RATIONAL ANIMAL - POLITICAL ANIMAL:
Nature and Convention in Human Speech and Politics*

by Laurence Berns**

In the beginning of his Politics Aristotle argues that "man is by nature a political animal." In fact man is more a political animal than any bee or any herding animal, for "man alone of the animals has speech," "man alone of the animals has reason," "man alone of the animals has logos." A word should be said about this word logos, which can be translated as word, speech, account, argument, ratio, or reason. Logos is connected to the verb legō which means to speak and to pick out, to select, to count. Our words collect, select, and elect are connected with the same verb. Logos is selected, elected, and chosen speech, meaningful speech, thoughtful speech. When people speak of Aristotle's definition of man as the rational animal they are referring to his statement that man alone of the animals possesses logos, possesses thoughtful speech. Aristotle goes on to say:

> Now voice functions as a sign of pain and pleasure and therefore is possessed by the other animals too (for their nature has gone as far as having sensation of

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> pain and pleasure and signifying these things to one another). But logos is for making clear the advantageous and the harmful and therefore also the just and the unjust. For this is special to man alone compared with the other animals; he alone has sensation of good and bad and just and unjust and the like. And the community of these things makes a household and a pólis...
> (1253a 9-18)

-- a political community. Logos makes clear the advantageous and the harmful, which presupposes an awareness of what is good for men and what is bad, which for Aristotle means what is in accord with nature, man's nature, and what is contrary to nature. This awareness is shared through speech, and thoughtful sharing entails thinking about how what is shared is to be distributed, hence the sharing of this awareness makes it possible for men to consider how the advantageous and the harmful ought to be distributed, shared and apportioned, it makes it possible for them to consider the just and the unjust. The community, or sharing, of good and bad, just and unjust makes a household and a polis; that is, what makes a community, and a political community primarily, is its awareness of having a common good, that good is justice, namely, what is conceived of as the right distribution of advantages and harms. Political societies can then be characterized in terms of the conceptions of justice, the conceptions of the right distribution of advantages and harms, operative or authoritative, in each.[1]

Most of what has just been said, I hope, is not too hard to understand. But should we not be bothered by at least one of the key terms just employed? I mean particularly the term nature. What has nature to do with good and bad, justice and injustice? Is not the Aristotelian conception of nature obsolete? Do we not learn what nature means from modern natural sciences, and from

1. Cf. Politics, 1276 a 34 - b 13, 1289 a 13 - 20, 1295 a 40 - b 1; N.E., 1131 a 10 - b 24, 1132 b 31 - 1133 b 29, esp. 1133 a 10 - 12.

the social sciences that model themselves on them? But before taking up the theme nature and Aristotle's understanding of nature we should, perhaps, explain why we concern ourselves with Aristotle at all. I shall try to deal with that question under five heads, discussed in increasing order of importance.

1) Aristotle's approach to nature and philosophy was the approach opposed by the founders of the modern scientific approach. By seeing what they were reacting against, what they rejected, we come to understand better the point of view dominating our thought and our times; we come to understand ourselves better. From this point of view we approach Aristotle's philosophy as a historical datum.

2) According to the view which tries to understand modern life in such a way, they claim, as is appropriate to the uniqueness of our situation, the Existentialist, or Historical Relativist, or Radical Historicist, or Heideggerian view, world views are primarily creative projects of different ages or different men in different ages. True openness, openness to determine the way which would be the authentic way for us, requires freedom from the blinders imposed upon us by our tradition. Aristotle was among those who were most decisive in forming the tradition. To clear out the cobwebs, to liberate ourselves from the tradition in ourselves, since it is a tradition of thought, requires understanding it. Liberation from the tradition, based on understanding it, is required in order to open ourselves to the broader perspectives that a unified planet requires.

3) There is what can be called the Crisis of Modern Science, of the Modern View of Nature. That is, modern science, the modern

view of nature seems to be unable to make sense of the world of human meaning, of those things which mean most to most human beings: goodness - badness, fairness - unfairness, nobility - baseness, beauty - ugliness, and scientistic social science reports that scientific reason cannot substantiate "value judgements." Instead of rational principles of action guidance for life is abandoned to various forms of unreason, or at best, to principles of expediency. Within Aristotle's view of nature and human nature those distinctions which we find to be most meaningful for our pre-scientific practical lives, distinctions like the distinction between good and bad, make sense. For the sake of supporting a sound view of human life we look to see if perhaps Aristotle's view of nature is not to be altogether discredited.

Under the head of the crisis of modern science there is also the problem of the intelligibility of modern mathematical physics, of understanding what it means, and what its methods presuppose, of understanding how it relates to our fundamental experience. As a sign, but only a sign, of what we refer to, let us consider the classical Greek word for science, epistēmē. Epistēmē does mean science, but it also means knowledge and understanding. Thoughtful students of classical Greek now hesitate before translating epistēmē with the word science, because to us science usually means modern science, preeminently mathematical physics, and this science does not seem to be necessarily accompanied by understanding.

4) Some look to Aristotle with a view to the need for a comprehensive natural philosophy which could make sense out of the separation of modern science from the world of human meaning by

relating both within a unified view of the natural world.[2]

5) We study Plato and Aristotle because we suspect that they may have articulated and clarified more adequately than anyone else the presuppositions and principles of the natural human understanding, that is, pre-scientific or pre-philosophic thinking, that order of understanding with which every man must begin all his thinking, that order of understanding which the different kinds of scientific thinking are necessarily modifications of, that order of understanding of things which is revealed through our discourse about the objects of ordinary experience. That men are compelled to think about things in certain prescribed ways does not establish that the things thought about in themselves are, or are not, as they are thought to be. If we want to avoid dogmatic fideism (the unphilosophical faith that things are just as we experience them) or dogmatic scepticism (the dogma that we know that things in themselves cannot be as we experience them) a much more powerful dogmatism among the learned of our times, we must be open at least to the possibility that the orientation of the natural human understanding and human discourse may be that instrument of learning, understanding and communication employed by what is perhaps the only animal open to the whole and to the essences of things. We turn to Plato and Aristotle for help in exploring this possibility. Aristotle takes human speech very seriously because the meaning of, the implications of, ordinary speech, properly refined, more than anything else, according to him, more, say, than symbolic mathematics, may lead us

2. Cf. e.g., J. A. Weisheipl, Nature and Gravitation, Albertus Magnus Lyceum, River Forest, Ill., 1955.

to the fundamental principles of all things.

The idea of nature has always occupied a, if not the, key position in what we call the Western tradition of thought. Throughout the history of western thought the fundamental issues were argued in terms of oppositions between Nature and something else: Nature and Grace, Nature and Supernature, the natural and the divine; between Nature and Art; between Nature and Convention; between Nature and Freedom; between Nature and Spirit, and between Nature and History.[3]

In fact Aristotle, among others, suggests philosophy and science themselves come into the world with the discovery of nature.[4] There were and still are people who have no distinct idea of nature. The words nature and natural (Greek physis and physikon) do not occur in the Old Testament, or in the Gospels. They occur thirteen times in the letters of the most sophisticated of the New Testament writers, the Apostle Paul, and only in five other places in the New Testament.[5]

Before nature was discovered, when thoughtful men wondered and discoursed about why things are the way they are, they talked about the gods. The theologoi, the mythologoi, preceded the physiologoi. The gods ordered and commanded things to walk or to go in their customary ways. The word way (derek) occurs over 1700 times

3. The last three oppositions presuppose the nature of modern natural science and are connected with the "conquest of nature."

4. This discussion is based primarily on the discussion in Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, (Chicago; 1953), ch.iii.

5. These enumerations are based on Young's Analytical Concordance to the Bible, Eerdmans, (1955).

..n the Old Testament and (hodos) at least 83 times in the New Testament. The gods ordained that fire should burn, clouds give rain, that the earth should bring forth crops, that women should bear children, that some should not eat pig meat and others should not kill cows, that some should bury their dead and that others should burn them, that murderers should be put to death, or that they should pay their victim's relatives at least one ox. The commands of the gods were delivered to the ancestors who were closer to them and transmitted by elders to their offspring by word of mouth or by writt reports. Authority went with age, with nearness to the source of authority.

At a certain point some curious and thoughtful man must have noticed that some things and some ways are always the same no matter what any one does about them, and others vary from time to time and still others would vary from time to time more if men did not make them happen the same way. He begins to become aware of the distinct between the necessary and the accidental, the necessary and the customary, and the necessary and the artificial.

If the same man or one like him were to become a traveler, like Herodotus, he then would also notice how some ways are the same everywhere, for example, fire burns the same way both here and in Persia, and other ways vary from place to place and from tribe to tribe.

What must have been most striking at first, because they most contradict "our way," were the ways that vary from tribe to tribe, the ways that depend most on decisions and opinions of men;

because the opinions men hold about the ways that vary from place to place contradict each other: e.g., the dead must be buried; they must not be buried, but burned. These contradictions lead to even more fundamental contradictory opinions, concerning the very origins of the gods.

From one point of view one learns the truth about such matters by listening obediently to the authoritative voices of the elders, from another one learns the truth by seeing for oneself. Man must always in some matters have made a distinction between hearsay evidence and seeing for oneself. The suspicion begins to arise that what one can see to be everywhere the same is primary, permanent and fundamental and that the other things are secondary, transient and derivative. Further, one sees that man-made things owe their existence to forethought; if the non-man-made things are so different, perhaps they do not owe their existence to forethought. Those things, which are everywhere the same, which do not evidently depend upon decisions of men seem to do what they do by themselves, through some internal power of their own. The man who has become aware of these distinctions begins to distinguish between our way and <u>the</u> way, the way according to nature, that which is right and good in itself because it is in accord with nature and that which is right and good because it has been instituted, legislated or commanded by our authorities.

Therefore, to summarize, on the basis of the distinctions between that which is everywhere the same and that which varies from place to place and from time to time and from tribe to tribe,

between what one can see for oneself and what one hears from authorities, between what seems to grow and move by itself and what depends on decisions and actions of men to come into and remain in being, between our old way and the right way simply,-- on the basis of these distinctions "the primeval notion of custom or way is split up into the notions of 'nature', on the one hand, and 'convention', on the other."[6] Certain men, then, who came to be called philosophers and scientists, begin to think that knowledge of this apparently impersonal necessity, nature, was the one thing most needful.

The distinction between what is good by nature and what is good by law, or by convention, good because it is posited, or laid down, or legislated, becomes crucial for political and ethical philosophy. In Plato's Republic, in the great debate about the nature and worth of justice, despite great disagreements about what is truly good and what truly bad, all the interlocutors share the premise that the good, whatever it may be more specifically, is that which is in accordance with nature, or good by nature. Human conduct, conventions and laws from this point of view are evaluated not in terms of whether they conform or not to divine law, but whether they are in accord with, or against, nature; sin becomes perversion.

Philosophy, from this point of view, becomes the most serious of all human pursuits. But wherever there are philosophers, a class which can include erring philosophers, there seem to arise imitators, or images, of philosophers, men who are aware of the distinction between nature and convention, but who never sufficiently reflect on

6. L. Strauss, op. cit., p. 90.

the reasons for the conventions; who fail to understand how it can be natural for men to live in accordance with conventions. Such men, called sophists or intellectuals, abuse the distinction between nature and convention so as to undermine all conventions, so as to undermine ordinary decency. One permanent task of philosophy, then, understood in this way, the Socratic way, I believe, would be to defend ordinary pre-philosophic practical wisdom from sophistical attack, to prepare, if necessary, a theoretical defence of ordinary decency against sophistical scientism. Furthermore, Plato's dialogues would seem to suggest that where there is "corruption of the youth," sophists produce it, but both sophists and philosophers pay for it. One task of political philosophy then would be to exhonerate philosophy from the opprobrium brought upon it by its imitators.

II

We return to our theme; the connection between man's rationality, his having logos, and his being by nature a political animal. In his discussion of the social and economic preconditions of political life Aristotle refers twice to the Cyclops story in book IX of the Odyssey.[7] The Cyclops story might be thought of as Homer's anticipation of Karl Marx.

> Thence we sailed on, grieved at heart, and we came to the land of the Cyclopes, an overweening and lawless folk, who, trusting in the immortal gods, plant nothing with their hands nor plough; but all these things spring up for them without sowing or ploughing, wheat, and barley, and vines, which bear the rich cluster of wine, and the rain of Zeus gives them increase. Neither assemblies for council have they, nor appointed laws, but they dwell on the peaks of lofty mountains in hollow caves, and each one is lawgiver to his children and his wives,

7. Politics, 1252 b 22 - 23 and 1253 a 5.

and they do not trouble themselves about one another. (ll. 105-115.)[8]

Odysseus not knowing all that yet wants "to go and make trial of those men, to learn whether they are both insolent and wild and not just, or whether they love strangers and are god-fearing in thought." (ll. 174-76.)[9] The Cyclops, Polyphemus was a monstrous man, "who shepherded his flocks alone and afar, and mingled not with others, but lived apart with his heart set on lawlessness." (ll. 187-89.)

Odysseus with twelve of his best comrades enters the Cyclops' cave. He supplicates the Cyclops in the name of Zeus, the god of strangers and guests.

> So I spoke, and he straightway made answer with pitiless heart: 'A fool art thou, stranger, or art come from afar, seeing that thou biddest me either to fear or to shun the gods. For the Cyclopes take no trouble for Zeus, who bears the aegis, nor of the blessed gods, since verily we are better far than they. Nor would I, to shun the wrath of Zeus, spare either thee or thy comrades, unless my own heart should bid me. (ll. 272-78.)

Shortly thereafter, having blocked off the cave exit, the Cyclops kills and eats two of Odysseus' comrades. He makes clear that he intends to do the same to all of them. Odysseus conceives and with the remainder of his men carries out a plan to put out the Cyclops' one eye while he is in a drunken sleep.[10] The Cyclops cries out and calls to all the Cyclops living nearby in their caves. They throng about outside his cave and ask what ails him, whether some man is killing him by guile or by force. Since

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8. A. T. Murray translation revised. Loeb Classical Library.

9. Insolent and wild seems to be balanced against loving strangers and not just against being god-fearing in thought.

10. Consider Euripides' addition to the story, Cyclops, ll. 531-43, 582-4.

Odysseus had told him that his name is Noman, he replies, "Friends, Noman is killing me by guile, not by force." They answer that if no man is doing you violence, perhaps it is Zeus, so pray to our father, Lord Poseidon; and then they leave. Odysseus later contrives his escape from the cave.

The economic needs of the Cyclops are provided for by the gods. Consequently economic pressures do not prod them, as primitive men are usually prodded, into forming larger communities for the sake of mutual aid, cooperation and exchange. Because they are never moved to form a larger society, they never develop any arts or crafts beyond the minimal skills needed for a shepherd's life. They live in caves, not houses, and, Homer specifically mentions, they have no ships, and no men to make ships, so that they might cross the sea and visit the cities of other folk as other men do. But most importantly by never forming cities, poleis, political societies, they never develpp the arts of civilised discourse, the arts of communication.[11] The Cyclops is fooled by a man skilled in the art of using words. Their lack of skill, of art with words makes it impossible for them to cooperate, to aid their fellow in his time of need. Not only are the Cyclops brutal, lawless, and uncultivated, but despite the fact that they owe their material plenty entirely to the gods, they are impious, and, incidentally, conceited. As the Cyclops says we "pay no heed ... to the blessed gods, since truly we are better by far than they." (ll. 275-76.)

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11. One of the most common etymologies of the word communication traces it back to roots meaning sharing a wall, com-moenia, a city-wall.

In his German Ideology Marx gives an all too brief glimpse at his picture of the final communist society, where not the Olympian gods, but machine technology and communist organization will provide everyman with all his economic needs thereby making possible the final freedom, freedom from the division of labor, or division of function, or division of nature itself. It will be "possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I like, without ever becoming a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critic."[12] Homer, on the contrary, suggests: Liberate all men from the pressure and discipline of economic necessity and what you will get is not a new higher, humanly fulfilled breed of man, but a race of Cyclops. In one of the many places where he touches on the relation between economic necessity and the development of man's higher faculties, Aristotle speaks of how the polis, the political community, is the complete community, the community which, after the family and the village, has come to the point of full self-sufficiency: He then says "indeed it has come into being for the sake of life, but it is for the sake of the good life." (1252 b 30.)[13]

12. Die Deutsche Ideologie, B.I.A.I. in Die Frühschriften, Kröner, 1953, p. 361, reading "nach dem" for "auch dds".

13. Homer's treatment in the Cyclops story of the theme of shepherd, on the one hand, versus tiller of the soil and man of the city, on the other, should be contrasted with the Biblical account of Cain and Abel. Cf. Genesis, chap. 4. Cf. Isaac Abravanel, "Commentary on the Bible," in Medieval Political Philosophy, eds. Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi, Free Press, 1963, pp. 255-59. Both points of view are to be found in Plato, Laws, 676 A - 681 D, 781 E - 783 A. On the latter see Leo Strauss, Liberalism Ancient and Modern, Basic Books, 1968, pp. 39-41.

III

Those works of Aristotle called logical received that name because they are, in general, devoted to the understanding, the discipline, and the perfection of *logos*.[14] In the first chapter of *On Interpretation* Aristotle explains that 1) written words are symbols of voiced or spoken words, 2) spoken words are symbols and signs of experiences, or passions, of the soul, that is perceptions, thoughts and sensations, and 3) the experiences of the soul are likenesses of things. The word symbol comes from two Greek words meaning to throw or to put together. Symbols are always made, or put together by men. The first thing Aristotle notes about written and spoken symbols is that they are not the same for all men, whereas the experiences of the soul and the things themselves are the same for all. We need only to think of what happens every time we understand something written or spoken in a foreign language. That sounds referring to the same things differ from tribe to tribe or nation to nation points to the fact that the sounds do not of themselves signify, or refer to, the experiences and things they are signs of, that is, they are not significant, or meaningful, by nature, they are significant by agreement, by compact, by convention. Con-

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14. Thus broadly conceived, the logical works include the Rhetoric and the Poetics. Cf. Alfarabi, The Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, trans. Muhsin Mahdi, Free Press, 1962, pp. 98-99. The ascent from and descent back into the Platonic cave are to be made, according to Alfarabi, by means of the Organon: the ascent, in order, by means of the Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, to the Posterior Analytics; the descent by means of the Topics, Sophistical Refutations, and Rhetoric, down to the Poetics. Cf. William F. Boggess, "Alfarabi and the Rhetoric; The Cave Revisited," Phronesis, Vol. XV, No. 1, 1970, pp. 86-90. See also Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, Magi Books, Albany, 1970, Foreword, pp. 1-3.

trariwise, the experiences of the soul, the perceptions, thoughts and sensations are the same for all and do not depend upon human agreement for their meaning; they refer to what they signify by themselves, not through the mediation of anything else; they are significant, or meaningful, by nature.[15]

Let us analyse the spoken symbol more closely. The medium or material of the symbol is voiced sound, which is produced naturally by man. The peculiar combination, organization and formation of the voiced sounds so as to signify this experience, taking these particular sounds to signify that particular experience, the forming of the material of the symbol depends upon human institution, upon convention. Other sounds could do as well, but once the sounds for a particular conception are agreed upon, once the decision is settled it becomes a mistake to use those sounds another way, to point to something else. Unlike groans of the sick, screams of terror or laughter, speech sounds acquire their signification through

15. Cf. Aristotle: On Interpretation, Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1962, Book I, Lesson II, pp. 23-29. The word symbol as used here and in Aristotle's text with its ultimate referent understood as naturally given should be distinguished from the modern mathematical symbol whose meaning is determined primarily by those rules of method governing the symbol-generating intelligence itself and the systematic context of symbols within which any particular symbol occurs. See Jacob Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra, M.I.T. Press, 1968, esp. chapter 9, pp. 117-25, chap. 11, 6, 2; chap. 12, A and B, pp. 163-178, 192-211. For Vieta "The letter sign designates the intentional object of a 'second intention'..., namely of a concept which itself directly intends another concept and not a [natural] being." The referent of the letter sign, of the symbol "in its merely possible determinateness, is accorded a certain independence which permits it to be the subject of 'calculational' operations." These symbolic formations are treated with the aid of the imagination by the symbol-generating intelligence as directly apprehensible beings "whose merely potential objectivity is understood as an actual objectivity." Klein, ibid. 174-75, 207-08. The way is opened for a symbol-generating intelligence which in a sense "prescribes to nature its [possible] laws" in order to discover laws which would never be "given" to the human understanding by nature itself.

human institution. The impulse to form and to share speech symbols arises naturally among men wherever they are found to exist. This natural impulse to develop the instrumentalities that allow for the communication and sharing of thoughts and feelings, of experience, is perhaps the most decisive of those phenomena that point to man's being by nature a social and political animal. We have returned to the theme with which we began. This natural impulse coupled with the desire for mutual understanding, among other things, points to the ends or functions of the speech symbol: living together, learning together and mutual understanding. In sum, three of the four causes accounting for the symbol are natural, they are the material cause, vocal sound; the efficient cause, the impulse; and the final cause, the end, living and learning together. The formal, or organizing, cause which gives each symbol its distinctive character as a sign is conventional. To generalize: man is required by nature, by his nature as a thoughtful, speaking and political animal to form conventions, the most important of which are those conventions that designate certain definite combinations of sounds as representative or significant of certain definite notions of the mind. Human nature is so constituted as to require the formation of conventions for its fulfillment. The same kind of analysis pointing to the need for the cooperation of nature and convention might be used to clarify Aristotle's view of the polis, of the political community, itself. Nature provides the material, the men, naturally differentiated in their capacities to fulfill their own and each other's needs; nature also provides the efficient cause, the political and social impulses within the men; and the final cause, the good life, the life according to nature. The formal causes, however, the laws and governmental insti-

tutions which arrange, organize and order the men towards the end are supplied by art, the legislator's art, and convention. This, however, as our earlier discussion of distributive justice shows, does not go deep enough. For laws are made by and are reflections of legislators. Who, or what kind of men, are to be legislators and governors is determined by the more fundamental order of distributive justice, the polity, or regime. Hence the ambiguity of "legislator", for he who shapes the opinions, beliefs and sentiments on which the order of distributive justice depends is a legislator in a deeper sense. The more fundamental form of the political community, to the extent that it has a definite form and is not shaped solely by circumstances, is derivative from such a legislative art, an art which it might be said is legislative primarily over logoi.[16]

Let us try to be more precise about the character of those experiences or passions of the soul, which according to the passage we have been analysing, are likenesses and thereby natural signs of things. We are talking about what we are actualizing, what we understand, when we understand, and do not merely hear, what someone is saying. The experiences of the soul, Aristotle says, are the same for all. If we are correct in the assumption that underlies most of our practical discourse, that when we talk to each other we are talking about, or intending to talk about, the same things, there must be something about things which can be the same for all men, that is, according to

16. Consider, for example, what constitutes the unity of the polis in Plato's Republic, 414 b - 415 d. We are ignoring here the distinction between logos and mythos. See Laurence Berns, "Aristotle's Poetics," in Ancients and Moderns, ed. Joseph Cropsey, Basic Books, 1964, pp.77-78 and esp. n. 16 on pp. 85-86; note 1, above; Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des lois, livre XXIX, chap. XIX; and Abraham Lincoln, "Fragment on the Constitution and the Union," 1860 or 1861, in Collected Works, Basler ed., Rutgers University Press, 1953, vol.IV, pp. 168-69.

Aristotle, their intelligible character. What our words signify or point to are the likenesses or actualisations in us of the intelligible characteristics of things. To put it in another way: If there is genuine knowledge of things in themselves, or if we are to avoid talking about what we know of unknowable things in themselves, according to Aristotle, things must have intelligible characteristics which intelligible characteristics or their likenesses can be actualised alike by all well-functioning human intellects.[17] The intelligible, because it can be truly the same in all of us, from this point of view, is the most common, most sharable thing accessible to animate beings. For this reason mutual understanding of the things signified by our words makes the human community a communion more intimate than that of any other animal.[18] More than one romantic novel, or domestic tragedy, not to mention domestic comedy, relies for its effect upon that essentially human awareness that the deepest intimacy can only come from mutual understanding.

17. See Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, (Yale U. Press: 1951), pp. 416-19; and Jacob Klein, "Aristotle, An Introduction," Ancients and Moderns, Cropsey, ed., pp.53-66; and A Commentary on Plato's Meno, U. of N. Carolina, 1965, pp.112-125.

18. Cf. N.E. 1155 a 20, 1170 a 26-b 14.