.

Exactly as in the fading of the season's first great views, we find we cannot be everything. Not only can we not remain aloof from the stands, but we cannot, in love with the grandness of them, attempt to take every stand at once. In attempting to do so, we shall merely mimic symptoms, and the attempt to follow all is a sign that we do not understand any. It is true, each presents a warrior against the dark and each is committed to the truth. But what does "committed to the truth" mean? Simply that the warriors, like all men who are not in the greyness, want the truth. In innocence we also were committed to truth but believed we had it. If we could have remained in that state there would have been no problem. But slipping out of it we lost the truth, no longer being able to find it naturally. The whole point is that now a single convention must be employed; if that were <u>not</u> the point, we would reach truth naturally, and conventions and the division of thewworld into darkness and light would be absurd.

Behind each stand is a sight which cannot be described in words. The tragedian does not say "You must stand by the extreme"; nor the Platonist "You must stand by proportion", arbitrarily. If we say grandly "Both Socrates and Antigone died for the truth", we will be speaking grandly, but we will certainly disgust Socrates and Antigone. They died according to their lights, in order not to betray them. Socrates died for the political nature of man; Antigone, for his aloneness. Resolve

the two into one as prettily as you like, but you will come out with two simple-minded suicides.

I would define the three main stands as reason, committment to an extreme, and acceptance of an irrational postulate. Each can include and explain the others quite nicely. We have studied them under the headings of the Platonic philosophers, the tragedians, and the Christians. They all postulate a war of darkness against light, although some more subtly than others. Some outline of each is necessary in order to see the way in which each demands everything.

The general definition of the Platonic stand is "mastery through reason", with the very important qualification that reason is not always laid out in the form of a Euclidean proof, and may become sight itself, as in the myths at the end of the dialogues. Just because reason, which is natural to men, seizes only certain things in order to devise "coherent" systems, reason is the only hope for knowledge of all. That is, our minds have a certain power of ascension, somewhat parallel to the ability to prove a Euclidean proposition. But Plato clearly sees that we will get nowhere unless we have been given everything, and in carelessly choosing only certain axioms, as most of us are wont to do, we will lie. Everything on earth is demanded as an axiom that we might reach the truth. But our vague realization of just that keeps us from it. Therefore he must unify all we see into some few catagories - not only is there Same and Other, but also certain Forms, such as Beauty and Justice. Expecting all things to fall more or less under these forms (for we are not evil but less good) we can compound everything for the sake of sight. We will see the finite infinitely magnified; if he allowed us to say the magnification was the image, we would

be miserable for the disparity - and so quickly he turns the tables and the magnification becomes the actuality. He boldly states that we will be happier in knowing more of what is - what a pitiable delusion that would appear to the tragedian. But he also maintains that those who have seen the reality must and will bring it back to the world of images, "this" world. The effects are the same as though this were the "real" world. In effect, he has demanded that we be glad that we can see what should be and that it exists, even if only for the sake of sight. We might say he lied, that in translating image and object he committed some heinious crime against truth. Yet what crime has he committed? Some crime will always be committed - if it is not perversion, it will be never to have tried at all. The absolute truth would be well if it were accessible other than by revelation, and yet I believe the final truth will be what you can do.

But whether or not the Christian stand is also a perversion it is not possible for those who are not Christians to tell. The Christian postulates that there is a kind of being called the blessed state, which we who are without it cannot understand, and certainly which we who have not accepted Christianity's irrational postulate (as indeed all postulates are irrational) could not hope to understand. Yet Christianity appears to offer the least perversion, taken on its own grounds. The desire for wholeness is a strong one, and I can understand how many in the end would turn to it. Have we not all longed to "become again as little children"? Take away the sense of grandeur and the desire for glory, and you find the majority of humanity did not leave childhood and simplicity out of any yearning to do so, and that the greatest longing is perhaps the

one to return to it. Must we out of pride deny our greatest longing, and might it not, when answered, point to the greatest truth? Might we not submit entirely to the infinite, towards which there is a great pull, and regain our innocence?

Men have visions. There are Dostoevsky's visions of human suffering, Rimbaud's visions of beauty, and our own lesser visions still overwhelming us. What shall we do with those visions of infinity? Pursued, they will twist and pervert the pursuer, for his passions match the things in their infinity, and he does not. Taken as a statement of a truth to be lived by, they will break one, as the vision of chastity broke Hippolytus. The Greek philosophers offer balance and proportion as an answer, but how impossible and how consequently dull that can be. The fourth thing we may do is to become simple as a child, so whole and good that nothing may pervert it, and that the Father himself in His one and only truth may take us into the realm of the blessed. Sick of good and evil, St. Augustine renounced them in God's oneness. We have all a sense of the infinite and we are all sick of limits. We are sick of law and of sin and of death. And

> ... this then is the proper and true definition of a Christian; that he is the child of grace and remission of sins, which is under no law, but is above law, sin, death, and hell ....

The only way to heal that sickness, I believe, is to become a Christian.

It is the tragic stand which is the least natural, and in which suffering is not merely upon the way but most greatly at the end. For the tragedian the gods are neither good nor evil. They are absolutely inhuman

forces against which our humanity must stand, accepting its resultant freedom as its glory. But for Plato, a rationality ran through all things, for the Christian an irrationality; for neither were the forces inhuman. We had only to unite with the world of truth in order to become what we should be. But the tragedian asserts that we are forever strangers in the world andthat the highest form of life can result only from the acceptance of that fact. The tragedians see, I feel, that the conflict of good and evil is but a product of time and mortality. While the Platonist and Christian look somewhere for eternity, the tragic hero will not compromise with it. He stands with and sees the pitiful convention with which life presents us - mortality and its grandeurs ringing about eternity, its little lights and darknesses made out of nothingness. He stands by its most pitiable delusion, the extreme of commitment, and thereby wages war with the nothingness. Only a being which can feel greatly can seize upon nothing and the delusion of something and strangle them both, by the greater force of his own life. Only Achilles can see the shortness of life and make it shorter, and by wrenching himself from the forces which give and take, assert the magnificence of what it is simply to be human. The tragic stand will always be lonely, for not only is the person who takes such a stand at war with darkness but also he is warring with only the force of his own humanity. There is no league of tragic men; the very idea of tragedy negates the possibility. While the Platonist says somehow that he is god, the Christian that he is a creature of God, the tragic hero says only that he is a man. To say that you are a man is never to cease asking "who am I?", for that is the question from which the answer "I am a man." has sprung, and the two are one. (I am one who believes we know the great statements

before the great questions.) Essentially, I believe, the tragedian has answered th fact that everything is demanded with the question who am I?, for that is his first translation of the demand. But because the translation is as impossible as the original, he takes upon himself committment to an extreme (of chastity in Hippolytus, of individual human dignity in Antigone) and agrees that, whoever he is, he will pay the full price for the sake of something larger than himself. If these two were nothing without the committment, it would not matter, for the tragic hero has set at once a price upon the thing to which he is committed, and upon himself, simply by integrating the two, as is unnatural.

Conclusion -- In commitment we become what we were not certain we saw -- commitment to large things must become commitment to another human -- the final conquering of the seasons -- that men honour life in both innocence and war -- that because of that we shall finally forgive them and thereby give the greatest gift, the belief in the right to life.

There was a certain naturalness in each of those three commitments, and that consisted in the fact that there is a certain longing in us for the answers each of them presents. That is, we strongly desire that Justice be somehow a reality, that we be children who may return to innocence and eternity, and that we discover and assert who we are as men. We have had glimpses of the magnificence of honour, of childhood, and of humanity pitted against inhuman forces. Yet the glimpses were uncertain. The primary yearning of commitment is that through it we become what we were not certain we could trust we saw. Very simply, if I am not certain that La Roux is honourable but through him I have seen honour, I must not as the modern psychologists (answering "because he has guilt feelings from frustration with regard to his uncle") or as the early adolescents (answering not at all, but very much enjoying the question) ask only why it is uncertain whether he is honourable, but I must ask how it is possible for me to be honourable. We finally doubt the reality of things concerning which we only ask that noble question why. We must commit ourselves to honour, without asking forever whether it is real. In that commitment the questioning of why must change to how, a question far darker than why, for whereas why at least implies ananswer, how implies nothing so much as it implies despair. I cannot help believing that just because how is so desperate, and commitment so unnatural, in becoming honourable we will discover, as well as give life to, the reality of honour.

But merely to be committed to such things as honour is hardly

to be committed at all, although in misreading the great books we might believe it were. We must be committed to a single thing - yes, in the danger of being quite ordinary, I mean another human being- in order to be committed at all. Socrates was committed to his friends, Achilles to Patroclus, and Jesus to his disciples. Only in this can we truly claim to love good or evil (for they are mortal things) or what should be (for that arose from, and for the sake of, what is) or to answer the fact that everything is demanded. To make a law more just in the same of light and justice is well, but it is simple, for it is fairly clear, for a law can only become more or less just, and is primarily two-dimensional. But a man is everything - in his eyes the world is reflected and exists, and for his sake the war between good and evil has been fought, and because of his gifts we have seen what should be. He is impossible, complicated, yet in truth it is of him that everything is demanded, for everything can only be demanded of everything. These books give visions no man can fulfill - of what it is to be a son, a voyager, a warrior. But we are committed to one who is ridiculous, petty, and ugly, as well as one through whom the darkness runs. This histories portray a greatness which we who are not great and certainly we who are young cannot understand. Men such as Aurelius are human, but they have become so much so that we feel an impossible distance, and forget it is the distance to a greater rather than a lesser humanity. As to our scorn of men like Tiberius, I can only say that perhaps we have confused a price which must be paid with some terrible envisioned compromise with the ideal. Destruction horrifies us, and we refuse to see that in traversing the distance to what could be, what is must be destroyed. But whereas com itment to a Justice involves merely knowledge, commitment to a man in the name of justice demands both creation and destruction. Knowledge will be the source of what we give, but what we give must be life and that can only be given to living things.

But the seasons in which we lived in the state of innocence have not ceased for our commitments. Nor have any of the great men failed to see this. Each speak of the final conquering of the seasons. In Book viii of the Republic, Plato speaks of the eventual decline of his perfect state:

> In plants that grow in the earth, as well as in animals that move on the earth's surface, fertility and sterility of soul and body occur when the circles of each are completed... but... all the wisdom and education of your rulers will not attain the laws which regulate them... (the laws) will escape them, and they will bring children into the world when they ought not.

Sophocles says in Oedipus Rex

> All things doth long, immesurable time
> Bring forth to light and then again conceal.

And the Bible repeats again and again the words of Isaiah:

> And the voice said, Cry. And he said, What shall I cry? All flesh is grass, and all goodliness thereof is as the flower of the field: the grass withereth, the flower fadeth: but the word of our God shall stand forever.

In view of the fact that the seasons run through us and make our stands ridiculous and our final words a crying out at death, which is the final and encompassing silence, how shall we live? We shall and must be happy, for only in that will we have answered the horrors of life. If we refuse to be happy because there is suffering, we have in reality lost the entire battle. I know that it is "impossible" to be happy, but I also know that honour demands that we should honour what in our feeling of being nothingness we shall never understand - that those who love us wish us first of all to be happy, and second of all to be good. Should we turn so quickly from that gentle voice in the midst of so clashing a war? I believe that to do so is not only dishonourable but also exactly what the forces of evil, had they personality, would desire that we should do. What greater deference can there be to evil than that we should acquire long, knowing, and grey faces. But if we cannot remember to be happy even

in seeing theclouds overhead in the midst of war, we are fighting for nothing. If men cannot be happy in this life there is no actual glory, for in what does glory consist except in the ability to wrench ourselves back when sight has twisted us and the things we held good. What is hell but heaven's destruction? If there can be no human happiness, we are entirely strangers, and so entirely unnatural, that we would do better not to exist at all.

I stated at the beginning of this paper that the state of innocence can have no connection with that state in which we perceive and join in the battle between dark and light. Yet the effect of having seen both states will be a compromise between them: the effect can only be a compromise because the two states cannot themselves compromise. The end of it all, then, is a forgiveness.

Not only in the vagueness but also in the war we had lost the ability to forgive. The loss of that ability makes us/be not only strangers to the non-human things but also to men and to ourselves. Until we forgive, we will not be able to look into the eyes of another. There is no need to speak further on thewretchedness of that condition, or the need to escape from it.

Forgiveness is a miserable compromise, but it is perhaps the best thing we shall come to. You have seen it in the eyes of a few of the old. If you thought to see it in the eyes of children, you are mistaken, for there you can see only trust. It does not come before we have demanded everything. It does not come while we are commencing upon the war, for the very nature of war is one to obliterate universal forgiveness. Forgiveness must be lost when we fist separate good from evil, or

we have not really separated them. It is gained only when we havegained someidea of who and what men are. We cannot know that until we haveseparated them from the forces. We cannot separate them until we are ourselves more human. But by separating them from the forces I mean nothing making them less responsible; I simply mean the realization that men are different even than good and evil, although they contain and perceive them. That they are different is marked out by the fact that they may or may not choose to honour the good. Man is neither light nor dark. He is not either gray, for there is no half-goodness, as we are wont, in our pictorial minds, to presume. If he were any of these, there would be no forgiveness, for although there might be a battle, he would have no choice whether or for whom to fight. But whoever men are, they are capable of a certain kind of honouring. It is for that capability, no matter how misused, that we shall forgive him. First, by honouring or desiring to honour something that is not themselves, they have set a price upon their heads which we cannot remove, and which only in the end we shall see. Secondly, and most importantly, this honouring is the only thing in us that can stand between the state of innocence and the war. Men honour life in both states, no matter how incomparable the states may be. What that means cannot be stated: it can only gradually be seen. Seeing that men honour life we will finally honour it. We cannot say the honouring is nothing, for by it we must admit, if we are honest, that man has beyond our quibbling set himself at a great price, even if he were originally nothing. In our honouring of their honouring lies forgiveness and the covenant with life, greater than any committment we made before. Honouring

and forgiving both men and life for the sake of our seeing that men honour life, we give the greatest gift we can - the right to live, in all its implications. Its implications are too many to enumerate, once you admit that for a long time you have not been sure of that right. One implication of the right to live is the right to be oblivious to the war, which in its heat we could never have granted; that right is simply the right to be innocent. We shall then become the mediator because of whom innocence may exist. That we should be him is as necessary as that we should be warriors, for life cannot be seen it its full glory unless it is first seen in wonder. Life in the very beginning and at the end has a glory and a wonder it can never have in the wars which begin with commit-tment. Because of our acceptance of the committment to everything, we will in granting the right to live have passed in Genesis from the role of Adam to the part of his God, in the end of the biblical paradigm of the loss of innocence:

> And the Lord smelled the incense they had offered him; and the Lord said in his heart, I will not again curse the ground anymore for man's sake ... neither will I again smite anymore every living thing as I have done ... And the rainbow shall be in the cloud; and I will look upon it, that I may remember the everlasting covenant between God and every living creature of all flesh that is upon the earth.

The Final Statement

> "The final statement about the poet's endeavor must be itself a poem; in that case, the very requirements of its form will reveal, as truest example, the way to address its subject." -- W. H. Auden

Forever gamboling in the glade

Under the sun I seek for shade

Crying for nanna so cold and staid

Killing my time in summer.

Youth, you very soon will die!

Oh, that you had known that I

Used to be a mummer.

---J. M. E. Michele*

*Mr. Michele is a friend of the College.

Portfolio: Four Nudes

Note:

During the school year of 1962-63, I conducted a Life Class in the St. John's Art Studio on Tuesday evenings until the middle of April. It was well attended by St. John's students and faculty and by townspeople as well. The moderate fees more than paid for the models and the art materials supplied so I have spent some of the surplus for the four reproductions included in this issue of the Collegian.

(continued after drawings)

COLLEGIAN



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