# NOMOS AND PHYSIS

## (An interpretation of Euripides' Hippolytos)

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The natural order of presentation might seem to be reversed in a title which focuses on Nomos and Physis as two related aspects of one and the same theme. Is not Physis (Nature) an indispensable ground for Nomos (Convention) and therefore a key to its understanding? The reason for reversing the seemingly natural order can be found in the suggestion, arising from Euripides' play Hippolytos, that, in the case of man, Nomos is as indispensable an end for Physis as Physis is an indispensable ground for Nomos, that Physis provides the potentialities, Nomos the actuality of man, and that therefore Nomos comes to be the key to a final understanding of man's Physis.

## II

Immediately following Aphrodite's prologue (1-57), the play presents Hippolytos, offering a wreath of flowers to Artemis (58-87). In the dedication of the wreath, preceeded by an enthusiastic hymn to the goddess's beauty and exaltedness (58-72), Hippolytos reflects on the possession of

"σωφροσύνη" and its connection to his companionship with Artemis.

"σοὶ τόνδε πλεκτὸν στέφανον ἐξ ἀκηράτου
λειμῶνος, ὦ δέσποινα, κοσμήσας φέρω,
ἔνθ' οὔτε ποιμὴν ἄξιος φέρβειν βοτὰ
οὔτ' ἦλθέ πω σίδηρος, ἀλλ' ἀκήρατον
μέλισσα λειμῶν' ἠρινὸν διέρχεται
αἰδὼς δὲ ποταμίαισι κηπεύει δρόσοις,
ὅσοις διδακτὸν μηδέν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇι φύσει
τὸ σωφρονεῖν εἴληχεν εἰς τὰ πάντ' ἀεί,
τούτοις δρέπεσθαι, τοῖς κακοῖσι δ' οὐ θέμις.

ἀλλ', ὦ φίλη δέσποινα, χρυσέας κόμης
ἀνάθημα δέξαι χειρὸς εὐσεβοῦς ἄπο.
μόνωι γάρ ἐστι τοῦτ' ἐμοὶ γέρας βροτῶν·
σοὶ καὶ ξύνειμι καὶ λόγοις ἀμείβομαι,
κλύων μὲν αὐδῆς, ὄμμα δ' οὐχ ὁρῶν τὸ σόν.
τέλος δὲ κάμψαιμ' ὥσπερ ἠρξάμην βίου."
(73-87)

The dedication unfolds in two parts. Each part begins with an appeal to the goddess and ends with a reflection, the first one on the possession of "σωφροσύνη", the second one on Hippolytos' companionship with Artemis. Both parts, though they correspond to each other in structure, differ from each other in tone: the second one applies to Hippolytos personally what the first one elaborates in general.

In the first part of the dedication, Hippolytos claims

that only nature and divine allotment can truly account for the possession of "σωφροσύνη". This claim is expressed in three, increasingly abstract statements: first a description, then a poetic image and finally a philosophical discussion. The description of the inviolate meadow, where the flowers for Hippolytos' wreath were gathered, distinguishes not only between flock and iron on the one hand, and the roaming bee[1] on the other hand, but also implies a distinction between the flock, something in nature, and the iron, something from nature, developed by art into something against nature, the sickle. This increase in supposed violation of the meadow, inherent in the sequence of examples which are set off from the example of the bee, has two opposite effects: its immediate effect, supported by a grammatical "ἀλλ'" (76), is separation. Furthermore, the repetition of the watchword "ἀκήρατον" (73, 76) ties the example of the bee rhetorically to Hippolytos' offering of the wreath, and sets them both off from the examples of flock and iron. Yet the interposition of those examples, implying violation, between the examples, implying no violation but rather fulfillment, suggests at the same time a separation between Hippolytos' offer and the example of the bee. This more subtle effect is to be weighed carefully, since the description of the roaming bee carries over into the poetic image of "αἰδώς". The extension of the one into the other is grammatically effected by the implicit continuation

of the direct object "λειμῶν' ἀκήρατον" (76). In keeping with the ambiguous character of the link between Hippolytos' offer and the example of the bee before, the grammatical conjunction "δὲ" (78) between the example of the bee and the image of "αἰδῶς" can at the same time be understood to connect and to separate. Furthermore, the image of "αἰδώς", gardening the inviolate meadow, contains in itself a strange alloy of wild and tamed nature, of nature and culture, and therefore seems to question Hippolytos' claim that only nature and divine allotment can truly account for the possession of "σωφροσύνη", the theme of the final discussion of the dedication's first part. Mentioning the gathering of flowers in the end of this philosophical discussion however suggests, that there is one continuous interpretation of Hippolytos' offer, which is consecutively expressed in descriptive, poetic, and philosophical language. The key term in Hippolytos' philosophical conclusion is "τὸ σωφρονεῖν" (80). Like the center of two concentric circles, it is surrounded by two pairs of correlated terms: "ἐν τῇ φύσει" and "εἴληχεν" in the inner circle, "διδακτὸν μηδὲν" and "τοῖς κακοῖσι δ' οὐ" in the outer circle. The opposition between the acceptance of the bee and the rejection of flock and iron from the initial description repeats itself in this final stage of the argument as the rejection of "τὸ σωφρονεῖν" as "διδακτόν", correlated with "τοῖς κακοῖσι" against the acceptance of "τὸ σωφρονεῖν" as "ἐν τῇ φύσει", correlated with "εἴληχεν". The opposition is emphasized rhe-

torically through closeness to the center and affirmative statement for what is accepted, remoteness from the center and negative statement for what is rejected. Grammatically, an "ἀλλ'" (79), like an echo of the one above, which isolated the example of the bee from those before, isolates the inner circle from the outer one. The connection between the poetic image of "αἰδὼς" and the philosophical discussion about "τὸ σωφρονεῖν" is controversial. The two possible constructions are: one --"'αἰδὼς' gardens with river dew for those to whom it is not taught, but in their nature allotted to be 'σώφρων' with respect to all things all the time, for those to pluck, but for the base it is not right;" the other --"'αἰδὼς' gardens with river dew; for those to whom it is not taught but in their nature allotted to be 'σώφρων' with respect to all things all the time, for those to pluck, but for the base it is not right." In both readings, the sentence structure is highly complex: In the first reading, where "αἰδὼς" is supposed to "garden for those, to whom it is not taught but in their nature allotted to be 'σώφρων' with respect to all things all the time, for those to pluck"; the repetition of the indirect object, once in relative, once in demonstrative form, seems to overstress the connection between "αἰδὼς" and "τὸ σωφρονεῖν." At the same time however, the length of the relative clause separates the repeated terms more than appears natural. In the second reading, where "'αἰδὼς' gardens with river dew; for those, to whom it is not taught but in their

nature allotted to be 'σώφρων' with respect to all things all the time, for those to pluck, but for the base it is not right", the lack of any grammatical relation between the first sentence and the following relative complex poses the problem as to the connection between "αἰδὼς" and "τὸ σωφρονεῖν". In addition to that, the necessity to supply "θέμις" for "τούτοις δρέπεσθαι" from "οὐ θέμις" predicated for "κακοῖσι", makes the whole relative clause with its discussion of "τὸ σωφρονεῖν" rather suspect.[2]

The problematic character of the dedication's first part will become clearer through an analysis of the second part and the correlation of the two in their respective three levels. The introduction of the second appeal to the goddess by "ἀλλ'" echoes those passages from the dedication's first part that stated the basis for acceptance and thus prepares the ground for the more personal character of the second part. The goddess, now addressed as friend, is bidden to accept a gift that previously was only offered. The justification "χειρὸς εὐσεβοῦς ἅπο " recalls the poetic image of "αἰδώς", imagined as gardening the sacred meadow. The account of Hippolytos' companionship, closely linked through "γὰρ" to the mentioning of his piety, seems to correspond to the discussion of "τὸ σωφρονεῖν" in the dedication's first part. In keeping with the positive and more personal character of the second part, the emphasis, indicated by the order of discussion, is now rather on the supernatural gift than on the natural en-

dowment. The correlation of "ἐν τῇ φύσει" and "εἴληχεν" from above, which centered around "τὸ σωφρονεῖν", seems to reappear in the correlation of "γέρας" and "τέλος δὲ κάμψαιμ' ὥσπερ ἠρξάμην βίου", which center around the description of Hippolytos' and the goddess's companionship. There is nothing in the second part that corresponds explicitly to the negative references in the first part, though the "τοῖς κακοῖσι δ' οὐ " seems to be implicit in Hippolytos' exclusive chosenness, the "διδακτὸν μηδὲν" in his wish for concord between the beginning and the end of his life (a notion, that is supported rhetorically by the position of "τέλος" at the beginning of the statement and contrasted grammatically with "δὲ" from the implications mentioned). The central account of Hippolytos' devotion to Artemis is puzzling in so far as it describes a companionship which is characterized by the exchange of "λόγοι", the mortal hearing the voice but not seeing the eye of the immortal partner. This detail becomes significant, if one recalls that the rational aspect of "τὸ σωφρονεῖν" had been questioned, if not denied, in the first part's negation of "διδακτὸν" and its correlation with "κακοῖσι." Apart from the fact that "σωφροσύνη" is to be explained etymologically[3] as "thinking sane thoughts" or "saving one's good sense" and therefore implies a rational aspect, the question arises whether the exchange of "λόγοι" can base itself merely on divine gift, allotted to one in his nature[4], or whether the

qualification "κλύων μὲν αὐδῆς, ὄμμα δ'οὐχ ὁρῶν τὸ σὸν" does not suggest that Hippolytos lacks insight[5] into the nature of his companionship as well as of the virtues connected with it. Judging from the correlation between the two parts of the dedication, Hippolytos understands "τὸ σωφρονεῖν", meaning chastity[6], to be aided by "αἰδώς", meaning shame, and both to be equated with "εὐσέβεια", meaning pious devotion to Artemis. The lack of insight, supposedly indicated by Hippolytos' not seeing the eye of the goddess, would pertain to three related aspects of his understanding: First, the meaning of the virtues "αἰδώς, τὸ σωφρονεῖν, εὐσέβεια"; second, their origin; and third, their interrelation. The fact that Hippolytos understands the meaning of these virtues exclusively in terms of his companionship with Artemis[7], determines at the same time their origin and interrelation. Yet the ambiguity of grammatical and rhetorical links in the dedication's first, more general, part seemed to question the interrelation between the virtues and therefore also their meaning and their origin. The unambiguous character of the corresponding grammatical links in the dedication's second, more personal, part only reinforces the impression that Hippolytos has lost sight of the complexity inherent in both the meaning and the origin of "τὸ σωφρονεῖν".

## III

The issue in question might be articulated most clearly by considering some philosophic texts, which are concerned

with the relationship between "αἰδὼς" and "σωφροσύνη", the terms most problematically related in this crucial passage of Euripides' Hippolytos. One might object to the attempt to clarify a dramatic statement through the analysis of a philosophic text. The objection however can be met by the fact, that Euripides himself employs philosophical language in such a way that it becomes an integral part of the drama.

In Plato's Charmides, a dialogue about "σωφροσύνη", we are presented with a number of definitions that are discarded, one after the other, as insufficient. Though all insufficient in themselves, their order of presentation from a less rational to a more rational understanding suggests the possibility that all of them play a part in a definition which, though never reached, might comprehend "σωφροσύνη" as a whole.[8] Significantly for our purpose, Charmides, in his second attempt, defines "σωφροσύνη" as "ὅπερ αἰδὼς" (160e). The refutation, which is based on a very inappropriate quote from Homer, ends with the assertion that "αἰδὼς" is neither good nor bad (161a-b) and therefore fails to define "σωφροσύνη", admittedly something good. The questionable character of the refutation reveals itself in two aspects, which are borne out by the drama of the dialogue: When Socrates, after comparing Charmides to a beautiful statue (154c), first asked him whether he possessed "σωφροσύνη"(158b), Charmides blushed and looked even more beautiful than before, since his shame became his youth (158c). Tracing out this apparent connection between "αἰδὼς"

and "σωφροσύνη", Charmides pronounces his second definition after courageously looking into himself (160e), an act that later will supply the basis for one of the highest definitions of "σωφροσύνη" (167a). A closer examination of Socrates' original question (158b-c) will provide us with an answer, as to why Charmides' second definition was nevertheless refuted. Socrates considered first, whether Charmides was by nature sufficiently endowed for "σωφροσύνη" (158b), then, whether he was already sufficiently "σώφρων" (158b), and finally asked him, whether he would say that he participated sufficiently in "σωφροσύνη" (158c). The stress on a natural presupposition that, on the one hand, is necessary, on the other hand insufficient in itself, explains the statement that "αἰδὼς" is neither good nor bad (161b). The comparison of Charmides to a beautiful statue might point to the fact that he possesses "σωφροσύνη" only in the static form of its natural presupposition[9].

The last chapter of book IV of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics deals with the same problem in a more elaborate form. "Αἰδὼς" is not considered a virtue, because it has to do with the body (1128b 14-15) and therefore is rather a "πάθος" than a "ἕξις" (1128b 10-11). Concerned with the same issue, Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics (1234a 24-35) provides the criterion for the distinction between "πάθη" and "ἕξεις": the former are "ἄνευ προαιρέσεως" (1234a 25-26). This however does not mean that there is no connection between the two: the "πάθη",

being "φυσικά", can be understood as leading into, "φυσικαὶ ἀρεταί", which are distinguished from "ἀρεταὶ" proper through the latter's being "μετὰ φρονήσεως" (1234a 28-30). The example of "αἰδώς", leading into "σωφροσύνη", is commented on in parenthesis, that for that reason people define "σωφροσύνη" in this genus, namely "αἰδὼς" (1234a 32-33). The difference between "φυσικαὶ ἀρεταὶ" and "ἀρεταὶ" proper is made even more explicit in book VI of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics by calling the latter "ἀρεταὶ κύριαι" (1144b 3-4)[10]. Now applied to virtue in general, the passage in book VI not only tries to clarify the similarity ("πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἠθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως", 1144b 4-5) and dissimilarity (καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσι ἕξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὖσαι", 1144b 8-9; cf. H.A. 588a 17-589a 9) between the two forms of virtue, but also understands their distinction to be based on a highly rational principle. While the two passages from the Eudemian Ethics spoke successively of "προαίρεσις" (E.E., 1234a 25-26) and "φρόνησις" (E.E., 1234a 28-30), the passage from the Nicomachean Ethics speaks of "νοῦς" (N.E., 1144b 8-9). Significantly for our purpose, the example illustrating the lack of "νοῦς" shows a man of strong body (the natural presupposition), who lacks sight (the rational component) and is therefore likely to fall heavily (1144b 10-12; cf. 1114b 1-25). As the passage from the Eudemian Ethics warned of confounding virtue with its natural presupposition (e.g. defining "σωφροσύνη" as

"αἰδώς"), so the passage from the Nicomachean Ethics warns of confounding it with its rational component (1144b 17-36) and suggests that it be understood as "οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως" (1144b 20-21).

The fullest treatment of the question is to be found at the beginning of book II of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: "οὔτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίγνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους" (1103a 24-26). What in the passages quoted above was distinguished as "ἀρεταὶ φυσικαί" and "ἀρεταὶ κύριαι", is here articulated in terms of "δύναμις" and "ἐνέργεια" (1103a 26-28). The difference between the two stages has to be bridged by "ἔθος" and "διδασκαλία" (1103a 14-18), their proportion depending on whether the virtue is "ἠθική" or "διανοητική", though the aspect of teaching and learning, which is illustrated by examples from "τέχνη" (1103a 31-34, 1103b 8-13), seems to become more and more relevant even for the moral virtues (1103a 31-1103b 2, 1103b 13-22), for instance "σωφροσύνη" (1103b 1-2, cf. 1105a 17-1105b 18). If matters were different, Aristotle points out, there would be no need for teaching, but we all would be either good or bad (1103b 12-14).

In such a case, as Plato's Protagoras remarks (323a-324d), one would never praise nor blame a man for the presence or absence of a virtue, since only nature or fortune would be responsible for it. Significantly for our purpose, the passage directly preceding this one, Protagoras' Prometheus myth

tells about how Zeus sent Hermes with the gift of "αἰδὼς" and "δίκη" (322c) to all men in order to prevent the threat of their mutual destruction. What the myth, appropriately for a divine gift, called "αἰδὼς" and "δίκη", the following discussion about political virtue calls σωφροσύνη" and "δικαιοσύνη" (323a ff.), representing the addition of a rational component in an ending indicative for abstract nouns.[11]

The one feature which is common to all the texts, quoted in this excursus, is the rejection of exclusivity in the account of virtue, be it by teaching, by training, by nature, or in any other way (Plato, Meno, 70a). The last possibility most meaningfully would combine all three ways.[12]

The one passage that not only brings this whole discussion into focus, but also opens up new perspectives to be followed up in the analysis of Euripides' Hippolytos, is the fundamental definition of man in the opening pages of Aristotle's Politics (1253a 1-39): "φανερόν, ὅτι ... ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον" (1253a 2-3). The "φύσει", which is replaced, in the elaboration on the definition, by "διὰ φύσιν" and in that form set off from "διὰ τύχην" (1253a 3-4), states man's being political as inherent necessity and differentiates thus the species "man" from others within the same genus "animal". Being political, on the other hand, does not seem to be an exclusive differentia, since it applies to other animals as well. (Significantly for our purpose, the examples chosen are the bee and herding animals, thus linking together the two

strongly contrasted in Hippolytos' dedication to Artemis. Hippolytos' acceptance of the bee against the rejection of the flock might be seen in the light of Socrates' myth in the Phaedo (82b), where those who possess "σωφροσύνη" without philosophy and thinking will, in a later life, take on the form of other political animals like the bee). The difference, which gives the differentia "φύσει πολιτικόν", added to the genus "ζῷον", differentiating power, is a difference of degree ("διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῴου μᾶλλον, δῆλον", 1253a 7-9; cf. H.A. 588a 17-589a 9), based on man's exclusive possession of "λόγος" ("λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων", 1253a 9-10, cf. 1332b 3-8 "τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῴων μάλιστα μὲν τῇ φύσει ζῇ, μικρὰ δ' ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ καὶ λόγῳ· μόνος γὰρ ἔχει λόγον· ὥστε δεῖ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις. πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς ἐθισμοὺς καὶ τὴν φύσιν πράττουσι διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πεισθῶσιν ἄλλως ἔχειν βέλτιον."). This natural possession of "λόγος" (1253a 9) allows for universalization with respect to the sensation and expression of pleasure and pain, shared in by all animals (1253a 10-14). While the sensation and expression of what is pleasant and painful is always occasioned by and bound to some particular occurrence, which involves one individual and takes place in one present time, the possession of "λόγος" allows for universalization of both through the notion of what is convenient and harmful (1253a 14-15) This

notion, that is based on abstracting from a particular present as well as from a particular individual, leads over into the notion of just and unjust, good and bad (1253a 15-18). The connection between the two prominent forms of the differentia "φύσει πολιτικόν" and "λόγον ἔχον" has to be gathered from the contrasting examples of the beast that is unable to, and the god who does not need to share in the notions of just and unjust, good and bad (1253a 27-29)[13]. The reference to man's being the best of animals, if and when perfected, the worst, if and when disassociated from "νόμος" and "δίκη" (1253a 31-33), suggests, in contrast to either beast or god, the capability for perfection on the basis of having "λόγος". The difference in wording between "being political" and "having λόγος" might point to the likely fact that having "λόγος" potentially makes for being political actually, but that being political actually makes for having "λόγος" actually. The difference between being and having would become apparent in the possible lack of having "λόγος" actually, in the possible failure of man to use his natural weapons for the intended purpose: "φρόνησις" and "ἀρετή" (1253a 34-35), a failure that would cause him to remain "ἀνοσιώτατος καὶ ἀγριώτατος ἄνευ ἀρετῆς" (1253a 35-36).

## IV

The thematic passage (73-87) from Euripides' Hippolytos, if it is seen in the light of this and the above discussions, seems to be concerned with one fundamental problem: the connection between Physis and Nomos. Hippolytos' rejection of

"το σωφρονεῖν" as "διδακτόν" can be interpreted as a rejection of the natural weapons, with which man is born and which are intended for the perfection of his nature, i.e. for the perfection of Physis through Nomos. Hippolytos' fault then would lie in his failure to recognize the fact, that what is natural for all animals is narrower in content than what is natural for man, the only animal which is by nature endowed with the possession of "λόγος". His failure to recognize the role of "λόγος" in human nature leads him to neglect the fact that in the case of man Nomos is as indispensable an end for Physis as Physis is an indispensable ground for Nomos, that Physis provides the potentialities, Nomos the actuality of man, and that therefore Nomos comes to be <u>the</u> key to a final understanding of man's Physis. Hippolytos' wish for concord between the beginning and the end of his life reminds one of the description of Charmides as a beautiful statue, a description which indicates Charmides' insufficient possession of "σωφροσύνη". The following analysis of the play will attempt to show that the play can be interpreted as a development of the thematic passage we have been concerned with. Indications given so far by Euripides as to the insufficiency of Hippolytos' view of himself and of human nature can be detected in content as well as in form: in content - from his being together preferably with beasts and a goddess; in form - from the grammatical and rhetorical analysis of Hippolytos' dedication to Artemis, which revealed the implicitly contradictory character of the ex-

plicitly stated notion that "τὸ σωφρονεῖν" is allotted to one in his nature by divine gift. The fact that the paradigms for acceptance in Hippolytos' dedication, the example of the bee, visiting, and the image of "αἰδώς", gardening the sacred meadow, imply a fulfillment of natural potentialities, questions Hippolytos' understanding of the origin of "τὸ σωφρονεῖν". Moreover, that "αἰδὼς" and "τὸ σωφρονεῖν", equated with "εὐσέβεια", seem to be at the same time grammatically disconnected and very closely connected, questions their relation as well as their meaning. The climax of Hippolytos' dedication in the description of the exchange of "λόγοι" with Artemis, Hippolytos only hearing the voice but not seeing the eye of the goddess, reminds one of Aristotle's example of the man with strong body, but without sight, who is likely to fall heavily. Aphrodite's characterization of the relationship between Hippolytos and Artemis as "μείζω βροτείας προσπεσῶν ὁμιλίας" (19), if it is seen in the light of the Aristotelian simile, would suggest that Hippolytos' hearing the voice but not seeing the eye of the goddess symbolizes his failure to appreciate the role of "λόγος" in man's nature and the likelihood of his fall for that reason. The failure to appreciate the role of "λόγος" in man's nature would show itself in the failure to appreciate the ways in which man's nature, perfected by convention, overcomes nature simply (cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1253a 31-33)[14].

## V

In the prologue, Aphrodite proclaims her vengefulness towards anyone who dares to affront her with "μέγα φρονεῖν" (6). Hippolytos' companionship with Artemis, yet even more his derogatory attitude towards herself ("λέγει κακίστην δαιμόνων πεφυκέναι[15]", 13), strike her as falling beyond any human bounds ("μείζω βροτείας προσπεσῶν ὁμιλίας", 19). Artemis, in turn, refers to the fatal revenge Aphrodite takes on Hippolytos by accusing her of wrath over his "σωφροσύνη" ("Κύπρις... σωφρονοῦντι ἤχθετο, 1400-1402). When Hippolytos finally realizes, which divine power destroyed him, he expresses his recognition with a verb that represents the neutral component of both: "μέγα φρονεῖν" as well as "σωφρονεῖν" ("οἴμοι, φρονῶ δὴ δαίμον' ἥ μ' ἀκώλεσεν", 1401). Between the two characterizations of Hippolytos, as "μέγα φρονῶν" by Aphrodite, as "σωφρονῶν" by Artemis, stands, like the fulcrum of a balance, Phaedra's prediction: "σωφρονεῖν μαθήσεται" (730-731). This prediction appears to be in striking contrast to Hippolytos' own understanding of "τὸ σωφρονεῖν" as "μὴ διδακτόν", where "διδακτὸν" was rather correlated with "κακοῖσι" (79-81). In accordance with this notion, Hippolytos' claim to be "σώφρων" revolves around the task to prove or disprove, in the second half of the play, whether he is base natured or not ("εἰ κακὸς πέφυκ' ἀνήρ", 1031, 1075, 1191; cf. 1071 "εἰ δὴ κακός γε φαίνομαι δοκῶ τε σοί", 1452 "ὦ φίλταθ, ὡς γενναῖος ἐκφαίνῃ πατρί"). Together with the thematic discussion of "τὸ σωφρονεῖν"

as "μὴ διδακτόν", the triad "μέγα φρονῶν" - "σωφρονεῖν μαθήσεται" - "σωφρονῶν" suggests the question whether the center separates or mediates between the two opposite characterizations. Before being able to answer this crucial question one would have to explore three related aspects: first, the broader context of Hippolytos' rejection of teaching in the case of "τὸ σωφρονεῖν", second, the internal and external causes behind this rejection, and third the meaning of Hippolytos' predicted learning to be "σώφρων". The last consideration, concerning itself initially with the relation between teaching and learning (cf. Plato, Meno, 70a), will be decisive for the final discussion of Hippolytos as tragic hero.

In the scene (88-120), which follows Hippolytos' initial address to Artemis, his old servant involves him in a conversation that aims at questioning his exclusive devotion to one goddess. At first, the cautious question is, whether the "νόμος" of "εὐπροσηγορία" (95), established among men (91) and supposedly ("εἴπερ", 98) following the "νόμοι" of the gods, has obliging force even where there is no inclination, as in the case of Hippolytos towards Aphrodite (106,113). The old servant's appeal to his young lord changes significantly from "ἄναξ" (88) to "παῖ" (107)[16] in order to indicate that Hippolytos' attitude of mind ("τοὺς νέους γὰρ οὐ μιμητέον φρονοῦντας οὕτως", 114-115) has to be accounted for with his youthful (118) immaturity and therefore to be forgiven (117). The final postulate of superior wisdom on the part of the immortals (120)

does not promise fulfillment, since both, Aphrodite directly (99, 103), Hippolytos indirectly (93, 94), are characterized by one and the same epithet: "σεμνός"[17]. Aphrodite's enmity against Hippolytos in her prologue was not so much provoked by his companionship with Artemis, as by his haughtiness, which expressed itself in derogatory statements about herself (13, cf. Bac., 330-342, especially 333-334). His attitude appears uniquely provocative, in that he alone of the citizens of Troezen (12) does not acknowledge Aphrodite's claim to all pervading fame (1-2, cf. 103, 445, 1268-1281). In accordance with the emphasis on what she is called or said to be (2, 13), her qualification "μόνος πολιτῶν" recognizes the worship of the gods to be a public matter, closely tied in with the "νόμοι" of the "πόλις". In contradistinction to that, Hippolytos stresses not so much the outstanding position he has among the citizens as among all mortals (84). This abstraction of himself from conventions, bound to time and place, and understanding himself as mortal in relationship to immortals, shows a radicality that goes both beyond and against the "νόμος" in question: beyond, in so far as it tolerates no compromise[18] of principles; against, because through this lack of tolerance his attitude points to the meaningless superficiality of a "νόμος" which is indifferent to the principles involved. Hippolytos' answer to the old servant's challenge to conform to the "νόμος" of "εὐπροσηγορία" with respect to Aphrodite: "πρόσωθεν αὐτὴν ἁγνὸς ὢν ἀσπάζομαι" (102, cf. 113), indicates that one

cannot, at least not uncompromisingly (104), worship at the same time Artemis and Aphrodite. (The close connection between the two goddesses[19], Artemis being not only the goddess of virginity, but also of childbirth, completing, as it were, the work of Aphrodite, does not render their incompatibility less striking).

The sequence of the first two scenes, Aphrodite's prologue and Hippolytos' address to Artemis, presented, as thesis and antithesis, the principles of the play. The third scene, the conversation between Hippolytos and the old servant, points, as to a synthesis, to a possible though improbable untragic solution. The fact that Hippolytos' only reply to the old servant's final exhortation ("τιμᾶτον, ὦ παῖ, δαιμόνων χρῆσθαι χρεών", 107) is in turn an exhortation to his fellow hunters (108-112) is underlined by repeating an expression of necessity ("χρεών", 107, 110); the old servant speaks of the necessity to use the gifts of the gods, Hippolytos of the necessity to have his horses prepared for exercise. The insistence on necessity in both cases, one implying immortal, the other mortal will, appears to hint ironically toward Hippolytos' terrible end, the destruction through his own horses. Hippolytos' last, contempuous line ("τὴν σὴν δὲ Κύπριν πόλλ' ἐγὼ χαίρειν λέγω", 120), together with his negative attitude towards acquiring "σωφροσύνη" through teaching, defies the old servant's hope that his young lord may mature and come to his right senses ("νοῦν ἔχων ὅσον σὲ δεῖ", 105). The question, which arises

from the unity of these three introductory scenes, is, whether the appearance of debunking the "νόμος" of "εὐπροσηγορία", even though it involves incompatible principles, is compatible with the possession of "σωφροσύνη", claimed by Hippolytos, and whether his attitude towards "νόμος" in general is significant for the truth or untruth of his notion about the origin of "σωφροσύνη".

VI

The "νόμος" of "εὐπροσηγορία", which was discussed in the final scene of the introduction, comes to be treated more specifically in the conversation between the nurse and Hippolytos (601-668), on the one hand, and Hippolytos and Theseus (902-1101), on the other hand. The two conversations are grouped around Phaedra's prediction for Hippolytos, "σωφρονεῖν μαθήσεται" (731), and spell out what Hippolytos' rejection of the "νόμος", specifically what his rejection of Aphrodite, means in a broader context: Rejecting Aphrodite, on the one hand, means rejecting family, on the other, rejecting political society, the one being the basis for the other and both an expression of man's "φύσις", represented through "νόμοι". This representation has its roots in the possession of "λόγος", which enables man to perfect his nature from potentialities to actuality. As a speculation, one might say that a rejection of Aphrodite, the goddess that initiates, even if unintentionally, family and political society, means, even if seemingly the opposite, a rejection of the perfecting role of "λόγος" with respect

to human nature. Seen in this light, Hippolytos' negative attitude towards Aphrodite leads directly to his denial of "τὸ σωφρονεῖν" as "διδακτόν", as result of a process of perfection rather than as a gift allotted to one in his nature. The correlation of the two aspects of Hippolytos' rejection, the rejection of family and political society, suggests itself both in form and in content: In form, the symmetry of the play (with Aphrodite and Artemis providing the frame[20] and Phaedra's prediction the center) keeps the two scenes between the nurse and Hippolytos and Hippolytos and Theseus in balance. In content, both are inextricably related through their exchange of roles: In the earlier scene, which points toward the rejection of family, Hippolytos accuses and condemns, and Phaedra, through the nurse, is accused and condemned. In the later scene, which points toward the rejection of political society, Phaedra, through Theseus, accuses and condemns, and Hippolytos is accused and condemned.

Hippolytos' condemnation of women as universal evil (608, 616, 629, 632, 651, 666), with its ironic conclusion "ἢ νῦν τις αὐτὰς σωφρονεῖν διδαξάτω, ἢ κἄμ' ἐάτω ταῖσδ' ἐπεμβαίνειν ἀεί" (667-668), ironic[21] if seen in the light of his rejection of teaching as source for "τὸ σωφρονεῖν" (79-81), shows a fundamental flaw in his understanding of human nature: His judgement that all women are alike in nature, ruled by passions, their passions served by reason; his suggestion to surround women with mute beasts rather than servants in order to avoid corruption through

exchange of words (645-648); and his absurd recommendation to buy one's children rather than to continue the human race through women (616-624), all three attest to his failure to appreciate the role of "λόγος" in man's nature. Judging all women to be alike in nature makes him misjudge Phaedra through the nurse, Phaedra's nobility through the nurse's vulgarity, Phaedra's reference to the Nomos as criterion for the struggle of reason over the passions through the nurse's reference to Physis as criterion for the triumph of the passions over reason. Towards the end of the conversation between Phaedra and the nurse, the nurse had tried to persuade Phaedra of the senselessness of fighting against love, a drive that is natural to all creatures of all elements, including the gods (437-439, 447-458). Only to have been begotten ("φυτεύειν", 460) under different decrees and different gods would, in the nurse's eyes, justify Phaedra's uneasiness with respect to these "νόμοι" (459-461). Phaedra's attitude, on the other hand, points to the essential distinction between all creatures of all elements, including the gods, and man: his not being fixed in his nature by universal powers but being responsible for the fulfillment of it on the basis of having "λόγος"[22]. Hippolytos' absurd recommendation to buy one's children according to financial ability in the temples of the gods would be a solution to the problem of continuing the human race without women, but it also would be a way to avoid all responsibilities that family life naturally imposes on men:

Responsibilities between husband and wife, between parents and children, that form men in their fulfillment of human nature, in their perfecting themselves and each other through "νόμοι", bringing to actuality the potentialities of "φύσις". Despite manifest disagreement between the nurse and Hippolytos, there is a strong resemblance in their fundamental view of human nature. Though the nurse accepts and Hippolytos rejects the triumph of the passions over reason, both presuppose that man's nature is fixed and therefore not to be altered by education. The nurse takes her standard from all creatures of all elements, including the gods, Hippolytos his from most men, close to beasts, and himself, close to gods. Yet this similarity in form between the nurse's and Hippolytos' view should not obfuscate the dissimilarity in content between the two. Hippolytos' intolerance of baseness and his radical[23] understanding of morality not only separate him from the nurse, but also bring him close to Phaedra. Both Phaedra and Hippolytos are driven into tragic conflict by the moral choice[24] between violating a sacred "νόμος" (in the case of Phaedra the "νόμος" of yielding to suppliants, in the case of Hippolytos the "νόμος" of keeping one's oath) and saving themselves from shame and death. The fact, that both preserve the "νόμος" rather than their own lives, becomes the stepping stone to tragedy for both of them. Yet this similarity in character between Hippolytos and Phaedra should not obfuscate the dissimilarity in tragedy between the two, shown by the difference

of their deaths. Phaedra is conscious of her fault and therefore kills herself, while Hippolytos is not conscious of his and therefore is killed. The similarity and dissimilarity between Hippolytos and Phaedra appears to be most ambiguous in Phaedra's central prediction for Hippolytos "τῆς νόσου δὲ τῆσδέ μοι κοινῆι μετασχὼν σωφρονεῖν μαθήσεται" (730-731). Judging from the correlation of the scenes directly surrounding this prediction, the sickness alluded to seems to be Hippolytos' misjudgement of Phaedra, followed by Theseus' misjudgement of Hippolytos. Both involve a self-contradiction: Phaedra contradicting her love with hate, Hippolytos contradicting his hate with love, though the one is a true, the other only an alleged self-contradiction. The question which carries over into the second part of the play is, whether and in what way Phaedra's prediction "σωφρονεῖν μαθήσεται" will come to be fulfilled.

The discovery of Phaedra's note drives Theseus into blind and unrelenting accusation of Hippolytos (790-1101). Theseus' conviction of Hippolytos' guilt, in full support of Phaedra's charge, springs from his knowledge of young men in general (967-970), from the knowledge that they are ruled by passions, letting their passions be served by reason (920, 926, 936, 951, 957). This misjudgement of Hippolytos uses against him the same argument (916-920) he himself had used in his misjudgement of Phaedra (616-668, cf. 921-922, 79-81): the impossibility of teaching anyone to think aright and be "σώφρων" who

is by nature "κακὸς" (942, 945, 949, 959, 980). Hippolytos' attempt to clear himself from guilt (933 cf. 731) and to refute Theseus by demonstrating that he is superior not only to the ways of young men, but to the ways of men in general (994-1001), makes him even more suspect in the eyes of Theseus. A man, who claims to be a companion of the gods and at the same time rejects the most natural and sacred ways of men (to have a family and to participate in political society), has to be suspect (949), or else the gods or the most natural and sacred ways of men, sanctioned by the gods, would be suspect. This however is a thought Theseus is not willing to embark on (951). Hippolytos' desire to be first in the "ἀγὼν" rather than in the "πόλις" (1016-1017) shows a lack of commitment that reminds one of his recommendation to buy one's children in the temples of the gods rather than to depend on women for the continuation of the human race (618-624). Both instances could be excused by the fact that Hippolytos is the son of an Amazon and therefore by nature averse to Aphrodite and family life, and the son of an Amazon by Theseus before Theseus' marriage to Phaedra and therefore by convention excluded from political leadership. Yet, far from excusing himself, Hippolytos judges his lack of commitment to the most natural and sacred ways of men to prove his freedom from all human passions, which in his view are nothing but all too human. The reason why his acclaimed being "σώφρων" (994-1001) - (by himself and by Artemis) - is accused as being "μέγα φρονῶν" - (by Aphrodite and in one or the other

form by all characters of the play) - can be found most openly in his boasting about it (73-87, 102, 994-1001, 1100, 1364-1365), as if it were something to be reckoned to himself rather than to nature and fortune or to nature and god-given fate, as he himself professes (78-81). The difference in judgement between the goddesses provides the frame for a deeper search into the meaning of "τὸ σωφρονεῖν", provoked by the center line "σωφρονεῖν μαθήσεται", which seems to contradict not only Hippolytos' understanding of himself but also his understanding of "σωφροσύνη" in general.

Hippolytos' understanding of himself apparently remains the same throughout the whole play: he sees himself as the most "σώφρων" of all mortals (994-1001). After being banned from his homeland, and ready to depart from it with his horses (which at the beginning of the play he had ordered to be prepared for exercise) (110-112), Hippolytos appeals to Zeus as witness of his innocence: "Ζεῦ, μήκετ' εἴην εἰ κακὸς πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ..." (1191-1193). In the following account of his death, which might be understood as Zeus' answer, one aspect comes to be pointed out as most terrible: that Hippolytos, who was so familiar with horses (1219-1220; cf. 110-112), should have been killed by his own horses, frightened by the appearance of the godsent bull out of the sea (1204, 1218, 1229, 1240). Even in the last scene, in the presence of Artemis and Theseus, the fatal race of his horses rouses Hippolytos to a more heartrending lament (1355-1357) than the fatal curse of his father (1348-1349,

1362-1363, 1378). The self-defending reappeal to Zeus, which refers to his being outstandingly "σεμνός", "θεοσέπτωρ" and "σωφροσύνῃ πάντας ὑπεροχὼν" (1365-1366) reminds one of the early scene with the old servant who exhorted Hippolytos to behave more in accordance with the "νόμος" of men and gods. The analysis of Hippolytos' rejection of the "νόμος" of "εὐπροσηγορία" and of his natural and conventional disposition towards such rejection will receive decisive clues from considering the circumstances of his death.

Hippolytos' confrontation with the bull recalls Theseus' encounter with the Minotaur.The significant difference between the two events can be seen in the nature of the man as well as in the nature of the beast. Theseus, on the one hand, represents himself, his family and his city. He is lead through the labyrinth with the help of Ariadne, who had fallen in love with him and had given him the famous thread of Daedalus. The beast, Theseus finally conquers, is a monster with the head of a bull and the body of a man. Hippolytos, on the other hand, is without responsibility for either family or city, the one by nature, the other by convention. In addition to that, he is banned from his homeland and therefore represents solely himself. The lack of experience in family and political life results in a lack of judgement about man and human nature. This lack of judgement made him spurn the thread he could have received from Phaedra, had he learned to be "σώφρων" , in other words had he learned to have respect for the labyrinth

of human nature. The symmetry of the play, with Aphrodite and Artemis providing the frame and Phaedra's prediction for Hippolytos the center, suggests not only, as mentioned earlier, the correspondence of the scenes between the nurse and Hippolytos, and Hippolytos and Theseus, but also the correspondence of the scenes between Phaedra and the nurse and the description of Hippolytos' encounter with the bull. The development of the scenes between Phaedra and the nurse from a mad alternating between the passions and reason (198-266) to a clear account of reason and the passions as warring powers in man's soul (373-430), is answered in the description of Hippolytos' encounter with the bull by a development from self-control to a complete loss of control; in other words, to a complete getting lost in the labyrinth of human nature. Unaccustomed to that labyrinth and to the hidden crossways between and the deviations of the passions and reason, the beast Hippolytos is finally, though indirectly, conquered by is not a monster, half beast, half man, but wholly beast, though of monstrous size[25]. Hippolytos' complete rejection of the passions, which he thinks renders himself above man and human nature, results in a complete ignorance about them and therefore in an extreme vulnerability with respect to them. The fact that he was not killed by the bull, but by his own horses[26], frightened by the bull, shows a lack in his understanding of himself as a man, a failure to appreciate the interrelation of the powers that make up human nature. The picture of Hippolytos in his chariot[27], losing control over his horses, frightened by the bull, reminds one of the picture Plato paints of the

human soul : Hippolytos, as charioteer, represents the controlling element of reason; the horses, tied to the chariot, represent the spirited element, in the case of Hippolytos usually under control, but able to be swayed either by reason or the passions; the bull, rising out of the sea, represents the passions, frightening the spirited element and finally overriding the control of reason. The fact that the bull comes out of the sea, the element always and everywhere in flux, might be a symbol for the difficulty of understanding the nature of the passions. The fact that Hippolytos' horses, frightened by the appearance of the bull out of the sea, race across the land and throw their master against the rocks, the hardest form of the firm element, the earth, might be a symbol for Hippolytos' uncompromising rigour. The circumstances of Hippolytos' death bear out the implications that contradicted the explicit statement of the thematic passage about "τὸ σωφρονεῖν" in the beginning of the play: The fulfillment of natural potentialities, implicit in the example of the bee, visiting, and the image of "αἰδώς", gardening the sacred meadow, together with the ambiguity about the connection between "αἰδὼς" and "τὸ σωφρονεῖν", between the natural presupposition of "σωφροσύνη" and "σωφροσύνη" itself, suggested that Hippolytos' explicit statement about "τὸ σωφρονεῖν", its not being taught or to be taught, but being allotted to one in his nature, was highly questionable. The circumstances of Hippolytos' death seem to reaffirm the questionability of that statement. The

complexity of human nature, represented by the complex of charioteer, horses and bull, would suggest that virtue has its origin not simply in nature but also in training and teaching. Hippolytos' rejection of the two latter stages of development and the wish for concord between the beginning and the end of his life means a rejection of the natural weapons towards "φρόνησις" and "ἀρετὴ" (Aristotle, Pol., 1253a 34-35) and results somehow in remaining "ἀνοσιώτατος καὶ ἀγριώτατος ἄνευ ἀρετῆς" (Aristotle, Pol., 1253a 35-36), rather than fulfilling human nature and becoming truly "αὐταρκὴς" (Aristotle, Pol., 1253a 1, 25-29). In terms of the thematic passage at the beginning of the play this would mean that Hippolytos possesses "αἰδώς", the natural presupposition of "τὸ σωφρονεῖν", but because he rejects training and teaching, does not possess "τὸ σωφρονεῖν", as he claims. His overestimating the divine makes him underestimate the human, a trait that marks both his way of life and his notions about life. A reason for that seems to be his awareness of the fact that wherever human affairs are concerned, there is rarely the possibility to adhere to principles, but more often the necessity to concede to compromises. This awareness, one could say, of the difference between Physis and Nomos, distinguishes Hippolytos from most men; yet it is this distinction from most men which illudes him about himself and what it means to be a man.

The fact that Hippolytos is killed in the end without

ever having acknowledged the presence of any flaw in his nature (a fact that contrasts strikingly with Phaedra's recognition of her guilt followed by suicide) raises a question about the central line "σωφρονεῖν μαθήσεται" which acts like the fulcrum of a balance, both parts of the play representing the scales in correspondence to each other. One aspect to be accounted for in this context is the discrepancy between Hippolytos and Phaedra in their connecting or disconnecting "σωφροσύνη" with either teaching or learning[28]. The question which arises from this discrepancy is whether Phaedra's prediction for Hippolytos "σωφρονεῖν μαθήσεται" (731) is in contradiction to his own understanding of "τὸ σωφρονεῖν" as something not taught or not to be taught, in other words whether his denial of teaching allows nevertheless for learning. Learning without teaching would take place, if Hippolytos, out of his own nature[29], were capable of developing his natural potentialities to the actuality of being fully a man, in which case the "τέλος" of his life would be, as he wished for, truly in concord with its beginning. Yet Hippolytos' repeated self-appraisal[30] as the most "σώφρων" among mortals reminds one rather of Aristotle's description of those that by talking and philosophizing about "σωφροσύνη" believe that they are "σώφρων", while they resemble the sick that only listen to the physician without following his precepts (N.E., 1105b 9-18). Hippolytos' life, which is spent in the concern for the hunt and in the company of horses, dogs, a small circle of

friends and supposedly the goddess of the hunt, seems to leave little room for learning, in the sense of comprehending the nature of man. Yet the disillusionment with his horses, followed by the disillusionment with his goddess, at the end of the play[31], opens up the possibility for a final fulfillment of Phaedra's prediction for Hippolytos. The disillusionment with his goddess (1440 ff.) significantly is expressed in terms that resemble the earlier description of Hippolytos' companionship with Artemis (85-86). There Hippolytos spoke of exchanging "λόγοι" with the goddess, here of obeying her "λόγοι", there he spoke of hearing the voice but not seeing the eye of the goddess, here of darkness touching his eyes - an indication that his believing himself in the friendship of Artemis was, at least from a final point of view, an illusion.

The problem of a friendship, either with beasts or gods, arises out of the difference of their natures with respect to man[32]. Beast as well as god, the one unable to share in a companionship which is based on the possession of "λόγος", the other not in need of it on account of his "αὐτάρκεια"[33], are fixed in their natures (cf. 13, "πέφυκα") below and above man and therefore no fitting partners for human friendship. Human friendship, on the other hand, flourishing most and most stable where it is based on equality, has as its highest goal the perfection of the friends through each others company, though the perfection has to stay within the limits of remaining human. Hippolytos' death in the company of his father, after

beasts as well as gods have deserted him, might be understood as a fulfillment of Phaedra's prediction: "σωφρονεῖν μαθήσεται". His pity for and forgiveness of his father[34] seem to be motivated by respect for human suffering (1405, 1407, 1409) and therefore to display a "σωφροσύνη" that is much broader then the one Hippolytos prided himself on throughout the play, a "σωφροσύνη" which was to be understood exclusively in terms of his devotion to Artemis. Nevertheless, the fact that his forgiveness occurs only after the appearance of Artemis and in obedience to her (1435-1436, 1442-1443, 1449, 1451), makes one wonder whether a "σωφροσύνη" ordered by divine intervention can be truly regarded as "σωφροσύνη". In Aeschylus' words: it makes one wonder whether Hippolytos' "σωφρονεῖν" at the end of the play not only comes to one who is unwilling to accept it, but also comes as "πάθει μάθος" and therefore as "χάρις βίαιος" (Aischylos, Ag., 174-183). The question left at the end of this analysis concerns the divergence of judgement between the goddesses, "μέγα φρονῶν" by Aphrodite, "σωφρονῶν" by Artemis, concerns the exact meaning of Aphrodite's "ἃ δ' εἰς ἐμ' ἡμάρτηκε" (21), which accounts for Hippolytos' violent death ("τιμωρήσομαι Ἱππόλυτον ἐν τῇδ' ἡμέρᾳ", 21-22).

## VII

Racine, in his preface to his "Phèdre", justifies changes he made in the character of Hippolytos with the fact that already the ancients had reproached Euripides for having presented Hippolytos "comme un philosophe exempt de toute imperfection: ce qui faisait que la mort de ce jeune prince causait

beaucoup plus d'indignation que de pitié" (§4). This characterization of the Euripidean Hippolytos seems to be at the same time right and wrong. Like a philosopher, Hippolytos does not feel himself bound by a particular, commonly accepted "νόμος", the worship of Aphrodite. The philosopher's reason for feeling himself superior to any particular "νόμος", is the recognition, that all particular "νόμοι", compared to the ground they stem from, compared to "φύσις", are only transient and depend in their coming into and going out of being on accidents of time and place. Nevertheless, the philospher recognizes the inherent necessity in man's nature to develop particular "νόμοι", that is he recognizes the necessary connection between "φύσις" and "νόμος"[35]. Unlike a philosopher, Hippolytos rejects the worship of Aphrodite in the name of the worship of Artemis, which means merely to supplant one particular, commonly accepted "νόμος" by another particular, though uncommonly accepted "νόμος". The rejection of the worship of Aphrodite in the name of the worship of Artemis seems, at first sight, to be a rejection of the passions in the name of something purer. The ways, in which the worship of Artemis expresses itself, are, on the other hand, certainly tainted by passion: chasing and killing animals as a hunter does not attest to a nature that would be divested of all animalistic feelings. In Racine's opinion not being tempted by Aphrodite was enough ground for having Hippolytos resemble a philosopher, exempt from all imperfection. He consequently not only changed

the title of his play to "Phèdre", but also believed that he should give Hippolytos "quelque faiblesse" (§4), meaning "la passion qu'il ressent malgré lui pour Aricie" (§4). Thus Racine, in a Christian rather than classical spirit, takes away the reason for Hippolytos' only flaw: his feeling of superiority over all human beings on the basis of being by nature not tempted by Aphrodite. The more radical "faiblesse" Hippolytos suffers from in Euripides' play is, that he does not recognize that his by natu and convention being predisposed to live a life dedicated to the worship of Artemis and therefore not being tempted by Aphrodite, is in itself not enough reason for being better than all men. His understanding of "σωφροσύνη" as something allotted to one in his nature leads him to restrict its meaning mainly to chastity (87) and therefore to mistake what man is by nature potentially for what man is by nature actually. The fact that man is an animal, but an animal which has "λόγος" and is political, necessitates the perfection of human nature through the development of "λόγος" in the society of other men, which means a perfection on the basis of nature through training and teaching, the latter two more or less depending on the former. The basic flaw in Hippolytos' understanding of himself and man in general seems to consist in his failure to recognize that in the case of man "νόμος", which expresses itself through the development of "λόγος", is as indispensable an end for "φύσις" as "φύσις" is an indispensable ground for "νόμος", that "φύσις" provides the potentialities, "νόμος" the actuality

of man, and that therefore "νόμος" comes to be the key to a final understanding of man's "φύσις"[36]. It is for this failure that Hippolytos is not a philosopher but a tragic hero. Seen in the light of Phaedra's prediction: "σωφρονεῖν μαθήσεται", his constant failure to recognize any flaw in his nature (1455) makes his death fall short of being truly a "πάθει μάθος", of representing a "χάρις βίαιος" rather than mere "βία" without "χάρις". This aspect of the play, and of Euripidean plays in general, is demonstrated most harshly through the presence of gods, that if they are gods, ought to be wiser than men, but that far from it, only set and clear the stage of human tragedy without ever redeeming it. What Goethe in his Song of the Harper expresses unambiguously:

> "You"-meaning the "heavenly forces"-
> "into life lead us ahead,
> You let the wretched become guilty,
> Then you deliver him to grief,
> For all guilt is revenged on earth",

this feeling of the tragic situation of man, Euripides expresses ambiguously with the Deus ex machina, with immortals apparently solving conflicts, which for mortals remain unsolved and unsolvable. This, I think, is part of what Aristotle (Poetics, 1453a 29-30)[37] means, when he speaks of Euripides as the most tragic of the poets.

## NOTES

1. For the symbolism, involved in the image of the bee cf. B.M.W. Knox, "The Hippolytos of Euripides", Yale Classical Studies, 13, 1952, p.28. It might be interesting to compare F. Bacon, Novum Organum, I, Aph. 95, and its elaboration in J. Swift, The Battle of the Books, Prose Writings of Swift, ed. W. Lewin, London, 1886, p. 178.

2. For the philological controversy over ll. 78-81 cf. W.S. Barrett, Euripides, Hippolytos, Oxford, 1964, pp. 172-175.

3. cf. Aristotle, N.E., VI, 1140b 11-12 "ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σῴζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν."

4. H. North's ("Sophrosyne, Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature", Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. XXXV, Ithaca, N.Y., 1966, pp. 74-75) assertion: "with regard to the origin of virtue, including sophrosyne, Euripides is firmly of opinion that physis plays the chief role" disregards the fact that the one pronouncing the theory in question is killed at the end of the tragedy. Euripidean fragments like Fr. 807 (Nauck) "μέγιστον ἄρ' ἦν ἡ φύσις· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν οὐδεὶς τρέφων εὖ χρηστὸν ἂν θείη ποτὲ" do not have to be interpreted with H. North, following E.R. Dodds ("Euripides the Irrationalist", The Classical Review, 43, 1929, p. 99) as attesting to the "moral impotence of reason", but can be understood as a claim to nature as a necessary but not necessarily sufficient source of virtue. The fact that in the case of man reason is a part of nature makes the claim to nature as chief source of virtue rather ambiguous. Dodds' (op. cit., p. 99) "Euripides' characters do not merely enunciate these principles, they also illustrate them", meaning "the victory of irrational impulse over reason in a noble but unstable being" ought to make one cautious in separating them out as "their authors thoughts" (op. cit., p. 98; cf. "The Αἰδώς of Phaedra and the Meaning of the Hippolytos", The Classical Review, 39, 1925, p. 103), expressing "systematic irrationalism" ("Euripides the Irrationalist", p. 103), opposed to "Socratic intellectualism" ("The Αἰδώς of Phaedra", p. 103).

5. cf. 1004-1005; for an elaboration on the distinction between hearing and seeing with respect to "the quest for the first things" cf. L. Strauss, Natural Right and History, Chicago, 1953, Ch. III, "The Origin of the Idea of Natural Right" pp. 86-89.

6. For a discussion of the different meanings of "σωφροσύνη" in Euripidean tragedy cf. H. North, op.cit., pp. 68-84.

7. Plato's Euthyphro explores this question with respect to "εὐσέβεια": The original definition of "τὸ ὅσιον" as "τὸ θεοφιλὲς" (7a) appears to be insufficient on the basis of differences among the gods as to their likes and dislikes (7b-8e). The amendment of this insufficient definition to "τὸ ὅσιον" as "ὃ ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλοῦσιν" (9e) is only an intermediary step on the way towards a more fundamental inquiry into the nature of "τὸ ὅσιον". The follow up of the crucial question, whether "τὸ ὅσιον" is "ὅσιον" because it is "θεοφιλὲς" or whether it is "θεοφιλὲς" because it is "ὅσιον", in the discussion of "τὸ ὅσιον" as "μέρος τοῦ δικαίου" (12a-e) points to a more universal definition which goes beyond the scope of this dialogue.

8. cf. H. North, op.cit., pp. 153-158.

9. For a comparable relationship between "αἰδὼς" and "σωφροσύνη" cf. Xenophon, Mem., II, 1, 22, and H. North, op.cit., p. 92.

10. cf. F. Dirlmeier, Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik, Darmstadt, 1969, note 138, 9, pp. 471-472 and "Der φύσει - Charakter der Arete" in "Die Oikeiosislehre Theophrasts", Philologus, Suppl. 30, 1, Leipzig, 1937, pp. 39-46.

11. Therefore, "σωφροσύνη" does not seem to me to be synonymous with "αἰδώς", as H. North, op.cit. p. 87, claims.

12. For the same disjunctive question cf. Aristotle, N.E., 1179b 20 ff.; Pol., 1332a 38-b 11 and H. North, op.cit., p. 208; related to "εὐδαιμονία" on the basis of "ἀρετή", cf. Aristotle, N.E., 1099b 9-1100a 9, E.E., 1214a 14 ff.. For a discussion of acquisition and loss of "σωφροσύνη" cf. Xenophon, Mem., I, 2, 21-23; Cyr., VII, 5, 75 and H. North, op.cit., pp. 123-132, especially p.131, with the discussion of Cyr., III, 1, 16-17, the problem of "σωφροσύωη" as "πάθημα" or "μάθημα".

13. For the exclusion of the lower animals and the gods from considerations of virtue cf. Aristotle, N.E., 1149b 27-1150a 1, 1178b 8-18 and H. North, op.cit., p. 205 and note 30 ibid..

14. For a harmonious view of "νόμος" and "φύσις" cf. Euripides, Bacchae, ll. 890-896 and E.R. Dodds, Commentary, adhuc, 2. ed., Oxford, 1960, pp. 189-190; Ion, ll. 642-644; cf. Philemon, fr. 87(K).

15. Ironically enough, Hippolytos' notion of a fixed nature is answered with fatal revenge by a goddess, the only kind of being to whom it truly applies. Of course, the judgement "κακίστην δαιμόνων", with its implicit hybris of mortal judgement over immortal nature, carries more weight than the otherwise true notion of a fixed nature in the case of gods.

16. Comparably, the nurse changes her usual address to Phaedra from "παῖ" or "τέκνον" to "δέσποιν'"; where Phaedra has shown moral strength (433) or at least moral indignation (695).

17. For the ambiguity of "σεμνὸς" as epithet of Aphrodite as well as Hippolytos cf. W.S. Barrett, op.cit., p. 187.

18. cf. B.M.W. Knox, op.cit., p. 22.

19. cf. B.M.W. Knox, op.cit., p. 28.

20. cf. B.M.W. Knox, op.cit., p. 29.

21. I doubt whether this is simply a "good sententious peroration", cf. W.S. Barrett, op.cit., p. 286.

22. cf. Philemon, fr. 87(K):

"τί ποτε Προμηθεύς, ὃν λέγουσ' ἡμᾶς πλάσαι
καὶ τἄλλα πάντα ζῷα, τοῖς μὲν θηρίοις
ἔδωχ' ἑκάστῳ κατὰ γένος μίαν φύσιν;
ἅπαντες οἱ λέοντές εἰσιν ἄλκιμοι,
δειλοὶ πάλιν ἐξῆς πάντες εἰσὶν οἱ λαγώ.
οὐκ ἔστ' ἀλώπηξ ἡ μὲν εἴρων τῇ φύσει
ἡ δ' αὐθέκαστος, ἀλλ' ἐὰν τρισμυρίας
ἀλώπεκάς τις συναγάγῃ, μίαν φύσιν
ἁπαξαπασῶν ὄψεται τρόπον θ' ἕνα.
ἡμῶν δ' ὅσα καὶ τὰ σώματ' ἐστὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν
καθ' ἑνός, τοσούτους ἔστι καὶ τρόπους ἰδεῖν."

23. cf. E.R. Dodds, "The Αἰδὼς of Phaedra", p. 103.

24. cf. B.M.W. Knox, op.cit., p. 15 "The fact that the moral alternatives are represented by silence and speech is not merely a brilliant device which connects and contrasts the situations of the different characters, it is also an emphatic statement of the universality of the action. It makes the play an ironical comment on a fundamental idea, the idea that man's power of speech, which distinguishes him from the other animals, is the faculty which gives him the conception and power of moral choice in the first place."

25. For the significance of the bull in Greek mythology cf. E.R. Dodds, Euripides, "Bacchae", 2. ed., Oxford, 1960, p. XX; ll. 920-922 and note pp. 193-194.

26. cf. the etymology of the name Hippolytos, either to be analyzed as "Breaking in horses" or as "Broken by horses".

27. For the symbolism involved in the image of the charioteer cf. H. North, op.cit., pp. 380-381, especially note 3.

28. cf. Plato, Meno, 70a.

29. cf. Xenophon, On Hunting, I, 11; XII; XIII, 4, 15ff.. For great parts of it, this treatise of Xenophon sounds like a commentary on Euripides' Hippolytos, attempting to demonstrate that hunting is the best preparation for "σωφροσύνη" and that it is best to be taught "παρὰ αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως" (XIII, 4).

30. cf. F. Bacon's interpretation of a similar myth in The Wisdom of the Ancients, IV, "Narcissus" or "Self-Love", The Works of F. Bacon, ed. Spedding, Ellis, Heath, Vol. VI, pp. 705-706.

31. cf. B.M.W. Knox, op.cit., p. 22, referring to Euripides, Hippolytos ll. 141, 1451.

32. cf. Homer, Od., IX, 105-566; both,the Cyclops and Hippolytos, are representatives of the same phenomenon, the "ἄπολις", though the Cyclops on the side of the beast, Hippolytos on the side of the god.

33. cf. Aristotle, Pol., 1253a 28 with N.E., 1158b 29-1159a 12; E.E., 1238b 18;27; 1244b 1-22; 1245b 14-19 and F. Dirlmeier, op.cit., note 180, 3, pp. 520-521; cf. Plato, Lysis, 214e-215c; Euthyphro, 14e 9-15a 10.

34. cf. B.M.W. Knox, op.cit., p.31. "The play ends with a human act which is at last a free and meaningful choice, a choice made for the first time in full knowledge of the nature of human life and divine government, an act which does not frustrate its purpose. It is an act of forgiveness, something possible only for human beings, not for gods but for their tragic victims. It is man's noblest declaration of independence and it is made possible by man's tragic position in the world. Hippolytos' forgiveness of his father is an affirmation of purely human values in an inhuman universe."

35. cf. Leo Strauss, op.cit., pp. 151-153.

36. cf. Leo Strauss, op cit., p. 145. "In the language of Aristotle, one could say that the relation of virtue to human nature is comparable to that of act and potency, and the act cannot be determined by starting from the potency, but, on the contrary, the potency becomes known by looking back to it from the act."

37. cf. G.E. Lessing's remark in the 49th piece of the "Hamburgische Dramaturgie": "Aristoteles hatte unstreitig mehrere Eigenschaften im Sinne, welchen zu Folge er ihm diesen Charakter erteilte", and his speculations about the passage in question.