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The Stand Standing Under Aristotle Is the Word Unheard and Understood

by
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If the lost word is lost, if the spent word is spent
If the unheard, unspoken
Word is unspoken, unheard;
Still is the unspoken word, the Word unheard,
The Word without a word, the Word within
The world and for the world;
And the light shone in darkness and
Against the Word the unstilled world still whirled
About the centre of the silent Word.

O my people, what have I done unto thee.

Where shall the word be found, where will the word
Resound? Not here, there is not enough silence
Not on the sea or on the islands, not
On the mainland, the desert or the rainland,
For those who walk in darkness
Both in the day time and in the night time
The right time and the right place are not here
No place of grace for those who avoid the face
No time to rejoice for those who walk among noise
and deny the voice

"Ash Wednesday'
T. S. Eliot

All parents expect their child to begin speaking and proudly mark the days when the first words or sentences are uttered, however clumsily. Men seem to regard speech both as something natural in the growing child and something good; but parents' judgments are not sufficient proof of its merit - a child is also praised when he adopts their attitudes and prejudices. There is a difference in that we would anticipate the first praise from even the wisest parent.

If we are to become wise, it is the example of the wise that we should follow, seeking to understand it. Our present example is Aristotle, who listened closely to the words of the philosophers and the common men. He drew from them not only the truths in what they said, but also the reflection of those truths in the fact and manner of their speaking. He saw the activity of the logos exercising its influence in everything, from the blooming of the first spring flower to the haggling in the market place.

Let us follow him, translating his speaking into ours, that we may someday come to share his insights about language. We will begin with a broad description of the universe and man's place in it, not because that is most knowable to us, but in order to fix in our minds the general meanings and relations of Aristotle's words. In the second section we will see the unity of what is knowable in the world and what is knowing in man, and the overflowing of its activity into speech. Finally, we will briefly indicate the role of speech as it carries the marks of its origin into the structure of our lives.

I

Being is spoken of in many ways - according to substance and the other categories, as it is true or false, as accidental, and as actual and potential. The categories are figures (schemata), and truth and falsity are the characteristi of relations according to them; they all apply to being in relation to thought, while accidents are only certain kinds of relations among existing things. It is the actual and potential that apply to all things because they are, without qualification. The purely actual is self-sufficient being whose organization is simple, whose activity is unmoving, whose existence is eternal and unchanging. The purely potential would be without organization or activity, yet to become something and with no share in the process of existing, if such a thing were said to 'be'. But the things of this world are neither unchanging nor undifferentiated; they are 'pieces' of the potential with a complementary degree of the actual. Their activity is the tension of the potential which is to be actualized or organized and the actuality it is to be; it is the nature of activity, like motion, to have an end, although should all the activity of this world reach its actuality, the world would cease to exist. Each activity, then, is drawn towards a complete end, but as it reaches it and is becoming actual, it is also relative to its potential and produces more activity. Activity is broken up in space and time; in striving for its wholeness, it repeats itself again and again in both dimensions so it may be everywhere and all the time; it is divided into separate actions so it may do and be everything always. In this way activity as a whole approaches the self-sufficiency of the actual. The identical numerical repetition produces many things of the same kind, species, and each species has a certain organization of activity which is neither simple nor entirely unique. All motion requires a mover who is the same as the moved, has the same organization, so they may 'touch', and who is as well different from the moved so it may impart to it the motion it did not have before.

There are primarily two ways of being organized, to be that which is acted upon or to be that which acts. All matter is organized to be acted on and changed; its actuality is potentiality. A thing may be used as it is to become part of a larger thing (as a brick is in a house) or it may be broken down into the simplest parts that retain organization and reassembled in another way (as food is). All material objects imitate pure potentiality in this way; in respect to the organization they will have, they are now undifferentiated

Having a soul is characteristic of acting or living things; that is, each one has within it its own actuality, a fixed organization towards which its activities are directed as towards their end and rest. Each kind of soul, species, is the organization for activities directed towards a more

complete rest, from which will come more organized activity. The simplest living soul is the nutritive soul in plants; its end or actuality is to make more life. Plants absorb matter and reorganize, actualize, it to be plant, the plant grows larger (is more in space) and produces another plant like itself (is more in time), so that the permanence and self-sufficiency of its soul may come to be in matter. Animals' souls, as well as being organized for nutrition, are organized for sensation, appetite and locomotion. It is through sensation that the first separation can be made between organization and the matter which is organized. Sense organs do not take in the material of a thing as food for the body is taken; they do not break the matter down or change the organization of the things they sense. Instead of eliminating it and replacing it with their own, they absorb it. A sense organ on perceiving an object responds to the activity of the object by being organized in respect to the same medium. If we say that sound is in the form of a certain ratio of vibrations that an object puts into the air, then we would say that the air impresses that same ratio in the matter of the ear; the sensitive soul is now ratio acting in the animal. Sensation is accompanied by pleasure when the perceived object is helpful to the animal, by pain when it is harmful. Comparing the forms in its soul, the animal comes to recognize the similarity in many impressions of one species of object and to identify the object when it is perceived again. It will identify an object the next time, recalling its species as pleasant or painful, and pursue or avoid it accordingly. By being organized in this way, the soul serves to delay pain and death and the return of the animal to less organized matter. The end of the animal soul is to make more existence as it is nutritive and to make and preserve pleasant existence as it is sensitive. The world for animals is not only organized according to the elements of matter, but divided into two larger groups - that which pleases the animal and increases organized life through it, and that which harms, reducing the level of organization. Because an animal can move himself and other objects, he can in a general way arrange the world to suit him by choosing the pleasantest places and caring for them.

There is one distinction to be made among animals, for man has in addition a rational soul. When the ear perceives a sound, the mind perceives the organization of the act of hearing, the organization of the contents of the sensitive soul; knowing the organization, hearing the sound, seeing its source, the man perceives the audible as it is in the sounding object. As rational, the soul contains only the organization of an object and not that aspect of it which has a personal, material relation to him. Comparing the forms in his soul, the man comes to recognize the similarities and dissimilarities of objects as they are for themselves and can identify them when they are perceived again.

Perceiving the activity of objects in the world as organization and matter separate and together and having this same organization active within him, he can imitate it, taking the organization from the forms in his mind and making them

act in his mind or in matter. He can move things according to their own organization so they will best be what they are and will best serve him in their proper ways. In a world of articulated form, the end prescribed by the rational soul, which is form, is that there be more form.

Soul in general then is the actuality, the end for whose sake the body takes in matter and form from the world, so that the actual can be in act and bring the motion of absorption to a rest-point, but only in order that the living thing may return more of that motion to the world.

II

Having made a preliminary identification of man and the world he lives in, we proceed to analyze more closely his distinctive characteristic, the rational soul. We have said that the mind, like the sense organs, is most simply a kind of matter upon which perceived forms are impressed; but it remains to explain precisely what this perceivable and knowable organization of matter is and how the mind deals with it.

Sense perception presents us with "confused masses" (things having been poured together), for we are continuously and simultaneously aware of many objects through each of our senses. We can begin an analysis of them by distinguishing the three aspects of sense perception: each sense is affected by the form of its proper object - sight by color, hearing by sound - but sight also takes in the entirety of the object and is responsible for an awareness of the "common sensibles", those qualities which accompany a thing <u>because</u> it is a perceptible object among other objects, such as motion, magnitude and unity, and thirdly the sensitive soul associates all of these with the object from which they came. Sense perception is of the particular as it has these universal characteristics (visibility, unity, etc.).

The mind perceives the organization of the sensitive soul, the forms left by these universal kinds of activities. Corresponding to the three aspects of sensation are three aspects of mental perception: when a sense perceives, mind perceives the organization of that perceiving, when the sensitive soul associates the perceived qualities with their object, the mind associates the forms with the object, and when the senses perceive the natural concomitants of a sensible object, the mind perceives them as concomitants of a formed object (the organization which is unity rather than unity in a thing). When the mind has been formed by these various separate sense perceptions of qualities which all belonged to one object, it has taken the place of that which

held them together in the object - a particular way of being organized, a particular relation or proportion (logos) of the elements - and the mind has become the logos of the object. Knowledge begins here, with what is most knowable to us, the confused wholes of mental perception.

When this organization is considered in connection with the perceived object, it is the eidos, meaning visual appearance; considered alone, it is the eidos, species. In the original perception of the object, no distinction is made; a piece of metal and a youth's locks are both seen as golden, but the color of the metal is characteristic of it as a species, while the color of the boy's hair is characteristic only of his individual appearance. The latter is an accidental attribute and not a true object of knowledge, for knowledge answers the question, what is it, and strictly speaking, 'it is a blond' is not satisfactory, while to say of a metal that it is golden is part of identifying it and its species. The mind, then, must have a way of distinguishing between the two meanings of form in its perceptions. The distinction is made first by sensation; having taken the perceptible forms within itself, the sensitive soul can compare and contrast them, 'feeling' the sameness in all water, for instance, in a river, puddle, or bowl. But this is sameness whose primary importance to the animal is that water is pleasant to drink. The mind knows itself as the same organization each time it considers water, as an organization that always produces wetness and a tendency to flow in the object, while the waves which may accompany this organization are of indeterminate kinds. Waves are part of the appearance, but wetness and fluidity are necessary characteristics of the species. The mind fixes these qualities, brings them to rest with itself as matter and them as form, and makes for itself an object to be a new source of motion when it is perceived. Then this object which is the species can be compared with other such objects and through the same process of determining the common, necessary characteristics, yet another more general object, a genus, is created.

In a similar manner, the many perceptions which contribute to the perception of a whole object or group of objects can be fixed in the mind; repeated perceptions of waves in water, milk and fields of wheat lead man to treat them as a definite kind of thing, as do repeated experiences of emotions, although they are not instances of a form residing in its own matter, but reside in the matter of the objects to which they are attributed. But where is the assurance that color is not in fact the necessary characteristic and surface only an attribute or that still water is not actually deficient and that waves are not essential to true water? And what indicates that the genus is 'higher' than the species, that plants as having the simplest souls or minerals as unmoving are not to be held in higher esteem than man, whose soul is complex and conflicts with itself and many of whose motions are restless and undirected? The proper question to ask is why - why are color and surface always found together, and why is man so confused while minerals are so certain and composed? Only man will ask this

question, for an animal is not concerned with whether true water must be moving, it only cares that the waves be small enough to let it drink. The answer is to be found in our original description of the universe. Each activity is striving for perfection, for its own sake and for the sake of the whole; some activities can come to a more complete rest than others whose ends are their beginnings. If the hierarchy of ends were known, then of each kind of activity we could say which characteristics are necessary to its ends, and to what extent it exists for the sake of others, contributing little of its own to organizing the whole, and to what extent others exist for its sake and how much of its own is given to the organizing of the whole.

Genera are therefore said to be the causes or principles of a thing's existence; for activities are determined by the actual form that is their end - the species or the end of the species which is the genus and which in turn 'acts' for the sake of higher genera. When a species is securely placed as the result of the last division of the last genus, it is known; its formal and final causes are the genera it belongs to; its efficient cause, its 'parents', are the members of the species reproducing themselves; and its material cause is the elements through which the organization acts. The logos, the knowable relationships within the object, takes on a second, more restricted meaning, being limited to the definitive activities and not all of the perceptible ones.

We have shown how man might come to know the world, but we have not considered how he comes to know himself. He is aware of the activity in his own soul, but for all he can tell about the people he passes on the street, he is the only rational animal in existence and there is no species through which he could be defined in relation to the other species in the world. If man's rationality were a faculty of his body as sensation is, then he could recognize it in other bodies just as other animals identify themselves and the members of their species through sense perceptions; but rationality is hidden somewhere in the center, and a soul that only conversed with itself there in silence would never perceive or be perceived by another rational soul. So man has speech in order that men may know themselves and each other as sharing in a common principle of organization, and he makes particular 'speeches' to express the many different activities of his complex soul in his complex body. To say that man is by nature a rational animal is to say that by nature he is a speaking animal.

There are two bodily functions necessary to animals who vocalize - the ability to produce sound and the ability to hear it - although neither belong to them for the express purpose of speech. For the animal with the ability to move, hearing serves the necessary function of detecting and identifying objects before they are approached so that the pleasant may be pursued and the unpleasant, avoided. Sound

is produced by the impact of air against an object; voice, by air against the 'windpipe' (arteria); but air is inhaled for the sake of the lungs and the heart. An animal must choose to make sound and direct the air against the windpipe to make it. Animals who articulate do so with a tongue whose necessary function is taste and which again must be directed by choice to form definite sounds. Speaking and hearing what is spoken are luxuries, for the sake of the well-being, not the being of the animal.

Voice, then, is primarily undifferentiated sound. Animals, having sensations of pleasure and pain, can determine or control the sounds they produce in a general way to express pleasure and pain - as purring or yelping - and to express the anticipation of either - as growling. Man, having more clearly articulated impressions, can utter more carefully articulated sounds. In the flowing matter of voice he marks out and defines a set of elements or letters, and they are very like proper elements with matter and a simple form of their own. Because voice can be given a construction analogous to that of objects, speech, more than the other faculties of man, can imitate or express these objects. Imitation is natural and pleasant to man, more so than for any other animal; for man has the clearest forms in his mind and the most accurate ability to order forms and so manipulate things according to themselves in order to produce exact or similar copies or to distort. Man takes pleasure in putting these forms into other things, making an activity that was not there in that way before, because he can do it by choice and do it well.

To 'imitate' one thing exactly with a voice is to name it - to point to, symbolize or mean the object - so a name is the first significant part of speech, the first significant combination of letters. But names are significant only by convention and not naturally as the arts are; for an object <u>is</u> in no way the sounds that can be made about it, while a picture is a natural representation because it can share visual characteristics with an object. Names as a species of formed things are made to stand for objects as formed things.

Speech is not limited to imitating objects as they can be pointed to, but can also indicate time and the passage of time. Names which indicate in respect to time are verbs. The basic similarity of names, or nouns, and verbs - which are regarded as being quite distinct, sharing only the category, 'word', in modern grammar books - is the result of the inseparability of an object and its activity, activity that includes, along with its being and being such as it is, its moving, making, acting, doing, etc. Nouns, representing the static characteristics, need not be separated from verbs, representing the moving, anymore than they are in man's perception of an object. It is the function of a sentence (logos) to express both aspects as the unity that they have in the object; this unity is precisely the logos of the object and the logos of man's mind. But even this unity

'is spoken of in many ways', to which there correspond many types of sentences. The concern of the present discussion is the relation of speech to human knowledge and the relation of both to the world, for which purpose we need only consider propositions.

An object has many aspects both in relation to itself and to other objects which are all the activities of its organization and being, and therefore of interest in the study of propositional sentences. They are grouped according to the categories: substance or individual existence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity and passivity. (We are given no explanation of the necessity for this particular arrangement, nor will we attempt to suggest one.)

A proposition is an imitation of these aspects; it names the object and one or more of its aspects. This is known as predicating (kategorein); technically it can mean accusing - in a proposition, a man 'accuses' an object of having some specific aspect. He will be either right or wrong, and the proposition will be either true or false.

The formal structure of language is very general and very simple, although it seems to be sufficient for expressing quite complex ideas; but then there is a sense in which the world is simple, too, being divided into animals, vegetables and minerals, which are also somehow sufficient for a high degree of complexity. There are a limited number of words - verbs for motion, nouns for rest, and conjunctions for making relations - and a limited number of ways they can be combined in a sentence; but the conjunction of things in motion and things at rest seems to exhaust the possibilities (with the exception of pure actuality and potentiality). So the man who can read things into this structure will see the expressions of objects' activities, and the man who speaks can communicate them to the one who listens. Whenever a noun is used, men know that it is indicating an object or something which in being thought of as an object; even if they are unfamiliar with the thing signified, they know that it must have a kind of matter, a form, and a set of characteristic activities; and depending on the case of the noun, men know that it is , for instance, an originator of activity (when it is used in the genitive). The different words in the predicate are similarly revealing: a noun refers to a genus or species (man is an animal) - although we do say the table is three feet long, we mean that the table is an object having a magnitude of three feet; adjectives indicate qualities (the grass is green) or states (the man is armed); and similarly for the other categories. It is this 'formula of knowing' in language that permits man to learn from speech itself.

Man's ability to deal with forms apart from the bodies they organize and apart from the sensible activities of the forms as they affect man personally distinguishes him from the other animals; it reveals itself in his speaking and in his learning from speech, in his knowing and in his learning from what he knows - that is, in the natural reactions of a rational soul to the forms of sense perception (speaking and knowing in a simple sense) and in the continuing process which takes these as its beginnings, as new perceptions to react to (learning). The related states of being knowable, known and knowing are all manifestations of a common principle of organization, of living, acting organization itself, whose aspects appear in different bodies at different times, so that, being separate, they may be in act and come together - the logos of the object that makes it knowable, the logos of the mind that can know, the logos (the 'formula' of each logos or sentence) of speech, and the organization itself, the living logos that is actuality.

We hardly need point out that the rigor and clarity of language and logos, although rational, is not human, for 'human' includes the notion of animal, and as an animal, man's place is to be part of the confusion that man's senses perceive. The first result of this is a certain imprecision in his language and thought which is mistaken from the point of view of the rational mind, perfectly natural for the human, and useful to those who employ language in their craft and art (as do the rhetorician and the poet). Let us consider the human. He can say that the table is three feet long, and in living his life - eating off the table, making it, moving it - he is not concerned with what the table is in itself or the fact that a table is not feet, but matter measured in feet, but only with the characteristics of the table that will affect him personally - whether it will fit between the wall and the bookcase. Although when man is defined as animal and biped instead of animal and rational, we may run the danger of being presented with a plucked chicken by way of example, the shoemaker is only interested in man because he walks and does it on two feet. The human is not living a life without reason, a life of illusion and mistake, that ought to be avoided as far as possible; the man moving his table knows where it belongs and why, the shoemaker has identified the 'essential' characteristics of the species. The human is living his <u>own</u> life and the reasoning that is within his power by nature is directed to the daily events of his own life. His reasoning is practical and he will take short-cuts in his theoretical thinking whenever the longer way is of no use at the moment.

The rhetorician and the poet both address their language to humans, speaking about human activities and for the purpose of evoking human reactions, so they too will employ human imprecision and human short-cuts. They can, for instance, select one characteristic of an object which is outstanding or most noticeable, and equate it with the object - in the statement that grass is green, they can allow the greenness

to stand for all the attributes of the grass and even for other perceptions that are taken in with the sight of green grass. They are using the form of rigorous language to represent the confusion of the perceptions from which it came, and 'green' now comes to stand for freshness, a certain smell, fertility, springtime, and the growth that will follow. Then they apply the adjective with its signifying of one whole to a whole which is similar in the respect they wish to emphasize, and they speak of a beginner or a youth as 'green'. This is imprecise, but it is not without reasoning, in fact, bears a close resemblance to it. It uses the process of comparison which reason makes between forms, although its beginnings are in perceptions, not as general forms, but as they actually occur in individuals; like reason, from a confused whole (a man's life) it separates out the parts (that age which is green), but not parts which are separate and distinct notions (the green age does not stretch from a given day in one year to a given day in another; it has an end, not knowledge, but signifying something to another individual in a way that will interest him.)

There are many ways in which language can be used by and for human beings, but the study of them belongs to a detailed analysis of language itself, not to an attempt to place language in the life of a rational animal. We will only indicate a few. A statement can be made and, instead of supporting it by dull but logical proofs, examples may be given of the occurrence of that or a similar activity in other times or places. Of the many words with overlapping meanings, such as father, teacher, master, ruler and tyrant (which reason will tell us name quite separate activities), one can be used in the place of another to indicate the attitude which is taken by the 'thing being organized' toward 'that which organizes it'; it might be said of a ruler that he was the father of his country in the sense either of generating it through his leadership or being paternal in his rule, and of a teacher, that he is a tyrant in the classroom. In each case, the method is that of reason, although the practice is human. Both the rational and the human manipulation and ordering of forms are evidence of the freedom of man's mind with respect to the physical world he lives in: he may follow its organization far beyond the manifestations, he may arrange it to serve his own purposes, he may please himself with poetry and art, he may play with it, punning and distorting.

III

We have now established first a living, unified cosmos of actual and potential and second a single species that is both human and rational. Let us try to put the species together and return to the unity of our beginning.

Given a particular incident in a man's life - a friend has asked him to keep a gun for him and comes now, in a highly emotional state, wanting it returned, but the man isn't sure he should give it back. If he appeals to pure reason, it might answer that it is in the nature of a thing lent to be returned, without mentioning when or where or the condition of the friend or the fact that the gun is a dangerous weapon; so there must be some other organization in him which will suggest an answer if we are not to conclude that man acts according to chance, while he thinks according to reason. Pure reason begins with the forms of sense perception, analysing, comparing, deducing until it knows form; but man is more than the forms of sense perception, offers the methods of reason more than one starting point. Man is said to have experience; that is, he as one 'confused mass' has an extended and complicated relation with other 'confused masses'; what is experienced as a sort of unity in time and place impresses a sort of unified form in the soul. Experiences can be compared and grouped in 'species' according to similarities in the way the man 'feels', the circumstances that precede or follow, the series of activities involved, etc. Most of the comparisons can not be exact: feelings are usually vague, circumstances rarely repeat themselves twice, and when the activities are identical, the occurrence is either a necessary one or one which is more properly classified as technical skill than experience. Nor do the comparisons always result in truth, for much of a man's experience may be related to his idiosyncrasies. Nonetheless, having identified the experience for himself, the next time he faces it, he feels he can choose how he will act, for he 'knows' what the effects of his actions will be in this case and can choose the ones that will bring about the end he wishes.

We speak of choice because those experiences which do not allow choosing are necessary or forced, two small subdivisions of activity for the species man. Man's ability to choose is also part of his nature; having knowledge, he knows the proper ends of activities in themselves, but as a living thing he desires activities to have their ends in his needs and pleasures. Pure reason can not direct him to abandon all ends but its own, for it would never have the forms of sense perception to begin with were it not for the body which perceives, the body which lives in the world reason thinks about. These activities are performed to serve reason's end as well as their own, as all activity in this world is for the sake of its own end and higher ones. Just as that which knows activities as they are knows their ends and orders them accordingly, that which 'knows' experiences and the ends that can be reached

through them orders them. This latter is practical reason, the organization of the soul, for the sake of the intellect, which a man may choose to refer to in ordering the activities of his life.

Pure reason, in analysing activity, recognizes it as continuous in so far as it is activity in general and divisible in so far as it appears as separate actions uniting their participants. That which is continuous and divisible admits of the more, the less and the equal. In the case of actions, their proper existence depends on a certain equity - there is a proper form for sight, but if the object is too bright for the eye, as when a man has just left a dark room, the activity will not be completed - the participants must strike a balance in relation to each other or the activity will end in distortion or failure. Thus pure reason states that if an activity is to come to its proper end, the participants must complement each other in all of the aspects involved, regulating their activity or having it regulated according to the mean; and practical reason, for the ends of pure reason, determines the mean for each 'species' of experience because it knows its nature and its end, in the general manner which constitutes 'knowledge' of experience. The possibility of ranging between two extremes which belongs to participants in human activity is called state of character (hexis), and that state which is disposed toward the mean of practical reason is virtue. Virtuous activity is accompanied by pleasure, for pleasure is just that 'feeling' which arises when something is done well and reaches its proper end.

Let us return briefly to the man who has been keeping his friend's gun. He now knows that he must act according to a mean, that each part of his entire situation must be seen in its proper perspective: the time, the place, the people and things involved, the degree or extent of activity, the effects all must be considered and given proportional weights in determining the decision. Only the individual who must act can take into account the aspects which are relevant and balance them in order to reach his decision, for it is the nature of a truly voluntary act to have its source completely in the actor. But the man must remember that neither the determination of relevance, nor the balancing, nor the expected end is exact, for that is not in the nature of human life nor should it be wished for there.

The question remains, how is virtue acquired, or even a virtue. We have already suggested its two aspects in coming to our description of it; first there must be the experiences whose perception impresses a form of virtue on the soul, for they will be accompanied by pleasure and the man will desire their repetition and second there must be knowledge of the dictates of practical reason so that the actions will be done for its sake and not for the sake of pleasure alone. In the first case, he must be led into the habit of virtuous

experience, and in the second, he must be persuaded, for persuasion is to the comprehending of every day life as teaching is to knowledge.

The highest moral virtues (for we are not dealing in this discussion with the intellect and its virtues) are those which involve the whole man, for the ends of the whole always stand above and include those of the parts; and one of these is friendship. It is not a relation between people acting together as a necessary means for some other end (as debtor and creditor do) nor for the sake of pleasure, for neither of these reach up to the ends of a rational animal. It is a relation between men because they exercise the human choice which makes 'virtue' a significant word. The virtuous man acts for the sake of his friend, and the friend for his; and they create a miniature cosmos, the man's activities directed toward the good of the friend as their end and that actuality coming to life in the good actions of the friend toward him, so together they contain both activity and living actuality as the cosmos does (that is, self-sufficiently, for any living creature is active and actual). This is one of the ways in which man strives to attain the perfection of human activity.

A man will desire to lead his friend, and his children, to virtue because he is a virtuous man. He will give them examples in his own activity; for his children he will establish the habits of those virtuous activities whose pleasures the young can appreciate, and, with virtuous restraint, always for their own good, punish their mistakes; he will persuade them, convince them with his words, that what they truly desire is virtue and that it is what he describes it as. But the ends of a virtuous man are not limited to himself and those close to him, for his ends are the ends of his species; he will wish all men to be virtuous, and for this purpose, men live in states.

A state is organized for the good of its members; like an individual, it has activities directed toward useful ends, pleasant, and virtuous ones, all ultimately for the sake of the rationality of the species. Its elements are its citizens, who are held together by a logos of common activity and common speech and language. But the state can not lead its citizens to virtue in the same way an individual leads his friends or his children; if it were to speak and act as an individual to each of its citizens, it would be through many minds and mouths and many bodies, and each leader would have a personal relationship with each of those he led. The particulars of their personalities would influence what was said and done; speech and activity give up their logical, knowable form and unity on this level. Instead of a whole, organized according to one form, the state would come to resemble the chance juxtaposition in space and time that is characteristic of matter. So the state has laws, a kind of discourse that lies between the purely rational - which is unaffected by the character of the speaker, the inflection of his voice or his choice of words, and

unaffected by the time or the place it is spoken or the person hearing it - and the human, which aside from its generally rational structure is composed according to just those considerations. Although laws are formulated by particular men and for particular people, they are presented as impersonal documents addressed to the state as an impersonal whole; they are written, having no inflection, and according to a formal style, so the words lose their flexibility; and although they are made of sentences, these are not propositional statements containing truth; although they were made in a definite time, they were made for indefinite generations to follow. So the force of law is greater than that of the individual, and less than that of reason; which is the proper mean for that which rules over human lives.

The species of man is unified again, for the proper balance of the rational and the human is found in the state. Man has created an organization which organizes him; he will act for the good of the state, and the state for his as one of its members. Each having its end in the other, a stabilit is created, a miniature cosmos, self-sufficient because it is good and good because it is self-sufficient.

Now that we have listened to the philosopher who listened to men and heard the world speak through them, we can draw our first conclusions.

All existence is activity caught between the actual and the potential. We have discussed it exclusively as it moves toward the actual, coming to be, one activity for the sake of another - although its passing away is according to the same form and just as much for the sake of ends - because the actual is its source and its goal, while passing away is its falling short. Following the continuous progress of the actual once more, we might say: a plant grows for its own sake until it reaches the size determined by its logos (and our interest is in the plant), being able to progress no farther alone, it reproduces for the sake of the species (our interest turns to the species), and the plant dies and decays in order to reappear later when its matter is eaten by another plant or animal (our interest is in the animal); the animal grows and seeks pleasure for its own sake, reproduces for the sake of the species, and continues maintaining itself (our interest turns to the part of its life which continues longer than is necessary to the species); man eats, harnesses or tames many of these animals during their 'extra' life, easing the burdens of his own life in order that he may extend and enrich its 'extra' activities (our interest has abandoned the animal's decaying corpse). In this leisure he obtains, man performs the activities that are uniquely human. Reason is the formal and final cause of this 'extra' life, for it is that in virtue of which he has

mastery over the world he lives in and that for the sake of which he lives.

Language is part of his leisure, his freedom from physical necessity. More than any object in the world, it feeds his mind, works in his harness to obtain what he needs or desires, and is tamed for his pleasure. Language is also part of man himself, the reflection of his soul through his physical body, revealing man to himself; and language is a reflection of the world through man's soul. Man, knowing language, sees the things whose reflection it is - himself and the world - united in it. Out of man, by language, is the miniature cosmos of the state, where man may best satisfy his needing, his wanting, and his wondering.

In every step the logos manifests itself, from the limiting of the plant to the freeing of the man. We began this study by noting that men praise children for bringing forth speech, but perhaps they would be wiser to praise the logos for having brought forth the child.

Coda

For pure reason the world is simple and known.
For pure common sense or instinct, it is simple and natural.
In between, it is complex and mishandled.

Common sense knows that cleanliness is next to godliness.
Reason knows why God is clean.
In between, we have to decide each day when to take a shower.

Who Is So Blind As my Servant?

Who is so blind as my servant,
so deaf as the messenger I send?
Who is so blind as my envoy,
so deaf as the servant of the Lord?

Isaiah

by Sarah Harrison

INTRODUCTION: A Note on Language

Paradoxes are made possible by language, but the very stresses that make paradoxes possible would, it seems, weaken the usefulness of language as a tool for finding the truth. For the fact that all men use the same sounds to express their reactions to certain experiences is a most persuasive argument for the correlation between what men think they perceive and what is in fact there to be perceived. If the word is the same to all men, so the argument goes, does it not give us enough evidence to say that the thought is the same, and if the thought is the same, is that not good enough evidence to say that the thing experienced is likely to be common. In fact it is often stated that if things are not as they seem to be, it would be useless to talk about them, for we would be unable to communicate anything. Now if we let paradox into this tight little system, does it not destroy it? But it is also true that men do not always use the same word to refer to what they consider to be the same thing; nor do they always "mean the same things" by the words that they use. And so it happens that different meanings arise for one word and that different words come to have the same meaning. When the speaker (or writer) does not make clear which of the several meanings he intends, the result is confusion; but when he uses several meanings simultaneously and consciously, paradox is the result.

So it must be noted that paradox is not just a species of confusion, because it is not in the ear of the listener alone. The author must have meant to express some sort of multi-layered meaning. Nor is it a species of surprise, the result of the author's putting in a different meaning than the listener expects in that particular context. For example, to say that those who mourn are happy is not paradoxical if all that is meant is that those who are presently mourning will at some future time be happy. In that case, the author has merely surprised the reader by intending, by the word "happiness", a future, and presumably

greater happiness, which he contrasts with a passing sorrow. On the contrary, the person who meant that statement to be a paradox would have to mean that those who mourn are happy under the same circumstances that they are sorrowful. (Perhaps that the cause of their sorrow was also the cause of their happiness.) But, applying the same argument used above in reference to the relevance of human thought to the universe, if such statements exist and if they have understandable meanings, what does this say about the nature of the universe?

Christianity is based on a whole series of paradoxes, of which the most paradoxical is perhaps the most basic - that God, the Creator and Ruler of the universe became man, a descendant of fallen Adam. Not a demi-god like Herakles, half man and half god; but all man and at the same time completely god. But not content with this supreme paradox, Christianity asks us to accept another - that having done so, He died, and not just any death, but that of a criminal, even though He was the most innocent of men (indeed the only innocent man). Christ's teachings are almost as full of paradox as His life - what does it mean that the last shall be first, etc.? With this kind of background it is not surprising that St. Paul makes so great a use of paradox in his writings. So extensive a use, in fact, that I can hardly hope to cover all of them; but I do hope to be able to shed some light on the problems posed by paradox in the discussion that follows.

"For God's foolishness is wiser than human wisdom, and God's weakness is stronger than human strength . . .the wisdom of this world is foolishness to God."[1] There are any number of questions posed by this statement. One of the most obvious assumptions to make is that this is merely a blanket indictment of reason - that man can never come to know God through the use of his reason since God is infinitely wise and His wisdom is so far surpassing that of man that it might as well, as far as man is concerned, be of an entirely different realm. But there are several objections to this view, if this is indeed St. Paul's point. From where does man get his reason if not from his likeness to God? If man can never understand God through his reason, how then is God the source of all truth, some of which obviously can be discovered by man's reason? Even more difficult to understand is how one is to interpret St. John's description of Christ as the Word of God, if the wisdom of God (which must be in some way tied up with His Word) is completely unfathomable to His creatures? What then is the relationship between man and Christ supposed to be? What has happened to the God-man; He seems to have been torn apart.

If St. Paul is simply dismissing reason as useless, or less than useless, does he not then imply that it might be detrimental to man in his search for God? But how can this

be if reason was given to man by God; if it was given uniquely to him it ought to be helpful in his unique search. No, while his view was related to this, I hope to show that it was slightly more complicated, and fraught with fewer objections.

First, it must be remembered that Adam fell, and when he fell he became subject to temptation from all sides. The gifts given him by God for his happiness became drawbacks if uninformed by God's subsequent gift of salvation. In the same way, man's reason in its present state is a drawback if uninformed by God's gift of faith (which may be what St. Paul means by God's foolishness). Consequently, when Christ redeemed man He restored his reason to its proper state. But the reason "of the world" is still unredeemed, and therefore still unwise. So St. Paul says, "But we have a wisdom to offer those who have reached maturity."[2] There is a wisdom that is other than of the world, one that is compatible with God's foolishness.

That Paul means the unsaved world when he speaks of the "world" in this context is clear from his other Epistles. In his letter to the Ephesians, he says, "For it is not against human enemies that we have to struggle, but against the Sovereignties and the Powers who originate in the darkness of the world"; and speaks of man before Christ as being "as good as slaves to the elemental principles of the world" in Galatians.[3] The word that is translated as "world" in these passages is αἰών , the same word used in the above-quoted passage on the "wisdom of the world". Αἰών originally meant one's life or the period thereof, and from there it naturally came to refer to an age of the world, or a long period of time (as it does in the English word eon); but in the New Testament it has two meanings: forever; or a world that has built into it a transitory character, world in the sense of a present αἰών to be contrasted with the αἰών to come. A picture is presented quite clearly by these quotations of a world in the process of passing away; it has been under the influence of powers of evil for most of its history, but the coming of Christ has defeated those powers and brought a new world into being, for the followers of Christ have died to the old world through Christ's crucifixion and have been born into this new world, in which they are not the slaves of a corrupt order, but heirs of the new world of Christ's kingship (the kingdom of heaven of the Gospels).

> But God, who is rich in mercy out of the great love with which he loved us, even when we were dead through our trespasses, made us alive together with Christ, and raised us up with him, and made us sit with him in the heavenly places with Christ Jesus . . .so then . . .you are fellow citizens with the saints and members of the household of God, built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Christ Jesus himself being the cornerstone.[4]

Now the rulers of this world are passing away and the heirs of the new have a wisdom that they have never known, "for if they had, they never would have crucified the Lord of glory!"; if they had not been under the sway of evil, men would have recognized Him. Their own wisdom was the end of their world, the end of the kingdom of evil, for in Christ's death men were freed from their slavery to sin. "For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set me free from the law of sin and death."[5] Now this is quite a paradox in its own right. The world's wisdom is indeed wise in the word and yet it brought about the destruction of that world.

But is the old world completely vanquished? In his second letter to the Corinthians, Paul tells them that they "will gladly bear with fools being wise". Since, in their wisdom they have suffered so many fools, they will surely allow one more, himself, to speak. Why is he a fool? Because, he says, he boasts, and yet still he does boast, nor is he without irony in calling them wise. No, they are wise because they have accepted the picture of the triumphant Christ as I have painted it; accepted it and celebrated it, while he has immersed himself in the old world of sin. But their acceptance hints of smugness; it is a picture easy to interpret smugly. It would be pleasant to think that your salvation meant that you had been whisked away into a new world in which sin held no attraction to you. It is all too likely that the Corinthians had fallen into this pleasant trap and that Paul is, in this passage, trying to extract them. He is a fool, because he acts as if this happy world that he has told them about did not exist, and yet his foolishness is God's foolishness, wiser than the wisdom of men. For to say that Christ has freed us is, strangely enough, not to say that we are free. It is as though we had literally been imprisoned, and the door had been unlocked - we are free to leave or to remain imprisoned, but the cell is so homey that we might never leave. Freedom is a frightening thing and the familiar sins are a comfort of sorts. But here we are, left with a paradox worse than the one that we have "explained" in some manner. The follower of Christ must believe that the "form of this world is passing away" and yet he must be like Paul and fight it as though it were in no danger of even being diminished, let alone dealt a death-blow. For "the last enemy to be destroyed is death",[6] and sin is a type of death. He must "deal with the world as if he had no dealings with it".[7]

To summarize: when man was created his intellect was such that it allowed him direct conversation with God, but when he fell he became damaged in some manner by the knowledge of good and evil. In this state, man continued for some time, but always God gives to some individuals what all men had once been capable of - the knowledge of "His ways". Then God sent His Son to redeem man, that is to extend to men the possibility of regaining their previous state. With that redemption, man's bondage to sin is no more; the one act of

Christ's death has saved all men, yet it is an act that must be enacted in each man. So man's intellect is reinstated, but the intellect of each individual is still imperfect and God must work with each individual, even though the human race has been saved. Because of this dichotomy, Paul advocates a dichotomy of action - of dealing with the world as if one had no dealings with it.

This dichotomy is caused by the fact that God exists outside of time and man in time. Consequently, God can act, and His action is at once "now" and "forever". Christ can redeem man in an instant and man's redemption can still be a continuing process, to be worked out in each man. Because any such action - one that involves both God and man, must exist on both of these levels (must be both in time and outside of it), any such action will be paradoxical to a being whose life is on only one of them and whose knowledge is not all-encompassing. Both levels will exist in full force, they are not mixed, in the sense that they join and produce a third level, but they are both present; the mind of God and the mind of man meet, but both retain their autonomy.

But how are the Corinthians to escape the trap that they have fallen into? Again Paul supplies the answer - "But we", he says, "preach Christ crucified".[8] They have accepted their redemption while ignoring the instrument by which it was brought about. It is the Christ that was crucified who has saved them, but they prefer to separate Him into parts and remember only the triumphant Christ. This was a mistake - "it behooves us to glory in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ".[9] They must not forget that Christ died for sins, that salvation was effected neither pleasantly nor easily. And as He did, so must the Corinthians; they must die to their sins as He died for them in order to rise with Him. God "has exalted the humble and put down the mighty from their thrones";[10] in order to be exalted, one must become humble, as did Christ. It is no coincidence that the solution that Paul proposes for the Corinthians' problem lies in what is perhaps the central paradox of Christianity: that of Christ's death.

This is a motif that runs through all the Old and New Testaments - that of God exalting the humble, and from Paul's point of view, it reaches its culmination in Christ. The story of Israel can be seen as a series of humblings and subsequent exaltations - the Chosen People are taken out of Egypt where they have been oppressed, they become proud and rebel from God, who causes them to wander in the desert for forty years; thus humbled they are led into their land, where they again become proud and are led into captivity a second time; again they cry out to the Lord, who again delivers them. The same thing has happened to all mankind - in Adam all men rebelled against God, but when they are humbled He will deliver them. This time, however, with a difference -

He delivers them before they are humbled. In other words, Christ died before all men had humbled themselves; but here we must remember that God is outside of time and therefore for Him an action, even an action at a specific time, is eternal; and also, we must remember that each man must humble himself before this salvation can apply to him. He must, indeed, humble himself in the way that Christ did. In short, in order to share in Christ's glory, the Christian must share in His process of humility.

> Have this mind among yourselves, which you have in Christ Jesus, who though He was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men. And being found in human form, He humbled Himself and became obedient unto death, even death on a cross. Therefore God has highly exalted Him and bestowed on Him the name which is above every name.[11]

But is it possible to share in this particular humility? This is the problem involved: Christ humbled Himself in becoming man, He emptied Himself of His Godhood and became a servant. Now the servant part ought not to be difficult in theory (although there are enough problems with it in practice). But precisely how can man humble himself in the way that Christ did? His very humility comes from the fact that He is God as well as man, and was God before He was man. If He were only man, there would be no problem in imitating His humility; but what is it that man can empty himself of that would allow him to imitate the humility of God?

God's glory makes Him God, that is, it is His very exaltation above us that makes us worship Him. All the other attributes that contribute to our awe are results of His glory: His power, the fact that He created us, et cetera. Now what is it that makes man what he is; what does he have that is comparable to the Glory of God? There are two things that contribute to man's humanity - his reason and his will; and both of these he must give up in one way or another. He submits his reason to God's wisdom when he makes the act of faith that causes him to seek for God. It is his will that he still retains and that we are interested in at this point. It is man's will that led him away from God in the beginning, the discovery that he could exercise his will other than in accordance with that of God; and it was his will that, as he discovered this, enslaved him. And, in true Pauline fashion, it is the submission of his will to God's that gives him freedom. It is in his emptying himself of will that he imitates Christ, and this is at once an act of humility and one of freedom. In reuniting his will with God, man regains his lost freedom, because God's is the only completely free will in the universe. It is by this method that man can find "the mind that you have in Christ Jesus". And it is for this reason that the last shall be first and that the meek and the

persecuted are happy, because they are imitating Christ in His suffering and therefore also in His glory.

As Paul says:

> It was to shame the wise that God chose what is foolish by human reckoning, and to shame what is strong that He chose what is weak by human reckoning; those that the world thinks common and contemptible are the ones that God has chosen - those who are nothing at all in order to show up those who are everything.[12]

For no man is everything, and man must know it before he can come to the realization that he needs God, he must be shamed into it, or else he will, naturally enough, never take the first step out of his cage. But with the "shame", with the realization that he is not everything comes, also because of Christ, the realization that this is his salvation, for the Lord hears those who call on Him. When he accepts the cross, he also receives the glory; but what the Corinthians have done is to try to take the glory without the cross, and that is impossible. And so, because they think themselves wise, they must become foolish.

But once a man has become foolish, with what does he meet God, that is to say, with what does he grasp the paradoxe implicit in his relationship with God? Not with reason, because in order for reason to function, it must already have premises. (Which is why proofs of the existance of God are quite convincing to people who already believe in God and not at all convincing to those who don't - the premises that have to be accepted already imply the existence of some sort of God; as did, for example, St. Anselm's.) But to say that God cannot be found through reason is not to say that man cannot find God. Reason is a tool: once we have made assumptions, we can use it, but not before. Now these assumptions together with the use we make of them through reason, we call reality. Neither alone is of much use. But what allows us to make these necessary assumptions? When we have found that, I think that we will have found what it is that allows us to accept faith, and with it, to accept paradox.

First, why are the two - faith and paradox - so closely related? Because of the problem of communication that I noted earlier. God is outside of time, and man within. In order for man to have faith, he must be able to accept paradox; first the paradox inherent in his temporal separation from God and then the other paradoxes that serve to make God's actions incomprehensible on any but His own terms, which are the terms of faith. The example that I gave above will serve to illustrate this. The redemption is both an action taking place at a particular time, in a certain place, and an action (if a thing taking place eternally can even be called an action) that is only operable in the individual man, and that

only if he makes it so. To put it in the most paradoxical terms possible - Christ redeemed man and yet man is still liable to damnation. This is explainable because of the "time gap", as is Paul's attitude toward the old and the new worlds. So it is necessary to accept paradox in order to have faith, and yet it is that faith that makes the paradoxes palatable. Paradox allows us to build a bridge between the two planes - the timeless plane of God and the temporal plane that we live in; and faith crosses the bridge, to allow us to see both sides. The metaphor can be carried even further, but it raises two questions. Who builds the bridge, and out of what materials?

The second question first: and to answer it we have to go back to the paragraph before this. Man makes assumptions, and he applies to them a reasoning process and comes up with conclusions. What makes him think that his conclusions have any relevance to the world? A type of faith in him, as a rational creature, that tells him that if his assumptions are correct and his reasoning without error, then his conclusions are indeed true; not merely valid within an arbitrary system, but true in the world in which he lives. This is not so easy a step to take - there is no reason to think that the world is as reasonable as we are; why should we think to discover anything about the universe? We could be twisting a completely irrational universe into our little mold. But in order to keep our reason (in more ways than one) we give ourselves over to this faith in the rationality of the "outside" world. So there must be in our intellect another faculty, not completely separate, but different from reason, that allows us to have faith in this reason. Is there any reason why this faith should not be related in some way to the faith that allows us to accept God? But if the faith is within us, now is it a gift from God? The "Faith" that is within us is actually closer to a lack that was at one time (before the Fall) filled, leaving us with a predisposition to accept faith, which we receive from God. So we have answered also the first question - who builds the bridge - ultimately God, who has given us the ability to have faith, and even when Adam turned away from Him, left him with a recollection, a niche that only He could fill.

What is the purpose of paradox in this system? It is unsatisfying to our reason, but it is quite satisfying to this other thing in the intellect. It serves to remind us of our lack, by expressing a truth that is beyond reason. "Tell me, where does wisdom come from, where is understanding to be found? The road to it is still unknown to man, not to be found in the land of the living . . .God alone has traced its path and found out where it lives", says one of Job's comforters. And paradox serves to remind us of this. We realize that what it says is true, but also that it is true in a way that we could not understand if we were completely reasonable. We appreciate it without quite knowing why; and by reminding us, it brings us to the realization that, as it also says in Job - "Wisdom? It is fear of the Lord. Understanding, avoidance of evil."

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Notes

[1]The First Letter of St. Paul to the Corinthians, Chapter 1, verses 25,26 (Jer.)

[2]First Corinthians 2, v. 6 (Oxf.)

[3]Ephesians 6, V. 12; Galatians 4, v. 3 (Oxf.)

[4]Ephesians, chapter 2, v. 4-6, 19-21 (Oxf.)

[5]Romans, chapter 8, v. 2 (Actually this is taken out of context, for Paul makes it quite clear that the Law of Moses is hardly of the kingdom of evil.) (Oxf.)

[6]Corinthians, chapter 15, v. 26 (Oxf.)

[7]First Corinthians, chapter 7, v. 31 (Oxf.)

[8]First Corinthians, chapter 1, v. 23 (Oxf.)

[9]Galatians, chapter 6, v. 14 (Jer.)

[10]Luke, chapter 1, verse 52 (Jer.)

[11]Phillipians, chapter 5, v. 5-9 (Jer.)

[12]Corinthians, chapter 1, v. 27-29 (Oxf.)

[13]Job, chapter 28, v. 12-14, 22, 28 (Jer.)

Who Was the Serpent?

by Melanie Sollog

Introduction

Throughout history man has been preoccupied with his fallen or limited nature, trying to explain why, and especially to what degree he is affected. Luther, at one extreme, thinks that nothing man can do by himself is good in any way. Calvin also presents this view, although with some rather fuzzy reservations designed more to preserve God's justice than to redeem human nature. On the other hand Plato, and to a greater extent Aristotle, divide the soul into various conflicting parts, some better than others. In this way they allow man some rectitude, while admitting the difficulty of rising above the passions and appetites. No matter what the school, or philosophy, or era, one thought seems universally accepted: man is not perfect.

But it will not be the aim of this paper to explore pre- or extra- Judeao-Christian tradition as to the reason for this corruption or infirmity. Plotinus would be a good reference for those who might decry this limit. The scope of this paper could not contain such a multitude of first principles as would be necessary if we divided our attention between the Bible and all the other world views presented in philosophy. Therefore we will devote our complete attention to the account given by the Bible of the first man and the first sin, attempting to answer only one basic question: What caused Adam to sin?

In order to prevent complete chaos, several other questions will have to be answered also. Some notion of God's nature, a description of the first man before his fall, and a definition of sin should be provided. But in order to proceed to the main problem with some facility the prior questions will not be dwelt upon. Indeed, some of them have answers which are generally given and accepted by the major theologians from Augustine on. This, of course, would not normally be proof of or justification for these answers. The fact that 'everyone is saying it' does not require a thinking individual to immediately believe it. But for the purpose of this paper such evidence ought to be sufficient. Hence it should not be wondered at if no more than cursory attention is given to generally accepted doctrine or dogma of the church. After all, the primary problem here is also one which remains within the boundaries of Judeao-Christian tradition. Therefore what will follow in the first several sections of this paper ought to be regarded in the same way which one regards Euclid's definitions or common notions. They will be assumed for the purpose of argument.

The method used in these first sections is that of question and answer and there are several reasons for this. The primary one is that of clarity and expedition. The question is set out, the answer proposed and briefly discussed, an extremely uncluttered, precise procedure, especially since most of the answers are assumed from venerable authority when they seem to agree. When they disagree violently, or else had little to say, the question was dealt with using scripture and the Whore Reason. Another justification for using this method is fo follow, in some way, Augustine, when he says that scripture may have a variety on interpretations, all true. Presenting a question to the motley throng of Christians and exploring briefly their differences can be of assistance when trying to extract an answer of sorts from the mountain of Christian verbiage.

A third reason is that these answers are merely assumed for the discussion in section IV. No pretence is made that the answers given here are the 'right' ones, except insofar as incomplete faith and faulty reason might dictate. It is therefore preferable to present the questions and answers as such, so that it may be absolutely clear what is assumed in the answers. In the last section there is only one main question. However, since it is to be more discussed than answered, it is treated as a problem. Hence the formal question and answer method is abandoned and a more in a sense relaxed approach adopted.

However, it is to be remembered that the main question throughout, and not only in the last section, no matter what wording of it is being used at the moment, is:

Who was the serpent?

I

The first group of questions concern themselves with the nature of God as Creator.

1. Whether God created everything that exists?

I answer that, God indeed created everything that exists.

The Bible says that, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form and void."[1] Augustine claims that nothing spiritual or corporeal exists except by virtue of the fact that God gave it being.[2] Aquinas, in Questions 44 and 45 of Book I, deals with this question at his usual length. His conclusion is very similar to Augustine's, namely that "all beings other than God are not their own being, but are beings by participation.' Luther and Calvin also concur in the belief that God created all things. It can easily be seen that this is a necessary

conclusion, given an omnipotent God. For if there existed something which was not created by Him, it would have originated in itself. This would be absurd in the light of God's omnipotence, for we should have to maintain the contradictory position that God did not have dominion over all things. Therefore, God created everything that exists.

2. Whether everything that exists is good?

I answer that, everything that exists is good.

The consensus of opinion here is also in the affirmative, namely that everything that exists, and thus necessarily created by God, is good. This presupposes of course that God is absolute goodness, but that follows upon His omnipotence. In other words, when a being has absolute and complete power over all other existing things, then anything this being does is perforce good. Otherwise we have another absurdity consisting of an omnipotent being subject to higher laws of morality. But let us refer to Aquinas. In Q. 6, art. 4, he says:

> It is absolutely true that there is something first which is essentially being and essentially good, which we call God . . . Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary, effective and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the likeness of the divine good belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good.[4]

Augustine simply says that everything that is is good. This is also corroborated by the two major non-Roman theologians.

3. Whether God could create anything that is not good?

I answer that, God could not create anything that is not good.

Is this not obvious? The mere fact that God created would necessitate goodness. However, Anselm has an interesting discussion of this, specifically as regarding God's power to do so. On the surface it would seem that to deny God the ability to create something that is not good would entail denying Him omnipotence. It is the old sophistry about making a stone so big that He could not lift it. Anselm, on the other hand, rejects this.

> For he who is capable of these things (that is, corruption, falsehood, and so on) is capable of what is not for his good, and of what he ought not to do; and the more capable of them he is, the more power have adversity and perversity against him; and the less has he himself against these.
>
> He, then, who is thus capable is so not by power, but by impotence. For he is not said to be able because

he is able of himself, but because his impotence gives something else power over him.[5]

This may not be entirely clear, although it is an intriguin point of view. Another aspect which may shed more light involves jumping ahead to the nature of evil. Let that be assumed as an absence or lack, which will be shown in more detail later. Then it follows that God would not create anything that is not good in itself. This can be shown by using the same argument adduced in the previous question. To create something partaking of the nature of evil, or not-good, that is, lacking something, there would have to be a corresponding lack in the Creator, which is absurd. All things were created perfect, in accordance with the perfect plan in the mind of God. We are not saying that all things were created equal with God - for that is patently false. The perfection we are speaking of is that by which a created thing exists or acts in perfect harmony with its end, the will of God. At any rate, there are several arguments to support that which will now be admitted as given in order to proceed. God could not create anything that was not good.

This means that everything that existed in the Garden of Eden was created by God - man, everything in him, the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, and the subtle serpent itself. Also, everything existing in the Garden was good, conditionally including the serpent, depending on what he is taken to represent. For example, if he is Satan in disguise, then he represents that which is evil; but this will be dealt with later. Here the intent is to show that, however sin or evil got into the Garden, God neither created it nor put it there.

And so we have obtained an idea of God as the all-good Creator of all things. Let us therefore move on to the next section and set up some definitions concerning the nature of man, as originally created, before his fall.

II

In the following discussion of man, we must be very careful to set out the type of man to be dealt with. Man, as normally thought of, connotes the fallen creature, with his fomes and concupiscence. That is not the topic here. It would be senseless to present man's fallen nature as the given situation, from which to derive the reason for his fall. Therefore, in the following questions, we will consider man only as first created.

1. What, in man, was created in God's image?

I answer that, man's free will was so created.

Both Aquinas and Augustine agree that the intellectual capacities of man are that which is in God's image. Referring to Aquinas in the act of quoting Augustine will indicate precisely what they mean by intellect. "(On the contrary) Augustine says that memory, understanding and will are one mind."[6] I must admit that this is very strange to me. The intellectual powers of man, excepting will, are so completely entwined with time that it is difficult to see how they can image God. Reason is a series of steps in time. Memory implies the past. Understanding, insofar as it is intuitive, could perhaps be seen as instantaneous, and therefore out of time, although it is usually the result of reason. It seems to me that only insofar as man differs from all created beings by having intellect, and as man was created in the image of God, which can be said of nothing else, are the two necessarily relatable. My preference is to place all of intellect except will in the category of the formal nature of man. In other words, simply because God intended man to be a reasonable creature, and thus capable of will, was man created with intellect. This would leave will to account for the image of God, a much more palatable view, since God is will, and man's will, taken by itself, is in a sense out of time. Dante propounds this when he has Beatrice say:

> The greatest gift of God's largesse, when He
> Created all, most prized by Him, and best,
> As most akin to His own quality,
>
> Was the will's freedom, crown of all the rest,
> Whereof all creatures made intelligent,
> They all, they only, were and are possessed.[7]

Hence it is in the intellect, and especially in the will, and most specifically in free will as being the image of God's will which is of necessity free, that we find the image of God in man.

2. Whether man was created perfect?

I answer that, man was created perfect.

The answer to this question is to be found in the first section of this paper. Man was created perfect with reference to his end, as were all created things. This perfection of course includes his free will.

3. What is man's purpose or end?

I answer that, the glory of God is the end of all creation, including man.

This question can also be stated another way. For what reason was man given free will? The only possible explanation, the only humanly comprehensible one which does not completely reduce God to human terms, is that everything in creation

exists for the glory of God. All these things are present as manifestations of His glory and goodness and power. And all exist for the further purpose of making the invisible of God visible to man. Since man is different from anything else in creation, it is reasonable to seek for a different purpose. But basically it is the same as all other created things, since man also is a creation. But man has a choice. Therefore man can choose to turn towards God and thereby glorify Him in greater measure than things unable to do anything else but give glory to God. Or he can turn away. It must be remembered at this point that we are now speaking purely of unfallen man, a man who was capable of giving himself to God purely out of love by his free will, and that that was his purpose or end. Whether man is capable of that now, without the aid of grace, is an open question which shall not be considered here.

Now we have established that man was in a state of perfection as created by God. His free will was, in the beginning, united as it should be with God.

III

Before speaklng of man in the act of falling, it will be helpful to enter into a discussion on the nature of evil and sin. This will serve to indicate exactly what is meant by 'The Fall.'

1. What is the nature of sin?

I answer that, sin is anything which causes a separation from God.

The Bible is relatively consistent in regarding the effect of sin as a separation from God. To quote a representative passage, Isaiah 59:2 reads "But your iniquities have made a separation between you and your God." Paul says in Romans 14:2 that "whatever does not proceed from faith is sin." Now faith is a dependence on God. Therefore if something does not proceed from a dependence on God, it must proceed from dependence on something else, which implies separation. Thus we may conclude that anything which causes a separation from God is sin. Aquinas, as usual, has an extraordinarily definitive discussion of the subject, and since he is expounding on Augustine's view, I will reproduce the pertinent paragraph.

> I answer that, as was shown above, sin is nothing else than an evil human act. Now an act is human because it is voluntary . . . whether it be voluntary, as being elicited by the will, e.g., to will or to

> choose, or as being commanded by the will, e.g., the exterior actions of speech or operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due measure. Now the conformity of measure in a thing depends on a rule, from which, if that thing depart, it is without measure. But there are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz., the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz., the eternal law, which is God's reason, so to speak. Accordingly, Augustine includes two things in the definition of sin: one pertaining to the substance of a human act, and which is, as it were, the matter of sin, when he says, 'word, deed or desire;' the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, 'contrary to the eternal law.'[8]

This also means that whatever does not proceed from faith - obedience to the eternal law - is a sin, and therefore causing a separation.

2. Whether evil exists?

I answer that, evil, in a certain sense, does exist.

This might seem a superfluous question, but if the first section of this paper is called to mind, one will realize that evil could not possibly exist for two reasons. First, everything that exists is good because everything that exists was created by God. Second, God could not create anything that was not good. Yet still there is such a thing as evil, something in this world that is not good. Where did it come from? Some have posited an uncreated evil, namely which exists previous to God, or at least which came into existence independently of God. This is also impossible given our hypothesis of an omnipotent God. So it would seem that evil is not anything. Which is exactly how we must look at it. Aquinas says that evil is the lack of something, or the privation of something, where the thing lacked is normally present or due.[9] Therefore, it would be evil if a man lacked hands, since hands are natural and due to that man. He also says that actions are always directed toward some good, but that direction toward a particular good does not necessitate eventual direction to the final good, or God. Hence an action can be evil because it lacks direction to the final good. Again, the presence of a particular good may prevent the presence of the final good, that is, the particular good causes privation of the final one. Augustine also holds this opinion if we look at Book IV of the Confessions. "The good things which you love are all from God, but they are good and sweet only as long as they are used to do His will. They will rightly turn bitter if God is spurned and the things that come from Him are wrongly loved."[10]

The question of how evil comes about will be dealt with in the last section of this paper. From the above we can see that evil does indeed exist, although in a negative sense. But if God created everything perfect, how could this lack or misdirection come about? That involves the free will of man, and only that; for even today, nothing but man is evil according to its purpose.

3. Whether God created evil?

I answer that, God did not create evil.

Does God do anything to engender evil? In one sense, God could indeed be viewed as the creator of evil, or sin, for He created the purpose for each creature, to deviate from which is wrong. This is what is meant when the Bible says that before the law there was no sin. But, in James 1:13, we find, "For God cannot be tempted with evil and He Himself tempts no one." And Luther describes how God works with both good and evil, but does not anywhere create new evil.[11] When God created everything as a manifestation of His own glory, and man with a free will as a further manifestation, He created nothing that was evil. This leads directly to the next question.

4. Whether the possibility of evil was necessitated by man's purpose and the greater glory for which he was destined?

I answer that, the possibility of evil was necessitated.

In other words, did God leave the door open for evil, so that His glory might be greater? This is probably true. Man was given free will, which implies choice, so that by choosing correctly, God might be exalted. That is why there was a prohibition placed on one act while man still lived in the Garden of Eden. What an empty thing free will would be if there were nothing to choose between. Therefore, to permit man to choose good, he must have been able not to choose it, and there would be no way for him to manifest this choice if everything in the Garden were within his reach. So inherent in man's purpose, which is to freely unite himself with God, is the possibility of not doing so, which is evil. But is man capable of separating himself from God? Does God have to withdraw? Must there be a possibility of sin in order that man might separate himself from God? One wonders if, in the absence of any restrictions, man could have effected the separation. Would he have been able to rebel in his heart? Given his rational nature, could he have been so irrational as to deny the absolute goodness and plenty of his surroundings by saying "It is not enough. I want to be God, not merely like Him and united with Him," when for all intents and purposes he was? Or was the prohibition needed to indicate to man his position of obedience? But these speculations, while interesting, do not help in answering the main question, simply because they

posit a situation which did not exist. In order to avoid complete chaos, we must remain within the bounds presented to us, namely man in the Garden disobeying the one commandment given to him. At any rate we can see from the above discussion that free will necessitated the possibility of evil or sin.

Therefore, in Eden, the sin of man caused a definite separation from God. Man was literally cast out of the Garden. Before that evil was not present, because the only things present were put there by God; but in the free will of man a possibility of evil was posited.

IV

And so the question finally presents itself: who was the serpent? As the scene opens we find man, the image of God, in the Garden surrounded by all the good things which God has created. God has created him of dust but He breathed life into his nostrils. Man was given dominion over all things in creation and a helper fit for him, namely his wife, Eve. And he was given a command. "You may freely eat of every tree of the garden; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die."[12] "And the man and his wife were both naked, and were not ashamed."[13] So, for an unspecified length of time they dwelt contented in the garden. Until one day the most subtle of God's creatures came to Eve and told her that if she ate of the forbidden tree she would not die but become like God, knowing good and evil. "So when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eye, and that it was to be desired to make one wise, she took of its fruit and ate; and she also gave some to her husband and he ate."[14]

What was this subtle creature? There are two possibilities. Either the serpent was an influence outside of man, which tradition names Satan, or he was something within the nature of man itself. The first consideration is more easily dealt with. It merely has to be said that Satan, an evil intelligence or fallen angel or what have you, came to man and opened up to him the favorable(?) possibilities that could result if man used his free will. Man obviously found it alluring to be like God, to find out something he did not know. It could simply have been curiosity on man's part. (From now on I will lump Adam and Eve together, seeing that they both did sin, after all.) Another possibility, linked with curiosity, is a desire to test God. The serpent outrightly states that God didn't mean it when He said man would die. This is the only falsehood uttered by the serpent, although, if it was Satan,

he might have known about the salvation of man through Christ, which knowledge would have made his statement at least partially true. But that is neither here nor there. However, given the existence of Satan, a further problem presents itself, namely how Satan became evil. And since, I believe, the answer to that question will be identical to the answer to the second possibility, it would be more fruitful to abandon the above speculations and pursue the notion of rebellion arising, perhaps spontaneously, in man himself.

From now on the serpent will be considered a metaphor for the intellect of man. This is to me much more believable than the idea of Satan. For example, one would think that a man who knew enough to name all the creatures of the earth would not be tricked into disobedience so easily. It seems clear that, even if Satan did exist, man was predisposed to believe him. I think that man knew very well that he was forbidden to eat of the tree, and also had some idea why not. But it was, of man's own choice, the wrong idea. I think the real nature of the fruit of that tree was not intellectual knowledge, but knowledge in the other sense in which it is used in the Bible. God meant, that if one ate of the tree one became acquainted with good and evil by actual experience, simply because, if one ate, one had committed a sin, that is, had actual contact with evil. This is borne out by the text. It is not said that man immediately became omniscient, or even that he knew everything that was good and evil. The Bible says that they knew they were naked. The only knowledge that man gained from the sin was that he was guilty and ought to be ashamed. He obviously did not become aware of good in any real sense because the next actions he takes are also sins. He is ashamed of his nakedness. He lies to God. He tries to slough off the blame onto his wife, who tries to shove it onto the serpent, claiming that he beguiled her, stole her senses from her. What kind of knowledge of good and evil is this? Besides, if man really did obtain the promised knowledge, of what use was the law of Moses to be? Supposedly man already knew what was right and what was wrong.

However, it is hard to think that man could really have had such a mistaken idea about the nature of the fruit. It would almost appear that God had misled him, which is impossible I think we have to say here again that man wanted to think of the tree in that way, just as he wanted to believe Satan, if Satan is posited. Man was determined to sin. But why? The two most likely reasons are a desire to be like God or a desire to test God or both. And how were these desires possible in a very good creation of an all-good God? Simply because man was given the gift of free will so that he might proffer even greater glory to God. But man, because he had an intellect and thus might look at himself as well as the rest of creation, was tempted into self-glorification rather than the opposite. He wanted to be as God. However, before

this is elaborated, a general survey of major opinions on this subject might be helpful.

Calvin presents a confusing picture of the 'heinous crime' of Adam. He says that it stems from pride, disobedience, arrogance, infidelity, and a host of other evil attributes which make it appear as if he viewed unfallen man with just about the same venom as he viewed fallen man. Calvin here seems to doubt the goodness of God's creation.[15]

Aquinas is very difficult to pin down on this point, but he does make a few statements in the Reply to Obj. 2, Q. 89, art. 4. He is talking about mortal and venial sin, but in the discussion he accidentally, as it were, gives the following view.

> This vainglory, which preceeded man's downfall, was his first mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceeded his first downfall into the outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in man, by the desire to make the experiment, and in the woman by doubt, for she gave way to vainglory merely through hearing the serpent mention the precept, as though she refused to be held in check by the precept.[16]

Augustine comes very close to my own opinion when he speaks of this matter in The City of God. He says that God created the will good, but the evil will came as a sort of falling away from the works of God to its own works.[17] If he had just gone that one step further, he could have given a reason for this, namely the intellect as a whole. But instead he goes into an involved discourse in which he says that Eve was deceived by the serpent but Adam was not. According to Augustine, Adam sinned out of affection for Eve and because he did not want to be alone. This is an unfortunate direction for Augustine to take, even if he does revert to the former opinion in a later section when he says that the soul becomes an end to itself; the devil succeeded only because man had begun to live for himself.

Luther says that unbelief is the sole cause of sin, including the occurrence in the Garden of Eden.[18]

From the above it can be seen that common ground is found among all these learned minds. In all cases is sin seen as the cause of sin, and in no case does any one of them seem interested any further in the matter, although Aquinas and Augustine come very close to completely explaining it. Perhaps Calvin is right and there are certain things reserved only to the secret recesses of God. But it is hard to think of this topic as such a thing. It did involve a man acting by and within himself, and it ought to be within man's power to come to some conclusion. My suggestion is the notion I described earlier, that is, man as an intellectual being, was able to look at himself, and thus was capable of self-aggrandisement.

Perhaps it happened this way, and I shall express it in the form of a likely story, since anything more positive would be presumptuous.

Man sat in the Garden. He looked at the trees and the animals and said, "God has given all these things into my dominion. Glory be to God." Then he looked at himself and said, "God has made me along with everything else, but especially in his image. This means that I am in my own dominion. Glory be to God." Then he looked at the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. He said, "Wait a minute. If God gave everything including myself into my dominion, how could He venture to forbid me to eat of this tree? What am I? Am I or am I not in God's image? If I am, well then, glory also be to me." And ate the fruit of the tree and died.

Who then is the serpent? It is man's own intellect, the most subtle of God's creatures. This is not to say that man's intellect is evil. That would be meaningless contradiction. It is only to say that man's ability to think and speculate about himself, coupled with his free will to act on his speculations, acted however innocently, to lead him to forsake God and devote himself to his own end. Are not your thoughts oftentimes beguiling, even as Adam's were?

NOTES

[1]The Bible, Revised Standard Version, Genesis 1:1

[2]Confessions, St. Augustine, (Penguin Books, London, 1961), p.312

[3]Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Book I, q. 44, art. 1

[4]Ibid., Book I, q. 6, art. 4

[5]Anselm, Proslogium, (Open Court Publishing Company, Lasalle, Ill., 1962), p. 12

[6]Aquinas, Book I, q. 79, art. 6

[7]Dante, Paradiso, Canto V, l. 19-24

[8]Aquinas, I-II, q. 71, art. 6

[9]Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Chapter II

[10]Augustine, p. 82

[11]Luther, Selections From His Writings, Dillenberger, (Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1961), p. 192

[12]The Bible, Genesis 2:16,17

[13]Ibid., Genesis 2:25

[14]Ibid., Genesis 3:6

[15]Calvin, Institutes, (Grand Rapids, Mich., Grand Rapids Book Manufacturers, 1966), Vol. I, p.213

[16]Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, p. 89, art. 4

[17]Augustine, The City of God (Brittannica Great Books Edition) Book XIV, Ch. 11, 12, 13

[18]Luther, p. 22

A Criticism of Plato's Political Philosophy

by George Henry Elias

Although it may prove difficult to ascribe merely a standar of utility to any other study which men consider a part of philosophy, it would be literally idiotic to judge political philosophy, understood as the science for the achievement of the just for man, by any other criterion. Such a standard is, of course, not intended to be a mean one, it is only that I do believe that the worth of any man's thought to be in its at least potential applicability to our problems - wherever they lie and whenever they occur.

To say that in his political writings Plato fails absolutel by this measure would clearly be wrong, perhaps to the same degree as maintaining that he must and will remain unexcelled in them. It is much less clear, however, as to the value which can be derived from him. Moreover, this general problem is obscured by two ancillae: Even if Plato has profoundly misconceived and misinterpreted the nature of politics, we are still served by this very profundity, for to understand and to refute him we must think just as deeply. In addition, the position is held by some that Plato, through Socrates,* frequently exaggerated in order to clarify and to bold-face.

Nevertheless, and these latter two qualifications notwithstanding, I say that Plato's answer to the problem of securing justice for man, as examplified in the Gorgias and the Republic constitutes an abandonment of it. I say that beginning with a concern for the justice of the entirety, his final statements are most notable for the lack of such a feeling, implied or otherwise. I say that because of his conclusions regarding the importance of life and the relation of man and his reason to the physical, Plato has misdirected the whole of his political philosophy, thereby depriving it of even potential applicability to the problem of attaining justice for even a part of humanity in our own day or any man's: the value of Plato's philosophy lies only in its stimulation. The true Platonic Statesman is an ultimately ineffective political entity, for he seeks justice alone, whose worth in comparison to other statesmen seeking justice for all can only be minor.

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* It is not one of the purposes of this paper to examine the relationship between Plato and Socrates; I only wish to criticize the body of work which we call "Platonic." Whether this work came from Socrates or Plato I am indifferent; I am not questioning its possible origin but its possible effect.

The relationship of Plato to the politics of his times is an important one for it is his reaction from it which to a large extent determined the course of the remainder of his life, orienting it to that of a teacher rather than that of a politician, to that of a philosopher rather than that of an active man of affairs. Plato writes in the Seventh Letter that in his youth he "cherished like many another the hope of entering upon a political career" just as soon as he came of age. (324e) At the time when the group which in history is known as the "Thirty" took power, the opportunity did arise and Plato was invited to join them ("assuming my fitness for the task," he writes), some of the Thirty happening to be relatives and acquaintances of his.

But the machinations of the Thirty soon revolted him, making the former government "look in comparison like an age of gold." (324d) Among their many maneuvers to consolidate their power, and that which undoubtedly appeared to Plato the most vile, was an attempt to connect Socrates with their government by forcing him to help bring a citizen to his execution. Plato's reaction is best expressed in his own words, "I withdrew in disgust from the abuses of those days." (325a)

It is difficult to give the precise reasons for the actions of any man and especially in trying to explain the motive of one entering politics. He may be moved by a desire for gain - either of money, of distinction or of power - or, and much, much more rarely, he may be moved by a genuine desire to aid people, generally or particularly. In the case of Plato, I believe, from what we know of his life and of his writings, his motive was surely the latter; moreover, we can be certain what form his aid would take - justice. He himself writes in this vein when describing his anticipation of the actions of the Thirty: "I cherished the belief that they would lead the city from an unjust life, as it were, to habits of justice." (324d) In other words, it is plain that Plato viewed politics as an instrument for achieving justice and he first entered that profession with the express purpose of securing it for the greatest number of people as would fall within his range.

After Plato left the government of the Thirty his life was still characterized, of course, by a desire for justice, but to an ever diminishing extent, outside of politics. The more he considered matters, the more difficult it appeared to him to administer a government correctly.

> The result was that I, who had at first been full of eagerness for a public career, as I gazed upon the whirlpool of public life and saw the incessant movement of shifting currents, at last felt dizzy, and, while I did not cease to consider means of improving this particular situation and indeed of reforming the whole constitution, yet, in regard to action, I kept waiting for favorable moments, and finally saw clearly in regard to all states now existing that without exception their system of government is bad. (325d)

And so, finding politics, or the structure ("their system of government") in which it operated inadequate for providing justice, Plato turned to teaching and philosophy. The direct result therefore of Plato's not perceiving any way in the existing order of things to secure justice in any degree was his adoption of philosophy. He continues in the same passage, "Hence I was forced to say in praise of the correct philosophy that it affords a vantage point from which we can discern in all cases what is just for communities and for individuals." (326b)

Plato's initial reaction to his first experience in politics - the withdrawal - can hardly be criticized. Unfortunately, a pattern of withdrawal became symptomatic of his entire political philosophy; and much more seriously, the withdrawal was accompanied by a constricting sense of justice. Having begun with an undoubtedly deep sympathy for the general, Plato finished with a prescription for the individual. It is the task of this paper to demonstrate that Plato failed to offer a satisfactory solution to the main problem of political philosophy - that of achieving justice on this earth. And that furthermore, even if Plato's principle contribution to political philosophy is considered to be his delineation of the ideal, he still fails in that he does not elucidate the relation of these ideals to their corruptions, thereby reducing any potential disciples to practical impotence.

The body of the Republic, Plato's most influential political writing, arises out of one of the most crucial questions of political philosophy. Implicit in the quest for justice is the assumption that it is desirable; and it is just this assumption which Adimantus and Glaucon eloquently attack in Book II, asking Socrates whether the just man, not the unjust man, is truly the happy man. A measure of the completeness of their case is the fact that Socrates is unable to resort to his usual means of refutation - pointing out the internal contradictions in the arguments of his interlocutor Socrates replies that he would be delighted to discuss such an important question but wonders if the relation between the just and the unjust man may be more easily discernable in something bigger. "Perhaps there would be more justice in the larger object," he says, "Let us first look for its quality in states and then only examine it in the individual." (368e) This is the origin of Plato's state in which strife and factionalism are eliminated and a stable order provided so that its inhabitants may achieve the greatest good for themselves.

To quarrel and to find fault with an opus of the magnitude of the Republic can be a much less rewarding labor than would be a straightforward attempt to appreciate it. Possibly it is a trait of any great work that it has many different meanings for many different people. And it is therefore no surprise that this is also true of the

Republic. Although it may have begun as a political treatise or even have been intended to be just that, it certainly would be a misrepresentation and diminution of its quality to have its worth stand or fall on that category alone. The Divided Line and the analogy of the Cave are just two examples of extrapolitical sections in the Republic; even though these may of course also be of great significance to a political scientist, their great relevance to other men is undeniable.

But it is the contention of this paper that construed narrowly as an exposition in political philosophy the value of the Republic is misleading if not limited. The first criticism is of the ambiguity of Socrates' answer to the original question of Adimantus and Glaucon. Socrates, in his demonstration that the unjust man is much less happy than the just man, unrealistically conceives the unjust man to be unjust in toto. The difficulty of such a reply is subtle. On the one hand, it will be unconvincing to the man who merely wishes to commit occasional injustices - in the sense of sacrificing a vague general interest to his own definite, particular interest - and is aware that from his own experience he is better off for having done them (i.e., his added material comfort substantially outweighs any mental discomfort). On the other hand, and much more seriously, if a man is completely convinced by Plato's arguments, which supposedly deal with the incompatibility of injustice and happiness, he will be at best unsure and at worst hamstrung as a statesman having to deal with practical political problems which frequently require permitting present injustice for the sake of future justice. Moreover, Plato maintains and enforces this ambiguity in the Gorgias, making it more difficult for the statesman who is interested in achieving justice for most men to accept Plato's philosophy.

At one point in the Gorgias Plato lays down a standard of improvement by which to measure all statesmen. First, Socrates interrogates Callicles,

> . . .since you are just beginning to enter public life and invite me also and reproach one for not doing so, shall we not examine each other and ask, Come now, has Callicles ever yet improved any of the citizens? (515)

From this Plato expands the argument and Socrates asks if Callicles can name any of the orators of old "from the time of whose first appearance to address the public, the citizens, who had previously been worse, are said to have been improved?" (520b, italics mine). And finally, when Callicles is unable to put forth any Athenian Statesman of her Golden Age who can meet this test (Themistocles, Pericles, et al.), Socrates makes a declaration which is the epitome of Platonic political philosophy, a statement which is the philosophic equivalent of the young Plato's "withdrawal in disgust" from the welter of Athenian politics: "I think that I am one of very few Athenians, not to say the only one, engaged in the true political

art, and that of the men of today I alone practice statesmanship." (521d, italics mine)

And so in Platonic political philosophy a man who disdains participation - and at one of those critical eras when a polity most needs men of great ability - becomes the only one to practice statesmanship. This is naturally not to criticize Socrates in that he was assuredly more effective in helping establish justice in the role of a teacher; but it is extremely censurable to hold that he was the only true statesman. The foundation of this statement is the conviction that it is the task of the statesman to improve the citizens. But even here it would seem that Plato is still begging the question, for the establishment of justice must be the prior responsibility of the statesman. The first problem of the statesman is to provide the necessary conditions for the improvement of the citizens - the maintenance of order, the opportunity for education, etc.; in a word, justice; and then, only after the achievement of justice, is the task of improving men practicable. The statesman must first work to provide the environment in which education may take place before he can even attempt education itself. Again, in an attempt to find the applicable in Plato we discover that he has set up an impossible standard (in that the posterior, improvement, cannot exist until the prior, justice, does), awarded the title of "Statesman" to somebody who will not even try to establish justice in general in his polis and passed over some who at least provided a degree of it.

Plato's complete withdrawal from political philosophy is in the Republic. Assuming that the establishment of justice in this world is the central concern of political philosophers, it is here in which Plato finally denies its realization. Plato's created city in which justice is to exist becomes "a pattern laid up in heaven" and "it makes no difference whether it . . .ever come into being." (IX, 592b) It makes no difference whether political philosophy has utility, no difference. Furthermore, he writes, "Until philosophers are kings or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy . . .cities will never rest from their evils." Is not this an abandonment of the question? It is as foolish as saying there will be justice when men become just? Is Plato merely wishing one section of humanity to be just? Is this what Plato's answer has come down to - the wistfully wishing a part to have a trait which the whole lacks?

The main criticism therefore of Plato's political philosophy is that he ultimately leaves the problem of the achievement of justice unsolved. Because of his fundamental beliefs concerning life and man's relation to the physical he chose to solve the political problem under the more general aegis of philosophy. We may conjecture that this happened because Plato first began

to contemplate philosophy itself before he turned to consideration of a part of it. This is not an unreasonable assumption for it is hardly surprising that a man should examine life in its entirety before he examines a particular of it. In a very real sense then the foundations on which he constructed his political philosophy predetermined its conclusion. If a statesman's primary concern is justice on this earth, the implication of this concern is a love of life in all its aspects or at least a basic belief in its importance. And it is this very assumption which Plato firmly disavowals in the Phaedo. To him happiness is only obtained after death. The problem of a rational man "consists precisely in the freeing and separation of soul from body." (67d) Life, simply defined as the temporary union of the soul and the physical, is an "unwelcome association"; "true philosophers /i.e., those most able to achieve happiness_/ make dying their profession." (67e)

> If at its release the soul is pure and carries with it no contamination of the body because it has never willingly associated with it in life . . .then it departs to that place which is like itself, invisible, divine, immortal and wise, where, on its arrival, happiness awaits it . . . . (80e, italics mine)

Is it such a wonder then if a man who abhors life neglects a question which is essential to any sort of happiness on earth? After all, if happiness may only be gained after death, does it really make any difference if the just state is merely "a pattern laid up in heaven"? It is plain therefore that the reason for the difficulty in applying Plato to our own problems in political life is precisely because Plato did not intend his political philosophy to be used as such. For him the central problem of political philosophy is not the establishment of justice, but merely the discovery of means to separate the soul from the physical. Because the solution of no earthly problem can result in happiness, any problem is irrelevant to the task of freeing the soul from the body.

The fundamental difficulties involved in applying Platonic philosophy to the everyday problems of securing justice become most apparent when examined in the context of the life of a statesman who has embraced completely Plato's philosophy. Such a life is that of Dion of Syracuse whose principle concern throughout his political career was the freeing of his native city from the oppression of a tyranny and the establishment of justice within it - exactly what I have maintained should be the principle concern of political philosophers.

Indeed, Dion is an excellent subject on whom to test with rigor the use of Plato's political theories, both in terms of politics and of philosophy. He seems to have been made to be the archtypal philosopher-king. Politically, he was the brother of one of the two wives of Dionysius I who first established the tyranny in Sicily in the fourth century, B.C. But, as Plutarch relates, Dion at first only "found an

honourable reception for his sister's sake; but his own worth and parts soon procured him a nearer place in his brother-in-law's affection." (1156) Dion was a man of exceptional political talent and soon became one of the ruler's most trusted and most powerful advisors. Dionysius I's opinion of Dion's "worth and parts" is well illustrated by the freedom which he granted him: not only did Dionysius order his treasurer to advance Dion any amount of money he demanded from the public coffers, but also Dion was the only man who "durst speak boldly what he thought." (1157) These privileges were allowed by a man whose trust in others was so slight that he permitted no one, not even relatives, to come into his presence until they had stripped naked and been examined by guards. When Dionysius I's son and namesake assumed power upon his death, Dion easily maintained his former position, despite his being the oldest representative of the interests of a rival claimant to the tyranny of Syracuse. At the first council Dionysius II held "Dion discoursed so well of the present state of affairs that he made all the rest appear in their politics but children, and in their votes rather slaves than counsellors." (1158)

Dion's philosophical credentials are even more impressive. Studying under no less an eminent teacher than Plato himself, he adopted and began practicing his philosophy at an early age and in spite of an environment in which, as Plato writes, most men avoided all industry "except such as is devoted to banquets and drinking bouts and painstaking attention to the gratification of lust." (Seventh Letter, 426d) Plato writes that Dion "was very quick of apprehension and especially so in regard to my instruction." Plato further praises him, reporting that he responded to his teaching "more keenly and more enthusiastically than any other man I ever met." (327) Furthermore, Plato comments on Dion's excellence as a subject for testing his ideas. "I set before him in theory my ideals for mankind and advised him to make them effective in practice." (327) On still another passage in the Seventh Letter Plato explicitly names Dion "the man who intended to make justice effective." (335c)

Nonetheless, it is the argument of this paper that despite Dion's many advantages of birth, character, talent and teaching, he was an ultimately ineffective political entity, for he sought justice alone. Moreover, it is maintained that the major mistakes of his political career - those which occurred crucially in his valiant but disastrous attempt to secure justice for the citizens of his land - were the direct result of his instruction in Platonic philosophy. In much plainer words, I say that Dion's adoption of the ideals of Platonic philosophy - although they may have, controvertibly, led him originally to make the trial - ultimately prevented him from realizing that justice. Plato, though he delineated the ideal, reduced his disciple to practical impotence.

Dion's attempt to establish justice in Syracuse took place in two distinct stages. The first stage was purely Platonic and during it Dion enjoyed Plato's full aid and blessing. This plan for securing justice for the people of Syracuse envisioned the improvement of the young Dionysius by instruction in philosophy; after making him a philosopher-king, justice would follow. The second stage, of which Plato strongly disapproved, was a military expedition led by Dion to free Syracuse by force, evict Dionysius and establish justice. Except for the ridding of Sicily of Dionysius both devices were complete failures.

Upon the assumption of the tyranny by Dionysius II, Dion hoped that the young man, more susceptible to teaching than his father, might be influenced by philosophy to halt the incessant debauchery of the court of Syracuse and work for justice, as he himself had done. Dion felt, as Plato writes, that if Dionysius were to do this, "the result for him and for the rest of the Syracusans would be the attainment of a life beyond all calculation blessed." (327c) For this reason Dion asked Plato to leave Athens and try to put his ideas into practice. If Plato were successful with Dionysius, Dion "had great hopes of creating, without bloodshed or slaughter . . .a happy and genuine way of living throughout the land." (327d)

The success of this venture depended on one person - Dionysius. Plutarch says that Dion supposed that Dionysius' dissipated life was the result of "ignorance and want of education." (1159) It is just this deficiency which Plato and Dion endeavored to correct, and it is here that they failed. Dionysius proved to be impervious to any sort of learning and Plato left in disgust. He was induced, however to make one more attempt, after hearing reports that Dionysius had become "marvellously devoted to philosophy." (338b) But once again Plato failed; this time also Dion was expelled and his property confiscated. Therefore, the possibilities of the method exhausted, Dion resolved more drastic action; he would conquer Sicily by force.

Taken as a whole Dion's action was in complete contradiction to everything Plato had taught him. Instead of suffering injustice he took it upon himself to commit it. We can take it as a measure of how far he was pushed that he was forced to abandon the very principles on which his entire life had been based in order to accomplish something he knew was right. When the moment for decision arrived Dion put his first belief - the establishment of justice - over the teachings of his master, although his entire thinking must have militated against it. But Plato displayed no such inconsistency. When the time came to choose between the possible freeing of a people by a virtuous man and the establishing of justice, on one hand, and, on the other, an untainted life of solitary justice, he unhesitatingly chose the latter, with no regrets.

> If he /the wise man/ thinks that the constitution of his city is imperfect, he should say so, unless such action will either be useless or will lead to his own death, but he must not apply force to his fatherland by revolutionary methods. When it is impossible to make the constitution perfect except by sentencing men to exile and death, he must refrain from actions and pray for the best for himself and for his city." (331d, italics mine)

When words are no longer efficacious and improvement thereby impossible, the wise, "Platonic" man maintains his judicial sterility by having recourse to prayer. Plato is unable to condone the necessity of committing injustice in order to prevent a greater one. The then-present sufferings of the Syracusan people at the hands of a wastrel tyrant were hardly sufficient to cause the philosopher to mar his singular sense of justice. This statement is a concise abstract of all the difficulties inherent in Plato's political philosophy. Within the compass of a few words Plato denies the need for relative justice, maintains the use of words and reason as the sole means for achieving desirable ends and prohibits the use of compulsion and injustice by the wise man in pursuit of justice. We can imagine the perplexity of a man like Dion when confronted with a choice like this one. We can only admire the depth of his feeling for people and his desire for justice. The unfortunate point, however, was that although he abandoned Plato in this larger object, he still tried to apply him within it, for the source of all his errors during the subsequent campaign was his refraining from actions of sentencing men to exile and death, even when by doing so it would have become more possible to perfect the constitution of the state and alleviate the sufferings of some people.

The entirety of Dion's campaign in Sicily is marked by poor judgement; in many cases it was only Dion's extraordinary eptitude which saved situations which he himself had created. From the beginning Dion had everything in his favor. Plutarch says that in his exile his agents reported to him that Syracuse with "lift-up hands implored his help, and with open arms was ready to receive him." (1166)

> There was but one mind and one wish or prayer among them all /the citizens of Syracuse/, that Dion, would undertake the design, and come, though without either navy, men, horse, or arms, that he would simply put himself aboard any ship, against Dionysius. (1166)

And to compound his good fortune he was able to land in a friendly port in Sicily while Dionysius was away in Italy. Even the report of Dion's arrival was delayed. He marched triumphantly across Sicily, gathering men and supplies continuously. Upon his entrance into Syracuse he

was greeted by the most important men of the city clad only in white; and soon after the populace spontaneously turned on all who were of Dionysius's party. The Syracusans celebrated Dion's coming as "the solemn entrance, after an absence of forty-eight years, of liberty and popular government." (1170)

Dion's subsequent blunders, which reversed this situation, arise out of two areas. Firstly, fostered by his instruction in Platonism, Dion still had a particular and aoristic sense of justice, having singularly failed to develop a greater sense both in terms of time and people, and was therefore unable to permit momentary acts of injustice which would have led to greater justice. Secondly, Dion had an amazing blind spot in regard to one of the most elementary concepts in the mechanics of governing, a concept which Plato in his writings either ignores or regards as an implication. Dion had apparently no conception of the necessity of establishing a foundation of power in the preliminary steps toward founding a state, just or otherwise. In one way it is not unusual for it is a carry-over of Plato's insistence on words and reason as the prime mover of men. But it is nonetheless strange, for many lesser men, in terms of both experience and ability, have clearly recognized its necessity. This lack of insight may be explained by Dion's close adherence to the doctrines of Plato. (In fact, Plato writes in the Seventh Letter of what Dion would have done, had he been successful. One of the points is that Dion would have "brought the citizens under discipline by instituting an appropriate and ideal system of laws," a point which is consistently Platonic but manifestly impractical.)

After Dion arrived in Syracuse the remaining supporters of Dionysius withdrew into the citadel of the city, and the problem of the people and their leaders became one of siege and dislodgement. While they remained, however, the danger of incursions from the fort was continually present and the city lived in a state of uneasy restlessness. As should have been expected, the people soon lost their feeling of massive gratitude for Dion and began to suspect him, as they do of most men not readily inclined to their wishes, of usurpation. Heraclides, whom Plutarch describes as a man "of no constant purpose, of a fickle temper, and least of all to be relied upon when he had to act with a colleague in any honourable command," (1172) understanding that the foundation for the rule of any government is power and perceiving that Dion was laying no such basis, realized that because of this the power, in this case, resided with the people. He therefore courted and won them (1172-1173), leaving Dion alone except for his small band of mercenaries and his political ability, which the severity of the occasion demanded Heraclides to use. "Heraclides openly professed the highest respect for Dion, and made him great acknowledgments for this favour /his appointment as Admiral/, attending him with all deference, as ready to receive his commands; but underhand he kept up his dealings with the populace." (1173) Heraclides' control of the people grew

so great that despite the fact that Dionysius escaped by sea through Heraclides' obvious negligence, he was not only able to persuade the people to refuse to pay Dion's mercenaries but also to convince them to elect a new generalissimo in place of Dion.

Dion's confusion of immediate justice and final justice reached absurd heights when he hesitated greatly to protect even his person against a mob of citizens when leaving the city after having been relieved of his command. Even Plutarch takes no notice of the ludicrousness of his dilemma, "Here Dion was in a great strait, being necessitated either to fight against his own countrymen or tamely suffer himself and his faithful soldiers to be cut in pieces." (1176) Dion's choice was between his life, in which the interests of Syracuse were focussed, and the lives of some citizens whose interests were not just immediately particular but were also intolerant of those of the whole.

Soon after Dion left the city Heraclides ably demonstrated the magnitude of his talents by his incapacity even to provide order in the city. Dionysius' men, still in the citadel, saw the disorder and attempted to retake the city; but the Syracusans, with tears and lamentations, hastily recalled Dion, who just as hastily returned to save matters. But not before the citizens, again thinking themselves safe, tried to reject Dion once more; but fresh attacks from the citadel persuaded them otherwise.

After Dion had provided order Heraclides voluntarily surrendered himself to Dion. In the true manner of the Academy Dion treated the entire affair only as it impinged upon himself, utterly forgetting that Heraclides' depradations were of concern to the entire city. "/He/ wished to let the world see that he valued not himself so much upon excelling Heraclides in ability and conduct as he did in outdoing him in justice and clemency." (1180) Dion therefore pardoned the man and released him to set further obstacles to the establishment of justice in Syracuse. In so doing he of course won the commendation of Plato, for he was following his dictates, but he certainly lost the applause of the men concerned with the interests of Syracuse. Heraclides continued to stir up the people and to militate against justice. Finally, even Dion recognized his mistake and had him secretly killed, but Plutarch maintains that his murder continued to trouble him and was like a blot and stain upon his life. (1185) (Compare with what Sartre says in The Flies, "The most cowardly of murderers is he who feels remorse.") Heraclides did not succeed in his designs only because of his obtuseness and not due to any especial acumen on Dion's part.

Dion was soon after killed by his implicit faith in the goodness of men. His assassin was his closest advisor who had been with him in all his military service and was the

first of his friends. Dion trusted him so much that he allowed him to participate in subversive activities, supposedly in order to report them to Dion. But the man, caught by his ambition, decided that the power of the tyranny outweighed that of friendship. Evidently Dion was unaware of the proposition that men are occasionally altered by changing conditions.

Throughout his career Dion was hamstrung by Plato's narrow sense of justice. He ably served the two tyrants primarily because they could shoulder the necessary unjust acts and allocate the just ones to Dion. And so when the time came for Dion to provide leadership he faltered. In control of the city whose rulers he had so long advised, he began to make enemies on all sides and generally "knew not what course to take." (1181) His errors may be concisely summed up: unaware of the necessity of establishing a basis for rule Dion did not recognize the need to exile and to execute men who were clearly setting up power bases for personal ends. This mistake was rooted in Plato's similar non-recognition of the problem and reinforced by his absolute injunction forbidding momentary injustices - an injunction of which the foundation was a standard of justice particular to the man.

A final examination of the value of Plato's work must not depend on the intentions of the author, for men will always try to make something more than it was intended to be and often succeed in doing so. The actions of Plato himself are a point in fact, for he not only consented to the application of his ideas to the situation in Syracuse but actually urged it. We must therefore search for the fault of Plato's political philosophy within that very context, rather than within another section of Platonism.

The mistakes which anybody makes in attempting to accomplish any desired goal can frequently be traced to a lack of the requisite technique in the field in question. For example, the mistakes a doctor makes can be attributed to a lack of precision in diagnosis. If he fails to cure a man of a specific disease, it is because his technique of identifying that disease was faulty. In a similar manner Plato's political philosophy can be scrutinized. His technique in investigating the milieu which we give the general name "politics" was philosophy in the sense that it "affords a vantage point from which we can discern in all cases what is just." (Seventh Letter, 326b) A fuller statement and a more beautiful description of its value is to be found in the Phaedo.

> Every seeker after wisdom knows that up to the time when philosophy takes it over his soul is a helpless prisoner chained hand and foot in the body, compelled to view reality not directly but only through its prison bars, and wallowing in utter ignorance. And philosophy can see that the imprisonment is ingeniously effected by the prisoner's own active desire, which

> makes him first accessory to his own confinement. Well, philosophy takes over the soul in this condition and by gentle persuasion tries to set it free. She points out that observation by means of the eyes and ears and all the other senses is entirely deceptive, and she urges the soul to refrain from using them unless it is necessary to do so, and encourages it to collect and concentrate itself by itself, trusting nothing but its own independent judgment upon objects considered in themselves, and attributing no truth to anything which it views indirectly as being subject to variation, because such objects are sensible and visible but what the soul itself sees is intelligible and invisible. (82e)

I think that, paradoxically, Plato's mistakes lie in his not exploiting the use of philosophy to its highest potential. Plato did not pick the vantage point with the clearest view.

The essential nature of political philosophy is reflected in the motives which drive a man to enter politics. As postulated earlier, they are a desire either for gain or for justice. But a desire for gain is merely the desire for power, for with the proper amount of power any object may be obtained. There are therefore two types of men, differentiated by their main motive force, who occupy the two opposite ends of a spectrum: the man who desires absolute justice and the man who desires absolute power. Although these two specific types may never have actually existed, all political men are more or less a mixture of them.

The circumference of these two words - power and justice - contain the whole of political philosophy. Although empyreal justice is the goal, mundane power is the means. It is the task of the political philosopher to clearly explain their relationship. In other words, given the motive forces of the two basic types of political men - that force which determines the nature of their actions - how is justice to be obtained through the use of power? The most significant and heartening point to arise out of this inquiry - if we assume complete use of Plato's philosophic vantage point - is the realization that both power and justice result through the proper use of either method.

In the first case, the man whose main concern is gathering power (the corollary being the desire for maximum power) very quickly realizes that if he always instantaneously seeks power, he will eventually acquire less than if he sometimes acts in the interests of the whole - being just. He becomes aware of the relationship between particular time and interest, on one hand, and general time and interest, on the other; and he soon learns to manipulate these in order to secure the maximum power. The process which occurs is an

expansion of his quest for power in a particular time to a quest for power in a general time, since this sort of power is larger and more durable. If this happens, the expansion from particular time to general time, the question of justice is solved, for over all time the most just will procure the most power. But, if there is no such expansion or it is a limited one, the question of justice is not solved, unless it is specifically raised. This is the case of men from Cleon to Hitler.

In the second case, the man whose principle concern is securing justice (the corollary being the protection of his conceived interests) realizes that if he is to enter public life he should no longer be interested in justice merely for himself (self-interest) but rather in justice for all who fall within his domain. His particular sense of justice expands to a general sense. If this is what happens, the expansion of the particular into the general, the matter of the maintenance of power is subsumed within it, for the self-interest of the man concerned with general justice is the interest of the entirety; if someone attacks him, he is striking the whole, which he has axiomatically vowed to protect. But, if his sense of justice does not expand, the problem of power is never answered, unless it is specifically raised.

This last case is, I submit, the case of Plato. Because of his prior considerations of philosophy, his particular sense of justice never expanded. The clearest example of his judicial pointedness is his dictum, "/We_/ must also hold it a lesser evil to be victims of great wrongs and crimes than to be doers of them." (Seventh Letter, 335) The conflict between this local sense of justice and a postulated concern for achieving general justice is the dilemma which must be solved, if possible, by all who wish to make Platonic political philosophy applicable.