THE COLLEGE

FILE

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April 1970

The College

Cover: Plato and Aristotle, from "The School of Athens," by Raphael. *Inside front cover:* McDowell Hall, Annapolis campus.

The College is a publication for friends of St. John's College and for those who might become friends of the College, if they came to know it. Our aim is to indicate, within the limitations of the magazine form, why, in our opinion, St. John's comes closer than any other college in the nation to being what a college should be.

If ever well-placed beacon lights were needed by American education it is now. By publishing articles about the work of the College, articles reflecting the distinctive life of the mind that is the College, we hope to add a watt or two to the beacon light that is St. John's.

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

In the April Issue:

A Giving of Accounts:

Jacob Klein and Leo Strauss

The following giving of accounts took place at St. John's College, Annapolis, on January 30, 1970. Mr. Klein and Mr. Strauss were introduced by Dean Robert A. Goldwin:

Mr. Klein and Mr. Strauss are going to present us tonight with two "accounts."

The origin of this event is, I think, quite simple. Many of us have known them both, as our teachers, for many, many years. In a sense we can say that we know much about their teachings.

But, in fact, most of us know very little of the genesis of their thought. And it occurred to us that it would be, very simply, enlightening, to hear from them their own accounts of the origin and development of their thoughts in those matters of greatest interest to us, their students. . . .

It is arranged that Mr. Klein will speak and then Mr. Strauss will speak. Then we will have questions, in our accustomed style.

Mr. Klein

This meeting has two reasons, one is accidental, the other is important. The first is the fact (and any fact is some kind of accident) that Mr. Strauss and I happen to have known each other closely, and have been friends for 50 years, and happen both to be now in Annapolis at St. John's College. The other reason, the important one, is that Mr. Strauss is not too well known in this community and that we as a real community of learners should begin to understand better why he is now a member of this community. We thought it might be not too bad an idea, although a somewhat embarrassing one, to tell you what we have learned in our lives, what preoccupied us and what still preoccupies us. Dead Week might perhaps indeed provide the right opportunity, the *kairos*, to do that. I shall begin.

Up to my twenty-fifth year I had one great difficulty. I was a student, and so was Mr. Strauss—we studied at the same university—, and I studied all kinds of things, something called philosophy, and mathematics, and physics, and I did that quite superficially. But what preoccupied me mostly during those years was this: whatever thought I might have, and whatever interest I might have in anything, seemed to me to be located completely within me, so that I always felt that I could not really understand anything outside me, could not understand anything uttered or written by another person. I felt that I was in a kind of vicious circle, out of which I could find no escape. I wrote a dissertation, which is not worth the paper on which it was written, obtained my Ph.D. degree, and then after a short while, returned to studies.

Now, while Mr. Strauss and I were studying we had many, I should say, endless conversations about many things. His primary interests were two questions: one, the question of God; and two, the question of politics. These questions were not mine. I studied, as I said, quite superficially, Hegel, mathematics, and physics. When I resumed my studying, a certain man happened to be at the University in the little town in which I was living. This man was Martin Heidegger. Many of you have heard his name, and some of you might have read some of his works in impossible English translations. I will not talk too much about Martin Heidegger, except that I would like to say that he is the very great thinker of our time, although his moral qualities do not match his intellectual ones. When I heard him lecture, I was struck by one thing: that he was the first man who made me understand something written by another man, namely Aristotle. It broke my vicious circle. I felt that I could understand. Then I began studying seriously, for myself, seriously, not superficially.

It became clear to me that one had to distinguish the classical mode of thinking from the modern mode of thinking. Our world and our understanding, as it is today, is based on a certain change that occurred about 500 years ago, and this change pervades not only our thinking but the whole world around us. It made possible one of the greatest achievements of man, mathematical physics, and all the auxiliary disciplines connected with it. It made possible, what we call with a strange Latin word, science. This science is derived from the classical mode of thinking, but this derivation is also a dilution which blinds our sight. My studies led me to conclude: we have to relearn what the ancients knew; we should still be able to persist in scientific investigations, where real progress is

possible, although the science with which we are familiar is also capable of regress and of bringing about a fundamental forgetfulness of most important things. As a consequence of these studies and of this understanding, a question arose: How should people be educated?

At that time a certain political upheaval made it necessary for me to come to these United States, and to land on the St. John's campus. This great question, how to educate people, became suddenly a "practical" question. I found here a man, an extraordinary man, whose name you all know, Scott Buchanan. He was also struggling with this question, as he had been struggling all his life. Since then, as the Dean told you, I have stayed here on this campus.

Mr. Strauss, meanwhile, worked on his own, tenaciously, indefatigably, and in an exemplary way. His erudition, his zeal, his tenacity brought fruit—resplendent fruit. As so many others, I learned from him. There are indeed, I think, differences between us, although it is not quite clear to me in what they consist. And I do think that at this point it is not too important to find out what they are. Mr. Strauss might allude to them.

Mr. Strauss

I must begin with an introduction to my introduction. Some faculty members, I was told, had misgivings about this meeting. The only ones which are justified concern this question: Is it proper for people to talk about themselves in public? The general answer is: no. But there are exceptions. First, what is true of men in general is not equally true of old men. Second, and above all, people may talk about their thoughts concerning matters of public concern, and virtue is a matter of public concern. Those thoughts, it is true, are connected with our lives and I for one will have to say something about my life. But this is of interest even to me only as a starting point of considerations, of studies, which I hope are intelligible to those who do not know my starting point. Why then speak of one's life at all? Because the considerations at which I arrived are not necessarily true or correct; my life may explain my pitfalls.

The subject is the relations between Klein and me, i.e., our agreements and our differences. In my opinion we are closer to one another than to anyone else in our generation. Yet there are differences. I wish to learn from Klein how he sees these differences. It is possible that our disagreements have something to do with the differences of our temperaments or humors. It is more helpful and worthy, however, if I tell the tellable story of my life with special regard to how Klein affected it. I must warn you: I may commit errors of memory. Apart from this I shall not always keep to the chronological order.

I was brought up in a conservative, even orthodox Jewish home somewhere in a rural district of Germany. The "ceremonial" laws were rather strictly observed but there was very little Jewish knowledge. In the Gymnasium I became exposed to the message of German humanism. Furtively I read Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. When I was 16 and we read the *Laches* in school, I formed the plan, or the wish, to spend my life reading Plato and breeding rabbits while earning my livelihood as a rural postmaster. Without being aware of it, I had moved rather far away from my Jewish home, without any rebellion. When I was 17, I was converted to Zionism—to simple, straightforward political Zionism.

When I went to the University I tended towards the study of philosophy. For reasons of local proximity I went to the University of Marburg which had been the seat and center of the neo-Kantian school of Marburg, founded by Hermann Cohen. Cohen attracted me because he was a passionate philosopher and a Jew passionately devoted to Judaism. Cohen was at that time no longer alive and his school was in a state of disintegration. The disintegration was chiefly due to the emergence and ever increasing power of phenomenology—an approach opened up by Husserl. Husserl told me a few years later, the Marburg school begins with the roof while he begins with the foundation. But also: Cohen belonged definitely to the pre-war world. This is true also of Husserl. Most characteristic of the post-war world was the resurgence of theology: Karl Barth. (The Preface to the first edition of his commentary on the *Epistle to the Romans* is of great importance also to non-theologians: it sets forth the principles of an interpretation that is concerned exclusively with the subject matter as distinguished from historical interpretation.) Wholly independently of Barth Jewish theology was resurrected from a deep slumber by Franz Rosenzweig, a highly gifted man whom I greatly admired to the extent to which I understood him.

It was in Marburg in 1920 that I met Klein for the first time. He stood out among the philosophy students not only by his intelligence but also by his whole appearance: he was wholly non-provincial in a wholly provincial environment. I was deeply impressed by him and attracted to him. I do not know whether I acted merely in obedience to my duty or whether this was only a pretense: I approached him in order to win him over to Zionism. I failed utterly. Nevertheless, from that time on we remained in contact up to the present day.

Academic freedom meant in Germany that one could change one's university every semester and that there were no attendance requirements nor examinations in lecture courses. After having received my Ph.D. degree (a disgraceful performance) in Hamburg I went to the University of Freiburg in 1922 in order to see and hear Husserl. I did not derive great benefit from Husserl; I was probably not mature enough. My predominant interest was in theology: when I once asked Husserl about the subject, he replied, "If there is a datum 'God' we shall describe it." In his seminar on Lotze's *Logic* I read a paper in the first sentence of which the expression "sense per-

ception" occurred. Husserl stopped me immediately, developed his analysis of sense perception and this took up the rest of the meeting: at the end Husserl graciously apologized. I attended regularly the lecture courses on the Social Doctrines of the Reformation and the Enlightenment by Ebbinghaus: I still remember gratefully Ebbinghaus's lively presentation of Hobbes's doctrine; Ebbinghaus shared with Hobbes a certain boyish quality. One of the unknown young men in Husserl's entourage was Heidegger. I attended his lecture course from time to time without understanding a word, but sensed that he dealt with something of the utmost importance to man as man. I understood something on one occasion: when he interpreted the beginning of the *Metaphysics*. I had never heard nor seen such a thing—such a thorough and intensive interpretation of a philosophic text. On my way home I visited Rosenzweig and said to him that compared to Heidegger, Max Weber, till then regarded by me as the incarnation of the spirit of science and scholarship, was an orphan child.

I disregard again the chronological order and explain in the most simple terms why in my opinion Heidegger won out over Husserl; he radicalized Husserl's critique of the school of Marburg and turned it against Husserl: what is primary is not the object of sense perception but the things which we handle and with which we are concerned, *pragmata*. What I could not stomach was his moral teaching, for despite his disclaimer, he had such a teaching. The key term is resoluteness without any indication as to what are the proper objects of resoluteness. There is a straight line which leads from Heidegger's resoluteness to his siding with the so-called Nazis in 1933. After that I ceased to take any interest in him for about two decades.

To return to 1922, the resurgence of theology, of what sometimes was even called orthodoxy, was in fact a profound innovation. This innovation had become necessary because the attack of the Enlightenment on the old orthodoxy had not been in every respect a failure. I wished to understand to what extent it was a failure and to what extent it was not. The classical statement on this subject in Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Mind* had become questionable because Hegel's whole position had been called into question by the new theology. One had to descend to a level which is, in the good and the bad sense, less sophisticated than Hegel's. The classic document of the attack on orthodoxy within Judaism, but not only within Judaism, is Spinoza's *Theological Political Treatise*. Spinoza's *Treatise* had been subjected to a fierce criticism by Cohen—a criticism which was impressive because Cohen was entirely free from the idolatry of Spinoza as the God-intoxicated thinker but it was nevertheless inadequate. In order to form an independent judgment I began, therefore, a fresh study of the *Theological Political Treatise*. In this study I was greatly assisted by Lessing, especially his theological writings, some of them with forbidding titles. Incidentally, Lessing is also the author of the only improvised live dialogue on a philosophic subject known to me. Lessing was always at my elbow. This meant that I learned more from him than I knew at that time. As I came to see later Lessing had said everything I had found out about the distinction between exoteric and esoteric speech and its grounds.

In 1925 Heidegger came to Marburg. Klein attended his classes regularly, and he was, naturally, deeply impressed by him. But he did not become a Heideggerian. Heidegger's work required and included what he called *Destruktion* of the tradition. (*Destruktion* is not quite so bad as destruction. It means taking down, the opposite of construction.) He intended to uproot Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle, but this presupposed the laying bare of its roots, the laying bare of it as it was in itself and not as it had come to appear in the light of the tradition and of modern philosophy. Klein was more attracted by the Aristotle brought to light and life by Heidegger than by Heidegger's own philosophy. Later Klein turned to the study of Plato in which he got hardly any help from Heidegger. Klein convinced me of two things. First, the one thing needed philosophically is in the first place a return to, a recovery of, classical philosophy; second, the way in which Plato is read, especially by professors of philosophy and by men who do philosophy, is wholly inadequate because it does not take into account the dramatic character of the dialogues, also and especially of those of their parts which look almost like philosophic treatises. The classical scholar Friedländer had seen this to some extent, but Friedländer had no inkling of what Plato meant by philosophy. Klein and I differ somewhat in our ways of reading Plato but I have never been able to find out precisely what that difference is. Perhaps the following remarks are helpful.

The first offshoot of Klein's Platonic studies is his work on Greek logistics and the genesis of modern algebra —a work which I regard as unrivalled in the whole field of intellectual history, at least in our generation.

While Klein was engaged in this work, I continued my study of Spinoza's *Treatise* from which I had been led to Hobbes, on the one hand, and to Maimonides on the other. Maimonides was, to begin with, wholly unintelligible to me. I got the first glimmer of light when I concentrated on his prophetology and, therefore, the prophetology of the Islamic philosophers who preceeded him. One day when reading in a Latin translation Avicenna's treatise, *On the Division of the Sciences*, I came across this sentence (I quote from memory): the standard work on prophecy and revelation is Plato's *Laws*. Then I began to begin to understand Maimonides's prophetology and eventually, as I believe, the whole *Guide of the Perplexed*. Maimonides never calls himself a philosopher; he presents himself as an opponent of the philosophers. He used a kind of writing which is in the precise sense of the term, exoteric. When Klein had read

the manuscript of my essay on the literary character of the *Guide of the Perplexed*, he said, "We have rediscovered exotericism." To this extent we completely agreed. But there was from the beginning this difference between us: that I attached much greater importance than Klein did and does to the tension between philosophy and the city, even the best city.

I arrived at a conclusion that I can state in the form of a syllogism: Philosophy is the attempt to replace opinion by knowledge; but opinion is the element of the city, hence philosophy is subversive, hence the philosopher must write in such a way that he will improve rather than subvert the city. In other words the virtue of the philosopher's thought is a certain kind of *mania* while the virtue of the philosopher's public speech is *sōphrosynē*. Philosophy is as such trans-political, trans-religious, and trans-moral but the city is and ought to be moral and religious. In the words of Thomas Aquinas only reason informed by faith knows that God must be worshipped, and the intellectual virtues with the exception of prudence do not presuppose moral virtue. To illustrate this point, moral man, merely moral man, the *kaloskagathos* in the common meaning of the term, is not simply closer to the philosopher than a man of the dubious morality of Alcibiades.

This view of philosophy was derived from my study of pre-modern philosophy. It implies that modern philosophy has a radically different character. In modern times the gulf between philosophy and the city was bridged, or believed to have been bridged by two innovations: 1) the ends of the philosopher and the non-philosopher are identical, because philosophy is in the service of the relief of man's estate or "science for the sake of power"; 2) philosophy can fulfill its salutary function only if its results are diffused among the non-philosophers, if popular enlightenment is possible. The high point was reached in Kant's teaching on the primacy of practical, i.e., moral reason; a teaching prepared to some extent by Rousseau: the one thing needful is a good will and of a good will all men are equally capable. If we call moralism the view that morality or moral virtue is the highest, I am doubtful if it occurs in antiquity at all.

I was confirmed in my concentration on the tension between philosophy and the *polis*, i.e., on the highest theme of *political* philosophy by this consideration. What distinguishes present day philosophy in its highest form, in its Heideggerian form, from classical philosophy is its historical character; it presupposes the so-called historical consciousness. It is therefore necessary to understand the partly hidden roots of that consciousness. Up to the present day when we call a man a historian without qualification (like economic historian, cultural historian, etc.) we mean a political historian. Politics and political philosophy is the matrix of the historical consciousness.

SELECTION FROM THE QUESTION PERIOD

Question: Concerning the difference between Mr. Klein and Mr. Strauss.

Mr. Klein: I do suppose that his emphasis on the political aspect of our lives, which can never be disregarded, of course, is something I do not quite agree with. On the other hand, we do agree that if there is philosophizing, it is a completely immoderate undertaking, that cannot find, ultimately, its goal, although one has to persist in it. Now where the difference here is, is really not quite clear.

Mr. Strauss: . . . I believe that there is another way of stating the difference. Mr. Klein and I differ regarding the status of morality.

Mr. Klein: (Laughter) I am not entirely certain of that. That's all I can say. Well, I will add something to that. And that is again a question of a difference of emphasis. I think I wouldn't emphasize it so much, the morality of man, but I do think that man ought to be moral.

Mr. Strauss: Yes—sure. I did not mean that when I spoke of our difference. I think that in your scheme of things morality has a higher place than in my scheme.

Mr. Klein: I really don't think so. Why do you say that?

Mr. Strauss: Because we have frequently had quite a few conversations . . . now and then, and one general formula which suggested itself to me was that you attach a higher importance to morality, as morality, than I do. Now, let me explain this. That the philosophic life, especially as Plato and Aristotle understood it, is not possible without self-control and a few other virtues almost goes without saying. If a man is habitually drunk, and so on, how can he think? But the question is, if these virtues are understood only as subservient to philosophy and for its sake, then that is no longer a moral understanding of the virtues.

Mr. Klein: That may be. (Tape break)

Mr. Strauss: . . . a statement by a modern extremist, but who had a marvelous sense for Greek thought, Nietzsche —in his *Genealogy of Morals*, third treatise, "What is the Significance of Ascetic Ideals," he explains, why is a philosopher ascetic? And he makes this clear, that he is ascetic. And, he says, that is not different from the asceticism of a jockey, who in order to win a race must live very restrainedly, but that is wholly unimportant to the jockey, what is important is to win the race. If one may compare low to high things, one may say similarly of the philosopher, what counts is thinking and investigating and not morality. Of course the word morality is a "bad word" because it has so many connotations which are wholly alien to the ancients, but, I think for provisional purposes, we can accept it.

Mr. Klein: If there's something that I learned from Plato, or that I think that I learned from Plato, is to

understand that nothing can be—*nothing* can be—that isn't in some way—and that's very difficult—good. That's why I do understand why Mr. Strauss says that the philosopher is in a certain way superior to the concern about morality, but I can not agree that the ultimate consideration of things, as far as one is capable of doing that, ever, ever, frees men of the compulsion to act rightly.

Mr. Strauss: Yes, I think that you believe that. Yes, that is what I meant.

. . .

Questioner: Of what use is the city to the philosopher?

Mr. Strauss: Without cities, no philosophers. They are the conditions.

Mr. Klein: You wouldn't deny that, would you?

Questioner: But it seems to me that the city provides for the needs of the body.

Mr. Strauss: Yes, sure.

Questioner: But does it provide for the needs of the soul?

Mr. Strauss: To some extent, sure.

Questioner: Is it necessary for its existence?

Mr. Strauss: To some extent, obviously. In one way or another, even if there is no compulsory education, the city educates its citizens.

Questioner: Wouldn't the philosopher get his education from nature?

Mr. Strauss: His first education, surely not. His first education he would usually get from his father and mother, and other relatives, that is to say, from the city.

. . .

Questioner: How does it follow from the saying that every thing that is, is somehow or other good, that a man should act rightly?

Mr. Klein: I would answer that very simply: He must try to be what he is. And, by the way, to be a man, a human being, is not a simple matter. The trouble with us human beings is that we are not quite complete, neither when we are born nor when we die.

Jacob Klein has been a Tutor at St. John's College since 1938, and was Dean of the College from 1949 to 1958. Born in Russia, he studied in Germany. He is the author of *Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra* (translation, M.I.T. Press, 1968), and *Commentary on Plato's Meno* (University of North Carolina Press, 1965).

Leo Strauss is the first Scott Buchanan Distinguished Scholar in Residence of St. John's College. He is also Professor Emeritus of Political Philosophy of the University of Chicago. His works include *Natural Right and History* (University of Chicago Press, 1953); *What Is Political Philosophy?* (Free Press, 1959); *Thoughts on Machiavelli* (Free Press, 1958); "How to Study the *Guide of the Perplexed*," in the translation of the same of the University of Chicago Press, 1963; *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (Free Press, 1952) containing "The Literary Character of the *Guide of the Perplexed*"; and *Socrates and Aristophanes* (Basic Books, 1966).

Biological Explanation*

BY ROBERT NEIDORF

This paper discusses an old but continuing controversy in the philosophy of biology. It is the controversy between those who claim that purpose and action for an end is present in the behavior of animals and in the development of their internal structures, and those who claim that it is inaccuracy of thought or plain superstition to speak that way. This second group I will call mechanists. The first group used to be called vitalists, but for reasons that will emerge I do not wish to use that term, since it carries certain unfortunate associations. The paper falls into two parts. The first is analytical and destructive; the second suggestive, vague, constructive, much weaker as argument, and to me much more interesting.

I. Living things, especially animals, have incredibly complex internal structures; their organs, tissues, and cells seem to be arranged in patterns which subserve the growth, maintenance or reproduction of the organisms in which they occur. So thoroughgoing is the apparent functional relation between the structures and their containing organisms, that the whole presents the appearance of a miracle. We see nothing like it in the rocks, the weather or the stars. It is then natural to suppose that plants and animals cannot be understood in the same way as earth, cloud and heavens.

How then can the organic world be understood? One might think of material organisms as governed by one or more Intelligences that are non-material, spiritual, in some way separate from the material organisms they govern. This hypothesis is usually called vitalism, and it is not susceptible to investigation by familiar methods; for this reason I lay it aside, but without prejudice. The obvious alternative is to think of governing Intelligences that are natural parts or aspects of animal material. Again there may be one or many, and the notion of a plurality of such Intelligences is not inconsistent with their subsumption in some fashion under a single world-embracing Intelligence. For simplicity, I concentrate in what follows on the hypothesis that there are many, each associated with a definite material organism. In this view the term Intelligence has to be understood metaphorically, since we do not find in plants or animals any evidence of deliberation or ability to grasp a universal. The hypothesis therefore takes this form: in the plant and animal worlds, vital processes are governed or at least influenced by some inarticulate and usually unconscious striving toward the achievement of a goal specific to the organism—that goal being the development and maintenance of just those structures and activities that are typical of the species, and the production of further instances of their own kind. This purposive striving is simply a characteristic or quality of the kind of matter that we encounter in the organic world, namely organic matter. This, as I understand it, is the core of the view held by Galen, and before him by Aristotle, a view now widely rejected as metaphysical, anthropomorphic, superstitious, sentimental, dogmatical, and—worst of all—prescientific. I call it organicism.

Part of the contemporary attitude of disdain toward organicism is based on evolution, for it seems that evolution makes it possible to understand the organic world in precisely the same way as the inorganic; that is, as a series of events governed by a blind mechanical causality. But here we come upon a surprise. At the very beginning of *The Origin of Species*, Darwin quotes Aristotle approvingly. He suggests that the principle of natural selection is "shadowed forth" in Aristotle, and he cites a passage from *Physics*, II, 8, which I give in the Oxford translation: *Why should not nature work, not for the sake of something, nor because it is better so, but just as the sky rains, not in order to make the corn grow, but of necessity? What is drawn up must cool, and what has been cooled must become water and descend, the result of this being that the corn grows. Similarly if a man's crop is spoiled on the threshing-floor, the rain did not fall for the sake of this—in order that the crop might be spoiled—but that result just followed. Why then should it not be the*

* A lecture delivered at St. John's College in Santa Fe, April, 1968.

same with the parts in nature, e.g., that our teeth should come up of necessity—*the front teeth sharp, fitted for tearing, the molars broad and useful for grinding down the food—since they did not arise for this end, but it was merely a coincident result; and so with all other parts in which we suppose that there is purpose? Wherever then all the parts came about just what they would have been if they had come to be for an end, such things survived, being organized spontaneously in a fitting way; whereas those which grow otherwise perished and continued to perish.*

Evidently Aristotle is here expounding a view, attributed to Empedocles, which has something in common with Darwin's. But Aristotle does not believe it, as we see in the passage immediately following:

It is impossible that this should be the true view. For teeth and all other natural things either invariably or normally come about in a given way; but of not one of the results of chance or spontaneity is this true. We do not abscribe to chance or mere coincidence the frequency of rain in winter, but frequent rain in summer we do; nor heat in the dogdays, but only if we have it in winter. If then it is agreed that things are either the result of coincidence or for an end, and these [*i.e.*, the teeth] *cannot be the result of coincidence or spontaneity, it follows that they must be for an end. . . . Therefore action for an end is present in things which come to be and are by nature.*

The argument may be restated thus: if a structure serves a purpose, the series of events causally antecedent to the structure are either relevant to the purpose or not. If not, they do not often realize the purpose, as we see empirically. But the teeth almost always do. Hence the process of eruption of the teeth is relevant to the purpose, is "for an end."

We must ask how a modern biologist of the mechanistic stripe would reply to this. No doubt he will point out that Aristotle has quite missed the point of the evolution theory. Evolution, he might say, does not invoke coincidence to explain the eruption of these particular teeth in this particular animal, but to explain the general fact that animals of such and such a kind have teeth of such and such a kind. The *first* teeth arose coincidentally, as the outcome of mechanical causes unrelated to nutrition; but since they *did* serve the nutritive function, the animal possessing them enjoyed a competitive advantage, and so on with a familiar story. Ultimately, *teeth*—not just these teeth but teeth in general—appear on the scene coincidentally; particular teeth, other than the first, arise by the operation of mechanical necessity flowing from a mechanism of inheritance. When we take this view, further shifts of emphasis occur, for then Aristotle's insistence that "action for an end is present in things that come to be . . . by nature" now appears superfluous; the mechanical causes explain everything.

So Aristotle's view is refuted or outflanked by shifting the subject to a wider context. But we have not heard the end of him, for his argument can also be shifted to that wider context and repeated. Thus: throughout the animal and plant worlds we see structures serving the accomplishment of what look like natural purposes. The occurrence of structure functionally adapted to ends is the general rule, not the exception. Hence that general fact cannot be the result of coincidence; therefore action for an end exists in things that come to be by nature. It does not matter at this point whether we hold, with Aristotle, that species are fixed and have always existed much as they are now, or whether we think with the evolutionist that species begin in time and evolve one from another. The *general* fact is the existence of functionally adapted structure, and that general fact has to be explained by acknowledging the existence of action for an end. To put the same point differently, the mechanist cannot prevail by referring the development of adapted teeth to an ingenious genetic mechanism, for we still have to explain the functional appropriateness of that mechanism. Thus Aristotle's argument has some residual forces despite evolution, and we see that the argument between biological mechanists and their opponents is really independent of the fact of evolution, which could have been inferred from the fact that the controversy antedates Darwin by two millennia.

Thus generalized, the Aristotelian argument on behalf of *action* for an end in nature is I think conclusive, provided we admit that there are such things as *ends*. So our question is now disentangled from the confusing context of evolution, and takes a simple form: is there such a thing as end or purpose in animals?

For Aristotle it was past doubt that the normal series of events in the life of a normal living creature represented an approach to a "completion," then a recession from that completion in senility and death. The completion itself is defined by the disposition to perform, and the ability to execute, a variety of complicated and highly integrated processes, including self-maintenance and reproduction. Except when he is in a theological mood—which is for him a strained one—it is no use asking him what the completed mature animal is for. It is for itself, for its specific normal processes. As the Zen Buddhists have it, the purpose of a flower is simply to open, a truth—if it is one—that cuts clean across the flower's reproductive function. For the mechanist, the attribution of the term "completion" to the adult animal is a conventional or subjective mode of speech; for him there is just a physico-chemical system passing through varying stages of activity and stability, and it makes no objective sense to single out any one stage as a privileged one, worthy to be called the completion or the desired end.

How can the controversy between mechanism and organicism be decided? I will review five different attempts to decide the issue. The first three are attempts to come

to a decision on empirical grounds, the fourth on pragmatic grounds, and the last on analytical grounds.

First empirical attempt: someone asks me whether animals have completions or ends and I try to find out by cutting up the animal, looking for the end or the directive agent for all the world as if I were looking for the vermiform appendix. This is clearly wrong. It is as if someone tried to find the form in matter with the help of a microscope.

Second empirical attempt: are there phenomena inconsistent with one theory or the other? And first, are there things that animals do that chemical systems cannot? If there are, it would overthrow the mechanist view. No one has yet built a tiger in a laboratory, but there seems to be no limit to the extent to which machines can imitate macroscopic biological behavior, and no limit to the ingenuity of biochemists in synthesizing almost-biological microsystems. It would be bad tactics to hang the organistic philosophy on the prediction that machines cannot do X, Y or Z; name it, and someone builds a machine that can do it. And it would be bad logic to hang it on the prediction that no one will ever build a machine that can do *everything* animals can, for this might be true as an accidental matter, even though animals were just machines.

Next, are there hard facts, real or imaginary, that could overthrow organicism? I can only think of one that has been proposed, and that is the imaginary fact of the laboratory production of a genuine animal, fertile and true-breeding. But I think it is wrong to imagine that this would refute the organic view. It would only show that animals can be produced in a peculiar manner. Roughly half of the higher animals—the female half—possess the capacity to synthesize animals from relatively simple chemicals; only the process is so usual that we fail to dwell on its truly remarkable and very puzzling characteristics, and in the human case we often take pains to prevent it.

Third empirical attempt: is one of the two views more adequate than the other? I.e., are there phenomena that can be accounted for under the one theory that the other theory must ignore as unexplainable? Again, probably not. The organicist says that stems grow up in order to put the leaves into the light and air. The mechanist discovers growth-controlling fluids generated in the tip which flow differentially down the stalk depending on its orientation, thus insuring that the stem grows upward. The mechanist now claims to have explained the directionality of stem growth, which his opponent could not do. His opponent replies that any purpose has to be effected by a mechanism, and he thanks the mechanist for having found the relevant one in this case.

Next, are there phenomena that can be explained teleologically but not mechanically? Again I think not. I think anything can be explained mechanically, but to explain why requires a digression, for here I must explain what I understand by mechanical explanation. What follows is a simplified version of an account found in Ernest Nagel's book, *The Structure of Science*.

I propose that mechanical explanation of a system involves four conditions. (1) The system or phenomenon enjoys momentary states or conditions defined by a finite collection of simultaneous momentary qualities; for example, in Newtonian mechanics the state of a material particle is defined by its location and its instantaneous momentum. (2) There is a formulated procedure for observing and measuring these qualities. (3) There are mathematical functions which connect the states of the system at one time with its states at other times in such a way that, given the state at some chosen initial time, one may in principle predict the state at any future time. (4) The system behaves in accordance with these predictions. Some philosophers hold that this is the general pattern of all explanation, with some variation in the definition of state to allow for statistical and probability considerations that are prominent in some kinds of systems. As might be expected, such philosophers tend to be hostile to teleological explanation. Mechanical explanation understood in this way is historically linked to an atomistic and chemical understanding of nature, which thus leans heavily on the ideal of prediction.

The 19th century biologist Hans Driesch believed that certain biological phenomena associated with embryological development and regeneration of lost members could not in principle be understood mechanically. But the history of biology passed him by and later workers, mostly enthusiastic mechanists, discovered mechanisms of heredity and growth control of a subtlety and complexity apparently undreamed of by Driesch. I believe this is typical of a general pattern; phenomena at one time inexplicable and unpredictable except from the teleological point of view later yield to mechanical explanation. One might even suggest that the mechanistic program is doomed to succeed; for given any *regular* phenomenon, it may just be a matter of ingenuity to invent a mechanical system with suitable state-definitions and time-dependent mathematical functions that "explains" the phenomenon.

Having failed to decide the controversy by empirical means, I now turn to a pragmatic attempt. That is, we might give the palm to whichever view seems most useful in generating interesting research problems and useful medical devices. At first glance the mechanist has the advantage here; certainly those university biologists who espouse some form of mechanism are also those who have the biggest buildings, the most expensive equipment, and the greatest number of Ph.D. students. They also have a rhetorical point to make, for they tend to claim that if you are satisfied with teleological explanations you will be uninterested in finding mechanisms, thus choking off inquiry. But neither Aristotle nor Galen deny the presence of the importance of mechanisms, they only deny the



adequacy of mechanistic explanations in isolation. Yes, says the mechanist, but we have made great strides in biology precisely by ignoring the teleological approach; we never use the concept of purpose or end. Then, asks the organicist, why is your literature choked with the words *purpose, function, in order to,* and so on? Oh well, comes the casual reply, that is just a short-hand for a more elaborate series of statements; we *all* understand that.

But do we? The attempt to decide the issue pragmatically ends in confusion, as is perhaps appropriate for all pragmatic attempts. We now find the mechanist using teleological notions, but claiming that in a fundamental sense he is not *really* using them. We must therefore examine the attempt to rewrite all teleological propositions in the form of non-teleological propositions; for it is essential to the mechanist position that such rewriting must always in principle be possible.

Space forbids a detailed presentation of any of the many recent attempts to carry out this program. Perhaps the most characteristic effort was published in 1950 by A. Sommerhof in a book entitled *Analytical Biology.* Sommerhof takes it as axiomatic that living systems are characterized by behavior and structure-growth which is *adaptive;* that is, conducive to some *goal* defined as a frequent, typical, or otherwise important state of the system. His problem is to define the apparently teleological term *adapted* in non-teleological terms. The analysis is complex, and colored by a full sense of the difficulties of the problem. He decides that a given response in a living system is adapted if and only if the following conditions hold. (1) The response will, in conjunction with a given environmental context, lead to the goal. (2) The response and its corresponding environmental context are each members of ensembles of real or imaginary responses and contexts, correlated with each other one-to-one, and such that any correlated pair will lead to the same goal. (3) The response enjoys a measure of causal independence from its corresponding context; rather, the response and its corresponding context are both outcomes of one set of prior causal conditions. (4) It is possible to say that, had the prior conditions been such as to produce a different environmental context, they would also necessarily have produced a different (but corresponding) response.

This schema provides a definite meaning for the assertion that a response is adapted, yet there is no reference to use, purpose, or striving. When we say a response is adapted we are referring in a short-hand way to its complex relations with other states real and ideal. What explains the response is the ordinary causal mechanism that produces it; and this latter is of course understood mechanically, in terms of disconnected momentary states related only by time-dependent mathematical functions.

But here I must express a misgiving. Let us assume—although it is arguable—that Sommerhof's analysis permits us to pass from any statement about goals to a complex of other statements expressed in strict mechanical terminology. Is this a translation? If it is, the process should work in reverse, and any biological situation that falls under the Sommerhof schema should be equally describable in terms of goals and purposes. I think that animal death is a case that falls under the schema, for in any environment that we know the higher animals all exhibit long-term processes leading to death. But no one will say that death is a goal, and that aging processes are responses adapted thereto. Sommerhof concedes this, and rejects death as a suitable goal-state on further grounds. It is then a matter for further discussion as to whether the rejection-criteria are—or can be—stated in purely mechanistic terms. My misgiving rests on the suspicion (perhaps unwarranted) that biologists characteristically select goal-states for causal analysis through a sense of their subject-matter that lies quite outside Sommerhof's schema, and quite outside any possible cluster of purely mechanical meanings. If so, Sommerhof's schema, however supplemented, is a way of deducing many useful mechanical statements from a few teleological statements, but it is not a *translation.*

This leads to what I think is the fundamental discomfort that will be felt by many persons, myself included,

in the face of an approach like Sommerhof's. Even conceding that it is possible to replace all of our customary uses of teleological terms with strictly equivalent mechanical terms, we might still feel that the result could only provide the bare bones of an adequate description. Mechanical terms do not describe the states of an organism at various times as truly related to each other, but as discrete moments tied together by empirical mathematical functions. Differently put, a mechanical description like Sommerhof's is not dynamic, but kinematic; it has no room for the forces, tensions, and pressures that we think operate in the organic world; it only tells us about static states that appear and disappear under a purely adventitious order. Like the cinema, it suggests that what appears to be dynamic and flowing is actually a series of static tableaux. Of course certain kinds of changes in these successive tableaux could be labeled as forces, but this would not satisfy the objector, because he is convinced that something goes on in the animal world analogous to what he feels when he senses internal muscular stress, the restlessness of a frustrated bodily drive, or the quiescence of satisfaction. No doubt this objection is anthropomorphic; it remains to be seen if it is on that account vicious.

What I am finally questioning is the whole tradition of describing nature and animal life in terms of disconnected momentary states, a tradition which derives on its epistemological side from Hume and on its ontological side from 17th century science. It is a tradition which insists that the fundamental entities of the world, or of our perceptive experience, are distinct items not related to each other except in space and time, and internally homogeneous. Thus, for Hume, any experience of feeling which differs from moment to moment is not one experience, but two. He says, "Whatever is distinguishable is separable." And for a devotee of Newtonian particle physics (which Newton was not), any change in the condition of an object has to be understood as a translocation of constituent particles, where each particle remains unaffected by its motion and is really just a series of instantaneous acts of occupation of points in space. The atoms do not and cannot acknowledge each other by any internal alteration, nor can one moment in an atom's life acknowledge the existence of past or future moments.

II. Having failed to decide the original controversy by any of the approaches made so far, the suspicion arises that we are dealing with a pseudo-problem generated by inattention to the meaning of the term *purpose*. Some would say that we should read the meaning of purpose from the animal world, where we see structures serving ends. Since it is just the suitability of this posture which is under examination, we cannot locate the meaning there without begging the question. Another source for the meaning of purpose rests in deliberative human experience; but it seems clear that animals do not enjoy such experiences. It is often maintained these these are the only two meanings for purpose; in which case the term is either applied to the animal world by convention and vacuously, or we have to impute thought to animals. But I think there is a third source.

Let me go back to David Hume, who is the outstanding exponent of the view that our experience is made up of disconnected bits and pieces carrying no intrinsic order. If under suitable circumstances I were to shout *Brutus*, most listeners could be relied upon to shout back *Caesar*. This is a kind of order among our perceptions that Hume must account for. He would point out that when we first meet Brutus we have no inclination to think of Caesar; that comes only after we have read Plutarch and Shakespeare. For Hume this shows that the psychological relation between imagined-Brutus and imagined-Caesar is not part of the perception we call imagined-Brutus; for if it were, it would have been there from the beginning. He accounts for the association by invoking a force of the mind which is trained, like Pavlov's dogs, to repeat in imagination those conjunctions of perceptions which have been forced upon it by past experience. This associative force of the mind is inexplicable in Hume's system; it reveals itself as a felt tension under certain circumstances and must be accepted as brute fact.

I would draw from these psychic phenomena a different lesson. Instead of saying that imagined-Brutus is associated with imagined-Caesar by a mind-force, we may say that the content of the present perception "imagined-Brutus" is truly connected to, stressed by, influenced by our past reading, so that it is now essentially and intrinsically related to the present perception "imagined-Caesar." After reading Plutarch, the experience "imagined-Brutus—imagined-Caesar" is not two experiences, but one, with distinguishable but inseparable aspects. It is only a dogma to assume that the presence within the experience of distinguishable aspects must be explained by breaking the experience into a conjunction of separate experiences, as Hume would have it. We are now spared the embarrassment of a mysterious mind exerting curious forces on its own perceptions, a mind which Hume in other contexts insists is nothing more than the collection of its perceptions.

The same point may be urged with the aid of a sketch that has appeared frequently in the works of Gestalt psychologists and recent philosophers. If you focus to the right of the central circle and say "antelope," you see one thing. If you focus to the left of the central circle and say "bird," you see something else. We have to distinguish carefully between the perceptions and what is supposedly really there on the sheet that bears the diagram. What is on the sheet is a pictorially neutral and unchanging pattern of ink-grains. But the existence of that unchanging thing is inferred from our perceptions, and it is a mistake to think *a priori* that our perceptions must have the self-contained neutrality that is in the inferred physical



reality. It is therefore a mistake to suppose that there must be one unchanging perception upon which the mind puts different interpretations at different times; there are many perceptions (loosely said to be perceptions of the same thing), spread out in time although bearing a family resemblance, and substantially influenced by other perceptions lodged in the same biography.

If it will be allowed that we have perceptions of sensation and imagination that cannot be analyzed atomistically, let me assume that the same holds for some of our emotions. I will then use the word *feeling* to refer alike to the contents of sensation, imagination or emotion. The next step is the claim that we have feelings which are organized organically, in the sense that there are indissoluble wholes within which one may sometimes discriminate tension and resolution, within which one may sometimes truly say that *this* strives for *that* and finds its completion therein. In a recent book, *Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling*, Susan Langer argues that this is so, and that the clearest articulation of such relations of feelings is to be found in the arts. She claims, for example, that the relations of tension and resolution found in music are really there as the music is felt, that they are not mere conventional terms of harmonic theory. In her view, all art is in part an articulation of this sort of genuine organic relatedness found at the level of feeling. I think it evident that such organically related feelings are found in our responses to felt bodily drives, to love, to novels and plays, and even to books on mathematics. Langer even maintains that our sense of deductive logical form is derivative from and dependent upon a universally shared feeling of rightness in connection with certain verbal relations. It is not essential to my argument to follow her that far, but only to concede that such a thing as irreducible qualitative "completion" exists in the life of feeling.

If this be allowed, we advance to another thesis:—that animals have such feelings. This should be laughable because so obviously true, but it is wrong to underestimate the power of scientific dogmas. One would think that anyone who has heard a dog scream would know that animals have feelings, yet there have been biologists who argued that vivisection without anesthesia is justified because animals are just machines, whose screaming is strictly analogous to squeaking gears. In any case, if animals have feelings I assume that some of their feelings are organic in the sense just stipulated; that is, that they sometimes constitute wholes within which there is tension and resolution, striving and completion. Surely animals do not attain to the levels of organic synthesis of feelings of which humans are capable, for we have the help of paint and canvas, drum and fife, and fairy stories; but attain it they do.

The next step is critical. If the psychological life of an animal is susceptible of regions of organic organization, why not admit that the same thing holds for the animal when viewed physically? The animal viewed physically is just a collection of material substances, and we are here face to face with the dogma that matter cannot feel. But that view is linked historically to the science and philosophy of a certain time, and it seems to me silly to cling to it if the argument leads elsewhere. The chief obstacle to the organic view of matter comes from the fact that we think we know what matter is, pretty much. Matter is what comes in billiard balls, steel beams, piles of mud, pools of water, wind on the face. Whatever it is, it neither feels nor possesses desires; to think otherwise is to throw us back into the world of river-gods and wind-spirits that we have figured our way out of—thank God. But I think it has to be observed that those who cling to a radically inorganic view of matter have a difficulty:—they have to account for the rise of organic feelings in animals, and of feeling and thought in humans, and it is peculiarly hard for them to do so. If we endorse the premise that matter consists only of atoms going bump-bump in the dark, it is hard to see how billions of atoms can do anything else than go bumpity-bumpity-bump in the dark, and there is still no place for feeling, much less thought. This difficulty is independent of the particular type of atomic theory one holds; it arises so long as one assumes that the fundamental constituents of matter are unalterable and internally homogeneous entities, either classical atoms or momentary system-states. Materialists of this mechanistic persuasion usually account for feeling and thought by assigning them to a miracle, or to a

non-material substance, or by denying that science is competent to cope with such airy things, or by denying altogether that they have any causally significant existence. I regard these one and all as counsels of despair.

The view I am advancing claims that matter should not be understood as something composed of self-contained particles or momentary states; matter should be understood as organic through and through, made up of events or acts each enjoying temporal thickness, capable of internal differentiation into aspects that from another point of view may also be events or acts, related to each other essentially rather than accidentally in space and time; matter is more like a changing forcefield, perhaps, than like a particle. It is further maintained on this view that matter is sometimes capable of sustaining relations which deserve to be called tension-resolution, or striving-completion, and that these relations cannot be decomposed into ensembles of isolated states as in Sommerhof's schema, but are what they are in virtue of a unique qualitative attribute that we recognize because it enters our own experience frequently. In this view it is possible for matter to achieve conscious feeling and thought. Compare this passage from Susan Langer's book, where she is discussing the complexity of physical and chemical systems:

The complexity of such processes is beyond the imagination of anyone who does not know some samples of them rather intimately; they grow up into self-sustaining rhythms and dialectical exchanges of energy, forms and qualities evolving and resolving, submicroscopic elements—already highly structured—merging and great dynamisms emerging. The common-sense tenet that such products of nature cannot attain feeling, awareness and thought loses its cogency when one is confronted by the actual intricacies of chemical and electrochemical organization. The bridge to organism arises of itself, and the conviction that "extended substance" [i.e., matter] cannot think and "thinking substance" cannot have material properties appears as a medieval doctrine handed down to modern philosophy in Descartes' famous dictum, and with no firmer foundation than his word.

The traditional view has now been turned up side down. Instead of regarding organisms as very complicated mechanisms, we regard mechanisms as tragically simple organisms. We see that for the mechanist action for an end was never possible in nature because in his view action in the dynamic sense is never possible at all. The controversy between mechanism and organicism may be decided in favor of the latter by imposing a metaphysical vision in which striving is present in animals because it is potentially present everywhere. It thus turns out that we are not discussing two contesting interpretations of experimental evidence; we are in fact discussing two contrary metaphysical visions about the basic character of the material world. It is obvious which view I incline to, and I would like to conclude by confronting the view with three brief criticisms.

First criticism: The view is silly because it imputes feeling to matter; the only kind of feeling we know is conscious feeling, and while animals may share this, surely plants and inanimate matter do not. This objection is based on the principle that there is no such thing as unconscious feeling. My only reply is to raise a further question. Suppose that during a heated conversation a man sits down beside me, so close that he crowds me on the bench. Without interrupting the flow of words, and without becoming aware of discomfort, I move over.* I would like to say that my motion was a response to an unconscious feeling. I suppose a mechanist would say that if I was not aware of any discomfort there was no such feeling, and my motion was a kind of reflex action. That is a possible way of describing the situation, but it seems to me an awkward way, and in any case I do not see why it is obvious that the situation must be described that way. Another example: Anyone who reads a lecture at St. John's and who survives the discussion afterwards finds out that he holds some important beliefs of which he was previously unaware. In general, we have no qualms about using the notion of an unconscious belief. But the ability to believe something is a most sophisticated human capacity; the ability to experience feelings seems far more primordial. If the former can occur unconsciously, why not the latter? It is an open question.

Second criticism: The view is anthropomorphic because it seeks to understand nature in terms drawn from human experience. Reply: If you insist upon trying to understand nature in terms entirely alien from human experience, you will never be able to explain human experience in those alien terms, and you will then be driven to invoke supplementary or supernatural principles. We see this in Descartes' theory that mind and matter exist side-by-side but independently. And we see it in Locke's theory that feeling and thought arise as a result of the action of matter on our brains, but how that happens is in his view forever incomprehensible to us.

Third and final criticism: Let us grant that organicism provides a unified scheme of explanation, even though that scheme may be more evident in the promise than in the execution; and let us grant that organicism is the only or the most accessible unified scheme. Still, why should we insist on a unified scheme at all? Perhaps the world does consist of a brute combination of mind and matter, which we describe and correlate but never render intelligible. Perhaps the material world does consist of a heap of disconnected atoms whose spatial relations to each other can be summarized and predicted but never reduced to some underlying intelligibility. Reply: In the opening passages of *Process and Reality*, Whitehead gives

* This example was suggested by Mr. Dean Haggard.

an interesting definition of an *incoherent* metaphysics. He says that a metaphysical scheme is incoherent if it contains principles that can be understood in isolation from each other, such as mind and matter, or atoms and paths of motion. In this way he expresses his preference for a scheme of understanding in which nothing is left as ultimate mystery, describable but unaccountable; for an incoherent system as he defines it is one in which the connection or togetherness of first principles is unaccounted for. Hence, organicism, which does not seek a simple deductive understanding of the world with everything flowing out of a single principle, but an understanding in which every principle, every experience, and every entity is incomplete in itself and must find its completion by reference to others. There is no mundane logic by which one can prove the superiority of such a scheme or vision.

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With Respect to Descartes

To avoid the lie he showed great tact;
And swore sincerely by the beard he lacked.
Not false cried Many, and it was true.
Nor true saw some, but only a Few.

Centaurs prance, they lead the dance.
The god hears the vaunt from below.
Uproused he turns him to advance.
Will he come with lyre, or with bow?

—Argonides

"When is St. John's Going to Resume Athletics?"

BY BRYCE JACOBSEN

A Midshipman from the Naval Academy recently asked me this question. Many alumni and other friends of the College have done the same during the years that I have been the Director of Athletics at St. John's. The question, with its implications that I am Director of what does not exist, or even Director of Nothing, has both amused me, and not surprisingly, even slightly irritated me.

That so many should still identify a college athletic program with an intercollegiate athletic program, is rather strange. Thirty years ago, however, not many questioned this, among other sacred cows of American education. President Barr had to explain to a waiting world the College's "revolutionary" abandonment of intercollegiate athletics in a radio address in November, 1938. Everything he said then still rings true now. Let me quote at some length from that memorable broadcast:

I propose to discuss an important step which St. John's College has taken within the past ten days. Many of those who are listening to me, including alumni members of the College, will by now almost certainly have been told by somebody that the College administration has abolished athletics. Those who believed this statement should, it seems to me, be gravely disturbed. I think I ought promptly to disabuse them. To keep the record straight, I shall therefore first state the facts. Athletics have not been abolished, but the College has decided that after the close of the present academic session athletic facilities will be increased* *and at the same time will be placed on a strictly intramural basis.*

. . . The system of intercollegiate athletics which has developed during the past 20 years will no longer support the prime purpose of a liberal college. I suppose I ought to have foreseen this. But I didn't. Certainly, there have been enough Carnegie reports, enough magazine articles by candid writers like John Tunis to convince men of my generation that we are sheer sentimentalists and ignoramuses if we suppose that intercollegiate athletics are the same thing we remember from 20 years back. They do things better now, with Rose Bowls, Cotton Bowls, and Sugar Bowls; with costly equipment, transcontinental journeys, and big money; with costly coaches and costly quarterbacks. I knew all this. The first thing I learned about athletics on arrival at St. John's was that we were booked to play our unnatural rivals, Army and N.Y.U.—in an effort to keep down the high cost of modern athletics by earning a good "gate." But still I thought it might be possible to adapt intercollegiate athletics to educational ends, to pare down schedules, to decline with

Photo by M. E. Warren

* Emphasis supplied. (Ed.)

thanks such games as Army and N.Y.U., and to protect the coaches from criticism if they lost games by refusing to hire athletes. I was mistaken.

The thing that taught me I was mistaken was what happened when intercollegiate athletics collided with a curriculum that really required work. . . . There is no reason on this round earth why securing a liberal education in an undergraduate college should be a less serious business than acquiring a medical education in a medical school. But if it is a serious business, then it had better steer clear of another very serious business, indeed a highly organized "big" business, intercollegiate athletics. For this big business has its own exigencies: those who won't meet them had better keep out.

That big business substitutes spectator psychosis for actual participation, cheering sections for playing teams, an orgy of sports goods equipment for costumes fit to have fun in, large business staffs with long-term schedules for the old-time impromptu challenge of natural antagonists, monotonous physical drill for learning to play by playing, pressure from fellow-students for zest to play, the exhibitionism of star performers for the satisfaction of playing well because it is more fun to play a game well than badly. The sum total of these things is hysteria, lost motion, the death of the amateur spirit, and an athletic system that competes with study instead of supplementing





and strengthening it.

We have all known these things for years, unless we have been ostriches or Rip Van Winkles. But I repeat, they don't prove fatal so long as undergraduate education is run in low gear. In fact, I should insist again that, so long as education is run in low gear, these things are better than idleness. But there is something better still, and that something is amateur athletics, amateur athletics of a quality no college can achieve so long as it is meshed in with the new kind of athletics, the big-business kind. The educational program now going on at St. John's must have the support of amateur athletics. It must have it, because amateur athletics is rich in terms of health, recreation, skill, and co-ordination. To get that support, it will expand its intramural athletics. More varieties of sport will be offered, and more facilities. Our colleges are often abusively called country clubs. I want to see St. John's offer the sort of athletic facilities a good country club offers.

. . . Sooner or later, I hope sooner, the present system of semi-professionalized intercollegiate athletics will hang itself. When it does, the problems that caused us to take our present stand will disappear. When it does, we shall doubtless play games with other colleges as naturally as

Photo by M. E. Warren

such games were once played. Meanwhile, athletics at St. John's will be for the student, not the student for athletics.

Over 30 years later, we recognize how right Mr. Barr was in his penetrating analysis of the state of intercollegiate athletics. The unhappy features of the system, which he so vividly described, have become worse since then. It may come as a surprise to some that the founding fathers of the New Program, Messrs. Barr and Buchanan, should have been concerned at all about athletics. But they were very much concerned about having a good athletic program, not the sham kind of thing described above. In those early years of the College, they worked hard and long with Mr. Ned Lathrop to set up and promote the new athletic program. Mr. Lathrop became the first Tutor and Athletic Director under the new system. To signify the College's involvement and commitment to the new athletic program, an Annual Athletic Banquet was held each year. Mr. Barr personally presented the various Blazer Awards to the students who had earned them. It was always, for some of us, one of the highlights of the year. Somewhere in the intervening years, sad to say, this tradition was lost.

Now that the history of the athletic program has been presented, let us examine the program itself in some detail. There are several areas to be considered. First, we maintain for the use of the College various fields, courts, and a gymnasium. There is widespread use of these facilities on an unorganized basis—persons simply coming to the gym to individually exercise, or to pick up any competition they can find in individual or team sports. The activity at this level is quite high.

Second, we run tournaments in certain individual sports. In November, we began with table tennis, in which some 47 students and Tutors were involved. In January, we have the badminton tournament. This year 56 persons participated. Last year 89 men were involved at least once in our individual tournaments. This is about 55 per cent





of all male students. We try to offer as much individual instruction as we can in these sports.

Third, we maintain an organized schedule of team competition in touch football, soccer, basketball, volleyball, and softball. We play 20 games in each sport, 100 in all. Once every spring we hold our annual track meet. The student body is divided into five teams, called "Spartans," "Hustlers," "Guardians," "Greenwaves," and "Druids." These teams are self-perpetuating and continuous. Freshmen are assigned to them in a simple alphabetical scheme. However, as sophomores, they are "drafted" permanently to some team. Many alumni who live in the Annapolis area continue to play for their team. Tutors are re-drafted each year on teams. This fall, 120 male students, many alumni, and many Tutors played in our football and soccer leagues. This is about 60 per cent

of the male students. Last year about 75 per cent of the male students participated in our team sports program.

We encourage participation as much as we can. It is, of course, all voluntary, and no one has to fear losing varsity status, or his scholarship, or his job, if he happens to miss a game, or if his team happens to lose now and then. All these activities have put the present gymnasium under severe stress. Its limited facilities seriously restrict the scope of our program. The College is planning to build a new physical education building, as soon as the money can be raised.

Our students are well aware that we have an unusual athletic program, designed solely for their benefit! (It is a sad commentary on most American colleges that the irony in the preceding sentence should make so much sense.) They appreciate this situation, and respond to it. The average student, with no special athletic abilities, becomes an important part of this enterprise. We count on his growing interest and involvement.

It is significant, I believe, that in recent years, almost no student has seriously questioned the fundamentals of this program, or proposed that we should resume intercollegiate athletics. The only people who have proposed such a return are those who are unacquainted with the present program. This is not to suggest that we have solved all our problems—far from it. But we keep working at them within the spirit and context of Mr. Barr's call for amateur athletics at St. John's.

I hope that the question posed in the title has been adequately answered. Our goal here, in the current idiom, is participatory athletics—or even the "athletics of involvement."

Bryce Jacobsen graduated from St. John's College in 1942. He was a farmer and carpenter until 1957 when he returned to St. John's as Tutor and Director of Athletics. Mr. Jacobsen has concentrated on the teaching of mathematics and has published articles on subjects like Apollonius' *Conic Sections* and Ptolemaic astronomy in the St. John's College *Collegian*. His even-tempered fairness, helpful instruction, and undefeatable excellence in every sport he tries his hand at have won him the admiration of all who participate in the athletic program.

We regret the following ERRATA in the December, 1969, issue in *The Habit of Literature*, by Richard Scofield.

Page one, column A, line 20 for the *read* a; l. 13 from the bottom, for and class *read* and in class; l. 6 f.b., for philosophy *read* philosopher; l. 2 f.b., for of *read* in; col. B, l. 10 for be of meat *read* be full of meat: p. 2, col. A, l. 26, for than having *read* than never having; col. B, ll. 5 and 6, for of St. John's students . . . to their own *read* of a St. John's student . . . to his own; l. 12 f.b., for actions *read* action; l. 11 f.b., for of a pagan *read* of pagan: p. 3, col. A, l. 7, for is a pleasure *read* is the life of pleasure; l. 17, for people who *read* people, who; l. 6 f.b., *omit* a; col. B, l. 3, *omit* the; l. 23 for will not be *read* will never be; l. 27, for it to *read* to it; ll. 12 and 13 f.b., *insert* commas after vocation and after as such: p. 4, col. A, l. 8, for and supernatural *read* and to supernatural; l. 9, for out of life *read* out of life and is for the benefit and use of life; col. B, l. 1, for claims *read* claim; l. 2, *omit* will.

(Eds.)

NEWS ON THE CAMPUSES

Both Campuses Claim Woodrow Wilson Designates

Edward Michael Macierowski, a senior in Annapolis, and James D. Danneskiold, a senior in Santa Fe, have been chosen Woodrow Wilson Designates by the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation in Princeton, New Jersey.

The students were two of the 1,153 finalists that topped a field of 12,000 outstanding graduating seniors nominated for the honor by more than 800 colleges.

The Foundation's selection committee picked Designates as "the most intellectually promising" 1970 graduates planning careers as college teachers.

Mr. Danneskiold is the first winner from the Santa Fe campus in the annual competition. He plans to do his graduate work in philosophy or in the history of science. The senior from Whittier, California, says he has learned a great deal about good teaching from his experiences in St. John's tutorials and seminars.

Mr. Macierowski has received the Walter S. Barr scholarship at St. John's for four years. During his junior year he won the Duane L. Peterson scholarship award for $1,000 for "high academic achievement, constructive membership in the College community, and commitment to later post-graduate work."

He is the student member of the Lectureship Committee that selects guest lecturers at the College. He was instrumental also in arranging "the Greek floor" in one of the dormitories for students interested in intensive extra-curricular study of Greek.

Mr. Macierowski plans to continue his studies at The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto, Canada.



James D. Danneskiold
(Photo by J. R. Thompson)

Edward Michael Macierowski
(Photo by Edward J. Edahl)

Graduate Institute to Open Fourth Session This Summer

The bulletin for the 1970 session of the Graduate Institute in Liberal Education is available at St. John's College in Santa Fe. The eight-week summer Institute will hold its fourth annual session at the College from June 22nd to August 14th.

The program is designed primarily for school teachers and other college graduates interested in exploring the basic works of Western civilization. The Director is James P. Shannon, who is Vice President of the College in Santa Fe. Seminars, tutorials, and preceptorials are conducted by members of the Annapolis and Santa Fe faculties along with some teachers from other colleges.

Students may earn a Master of Arts degree upon the successful completion of four summer sequences of study or three sequences plus nine hours of graduate credit from another institution. The four subject areas are again Politics and Society, Philosophy and Theology, Literature, and Mathematics and Natural Science.

Contributors Receive Copies of Great Books

In its last mail solicitation for donations, the Santa Fe Development Office offered copies of several of the Great Books to those who sent contributions to the College. Of the twelve books offered, most requests came for Montaigne's *Essays* and Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*. In

third place was Darwin's *The Origin of Species*, followed by Melville's *Billy Budd*, Einstein's *The Principle of Relativity*, Homer's *The Iliad*, Apollonius' *On Conic Sections*, Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex*, Freud's *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, *The Constitution of the United States*, and Plato's *Crito*. The only book listed and not requested was *Elements of Chemistry* by Lavoisier. Van Doren's *Liberal Education* also was offered and it ranked next to Darwin in popularity although not on the Great Books list.

The mailing was considered successful with about 40 per cent of the donors giving to the College for the first time.

Board member David Ginsburg pauses before answering a question during an Annapolis student Forum meeting *(Photo by Bob White/ Anne Arundel Times)*.

Senator Charles McC. Mathias speaks during a student Forum meeting in Annapolis *(Photo by James Villeré)*.

Forum Features Washington Seminar Members as Guest Speakers

Since January a prominent group of federal officials, national legislators, attorneys, Washington columnists and political writers have been making individual guest appearances at the St. John's College student Forum in Annapolis.

The guest appearances constitute a kind of "tuition" for the St. John's seminar the group held one night a week for five weeks during November and December in Washington at the National Press Club.

The subject of the seminar was "Plato's *Republic*." Dean Robert A. Goldwin called the seminar the "highest level, postgraduate course in political philosophy in the country."

Members of the seminar include Joseph Califano, attorney and former special assistant to the President; James Farmer, assistant secretary of administration, Department of Health, Education and Welfare; David Ginsburg, attorney and former executive director of the Commission on Civil Disorders; Miss Meg Greenfield, editorial writer for *The Washington Post;* Thomas Houser, deputy director of the Peace Corps; Senator Charles McC. Mathias; Representative Abner J. Mikva; Robert Novak, syndicated columnist; Allen Otten, Washington correspondent, *The Wall Street Journal;* Senator Charles H. Percy; and John Robson, attorney and former Undersecretary of Transportation.

In addition to the Dean, Jacob Klein, Tutor Emeritus, and Miss Eva Brann, Tutor, represented the College.

St. John's and Naval Academy Hold Joint Seminars In Annapolis

St. John's College in Annapolis has been participating with the United States Naval Academy in several joint

St. John's students and Naval Academy Midshipmen participate in a joint seminar *(Photo by Robert Fenton Gary)*.



seminars on liberal arts topics.

The first seminar, held at the College during the first week of last December, brought together nine St. John's students and nine Midshipmen to discuss Paper Ten of *The Federalist.*

John A. Fitzgerald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Academy, and Robert A. Goldwin, Dean of St. John's, led the discussion.

According to Dean Goldwin the initial seminar was "a splendid success." He also observed that this seemed to be the first joint activity between the two campuses that anyone could remember.

At the conclusion of the first meeting, both the Dean and Rear Admiral James Calvert, Superintendent of the Naval Academy, decided that there should be more of such seminars.

Additional meetings have taken place and are being planned for topics in the natural sciences, mathematics, and politics.

Caritas Society Formed To Aid St. John's

The Caritas Society, the women's group of the Friends of St. John's College in Annapolis, was formed recently to promote a variety of cultural activities at the College.

The society took its name from the Latin word meaning "love and dear regard for." Its goals are "to create a new image of St. John's for the Annapolis community, to make the College the cultural center of Anne Arundel County, and to raise funds for student aid purposes."

The society's first activity was to sponsor Archibald MacLeish's drama, *J.B.*, produced by the students' Modern Theater Guild. Chairman of the December event was Mrs. Joan L. Baldwin.

During January, under the direction of Mrs. Alan G. Harquail, chairman, the society sponsored a harpsichord concert by Tutor Douglas Allanbrook. Proceeds benefited the Faculty Scholarship Fund for student aid. The concert was taped for future broadcast by an educational radio station, WETA, Washington, D.C.

During March the society was host at a luncheon reception on the first day of its Cinema Review I. Mrs. Theodore G. Osius was chairman of the event.

Additional functions are planned for the year including a general membership tea during the spring.

Santa Fe Citizen Donates Land to College

Ten acres of land adjacent to the Santa Fe campus have been donated to St. John's by the local owner, Mr. LeRoy Manuel. The land will provide additional frontage along Camino de Cruz Blanca as well as protecting that area from possible unsightly private development. The gift was in addition to the eight acres donated by Mr. Manuel in the early 1960's. The St. John's campus now totals 270 acres at the foot of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains. Most of the land was given to the College originally by John Gaw Meem, Santa Fe architect and member of the Board of Visitors and Governors.

Students Hear Vietnamese Official

A representative of the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, D.C., came to Santa Fe in January to speak at St. John's at the request of a student organization there called "Goodtimes Overground." Tran Kho Hoc, Third Secretary with the embassy's political section, spoke on "Prospects for Peace in Viet Nam." After his speech, he answered questions for about 1½ hours and visited a student barbecue.

Tran Kho Hoc of the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, D.C., came to Santa Fe at the invitation of St. John's students to present his government's views on the war.



Santa Fe student Elizabeth Randolph, 1973, learns silver craft under the guidance of a local artist. This is one of numerous extracurricular activities available to St. John's students *(Photo by J. R. Thompson).*

Mr. Hoc said he believed American demonstrations for the immediate withdrawal of troops were "well-intended" but "more subjective than rational." He said North Viet Nam should admit it is an aggressor and should agree to supervised elections in all of Viet Nam. Members of the audience questioned him about such matters as the imprisonment of political opponents to the government, the closing of newspapers, and desertions of South Vietnamese soldiers.

Mr. Hoc is one of several speakers and entertainers brought to the campus this year by Goodtimes Overground, which also sponsors studies on topics of interest.

Fasching Ball Held At Santa Fe

The Santa Fe students celebrated the end of the winter session with a

The breaking of the piñata is an old Southwestern custom which St. John's students adapted in the Holiday party they gave for the children of the Santa Fe faculty and staff *(Photo by J. R. Thompson).*

Fasching Ball to which they invited the public. The "Fasching" title was suggested by the Director of Student Activities, Istvan Fehérváry. It is the name of the festive season before Ash Wednesday in Europe.

Two bands played a variety of music from waltz to rock for the semi-formal ball in the Student Center. Donations were accepted to help to pay the expenses. It is hoped it will become an annual event for the students and the College's friends in Santa Fe.

Fencing Team Seeks Competition

A former champion from Hungary is training what apparently is the only fencing team in New Mexico at St. John's College. Istvan Fehérváry, the Director of Student Activities at St. John's, won the first national competition in foil fencing for youth in Hungary at the age of 17, and he was a member of the Hungarian Olympic team in fencing and modern pentathlon. He believes that St. John's is an appropriate setting for an ancient sport which he describes as intellectually and physically demanding as a combination of chess, ballet, and track running. He is quite impressed with the progress of the students, who practice several times a week. They are searching for another team in the area with which to hold a competition.

Board Members and Students Bridge the Generation Gap

When members of the St. John's College Board of Visitors and Governors come to town for a meeting, they make a point of talking to students as well as to staff members. At the January meeting in Santa Fe, the Board members exchanged ideas with students at the opening business session of Friday, at special seminars on Saturday afternoon, and informally in the coffee shop and elsewhere on the campus.

The seminar reading was the commencement address given last year in Annapolis by Jacob Klein. It produced lively discussions on the meaning of liberal education and the relative roles of reason and sentiment in pursuing a worthwhile life. Participating Board members expressed enthusiasm for continuing the discussions at future meetings.

Students also attended the Board meeting in Annapolis during October and entered into lively discussion of campus life with Board members.

Ecology Crisis Attracts Student Interest

Students at Santa Fe have become involved in the growing national concern over the pollution of the natural environment and resources. Nineteen students received permission to attend the "Can Man Survive?" symposium held at Colorado College in mid-January, After their return they helped to conduct special seminars at St. John's on January 30th with Paul Ehrlich's article "Eco-Catastrophe" as the reading. Conservation films from the Sierra Club were shown that afternoon and a table of material on ecology was offered in the Student Center. Students also have participated in local meetings on programs to control pollution in Santa Fe and New Mexico. Plans were being discussed for action on April 22nd, when national attention was to be focused on these concerns.

Touche! Santa Fe seniors Michael Landry and Carol Paterson practice on the campus patio *(Photo by Kathy Lear).*





Leo Strauss, Scott Buchanan Distinguished Scholar-in-Residence (right), receives a copy of the citation accompanying his honorary doctor of laws degree from the Very Rev. Joseph T. Cahill, C.M., president of St. John's University in New York.

St. John's University Grants Honorary Degree To Leo Strauss

During convocation exercises in November, St. John's University in New York presented an honorary doctor of laws degree to Leo Strauss, Scott Buchanan Distinguished Scholar-in-Residence at St. John's College in Annapolis.

The convocation climaxed an all-day symposium of commemorating the 500th anniversary of the birth of Machiavelli.

The Machiavelli Symposium presented distinguished scholars who delivered papers relating to the life and work of the Florentine author. Mr. Strauss spoke on "Machiavelli and Classical Literature."

His paper will be printed in *Review of National Literature*, a new periodical to be published by the St. John's University Press in the spring.

The Reverend Joseph I. Dirvin, C.M., Assistant to the President of the university, read the degree citation which began, "A colleague has paid Leo Strauss the highest tribute one scholar can pay another by remarking that he has brought to academic studies 'the scholarship and philosophic insight necessary to a proper confrontation of ancients and moderns.' "

Adult Community Seminar Held in Annapolis

The St. John's College Adult Community Seminar is meeting again this semester. The seminar is a series of discussions of great books, led by St. John's tutors. The seminar is open to the public. The only requirement is that the assigned book must be read in preparation for the discussion. Each seminar is two hours long; it begins with a question by one of the two tutors and it continues with discussion by the members of the seminar.

Readings for Spring 1970 include *Democracy in America* by Tocqueville; several addresses, speeches, and letters by Lincoln; articles by Mencken; *Go Tell It On The Mountain* by Baldwin; and *The Great Gatsby* by Fitzgerald.

Tutors Geoffrey Comber, Nicholas Maistrellis, and Robert L. Spaeth have been leading the discussions.

Board Appoints New Member

Attorney Charles David Ginsburg of Washington, D.C., has been elected to the Board of Visitors and Governors. A graduate of West Virginia University and Harvard Law School, Mr. Ginsburg has had experience in various governmental positions in Washington, the latest as Director of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (The Kerner Commission). He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa. He has participated in the recent Washington Seminars conducted by Dean Goldwin.

The Board at its January meeting in Santa Fe also approved the appointment of two new tutors at Santa Fe effective July 1st—Frank K. Flinn of Philadelphia, and John S. Chamberlin of Toronto, Canada. Mr. Flinn is assistant professor at LaSalle College Graduate School of Religion, and Mr. Chamberlin is Archivist, Center for Medieval Studies, University of Toronto.

Concerts Honor Beethoven Bicentenary

Santa Fe Tutor Timothy Miller is presenting a series of four public concerts this year at the College in honor of Beethoven's bicentenary. Miller has performed two piano programs and will give the remainder of the series later in the year. He holds degrees in English literature and in music from Harvard, Yale, and Indiana Universities, and also has studied at the Music Academy in Hamburg and at the University of London.

Annapolis Gains February Freshmen Class

Twenty-one students, mostly transferees from other colleges and universities, began their college education again as freshmen at St. John's Annapolis campus this February.

The class includes students from twelve states and the District of Columbia, with six students from Maryland, and one from Hawaii.

The students signed the College register as part of the regular formal ceremony. The Faculty attended in full academic regalia.

The freshmen will complete their year during the summer in Annapolis. Robert L. Spaeth, Tutor and Assistant Dean, is director of the summer program.

Some of the places from which the students have transferred are Boston University, McGill University, Purdue University, the University of California at Levine and Santa Cruz, and the University of Maryland.

Charter Flight

The much-advertised charter flight to Italy has been cancelled. Although the flight was opened to all members of the College community, as well as to the Friends of St. John's, there was insufficient response to the invitation. (Based on actual deposits received, the flight would have cost about $2,500 a person and that certainly was no bargain!)

ALUMNI ACTIVITIES

Counseling and Placement

During the past few months both the Alumni Association's Career Counseling Program (or Alumni Advisory Program) and the placement and counseling services of the College have been subjected to critical review.

The Counseling Program started four years ago under the leadership of then-president Jack L. Carr '50. Since that time individual alumni have counseled students on an occasional basis, and once-a-year discussions about graduate schools have been held with students at three of the last four Homecomings. Any other alumni counseling has been a personal, voluntary, and informal activity.

Counseling and placement at the College have been the responsibility of one of the assistant deans whose duties also include supervision of the financial aid program as well as teaching. Graduate school counseling has often been done by tutors on the basis of a personal friendship with a given student, with no coordination through the placement office.

Dean Goldwin has stated that the College must improve its counseling service, especially in guiding students toward graduate fellowships. At the same time, the Alumni Directors see room for improvement of alumni participation in counseling. The concern of Mr. Goldwin and the attitude of the Alumni Board are underscored by comments from younger alumni who are still in graduate school, and seeking positions: they know the College is not doing all it should to help them.

It is recognized that the College's financial resources for placement and counseling are limited. This is an added reason for a joint College-Alumni endeavor. With this in mind, the Alumni Directors appointed Mrs. Nancy Solibakke '58 as a committee of one to study the placement and counseling function at St. John's, with particular emphasis on alumni involvement.

After consulting with Dean Goldwin, Mrs. Solibakke and Charles E. Finch, Assistant Dean for placement and financial aid, visited a number of college placement offices. Based on their findings, Mrs. Solibakke on February 10th submitted a report to the Alumni Board for study, approval, and transmission to Dean Goldwin.

The report sent to the Dean contained four specific recommendations:
1. That the placement office institute standard placement techniques including student dossiers, preparation of students for interviews, and standard liaison activities between the College and possible placement situations;
2. That the placement office formulate lines of communication to the students making as much information available to them as possible and in general serving as a liaison between the student and placement information;
3. That the Dean in consultation with the faculty explore forming a faculty placement committee that serves on a rotating basis to advise students in their junior and senior years and whose duties it will be to keep abreast of information coming from the placement office and pass it along to students who, in their judgment, would benefit;
4. That the Alumni Association set up and maintain in the placement office a file of alumni and others who are familiar with the St. John's curriculum and who will serve as advisors to students in various professional and academic fields both about the general "state of the field" and about specific requirements and possibilities of which they are aware.

Mr. Goldwin found the report most helpful, and is exploring ways of putting the first three recommendations into effect.

The Alumni Association has begun to implement recommendation number four. During late February a special questionnaire was sent to certain more recent graduates. When completed and returned the questionnaire will form the nucleus of the Alumni Placement Counselor File.

Ultimately, the placement officer at the College should serve as the coordinator for all career, employment, and graduate school counseling. It is hoped that alumni and others, as potential employers, will make their needs known to the placement officer. The combined efforts of the faculty, the placement officer, and the alumni counseling volunteers should then provide graduating seniors and younger alumni with a much-needed service.

Alumni Are Giving

This year's Alumni Annual Giving Campaign is off to a very healthy start, Chairman Myron L. Wolbarsht '50, reports.

During the first 30 days of the drive, 129 alumni responded with some $3,800 in gifts. Leading the response were 16 King William Associates (contributors of at least $100).

The class captains and their volunteer agents started to work during January and February, and the effect of their appeals was felt almost immediately. By the 28th of February more than $8,300 in unrestricted gifts had been received from 311 alumni. An additional $800 was received from corporate matching programs of companies employing alumni. Of the responding alumni, 32 were King William Associates.

These statistics point to the important fact that the alumni of the College, in response to appeals from classmates and friends, are setting new records this year. The February 28th gift totals were almost a full month ahead of last year. That is a record of which all alumni can be proud, especially, of course, those who have contributed.

If you have *not* sent a gift this year, please consider what a gift can mean to St. John's. Like all of us, the College is affected by the inflation of the national economy. Careful management of our resources can achieve a great deal, but it cannot work miracles. In order to buy needed services, to attract and keep able tutors and staff, the College must spend more and more money. Income must keep pace with spending; gifts are an important part of our income.

Students also bear their share of increased costs: fees for next year will be at an all-time high of $3,400. (Ten years ago they were $2,100; on a comparative basis, it takes $40 now to match the value of a $25 gift in 1960.)

If you have never made a contribution to the College, consider doing so now. If you simply have not responded this year, consider increasing your gift. Your support, so eagerly sought, is just as deeply appreciated.

CLASS NOTES

1909

In the December issue it was stated that the Class of 1909 was not represented during the reunions at Homecoming. *Allen H. St. Clair* writes to point out the error of that statement, and we apologize to him and to his two guests who were indeed present.

1921

Dr. *Thomas B. Turner*, Dean Emeritus of the Johns Hopkins University medical faculty, has received the William Freeman Snow award for distinguished service to humanity. The award is the highest presented by the American Social Health Association.

1923

Paul L. Banfield, who founded Landon School 40 years ago, announced in December that he is retiring as headmaster of the Bethesda, Md., boys' preparatory school. His retirement will be effective this coming fall.

1933

J. Dudley Digges, former chief judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit of Maryland, was appointed associate judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in November. In his new capacity, Judge Digges represents the Fourth Appellate Judicial Court, which includes Maryland's four southernmost counties. Judge Digges is the immediate past president of the Maryland State Bar Association.

1934

The January 11th edition of the Santa Fe *New Mexican* carried an interesting feature about *W. Thetford LeViness*. Mr. LeViness, a resident of Santa Fe for 30 years, was our only resident alumnus when St. John's first went into that city. He is the librarian for the State Department of Health and Social Services, and pursues an active second life as a free-lance writer. His particular area of interest is New Mexico and its native cultures, and although confined to a wheel-chair (a cerebral palsy victim since birth) he visits Indian pueblos and archaeological digs throughout the state. Mr. LeViness's articles have appeared in many newspapers and periodicals, and he is a regular contributor to the *New York Times*.

Horace W. Witman recently sent Miss Strange some family information which she thought his classmates might enjoy. Mr. Witman wrote that daughter Hope Ann was married last April, and having finished a business college course, is employed as a medical secretary in Wilmington, Delaware. Daughter Elaine received her A.B. degree *cum laude* in English from Lincoln University in June, and has joined the University's library staff. Son John is in the 11th grade, and is now choosing between the Naval Academy and a medical career.

1938

R. Cresap Davis is teaching full time at Frederick (Md.) Community College as associate professor of business administration. He is serving this year as chairman of the Faculty Council.

1941

If you have ever conducted a meeting of any organization, chances are you relied heavily on the orderly mind of the grandfather of *Henry M. Robert, III*. His "Pocket Manual of Rules of Order for Deliberative Bodies" has sold more than 2.6 million copies in several editions. With his mother, Mr. Robert, III has just edited a complete revision of the authoritative volume. Published by Scott, Foresman & Co., the new edition appeared on February 19th, 94 years to the day after the first edition was published. On February 16th Mr. Robert appeared on NBC's "Today" show to publicize the book.

1942

A. Chesley Wilson, after several years with the American Hospital Association in Chicago, moved to the Annapolis area about two years ago. He works at the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda.

1946

Charles L. Van Doren delivered the weekly lecture in Santa Fe on January 16th. Mr. Van Doren, associate director of the Institute for Philosophical Research in Chicago, spoke on "Rhetoric."

1947

Richard S. Harris has written "The Fear of Crime," published by Prager Publications in New York City, a critical look at events leading to passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Mr. Harris, whose writings appear in *The New Yorker*, is also the author of "The Real Voice," about Estes Kefauver's attempts to regulate the pharmaceuticals industry, and "A Sacred Trust," about Medicare.

Joseph I. Killorin, Jr., dean of Armstrong State College, Savannah, Ga., participated as a panel member in the International College and University Conference held in Atlantic City in March. Dean Killorin's discussion area was "Inter-Institutional Cooperation; Who Benefits?" His daughter Diana, by the way, is a freshman on the Annapolis campus this year.

1950

Two members of the class of 1950 now have a greater-than-normal interest in the College these days: *James H. Frame's* son Matthew and *Theodore W. Hendrick's* son Bill are members of the Annapolis freshman class.

1951

James A. Grinder and Mrs. Nancy Moran Noel were married in New Canaan, Conn., on February 27th. Mr. Grinder is a vice president of A. A. Schechter Associates, Inc., a New York City public relations firm.

1952

Walter Schatzberg has been appointed to the rank of associate professor of German at Clark College.

1954

Merle Shore and his wife *Priscilla* '55 operate the Village Frame in Santa Barbara, Cal., a shop specializing in frames, prints, and original graphics of international stature.

Alfred R. Sugg, Jr., a member of the Theater Department at Western College, Oxford, Ohio, delivered the Friday lecture on January 23rd in Annapolis. His subject was the dramatic structure of "Prometheus Bound."

1957

Mrs. Arnold Daane of Cambridge, Md., received a Christmas message in December alleged to be from her son, Navy Lt. Cdr. *Hugh Allen Stafford*. Cdr. Stafford, identified by the

Department of the Navy as a prisoner of the North Vietnamese, sent his message over Radio Hanoi, and a tape was given Mrs. Daane by the Navy. Cdr. Stafford was shot down over Haiphong August 31, 1967, while on his 31st combat mission. Although Mrs. Daane could not positively identify the taped voice as that of her son, several letters and a postcard written in apparently fresh ink indicate that he is indeed alive and well.

1960

Jonathan Alfred Kaplan and Abigail Winston Ewert of New York City were married in Dedham, Mass., on November 1, 1969. The bride was graduated from Winsor School and the Boston Conservatory, in dance.

Kenneth H. Thompson sends a most interesting brief of his activities. An assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Dr. Thompson is devoting full time this academic year to his research on comparative politics. He is one of twenty political scientists in the nation to be awarded a Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fellowship for the year 1969-70. Mrs. Thompson is an assistant professor of sociology at Scripps College, where she is a colleague of *Harry Neumann* '52. The Thompsons have just built a mountain home at Big Bear Lake in the San Bernardino Mountains near Los Angeles. Dr. Thompson also writes that they have visited former dean *Curtis Wilson* and his family in La Jolla, Cal.

1961

Darrell L. Henry, president of the Alumni Association and Zoning Hearing Officer for Anne Arundel County (Md.), resigned the second of those positions to enter practice with an Annapolis law firm on February 12th. Mr. Henry received his law degree from the University of Baltimore in 1965.

Did you know that *Arthur I. Simon* was the discoverer and is now the manager of Goldie Hawn, the zany blonde featured in television's weekly show, "Laugh In"?

1963

Dr. *Oliver M. Korshin* visited the Santa Fe campus last November. He works for the U. S. Public Health Service out of San Francisco, and makes his home across the Bay in Tiburon.

1964

Stephen C. Fineberg writes from Athens, where, although a "confirmed philologist," he has been studying at the American School for Classical Studies this year. He plans to be back at the University of Texas next year, pursuing his doctoral work. Mr. Fineberg's experience in Athens has "opened whole new perspectives on antiquity" for him. "It was something of a rude awakening to discover that the Greece of the 19th century romantics . . . was in fact (and is) excessively muddy, sweaty, and above all very noisy."

1965

David R. Lachterman lectured in Annapolis on Friday, February 27th. His subject was "Selfhood and Reason," concerning Kant's distinction between theoretical and practical reason. Mr. Lachterman is a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Syracuse University, and a Fellow, Institute in Greek Philosophy and Science, Colorado College.

1966

Ian M. Harris writes that he received his M.A. degree last spring from Temple University, and that he is now enrolled in a doctoral program at Temple.

Michael Weaver in November was awarded a tuition scholarship and a graduate assistantship in the University of Cincinnati's Department of Philosophy.

1967

Gay (Singer) Baratta writes a most appealing letter about the life which she and husband *Joseph* '69 are leading in Israel. He has just finished an intensive Hebrew language course, and has started a program for potential teachers. Mrs. Baratta is a computer systems programmer at the Israel Institute of Technology. Their apartment in Haifa has a view of the entire city, the Mediterranean Sea, and the coast. The Barattas both, to quote Mrs. Baratta, ". . . find the goals of the St. John's language tutorial vividly realized in living here; learning and living with a new language really makes one think about what language is supposed to accomplish—and how it does it."

Richardson B. Gill, San Antonio, Tex., business executive, has announced his candidacy for the U. S. House of Representatives. He will try to unseat incumbent O. C. Fisher, a 28-year veteran of the Congress. Mr. Gill is president and chairman of the Board of Richard Gill Properties and of Gillsons Co., both of San Antonio, and a vice president of the El Rancho Grande Hotel Co. of Brownsville and San Antonio.

1968

William R. and *Rebecca (McClure) Albury* celebrated the arrival of their second child, Alicia Frances, on February 13th. Alicia's father is now a graduate student in the history of science at the Hopkins, while her mother is completing work for her bachelor's degree in the Evening College of the same university.

Christopher Ballmer (SF), replying to the mailing about the Italian charter flight, regretted that, since he was on ". . . a 52-week deluxe Vietnam holiday. . .," he could not possibly consider the one to Italy.

Jane-Ellen (Milord) Long writes that she is Book Editor and a member of the catalog department at Schwann, the Boston publisher of a well-known record catalog.

According to a recent letter from his father, *David I. Moss* (SF) is currently enrolled in the rabbinical program at the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York. During his first year after graduation, the younger Mr. Moss was a student at Hebrew University in Jerusalem. While in Israel he learned the exacting art of Torah calligraphy, and has gained some recognition designing marriage contracts for his friends. His father reports his son finds New York very noisy after Santa Fe and Jerusalem.

Donald J. and *Marilynne (Wills) Schell* announce with joy the arrival of Patience Alexandra (Sasha), born in New York City on the 19th of February. Mr. Schell is a second-year student at General Theological Seminary. Mrs. Schell has completed one semester toward her master's degree in Early Childhood and Elementary Education at New York University.

1969

Miriam A. Cunningham and Michael J. Cohen were married on November 23, 1969, and are making their home in Brooklyn, N. Y.

Linda Torcaso and *Mark Bernstein* were married on December 28th in Washington, D.C. They are now living in Philadelphia where she is a first-year student at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and he is a research associate at the Franklin Institute Museum.

Wendy Watson (SF) and *Kirk Cheyfitz* SF'68 were married several months ago in Washington, D.C., and are making their home in that city.

In Memoriam

1909—Col. Everett LeC. Cook, Washington, D.C., January 8, 1970.

1912—Col. Charles R. Jones, San Antonio, Tex., January 20, 1970.

1915—Howard Claude, Galena, Md., February 25, 1970.

1916—Col. Gabriel T. Mackenzie, Kendall, Fla., January 12, 1970.

1920—Dr. Joseph J. Klebach, Scranton, Pa.

1922—William D. K. Aldridge, Chestertown, Md., Summer, 1969.

Philip H. Cooper, Phoenix, Md., July 26, 1969.

Edgar F. Voelcker, Baltimore, Md., November 1, 1969.

1923—BGen. William C. Baxter, Phoenix, Md., January 29, 1970.

1926—George A. Woodward, Crofton, Md., January 12, 1970.

1931—Henry S. Emrich, Pacific Palisades, Cal., March 7, 1970.

1933—Carl S. Thomas, Easton, Md., November 24, 1969.

1935—MGen. George M. Gelston, Lutherville, Md., February 17, 1970.

1937—Herbert K. Clayton, Baltimore, Md., December 1, 1969.

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