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EDITORIAL

The Collegian, in virtue of being the newspaper of a small college, published by and for the members of a small community, can not hope or pretend to compete with the publications of larger communities. News, as conventionally understood, is here circulated, edited, interpreted and even censored by the grapevine and the several gossip cliques much faster and much more completely than any printed sheet could hope to edit, interpret, censor and publish. Such news is not the business of the Collegian. It sees as its purpose the more or less regular publication of criticism pertinent to the intellectual life of the community together with such creative efforts as are presented to the editor. Reviews of lectures, concerts, movies, plays, books, even of the dialectic of the playing field if well written, poems, stories, essays, these are its material. Almost anything falls within this range. Almost anything if well written will be printed.

The activities of this volume of the Collegian have been planned with these things in mind. The Collegian will be published once every three weeks, oftener if there is material enough. It will again offer a prize for the best article, poem or short story written for its pages. It will again print the prize material from the several annual competitions. To this end it presents in the first two issues Mr. McRaney's prize essay which was not available to the Collegian at the time of last publication.

In an effort to gain new material the Collegian has agreed to review all new Modern Library publications. The reviewer will be selected by the editors and will, of course, receive the review copy.

The Collegian also wishes to point out that its editors have never been too busy. Whether published or rejected, all material is welcomed from students, faculty, alumni and friends of St. John's. Anything in the intra-collegiate mail addressed to the Collegian will be received.

For the Editorial Board
Washburn, Editor.

SIGMUND FREUD

The Interpretation of Dreams

Modern Library Edition.

She dipped her locks in a bowl of henna
And booked a ticket straight to Vienna.

Ogden Nash.

It has seldom happened that one man has influenced the outlook of his age as strongly as Sigmund Freud. His theories have not only achieved a revolution in medical psychiatry, but contemporary thinking on what is good or evil, beautiful or ugly, divine or profane has come under a Freudian aegis. Not only has the science of psychoanalysis been accepted or rejected in academic circles, but the educated and uneducated public has started to consider the Viennese psychiatrist devil or prophet. As proof for the great demand for Freud's works, the *Interpretation of Dreams* has now been brought out in a regular Modern Library edition. Even the "book and gift shoppes" of cities in the 10,000 population class carry a Modern Library assortment, and chances are that this small edition with the good-looking dust cover will be seen in many American homes. I think that the Modern Library did well in choosing the *Interpretation of Dreams* as a mass-circulation work. It does not contain Freud's best presentation of the psychoanalytic theory—both the *Introductory Lectures to Psychoanalysis* and the *Introduction to Psychoanalysis* do this much better. Yet these are later works, written when Freud was already aware of the commotion he was causing and had adopted a more standard vocabulary for his science. The *Interpretation*, on the other hand, is a pioneer work, addressed by a physician to scientists and presented as a series of developed experiments.

After a fairly brief introductory exposition, Freud presents analyses of his own dreams or of dreams brought up by patients in the course of treatment. To a reader who expects to be glamorously converted or delightfully repelled by psychoanalysis, the *Interpretation* will be disappointing. On the other hand, the book gives anyone a fair chance to make an objective appraisal of the strength and weakness of Freud's method. The English translation by Dr. A. A. Brill is adequate. Its only serious defects are caused by stumbling blocks in the English and German languages. For instance the German *Lust* does not carry the same meaning as the English *lust*. It merely signifies pleasure, yet that English word is too weak to render its full and all-embracing significance. Again, Dr. Brill could not possibly render German proper names which, in some analyses suggest significant nouns of the same spelling (Ex: Brucke, the name of Freud's most important teacher is also the German

name for bridge) into English so that some analyses lose their force and elegance in translation.

The space proper to a book review cannot permit a full criticism of Freud's theories. I shall merely mention a few points which struck me during this reading of the *Interpretation of Dreams*. Even if one admits the existence of an unconscious, barely existent in everyday life and manifested only in dreams and at rare occasions, some of Freud's analyses are not altogether convincing. For it is only possible for Freud to make symbolic interpretations of several parts of the manifest dream content, i.e., the dream as remembered. He successfully identifies sexual symbols by their recurrence in similar situations and by their corresponding places in folklore and mythology. He shows us by numerous examples *vide Cap. VI., Ex. 7, 8, 9, 10* how verbal associations and word-groups make a rational picture in accordance with the diagnosis when analyzed into their components. Yet, strikingly, Freud admits to a sort of intuitive diagnostic paradigm which forms in his mind as soon as the dream is told and the patient is before him. For instance, in the case of the girl who dreams of arranging flowers in the centre of a table at the occasion of a birthday, he jumps to the conclusion that the flowers represent her own genitalia and "birthday" means the birth of her future child because he already knows that she is engaged to be married. The rest of the analysis is beautifully fitted into this pattern by non-suggestive free association. The flowers are "lilies of the valley, violets, and carnations or pinks" and the patient identifies lily with purity, carnation with incarnation, violet with violate, adding that these are expensive flowers, one has to pay for them. Hence Freud concludes that the dream alludes to her "expensive virginity," and as she relates further that she remembers putting "green crinkled paper, like moss" about the flowers in order to hide an unsightly gap in them, the green paper becomes the *crines pubis*, the gap, the *vagina*. Here I ask myself whether a certain irrational gap does not exist between the positing of flowers (deforation) as genital symbols and this particular interpretation of birthday, table, and arrange which hinges on that first assumption, yet which makes up the substance of Freud's analysis? Could it not be that those flowers were, for instance, not her own, or that the emphasis should be laid on birthday or table, rather than on flowers? Similarly, why should a young man's dream of his former governess in a

black luster dress mean that he accused her of lustfulness rather than that he re-awakened an earlier desire to which the similar sound of lust and luster might be related in a different way?

I am not trying to question the validity of Freud's premises. I am only suggesting that as far as research into dream symbolism might progress, it will still be the analyst's particular understanding of symbolic interrelationships that will condition the aggregate image of the patient. The individual psychoanalyst, as we see demonstrated in the *Interpretation of Dreams*, follows a fairly standard mode of thought. Consequently the patient, after some hundred analytic hours, might automatically think of himself in the same way. Thus a rational "soul pattern" may be built up through the analyst's mode of understanding and the patient's response to it. That this essential subjectivity in the interpretation of data plays a definite role in any empirical method never seemed to bother Freud in the *Interpretation*, or afterwards.

This leads me to my second critical point. In the *Interpretation*, Freud trespasses guilelessly onto territory which had been reserved for philosophers before. He makes an implicit definition of the human soul as a pleasure seeking vegetative "tis," while he emphatically proclaims himself "physician-scientist", not philosopher. What is more, he believes that his discovery is something new. I am afraid that, in this respect, Freud was time-bound. Certainly the stodgy Victorians of his own era who made up the most repressed and frustrated society in human history were shocked and repelled by the doctrine. Yet I am sure that William Shakespeare and St. Augustine would not have been surprised at the black soul of Freud's bourgeois patients. In this way, Sigmund Freud was much less and much more than his avowed conception of himself. As a physician, he did not make a new discovery about man. He merely invented a therapy, suited to his own times, which was effective in treating man's permanent and inherited sins. As a philosopher, he has rediscovered a traditional picture of man which gave a more likely story than the God-sent business and morality doctrine of the late nineteenth century. We may say that he created another aspect of the Graeco-Christian myth of man and is for this reason an "eminently quotable poet."

W. B. Fleischmann

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On A Prerequisite To Intellectual Knowledge

Man proceeds to intellectual knowledge through separation. He knows first intuitively through identification with the object known. When he first opens his eyes on the world and begins to perceive things, he is not separate from the things he sees but is thoroughly bound up in them. When he first learns to speak, his words are not thought of but are as much a part of him as the feelings and desires they express. He even has no distinct conception of himself as an entity in the world about him.

At some point a process begins which is analogous to the progressive separation of an embryo from the egg yolk it is at first completely attached to: he begins to separate himself from certain of these unconscious parts of him. This is the beginning for him of the possibility of intellectual knowledge (as opposed to intuitive knowledge) for only then can he begin to look at anything from the outside as is required by the Intellect.

His parents, for instance, become not just inexplicable mergings in and out of his visual field as they come and go, but entities possible to be affected when he cries and makes noises. Though there is not "thinking" at this stage in the usual sense, the necessary condition for thinking has taken place, and he will later be able, through acquaintance with other separated entities, to make such abstractions as "mother," "father," "person."

Jean Paul gives us an account of one of the first separations that is made: "Never shall I forget the inner sensation when I was present at the birth of my self-consciousness, of which I can specify both time and place. One morning, when still quite a young child, I was standing under the doorway, and looking towards the woodstack on the left, when suddenly the vision, 'I am an ego,' passed before me like a lightning flash from heaven; my ego had seen itself then for the first time and forever."

Later, particularly under the influence of his school, the child comes to separate from his larger being the words he has unconsciously acquired by imitation. What before were unconsciously used, and as much a part of him as his hands and feet, become objectified and prepared for the action of his self as knower in all the manifold ways the knower can have knowledge of the known. Spelling and grammar are learned, and later etymology, philology, etc.

This separating is carried on throughout life

as deeper and deeper layers of his larger unconscious self are disengaged and become the property of his growing conscious self. (The conscious self has other sources for its growth, for the Intellect can relate and expand endlessly its concepts. But the depth to which a person can reach in his intellectual thinking is governed by how far he has proceeded in this disengagement.) Not only individual objects in the world about one become objectified, but eventually the external world as a whole, permitting thought about it and giving rise to such intellectual theories as those of Descartes, Berkeley, and Kant. And not only individual words of one's language are divorced from their original utilitarian character, but eventually language itself, allowing one to differentiate between meaning, still an intimate part of him, and its arbitrary symbol. Such theories as those of Korzybski and Carnap become possible after their separation.

This successively deeper disengagement seems to be progressively accomplished on the scale of the human race as well as in the individual. The important and liberating inquiries connected with Semantics have appeared only very recently. (Though Plato could write a *Cratylus*, there is no indication that he and his successors for many centuries were sufficiently advanced to see language as totally arbitrary articulation corresponding with doubtful success to the articulations in "reality" it was supposed to represent. Otherwise, why should a word be taken, — for instance, "Justice" in the Republic, and an enquiry pursued as to what it was? Rightly seen, "Justice" has no correlate in reality, no definite and separate meaning, but is the manifestation of a particular meaning stated by a particular time (whenever anybody uses the word in expressing himself). It has as many meanings as the number of times it has been used and no one can succeed in giving an adequate intensional definition of it.) And it was many centuries before Despartes could manage to disengage the outer world from the "knower" in him so completely as to see the lack of any certainty of its objective existence. For Plato and Plotinus it might have had a diminished place in "Being," but I doubt if they could have considered it as the totally subjective thing Kant did.

In the individual this process of disengagement goes on in some at a faster and in others at a slower rate. Most are behind the most advanced points reached by the race, perhaps centuries behind. Stop a man in the street and engage him persistently in a discussion over

whether that lamp-post he sees is really there, and not just some irresponsible twitching of a brain cell, and I deny any responsibility for your physical welfare. Not having separated the representations of his mind from his larger self, he is not capable of considering these representations in any way. He simply cannot think about them, and is therefore incapable of seeing the possibility of a theory which doubts their existence. Or ask a person whether he considers "number" important. He will not know what you mean (as I did not when asked this question by an unfortunately-addicted-to-mathematics Seminar leader during my Freshman year) because, though he has acquaintance with numbers (like Meno's virtues) and can add and subtract, these numbers have never passed beyond the useful stage for him and been disengaged as-a-whole from action for the purpose of speculation. And few will see the difference in asking in the course of a discussion, "What does 'soul' mean," and, to a person who has just used the term, "What do you mean by 'soul' ". For them symbol is still so completely bound up with symbolized that the two are equated, or at least considered to have one-to-one correspondence.

To sum up then, we have seen that man's first knowledge is by identity with the thing known. (A thorough intellectual would probably balk at this "identity," sometimes called "intuitive knowledge." What is meant by it is the complete lack of consciousness of self in preoccupation with the thing "known." When one completely concentrates on a thing he is not conscious of anything but that thing, and is thus "identified" with it. One need not look far in his daily experience to see how he is at times so completely preoccupied with things heard, seen, or thought as to justify this term. One is always learning this way no matter how far he has proceeded in his disengagement process.) Progressively, he separates some of the outer objects of perception, some of his unconscious habits (such as language), and some of his inner perceptions (feelings, desires, fears, etc.) from that part of him which is capable of knowing intellectually, and thence proceeds to know about them to a greater or lesser degree. These things separated are individuals, and through the ability of the Intellect to recognize samenesses in these entities, the sphere of knowledge is expanded through the introduction of abstractions (Mother and Father to mother and father in general to animal, etc.). Language, Number, Mind-representations and all the other closer attributes

of the person are not higher order abstractions from words, numbers, and external and internal objects, etc., but require a separation from our unconscious self themselves. (No doubt one can and does arrive at an abstraction "language," but this is by no means the same as the view of it acquired when it is disengaged; one is still immersed in language in the former case, whereas he is outside it in the latter.) The progress is always from the unconscious to the conscious, this latter term really implying nothing else than the consciousness of one's self simultaneous with and distinct from the thing perceived or thought. One given to creative philosophies or scientific thought will recognize that much of his struggle is the attempt to bring what is largely unconscious and only vaguely felt into the clear light of full consciousness where he can see it as a separate entity or entities and begin to know what it is.

We have also seen that different people accomplish this disengagement, or formation of a conscious self from the unconscious self, at different rates. Many seem to stop after a while, or proceed so slowly that during their life they do not get very far. Does it make any difference whether one proceed slowly or quickly? It does from the standpoint of intellectual knowledge of course because how much,—more especially, how deeply, a person knows is dependent on how much of his unconscious self he has brought to consciousness. But there is also another factor in favor of a rapid, and therefore more far-reaching, disengagement. Man is unfortunately prone to becoming rather violent about those things which constitute his unconscious and more intimate being. (What happened to you when you asked the man on the street about the lamp-post attests to this.) They are all part of the house he lives in, and whether it be built on the sand or on the rock, he is apt to fly out and defend it very energetically if he thinks it is being attacked. He is incapable of looking at any part of it objectively, the whole house still being the part of him that does the looking, and so if one politely begins to question and discuss one of his taken-for-granted, he will vaguely feel that the whole house is indiscriminately being subjected to the winds and the rains and must perforce be saved at all costs.

In short a man is unteachable in respect to the things that still form a part of his unconscious self.

A. H.

THE ABBEY OF THELEME How Theleme Was Born, or "That War Is The Parent of All Good Things"

1. The war between Picrochole (spleen, spite) and Grangousier (Great Gullet), father of Pantagruel (All-Athirst).

In the early autumn (the wine season) some bakers of Lerne (in the domain of Picrochole) happened to pass down the highway into the domain of King Grangousier on their way to Tours. They were transporting ten or twelve horseloads of freshly baked cakes. Some shepherds of Grangousier who were guarding the vines against marauders graciously asked to buy some of the bakers' cakes. Far from complying with the decent request of the shepherds, the bakers turned upon them with epithets of filth, styling them "waifs, snaggle-teeth, red-headed Judases, wastrels, and shit-abeds . . ." The healthy shepherds, incensed by such unjust insults, hurled a few of their clubs at the haughty bakers, and sent them scurrying back to Lerne without their cakes. Whereupon the shepherds and their shepherdesses sat down to a feast of cakes and fine grapes.

Picrochole, hearing of the atrocity committed upon his bakers, was stirred into vain-glory by a solemn council of his nobles. "My Lord Tickledingus Touchfaucet, summing up the unanimous sentiments of the assembly, declared that Picrochole could defeat all the devils in hell, if these so much as showed their noses. Without believing this wholesale, the monarch none the less did not question its truth." Carried along by the passions appropriate to his name, Picrochole determined to seek retribution by means of immediate conquest, without wasting time with useless parleying for peace. Whereupon he dispatched his men into Grangousier's realm to ravage the countryside.

The aged, pious, but thirsty Grangousier, hearing of the breach of a peace (between himself and Picrochole) that had been deemed inviolate by the whole world, summoned his son Gargantua from his studies in Paris to protect the hereditary domain of his father. Speaking of the rupture of the peace, he said, "I consider it my duty to assuage his (Picrochole's) tyrannical anger; I have offered him all I thought might satisfy him; several times I have despatched friendly envoys to find out how and by whom he considered himself outraged. But his only answer has been this declaration of war, and the claim that he sought to put order in my land. Hence I concluded that the Eternal Master had abandoned him to the government of his own will and sense. And how shall these be anything but evil unless the grace of God continually guides

them? I believe the Divine Power has sent him here under such grievous auspices so that I might bring him back to his sense." Whereupon Gargantua, with due filial awe, mounted his gigantic mare and turned homeward.

2. The Abbot (Father) of Theleme, Friar John, and how he begot it as a warrior.

The soldiers of Picrochole, carrying out their King's command to ravage the countryside, came upon an Abbey near Seully. Seven companies of infantry and two hundred lancers began to break through the walls of the Abbey and pillage the vineyards. The terrified monks assembled and sent up to God chants and litanies against war, adding to these responses in favor of peace. One monk acted differently. Friar John of the Funnels — "a youthful, gay, wide-awake, good-humored, and skillful lad, a true monk if ever there was one since the monking world started monkeying in monkeries" — seized his staff of the cross and threw himself into the enemy. Before long with the aid of his adaptable weapon (and with the aid of God, I maintain) he had polished off "thirteen thousand six hundred and twenty-two, exclusive, of course, of women and children." This notable heroism of Friar John turned the tide against the aggression of Picrochole. Gargantua arrived from Paris shortly on his gigantic mare, which rather conveniently piddled upon the bulk of Picrochole's soldiers and sent them swirling away to their deaths. Picrochole fled from his realm ignominiously and a just peace was established.

Gargantua, in rewarding Friar John for his service to the domain, offered him the Benedictine abbeys of Bourgueil or St. Florent, among the richest in France. The monk flatly refused. He stated categorically that he did not seek the charge and government of monks. "For," he explained, "how shall I govern others when I cannot possibly govern myself?" There was a pause. "But—," he hesitated. "But if you believe I have given and can give you good service, let me found an abbey after my own heart."

3. How Friar John, the Abbot of Theleme, seems to be at war with all monkdom — or, the regulations of the Theleme order.

The new abbey was to be known as Theleme (meaning free will). It was to be contrary to all other Abbeys. Eight stipulations or regulations were set up and marshalled against the monastic world:

- I. (a) All other monasteries are solidly enclosed by a wall (mur).
- (b) Where there are walls (mures) before and behind, there are murmurs (murmures) of envy and plotting. Therefore, there will be no wall around Theleme.

- II. (a) In certain monasteries if women enter (that is, honest and chaste ones) the ground upon which they walk is to be swept.
- (b) At Theleme, if any nuns or monks enter, every place they pass through is to be thoroughly disinfected.
- III. (a) All other Abbeys on earth are compassed, limited and regulated by hours.
- (b) At Theleme, no clock or dial of any sort should be tolerated. On the contrary, their time here would be governed by what occasions and opportunities might arise.
- IV. (a) In all other Abbeys, the women who enter are wall-eyed, lame, hunchbacked, ill-favored, misshapen, half-witted, unreasonable, or somewhat damaged; the men, cankered, ill-bred idiots, or plain nuisances.
- (b) Accordingly, at Theleme only such women are to be admitted into the order as are beautiful, shapely, pleasing of form and nature, and only such men as are handsome, athletic and personable.
- V. (a) In all other convents men enter only by guile and stealth.
- (b) At Theleme, no women would be in the Abbey unless men were there also, and vice-versa.
- VI. (a) In all other Abbeys the men and women were forced after their year of novitiate to stay there perpetually.
- (b) At Theleme, the men and women come and go whenever they saw fit.
- VII. (a) In all other monasteries and convents, the religious usually made the triple vow of chastity, poverty, and obedience.
- (b) At Theleme, all had full leave to marry honestly, to enjoy wealth, and to live in perfect freedom.
- VIII. At Theleme, the women were admissible between the ages of ten and fifteen, the men between the ages of twelve and eighteen.
4. "Again they (the French armies) are doing this (carrying on war) so admirably that I almost agree with the good Heraclitus when he states that war is the parent of all good things. One might suppose, as our fathers did, that our French word 'bel' was derived from the Latin 'bellum,' as though nobility and

beauty came from war. Only the mouldiest patcher of rusty Latin would have you believe that this is not the fact. For has not war disclosed all manner of benefits and wonders? Has it not abolished evil and ugliness? Why could Solomon, a sagacious and peaceful monarch, find no more perfect expression for the ineffable glory of divine wisdom than the phrase 'terrible as an army with banners'?"

An Exposition on Pantagruelism

1. Two things must be established before the Abbey itself is considered. One is the nature of Pantagruelism. The other is the method of Pantagruelism. The first cannot be properly understood without the second; but it will be helpful to get a partial understanding of the definition of Pantagruelism first.

2. The nature of Pantagruelism.

The first step in discussing Pantagruelism is to show that it is something essential to the nature of man. Pantagruel means "all athirst." This indicates that there is a kind of eros that characterizes the Pantagruelist. This problem, however, will be dealt with a little later. Let it suffice here to give the definition of Pantagruelism, which, along with two other important assertions, will establish its essentiality. "Pantagruelism is a certain gaiety of spirit produced by a contempt for the incidentals of fate, a healthiness and cheerfulness of a spirit ever ready to drink, if it will." "Laughter is the essence of mankind." "Drinking . . . is the essence of mankind." It is readily seen that laughter is to be connected with the "gaiety produced by a contempt for the incidentals of fate" — that is, with the first part of the definition. Drinking is manifestly linked with the second half of the definition. The essentiality of Pantagruelism, then, is established; and it seems to be shown forth in two characteristic modes of action, laughter and drinking. Proceeding a little further, we see that the attributes of gaiety, healthiness, and cheerfulness of spirit; a contempt for the incidentals of fate, and a readiness to drink are natural, and that their privations are unnatural.

Upon examination it turns out that Rabelaisian laughter and drinking are all but the same. In the Prologue to Book III Rabelais says: "My barrel (of wine) is a veritable cornucopia of merriment and mockery." It seems that laughter is a "giving out" of merriment and mockery, drinking a "taking in."

It is well to state at this point that drinking has a two-fold significance that will become pertinent later on. It is a symbol of easy comradeship, of a jovial intermingling of men of

different stations. It is also a symbol of the wedding feast.

3. The method of Pantagruelism.

A discussion of the method of Pantagruelism will do well to begin with a quotation already given: "I almost agree with good Heraclitus when he states that war is the parent of all good things." The "almost" is taken care of by supposing it to be Rabelais' rejection of the part of the original doctrine of Heraclitus that is incompatible with Christianity. There is ample evidence to support this supposition. The road to Heraclitus is then free of obstacles. In Heraclitus the quoted statement means that peace is not understandable without an understanding of what it is not—its opposite, war. In a world where there is war, peace is a cessation of war; so that peace (which is good) can come only out of its opposite, war. In this way war is taken to be the parent of all good things—that is, when war and peace are applied by analogy to all other contraries. For example, beauty and ugliness: ugliness is a kind of warfare, and beauty is a kind of peace. Yet beauty can only be understood insofar as its opposition to ugliness is understood. Furthermore, war is the strife of contraries. This strife consists in the opposition of a thing to its contrary. This kind of strife is indicated perhaps in the quotation given above in which "the ineffable glory of the divine wisdom" is said to be "terrible as an army with banners"—as if to say that the Divine Being broods with His omnipotence over its privation, which it allows to remain in the world. Rabelais indicates his interest in this strife of contraries in chapter X of Book One in which, while describing the colours of the young Gargantua's livery, he proves (flippantly, to be sure. But what do you expect?) the correspondence of a group of contraries. In order to substantiate this notion I shall quote a portion of the chapter: "Take two opposites — say, good and evil, virtue and vice, hot and cold, white and black, joy and grief, pleasure and pain, and so on. Couple them so as to make a contrary of one comparison agree reasonably with its fellow in the next comparison. Then inevitably the contrasted contraries to which you have compared them will, in turn correspond. Thus virtue and vice are opposites in one kind; so are good and evil. Now if one of the contraries of the first kind agrees (like virtue and good, for we know virtue to be good), then the remaining set of qualities — vice and evil — will in turn agree, since we know vice to be evil.

"Having mastered this logical rule, take one pair of opposites, joy and sorrow, and couple

it with another, white and black—for they are physically contrary—well then, if black signifies mourning, then white rightly signifies joy.

"This signification is neither imposed nor instituted by one man. On the contrary, it is admitted by general consent of all men, in accordance with what the philosophers call jus gentium, universal law, which rules in all climes." In accordance with this logical rule, then, a catalogue of Rabelaisian contraries will serve as a framework for the whole paper.

A Catalogue of Rabelaisian Contraries

Good	Evil
Virtue	Vice
Hot	Cold
White	Black
Joy	Sorrow
Pleasure	Pain
Laughter	Weeping
Comedy (Satire)	Tragedy
Democritus	Heraclitus
Peace	War
Gaiety	Woe
Cheerfulness	Moroseness
Harmony	Discord
Freedom	Slavery
Honor	Baseness
Health	Sickness
Self-respect	Hypocrisy
Morality	Malice
Generosity	Avarice
Friendliness	Hatefulness
Hope	Despair
Wisdom	Folly
Male	Female
Love	Hate
Rule	Ruled
Obedience	Rebellion
Before	Behind
Procreative and copulative functions	
(Excretory functions of organs of procreation and copulation)	Excretory Functions

4. Heraclitus Pantagruelized.

Alongside the warfare and opposition of contraries there is also love and an inclination to peace. Witness the warfare of male and female, which is resolved by a natural inclination into harmony and peace. Furthermore, the very opposition of contraries gives rise to a mutual love and need of one another—since the existence of one depends on that of the

other. In the Fifth Book Rabelais speaks of the necessary love of contraries for one another. "No king under the arch of Heaven, were he ever so powerful, could do without his fellow men; no pauper, were he arrogance personified, could dispense with the rich. Not even the philosopher Hippias, who boasted he could do everything, was able to eliminate his fellow men from his existence. Well, then . . . man could not do without a sack. But how much less could he do without a drink. That is why . . . we hold drinking, not laughter, to be the essence of mankind . . . Remember friends, that by the vine we grow divine." In this passage there is an abrupt change from the need of contraries (or, in this case, men in contrary relations) for one another to drinking. Is this change a reasonable one? It has been stated previously that wine is in Rabelais a symbol of mirth and mockery. Also, more generally, it has a dual significance which has been pointed out—a mirthful intermingling of men of contrary stations; the wedding feast. Stated succinctly, the conclusion to be culled from this discussion is this: the love and strife of contraries produces in man the essential activity of laughter—of which there are two kinds, mirth and mockery.

Here again the principle, "war is the parent of all good things" can be invoked. It will be noticed that in the catalog two sets of contraries have an intermediate term. One of these is comedy-tragedy, satire being the intermediate term. The Rabelasian distinction between satire and comedy is the simple one of "laughing at" and "laughing with." It is evident that satire is a hybrid form of tragedy and comedy—it involves laughter on the part of the satirizer and weeping on the part of the satirized. This "laughing at" arises from the comparison of a certain harmony with its corresponding discord. This comparison provokes laughter at the discordant object. This comparison rests on an opposition between the two objects, and the laughter itself is a declaration of war against the derided object. Insofar, then, as satire involves laughter it is good; but insofar as it involves war it is evil. Also, satire is the road to comedy—"laughing at" precedes "laughing with." We must first recognize the opposition of contraries and laugh at the discordant object before we can grasp the order arising out of this opposition and have our laughter transformed from mockery to mirth. Until we have grasped this order presiding over the warfare of contraries despair lies at the root of our laughter (mockery). When we do grasp this order a sense of peace and relief arises within us and replaces the discord of despair. And in this way our

laughter is turned to gaiety.

But why does the vine (mockery and mirth) make us divine? Because in progressing from satire to comedy we are becoming more like God. God is pure laughter without any admixture of satire. His knowledge contains all contraries, but the relation of contrary to contrary is a relation of sweet harmony and bliss. A giant is a man whose eros (love) and capacity for wine of pure laughter is gigantic. He is a god among men because his comic wisdom enables him to meet every difficulty with serenity. He recognizes his dependence upon God, for he knows that it is God's omnipotence which makes comedy possible.

It will be helpful to end the discussion of Pantagruelism with a consideration of another set of contraries—one that has a more intimate relationship to men's lives. This set of contraries is that of procreative and excretory organs of the body. The former is designated heavenly by Rabelais when he has Gargantua's codpiece lined with a "flaring blue damask" ("blue denotes things celestial"). The codpiece is described in the following manner: "Inevitably you would have compared it to some proud cornucopia such as you see on ancient monuments, or such as Rhea gave to the nymphs Adrasta and Ida, nurses to her son, Jupiter.

"You recall the tale doubtless. The goat, whose milk nourished the divine infant, happened to break one of her horns against the rock. Straightway the nymphs filled it with fruit and flowers to present it to Jove, who made of this horn a source of eternal abundance.

"Well, Gargantua's codpiece was like that horn: forever lively, succulent and resinous; full of juice, aflower with pistils and teeming with fruit." The copulative and generative organ is a physical imitation of the divine abundance and joy. The excretory organ is contrary to the procreative organ in a manner analogous to "before" and "behind." The excretory function is derided consistently in order to enlighten its polar relation to the procreative and copulative function. The excrement is useless waste matter, stuff cast off from the organism. These are the aspects which are stressed. However, there is one additional factor involved in this relationship. The procreative organ has itself an excretory function. This indicates, it seems, that this most heavenly part of the body has a disgust as well as admiration attached to its use. This point will be helpful later in the treatment of the purpose of Theleme.

(To be concluded)