

# The COLLEGIATE

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## THAT THE POLITY ITSELF IS A THREAT TO THE COMMUNITY

Mr. Simms in his recent treatise decrying the spirit of the polity seems to have reiterated once more a tired cry whose age is perhaps exceeded only by its sheer futility.

I propose to disagree with Mr. Simms regarding the cause of polity apathy and even to question the worth of the spirit which impels him to such painful reasoning. I shall not myself reason back to him with equal care, not only because I cannot, but because I do not think it appropriate to either of the ends we seek. Such reasoning is designed rather more to encourage contemplation than to incite action (which is above all what Mr. Simms seeks), and I must confess that for myself and those at my level of accomplishment, it was quite sufficiently exhaustive to follow the formal intricacies of Mr. Simms let alone the additional difficulty of acting upon them. Further, since the reasoning of Mr. Simms led to thought rather than to action, necessarily it drew me not to what Mr. Simms had aimed to accomplish, but rather to complete disagreement.

That the polity lacks definition I freely acknowledge since, if it were fairly defined, I am convinced our apathy would be even greater than that which Mr. Simms is so ready to decry. But in our present state we are largely deceived and, though we cannot give a proper account of it, we loosely imagine that the polity is a thing of importance and that we ought to do what Mr. Simms urges. But in our secret and better judgement we are sufficiently acquainted with the truth that Mr. Simms, and all those of like mind before him, have repeatedly failed to stir us.

It seems to me that Mr. Simms is in error when he supposes, in the opening part of his discourse, that mankind are of so noble a political disposition that the mere defining of government will so impress them as to constitute in itself the cause for political activity. On the contrary most men, though quite ready to praise a noble definition of government, are ready equally to destroy that definition if it should seem to cause them some personal discontent, or if they should chance to see that by such destruction they or their friends might stand to gain something valuable, such as wealth or power. For, although we freely admit that the ends of government should come in preference to our own, our practise counters our philosophy by asserting that our individual happiness is absolutely our first concern. And what is most obvious is that the great mass of citizenery act politically whenever it pleases them and without any conception of how the government ought to be defined. Political activity is caused when an individual or group is discontent or indignant over the discontent of another. For, by such discontent they are driven to any action which they think might be the means for effecting the changes which would please them. In this process they are forced to learn something about means; they must discover which means they may use with impunity, but never during the course of these events do they require a formal definition of government. Definitions are the toys of scholars. Although they may be of service to our political activities, they by no means supply them their motives. The true motives for political activities are found in the existence of issues about which we entertain opinions and convictions, together with a certain kind of hope by which we sense a way to rid ourselves of our discontent. Conversely then, since the polity is an imitation of political organization, and lack of political activity, as Mr. Simms himself seems to realize toward the end of his account, is caused not at all by a lack of definition, but by a lack of issues and a lack of hope. For these things which hold true of political activity universally now hold true particularly, in the case of the polity.

It is not that we have no issues or that we have no hope, but only that we very reasonably refer our issues to that area of the community which is empowered to resolve them and, by the very structure of the community, this area is nearly always the administration and almost never the polity. (Mr. Simms has made another error in dividing the community into the academic and the political. He should rather say that the community is one and that it is all political. He has been led into this error simply because the polity has no power in academic matters.) For since the community is primarily academic, very reasonably our greatest potential for political activity would normally be conceived in academic matters. But, while the responsibility for the academic is very properly in the hands of the administration, our greatest potential for political activity is dissolved into individual and private dealings with the Dean. Second to the academic are issues conceived in matters of "residence", which term serves to include much of our social activity. But with the annexing to the administration of the rules of residence our second greatest political potential has dissolved into a series of private and individual disputes over fines. The area remaining to the power of the polity is truly trivial and truly difficult to define, and it is therefor not to be exclaimed upon, but only to be expected that in our secret selves we are not interested in it. This, then, is a more accurate account of our political apathy.

Now there are those among us who speak often and at length of the responsibility of the students to the college. And they speak in such a fashion that I am led to suspect that is not this responsibility so much as themselves which they labor so diligently to praise. Surely they suffer under a great illusion, for whether they truly speak in honor of such responsibility for the college is the business of the administration and it is a ridiculous pretense for students to speak of it as if it were their own. The sentiment, let us say, is kindly, but to argue such a posi-



tion is folly. It is illusory to imagine that the concerns of the polity are co-extensive with the concerns of the college, especially since the polity itself is a kind of toy granted to the students by the administration and capable, as has been demonstrated in the case of the rules of residence, of being wholly withdrawn at the pleasure of the administration. The existence of the college is altogether independent of the existence of the polity. The reputation of the college, although of concern to students, is in fact the responsibility of the administration. It is wholly natural and reasonable that students are not responsible to a college which is not financed by them and whose academic policies and rules of residence are totally outside the sphere of student control. New buildings rise, new students appear, the program changes, the coffee shop, bookstore, and dining hall operate, announcements appear on bulletin boards stating this, requiring that; these things are all the proper effects of the administration. The existence, maintenance, and reputation of the college are not a student's responsibility, but are held in the hands of the administration, and, even if they were not so held, they certainly ought to be. For students are as children in the community. The polity as it presently exists has only the power of half-heartedly appropriating certain funds and of executing social discipline with regard to vague social regulations. (We need not mention the power it gives to students to bargain with the administration since this power would exist regardless of the polity.) The power of polity members to execute discipline through the court is the small and vulgar responsibility of judging one another's conduct, and this, as I maintain, together with what remains of the polity ought to be utterly done away with.

The polity, by which is meant student government, represents an attempt on the part of the administration to bestow, or lay onto students, certain of its own responsibilities, either because it thinks it instructive to students to bear such responsibilities, or because it imagines that by this means these responsibilities can be more efficiently executed. Further, although individual members of the administration will not always confess it, the administration as a whole acknowledges that these responsibilities are its own, because it carefully reserves the right to withdraw them at its pleasure. Consequently, such responsibilities, from the view point of the polity, are purely nominal. And this constitutes one of the chief causes for the failure of student political organization, for as long as its powers are nominal it cannot be expected to take them seriously.

In truth then, the responsibility in the college is not of the students to the college, but necessarily always from the administration to the college and the students. For students are as children in the community.

Now there are very many readers who will be greatly offended and rush to arms at this last statement since it is so greatly opposed to what, in incredible error, is commonly held. But I urge such readers to bear with me yet a little longer out of the likelihood that it is their very readiness to anger which has heretofore prevented them from grasping so manifest a truth. For, that such is the case with responsibility in the college, if not plain enough from a cursory glance of the structure of the community, is rendered more than obvious by the activities of the administration. For why, I ask, did the administration make a mockery of the polity by taking it upon itself to prod the court into activity in the recent case of Burton Abelow? Only because the administration was laboring under the weight of those very responsibilities which it had nominally laid upon the polity and which the polity, because of its natural disposition to failure, could not feel for itself. The case of Mr. Abelow was, in fact, the case of "The Administration versus Burton Abelow", and the court was given no choice but to find him somewhere guilty. Again, in the case of the rules of residence it is plain enough that the administration, seeing the failure of the polity, was forced by the weight of its very own responsibility to act as it saw fit. Again, we have only to observe the activities of the executive committee to see immediately that it is not so much a mediator between students and administration as an instrument whereby the representatives of the administration make demands upon the students for the execution of the responsibilities of the administration. Therefore, they stand in absurdity who do not confess that all responsibility is necessarily wielded by the administration. Now it is not as though by pointing out that students are not responsible to the college I am advocating some kind of wild license. God forbid! The well-being of the college is necessarily of concern to the students both individually and collectively. But this concern need not be manifested in an attempt by students through student government to grasp formal power and responsibility. Let me be clear here in order that none are gratified who foolishly imagine I only attach established things out of ill-will and contrariety, and that I offer no constructive alternatives to the evils I decry.

The community, as was said, is one and political. But it is a kind of oligarchy for the Administration rules and the students are subjects. Therefore, I distinguish between formal responsibility to the college on the one hand, and enlightened concern on the other. The former, which finds expression in official rules and policies is the proper effect of the administration, the latter is shared by all and finds expression either in a kind of sentiment, or in individual self-discipline. These notions taken together constitute that position in terms of which all that is here attacked is attacked, and that all that is advocated is set forward. For although those have some shadow of truth who maintain that the student is central to the college and a kind of end for its existence, they ought not to speak of this as though it implied student responsibility. The student does not come to the college in order to take over responsibility for it, or to develop or maintain it, but rather he trusts in the college to maintain and develop him. The administration sets out certain educational ends in the catalogue toward which it is then responsible to aim. The student, acknowledging the worth of these ends, comes to the college and tacitly agrees to un-



dertake such discipline as the administration finds requisite for the sake of these ends. It is, then, rather like a contract, except that the student is more properly said to be responsible to himself to become, in so far as possible, a fertile bed for the working of these educational ends, than to be responsible to the administration. But in any event it is certain that the student is not responsible for the conduct of other students or for the college in so far as it relates to such conduct and the polity is a threat to the proper order of the community because it tries to grasp both ends of the contract or to upset that ruler-subject, parent-child relationship in which the essence of the teacher-learner relationship is also given.

Now although the administration is impowered to bestow and to remove student government, the students are free to accept or to reject this gift. I say it ought to be rejected; formally, because if it is inconsistent with scholarship as will be shown, and practically, because it asks us to perform vulgar tasks and causes hypocrisy. The polity is possessed of trivial, unpleasant, and wholly nominal responsibilities which it is repugnant to sustain.

But our supporters of the polity once they confess that the powers of the polity are trivial, will now urge that there is a certain virtue and beauty in performing a small task well and that a well organized and active polity could at least be like a clever hand serving its part in the activity of the whole body. I am myself rather fond of this image but I urge that, like a continual desire for a small, sweet candy, it ought to be given up so that we may go that much more easily about our affairs. The very apathy of the polity serves to demonstrate the failure of this position since so many, if they cannot control the whole body, would rather give it up altogether than suffer the indignity of the charge of a single small hand. But the real argument against this position emerges when we consider the central question of whether or not the role of administration and judgement is consistent with the role of the student, and whether the idea of student government is consistent with some of the expressed ideas of the college. With regard to the former it is likely that the student, in so far as he is a student, is not an administrator or judge. We are being foolish to commit our behavior to the rashness of student judges not only because we thereby make them hypocrites, but because if they were not rash judges they would have no need to be students. Although the student may ultimately make a good judge, it is almost to quote the catalogue to say we must first let him alone to be a student so that, in order to learn, he may compare the judgments of others without, for the moment, incurring danger to himself. For, as Mr. Klein pointed out in his September lecture, the teacher is active, working upon the passive student, all of which serves to support my meaning "a fortiori" when I propose that it is the administration that is responsible to the student and not the reverse. To make a judge of the student is to make him active; a knower rather than a learner. It is to try to make the raw material act upon the artist rather than the reverse. For the student, in the words of Mr. McGrath, is "an ignorant, moveable substance", and students are as children in the community.

We need not consider the opinion of those who maintain that student government is itself a way of learning, that it is instructive for children to have "responsibility", that through such responsibility they may "express themselves". For learning is not such an ugly thing that we must accuse, misjudge, and toy with one another for its sake, and those who wish to learn in this fashion ought to go to Antioch College or join the police force and leave us in peace. We are all acquainted with the discord between political activity and learning in the best sense. Why is it that the friends of the polity wish to plunge us back into the cave before we have come near to getting out? We are quite shaky enough as students without these strangers from the polity tempting us with the vain-glory of politics. The student does not move easily, but staggers along among his habits, pushed and shoved by his appetites, whispered to by fears, beckoned to by hopes, and nagged at by his reason. Spending as little time as he does in study and thought, and so little of this time under the motive of genuine curiosity as under habit, or the desire for esteem; this student ought not to have the faint flame of his scholarship blown upon with the heavy breath of the polity. The student, in the aspect of scholarship, is already under siege.

These considerations are sufficient to show that the role of the student is not consistent with the role of the polity member since, in fact, the two are wholly opposed. And while Mr. Simms rightly sees that the student is a member of the community, he errs when he tries to make student government a necessary development from such membership. Students are as children in the community, for their freedom is restricted, but they are at the same time free from political obligations, and indeed, the student, as properly the receiver and not the giver of discipline, is very like a child.

It is for this reason also that student government is not consistent with some of the views of the college since the college would remove the student from the bigotry and complexity of political activity in the hope that by cultivating his skills apart from this confusion he might later re-emerge to confront it with a calm and more collected mind. It is not that he is to have a complete ivory tower, but that he is to be slightly cloistered. But with this polity a small imitation of the very atmosphere we would avoid has crept into our midst and deceived us. Therefore, on this count also, the idea of the polity is out of the favor of common sense.



These are not the only evils brought upon us by the polity. These, rather, are formal considerations, while other evils arise, as one might expect, when the idea of the polity, evil in itself, is actually in practice. For student government causes an hypocrisy in its participants, which, when added to the unusually generous quantity of this vice found in human nature, makes these participants very nearly intolerable. For since the scholarship of the student is under siege we have not the strength left to ward off even the most common vices when student government forces them upon us. Student government requires us to condemn others for offences we have ourselves committed, and there is no more repelling sight than that of these hypocrites sitting about the coffee shop praising obedience to the rules and proclaiming thereby their own virtues. For these persons, being thus diseased, imagine that it is we who are sick, and they who are the proper surgeons to operate upon us. And when they have us strapped to the operating table, speaking the while with the voice of responsibility in one mouth, and the voice of intemperance in another, they operate upon us with an ax.

We have no need of all this foolishness; no need of these repeated meetings and discussions, and those grotesque discourses on student responsibility. Student government is neither necessary, instructive, or pleasureable, and, finding favor on none of these grounds, it ought to be put away as a toy of childhood. It should be urged that all political responsibility be put also in name where it already is in fact; in the hands of the administration. We need not fear that by giving up the polity we might suffer the rule of a tyranny, for surely we would not assert that the administration, which we so freely confess ought to control the academic program, might be incompetent to administer social regulations. Nor need we fear that we might lose voice for the interest of our affairs, for we may speak with equal freedom without the complications of the polity. Nor shall we listen any more to those who urge that we must have the polity to execute judgment against those social offences which the administration is too far removed to police, for they stand refuted by the very failure of the polity to perform this function.

Student government tries always to focus our attention on community problems rather than individual ones. In fact, this supplies a cause for its existence since, if it reminded us of individual shortcomings, we might set about to remove them before they are allowed to swell into the community. We must not allow the polity, itself a community problem, to remove our attention from the moats that abound in our individual eyes.

We are therefore, above all that has been said, free from the conflict of responsibility which the administration, through the polity, has offered to lay upon us. But being thus free, it is now more than ever clear that we are inescapably responsible to ourselves both as students and as human beings in search of ourselves and of freedom. It is in view of this responsibility that we are greatly to be congratulated for our apathy toward the polity. For in this we have demonstrated our refusal to substitute the lesser cause for the greater or to replace serious learning with vanity.

Michael Sanford



## POOR OLD HUMPTY

*Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall.*

*Humpty Dumpty had a great fall.*

*All the king's horses and all the king's men*

*Couldn't put Humpty together again.*

In the year 937 B.C. this tale was told by an Egyptian woman who was trying to put her son to sleep. Sam Weinberg, the local tax collector, was hidden outside her pyramid hoping to get some facts on her form. Amazed at the cleverness of the tale Sam took it to his friend Isaiah, who could write, and had it preserved for posterity. Since Sam couldn't read either he left the tale with Isaiah. Upon Isaiah's death this tale along with his other writings were collected and put in *The Good Book*.

One Saturday afternoon a rabbi interpreted the tale as saying that since Adam and Eve had fallen the rest of mankind was doomed. Because nothing the king, who represented God, could do would allow them to re-enter the garden of Eden, or heaven, the members of the synagogue took this explanation to heart and decided that if they had nothing to gain there was no point in supporting the rabbi. In attempting to resolve the problem the rabbi died of starvation.

The big wheels in Jerusalem, missing their cut, decided that they must solve the problem or go to work. It became more and more obvious as less and less money came in that the king was a mortal one and not God. So they declared the only way to heaven was through the church, as this passage proved beyond a doubt that man could not do it himself. At last everyone was satisfied.

In the battle to establish Christianity the Christians pointed with assurance to Humpty. For it was manifest to anyone with a little gray matter that Humpty symbolized the Messiah who would die and could not be resurrected by man but only by God. In this way it was possible for Humpty to feed many poor hungry lions.

In the dark ages a priest after much contemplation decided that perhaps the wall in the Humpty passage was really a wall. He further deduced that after falling from a wall the soul would be completely separated from the body and could not be forced to re-enter it. Delighted at the thought of being free of his contemptuous passion-ridden outer shell, he jumped from the wall around the city. Upon investigation of his body it was found that his soul had indeed left it. The real meaning of Humpty had finally been demonstrated empirically. Before a week had passed the pile of bodies under the wall was high enough to allow the wall to be scaled and the city to be captured by a neighboring king. The new king liked the city so he did away with the priest's interpretation.

In 1569 a Spaniard said that the Humpty passage might not have any meaning. He was promptly toasted to a crisp.

A little later in history a great passion arose for forming sects. One of these believed the "the wall" was virginity and "to fall" was to be lost forever. This sect soon passed out of existence.

In 1708 the Pope made the infallible statement that evolution was impossible. He cited the Humpty passage as proof.

In 1985 the missing link was found. The Pope made the infallible statement that evolution was possible. He cited the Humpty passage as proof.

In 2139

H. Wynn



CLEAN-CLEAR COLD - a pristine sky waits above, below  
 joyous silent cowed shapes, shades, shadows move as one  
 in one. ;  
 mesmerized with love. ;  
 each nothing awaits the sacrifice -  
 as a holy frenzy floods-about the sandled feet -  
 awaiting  
 the hallowed kiss that ends in rest. ;

I held a skull in my hands  
       years danced back  
 and simple, holy, child-like patterns  
 spin - sin - sweat, ;  
 millenniums of flesh  
       rise vapor-like, vague, an incense  
           hallows mankind's breath  
 that which is not me, though often  
           seemed a birthright  
                   dies. ;

Silent - churchlike  
 sacristy lamp above the dollar  
 sign. ;  
 where is the priest?  
 ulcerated parishioners appear  
 red eyed - contrite - indulgent  
 minded: Oh! Christ I need to drink. ;  
 quiet wop ladies, beaded and  
 old - they would have a quartet  
 with  
 mary. ;  
 and the hallowed Irish  
 talk about your chosen people  
 just ask them. ;  
 medals, myths and mass cards. ;



Snow falls silently  
 Its deceptive purity transforms the manstained.

Nun-like images appear  
 As winter's barren witnesses .

Vagrant veil of white, short lived –  
 I resent you!

Your calm clean visage  
 Precede your sister slush. ;

We did not go to supper  
 we spoke – and  
 the sun set. ;

this holy youth, devout in doubt  
 to you nothing can be told  
 no – quieting truths unfolded  
 by the assigned minds – that  
 only dreams ago berated acceptance. ;

they have their heads in the stars  
 but cannot find their way in the streets. ;

she was a little girl from nowhere  
 and my name was mr. nothing. ;  
 a man wrote a poem about how to  
 hump a cow and all these men  
 drink wine before they breathefast. ;  
 i never knew a carpenter  
 who did not swear. ;  
 do you think he ever wiped his  
 nose on his sleeve?

J. Baldwin



## SOMETHING FOR THE BIRDS

When I used to stay at this place on the square, I loved to look out the window and watch an old woman feed birds. Of course lots of people feed birds but she did it better than anybody else I had ever seen. She would sit there with this big shopping bag full of stuff: bread and popcorn and all kinds of nameless things she got from an Arab bakery when they were too old to sell. She was rather crazy I guess, because she would reach in the bag and come up with a big handful of this stuff, then she would scream out at the top of her lungs: "Something for the birds!" and fling it up in the air. Then the birds would come and pick out the stuff they liked. Other people just got pigeons and sparrows, but she got all kinds of birds, and sometimes wildlife people would come down and watch. It was quite funny, because they carried field glasses and wore clothes like they were going to the country, and then they would just sit there in the square and watch. She begged for herself and the birds together: she had a kind of pot and when she ran out of the stuff in her bag she would rattle the pot at people and yell: "Something for the birds!" Not really loud, but carrying, as if she were calling across sand dunes. She usually did fairly well, but if her bag stayed empty too long then the wild life people gave her money--a kind of subsidy. She was really a boon to those people.

Sometimes if it were a new kind of bird she would have trouble finding anything it liked, but she would grub around in her bag and after a while she would come up with something that the bird would eat. Once though, I remember, there was a bird she just couldn't seem to please. She tried all kinds of things and even picked the seeds off a little petrified cookie, but that bird just wouldn't eat. Well, finally she went over and pulled up a little bush that wasn't doing too well anyhow, and sure enough, that bird came down and ate some kind of little grubs that came up with it. She had gathered quite a crowd for this performance and everybody clapped like it was the circus, but she didn't pay any attention at all.

After this (which we all had to admit really was a triumph) she hardly ever left her bench. Just long enough to fill the bag and then she was back again, day and night. If you could say that such a person were cracking up, I would have said it, but she wasn't the kind of person to talk about like that. Though it was getting colder.

Then there came this omen. Two vultures appeared out of nowhere and roosted on the cross on top of a church on the other side of the square. Some people thought they were just hungry and were waiting for her to get them some meat, but I knew better than that: death was near, and these creatures were come to carry her off to some magic Birdland where she would finally be at home. I was still quite a romantic at that time.

It was colder that night and sleeted a little. I slept badly and just after daybreak I went to the window to see how the old woman was, or if she was still there. She was still there all right: stretched out on the ground with the bag beside her, its contents scattered on the ground. The two vultures were quietly eating her leg. I guess it was the only thing she had that they liked.

Bert Morgan



OMNIA QUOD COGNOSCO, LEGO IN TABULIS DIURNIS  
- Will Rogers

I the imagist,  
Spiral my art into  
A waiting brass spittoon.  
I sing my suffocation  
To the hairless color of  
Tainted flesh  
While selling the sour fish  
Of resurrection,  
To whomever can  
Suffer its candied odor.  
And thus, the deathless drips  
Of a soggy wash rag  
Must hold their tale  
In rancid clandestine,  
While being the Being of Being being Being.

Thomas St. Smelliat\*

\* Outside of his pseudonymous role, the author of this rare piece of kaleidoscopic insight is well-known to us for his triumph in another field of Art, the musical comedy. Ed.



## DIE WESSENERKENNTNIS DER DINGANSICHSWAHRHEIT

In determining the non-existence, or as some would have it, the non-being of indeterminate objects we must first search for some grounds of ultimate reality which will be beneficial to the least of our intellects and which will, it is hoped, lead to a sufficient reason for our enquiry, which must be carried on with the utmost in diligence and understanding and must finally arrive at those longed-for truths, which all men desire, but in their inefficient process of intellect and imagination, are, sadly wanting. If, however, we find that we too, in our search, fall far short of our mark then we must bow in all humility to those superior intellects who will, in time to come, it is hoped, take up our search at the point where we left off, correct our errors and fill in our gaps, so that the general knowledge of these matters will not always remain dark and obscure to the minds of men but will, on their discovery, reflect the divine dignity of the human kind. But, so we will not be like the peasant, who on his daily journey to the fields, finds, each morning, that he has forgotten his plow, we must take note of our materials at the very outset, define our terms and clarify our relations so that as we move to more complicated matters which rely on the vividness of these concepts we will have ideas which are not only clear but also distinct, as the illustrious and profound mathematician, philosopher and leader of mankind, M. Des Cartes so wisely and carefully taught us.

The terms which are subsequently defined are terms of no small importance in the science of metaphysics and consequently bear prodigious weight on the matters at hand. Though the meaning of these terms have for centuries been argued and though men have been burned for the wrong and misapplied use of them, I feel that the ones following are so simple, so direct and so inclusive that they will immediately be grasped and assented to by even those tenacious intellects who will, when given the opportunity, suck, like leeches the essential life blood from serious and enlightening nomenclature, by insincere and fruitless quibbles.

The first term we must deal with and one which offers the most resistance to the careful mind is that which is, perhaps of all the others, the one which most basically underlies all metaphysical experience—Transcendence. Now, Transcendence is the transference of any one Being to a different level of existence, which level is always, for our purposes, on a higher plane and one more complex than its previous one and which plane of existence performs the act of completing the Being into a more complete and Unified form. Now, what do we mean by Being? Being is that which is, or which is for the sake of some ultimate Being for whom it exists, not arbitrarily or through whim, but through Necessity and which is made Determinate through the ultimate Unity or final Necessity. That which is Determinate is fulfilled by the ultimate Unity by the final Necessity and which is given a certain definition of that, so that it may subsist as it is and only as it is. Necessity is that which gives bounds to the acts of any Being and which terminates its Sameness or Otherness both in relation to itself and to the ultimate Unity, as well as, of course, to other Beings which are either like or unlike itself. Unity, is that which acts through Necessity to complete the essential character and disposition of any given Being to any given purpose which was assigned at the very outset of everything. It is Unity because it is both Same with everything and Other than everything, particularly with itself, so that taking all necessary, categorical, and contingent occurrences into consideration they must never be greater than, or less than, but equal to the Unit. The Unit one is that which not having any parts is itself no part. The Same is that which cannot Transcend the bounds of itself to become Other than itself with itself or with another. Other, on the other hand, is simply the opposite of this.

We see, now, by these same definitions that our conclusion can decisively be reached by several clear and precise *reductio ad absurdum* arguments which, though seemingly enthymemic, are actually *a priori* and which make manifestly certain the concomitant attributes of those several substances, which basically are concerned with the highest metaphysical contingencies and which lend themselves by their very nature to the most sublime speculation in matters relative to universal application by careful defining of integral terms of relations and things absolute in the essential character of the particular discourse of apperceptive unity and that the thing in itself, or in the language of the metaphysicians, the *Ding an sich*, which is, in the final analysis, submitted to the stringent hypothesis of probability proves the concept that the non-being of any undeterminate thing is contained in its very history of nothingness and in the impossibility of its coming to be either in the world of becoming and being or in the world of appearance, and reality, which duality can never exist simultaneously in the same metaphysical or divine system. Consequently there can never be at the same time and in the same respect that which is clearly not: *Cogito ergo non sum.*

B. Siemens