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SPEECH, ITS STRENGTH AND ITS WEAKNESSES

To undertake to speak about speech means to embark upon an endless task. Yet there are strict limits that I have to observe and to be aware of: limits of time, of redundancy, of attentiveness on your part. I shall have to focus your attention on what people mostly concerned about speech have said. These were the people whom we call *οἱ φιλόσοφοι*, the "lovers of wisdom" among the Greeks. But I shall also have to appeal to an understanding of what usually happens to speech, to an understanding which those people do not seem to have had. I shall be as brief as possible, and I hope you will not mind my careful -- nay, my pedantic use of English and Greek words.

(Parenthetical remark: some of what I am going to say I have said before in lectures and in print, but not all of it.)

Let me begin by quoting from Plato's dialogue entitled Phaedo. This dialogue pretends to describe what happened during the very last day of Socrates. Attentive reading shows that the content of the dialogue is mythical, but that the mythical frame allows us to become aware of what Plato understood to be Socrates' unique and overwhelming impact. At a crucial point of the dialogue (95 E ff.) Socrates, after silently looking back into himself for quite a while, reaches -- in speaking -- far back into his own youth. He wanted very much, he reports, to find out, with regard to any single thing or occurrence, what was responsible for its coming into being, its passing away, its being the way it was; but he could not find any satisfactory answers. Nor could he learn anything from anybody else, not even from the great Anaxagoras. He had to abandon the way in which questions like these were dealt with in the various versions of the "inquiry into nature" (*Ἐπι φύσεως ἱστορίαι*). He decided to embark upon a different journey, a "second journey", which means, he decided to take to the oars, since the wind had failed. This is the presentation he makes of his new endeavor.

By looking directly at whatever presents itself in our familiar world, at things and their properties, at human affairs and actions, we run the risk of being blinded, as people do when they observe the sun during an eclipse, if they do not look at its image on some watery surface. That may well have happened to those investigators of nature. To avoid being blinded, Socrates thought he had to "have recourse to spoken words" (*εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγεῖν*) and "see in them the truth of whatever is" (99 E).

In the dialogue entitled Philebus, Plato again makes Socrates refer to men engaged in the study of nature (59 A-C): these men want to understand how this world of ours came into being, how it is acted upon and how it acts itself, that is to say, they are trying to discover transient productions of the present, the future and the past, not what unchangeably always is. To discover the immutable it is necessary to rely on the power of discourse (*ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις* - 57 E), in exchanging questions and answers with oneself and with others. The power of discourse is the power inherent in human speech, this marvel, let me say, this greatest marvel perhaps under the sun.

The Greek noun *λόγος* and the Greek verb *λέγειν* have a vast range of meanings. They may refer to reckoning, accounting, measuring, relating, gathering, picking up (let us not forget the English words "collect" and "select", derived from *λέγειν*). But, above all, they refer to speaking, discoursing, arguing, discussing, reasoning. That's how we have to understand Aristotle's statement (Politics I,2, 1253 a 10): *λόγον...μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζώων*, "man alone among living beings possesses speech", and that implies: man alone possesses the ability to understand the spoken word, to understand articulated speech.

We mean by speech - everybody means by it - a sequence of sounds uttered by somebody in such a way as to be understandable to others. The verb "to understand" refers primarily, though not uniquely, to speech. Hearing somebody speak, we may say: "I understand what you are saying". We may, in fact, misunderstand, but even misunderstanding involves understanding. But what do we understand in hearing somebody speak? Not the sounds in themselves, the audible low and high pitched noises issuing from somebody's mouth (or some machine, for that matter). We hear these noises, but hearing is not understanding. That is why we do not understand speech in a foreign tongue. In a manner which, itself, is hardly or not at all understandable, the sounds carry with them - or embody or represent - something else, precisely that which makes us understand, whenever we understand. This source and target of our understanding consists of units to which single words correspond as well as of combinations of units to which sequences of words correspond. The speaker and the hearer share - or, at least, intend to share - the understanding of those units and of those combinations of units. The speaker transposes what he means into sounding words variably intoned, and the hearer who understands reverses that process in reaching back to the intended meaning. The intended meaning is what the Greeks called τὸ νοητόν (νοητόν being a verbal adjective of νοεῖν, which means "to receive the intelligible"). Among the intelligible units, the νοητά, there are two kinds: some are intelligible by themselves, some help us to receive those first ones, help us to understand what is being said. Speech and understanding are inseparable. Λόγος means inseparably both speech and that which can be and is being understood in speech. It is

in man and, to repeat, only through man that λόγος manifests itself conspicuously. Neither birds nor porpoises nor seals have λόγος, though they are able to "communicate" with each other and even with human beings.

We all remember, I think, a phrase that Homer uses so often when describing human speech, the phrase "winged words" (ἔπεα πτερόεντα). Whence this image? In most cases the phrase occurs when a personage, a god or a man, addresses another single personage, a god or a man. Occasionally it is also used when someone speaks to a group or a crowd of people. Minstrels in Homer are never said to utter or sing "winged words". Now, words are not called "winged" to indicate their soaring or lofty quality. The image seems rather to imply that words, after escaping "the fence of the teeth", as Homer puts it, are guided swiftly, and therefore surely, to their destination, the ears and the soul and the understanding of the addressee. It is more difficult to reach a crowd of men than a single man. Exertions of a special kind are then required.

What is speech "about"? About everything man is familiar with - the sky and the earth, the rivers and the sea, the living beings around him, on land, in water, in the air, the things he himself builds and produces, as well as the tools and appurtenances that his arts and skills require to produce those things, and furthermore, the knowledge that guides his arts and skills, not only to satisfy his most elementary needs, but also to establish customs and institutions in which his life flows from generation to generation, in happiness or misery, in friendship or enmity, in praise or blame, and to which customs and institutions he is attached beyond his most pressing wants. That is what his speech and his understanding are mostly about.

What we say, however circuitously or confusedly or loosely, is said in words and sentences, each of which conveys immediate meaning. The λόγος cannot help moving in the medium of the immediately understandable. But words and sentences can also be involuntarily or deliberately ambiguous. We can play on words. Plato's dialogues, for example, are replete with puns. However, ambiguities and puns are only possible, because words and sentences carry with them several distinct meanings which, separately, are clearly understood. To be sure, speech can be obscure. But it can be obscure only because the clarity of some of its parts impinges, or seems to impinge, on the clarity of others.

Speech, then, presents to the understanding of the listener what the speaker himself understands. It presents to the listener nothing but combinations of νοητά, of intelligibles. In doing that, however, speech speaks about all the things and all the properties of things that abound around us, all the special circumstances and situations in which we find ourselves. The question arises: do the νοητά, the intelligibles, presented to us in speech, have their foundation in themselves, or do they stem from the things and circumstances spoken about? Does not human speech translate the language, the γλώσσα, of the things themselves?

Let me turn for a moment to the way things and events around us have been and are being referred to. In Galileo's words: "The book of Nature is written in mathematical characters". Descartes said: "The science contained in the great book of the world ...". Harvey said: "The book of Nature lies open before us and can be easily consulted". The phrase "book of Nature" is a metaphor used long before the seventeenth century, but why was this particular metaphor ever chosen?

Is it not because Nature is understood as something that can be read like a book, provided we know how to read it? But does not that indeed imply a language that is Nature's own? Francis Bacon was of the opinion that Nature is subtly secretive, full of riddles, Sphinx-like. But secrets can be revealed, riddles can be solved in words. We persist, don't we, in solving the "riddles of nature". In ancient times the order of all that exists around us was taken much more directly as a language, a language not heard and not written, yet visible, and if not visible, one to be guessed at. Human speech seems indeed to translate that visible or invisible language of things into the audible language of words. And just as the sounds of human speech can be traced down to their ultimate components to which the letters of the alphabet correspond, things around us can be decomposed into their first rudiments - the "elements" - the original letters of the language of things, as it were. Our speech, even our unguarded colloquial way of speaking, may reveal to the attentive listener the hidden articulations of the language of things. Aristotle, no less than Plato, was constantly following up casually spoken words. It seems that Heraclitus, the "obscure", used the word "logos" in reference to the language of things. Let me quote from the fragments in question. First: "Of the Logos, which is as I describe it, men always prove to be uncomprehending, both before they have heard it and when once they have heard it. For although all things happen according to this Logos, men are like people of no experience, even when they experience such sayings and deeds as I explain, when I distinguish each thing according to its nature and declare how it is; but all the other men fail to notice what they do after they

wake up, just as they forget what they do when asleep". Then this: "therefore it is necessary to follow what is common; but although the Logos is common, the many live as though they had their own thoughts". Then this: "Listening not to me, but to the Logos, it is wise to agree that all things are one". And finally, to supplement the last fragment: "Out of all things - one, and out of one - all things". (Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, 1957, pp. 187-188, 191.) The Logos makes us understand, if we follow Heraclitus, what the things themselves are saying, brightly and darkly, in tune and out of tune.

Speaking and understanding what is being said involves thinking, involves what the Greeks called διάνοια. Let us hear what Plato has to say about the relation of speaking to thinking. In the dialogue entitled The Sophist, in which Plato makes the Stranger from Elea converse with the young mathematician Theaetetus, the Stranger remarks (263 E): "...thought (διάνοια) and speech (λόγος) are the same, only that the former - that is, διάνοια -, which is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of thought". Thinking, as Plato understands it, is not tied to what the moderns mean by the "stream of consciousness". It can be imagined as a discontinuous, not always regular, stepping forward, and stepping aside, and stepping backward and forward again, what speech, too, usually does. It is necessary to note that for Plato, and for Plato alone, this identity of thought and speech is not a complete one: facing the highest, all-comprehending intelligibles, thought is not able to transpose itself into suitable words. In the seventh letter attributed to Plato we read the phrase

"the weakness of spoken words" (τὸ τῶν λόγων ἀσθενές - 343 A 1), and the dialogue entitled The Sophist itself shows this weakness rather clearly, as we shall see in a moment. Moreover, speech and thinking can both deceive us, disconnect our steps, and thus distort and falsify the truth of things. The firework of the sophists, for example, - and there are always sophists around - make things and relations of things assume a most unexpected, dazzling, and puzzling aspect: things suddenly appear not to be what they are. But who is doing the lying, if it be lying, the sophists or the things themselves? A critique of speech and of thinking, a critical inquisition into speaking, thinking and arguing has to be undertaken - as it was undertaken by men as diverse as Parmenides, Prodicus, Plato, Aristotle. The result of this critique can be stated as follows: to speak does not always mean to make things appear in their true light. For Aristotle only one kind of speech, ὁ λόγος ἀποφαντικός, the declaratory and revealing speech, and the thinking which belongs to it, translate and present the language of things. To be able to use this kind of speech requires a discipline, the discipline of the λόγος. Everywhere in Aristotle's work, one senses, to the annoyance of some and to the delight of others, the effectiveness of that discipline, the effectiveness of what we call (and the author himself does not call) the "logic" of Aristotle. (Cf. On Interpretation 5, 17 a 8; 4, 17 a 2; 6, 17 a 25; Posterior Analytics I 2, 72 a 11.)

Given the ever-present possibility of declaratory and revealing speech, Aristotle need not, and does not, set limits to the power of the logos. For Plato, however, as I have mentioned, there are limits that spoken words cannot transcend. This becomes quite clear in the dialogue

entitled Cratylus. In it Socrates first invents fantastically funny "etymologies" of words, etymologies of proper names of heroes and gods as well as of familiar designations given to the ways men behave and think. Socrates then contrives rather playfully (422 E ff.) to describe the letters and syllables of any word as providing an "imitation", a μίμημα (423 B; 430 A,B,E; 437 A) of the very being (οὐσία) of what is supposed to be "imitated". This "imitation" is also said by Socrates - said more accurately - to be a "disclosure", a "revelation", a δῆλωμα (425 A,B; 433 B,D; 435 A,B) of the thing in question. Finally the assertion is made that even "revealing" words may well be interpreted as not fostering our understanding. One has to agree, says Socrates, that things which are can be learned and sought for "much better through themselves than through names" (439 B). And that is only possible if what truly is is not subject to change, as Heraclitus claims, but is immutably what it is. Whether this is so or whether what the Heracliteans and many others say is true, is a question difficult to decide, but "no man of sense can help himself and his own soul by relying on names" (440 C). The power of the spoken word is thus a limited one, according to Plato, which makes his dialogues as troublesome and as wonderful as they appear to be.

Let me try to show you this by referring to, and quoting from, the dialogue entitled The Sophist. This dialogue is the central piece of a trilogy, namely the trilogy of the dialogues entitled Theaetetus, The Sophist, and The Statesman. The conversations and events which are presented in these names are supposed to take place at the very time the suit against Socrates has its beginning - as you can read at the very end of the first piece of the trilogy. We find in the second and the third dialogue, namely in The Sophist

and in The Statesman, an abundance of so-called "divisions" (*διαίρεσις*) which, in The Sophist, are supposed to be the means to establish what a "sophist" is. Opposed to the "divisions" are the "collections" (*συναγωγαί*), and let me quote what, in the dialogue entitled Phaedrus, Socrates has to say about these "divisions" and "collections" to that lovable young man, Phaedrus: "Now I myself, Phaedrus, am a lover of these divisions and collections as aids to speech and thought; and if I think any other man is able to see things that can naturally be collected into one and divided into many, him I follow after and walk in his footsteps as if he were a god (this is a playful and ambiguous reference to a line in the fifth book of the Odyssey). And whether the name I give to those who can do this is right or wrong, god knows, but I have called them hitherto dialecticians" (Phaedrus 266 B-C). Now, the first five "divisions" in the dialogue entitled The Sophist do not reach their goal, except in one very peculiar case. The goal is to establish, as I said, what a "sophist" is. In this dialogue a nameless Stranger from Elea performs these dialectical exercises with the help of young Theaetetus, whose looks resemble those of Socrates (Theaetetus 143 E). Of Theaetetus we also know, from the dialogue that bears his name as well as from other sources, that he was a powerful mathematician, especially interested in incommensurable magnitudes and multitudes. Books X and XIII of Euclid's Elements are based, in part at least, on his work. In the dialogue entitled The Sophist young Theaetetus is shown to distinguish and to count well, so well, indeed, that he helps us to understand what the Eleatic Stranger, alone, by himself, could not make us understand. Let us see.

There are five "divisions" in the beginning of the dialogue, meant to catch the "sophist". After they have been made they are counted up by the Stranger and Theaetetus in the following way: "Stranger: First, if I am not mistaken, he [that is, the "sophist"] was found to be a paid hunter after the young and wealthy. Theaetetus: Yes. Stranger: Secondly a sort of merchant in articles of knowledge for the soul. Theaetetus: Very much so. Stranger: And thirdly, did he not turn up as retailer (κάπηλος) of these same articles of knowledge? Theaetetus: Yes, and fourthly we found he was a seller of his own productions (αὐτοπώλης). Stranger: You remember well" (231 D).

I have to interrupt this quoting to check whether Theaetetus does remember well. By going back, we see that the Stranger had previously summarized (224 D-E) the third division in these words: "And that part of acquisitive art which proceeds by exchange and by sale in both ways (ἀμφοτέρως) as mere retail trade (καπηλικόν) or as the sale of one's own production (αὐτοπωλικόν), so long as it belongs to the family of merchandising in knowledge, that part you will apparently always call sophistry". Theaetetus had then answered: "Necessarily so, for I have to follow the argument, the λόγος". Theaetetus remembers well: he remembers that retail trade and also the sale of one's own production had been mentioned, but he forgot, he forgot, the word ἀμφοτέρως (in both ways), and this makes him add to the third description a new one, which he calls the fourth. Both, his remembering and his forgetting have remarkable consequences. In the counting up of the "divisions" the fourth becomes the fifth, and the fifth, which is the one that reaches its goal, namely the correct description of the work performed

by a quasi-sophist, namely by Socrates himself, - this fifth "division" becomes the sixth. Let us not forget: six is the first "perfect" number, and only a "perfect" number is fit to be applied to Socrates' work. But, moreover, the forgetfulness of Theaetetus compels us to pay special attention to the word which he forgot, to the word ἀμφοτέρωσι, or more exactly to the word ἀμφω (both) and to its cognates. We become aware that this word is used over and over again in the dialogue. Here is just one example. Speaking of the "sophist", the Stranger remarks at one point (226 A): "Do you see the truth of the statement that this beast is many-sided and, as the saying is, not to be caught with one hand? Theaetetus: Then we must catch him with both .

The significance of this word "both" becomes fully apparent when the Stranger and Theaetetus focus their attention on "Change" (κίνησις) and "Rest" (στάσις). I shall quote again (250 A-C): "Stranger: You say that Change and Rest are entirely opposed to each other? Theaetetus: How could I say anything else? Stranger: And yet you say that both and each of them equally are. Theaetetus: Yes, I do. Stranger: And in admitting that they are, are you saying that both and each of them are changing? Theaetetus: No, no! Stranger: Then, perhaps, by saying that both are, you mean they are both at rest? Theaetetus: How could I? Stranger: Then you put before you Being (τὸ ὄν) as a third, as something beside these, inasmuch as you think Rest and Change are embraced by it; and since you comprehend and observe that these commune with Being, are you saying that they both are? Theaetetus: We truly happen to divine that Being is something third, when we say that Change and Rest are. Stranger: Then Being is not

both Change and Rest together, but something else, different from them.

Theaetetus: So it seems. Stranger: According to its own nature, then,

Being is neither at rest nor changing. Theaetetus: M-hm (in Greek:

οὐκ ἔδόν)" . The last statement of the Stranger cannot be taken at face

value. And Theaetetus immediately afterwards recognizes that it is

totally impossible for Being to be neither at rest nor changing.

The root of the difficulty, of the perplexity in which we, who listen

to this conversation, find ourselves is that, in the case of Being,

Change and Rest, our human speech, the λόγος, is failing. It is failing

when it tries to speak about such greatest "looks" (μέγιστα εἶδη--254C2-3), that

is, such all-comprehending νοητά. Being (τὸ ὄν), Change (κίνησις)

and Rest (στάσις) appear to be three εἶδη, three "invisible looks",

while in truth Change and Rest are "each one" (ἐκάτερον ἓν) and "both

two" (ἀμφότερα δύο). Both together they constitute Being (τὸ ὄν).

This means that, according to Plato, Being must be understood as the

eidetic Two. The eidetic Two is not a mathematical number of two in-

divisible and undistinguishable monads, among infinitely many such

mathematical twos. Nor is it two visible, divisible and unequal things,

two houses or two dogs or two apples, for example. The eidetic Two is

a unique dyad of two unique εἶδη, of two "invisible looks", namely

of Change and Rest. And just as they both together, and only both

together, are the εἶδος, the "look", the "invisible look" Being, so

the Stranger from Elea and Theaetetus can only both together deal

with the question of Being. That's why the Stranger says at one point

to Theaetetus (239 C): "let us bid farewell to you and to me". He

means that neither he alone nor Theaetetus alone can accomplish the task,

but that they can do it only both together. But this they can do "not with complete clarity" (μη πάση σαφηνεία - 254 C 6), because they are speaking about it.

It is thus that a weakness of speech is revealed in the dialogue entitled The Sophist. But this dialogue also shows why there can be falsehood uttered in speech, why speech can state what is not true. There is, however, a wide spectrum of the un-true, ranging from falsehood to likelihood. This is the background of the dialogue entitled Timaeus, and I would like to quote a passage from this dialogue to make you experience the playful and saddening ambiguity of this passage. It deals with the human mouth. It claims that it was fashioned "for ends both necessary and most good", "as an entrance with a view to what is necessary and as an outlet with a view to what is most good". I keep quoting (75 D-E): "For all that enters in and supplies food to the body is necessary, while the stream of speech which flows out and ministers to thoughtfulness is of all streams the most beautiful and most good". Can we forget how much evil, how much falsehood, how much trifling, how much nonsense also flows out? No, we cannot. But this must be added: in all those cases I just mentioned speech does not minister to thoughtfulness, to φρόνησις.

Let me now turn to a character of speech to which the ancients apparently did pay only scant attention. A most remarkable similarity obtains between words, spoken words of live speech, and money, - money, that is, available in coins and bills. Both are precious, both circulate freely, coins and bills from hand to hand, words from mouth to mouth. The imprints on coins and bills are gradually erased, effaced, rubbed

off, just as the meanings of words seem to become fuzzy, blurred and empty with the passage of time. There is even counterfeiting in language as there is in money. Human speech can and does deteriorate to an extent which renders it obnoxious, makes it unable to reach anyone, deprives it totally of wings.

It was Edmund Husserl who, in modern times, pointed to this inevitable deterioration of human speech. According to him the signifying power of a word has, by its very nature, the tendency to lose its revealing character. The more we become accustomed to words, the less we perceive their original and precise significance: a kind of superficial and vague understanding is the necessary result of the increasing familiarity with spoken - and written - words. Yet that original significance is still there, in every word, somehow "forgotten", but still at the bottom of our speaking and our understanding, however vague the meaning conveyed by our speech might be. The original "evidence" has faded away, but has not disappeared completely. It need not be "awakened" even, it underlies our mutual understanding in a "sedimented" form. "Sedimentation is always somehow forgetfulness" (Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als intentional-historisches Problem, first published by Eugen Fink in "Revue internationale de philosophie", I, 2, 1939, p.212). And this kind of forgetfulness accompanies, of necessity, according to Husserl, the development and growth of any science. (The text about the "origin of geometry" appears also - in a slightly changed form - as the 3rd Appendix to Walter Biemel's edition of the Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology - Husserliana, Vol. VI, 1962 - and as the 6th Appendix to David Carr's

translation of the "Crisis" - Northwestern University Press, 1970.

The sentence "sedimentation is always somehow forgetfulness" is omitted in Biemel's and Carr's versions. I assume, however, that this sentence is based on Husserl's own words, uttered in conversations with Fink.)

To be sure, the original evidence can be "reactivated", and indeed is reactivated at definite times. This interlacement of the original significance and of its "sedimentation" constitutes, we read in Husserl's late work, the true character of "history" (Ibid., p. 220). From that point of view there is only one legitimate form of history: the history of human thought. History, in this understanding, cannot be separated from Philosophy. Husserl's own philosophy, as it develops in its latest phase (1935-1937), is a most remarkable attempt to restore the integrity of knowledge, of ἐπιστήμη, threatened by the all-pervading tendency of "sedimentation". It has remained an attempt. But it may help us, in any event, to understand the character of speech, the character of the spoken word. It may help us to cautious in our speaking and listening.

When we hear - or read - words intended to convey opinions about things, about what they are and how they are, it is amazing to observe their almost total dependence on the Latin rendering of crucial Greek, and especially Aristotelean, terms used in searching or revealing speech or, as we say, in "philosophical" discourse. The adoption of this Latin rendering by modern western languages usually involves a radical change and certainly a "sedimentation" of the very meaning of the terms in question. We hear a great deal about pollution today - the pollution of air, water, and land, which burdens our lives. But we hear rarely about the pollution of our language, which burdens our understanding.

Our daily language, not to mention the "elevated" language of inquiry and exposition, is permeated and polluted by distorted terms in pseudo-Latin or even pseudo-Greek guise. Don't we use words like the following ones all the time: "actual", "dynamic", "potentialities", "matter", "substance", "theory", "information", "energy", "category", "logical", "formal", "abstract"? How strange and how discouraging! Do we know what we mean by these words? I could extend this list quite a bit, but I should like to add only these six terms: "ideal", "essence", "concept", "reality", "individual", and - horribile dictu - "mind".

This tendency of "sedimentation" of human speech finds, it is true, its counterpart in the tendency to reactivate its original significance. Beyond that, it may happen that human speech reaches levels previously not experienced at all: they may increase its vigor, lift its signifying power to new heights, elevate it truly. Responsible for this are mostly - and rarely enough, to be sure - written words. New words or new combinations of words can be "coined", as we so aptly and significantly say. At decisive points in his dialogues Plato resorts to this kind of coining; in the dialogue entitled The Republic, for example, but most notably in the dialogue entitled The Statesman. (We are aware, of course, that Plato's dialogues, although presenting lively spoken words, are the result of uniquely careful inditing and writing.) Story-writers engage - sometimes - in this kind of inventive writing, as Joyce and Faulkner did. The most important cases of newly articulated written speech, however, are found in declaratory works which intend to convey knowledge, derived from questioning that is profound and deeply serious. Such works are those of Aristotle, of Hegel who raises Aristotle to new levels, and of Heidegger who opposes Aristotle radically.

Their peculiar way of speaking sheds new light on things, on their roots, their relations, their very being. We have to note: none of these authors have written works that are easily translatable, - and this cannot be otherwise.

Let me be fair to people of the Latin tongue and, by way of conclusion quote Virgil, the poet. In a letter to a friend Virgil says that he gives birth to verses in the manner of bears and according to their custom (*parere se versus modo atque ritu ursino*), that is to say, that he produces his verses the way the mother bear handles her newly born cubs: assiduously and persistently she licks them into their proper shape. Such assiduous work, performed on the written word and undertaken to assure the right articulation of a composed whole, can and does restore and preserve the integrity of human speech. It is thus that the written word repays its eternal debt to the spoken word.