


THE ST. JOHN'S

COLLEGIAN

Lawrence Sandek, editor

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OF SOUND IN SIGHT

THE ATTEMPT to capture the essence of one sensual experience by means of another is so common and usually so overwhelmingly unsuccessful, that one is hard pressed to describe his reactions when he witnesses a successful try. Indeed, in that very trying one is attempting to do precisely what the authors of that "trans-sensing" have done; and in the face of so many failures or mediocre successes before and after him, either a good deal of confidence or a modicum of impertinence must support the reviewer in his attempt to review.

This "trans-sensing" was notably and immediately accomplished in the early sequences of *Berlin*, a silent film of the 'twenties. Particularly in that sequence that followed the train through the countryside, into the environs and suburbs of the city, and finally into the station.

After establishing the course of the train, the attention of the camera was directed to incidentals to that course. The most salient incidentals being the racing past telegraph poles, the sound and feeling of the wheels, and the thrusting back of track. The elements of the "trans-sensing" were established by viewing these three facts in the context of the passage. The camera looked at the landscape, then the tracks; back to the landscape, thence the wheels; wheels to track, and landscape again. And then the movement into the body of the impression. The wheels, the track, the poles, alternately then faster, and finally rhythmically ---;

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And again, as the train entered the terminal, racing up to the station marker
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 the whole experience of arriving was represented so forcefully that one could almost hear the last sigh of the escaping steam from the locomotive.

But these were only the most obvious examples of "trans-sensing". That phenomenon was present throughout the film in one degree or another, and perhaps the measure of its success was the absorption of an audience accustomed by conditioning to movie entertainment via two senses, sitting raptly through a poem via only one.

The interesting thing about *Berlin* was that the successful "trans-sensing" was only incidental to a larger effort—perhaps its success lies in that very incidentalness. The basic effort was to bring into a concentrated frame of time and experience the tremendous complexity of a great city. And in that effort, to point to the paradox inherent in the very idea of a city. Namely, the liberating of people in the security of method and routine—of dependable sources of supply, in the sureness of specialization (the two pairs of hands wrapping a single newspaper in two deft motions); and the paradoxical imprisoning of them in enervating sameness (the hands that folded the newspaper supported an entire family by the repetition of that one deft motion).

The film based on that essential idea, then became an amalgam of eloquent snatches building a sense of containment and safety, and imprisonment and regulation, that the author apparently felt was in the very grain of a city.

The snatches were of people; of the distortions of human character, presumably caused by the rigidity of city life. Rigidity that demands, on the one hand, overdevelopment of some facets of the human nature; and on the other hand, suppression and atrophy of others.

The sickness of the human character in such an environment was then drawn with the swift preciseness and conviction of an omniscient eye—the camera. The camera weaves among an anonymous stream of people, rests on an integer for a moment—and in the pause makes it an individual—and flits on. The Dozing Libido on his way to work in the stupor of routine, reverses direction at the tacit invitation of a street-walker; the charity of an Industrial Cipher as he pauses to give a beggar a coin; The Innocent, that through her naivete will find-out what-its-all-about from the Nervous Cigarette in the rakish hat; the world-filling of the Little Boy as he strides across creation beside the Big Uniform; the petulance of the Little Girl that tears the cover from her playmates carriage; the uncertain but desperate attempts of the Jaywalker to make a crossing; the pathetic concern of The Hand on the nose of a downed horse. All are urgent gestures, almost off-handed; and they are shorthand for human nature in a trap.

But the very fact that the films authors feel that life in a city is somehow inherently bad; and the fact that they choose instances which they apparently think reveal the essential human character—the essential human character shining through perversion, like a blade of grass through a crack in a concrete sidewalk—implies a reference point, an ideal. An ideal of what human nature is. And thus we are again faced by the problem of how one knows what might be in the face of experience that is solely of what is.

The force of the picture does not lie in *how* we know, but in that we *do* know, and knowing, what to do about it.

-Sandek

MUSIC, MEANING, AND UNDERSTANDING

ONE PREPOTENT QUESTION seems to have arisen from the recent Julliard String Quartet concert. "Does Schoenberg have meaning?" is a question which can be partially answered by a comparison with the Bartok work heard on the same program.

The fundamental fact without which modern music would be impossible is that dissonances differ from each other. That this is so can be easily affirmed by the experience of anyone willing to spend a little listening-time with dissonant music. Movement from one dissonant sonority to another is not, then, continued cacophony, but a definite musical progress from "one" to "other". The possibility of musical meaning depends totally on this capability of sound to admit of distinctions.


Having once made the first step into modern music, i. e., having become conversant with dissonance distinctions, the listener faces the great problem of coming to terms with individual composers. For the possibility of individual differences within a dissonant context is as great as that which allowed a Bach and a Mozart to exist within the same consonant context. Bartok, for instance, though relentless in the use of dissonance, gives the listener an easier time of it than Schoenberg.

The great difference between Bartok and Schoenberg lies in how the unfolding of dissonance distinctions takes place in time. Bartok's music, complicated as it is, gives a quite clear harmonic superstructure, harmonic in the sense that walls of sound are built up which resolve quite clearly into other walls of sound. More precisely, definite dissonant sonorities are set up within which melodic activity occurs.

In a sense, it is because he lacks this type of harmonic superstructure that Schoenberg is labeled "atonal". Schoenberg has set up for himself an arbitrary law governing melodic lines, which makes impossible the melody-within-a-sonority that occurs in Bartok. However, I think a better acquaintance with Schoenberg will prove atonality an inadequate analysis. For the very thing which happens in Bartok happens in Schoenberg, but is greatly compressed in time. Thus, any single sonority is part of a fast moving chain of dissonances, a chain which has musical meaning because its dissonances are musically related. It is the transience of any single sonority which poses the listener his greatest problem. Among other things, it absolutely demands of him prior acquaintance with the music if its musical meaning is to be followed.

Perhaps what is here described does not actually occur in Schoenberg. What if it doesn't? Then the charge that Schoenberg is purely intellectual and meaningless is true. Establishing whether or not it occurs becomes, then, the crucial point in determining Schoenberg's worth. The responsibility of judgement is great. For, if there is meaning, it is of this sort (for the arbitrary system eliminates the other); but, if of this sort, the problems of the listener are great. Consequently, the judge must be aware that what seems absence of meaning may, in fact, be absence of understanding.

- Jim Chrestensen



THE LORD'S PRAYER

(As Revised for the Third Dispensation)

Our Energy which art in Nature
 Conserved be thy sum;
 Thy KE come, thy mv^2 be done
 On Earth as it is in Newton.
 Give us in equal times
 Our equal increments of velocity,
 And forgive us our inertia
 As we forgive those who impress their force upon us;
 Lead us not into resisting mediums,
 And deliver us from equal and contrary reactions,
 For thine is the KE
 The Law of Gravity,
 & Ultimate Equality
 In Infinitum.

Amen. Fiat, fiat. Amen

- W. L. Graham

THE INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

MR. NEUSTADT informed us, by way of preface, that his lecture was to be a defence of the value of Claude Bernard's *Introduction to Experimental Medicine* and an appeal for its reinstatement in the program. The interesting aspect of this appeal was that it was to be based not only on the book's demand that the science of medicine have a rational basis, but more importantly on the book as an example of the scientific hypothesis having become a 'poetic act.'

In reading the catalogue of St. John's College, one discovers that the growing dichotomy between the classic conception of the liberal arts and the disciplines of the laboratory sciences is spoken of as one of the basic causes of the collapse of contemporary education; and, that their reunion is spoken of as one of the College's aims, on the grounds that the dichotomy that has divided them is false. For it is the thesis of both the liberal arts and the laboratory sciences that the central act of teaching is the 'poetic act.'

The 'poetic act' is that insight into reality which has been the gift of each of the liberal artists whose works make up the core of this program. It is a perception whose peculiar mode of reception and form of expression makes it invaluable. For it is the intuitional grasp of an idea, the grasp of an idea as one single whole, which expresses itself in terms so compacted and simple as to deceive the student into exploring and discovering the difficult meaning that lies in them.

The *Introduction to Experimental Medicine* seems to have been written as a specific curative to a specific ill: its central problem was the influence of a school known as *vitalism* upon the art of medicine in its time. The primary tenet of this school was that the organism, simply because it was an organism, was endowed with the power to transcend physical laws. The effect of such a tenet was to make the physician truly incapable

of saying that any given effect followed from a knowable cause.

M. Bernard countered *vitalism* with Man's real incapacity to think in any save cause and effect relationships. On such an assertion, he demanded that the art of medicine could only progress by means of an underlying science of medicine and further proposed that this science should be one of the laboratory sciences.

To enforce such demands, Bernard felt the need of a single hypothesis upon which physiological investigation might proceed. Otherwise the book would be justly considered a useless polemic.

Now, in considering the organism, it is usual to consider it as being distinct from the outer cosmos and its happenings, all of which make up the external environment. M. Bernard saw that the gut and finally all that we call flesh and blood, cut off from the external environment by layers of dead tissue, make up an internal environment which is a sort of dynamic matrix for the organism. For, though all parts of this internal environment are always in transit, coming from and returning to the external environment in a never-ending stream, the motion is in certain constant proportions so that an equilibrium is maintained. Working under this hypothesis, the end of the science of medicine is to discover the proportions that maintain the equilibrium and how they are naturally maintained; and the end of the art of medicine is to assist the natural organs in maintaining that equilibrium.

When Lavoisier speaks of an hypothesis, he speaks of it as coming directly from facts and proceeding slowly and piecemeal with the progress of experimentation; Bernard on the other hand, in one moment of supreme insight achieved as a result of the disciplines of the laboratory sciences, saw the nature of flesh and blood in such a way that physiologists ever since have, in their experimentation (which is the dialectic of the laboratory sciences) have done nothing save affirm him. The 'poetic act' of Claude Bernard was the vision of a free man, freed by the liberal art of the laboratory sciences.

- Bernard Jacob

THE RETURN OF THE ANTEDILUVIAN

JUST BEFORE THANKSGIVING, we were treated to a lecture by Mr. Jack Neustadt, a much-touted *Wunderkind* who graduated from St. John's during the first blush of its Golden Age, and who later became Dean of the College at about the time of the Flood. As the title of the lecture was *The Internal Environment*, the evening promised to be an almost incestuously cozy affair.

Mr. Neustadt opened his lecture (on Claude Bernard's *Introduction to Experimental Medicine*) with a few remarks on poetry. The principal relevance of these remarks to the body of the lecture seemed to be that Bernard had written a play in his youth. I mention this subject mainly because Mr. Neustadt did so.

Mr. Neustadt then delivered what I took to be a resume of Bernard's contributions to medical science. Since, unfortunately, I have not read Bernard's *Introduction*, I am in no position to criticise Mr. Neustadt's interpretation of the book, or to determine how much of the lecture was explication of Bernard and how much sheer Neustadt. I can cope with this difficulty only by making no such attempt, that is, by treating the lecture pretty much as an independant work.

As a background, Mr. Neustadt made it quite clear that Bernard was concerned not with the essential *why*, but with the relative *how*, and that this *how* was to be understood in the context of Hume and Kant. That is, that causality is to be understood as our mode of thinking about events rather than as a property of events themselves; or, as Hume might have put it, that a causal relationship is merely our expectation, arising from experience, of the juxtaposition of certain events in time.

This understanding of causality seems to have been adopted by Bernard as a means of reducing the objections of the so-called Vitalists, who held that living things could not be understood in terms of physical laws of cause and effect. When causality is regarded as a form of thought, rather than a property of things in themselves, this objection becomes meaningless. One is then able to treat medicine in the same way as the other physical sciences, thus establishing general principles to serve as guides in particular situations.

The first of Bernard's general propositions was that an animal is a bag of antediluvian seawater containing a society of highly specialized cells. This seawater constitutes the internal environment in which the organism lives. The argument was rather involved, having to do with the chemical constitution of the interstitial fluid and its similarity to the extrapolated constitution of seawater in the remote past.

The organism is thus presented as having dominated its original external environment (the sea) by making it internal. It thereby became independent of its surroundings, of the vicissitudes of external events, within the limits imposed by the necessity of maintaining the "internal environment" in the state necessary to the organism's life. This, according to Mr. Neustadt, is the archetype of freedom.

The second definition of an organism now appears: an organism is a system in equilibrium. This definition is a mere restatement of the foregoing, which, however, brings the organism into the purlieus of the more general proposition, that a system in equilibrium will react to any external force so as to minimize the effect; that is, to maintain equilibrium.

Freedom, then, biologically speaking, is independence from the external environment, but depends on the maintenance of a state of equilibrium, of stability as Mr. Neustadt put it, of the internal environment. It may be remarked that the organism is under the internal necessity of reacting to any imposed force so as to maintain this equilibrium; only within this limitation is it "free", or independent of things external to itself.

At this point Mr. Neustadt harked back to his earlier definition of determinism as implying "a complete and necessary relationship between things." This, he pointed out, is the condition under which alone rational understanding is possible. He proposed the theory of statistical probability as a relationship which would resolve the contradiction between freedom and determinism.

This last climactic proposition was very appealing, and seems somehow true, but just what it means remains dark to me. To Mr. Neustadt, who suddenly disclosed that he was operating on the loftiest metaphysical plane, it meant "rational freedom under law". There seems to be a certain ambiguity in this; perhaps an antimony of pure reason is implicit in the sudden shift from phenomenological biology to slightly noumenological ideas. It seems to me, for instance, that in this interpretation of "rational freedom under law", "freedom" is a property of the individual, "law" applicable only to the aggregate, and "rational" excluded from the case, as being applicable only where "free" and "lawful" are predicable of the same subject. Perhaps Mr. Neustadt had this in mind when he raised the question of Poetry.

At any rate, he immediately mentioned poetry again, and for a moment I thought he was going to attempt something really startling, such as a resolution of poetry and science

similar to the statistical synthesis of freedom and necessity just mentioned. Not so, however. He merely wanted to bring the lecture to an edifying close. To this end he delivered an inspirational encomium about St. Johns, the torch-bearer of the American Renaissance, which I should prefer, in charity, to regard as deliberate burlesque.

Rhetorically the lecture was above average, which is to say that Mr. Neustadt's enunciation was clear, his manner animated, some of his jokes were amusing, and I dare say he could be heard from the balcony. In general, the lecture (approximately enough, since it was on biology) was like life, in that while the beginning and the end were excruciating, there were some damn' good moments in the middle.


The question period was as disreputable a ruckus as any I have attended.

Various members of the college questioned Mr. Neustadt about his remarks on the subject of poetry, with a view to understanding the distinction between theoretical and practical medicine. It never became clear just what Mr. Neustadt, or for that matter anyone else, meant by the word. Mr. Neustadt mentioned *The Republic*, where, to my recollection, it was said that the poet had nothing to do with truth but only imitated appearances. This is a remark, to be sure, that could be made of any scientist who operates in the framework erected by Hume and Kant, but I hardly think Mr. Neustadt had that in mind.

It was perhaps unfortunate that Mr. Neustadt's interlocutors held to this subject so relentlessly after it had become clear that it had no special relevance to the matter in hand; it was more unfortunate that the most distinguished sapling from the Seedbed of the American Renaissance could find no device better than ridicule wherewith to defend his position or turn the discussion into more rewarding pastures.

In any case, Mr. Neustadt was quite put out when this question of poetry persisted, even after he had mentioned Plato. It was also distressing to him that so few present-day St. Johnies understood his brand of basic english, a language whose vocabulary seemed to be largely composed of proper names (of authors, dialogues, etc.). To alleviate his distress, he treated his interlocutors as so many straight men in what he had seemingly concluded was the St. Johns Follies. The show was apparently quite a strain as he called it off at 10:45.

- W. L. Graham



THE REALITY OF DR. CALIGARI

THE DIFFICULTY facing a person who wants to understand artistic works like *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* is the seeming impossibility of reasonably accounting for most of what goes on in them. In the case *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* we are confronted with the daydreams of an insane man. Perhaps the best thing to do under this sort of handicap is to look at certain aspects of the work in order to remind ourselves of what is involved in calling it art in the first place. That is the purpose of this article.

The completely artificial construction of landscapes and other natural surroundings is one of the most—if not the most—striking feature of this film. The command of a precise, though unreal "studio universe" is preferred to a reality which would, for the most part, be dependant on indeterminable factors. This contrived mathematical precision achieves exactness at the cost of any semblance to what is usually understood to be reality. Such exactness is, after all, only possible if the material subjected to it can receive it without complete distortion. Material of this sort is not to be found in what is usually considered to be reality.

In order to clarify this distortion it would not be unprofitable to look at the place men occupy in the "studio universe". It seems to be a paradoxical one. On the one hand, they gain a prominence which isn't theirs by nature because they seem to be the only things capable of meaningful action; on the other hand, the very exclusion of chance and accident in this precisely ordered system makes men, by reason of their not precisely determinable actions, seem out of place and therefore meaningless. In fact, the only people who appear to be at home are the somnambulist Caesar and his mad master. For the other people, this contrived order of things can never be a home.

One could even raise the question of why the human beings weren't depicted in harmony with the "studio universe". Why not give to men the precision that has been imposed on their surroundings? It would thus be possible to eliminate, at least for artistic purposes, all the imprecisions that are involved in being a man. In fact, an artist who accomplishes this task might claim a sort of higher reality for his work. He might claim that this is the way things are, even though it isn't apparent to you this way. If he were questioned as to the foundations of this strange reality, he might claim to have reached it by looking at the world in a certain way. Quite possibly, he could present the uninitiated with a method which would enable them to see the world in terms of this same strange reality. In this way the strange reality, if it were accepted, might take the place of what is usually understood to be reality. The attempt would be made to understand the latter in terms of the former. But this, of course, is only possible if the contrived reality can be imposed upon the everyday reality without the latter's complete distortion. This does not seem to be possible without reducing the human situation to a state of meaninglessness. The world would be seen as some supermind might see it, not as it is usually seen by human beings. Such a world can only be imagined by men; it cannot be lived in by them.


Indeed, such a view of the nature of things demands that men take themselves out of nature in order to impose the ideals of the "studio universe" on what is usually considered to be natural. For if they do not consider themselves to be out of nature, they will have to impose the ideals of their "studio universe" on themselves.

To understand the importance of the intentional disproportion between man and nature, it must be remembered that this incommensurability doesn't exist merely in the madman's narrative. The same curious geometrizing of everyday surroundings manifests itself quite clearly in the film's concluding episode in which a normal state of affairs is presumably depicted. Indeed, according to Siegfried Kracauer's book, *From Caligari To Hitler*, the original screenplay did not call for a madman to narrate the story. On the contrary, it was intended to be an account of real horrors. This script began with the

with the coming of Dr. Caligari to a small German town and ended with him in a strait-jacket. For confirmation of his contentions, Kracauer points to the original manuscript written by Messrs Janowitz and Meyers, and to their violent protests against the radical alterations which were made in their story. According to these documents, the purpose of the film was a violent protest against insane political power (personified by Caligari) which results in mass conscriptions and world wars. The revised version of the script not only condemned the hero of the original story to a lunatic asylum, but also glorified the madman of the original.

In any event, it is obvious that a peculiar transformation of what is usually understood to be reality occurs in this film. Not only is this true in the insane scenes but it is apparent also in the supposedly sane last scenes. It therefore seems impossible to clarify the meaning of such a work without a previous analysis of reality as it is in itself, that is, prior to its transformation by such art. But art of this sort is not itself a guide in such an analysis since it is not at all concerned with that wealth of meaning we have in mind when speaking of the world of common experience. This common sense understanding of things may, with some justification, be called the natural understanding of the world. By virtue of being this, it certainly involves an articulation of reality which precedes the sort of "artistic" articulation given in *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari*. Until the proposed analysis occurs, our original question as to what is involved in calling such works Art must remain unanswered.

- Harry Neumann



FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF THE BLUE ANGEL

THE PROBLEM of writing about this film is really great, as it hits, and it hits very hard, both the emotions and the rational; and since emotions are quite impossible to reproduce in a critique, a great deal of the force of the film escapes . . . however --

What a truly magnificent and masochistic picture -- an example of a sensitive man dedicated to and protected by the study of the forms and formalities, crushed after a voluntary leap into a formless and unprincipled void, an insensitive chaos.

This was not the tragedy of Professor Rath alone, but also of the terrible state of Germany, lost and bewildered after the crushing "peace" of 1918 which, rather than collapse as did the professor, plunged into the barbaric orgy of Hitlerian National Socialism.

This too is the dilemma of modern man, who, after centuries of setting up forms and formalities in philosophy and religion, senses their deep sterility, and thus allows his instincts and desires to plunge him into a sensual and brilliant materialistic chaos. Who now, too late, realises that in jettisoning all, he is left nothing, no applicable standard -- and must either build a new one or go mad.

But why do I say this? How did I get this from the film? Well, I think the symbolisms bear me out. The clock with the revolving figurines in the Blue Angel, which apes the ones in the cathedrals of Strasbourg and Köln, except that instead of the apostles, followers of Him who lived for love and mercy and died to atone for the sins of mankind, were grotesque Bacchanalian wine-cup bearers, lecherous nude forms, the symbols of sensual body lusts -- sex and the grape -- the material gods of the new era.

-- the dial of the clock which recorded the beginning of the adventures of Professor Rath, of Germany, of Modern Man, at eight in the morning, and ended at eight -- at night -- a full cycle complete; from light unto darkness.

-- the burning of time by the instrument of physical beautification, the curling iron; -- and, of course, Lola, perfectly adjusted to her environment, an even mixture of sex and pragmatism; she knew what she wanted; she knew how to get it -- that was good -- anything else was bad.

An the marriage of Lola and the professor was analogous to physical pragmatic materialism which incongruously carries and keeps formalised religion and philosophy in the western world, until the latter can no longer justify its existence with the former and collapses.


-- and then, the tragic ending in which materialism and insensitivity triumph utterly over the formal man, -- the old professor sits broken and collapsed in his former seat of respect, unable to flex or build a new standard and so atavistically reverts to the old in a cataclysmic mental break -- while Lola, not caring as the old order changeth for the new, her lovely amoral, under-clad body straddling a chair before the cheering multitude, sings in a throaty voice:

"Ich bin von kopf bis fuss auf liebe eingestellt."
(*"From head to toe I'm attuned to love."*)

Especially interesting to note is that this film was made in 1930, just before the collapse of the Weimar Republic, just before Adolph Hitler became chancellor. The picture highlights the strong current of brutality and amorality, of disillusionment and cynicism in a horrifying way. Here is the lusty and cruel, insensitive and barbaric, moral vacuum into which the little Corporal, screaming slogans of hate and disaster, stepped. This was the environment, these same beer halls, that produced him -- and that produced in him such

an intense disgust for what he imagined the essence of Western Civilization to be. These people, the cynical and the disrespectful, the mawkish and the sadistic, were his screaming echoes three years after. Thus this film takes on from this position of hindsight an additional fascination, as it supplies the backdrop for a nightmare of humanity that immediately followed it.

And thus was symbolic not only of the personal tragedy of poor Professor Rath, but also of Germany, and perhaps now us. I hope not.
- Fred Wildman



POSSIBILITY, EROS AND FREEDOM

by Warren Winiarski

THIS PAPER is directed to an understanding of poetry. It will concern itself almost entirely with the ontological significance of the poetic, that is, with the made, the imaged, the formed. Perhaps the word 'art' would more appropriately define the subject of inquiry. For, in some sense, what this paper deals with is art, that is, the artificial. Since, however, the discussion will favor both words with the same intention, and use each with no regard for their possible distinguishability, it is to be noted that by poetry is meant that which is artificial, that which is made by man and not nature, that which is produced by some kind of imitation.

I

THAT WHICH TAKES PLACE in a poem, on a stage, in any work of fiction or in general in any Artistic or poetic medium, is only the image of what *is*. As such, it deserves recognition as a result of man's and not nature's. Nature does not imitate, it *is*. The creation of a work of poetry involves man in the making of illusions, of appearances, which though they in some way resemble that which they were fashioned after--differ so much that they must be considered as a separate species of Being.

Taking the real existence of Possibility as something other than an Aristotelian prejudice, and considering it as a meaningful analysis, the characteristic of Poetry becomes clearer. For since poetry is not that which is by nature, but by man, and yet it in some sense *is*--then if we restrict the term *is* for those things by nature, we have poetry as a fictional¹

1. Fictional, fr. - fictio, to form, to produce. cf. Ger. Bilden, to fashion. Also cf. "Hypotheses non Fingo" and Figment (Fig + (N) Gere, to Feign)

is. And continuing this line of thought we have the *is* as the *actual* and the *fictional* as the *possible*. Thus, the separateness of those things which are the beings of nature and those things which are the images of Poetry, arise from the determination of the former as actual and the latter as only possible.

The possible in this signification indicates potentiality only in the sense that the poetic entity is free from the determination of matter, and therefore is not actual (by nature). The poetic entity is undetermined when related to the *is* of nature, and may or may not be determined when related to its own fictional *is-ness*.

This indeterminateness with respect to the *is* of nature I shall henceforth call the poetic possibility as *could*.

It has been maintained that fiction (which is a kind of poetry) involves a moral problem. If we consider morality as involving a *should* proposition, i. e., a choice, the point is well taken. For fiction can represent its protagonists as escaping the consequences of their actions, which many would do but few *should*. But fiction can present moral escape as in Rabelais, or moral necessity as in Don Quixote, indicating that the moral problem in fiction is there only by virtue in the presence in this art form of possibility as the *could be*. The poet may be corruptor or emancipator simply because those entities with which he deals are cleansed of the *should* and offer only the *possible*. The moral escape of comedy, as the moral retribution of tragedy are equally possible to the poet.

Thus the problem of morality is involved only accidentally with the nature of poetry (in this case fiction). But since poetry presents the possibilities, the *clouds*, it may be said that the moral problem arises out of the poetic, while it cannot be said to be there essentially.

We should now consider the imperative as an appendage to the poetic medium, while we reserve for it its proper station above the poetic and independent, while yet its condition of Possibility is the poetic. Having seen that the nature of poetry is possibility and only possibility and that the *should* or moral proposition arises out of it only accidentally, it must be shown how it comes to be that the poetic image or the *could* gives rise to the *should*. And further, in what relationship these two stand to the things of nature, i. e., the *is*.

It may be asked, is it simply by virtue of the fact that the poetic work is an image that the *could* characteristic arises or by virtue of something else? It is by virtue of the fact that the *creation* is not by nature but by man that it *is* not. But this negative predication is certainly not the means which yields the character of *could*. The *could* arises from the fact that the creation is a product of $\pi\omicron\epsilon\lambda\omega$ -- a thing made. The nature of mortal imagination is to conceive possibility where there is none, or conjecture the possible where only the impossible exists. Thus in all things by $\pi\omicron\epsilon\lambda\omega$ there is *could* from the nature of origin--thus by necessity, the image is not the mirror, not a duplicate. Something is added to the fashioned thing which was not in the model, or better, something is created which differs from its model by the characteristic of possibility. The poetic, then, differs from the actual, the *is*, in that as it conceives, imagines and creates, the poetic removes the determinations or necessities of the *is*.

Seen from another direction, the creation process involves a transformation, not of the matter but of the form. For as *is* is the form of the things by nature, possibility is the form of things by man and therefore, it is possibility which is the form of poetry.

Since, then, possibility is the form of poetry; and the moral proposition, i. e., the *should*, arises from both the matter and form, it follows that poetry is in no way culpable of offer-

ing moral escape or damnation. But when the formal (art) and the substantial (the matter receiving poetic treatment) merge (as they must), the moral problem involved in the artistic is evident. For, a representation or an image are only possible beings, therefore any *should* arising from the representation is subject to the genius of man's imagination which differs from the divine intellect in just this ability to know the possible from the impossible.

When a poetic work acquires the characteristic of possibility, it loses the characteristic of possibility, it loses the characteristic of determinateness. Material enveloped by the robes of poetry is transformed from the clear and apparent force of material necessity into the fluctuating and undetermined. The action is somewhat analogous to that which occurs in a mathematical function, where the values of factors vary with each operation. A better analogy, perhaps, is the distinction between arithmetic and algebra--the first involving entities whose value is determined, the latter involving a formal principle which allows its entities a variance or undeterminateness.

This loss of determinateness effects the receiver of the poetic work by freeing him through the poetic moment from the necessities of matter. He becomes as undetermined as the algebraic function, he loses the necessities of his flesh, of his environment, of his world. Only Don Quixote could say, "I know what I am and I know what I may be"--- for him the poetical had merged with the substantial, his undeterminateness was determined.

Those other than Don Quixote, those to whom the poetical and the substantial are separate, cannot maintain their material uniqueness while within the realm of poetry. On the contrary, they lose their integrity, their singularity and become other than they are. In other terms, they know not what they are. (2) He who seeks recreation in poetry is recreated as he re-creates.

This loss of identity may be better explained by the etymological consideration of a word which enjoys remarkable currency. The word is entertainment. As it is used in the popular jargon, it indicates amusement, pleasurable activity and a kind of relaxation. Though these connotations are by no means misleading, their true significance with regard to this kind of activity cannot be grasped without going further. Entertain is compounded of *Enter*, between, and *Tenere*, to hold. Thus in this analysis, entertainment is a state of being held between the necessities of one's identity and the necessity of action. Thus, the aforesaid connotations take on a new meaning; for would not the suspension of material necessity, (the necessity of identity) on the one hand, and the non-necessity of action, on the other, yield a state of amusement, pleasure and relaxation?

The analysis of entertainment as a mediating ground between the necessities of matter and those of action has in the case of poetry, yielded some enlightenment. It is conceivable that an analysis of specific kind of these necessities along with their mediating grounds will furnish some further enlightenment.

(2) The Greek dictum, "Man know thyself" and the predisposition of the greatest of Greek poetry to deal with the possibility of this fulfillment is especially significant here.

LET THERE BE ARRANGED a table, somewhat analogous to the Aristotelian Table of Contraries, and in this table, let there be listed three terms corresponding to the tripartite division of *is*, *could*, and *should*, thus

IS	COULD	SHOULD
<i>Ruled by Nature</i>	<i>Free From Nature</i>	<i>Ruling Nature</i>
<i>Being Determined</i>	<i>Free From Determination</i>	<i>Determining</i>
<i>Sense</i>	<i>Imagination</i>	<i>Reason</i>
<i>Sensual</i>	<i>Aesthetic</i>	<i>Moral</i>
<i>Physical</i>	<i>Poetic Disposition</i>	<i>Spiritual</i>
<i>Passivity</i>	<i>Suspension</i>	<i>Activity</i>

In each of the above series of three terms the progressions of priority moves from left to right. In this way, 'ruled by nature' may be said to be prior to 'free from nature,' and similarly, 'free from nature' prior to 'ruling nature.' But the progression of priority may be understood in two ways, e. g., sequentially and causally. Considered sequentially, According to Aristotle. When the sequence of two things cannot be reversed, then the one on which, the other depends is called 'prior' to that other 14a 35. Sense does not imply imagination, nor does imagination imply reason, therefore, considered sequentially, sense is prior to imagination as imagination is prior to reason. In the same way, *is* does not imply *could*, as *could* does not imply *should*. But the existence of an imperative implies its consideration as a possibility, just as possibility implies a change of something.

Considered causally the case is ambiguous. For it is difficult to say whether sense causes imagination or imagination, reason. It is equally difficult to say that the sensual causes the aesthetic as the aesthetic causes the moral. The difficulty might be disposed of by saying that the sensual is the condition of possibility for the aesthetic and so on. But this falls back upon the notion of sequence and not upon cause, leaving the causal priority undeterminable.

There is yet another approach to the matter of priority. Let the notion of cause be reversed so that in place of looking from the cause to the effect, we look from the effect to the cause, that is, teleologically. Then the series progresses from right to left and unqualified priority rests in the column headed by *should*. Aristotle joins the issue by remarking that, in the individual, potential knowledge is in time prior to actual knowledge, but in the universe as a whole it is not prior even in time. It is possible that an extension of this notion can be made with profit. The informing principle of the progression (for in the individual) would then be the imperative which would stand universally prior.

Having now considered the series of terms and their relationship to each other, let the column of terms be examined

(continued on next page)

Things characterized by 'is' are those things which cannot be other than they are—they involve a material necessity.

Things characterized by 'could' involve production by imitation. They do not carry the force of material necessity, nor the force of moral necessity. They occupy the mean position between these two, namely, entertainment.....

Things characterized by 'should' are necessities in the sense that, first, they must be done in order to accomplish the possible ends, and second, they are those things without which the good life is impossible. It follows therefore that an act of will mediates between the 'could' and the 'should'.

Man exists in this sphere as a patient, e. g., the sensual has determination as its fulfillment, it receives an object.

.....man in this position of entertainment is therefore neither patient nor agent.

The should has determination of an object as its fulfillment—it creates an object.

The 'is' being in constant motion demands variety and substance.

The 'could' deserving rest, or the permanent, demands unity and formality.

This is the realm of immediate truth and therefore there exists no problem of consistency.

Mans activities here demand consistency since there is no possibility of conformation by immediate truth.

Here is the problem of measurement and therefore error.

Here is the problem of λογος and therefore incommensurability.

FORCE

ART

LAW

Compulsion of sense (immediate) truth
Sensual evidence

Compulsion of beauty
Beautiful
Aesthetical evidence

Compulsion of reason
Good
Moral and intellectual evidence
Form

Matter

This further series of terms follows the explanation given to the first group, namely, as the form of things by nature *is*, as the form of poetry *could* as the form of things by reason *should*. There may be some question as to why the modification of immediate is appended to the term truth in the above series. This objection has in part been met, in as much as truth in the category of *is* has an immediate and forceful evidence, and there-

fore is distinguished from the truth of poetry or the truth of the imperative. It may be further asked why poetic truth is not given in the progression. This has in part also been met, since it is understood that poetry deals with pure possibility and is, therefore, ceaseless activity as opposed to imperative truth which may be called rest, and immediate truth which is a kind of rest in motion. This last deserves separate consideration. The truth of the *is* can best be expressed by analogy with Zeno's paradox on the moving arrow--"For so long as anything is in one and the same place it is at rest, but the arrow (while apparently moving) is at each moment in one place alone, therefore it is at rest in that moment and in each of the others." Now the compulsion of sense is like the moving arrow and the immediate truth is like the moment of rest within that movement. Therefore immediate truth is the result of our own segmentation of otherwise indiscreet continuity.

Returning to Poetic truth, the proverbial wisdom of Sancho Panza and the evil demon of Descartes may be considered instruments of poetic truth. The poet offers no truth but only the possibility of truth.

The absence of a middle term in the progression, *matter*: *form*, indicates that there is an especial difficulty. Indeed the difficulty exists in all the progressions. But with the opposition to form and matter the issue is most clear and the explanation most manifestly inadequate.

What mediation will be allowed passage when the opposition and contrariety of these two is given? What demiurge with his desire to inform matter will serve to explain the momentary merging of matter and form, the coexistence of the changing and the permanent? What mediating activity derives the eternal from the flux, the form from the matter, the *I* from its conditions?

It is submitted that the formal principle of the mediating activity in question is possibility. Further, that any account of the juncture or mediation of these two (Form and Matter) as all other terms in these progressions, is essentially poetic. Indeed, the poetry arising from such an attempt at mediation, may carry with it a certain compulsion. Reason may be convinced (*con*-altogether, and *vincere*-to conquer) and yield to assent in the form of an imperative. Yet it must be recognized that in all likelihood there is a distinction to be made between a statue of a man, and a man; between an account and the thing accounted for; between a tree and an hypothesis.

It is to be understood that this disposition of possibility admits of degrees. For there are somethings which are more amenable to an imperative and others which are less so. The amenability of imperatives notwithstanding, it can be seen that within this disposition of possibility (considered essentially) there is an absence of necessity in either direction. It is with this absence of necessity that the final focus is concerned.

III

IT HAS BEEN SHOWN that the mediating term of all given progressions is characterized by the formal principle of possibility. It has also been shown that the two end terms involve certain kinds of necessity. It is now submitted that the mean term of possibility is characterized by the presence of *eros*, and that this *eros* has as its formal principle, freedom.

For poetry, the conception of the possibility that a thing could be somewhat otherwise, is an awareness of the lack in the *is*. This awareness is at once a mode of freedom--for, it indicates an escape from necessity. The lack that is recognized in the *is* is at once the means of transition to the *could* and from thence to the *should*. Poetry, however, as has been pointed up, does not essentially deal with the *should*. If an analogy be allowed

the figure of poetry is the ellipse, while the imperative concerns itself with the completion of the ellipse to a circle. Poetry has as its essential realm the lack or recognition of defect, the possibility of fulfillment. Thus:

NECESSITY
(that which cannot
be other than it is)

FREEDOM

NECESSITY
(that without which
the good life is
impossible)

Coeval with the recognition of Lack is the conception of the possibility that one may not lack. This is freedom, for, while one dwells within this realm, the idea that one may be other than he is removes the necessity of identity and hence yields freedom. But when the will seeks removal of the defect of identity, one is no longer free, but determined by the imperative. Thus:

IGNORANCE

EROS

WILL TO KNOWLEDGE

The awareness of ones ignorance is identical with the conception of the possibility of non-ignorance. This again is a transitory moment of freedom. When, however ones *eros* is directed to fulfillment (knowledge) the freedom is no longer--it is substituted by a determined will. Thus:

SENSUAL SATISFACTION

EROS

WILL TO IDEAL

There is recognition here of the lack in the *is*--what *is* is not all that could be. This moment of fault is at once the conception of the possibility of an *otherwise*. When the possibility has been transformed into an imperative, the Lack is filled with respect to the possibility. (The possibility now has an act of will appended to it and is therefore removed from indeterminateness.) It must be stated that the Lack remains with respect to the *is* (which may always Lack); however, since one of the possibilities has in fact received the imperative the freedom of the *could be* is gone and the relationship of *eros* no longer exists between the *is* and the *could*, but between the *is* and the *should*.

For example, where Don Quixote's *eros* exists between the *is* and the *should* (since for him these two are in a sense merged); the *eros* of Faust is between the *is* and the *could*. Having signed the contract in Blood (necessity of identity) he is removed thence to the realm of possibility, to the realm of production. Only his imperative to hold the moment ends the freedom of $\pi\omicron\epsilon\omega$.

It may be said finally that the disposition to remain under the formal principles of Possibility and undetermined freedom is Faustian Activity. For the apparent moral emptiness and self sufficient being of Faust demands that the sphere of his deeds be the sphere of his own creation. His genius has destroyed the being of the sensible world as it has destroyed the intelligibility of the world of reason, he has nothing left to him but the deed, or more exactly the form of the deed, *possibility*. Having abandoned reason, and revaluation his *doing* is made possible by magic--that which is both the reason and revaluation of his own soul; in short, by magic he attempts to force from nature her secrets, or better, he attempts to rebuild, reform, recreate that which he has rejected as nothing. He is as the spider in The Battle of The Books which spins its web-universe from the excrement of its own entrails, the duration of which web depends upon its being forgotten, or his in a corner. The freedom of Possibility as well as the freedom of Faust, is best described by conceiving the condition of Adam after the fall, without the help of God.

Drawings Tom Heineman