THE MUSIC OF THE REPUBLIC

by
Eva Brann



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"...absque philosophia
civitatem philosophicam expressi
mortalibus."

THE MUSIC OF THE <u>REPUBLIC</u>

This study came about in the pursuit of questions raised in a reading group formed by the Misses S. Manire, S. Rutzky, D. Schwartz and myself. A shortened version was given as a Friday night lecture on March 18, 1966 at St. John's College in Annapolis.

Survey of Theses

I. Mythos

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A. The *Republic* is composed of concentric rings encompassing a center. 1

B. The outer ring represents Socrates' descent into the house of Pluto-Cephalus.
1. The oath "By the Dog" is an appeal to Hermes the Conductor of Souls. 2
2. Socrates assumes the role of Heracles, founder of cities. 3
3. His longest labor is the bringing up of the triple monster Cerberus - the soul. 4
4. His greatest labor is the release of a new Theseus. 4

II. Logos

A. The second ring represents the founding and degeneration of cities "in speech" (Books III, IV and VIII, IX).
1. Four cities are founded: the city of demiurges or craftsmen, of warriors, of guardians, and of philosophers. 5
2. To these correspond four degenerate forms.

B. These cities are "in speech" only, since they can be neither generated or regenerated.
1. The Phoenician tale implies that men can be mined as a public treasure. 6
2. The just city founders on the un-naturalness of human nature and on the "founding paradox". 7
3. The degenerate cities themselves are actual, but the argument about them is "detached". 9

C. In Polemarchus' house justice, defined as "doing one's own business", is the craftsmen's specific virtue.

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1. The "demiurge" is opposed to the "panurge" in all his forms. 9
2. The inner justice of the philosopher converts the definition into "knowing one's own soul". 11
3. For the philosopher the argument that justice is profitable fails. 11

III. Ergon

A. In the center of the Republic Socrates founds the philosopher's city "in deed" (Books V-VII).
   1. A public vote forces Socrates to propose his communal design. 12
   2. Other works corroborate that the philosopher city is not the guardian city. 13
   3. Socrates' city in the Timaeus is not that of the Republic 14

B. The paradoxical condition for bringing about the city is that its founder must already live within it.
   1. Socrates lives so as to fulfill this condition. 14
   2. Glaucon has the qualifications of a young ruler. 15
   3. The bodily community of the guardian city is replaced by a dialogic community. 16

C. Democracy, the exact inverse of the just city, perversely proves to be the soil for the just city. 17

D. The just city can be brought to life by providing a fitting macrocosm, as in the Timaeus.
   1. Temperance replaces justice in this city. 18
   2. Antiquity in the Timaeus represents spurious actuality. 19

IV. Music

A. Glaucon's education in Books V-VII is Socratic music.
   1. The guardians' training is by purged traditional music (Books II and X).
      a. Socrates corrects the myths of gods and Hades but postpones the correction of the myths of man. 20
      b. The Republic itself exactly obeys the stylistic requirements of "purged music". 21
      c. This music is explicitly excluded from the plan of the philosophers' education. 21

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   2. Socrates' music is "philosophical music".
      a. Socrates has spent his life making music. 22
      b. Socratic mimeses of truth are images rather than myths. 22
      c. Such images are sketched in the soul by long reflection. 22
      d. Socratic images induce a logos while myths are preceded by one. 22
      e. Socrates fulfills his own requirement that all poets make an "image of the Good". 23
      f. Socrates corrects the Promethean Myth of Man in the Cave Image. 23
   3. His plan for the philosophical education is presented musically as the "prelude" of mathematics and the "hymn" of dialectic. 23
   4. The central dialogue is a symmetric texture of images and their explications and correlations. 24

B. The discovery of opinion (doxa) is Glaucon's introduction to philosophy.
   1. The outer dialogue requires the "helmet of Hades" which excludes "good opinion" (Books II and X), but the central conversation is governed by "true opinion." 25
   2. Summary of 474-480 (Book V). As "becoming" is between being and non-being, so "opinion" is between ignorance and knowing. 26
   3. "Opinion" corresponds to "spirit", the mean between "reasoning" (logistikon), and "desire" in the tripartite soul. 26
   4. The logistikon, properly called the "calculating power", is a lesser faculty than "knowing". 27
   5. After the new division of the soul as an "instrument of learning" the terms of the "lower" tripartite soul designate desires. 28
   6. The finer division of the soul by finding "the middle" is the dialogue's main pre-dialectical exercise. 29

C. The orator Socrates is elected to defend philosophy before the democracy (487-505, Book VI).
   1. Adeimantus is the expert on corruption. 29
   2. Socrates by his images persuades the many to accept philosophers as kings. 30
   3. He refuses Adeimantus access to the "highest study", the Good. 31

D. Socrates tells Glaucon of the Good in a "true image", the "sun image".
   1. Summary and tables of 506-511 (Book VI). The sun image is explicated by the Divided Line. 32

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2. The image requires Glaucon to exercise the two lower, "doxastic" powers of the soul
   - a. The lower of these, likeness-making and recognizing (*eikasia*), known to Glaucon as a game, is Socrates' chief instrument in this context. The image itself forces Glaucon to recognize the visible world as a mere image. — 34
   - b. His trust (*pistis*) in the visible world is shaken and a belief in the rule of the Good is substituted. — 35
   - c. Socrates' non-dialectical or "doxastic" presentation of the Good serves to avoid misunderstanding and to instill a kind of artificial recollection in Glaucon. — 35
3. The Divided Line, a figure for knowledge, provides training for Glaucon's power of "thinking." [illegible],
   - a. *Dianoia*, "thinking things through", involves a higher *eikasia* in two ways: natural objects are here regarded as images, and also analogies are to be made by recognizing likenesses. — 36
   - b. The mathematical faculty characteristic of Glaucon, *dianoia*, is discovered by him as a "mean". — 37
   - c. Socrates particularly invites Glaucon to a dialogue on number; this passage is the only approach to dialectic in the *Republic*. — 37
   - d. *Dialegesthai* has three meanings: *conversation* among the many, *dialogue* between a knower and a learner, and *dialectic*, the movement of the soul within itself. — 38
4. The mathematical model of proportion (*analogia*) is fully exploited.
   - a. The Good is not really a "study". — 39
   - b. The absence of dialectical accounts (*logoi*) of being is expressed by the absence of definite ratios (*logoi*) between the line sections. — 40
   - c. Socrates forms four proportions from the Divided Line, showing Glaucon how sameness of relation runs through the whole before he knows the parts themselves. — 41
   - d. This induces him to trust the bond of similarity (*homoiotes*) required for dianoetic ascent, which is by likenesses. — 42
   - e. The Good, by exercising a downward *eikasia* and likening things to itself, makes this ascent possible. — 43
   - f. The mimetic arts are condemned for usurping the power of the Good (Book X). — 43

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5. The image of the Good implicitly introduces Glaucon to the fundamental problems of dialectic.
   - a. The Good has three capacities: as *progenitor* it fathers the sun; it is the *responsible cause* (*aitia*) of knowing; it is the *ruling source* (*arche*) of being. These are presented in reverse order of "political" importance. — 43
   - b. A diagram shows how being is articulated in doubles by the Good, and particularly why becoming is doubly apprehended, in *sense perception* and *opinion*. — 44
   - c. The Good is not really a differentiating but a binding source complimented, as the image implies, by a secondary "dyadic" source. — 45
   - d. "Likeness", which fails to account for "participation" within the realm of being, takes the place of "otherness" beyond being. It is that "bond," by which the whole becomes one, which the three-term proportion of the Divided Line expresses. — 46
   - e. In the dialectic progress from "what each is" to "what the Good is" the latter is revealed as "the whole", and thus as the pattern of all political community. — 47
   - f. The Myth of Er contains the mythical counterpart of the sun image - a model of the world within the world. — 48

E. Socrates tells Glaucon of evil in a second "true image", the "cave image".
1. Summary and table of 514-517 (Book VII). The cave is to the upper world as the place of visibility is to the place of thought. — 48
2. While in the sun image the places prepared by the Good for the soul are shown, the cave image shows the actual dwelling of men; thus the cave image explicitly includes ignorance and even deceit. Ignorance, however, corresponds to non-being. — 50
3. Therefore a different correlation of the images is implicit:

	sun image		*cave image*
{	being: intellectual realm		
{	becoming: ⟵	sensible realm	⟶
{	non-being:		underground realm — 51

4. Non-being is the mother corresponding to the Good as father.
   - a. Politics as the dissembling art of managing human stupidity has a special place in the cave image. — 51
   - b. The cave as womb is a figure for non-being, to which is opposed the realm of being under the sun; between them lies the road along which "coming into being" takes place. — 52

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c. Socrates identifies the cave as the mortal Hades, the "sightless place". The backward position of the prisoners signifies human perversion, which is corrected by the Socratic "conversion". 52
d. Socrates alludes to Pythagoras' descent into Hades; in fact the dialogue itself has the form of a Pythagorean "recollection exercise". 53

F. Socrates recites the "hymn of dialectic" for Glaucon.
1. The ascent from the cave represents the road of learning, which has three parts:
a. "Conversion" is not within the formal plan because it is, in effect, now being accomplished. 53
b. The "haul upwards" is effected by the building of an intelligible cosmos according to a purified Pythagorean mathematical curriculum. Socratic mathematics as a "propaideutic" study is "inverse" or "dreaming" dialectic. 54
c. Dialectic itself is withheld from Glaucon as accessible only by the path of study; instead its praises are sung in a "hymn". 55
d. Having heard the plan, Glaucon, as an initiate of the mysteries of learning, becomes a fellow law-giver. 55
2. The ages for study and practice are set as in a formal curriculum.
a. The education of the rulers always leads out of the city which contains nothing "fair" for them; in it geometry is substituted for eros. 56
b. Because of the hypothetical character of "patterns", the rulers in the Constitution do not study constitutions, but learn to rule "in the light of the whole". 57
c. Socrates introduces the dead philosophers as "new divinities". 58
d. Socrates has brought up his Theseus. 58

I. Myth

A.

At the center of Plato's second longest dialogue, the Constitution (Politeia), usually called the Republic, there is an ergon, a deed or accomplishment. In order to find this center it is necessary to establish the periphery. The Republic is composed on the plan of concentric rings; the themes on the diameter reappear in reverse order as if they were reflected through the central axis. The outermost periphery is a setting of myth. A broad inner ring consists of the construction and destruction of the successive forms of a pattern city in "speech", logos. The themes of this ring, for instance the attack on the poets, are also symmetrical with respect to the center. This center itself, clearly defined as such by the plan of the dialogue, presents the actual founding of a city in "deed", ergon.

B.

1. Anyone who has used an annotated edition of the Republic[1] will have read the curious anecdote told by Diogenes Laertius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus about the beginning of the work. The latter reports that many stories about the care Plato took to "comb and curl" his dialogues were current and especially one about a tablet found at his death which contained "that beginning of the Republic which goes 'I went down yesterday to Peiraeus with Glaucon the son of Ariston', transposed with subtle variety." We may infer that some special meaning was to be conveyed by the beginning. Indeed there is something curious about its style: ancient as well as modern Athenians, when they visit their harbor, do not go "to Peiraeus" but "to the Peiraeus" (e.g., Thucydides VIII,92,11); this is Cephalus' own usage (388 c 6),[2] and since he lives there he ought to know. The phrase εἰς Πειραιᾶ is to be heard in a special way. Now it happens that the Athenians heard a certain meaning in this name - it meant the "beyond-land", ἡ περαία, the land beyond the river which was thought once to have separated the Peiraic peninsula from Attica.[3] Therefore let us try reading: "I descended yesterday to the land beyond the river together with Glaucon the son of Ariston,...in order to offer my devotions," he goes on, "to the goddess...." The goddess, we learn at the end of the first book (354 a 11), is Bendis, a Thracian stranger identified with Hecate,[4] the guardian deity of the underworld. Socrates is on his way back up to

town when Polemarchus with his companions detains him and presses him to come to his house, where they find Cephalus, Polemarchus' rich old father, sitting in state. He is on that "threshold [to Hades] which is old age" (328 e 6).[5] As he himself explains, he scarcely has a body anymore; He is, as his name signifies, a mere "head" - as Socrates slyly points out, he sits on a head rest, a <u>proscephalaion</u> (328 c 1). His riches, <u>ploutos</u>, (331 b 7), Socrates suspects, are his great comfort. A strange light is thrown on him and his house by an ancient source which reports him over thirty years dead at the dramatic date of the dialogue, which is between 411 and 405 B.C.; his son himself has only a few more years to live before his death at the hands of the Thirty Tyrants.[6] <u>We are in the city of shades</u>, in the house of Pluto.

Socrates occasionally refers to this situation throughout the dialogue, for instance when he declares to Thrasymachus and the others who are there, in solemnly ambiguous language, that he will not cease his efforts until he has prepared them "against that other life when, born again, they may happen to hold such discourse" (498 d 3-4). And the very figure for the young guardians of the city which he builds for his audience is a reminder of the setting: they are to be like watchdogs who, as true lovers of wisdom, determine their friends and their enemies by the test of their knowledge or ignorance of them. The perverse pattern of such dogs is Hesiod's hound of Hades who possesses the "evil art" (<u>Theogony</u>, 770) of fawning on strangers and devouring those at home in Hades.

2. What is Socrates' business down there? To detect the myth that provides the venerable setting for Socrates' descent it is necessary to go rather far afield for a moment.

On certain occasions Socrates uses an oath which was evidently considered in antiquity to be his very own: "By the dog!", and in the <u>Gorgias</u> (482 b 9) more explicitly: "By the dog, the Egyptian god!".[7] Socrates uses the oath several times in the <u>Republic</u> and often in characteristic contexts, that is, in rhetorical passages and particularly in those concerned with the philosopher's part in politics (399 e 5, 592 a 7). Who is the Egyptian dog god whom Socrates calls on? Plutarch (<u>On Isis and Osiris</u> 368 e-f) describes him: he is born of an underworld mother but nursed by a heavenly goddess and thus belongs to both realms; he can see his way both by light and by dark and therefore has the office of mediating between the upper and the lower world. His Egyptian name is Anubis, but to the Greeks he is Hermes, the Interpreter, the "psychagogue" who conducts the souls of the dead and guides those who must descend into Hades while yet alive (cf. <u>Diogenes Laertius</u> VIII,31). He is also the bringer of political

wisdom to men (<u>Protagoras</u>, 322 c 2). In particular, Hermes is known as the guide of the hero Heracles in his famous descent into Hades (<u>Odyssey</u> XI,626) and is often so represented on vases.

Heracles himself is a most versatile hero.[8] He is the chief founder of cities - witness the many cities called Heracleia. He is the great civilizer, "using music" - at which he is proficient - in this task. He is the guardian of boys' education, the guardian of the <u>palaestra</u>, and the boys devote their hair to him. He teaches men letters; Plutarch jokingly calls him "most dialectical" (<u>The E at Delphi</u>, 387 d). He is a partisan of virtue, having, according to a story told by Socrates (Xenophon, <u>Memorabilia</u> II,1,21; cf. <u>Symposium</u> 177 b), chosen to follow Virtue as a teacher rather than Vice because of the happiness, (<u>eudaimonía</u>) she promised. But Heracles' greatest fame derives from the deeds or labors imposed on him by the unjust king Eurystheus. These include the killing of the snake-headed Hydria and of the Nemean Lion, but his most awesome deed is his descent, his <u>katábasis</u>, into Hades. His task there is to bring up to the light of day the triple monster Cerberus. He has Hades' permission to do this, but he is to gentle and persuade the beast and not to hurt it. On his way into Hades, so the story goes, he at first forgets his business and allows the shades to detain him in conversation. Before returning, he performs an incidental labor, a <u>parergon</u>, in releasing Theseus, his emulator and the founder and lawgiver of Athens, who is chained down in Hades, though he fails to free Theseus' companion Peirithous. While in Hades he is nearly washed away by the underworld river.

This hero is, as it were, made for Socrates, and he himself makes the comparison. In the <u>Apology</u>, speaking of his search for a wise man, he says to the court: "And by the dog, men of Athens - for I must speak the truth to you - those who had the greatest reputation seemed to me nearly the most deficient... so I must show you how I wandered as if performing certain labors..." (22 a 1). Every Athenian would of course recognize the allusion; most translators put it into the text. Again, in an interlude in the <u>Phaedo</u>, Socrates, playing with Phaedrus' hair, which, if he is Heracles, is his due, explicitly consents to take that role in the battle of argument, with Phaedo playing Iolaus (89 b-c).

There are certain signs and indications that Socrates plays this same role in the <u>Republic</u>. He "descends" to the land beyond, is caught in conversation in the house of Pluto and, like the phantom Heracles whom Odysseus meets on his own visit to the shades - the true Heracles is among the gods - he tells down there the story of his own descent (<u>Odyssey</u> XI,601). He first fights the sophist Thrasymachus, who comes at him "like a beast" (336 b 5)[9] and with whom he says he would as soon quibble as "shave a lion" (341 c 1). A little later Thrasymachus, laughing σαρδάνιον, "like one doomed" as the scholiast explains the word, adresses him "O Heracles! this is that wanted dissembling of Socrates" (337 a 4), which is, of course,

nothing but a popular exclamation of wonder, but which sounds almost like the lion's roar of recognition - by the end of the first book the lion is subdued. At one point Socrates refers to the wrong way to kill the Hydria, implying that he knows the better way (426 e 8).

3-4. But the longest labor begins after the "prelude" (357 a 2) of the first book. In the nine books following, the running motif will be that Heraclean theme, the relation of virtue to happiness, ever recalled, even in the midst of yet greater matters which are curtailed in its favor (e.g., 445 a, 580 b, 608 c); this relation is to be examined in a man who is wearing the Ring of Gyges (359 c 6) and, as Socrates adds, the Helmet of Hades too (612 b 5), a magic cap which deprives him in life of all appearance and reputation and puts him on a level with the bare, stript souls in Hades (cf. <u>Gorgias</u>, 523 c). In the course of this argument Socrates will indeed teach his audience letters, using the great text of the city to teach them the small letters of the soul (368 d, cf. 402 a 7). He will, as we shall see, found a city. By the "psychagogy" of his rhetorical music (<u>Phaedrus</u> 261 a, Aristophanes, <u>Birds</u> 1553[10]) he will release his Theseus, blamelessly confined to Hades (391 c 8). But his longest effort will drag to light a triple monster having, like Cerberus himself, a bush of snakes for its lower part (590 b 1). Having plumbed in argument the remote depths of the tyrant's life, Socrates recalls once more "those first words because of which we came here" (588 b 1), namely Thrasymachus' claim that injustice under the reputation of justice is profitable. To conclude the case against him they "model an image of the soul in words" (588 b 10). It will, Socrates says, be a creature such as is found in ancient myth, a Chimaera or Scylla or a <u>Cerberus</u>, whose nature it is to have "many forms grown together into one" (588 c 4) under the outward guise of a man's shape. When they have brought up the soul and cleansed it of accretions (611) "we have", Socrates says, "discharged ourselves of the argument" (612 a 8). Heracles has delivered Hades of its monster.

Having ceased to enact a myth, Socrates closes the dialogue by telling one, a recollection of one of those "myths which are told about those in Hades" which keep tormenting Cephalus who is so close to these things (330 d 7). In this myth, Er, the Pamphylian or "All-tribesman" (614 b 4) is charged by the souls to carry back to the living the long tale of their thousand-year journey, of the ascent or descent which is their reward or punishment. He actually tells only of the <u>end</u> of these journeys since, as Socrates significantly observes to Glaucon, the story itself would take "a very long time to go through" (615 a 5). Socrates ends the dialogue by urging Glaucon to hold fast to the "upward way" (cf. 514 b 4), so that they may do well in the

thousand-year journey "which we have just gone through" (ἣν διελύθαμεν, 621 d 1). He means the ascent of the dialogue itself (e.g., 473 a 5, 544 c 9).

This then is the setting of the <u>Republic</u>: Hades with its tales and a deliverer willing to go down and able to come up - a most appropriate setting, for down there, so all the tales go, justice is close at hand (330 d 8, 614 c 3).[11]

II. <u>Logos</u>

A.

1-2. We come now to the arguments, <u>logoi</u>, which form the broad middle ring encircling the center. As the question concerning the connection of justice to happiness is answered by bringing to light the human soul, so the soul itself is discovered by raising and taking down cities. This is done "in speech" (λόγῳ) and not, to use a pervading Greek opposition, "in deed" (ἔργῳ, e.g., 382 e 8, 383 a 5, 498 e 4). Let us first follow these city constructions.

At the beginning of the enterprise Socrates says: "Come then, let us make a city from the beginning <u>in argument</u>" (τῷ λόγῳ, 369 c 9, cf. also 369 a 5, 472 e 1, 592 a 11). The object is to find the nature of justice by looking at the largest context to which it is applicable - hence the city founded in speech will have to be just. They first found a community of craftsmen, workers collected to ply their own trades so as to supply each others' wants, making the city as a whole self-sufficient (369 b). In this city the full political weight of the Greek name for craftsmen, <u>demiourgoi</u> (δημιουργοί, 370 d 6) "public workers", is realized. This, as we will see, is the most literal model from which to read off the definition of justice which runs through the <u>Republic</u>, but just as Socrates is about to do that, Glaucon stops him. This, he says, is a city of pigs (372 d 4). He means that the citizens' whole being, like that of pigs, is absorbed in consuming and being consumed - there is no place or leisure for honor and pride. Socrates, though still maintaining that this city is the "true" and "healthy" city (372 e 6), yields to Glaucon and changes the "first city" (373 c 5, Aristotle, <u>Politics</u> 1291 a 18) by the addition of luxury and that soldier element which will procure wealth and maintain safety. He assents to the construction of this "fevered" city because in it one might see "how justice <u>and</u> injustice grow up in cities" (372 e 5); this city, then, will contain the seeds of injustice also. He describes the natures and the training of the soldiers or guardians (φύλακες), a subject to which we must return. At

the end of this long argument (375-414) Socrates again reorganizes the city, this time by division, namely of the guardians into guardians proper, older men who rule, and the auxilliaries (ἐπικούρους καὶ βοηθούς, 414 b 5), the younger fighting men. This third, tripartite, city suffices to read off the similar constitution of the soul and to show conclusively that, as in the city, so in the soul justice must be profitable. Socrates now considers the positive half of his task finished and is about to go on to investigate how injustice comes about in cities and souls (445-449, Book IV). He is interrupted. Three whole books (V-VII) intervene in which a fourth and very different city is founded. Not until Book VIII does he return to the argument. In Glaucon's figure, "like a wrestler he assumes again the same position" (545 b 5) and goes on to account in order for the four degenerate cities (544-592). When this argument, the complement to the genesis of cities, is done, Glaucon once again refers to "the city which we have just been founding and which is preserved <u>in speech</u> only, for I do not think that it is anywhere on earth" (592 a 10).

B.

1. Now what is the meaning of the claim that the genesis of the city, or the city itself, is only "in speech"? It means of course first of all that no actual city of living men comes into being while they speak or as a consequence of their discourse. But that is mere fact. What is more interesting is that no such city <u>can</u> come to be now or later, <u>by the design and intent of the argument itself</u>. These word constructions are not "constitutions", the practical patterns for working cities such as Plato and his pupils were invited to write for Greek cities.[12] The dialogue conveys this in one astounding fact: no human being is ever <u>born into</u> any of the three cities - they cannot regenerate themselves; they are unnatural. The first city is constituted by collection, the second by addition, the third by division. No less strange is the original physical settlement of the third city which is first said to begin with the <u>exodus</u> of the guardians to a camp outside the old city (415 d 6), but later with the <u>expulsion</u> of all souls over ten years old (540 e 5). The citizens are to accept this curious fashion of founding a community because of the "Phoenician myth", the one noble lie (414 b 9) which they are told (414; cf. 489 c 8): that their youth and education was a dream; that they were really formed like metals in the womb of the earth their mother, who sent them up fully formed, that they are therefore all brothers, though of different metal. Those who have an admixture of gold must rule and those of silver must assist

for, as an oracle foretells, the city will fall when a man of brass or iron rules. The purity of the metals must be carefully preserved, and if a gold or silver parent has a child with an admixture of brass or iron he must consent to see it put into a lower class.

The "lie" in this myth is not that men are of different metals or that the city cannot survive the wrong kind of ruler - all that is true - but rather the claim that the citizens have no proper natural birth and no privacy of soul. Under their flattering epithet "earth-born" (415 d 7), which intimates that they are Giants, is hidden the claim that they are natural bastards who have a mother but no father and that their soul can be accurately assayed like any ore. So too the continuation of the city depends on the citizens' belief,[13] that each generation is newly mined, like a public treasure, from the earthly element on which the city rests.

But the curious character of this "needful lie" (414 b 9) is that the joke is, so to speak, on the guardians. The myth must not only be believed to be true - it ought in fact to be so, if the city is to breed true. For if men are <u>not</u> born from a common parent at the right time and with pure souls easily assayed, the guardians cannot control the new generation and insure the stability of the city.

2. The community (<u>koinonia</u>) of women and children, the "source of the greatest good to the city" (464 b 5) is intended to achieve exactly this community of birth. All children born in the same year are to be ignorant of their parents and are to be called brothers and sisters, although this ignorance may eventually lead to incest (461 e 2). These children of the city will be tested all the time, but one of the conditions for stability is beyond the guardians' control: the timing of the mating. For as Glaucon wisely observes, the best are drawn by necessity to have intercourse with the best, but this necessity is "not geometric but erotic" (458 d 5). Yet the guardians' control of breeding is to be precisely "geometric". The Phoenician myth, in accord with Phoenician greed (436 a 2), makes of men a Plutonic treasure to be dug up and refined at will; the scientific counterpart of this is to consider them a crop to be sowed and harvested in accordance with the heavenly motions.

The geometry of these motions as they affect breeding is, however, not known to the rulers. In Book VIII Socrates has just resumed the discussion of the degenerate cities when he stops himself and prays to the Muses to tell him "how discord first arose", an allusion to the <u>Iliad</u> (I,6; XVI,112) and the fall of the city of Troy. The Muses' response is a mathematical myth. A city so constituted as his, they say, can hardly be moved (546 a 1), but since everything which has a genesis also has a degeneration, the city will not last forever - note that in the order of argument the decline in fact follows <u>immediately</u> upon the beginning. It must come because the

the rulers' reasoning, or rather their calculating power, mixed with sense (λογισμῷ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως, b 1) as it is, will not be able to apprehend the "geometric number" which governs births. The Muses recite this fabulous number, which is indeed not to be understood. Thus the generation of rulers is corrupted and as a final consequence of their baser metal they neglect the study of music and lose the power of testing souls. This is how the decline of Hesiod's ages, from gold down to iron begins.

Human generation is thus an impenetrable mystery, and the city founders on the rock of the fact of bisexual generation. The human being, considered as that unstable union of body and soul, does not run <u>true to type</u> as does a plant. Human nature is un-natural. This is the insuperable problem which is again attacked in the <u>Statesman</u> (271), where the Golden Age, the age of the direct divine rule of Cronos, is characterized exactly by this - that men grow directly from the earth and have no human birth. Later on Socrates quotes an old phrase[14] to contrast the city with non-human nature: "You do not think," he says, "that constitutions come out of 'oaks and rocks' and not out of the characters of those in the city?" (544 d 8). Very nearly the same figure is used by Vergil for the human race of the Golden Age of Saturn; they are sprung from "trunks of trees or rugged oaks" (<u>Aeneid</u> VIII,314). The Golden Age is the age when men grow naturally.

The dialogue itself tacitly underscores the impossibility of genetic control, both at the very beginning and at the very end. For of those said to be present in Cephalus' house, five are full brothers, two of them Glaucon and Adeimantus, sons of Ariston, and the three others Polemarchus, Lysias, and Euthydemus, the host's sons. The conversation itself will show how the sons of the "Best" - Socrates often alludes to the meaning of the father's name (e.g., 327 a 1, 368 a 4) - differ profoundly, and something similar was known of Polemarchus and Lysias (<u>Phaedrus</u> 257 b). And the Myth of Er which concludes the conversation shows why generation is intractable; human nature is not determined on the hither side of life by others, but in the "divine place" beyond by each soul for itself (617 d 6). The coming to be of the city is therefore not in accord with the coming to be of human beings.

The enigma of regeneration is, however, only secondary to the paradox of the city's foundation itself. For, it turns out, only those will be content to accept this constitution who have accepted the "dye" of its laws (430 a 3). The just city can only be realized by its own children; to begin it must have already begun. We see why the act of settlement itself is so indefinite, amounting once to the emigration of all rulers and another time to the removal of all adults who leave behind a city of children. This is what is meant by claiming that the

three constructed cities are cities in speech only. They are the kind of city that the dialogue's most knowing reader was to call a "No-place", a <u>Utopia</u>.

3. The degenerate cities which are symmetrical with the three constructed cities are, on the other hand, all too realizable - indeed they exist. Socrates underscores this by mentioning, in this context alone, actual Greek cities, namely Crete and Sparta, the timocracies (544 c 3). Yet here too, in a different way, the argument is remote from the deed.

The argument that Socrates returns to in the eighth book had just been initiated at the end of the fourth. Of the five "bends" (τρόποι) of the soul, one alone is good while the other four illustrate the multifariousness of evil; to these latter correspond four cities. They have "so far ascended in argument" (445 c 5) as to stand on a look-out tower whence to view the manyness of vice. This discussion of vice, when picked up three books later, continues to rise above its subject until, having traversed timocracy, oligarchy, and democracy, they finally look down on the sink of tyranny and the abyss of the tyrant's misery which is 729 days, that is two years of continual travel, beneath them (587). This is what characterizes all serious discussions of vice - they must certainly not bring about that of which they speak, but rather become more detached the closer they come to the truth, just as the best judge of criminals should have the least experience of crime (409 a). The effect of this "remoteness" on the argument itself is that the degeneration of cities is presented as an inevitable downward progression. Here the argument takes account, as it were, of its own impotence - the situation is in actual fact desperate and in a few years a fierce battle between the democratic faction and not one but Thirty Tyrants will be raging about the sanctuary of the very goddess whose feast is now being celebrated (Xenophon, <u>Hellenica</u>, II,4,11), and the tyranny will have destroyed the host's family, while a few years later a temporarily restored democracy will have murdered Socrates (399 B.C.).

C.

1. The facts of the host's family's condition and politics determine the conversation in yet another and pervasive way. The family runs a prosperous shield manufacturing and selling business, and both Polemarchus and Lysias are known to have democratic leanings though, we may suppose, of a decent and moderate sort. This is the clue to the peculiar treatment of the virtue which later gave the subtitle "On Justice" to the dialogue. It is not usually Socrates' way to inquire whether a thing is profitable or unprofitable before having inquired

"what it is" (e.g., Meno 71 b), but this is just what happens with respect to justice in the Republic. From the second book to the end the question is: Is justice profitable? What justice is, is assumed. As Socrates, somewhat to Glaucon's annoyance, insists (432 e 8), when they come to find justice in the city they have constructed they find there nothing more than they put in; the city is just because they have made it that way (433 a 1, 443 b 7). The working definition that is not the result but the assumption of the argument is that justice is "doing one's own business and not meddling" (τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν, 433 a 8), a definition they have heard from many others and have themselves often given.

Justice so conceived is, to begin with, simply the opposite of the literal understanding of the names for various degrees of wrong-doing. There is πολυπραγμονεῖν (433 a 9, 443 d 2, 444 b 2), literally "much-doing" or being a meddling busy-body, πάντα ποιεῖν (596 c 2), "doing everything" or being a jack-of-all-trades — Socrates' favorite description of the sophists' easy expertise (cf. 397, 596, cf. Sophist 233 d 9) and worst of all, πανουργεῖν (409 c 5), "being up to anything" or simple shameless wickedness, the behavior of the man who takes full advantage of the impunity given by Adeimantus' Ring of Gyges. Positively, justice is acting in accordance with that conveniently ambiguous phrase εὖ πράττειν, either "doing right" or "being well", with which the Republic ends (463 e 4, 519 e 1, 621 d 1).

From this point of view the most simply just city is, as Socrates himself says, the first, the self-sufficient city of demiurges or craftsmen who both know and do their own business (373 e 6, 428 b 12). In them virtue is indeed wisdom (σοφία), in the good old-fashioned sense in which sophia means what in English used to be meant by "cunning", namely craft and skill, and arete means the power to do work, the "virtue" of an agent (cf. 350 c 4, 353 e 1).

We may well ask how a view so practical, almost pat, comes to underlie the dialogue. It is necessary here to recall that justice in the city is exposed by finding and analyzing out the other virtues and considering the remainder (427 e 13). Thus wisdom is found to be the rulers' virtue, courage that of the warriors, temperance the agreement of all on who shall rule (432 a). Justice is then found in each class as that virtue by which it does its own work and nothing else. Now clearly in this context temperance is somewhat redundant. In fact, when Socrates turns from the city to the soul he makes no distinction between justice and temperance (443 d 4, cf. Laws 696 d 11, where temperance is called a mere "appendage", πρόσθημα, and Charmides 161 b 6, where Critias very knowingly, as he thinks, proposes the present definition of justice as a definition of temperance). We may therefore say that justice is that special virtue which all three classes possess

and consequently a unique and special virtue for the craftsmen, "the popular and citizen virtue" (τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετήν, Phaedo 82 a 11). It is the virtue by reason of which each performs "that to which his own nature is most fitted" (εἰς ὃ αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη πεφυκυῖα εἴη, 433 a 5), by which, we might almost say, a human being is ever himself. In some cases this means quite simply "minding one's own business", as must the lover of wisdom, for instance, in a city not fitted to his nature (496 d 6). Justice might therefore be termed the private public virtue which turns particular natures to the general account. This is why its presence is the greatest good and its absence the greatest ruin to cities (433 c 4 - 444 b 7).

This virtue, in essence decent self-respect, is therefore quite naturally discussed under the roof of people who would constitute the multitude of the merchant and artisan class of the third city, supplying young warriors like the sons of Ariston with their armor and occasionally sending a philosophically disposed son like Polemarchus (cf. Phaedrus 257 b 4) up into the ruling class.

2. But Socrates never allows us to forget that this third city is a dialogical phantom and that the justice in it is, for all its apparent practicality, a mere "idol" (εἴδωλόν τι 433 c 4), since the true virtue does not lie in deeds concerned with the outside but in the inner disposition of the classes (γένη, d 3) of the soul and their ordering. We will see that in the case of the true ruler, that is, of one so "constituted" as to be able first of all to rule himself, the distinction between "his own affairs" and "others' business" vanishes. For him that which is most common is also most his own "and with his private affairs he will preserve the common business" καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων τὰ κοινὰ σώσει, 497 d 5). In him, "doing his own business" will be turned into "knowing himself", which means "looking...at myself, whether I happen to be some beast more complicated than Typhon [Cerberus' father, Theogony 311] or a gentler and simpler animal" (Phaedrus 230 a). True justice is concerned with that in man which is "truly about himself and his own business" (ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, 443 d 1). This is the reason why, as we shall see below, the soul is the one single subject of the dialectical method in the Republic.

3. This "inversion" of justice in the case of the true ruler, that is, in the philosopher king, leads to a curious suspension of the main argument in the central three books. If for the guardian rulers justice can only with difficulty be proved to be profitable because of the hard life they lead (419 a, 465 e 4), for the philosopher kings it is altogether impossible. For those who already consider themselves to be living in the Isles of the Blessed (519 c 5) the descent into

the city to take office cannot be made to seem like happiness (519 d 8) nor can it possibly improve the tone of their souls. They must be made to enter politics "forcibly" (ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον, 520 e 1); in fact their reluctance is a guarantee of their suitability (e 4). Glaucon sees immediately that the main point of the outer rings of the argument has been lost and wants to know if the philosopher rulers are not being treated unjustly (519 d 8). Socrates' answer is an evasion; it is not their happiness but that of the whole city which is to be considered. When all is said and done the true rulers of the Republic enter politics only out of pity, gratitude and simple decency (516 c, 520 a-e).

III. Ergon

A.

1. Socrates is about to go on with the investigation of the unjust cities when he is again restrained, as once before on his way up to Athens (327), by a conspiracy of Polemarchus and Adeimantus (449). After some whispering a vote is taken and the decree which has been passed is announced by Thrasymachus (450 a 3): Socrates must expand and defend a principle mentioned before with conspicuous briefness which is to give the city unanimity or better, perfect publicity: "Friends own what is common" (κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων, 449 c 5), a new political reading of a current phrase (cf. Lysias 207 c, Phaedrus 739 c), which may mean, significantly, two things: "what a friend owns is at the service of his friends", or "what friends own insofar as they are friends is communal by nature". They particularly want to know about the equality of education for men and women (451 b) and the community of wives and children (457 b). Socrates reluctantly complies and faces the first two of the three waves threatening to overwhelm him (473 b 6). He has gone on to describe such a city's relation to other Greek cities when Glaucon erupts:

"But it seems to me, Socrates, that if one were to allow you to talk about such matters you would never remember what it is you pushed aside in saying all this, namely this - is such a constitution capable of coming into being and in what way is it possible?" (471 c). And he insists on this question although Socrates stalls by getting him to admit that the object of their discourse was the discovery of justice and injustice and their respective merits, and that the "city in speech", having served that purpose is none the worse for being impractical (473 a 1). But since Glaucon insists, he

must not not force Socrates to show that "what they went through in speech (τῷ λόγῳ) can completely be in deed" (τῷ ἔργῳ); he must content himself with as close an approximation as is possible (a 1). This approximation will be reached by making the least number of changes in things now done badly in cities such that they may be founded according to their constitution, whether there be one or two or others, but as few as possible (b 4).

So Socrates, like Odysseus, meets that third wave which will carry him to his Phaeacia (Odyssey V,313,336,425). The one thing that must be changed, he announces solemnly (b 8) is this: "Unless either philosophers rule in the cities or those who are now called kings and dynasts philosophize genuinely and sufficiently and these two coincide, namely political power and philosophy, and the many natures of those who now pursue either way separately have been excluded by necessity there is no end of evils, my dear Glaucon, in cities or, in my opinion, in the human race" (c 11). He adds that he cannot see how any other city can be happy in public or in private.

Together with Glaucon he now prepares the ground for a new city. It is necessary to show why this "one change" may be said to produce a new city - is it not merely the guardian constitution put into effect? Both Socrates and Glaucon, at least, seem to regard these two as different; he calls the latter "the first selection" (536 c 8) and Glaucon refers to the former as the "better" city (543 d 1). And then, as Socrates himself says, an actual city is never the same as its pattern, its paradeigma, (472 d 9, 473 a). The guardian city and the philosopher city differ, then, as does a realization from its pattern. The discourse on the possible city will be, among other things, a subtle consideration of the relation of pattern to product, of "theory" to "practice". The addition of that which makes the pattern possible will prove to be that which makes it superfluous.

2. The philosopher kings can certainly not be regarded as part of the constitution of that just city which must have been known generally as "Socrates' city". Aristotle, in his critique of the Republic, mentions as its salient features the warrior class and the community of women, children and goods but omits all mention of the philosopher kings (Politics 1291 a 20, 1261 a 4). Aristophanes in The Female Parliament (427), where the community of goods and women becomes the law of Athens, fails to seize the comic opportunity inherent in the subject of female philosophers. It is likely that this play was written before the Republic and we may infer that people - Socrates in particular - were talking about such a city. In the dialogue there are enough passages parallel to the play[15]) to constitute an acknowledgement to posterity that the women's city is a parody of Socrates' notorious city. In fact, the nod is nearly explicit, for in facing his first wave Socrates remarks that after the men's part has been play-

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3. Last and most weighty is the account Socrates himself gives of his city in the <u>Timaeus</u> when he recapitulates the constitution which he had presented to his friends in a discourse on the previous day. There is no reason whatever to conclude that the <u>Republic</u> is that discourse. In fact, while the <u>Republic</u> is spoken on the day after the Bendidia, the <u>Timaeus</u>, quite appropriately, takes place on the Lesser Panathenaea, a festival which occurred two months later, also in the Peiraeus (26 e), and during which a gown was sent up to Athena "on which the Athenians, her nurslings, could be seen winning the war against the people of Atlantis" (Scholiast on <u>Republic</u> 327 a). Also the dramatic year of the <u>Timaeus</u> seems to be earlier than that of the <u>Republic</u>[16] The city Socrates recapitulates is not the city of the central books of the <u>Republic</u>, for, although his account is said to be complete (19 a 7), the philosopher kings are omitted; it is rather the "third city" with all its notorious features. We may infer that Socrates proposed this city on various occasions and that it was known as his.

This guardian city therefore differs from the philosopher city and differs as the impossible differs from the possible. Socrates himself explains to Adeimantus, when he asks whether this guardian city they have founded is the city suited to philosophy, that it <u>is</u> that city in many ways but that there "would always be needed <u>someone understanding the reasoning</u> (<u>logos</u>) behind the constitution - that same one who guided you when as a law-giver you laid down the laws" (497 c 7). The difference between the cities is therefore not constitutional, for the older guardians will still rule and rule so as to achieve the most harmonious community possible. The difference is rather in the rulers themselves, in what they will look to, in their education. We will see whether this may not outweigh any more externally obvious difference.

B.

1. But the claim is not that the fourth city is a possible city but that it is actual, that it comes into being while Glaucon and Socrates converse, that it is a city "in deed", <u>ergoi</u>. According to what has been said, this could happen only if one paradoxical condition were fulfilled: if there were some one adult who actually lives in the just city, who, as a living citizen of the city, can bring up another within it. This must be the case not only

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source. There is, as we will see, no eidos, no idea of a city, while the community which underlies dialogic communication is precisely eidetic, and, unlike the guardian's community of bodily goods (416 d), indestructible, for the eidos which underlies speech is not a delicate adjustment of "one out of many" but an indivisible one "by itself" and opposed to all manyness (e.g., 479). This is the "common thing" which belongs to friends. The foundation of the fourth city consists in beginning the dialogue with which an education begins. We will see exactly how Socrates goes about this founding act.

C.

But first it is necessary to see where and under what circumstances his foundation takes place.

The conversation of the Republic is held in the Peiraeus, the harbor of Athens, on the day of the Bendidea. In the mythical dimension this place is revealed as Hades, in fact it is a turbulent center of Athenian democracy. The cult of Bendis, a new Thracian import, is itself a symptom of dissolution, "a new workshop of turbulent revelry" as a comic writer[18] seems to have described it. Its celebration is to culminate that night in a torch-race and an "all-nighter" (παννυχίς, 328 a 8), an orgiastic affair which the young men are clearly waiting to join.

Socrates and Glaucon, both citizens of this democracy, will hold the conversation which occupies the central books of the Republic within this setting. It is, in a strange way, the right setting, as the dialogue itself intimates. To show this let us look at the degenerating cities and citizen souls of Books VIII and IX.

There are four of them, in downward order: timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny (544 c). But exactly as in the case of the just city the monarchy and aristocracy are regarded as being two names but one constitution (445 d 4), a case may be made for taking democracy and its inevitable consequence, tyranny, together. For not only do they in fact alternate with each other in Athens at this time, but within Socrates' scheme they have this important trait in common, that they are both less than cities, almost non-constitutions, to which no definite kind of soul corresponds (557 c 1). This bracketing gives us the following scheme:



which conveys a kind of inverse correspondence between the best and the worst. This correspondence of opposites is

evident in a number of ways: the just rulers, especially when the elders of the third city become the philosophers of the fourth, make no difference between their own and the public business (497 a 5), and in a perverted way, neither does the tyrant, whose rule is a private nightmare publicly staged (573, 576 b 5) - for in private the tyrant is himself, like his city, most absolutely tyrannized. As does the just constitution, the democracy contains three classes which again correspond inversely: the have-nothings in the latter form the lowest and largest class and the most eager for revolution, while in the former they are the highest and least class (428 e 7), most careful to preserve the city. And again: the ruling class in the democracy cannot fight because of its luxuriousness (556 c 8) while those who have that strength and should be the watchdogs become wolves to the human fold (415 a, 566 a 4). These cities then are related by Socrates as extreme opposites (576 d), and he even describes them by the same term: the just city is called "the city of beauty" (καλλίπολις, 527 c 2) and, the democracy too is called, bitterly, the "most beautiful" of constitutions (καλλίστη, 557 c 4) for the colorful variety of constitutions to be found within it. All the other characteristics contribute toward putting the citizen of a democracy into a perverse but peculiar relation to the just city, but it is this last which makes democracy practically the best base for Socrates' enterprise. For as he tells Adeimantus, it plays host to so many constitutions that "he who happens to want to found a city, <u>as we are now doing</u>, must go to a democratic city", and having picked a constitution he likes he may proceed to settle his city (557 d). This is precisely what Socrates does, who, as he himself points out, never considered leaving a perverse Athenian democracy for a dully decent timocracy like that of Sparta or Crete (<u>Crito</u> 52 e 5). The dialogic community is one of the many Athenian constitutions.

D.

1. One point remains to be made which will bring out the full force of Socrates' founding act. As we have shown, two things are required to bring the best city into being; that the breeding of the citizens should be founded in nature and that the vicious circle by which the established order makes citizens in its own image should somehow be broken. These same conditions are fulfilled in another dialogue in a totally different way.

Although the guardian city and its institutions are said at various times to be according to nature (e.g., 428 e 9, 456 c 1), it is the nature of the soul which is meant, a most un-natural nature, as we shall see. The

consequence of this is that the city no sooner ceases to be regarded as a mere pattern but begins to have corporeal life than it enters its road of dissolution. For it, change or "motion" (κίνησις) is "discord" (στάσις, 546 d) "A constitution in agreement with itself cannot be changed" (ἀδύνατον κινηθῆναι, d 1); for it the question "how...then does our city come to have changed?"(d 5) is answered by the inaccessible mystery of the mathematics of birth-governing celestial cycles (546). Now in the <u>Timaeus</u> Socrates expresses precisely this wish - to see his city put into motion (κινούμενα, 19 b 8), like a person who sees some fine animals painted or resting and feels a desire to stir them. His hosts therefore must find a way to "move" his city without dissolving it. Timaeus', Critias' and Hermocrates' entertainment of Socrates on the Panathenaea (17 a 1, 26 e 2), unlike the bitter feast Thrasymachus serves him on the Bendidea (354 e 10, 357 a 2), is truly amusing for him. They present to him the frame of his picture, as it were, by providing that mathematically moving macrocosm into which the harmony of his animated city will fit consonantly - in the <u>Republic</u> the largest context, and that one of strife, had been Hellas (496 b 5); now it is the numbered heavens. Where in the latter the city was a soul writ large, in the <u>Timaeus</u> the city is as a cosmos writ small (27 a, 41 d 4, 69 b 1, cf. <u>Republic</u> 506 a 9). Obviously in this setting the main political virtue would not be what might be called the "substantial" virtue of justice but rather the "relational" virtue of temperance, so strangely dim in the <u>Republic</u>, for as Socrates says there (430 e 6), "temperance is a sort of cosmos" - an interior cosmos.

2. The city itself they animate by translating it into history. Its citizens are indeed earth-born, sown by the twin gods Hephaestus and Athena, she the goddess of <u>wisdom</u> and <u>war</u> and he the patron of the <u>craftsmen</u> of the city. To this "natural" genesis corresponds a natural end; the city sinks out of sight in a cataclysmic earth-quake (25 c 7). Socrates had presented them with a myth (26 b 4, c 8) and a living myth, a tale of antiquity, is the gift they return.

The city of the <u>Republic</u>, on the other hand, is only as old as "yesterday". It too has a source beyond itself, but this source is not <u>within</u> nature, visible or intelligible, but <u>beyond</u> it (540 a 8). The true ruler must be in touch with this source - this, the <u>fulfilled</u> love of wisdom, is what is meant in this dialogue by <u>philosophy</u>; Glaucon's question about the genesis of the best city turns into a question of the genesis of a philosopher (504 b). Socrates answers this question with a demonstration.

IV. Music

A.

1a. We shall now show that, like Heracles, Socrates uses music to "civilize" his young guardian. It is not the traditional music of the poets which he uses but his own restoration of true music, for he takes seriously Damon's thesis that a change in the character of a city's music produces a change in the fundamental laws (424 c 5). Socratic music is, as we shall see, philosophical music, the music of truth. Its special force will lie in this, that its logoi are at the same time erga, this being precisely what the poets cannot achieve, so that they leave no true "works" behind at all (599 b 3).

By "music" the Greeks mean whatever activity is under the care of the Muses - that tradition consisting of arts and skills which we call "arts and letters", and among these especially poetry and melodic music. To be "amusical" is to be an uneducated boor. Accordingly the upbringing of the guardians of the third city, described in Book III, is to be "that discovered over a long period of time", namely gymnastic to strengthen the body and music for the soul (376 e 1), to make it gentle and "well-arranged" (εὐσχήμονα, 401 d 8). But this available music will have to be purged. Now music is understood to be altogether "image-making and imitative", mimetic (εἰκαστικήν--- μιμητικήν, Laws 668 a 6), so that the purging consists of condemning the poet's false and deteriorating representations especially of gods and heroes and of expunging the passages where he "images badly in his logos" (εἰκάζῃ κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ, 377 e 1). Children will then be told myths which will be, on the whole, lies, though harmless ones, and which will contain some truths (377 a 4). Socrates gives a practical demonstration of this purgation in reviewing passages containing myths - as Aristotle did later he regards poets primarily as myth-makers (μυθοποιοί, 377 b 11, cf. Poetics IX,9) - harmful to the tone of the soul. When he has criticized the myths, particularly the Homeric ones, "about gods...and demigods as well as heroes and about those in Hades" (392 a 5), among them the slanders concerning Theseus' presence in Hades (391 c 8), he declines for the moment to go on to correct the myths concerning men. For these are worst told by the poets nor can we correct them until we know how justice works (392 b). We may, accordingly expect such a correction of the myths of man later on. Socrates concludes by requiring not only the poets but all imitative artists to make in their works "the image of the Good" (τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα, 401 b 1).

1b. Not only the stories of the poets, their logoi (392 c 6), are purged but their mode of speech, lexis (ibid.), which corresponds in them to the modes of melodic music, also comes under Socrates' review. His remarks make the dialogue itself the vehicle of a most fundamental reflection on the dialogic mode, for the form of the Republic is a subtle but precise example of the approved mode. Socrates distinguishes two basic poetic modes. The first of these is straight narration in which the poet himself is speaking directly while his characters speak in indirect discourse. In the second mode the narrator drops out entirely and the characters speak in their own persons, as in all drama (392 d 5). Epic represents a mixture of these two basic styles (394 c 4). The first mode is honest, but the second mode is censured because in it the poet, by hiding himself, hides the fictional nature of his work and slides out of all responsibility for its truth, while the actor or reader is caught in an unwitting imitation. For he becomes, as it were, the character - all too often reprehensible - whose direct speech he declaims, while the guardians should be allowed to imitate only good men (394 d 1).

The Republic itself has that form which is exactly designed to provide at once the most complete poetic responsibility, the greatest mimetic force, and the most beneficial imitation. For the narrator, Socrates himself, is ever present and responsible and he keeps himself before us with the ever recurring phrases "he said" and "I said" (393 c 11, contrast Theaetetus 143 c). What is more, he is not an anonymous mouthpiece, whose work one reads, as one does the Homeric epics, without ever learning who the poet was. (We see here, incidentally, one reason why Hesiod, who not only identifies himself but even warns the reader that his source, the Muses, will sometimes lie, Theogony 22,27, is, if less loved, yet more acceptable, 546 e 1, 607 c 8). The teller is Socrates, backing his own words with the acts of his own life. At the same time these words and arguments are direct and dramatic, in the sense that one may rehearse them in one's own soul and try them out for truth, thereby letting the logos turn into an ergon. And finally, the Republic as a whole is an imitation of the activity of the "best of men" (Phaedo 118 a 17); it is Plato's imitation of Socrates.

1c. Nevertheless in Book VII, when Socrates revises the guardian education for the philosopher city, music is explicitly and emphatically excluded from the formal plan of education as "no learning matter" (μάθημα οὐδέν, 522 a 3, 537, cf. 504 d 1). For such music is a habituation of the soul, but it does not lead to knowledge; it is a training but not an education, a conditioning but not a journey to the source, for "the dialectic pursuit alone travels in this way" (ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτῃ πορεύεται, 533 b 7). Consequently the musical training is completed very early and culminates in gymnastics (376 e 6, 546 d 7, 591 c 5).

2a. We know from the dialogues, however, that there is a music yet different from both the traditional and the purged music, the philosophical music mentioned above. Evidently it was Pythagoras who first appropriated the oldest of the Muses, Calliope, for philosophy.[19] Socrates gives her, together with the next sister, Urania, this same office in the *Phaedrus*, where the latter watches over those who make stories about the heavens and the gods, while the former cares for those who compose "human stories" (λόγους ἀνθρωπίνους). And in the *Phaedo* Socrates tells of a dream that has come to him often and in various shapes but always with the same message: "O Socrates, make music and let that be your work" (μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου, 60 e 5), which he has always taken to mean that he should pursue philosophy, that being "the greatest music" (μεγίστης μουσικῆς, 61 a 4, cf. *Republic* 499 d 4, 548 b 8).

2b. What then is this philosophical music, this "inquirer's imitation" (ἱστορικὴν μίμησιν, *Sophist* 267 e 2)? In the passage of the *Phaedo* quoted above, Socrates says of himself that he himself is not a myth-teller (αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦ μυθολογικός, 61 b 5). This is literally true, for he is not one who makes *imitations of what never was nor will be*, but one who makes *images of what is*. We must immediately mention an almost paradoxical exception to this - the *logos* of the cities built "in speech" *is*, as it were, Socrates' own myth: he speaks of "the constitution which we *told as a myth* in speech" (ἡ πολιτεία ἣν μυθολογοῦμεν λόγῳ, 501 e 4). But otherwise Socrates avoids telling myths of his own making; the "noble lie" of the guardians is a myth attributed to the Phoenicians (414 c); that anti-Homeric *Nekyia* or Descent to Hades, Socrates' substitute for Odysseus' false and tedious tale to Alcinous (cf. scholion on 614 b 1) which closes the dialogue, is attributed to Er and only "saved" by Socrates (621 b 8), and in other dialogues too Socrates avoids responsibility for myths (e.g., *Gorgias* 493, *Phaedrus* 244, *Meno* 81). Images, on the other hand, are his very own mode; as Adeimantus knowingly remarks at one point "It isn't the usual thing, I suppose, for you to speak through images" (487 e 6).

2c. An account of how such images as Socrates makes are formed is given in the *Philebus* (38 e). When someone goes about reflecting (διανοούμενος) much by himself, many true opinions and accounts become written into his soul as by an inner scribe. This scribe is succeeded by a painter who draws images illustrating these inner accounts, and if the accounts are true, then so are these images.

2d. Socratic images therefore differ from myths in being the direct *consequence* of an inner argument, and not the persuasive *counterpart* of a public conversion. In their presentation myths are thus preceded by an argument, as

nearly the whole *Republic* precedes the Myth of Er, and as dialogic passages precede the myths, for instance, of the *Phaedo*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Symposium*, the *Gorgias*; images, on the other hand, are either actually followed by an explication which draws out the argument which went into their making, or they themselves give plain hints how the participant in the dialogue should reflect on them. This reflection is of a very peculiar kind and in inducing it lies the special strength of the Socratic image: each such effort is accompanied by a reflection on itself, for to study a Socratic image means to study not only its content *but the nature of image and imaging itself*. The study of Socratic imagery is then exactly what Socrates himself says music ought to be: the study of true being *and* its images, and, as he repeats twice, this is the same art and effort (402 b 7, c 7). In Aristotle's opinion the making of such images, which are, as we shall see, based on analogy, the chief sort of metaphor (*Poetics* 1457 b 11), demands by far the greatest poetic gift, for it demands "the ability to see what is like" (1459 a 17). We shall see that this is also the philosophical gift. In Socrates' images the "ancient difference between philosophy and poetry" (607 b 5) is composed.

2e-f. Socrates himself fulfills the demand he makes of all poets, to "make an image of the Good" (401 b 1). His image of the Good is the sun "image" or "likeness" (εἰκόνα, 509 a 9, ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα, 509 c 6), which dominates the center of the dialogue. It is followed by that example of a "corrected" Myth of Man which Socrates had before omitted (392 a 8). The myth which he chooses to correct, tacitly but devastatingly, is indeed themost crucial of all stories concerning humans. It is the one told by Aeschylus in the tragedy of *Prometheus Bound*, which tells how the treasonous immortal Prometheus gave men fire (254), how he opened their eyes (447) and made them see, and how he made them come out of the caves they had been, antlike, inhabiting (452) into the light of day to see the heavens and to become wise (476). As Socrates re-tells this myth in his "image of the cave" (*Republic*, 514), it turns out that the fire Prometheus brought was a counterfeit light (b 1); those few who know how to use it only abuse it, allowing it to project deceptions (b 8); men's eyes are as blind as ever (515 c 9); they yet live deep in a cave and their wisdom is worthless (516 c 7). We might add here as a note for the future that in the *Philebus* Socrates intimates that the true Prometheus is Pythagoras (16 c), and that in the *Protagoras* the sophist himself, while crediting Prometheus with having brought the other arts to men, claims that he omitted the political art, which Hermes brought later directly from Zeus to all men alike (320 c 8).[20]

3. Socrates' music in the *Republic*, as contrasted with the battering ram of his rhetoric in the *Gorgias*, is intended to

work a gentle and orderly conversion of the soul to the love of wisdom; it is what Socrates once refers to as the "art of conversion" (τέχνη...τῆς περιαγωγῆς, 518 d 3). According to the formal plan of the philosophers' education, at twenty those chosen to study begin a formal sequence of mathematics culminating in a "synopsis" (c 2). At thirty, after another selection, the young philosophers enter upon the long road of dialectic, which again culminates in a vision, that of the Good itself (540 a 8). As Socrates had before introduced Glaucon to the Good as the "greatest study" poetically, by an image, so he now sets out the plan of study which will prepare Glaucon to reach it in a "hymn": "Don't we know," he says, speaking of the mathematical studies they have just surveyed, "that all these things are only the <u>preludes</u> (προοίμια) of the <u>hymn</u> (νόμου) which we must study?" (531 d 7, cf. <u>Timaeus</u> 29 d 5; <u>Laws</u> 722 c 6). And a little later, playing on the double meaning of <u>nomos</u>, law or song, he speaks of the "law which the activity of dialectic fulfills" or the "song which it performs" (ὁ νόμος ὃν τὸ διαλέγεσθαι περαίνει, 532 a 1). Socrates will not turn this song into arguments, since "no longer, dear Glaucon, will you be able to follow me...for you would no longer be seeing an image of what we are discussing but the truth itself, as it appears to me" (533 a 1). Socrates' music, as the art of conversion, is nothing but the poetic synopsis of the end and the road of the philosophical education itself, designed to turn Glaucon into the right course. That was the significance of the omission of music from this plan - its very presentation itself was to be the overture to learning. We will see that when the end of study is the "highest study" the images and songs in which it is previewed demand the highest art.

4. Books V-VII, which contains the central images, are again, like the "outer" books, roughly symmetrical about the center. On the completion of the just city culminating in the discussion of the community of women and children (V,449-471: VIII,543 a) follows Glaucon's question concerning the possibility of this city with Socrates' answer about the philosopher kings; this question and its answer frame the center of the dialogue (V,471 c - 473: VII,540 d). The next inner theme is the definition and - here Adeimantus interposes - the defense, temperament and proper age of the philosopher (V,474 b - VI,502: VII, 535-540). At the very innermost core is Socrates' initiation of Glaucon into the philosophical education, effected by two great images, the "sun image" and the "cave image". These are interwoven with explications and with each other as shown in the table:

507 a ┌sun image
509 d │ ┌explication of the sun image by the "Divided Line"
514 a └cave image
517 b │ ┌correlation of the two images
522 a └explication of cave image in the "plan of studies"
533 a └correlation of the explications

We have before us a composition of intricate but clear texture.

B.

1. Glaucon's introduction to philosophy will itself have a prelude - he will discover for himself the meaning of "opinion", <u>dóxa</u>.

Opinion with its various meanings and its absence or presence determines the key of the different parts of the dialogue. The outer ring of <u>logoi</u> is explicitly spoken in a signature appropriate to the absence of the "good opinion" of mankind and its homonymous consequence "reputation" (δόξα). Adeimantus has stipulated at the beginning (Book II) that the argument about justice must "remove reputations" (τὰς δὲ δόξας ἀφαιρεῖ, 367 b 5) and has provided the magic Ring of Gyges,[21] which will allow the wearer to do anything, that is, to be a complete <u>panourgos</u>, without being seen or blamed. At the end of the argument (Book X) the ring and also the concealing Helmet of Hades which the argument had been wearing can be removed (612 b 5), for even on the supposition that the opinion of men has no weight, justice has been proved profitable. At the center of the dialogue, however, where an <u>ergon</u> is set into the <u>logos</u>, the opinion of mankind cannot be supposed away, for the many will have to be won to the acceptance of philosophy if anything is to be done.

But it is really the inner source of this public opinion, the faculty of the soul Glaucon will soon learn to call <u>doxa</u>, which is of overwhelming importance at the center, both for the older and the younger lover of wisdom. For about the "greatest study" <u>Socrates himself has</u>, as he repeatedly says, <u>only opinion</u> (506 c 4, e 2, 509 c 3, 517 b 7, 533 a 4), although opinion so well founded that Glaucon will not be able to follow him without a long course of study. So also the "interest" on the capital Good, its child - Socrates plays on the double meaning of τόκος : child and interest, as in our phrase "bearing interest" - which he gives to Glaucon will provide him only with opinion, but as the interest is not paid in counterfeit coin and the child is no bastard (507 b 5) so, we may infer, will Glaucon conceive not false but "true opinion", and this is the beginning required for learning. But throughout, the one thing which everyone wants in truth and not merely in reputation (τῇ δὲ δόξαν 505 b 8) will have to be approached by opinion.

2. As so often in the *Republic*, the conversation makes its own medium the object of reflection, in the case of *doxa* at its very inception.

The "third wave" has just closed in on Socrates (Book V, 473 c 6). He and Glaucon must now define the philosopher (474 b 5). Just as there are some who desire love, he says, and some who desire honor, there are some who desire wisdom, and *all* of it. Glaucon asks whether the lovers of wisdom then include lovers of sights and sounds. Socrates answers with a distinction to which he would have difficulty in getting anyone but Glaucon to ageee (475 e 6): The just and the unjust, the good and the bad, are each one by itself but "in communion with deeds and bodies and one another they are imagined in every way and appear each to be many" (476 a 4). Now lovers of sights love - and apprehend - beauty in its manyness and are asleep with respect to true beauty itself, being unable to distinguish this *one* from the *many*, but the philosopher loves true beauty. The thinking (ἡ διάνοια) of the latter is knowing and is to be called knowledge, *gnóme*, while the former only opines and has opinion, *dóxa* (476 d 5). Furthermore knowledge must be of something which *is* and is "that which is completely" (τὸ παντελῶς ὄν), which is completely "to be known", *gnostón*, while "what is not" (μὴ ὄν) is entirely "unknowable", *ágnoston* (477 a 1). Now if there is something "between" (μεταξύ) complete being and complete non-being, then, as knowledge belonged to being and ignorance (*agnosía*) to non-being, so to this "thing between" (τὸ μεταξύ) must correspond something which is itself "between ignorance and knowledge" (*epistéme*, a 10). This is found to be *opinion*, having an object and a power (δύναμις) different from either knowledge or ignorance (b 12). If he and Glaucon can discover what it is that, being more shadowy than the former but brighter than the latter, lies between them, they will have found "that which is to be opined", the *doxastón* (478 e 3), and so they will name it, "assigning extremes to extremes and means to means" (e 4). They will appeal to the lover of beauty in manyness and ask him if all these things are not also sometimes ugly, and if the same is not true of things just, great, or heavy - that they will all be found at some time to be the opposite, so that they cannot be said to be or not to be one thing or another and are tossed about in between being and non-being. A lover of such things should be called a "lover of opinion" and not a "lover of wisdom" (φιλοδόξους, φιλοσόφους, 480 a 13). So ends Book V; becoming, *genesis*, the "in-between thing" has not been explicitly named.

3. This foregoing argument cannot help but remind Glaucon of an earlier one (Book IV), in which it had been concluded that cities derive their constitutions from the

individual constitutions of their citizens.[22] Socrates had then asked whether the three powers of the soul, those of desire, of spiritedness, and of reasoning, belong to three parts or whether we do each of these with the whole soul (436 a 8). To show that there are indeed three separate parts they posit a strict correspondence between desires and their objects. If a man wants at the same time to drink and not to drink because he knows that he ought not to, then his soul must contain two opposing parts: a "bidding" and a "forbidding" part (τὸ κελεῦον, τὸ κωλῦον, 439 c 7). There are then these parts: the rational part or *logistikon* with which he calculates (ᾧ λογίζεται) and the desiring part or *epithymetikón* which is unreasoning (ἀλογιστικόν) and where desire (*epithymia*) sits (439 d). Between these two, the forms usually recognized (εἴδη, e 2), Socrates inserts a third part, the spirited part or *thymoeidés*, which Glaucon, obviously listening to the name, thinks more akin to desire, but which, as Socrates points out, can be an "auxilliary" of the reasoning part (e 3), making us feel high-minded anger or *thymós* (440 e). Finally, these three parts are arranged within us as the "three terms of a musical proportion" (ὅρους τρεῖς ἁρμονίας, 443 d 6) and *thymos* becomes "the in-between power" (τῇ μεταξύ δυνάμει, 479 d 8).

Glaucon has therefore been asked once before to distinguish the parts of the soul by means of their relative object and to understand one of these parts as a mean between two extremes. If we juxtapose the results of both exercises we get the following result:

logistikon	:	*gnosis*
thymoeides	:	*doxa*
epithymetikon	:	[*agnosia*].

For the middle parts this correlation is, in fact, tacitly but unmistakably made in the dialogue. For instance, a chief characteristic of the warriors, who as a class of the just city correspond to the *spirited part* of the soul, is the "preservation of law-abiding *opinions*" (δόξης ἐννόμου σωτηρία, 433 c 7) within them. Also in a timocracy, which represents spiritedness among the degenerating cities and is emphasized as lying "between" aristocracy and oligarchy (527 c 6, d 1), the chief characteristic of citizens is love of honor (548 c 6), which implies a connection of *thymos* with the external *doxa* called reputation.

4. The *logistikon*, on the other hand, is not quite coextensive with *gnosis*. Here we must stop to observe the name itself. In the traditional double division of the soul into a rational and an irrational part, the first as having "reason", *logos*, that is, the power of giving accounts (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1102 a 30) was quite properly called *logikon*, evidently already by the Pythagoreans.[23] Why then does Socrates call it the *logistikon*, connecting it explicitly

with the verb *logizesthai*, to reckon or calculate (439 d 5), rather than with the *logos* of *dialegein* (511 b 4, 534 c 3)? It is because the *logistikon* is a restricted power, whose specific "work" (ἔργον) later turns out to be calculation, measuring and weighing - whatever corresponds only to the lower part of the knowing power, to that power of mathematical thinking which Glaucon will later discover, once again, as a mean between opinion and knowledge and will learn to call *dianoia*. We must remember that the guardians as dog-philosophers have an admixture of ignorance in their knowing power since they recognize the city's enemies by the criterion of their own ignorance of them (376 b 5), but that their service as soldiers and administrators requires a knowledge of applied mathematics, a part, secondary, to be sure, even of the philosophers' education (522 c).

As for the lowest powers, on the other hand, the *epithymetikon* might be said to correspond to ignorance in a certain way, since the object of the first, pleasure, partakes of the object of the second, non-being (585). But actually "ignorance...is a voidness in the condition of the soul" (b 3) and no *power* at all.

It follows that the tripartite soul of Book IV, although it has a coextensive middle part, both begins and ends on a level below the soul described in the central conversation. How is this new soul to be understood?

5. At the very beginning of the articulation of the "first" soul Socrates had warned that nothing accurate could come "from such proceedings" (μεθόδων, 435 d 1) and that a "longer and fuller way" (ὁδός, d 3) would be needed, a requirement repeated at a crucial moment in Book VI (504 a 4). With the discovery of *doxa* Socrates has started Glaucon on this longer way. The soul that now emerges is the soul as "the instrument by which each man learns" (τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος, 518 c 5, cf. 527 d 8). The parts of this soul are specifically called 'powers' (δυνάμεις, 477 b, c, e) when first introduced. Compared to this learning soul, the three parts of the first soul sink to mere tendencies or dispositions. Indeed the alternate name of the *logistikon* is "the wisdom-loving part" (τὸ φιλόσοφον, 586 e 4), and the love of wisdom is often called an *epithymia*, a desire, in the central books (e.g., 475 b 4, 8, 517 b 6). And of course, the very name of the *thymos* alludes to *epithymia*. This means that in a sense all these parts *are* desires, and so it fits very well that the wisdom-loving part should not be coextensive with the knowing part, since when the soul truly knows it no longer desires the objects of knowledge but has attained and moves among them. Thus once the learning soul has come into focus the terms of the tripartite soul are used mostly to distinguish temperaments or "lovers". The philosopher, for instance, is defined by a division of men into lovers of erotic pleasure and of wine, lovers of

honour and lovers of wisdom (474 c 8, cf. 435 e 7). Again, the degenerate cities are characterized by different prevailing appetites, and when tyranny is discussed the three parts of the first soul are explicitly connected to three "pleasures" or "desires" (580 d). This tripartite soul is the *embodied* soul, a monstrous, forcibly conflated unity (588 d), but the soul of the center is the *soul by itself*.

6. The "division" of the soul is *the* pre-dialectical exercise, the *gymnasia* (*Parmenides* 135 c 8, d 4, 7) of the *Republic*. Almost every reference to the dialectical process of dividing (διαιρεῖν) refers to distinguishing the parts or the objects of the soul (476 a, 454 a, 523 a, 580 d, 571 b, 595 b, 618 c). "Division" or *diairesis* is not here a formal undertaking, as can be gathered from the numerous names given to these parts: εἴδη, γένη, μέρη, πάθη (435 b, c, e, 439 e, 441 c, 443 d, 442 b, c, 612 a 5). In the course of the central conversation a quadripartite learning soul will emerge, but Socrates indicates that more divisions might be made in a more complete study (534 a 7) and that the question whether the soul is ultimately one or many in kind (πολυειδὴς εἴτε μονοειδής, 612 a 4, cf. 443 d 7) is not finally settled. An important aspect of this dialectic exercise is the finding of the "in-between", the *metaxý*, which Glaucon immediately recognizes as analogous to the mathematical problem of "finding the mean", and which is the chief gift necessary to the dialectician (*Philebus* 16 e 1, cf. *Symposium* 22 a 1). The soul becomes the object of this exercise because, as we have seen, the philosopher's version of the definition of justice is "know thyself"[24]; the exercise remains an exercise because, as we shall see, Socrates must exclude true dialectic from the *Republic*.

C.

1-2. Adeimantus the "Dauntless," who has heard and is shaken by every current doubt (cf. 362 e, 419 a), interposes an objection (487 b): Socrates' argument about the excellence of philosophers is convincing in words, but in deed everyone knows that these people become either scoundrelly or impotent, especially if they keep it up past their youth. Socrates proceeds to win Adeimantus and the rest of the crowd - there are, excepting Glaucon, eight auditors - "in deed". He does not deny the accusation, but he will justify his demand for the rule of philosophers by an *image* (e 5) and its explication (489 a 4); the image is that of a mutinous crew and the good but powerless captain. There follows a series of images which show that it is that greatest of all sophists, the many, who corrupts most natures, the best the most deeply; this Public Sophist is as a great brute which the little private

sophists know how to propitiate (492 a - 493 d). Thus philosophy is left desolate and any little tinker may, as it were, take her as a wife (495 e). There are, however, some good natures who are for various reasons incorruptible - Socrates here mentions his own "divine sign", the daimonion (496 c 4) and in such close connection with a "genuine and well-conditioned ethos"(b 2) that one can scarcely help thinking of the Heraclitean saying that "ethos is a man's daimon" (Bywater, Fr. 121). Such a nature will run to shelter as from a storm and will live - and die - in private. Thus such a man will do great deeds but not the greatest, which he can only do within a suitable constitution (497 a).

Adeimantus' worries about the slanders of philosophy which he has heard are allayed. They return to the possibility of the city, and now Adeimantus wants to know whether any of the contemporary cities are suitable to philosophy (397 a 9). Not a single one, says Socrates (who, however, as we have seen, himself lives and acts as a philosopher in Athens), not even the city we have just founded because it too is in need of a man, of a living law-giver, in addition (497 d), the very one they were talking about when Adeimantus interrupted. This man's problem is how philosophy may be pursued in such a way as not to ruin the city; the solution, as announced by Socrates, is that not the young but those advanced in life must most devote themselves to philosophy. Adeimantus remarks on how serious Socrates seems to be here, but he thinks that most of his hearers will object just as earnestly and Thrasymachus most of all. Socrates says reprovingly, "Do not make a falling-out between me and Thrasymachus, who have just become friends - although we were not enemies before" (498 c 9). Thrasymachus assents by his silence (cf. 450 a 5). It is no wonder, Socrates goes on, that the people are hard to persuade for they have never seen a virtuous man rule in a similar city, and this is why no city or constitution will ever become perfect until some necessity forces the lover of wisdom to take care of the city or the true eros of philosophy falls on princes. This may very well happen, and if there is now some "barbaric place" (499 c 9), or if there ever was or will be a situation where this is true, "the constitution we discussed has come into being and was and will be, whenever this Muse is in power in the city" (d 3). We must not attack the many for they will become gentle and will believe that no city can be happy which is not painted by an artist looking "to a divine pattern" (500 e 3). Such an artist will begin with a clean slate, painting on it a constitution whose model is both the just and the beautiful and the temperate itself and the actual condition of men (501 b), and the many will accept him. So a conclusion has been reached - our law-giving is difficult but not impossible (502 b).

In this interlude with Adeimantus, Socrates has completed the practical foundation of his city. Having been voted into office he succeeds by his oratory in allaying the popular fears of the "philosophical clan" (τὸ φιλόσοφον γένος, 509 e 3), by presenting a persuasive example of the uncorrupted lover of wisdom - himself. In defending what appears to both of them a crucial matter, the life-long pursuit of philosophy, he even becomes, as he himself remarks in retrospect, a spirited orator (δοκῶ . . . θυμωθεὶς . . . ἐμοὶ ῥήτορι, 536 c 4). He is anxious and successful in preserving the peace with Thrasymachus, the single sophist who represents that brutal public sophist, the people (cf. 336 b 5). And when he intimates that their city may even now exist in some barbarian spot, we must recall that the dialogue must now have been going for well over ten hours; it is night and we may imagine sounds of a Thracian orgy beginning to penetrate into the house - a celebration the company had come to attend but which they will now miss as they sit through the rest of the night under Socrates' spell.

3. Socrates is now actually through with Adeimantus. He will use him as an interlocutor only once more, in the discovery of the degenerate cities (548 d 8 - 576 b 10), for Adeimantus is the expert on accounts of the worst. However they continue a little beyond. Socrates reviews the three waves he has faced and ends by daring to formulate the "possible city" boldly in terms of the guardian city: "guardians in the accurate sense, it must be ordained, are philosophers" (503 b 5). These must be at once quick and gentle and able to undertake the "greatest studies" (τὰ μέγιστα μαθήματα, 503 e 4). Adeimantus wants to know what these are, and Socrates reminds him of their former study of the soul and its virtues and how they then said that a longer road must be taken to reach better things (504 a 4). But what are these, Adeimantus insists. Socrates is annoyed that Adeimantus either does not understand or is trying to make trouble, "since you have often heard this - that the idea of the Good (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα) is the greatest study" (505 a 1), for this is what makes all other things useful, and this alone is what everyone wants not in seeming but in truth. Although Socrates has already said that this Good cannot be either knowledge or pleasure (505 c) Adeimantus presses to be told whether it is either of these or yet something else. A sarcastic exchange follows in which Socrates denounces Adeimantus' unwillingness to hear, and Adeimantus scores Socrates' propensity for repeating the opinion of others(!), which ends in Socrates' refusing to talk to him about the Good (506 c 11). Now Glaucon returns to the conversation and implores Socrates not to stop just as the consummation of the argument is ahead; they will be satisfied if Socrates speaks of the Good as he did before of the virtues (d 1). Glaucon does not realize that they have already set out on

the "longer path".

D.

1. Socrates yields to Glaucon. He will not speak of the Good itself, but rather of its offspring (ἔκγονος) which is most like it (506 e). Socrates reminds Glaucon of the "oft-told" story of the one and the many (cf. 476). Those many good and beautiful things are seen but not known, while the thing itself, by which what was many comes under one idea (κατ' ἰδέαν μίαν) is known but not seen (νοεῖσθαι, ὁρᾶσθαι, 507 b 9). Now the artificer of the senses has made sight the most costly of the senses since it needs a "third kind of thing" (γένος τρίτον, e 1), light, to work. The sun is he of all the gods in heaven which gives us this light, and so the "sense" (αἴσθησις) of sight and the "power" (δύναμις) of being seen (e 6) depend on it. The eye is "most like the sun" (ἡλιοειδέστατον, 508 b 2) of all "the organs of sense" (τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων, e 6). This sun is the child of the Good, which it begat "analogous to itself" (ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, b 8). For the Good is "in the place of thought" (ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ) "in relation both to thought and to things thought" (πρός τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, c 1) what the sun is "in the place of visibility" (ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ, c 2) in relation to sight and things seen. Socrates completes the analogy by likening "that in the soul which knows in this way" to the eye; as the eye sees things clearly (σαφῶς, d 1) when lit up by the sun, so the soul knows or merely opines those things according as the idea of the Good gives truth (ἀλήθεια, d). Glaucon is amazed. Adeimantus' question is now certainly answered - the Good cannot be either knowledge or pleasure (509 a 6). Socrates says that there is yet more to be seen in the image (a 9), for the sun not only provides visibility but also growth and becoming, genesis (b 3), though it is not itself becoming. Analogously the Good is the source of being though not itself being (b 7,9). This image or eíkon, which we shall call the "sun image" for short, is best seen in a schematic sentence:

As the / So the {sun / Good} is responsible for giving {light / truth} in

the place of {visibility / thought} to objects of {vision / thought},

which are therefore perceived with {clarity / knowledge} by the

{eye / soul}, and it is also the source of {becoming / being}.

This image is now explicated in the "Divided Line". Glaucon is to take the double realms (διττὰ εἴδη, 509 d 1), the visible (horatón) and the intelligible (noetón), and to cut them, as he would a line, in two unequal parts. Then he is to cut each section again in the same ratio (d 7), and he will have, in the lower part, one subsection related to the other "in respect to clarity and lack of clarity" (σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ, d 9) in the same way that images such as shadows and reflections are related to that of which they are images, namely natural objects and manufactured things (510 a). To this whole lower part belongs "the opinable" (doxastón, a 9). Next the lower subsection is considered. Here "the soul, using those things before imitated as images" (ὡς εἰκόσιν, 510 b 4) proceeds "from hypotheses" (ἐξ ὑποθέσεων) not "to the beginning" (ἐπ' ἀρχήν) but "to the end" (ἐπὶ τελευτήν), while in the uppermost section she makes her way (τὴν μέθοδον) without any use of images by the ideas or eide themselves and through them alone, up to the un-hypothetical beginning (b 6). Socrates explains the lower of these subsections in terms of the mathematicians' work, who assume certain hypotheses without giving an account of them and on the basis of these reach consistent conclusions. In doing this they may use the "visible aspects" (ὁρωμένοις εἴδεσι), but these are not what they are thinking about (διανοούμενοι) - namely the intelligible eidos (a 3), which "one may see in no other way than by the thinking faculty" (τῇ διανοίᾳ, 511 a 1). In the top section the intelligible eidos, the eidos noeton itself, is attained by "the power of dialectic" (τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει, b 5), which uses the hypotheses as "hypotheses in being" (τῷ ὄντι), meaning both that it is now aware that they are so far nothing but hypotheses and that it treats them as hypotheses leading to being. And going up unto the un-hypothetical beginning it descends, using nothing sensible, but only the eide themselves (b-c). Book VI closes as Socrates assigns four "affections" (παθήματα, d 7) of the soul to the four sections: thought or nóesis to the highest, thinking or diánoia to the second, trust or pístis to the third, and to the lowest image-recognition[25] or eikasía; these are to be "ordered analogously" to their objects (e 2). A table relating the line to the sun image will make this clearer:



2a. In presenting the sun image to Glaucon Socrates is requiring him to exercise his doxa.

Of the two "doxastic" powers, the lower, whose pregnant name is eikasia, thrown in at the very end with conscious nonchalance, will prove to be the most pervasive of the four "affections".

Ordinarily the verb eikazein means to "imagine" both in the sense of making an image and likeness, and of discovering a likeness or likelihood, i.e., to compare or conjecture, while eikasia is both the ability to make or see images and likelihoods, and the image and likelihood or conjecture itself. To Glaucon the word would particularly call to mind a witty and malicious amusement with which clever people spiced their symposia, called "likenesses" or eikasiai.[26] It consisted of representing someone in an image, whereupon the victim might retaliate by making a "counter-image" - or by refusing to play. So Meno tells Socrates that he appears to him to be "most like" (ὁμοιότατος, 80 a 5) a torpedo fish, and Alcibiades, in the one true triumph of his life, appearing in the Symposium as the god Dionysius himself, speaks of Socrates "through images" and compares him to one of the Sileni in his train, except that - since his image is "for the sake of truth" (215 a 6) - this Silenus is more sober and far more divine than the god himself. And in Xenophon's Symposium (VI,8) Socrates curtly forbids the game when the eikasiai threaten to become injurious and false. Now Socrates is in the habit of introducing great matters under the image of a game or riddle (cf. 479 b 11, 521 c 5), and Glaucon will soon see that the "game of images" itself is no mere image.

In the meantime it must startle him to hear "conjecturing" elevated into a "power" in a direct line with thought

itself. But as the meaning of Socrates' central image penetrates he must notice that it itself requires a peculiar application of his ability to see images - for he is, on the one hand, intended to imagine by means of the image what the Good is "like", but he is also, on the other hand, to recognize that the sun's world is but a likeness, that his own visible world is a counterfeit of being. Socrates had in fact prepared Glaucon for the fundamental importance of this power to recognize an image as an image. To fail to possess it is to be permanently asleep to being: "Look, isn't that just what dreaming is - when someone either in his sleep or while awake regards that which is like to something not as like but as the same as that to which it is like?" (476 c 4). In absorbing the sun image, Glaucon then learns to use his eikasia in both of the fundamental senses which Socrates, as the savior of the true meaning of words, has restored to it.

2b. So also the next power, pistis or trust, comes into play. For as in seeing the sun's world as an image, Glaucon has been forced to lose trust in the visible world, so in seeing the sun as an image of the Good and most like to it (ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ, 506 e 4) he acquires a better doxa of this world, a trust that life and government in the image of the Good are possible here. This trust is the "eikastic" counterpart of the persuasion exercised in myth-telling (cf. 621 c 1,3). In this use of the image we wee why the question "whatever is the Good itself?" is "bid goodbye for now" (506 e 1), why no explicit "dialectical" account of the Good is given at all: the Good appears here only as the end or incentive to learning and doing, as "that which every soul pursues and on account of which it does everything, having a presentiment that there is some such thing" (505 d 11). It is that one same thing which all human action, be it for show or genuine, intends for the actor not in seeming but in being, and the difference between attaining it or missing it is precisely knowledge or lack of it (e 2). In that sense it is the "greatest study", for, as we will see, in another sense it is no "learning matter" at all. The overt treatment of the Good in the Republic consists simply in maintaining both that there is one genuine end of all human effort which is at the same time its source, and that it is necessary to hold this opinion.

2c. Yet the absence of some explicit reflection on the nature of the Good seems in want of further explanation.

An Aristotelian anecdote about the audience's reaction to Plato's lecture on the Good, related by Aristoxenus in his Harmonic Elements (II,30), is pertinent here: "They came, every one of them, expecting to get some one of the goods considered human...but when his reasonings appeared to be of studies and numbers and geometry and astronomy and of the limit - that as a limit Good is one (τὸ πέρας ὅτι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἕν), I think it seemed to them very strange

indeed, and then some sneered at it and others criticized it. Now what was the reason for this? That they knew nothing beforehand, but just like intellectuals (ἐριστικοί) were present to lap it up on the strength of the word itself." Now Socrates himself had several such "eristics" on his hands - one of them Adeimantus, to whom he is careful to mention the "idea of the Good" as something Adeimantus has often heard before, as something which is a cause of usefulness and profit and without which a man "cannot have the sentiments of a gentleman" (καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν φρονεῖν, 505 b 2), to which Adeimantus reacts with a pat, eristic question worthy of a Meno: "But you Socrates, do you think the Good is knowledge or pleasure or some other thing besides these?" (506 b 1), clearly a standard question about "the Good" (cf. Philebus 19 c). Here Plato nobly shows Socrates as wiser in practice than he himself was - in the two dialogues dealing with the Good, the Republic and the Philebus, Socrates finds tactful ways to choose his interlocutor and to bring him along. In the present dialogue he silences Adeimantus by suggesting to him that he has heard it all before - the ritual-like use of the term "idea of the Good" (505 a, 505 e, 517 b, 526 e, 534 b), when the Good is not an eidos at all, sounds like a soothing allusion to current discussions (cf. Epicharmus in Diogenes Laertius III,14) - while he's bringing Glaucon with a light hand to the "awe-inspiring enormity" (δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς, 509 c) of this Socratic Good.

But Socrates' indirection is not only a matter of avoiding public misunderstanding; it also has a positive pedagogic aspect. In providing Glaucon with images to reflect on, Socrates instills in him a kind of artificial "recollection" (cf. Meno 81 c) which will enable him to "recognize" the logos he might after reflection come upon.[27] This is, after all, what an interpretation of an image is - a recognition of its meaning. Therefore in some way a dialectical account of the Good like that severely arithmetical one given by Plato in the famous lecture on the Good mentioned above, or in his other "unwritten teachings", must be latent here.[28] We shall try to find it.

3a. When Socrates has delivered his sun image Glaucon asks him to go once more through the "likeness of the sun" (τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα, 509 c 6) to fill in whatever had been omitted before. Socrates' answer to this request is the dividing of the line.

The Divided Line is the mathematical figure for the implicit logos and the possibility of learning what is yet unknown. The choice of a linear figure is itself meaningful, for the line, as the unique connection of two monadic points, stands for that closest of all relationships of like to like of which the knower and the known are the

paradigm (cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, 404 b 5 citing Plato; Metaphysics 1036 b 8, the Pythagoreans). In understanding this explication of the sun image, Glaucon exercises his dianoia.

The word dianoia is used quite generally of what we would call "mental activity". For instance Socrates himself says (476 d 5): "Why may we not call the mental activity (τὴν διάνοιαν, cf. Sophist 263 d) of one who knows, 'gnome' and of one who opines, 'doxa'?" This word too is "restored" by Socrates. The dianoia which goes with the third section from the bottom is the power used in thinking or, as the phrase goes, in "thinking things through"; it means attending to or searching for that in them which can be grasped in thoughtful words, which the Greeks call logoi. This involves a higher kind of eikasia which may be termed "dianoetic eikasia",[29] for sensible things when caught in speech reveal themselves as mere imitations of something which the logos is truly about, as the "visible aspects" (horómena eide, 510 d 5) of the true "looks" (eide) of the thing itself. (So in the Phaedo 99 d, Socrates intimates that in a certain way logoi deal with imitations, though not in truth.) The objects of the dianoia are therefore described primarily as "images"; in the dianoetic section the soul preceeds by "using the things then imitated [i.e. the natural objects which were imitated in the lowest section] as images" (510 b 4, 511 a 7). By "supposing" these, i.e., using these as hypotheses, distinctions can be made and conclusions reached. The referents of geometric drawings are such figurative hypotheses, while the great arithmetical hypotheses are those recommended by Parmenides himself as a pre-dialectical study, the hypotheses about the "one": that it is or is not (Parmenides 135 c 8).

3b. If from Socrates' point of view the fundamental nature of the present discourse is eikastic, for Glaucon it is dianoetic. Summarizing in his own words, but accurately, what he has learned from the division of the line, he brings out a central fact only implicit in Socrates' words, namely that the objects of the dianoia are the same as the noeta of the uppermost part, that they are these noeta without a full logos, and ends by treating the faculty as that which the division was intended to define. For observing that the very name of dia-noia suggests a mean, he defines it, analogously to doxa before, as "something between (μεταξύ) doxa and nous [thought] " (511 d 4), as the naturally intermediate faculty (cf. Symposium 202, where Eros as daimon is the corresponding intermediary).

3c. Socrates of course depends on the mathematical predisposition of his young philosopher - mathematics being after all the young rulers' childhood amusement - in introducing him (cf. 508 c 4, 509 d 1) to the exercise of the

lower noetic faculty. In Book VII, in the very act of beginning the long description of that formal mathematical education which is the "prelude" to dialectic (531 d 7), Socrates actually engages Glaucon in a serious "methodical" dianoetic exercise. When Glaucon, accurately recalling the musical education of the guardians, perceptively concludes that this cannot be the study the future philosophers need, Socrates asks him: "O my marvelous Glaucon, which would be such a study...?" Glaucon eagerly interrupts to ask what study indeed might be left (522 b 3). Socrates now invites him pointedly to become his "fellow inquirer" (συνθεατής, 523 a 7) as he "makes divisions within himself" (διαιροῦμαι παρ' ἐμαυτῷ) about what studies lead toward being, and to "say 'I agree' or 'I disagree'" (σύμφαθι ἢ ἄπειπε), being careful to see that Socrates is "oracling" correctly. The discussion which follows shows that arithmetic is precisely the study wanted, since it is "inviting to the dianoia" (παρακλητικὰ τῆς διανοίας, 524 d 3) and "arousing to noesis" (ἐγερτικὰ τῆς νοήσεως, d 5). Socrates proceeds to begin with Glaucon the study of "the one and the two and the three" (522 c - 526 c), and this is Glaucon's first and only step on the dialectical way; here and nowhere else in the Republic is there undisguised direct philosophical work - a "huge work", as Glaucon has begun to realize (511 c 3, 531 d 5).

3d. But why should Glaucon need to be especially invited to this dialogue, since they are already in the midst of one and have indeed come, as Polemarchus says in the beginning, to converse (διαλεξόμεθα, 328 a 9)? Evidently there are various ways to converse. In fact three meanings of dialegesthai can be distinguished in this dialogue.

First it can mean a conversation in which anyone may take part. This, despite Thrasymachus' efforts to stage an exclusive rhetorical display, is its meaning in the "prelude" (357 a 2) of the dialogue, Book I. It can also be that "power of dialectic" proper (δύναμις τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι, 511 b 4, 532 d 8, 533 a 8) in which the logos, the account-giving power, by itself, leaving all sense perception behind, moves "by the eide themselves, through them and into them" (511 c 1). This power is imitated by sight (531 a 2) - as the eye sees things at once distinct and together, so the soul ranges over the noetic "sights", as the name eidos, "sight, look, aspect" indicates. It is clear that Socrates regards the soul as truly moving (cf. Timaeus 36 e 1), both upward and downward, only in dialectic, which is thus repeatedly called a "way", a "pursuit or a method", a "journey" (ὁδός, 533 b 3, 532 e 1,3; μέθοδος, 533 b 2, c 7; πορεία, 532 e 3), while the conclusive motion of the dianoia is downward (510 b 6, d 2) as in deduction, and that of the lowest two powers is back and forth as in comparisons. In the use of its lower powers the soul is said to be bogged down and made sluggish (533 d 1, 611 c) by its

association with the body; the soul is never quick with bodily life but only with the logos. But dialectic is only praised in the Republic (532 a 1); its actual exercise is impossible to one who is not "practiced" (ἐμπείρῳ, 533 a 9) in dianoetic studies. And indeed those "propaedeutic" (536 d 6) mathematical studies are carefully trimmed not only of all "banausic", i.e. applied, elements, but also of all explicit "eidetic" admixture - for instance, nothing is said of the "eidetic numbers" (cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics XIII,6) - although allusions to dialectical terms abound.

There remains a middle dialegesthai, which is characteristic of this central conversation. This is speech between two souls which must have a sensible clothing of sound, the audible dialogue. Such dialogue is strongly distinguished from myth-telling (e.g. Protagoras 320 c, 324 d, Gorgias 523 a, Timaeus 26 c), which appeals to trust and imagination, because it involves primarily the dianoia which supervenes as soon as sense perception when expressed in words gives rise, as it inevitably will, to dilemmas, for instance self-contradiction (524 e 3). In supplying hypotheses to solve these dilemmas it brings in noeta and invites the uppermost faculty of thought, noesis (523). In itself it is the faculty of differences, distinctions and contradictions, which ever ranges betwixt and between and which, unguided, can be an aporetic or "wayless" affection (524 a 7). Therefore in such a dialogue one of the interlocutors must know somewhat more than the other, must have advanced into dialectic so that he will be able "to ask and answer most knowledgeably" (534 d 9). Here, with Glaucon, Socrates exercises this superiority more even than usual , since their conversation is "synoptic" and requires a large fore-knowledge. The introduction to arithmetic mentioned above displays precisely the required relation of the interlocutors: Socrates makes dialectical divisions "within himself" (523 a 6), which he "shows" to Glaucon (a 9), while Glaucon is to look on with him and to agree or disagree. But most of all this dialogic superiority is evident in the very naming of the powers of the soul with which Book VI closes, for they are, as it were, named from above. Anyone who has not left the first three sections cannot possibly know their true names: doxa, as used ordinarily, means the faculty of judgment; people rarely think that they have what to Socrates is "mere opinion" but rather that they know what they are talking about, while the various provinces of the dianoia, namely the arts and mathematics (511 c 6, d 3), are regarded by their devotees as producing "knowledge" (533 d 4).

4a. We return to the invitation extended to Glaucon by the sectioning of the realms "as if" they were a line. As was said, the Republic has no dialectical treatment either of the Good or of the eide, but this missing logos is absent in a different way for each:

The Good has no "place" within the realm of being, for it

is "beyond being" (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, 509 b 9). Since it is that which is "un-hypothesized" it cannot be traversed in the way in which are the "hypotheses to being", the stepping stones of the <u>logos</u> (511 b 8). Consequently there is no power of the soul which corresponds to it, as is signified by the fact that it is off the Divided Line. Although within the context of the imagery of sight, the eye of the soul is said to look <u>at</u> it, a distinction between movement "among" and "through" the <u>eide</u> (αὐτοῖς εἴδεσι δι' αὐτῶν, 510 b 8, 511 c 2) and movement "up unto" the Good (<u>μέχρι</u> τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου <u>ἐπὶ</u> τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχήν, 511 b 6; <u>ἐπ'</u> αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν, 533 c 8) is maintained; the latter has about it something tangential and momentary - the sight is scarcely (μόγις 517 b 9) achieved. Furthermore this beholding is not knowing in the dialectical sense, for the "idea of the Good" is the result not of "intuition" but of "abstracting" (ἀφελών) and "defining in a <u>logos</u>" (534 b 9). Socrates repeats this several times: the Good as responsible source is known only <u>after</u> the vision, on the downward return, so to speak, by a <u>syllogismos</u> or collection of <u>logoi</u>, a <u>logos</u> of <u>logoi</u> (καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἂν ἤδη συλλογίζοιτο... ὅτι αἴτιος, 516 b 9; ὀφθεῖσα συλλογιστέα εἶναι ὡς...αἰτία, 517 c 1). The Good, the "greatest study", is not really a "learning matter", a <u>mathema</u> at all.

4b. For those realms, however, which are on the Divided Line, the absence of <u>logoi</u> takes on a different significance and form. It is essential to the following discussion to recall that the word <u>logos</u> means not only <u>account</u> or reasoning but also the mathematical relation of <u>ratio</u>, a double meaning of great importance particularly in "Pythagorean" contexts (e.g. <u>Epinomis</u> 977 c 3). Now we are told that each of the unequal main sections of the line is again to be cut in the same ratio (ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, 509 d 7), but we are given neither the ratio itself, be it numerical or irrational, nor are we told whether the greater or the less of the unequal segments is to be the upper one. We can conclude nothing except that the two middle segments must be equal, i.e., that <u>pistis</u> and <u>dianoia</u> are in some way coextensive, as is indeed necessary since the <u>dianoia</u> uses <u>natural objects</u> as images.[30] This absence of definite ratios is the more noteworthy, as for the earlier tripartite soul the numerical ratios of the parts are, playfully, given: they form the musical progression of the "high", "low", and "middle" notes, that is, of prime:fourth:octave, which are as 3:4:6 (443 d 6).[31]

But if the <u>logoi</u> themselves are absent, this much about them is given: they are the <u>same</u> throughout, for that is what defines a proportion, an <u>analogia</u>. How is Glaucon to interpret this mathematical fact which is presented to his <u>dianoia</u>?

4c. Immediately after the fundamental division of the line and the description of the lower subsections, Socrates reads off a first proportion (510 a 9):

<u>doxaston</u> : <u>gnoston</u> :: images : imaged object;

this announces that the internal relations of the lowest realms are the same as those of the whole, that the whole is mirrored in even its lowest parts. At the very end of the Divided Line passage he reads off another proportion (511 e 3):

segments of line : truth :: affections of soul : clarity,

which means, in mathematical terms: the affections of the soul are the <u>correspondents</u> (Euclid V. Def. 11, given a:b;:c:d, <u>a</u> is said to correspond to <u>c</u> and <u>b</u> to <u>d</u>) of the realms of being which the line segments represent. Or, using analogical reasoning, that is, inferring the likeness of correspondents (cf. Aristotle, <u>Metaphysics</u> 1016 b 34, 1093 b 18; <u>Topics</u> 108 a 7), we may conclude: known and knower are <u>alike</u> (cf. Aristotle, <u>On the Soul</u>, 404 b 18). Here the analogical method brings out the bond which "yokes together with the strongest yoke" (508 a 1), the linking of known and knower by the light of truth, which can bind them precisely because they are both "like the Good" (509 a 3), that "ruling source" of the "community" of knowns and knowers (cf. <u>Sophist</u> 248 a 11). And finally, in concluding the explication of both the sun and the cave image, he forms two more proportions (534 a 3):

being : becoming :: <u>noesis</u> : <u>doxa</u>
<u>noesis</u> : <u>doxa</u> :: <u>episteme</u> : <u>pistis</u> :: <u>dianoia</u> : <u>eikasia</u>,

the first of which signifies that the degrees of knowing are the same as those of being. The last displays particularly well the force of the mathematical form Socrates has chosen. For since the affections of the soul are coordinated with linear magnitudes they may be "alternated" (Euclid V, Defs. 13,3) so that the first is to the third as the second to the fourth, and this is exactly what Socrates has done here. This form draws attention to the close relation of each faculty in one main segment to the corresponding faculty in the other, a relation which is the same as that of the main faculties and again as that of the realms of being. The last ratio given particularly justifies the notion of a "dianoetic eikasia", while the ratio before that shows a certain special relation between knowledge and trust; this comes out clearly in that unassailable finality, on a low level not unlike the self-sufficiency of knowledge, which certain sense perceptions possess (523 a 11).

Obviously by using the various Euclidean operations (V,

Defs. 11-18) on these proportions, and by attending either to the sameness of the ratio relation or to the likeness of the correspondents in the new proportions, it is possible to obtain a variety of illuminating results. All of these are, however, only the expression of two fundamental similarities: that of the knower and the known, mentioned above, which leads Socrates to tell Glaucon to "order them [the affections of the soul] analogously" (511 e 2) to the realms of being, and secondly, that really prior similarity of each degree of being to the one next higher, by reason of which these degrees are described in turn as "that which is made similar" (ὁμοιωθέν), "that to which it is made similar", "that which was before copied now treated as a likeness" (εἰκών, cf. 510 a 10, b 4, 511 a 7), while the *eide* themselves are *agathoeide* (509 a 2), forms "*well*-formed" or formed in the likeness of the Good.
This four-stepped ladder of similars is what makes upward transition, i.e., the dialectical road, possible. It is, we should note, first articulated in the Divided Line; the sun image has only two undifferentiated realms, the intelligible and the visible. The Divided Line in a certain way preserves this original homogeneousness of the larger realms; images and natural bodies are not differently constituted, that is, made of something different, for both are sensibles (510 a 1; note that reflections are "in water" and "on smooth bodies", i.e., the difference is not that of the visible to the palpable), and hypotheses and *eide* are both intelligibles. What differentiates the realms internally is rather the "reflective" distinction of like to likened, by which the parts reflect the imaging relations of the sun to the Good.

4d. Glaucon must then see that the *logoi* relating certain aspects of the whole are one and the same throughout, that on account of similarity or likeness (*homoiotes*) there is *one logos* pervading the whole. In presenting this to Glaucon mathematically, Socrates is in fact presenting him with such *hypotheses* about being and becoming as will make thinking itself, namely thinking consistently, i.e., "preserving a sameness of *logos*" (ὁμολογουμένως, 510 d 2) possible. For if the characteristic dianoetic direction is downward to conclusions by deductions which win agreement (*homologia*), the inventive or discovering *dianoia* moves upward by an *analogia*; it is this latter use which is chiefly required of Glaucon in this dialogue: "Make an analogy..." (524 d 8, cf. 509 b 2). A sober application of this means of learning is examined in the *Statesman*: when something about which the learner has right opinion is used as an example, a *para-deigma*, something "to be shown beside" some unknown, then this unknown may become known to him by the recognition of the analogy (277 d 9; Socrates in his characteristic reflexive mode explains "example" by an example, just as in the *Republic*

he explains "image" by an image). The sun image is just such an "example".
We may say that the Divided Line tells the story of "recollection" mathematically by presenting through proportions that "affinity" of all nature (cf. *Meno* 81 d 1) which makes it possible to move with recognition in unknown places.

4e. The first and original affinity, the sun image implies, is that which the Good as progenitor gives to the sun as an offspring made in its image. In other words, the Good itself possesses an image-making power which it passes down to the *eide* and which they pass on in turn (cf. *Phaedrus* 250 a 6). This "downward *eikasia*", as it might be called, is originally responsible for our own ability to recognize likenesses or to make analogies, for our "upward *eikasia*" and the pleasure of recognition which it gives us (cf. Aristotle, *Poetics* 1448 b 1), a power so fundamental that without it we would not know the looks, the *eidos*, of our own face!

4f. We can now see why the criticism of poetry in Book III turns into the radical "ancient quarrel"[32] between philosophy and poetry" (607 b 5) in Book X. In the light of the sun image poets are *usurpers and perverters of the power of the Good*. They are more despicable even than that charlatan who by carrying a mirror through the world claims to have "made everything" (596 c 1), when he has only borrowed the lowest effects of the power of the Good, for they make artificial images, using a perverted power of *eikasia*, a "low generation" called "*mimetic*" or imitative (602 b 4), which produces images indiscriminately of good and bad (604 e 1, cf. *Sophist* 233 c) and distracts the hearers from true being (605 a 9). *Mimetic* products are not natural likenesses (cf. the phrase in *Gorgias* 513 b 4) but are separated from the true source of images by the interposition of a human maker, who "makes images vilely" (εἰκάζῃ --- κακῶς, 377 e 1). Poetic *mimesis* makes artificial imitations,[33] while Socratic *eikasia* makes likenesses in the sense of observing those which are already there by nature, clothing them in figures and putting these in words.

5a. We must now see what conjectures about the Good the sun image allows Glaucon to make on reflection, even though a *logos* must be absent.
In the image the Good is presented in three successive capacities, a triplet proved fundamental by its recurrence in the *Philebus* (20 b 8). It is presented first as the *father of the sun* (508 b 12), then as that which is *responsible for knowledge* (e 6) and last as the *source of being* (b 7).[34] The first of these might be called its cosmogenetic function, by which the potent male Good generates the sun as a male offspring to be lord of the visible world and a secondary source analogous to itself as ruler of the world of thought (508 a 4, 517 c 3). The obvious question here is whether the

sun also has a mother - the cave image will deal with that. In its second capacity the Good is several times called the aitia, the "responsible cause" (508 e 3, 517 c 2), and aitios, "that which is to be called to account" (516 c 2) both for the passive state of nooúmena, "beings known" (508 e 1, 509 b 6, d 8) and for the active knower (508 e 2), that is, for the soul in its "state of knowing" (509 b 6) - an aitia more beautiful and more honorable than its effects. In its third capacity, the Good is called king (509 d 2, 517 c 4) and arché, "ruling source" (510 b 7, 511 b 7) of the whole , or "arche itself" (533 c 8), "in power and seniority exceeding the nature of being" (509 b 9), which gives things both their "state of being" (τὸ εἶναι) and their ousía, their "nature as beings" (b 5). The latter two capacities are duplicated by the sun as source of sight and becoming.

Socrates presents these functions in the order which will bring Glaucon up by analogy from the visible many to the invisible one (507 b 1). In the order of logical generation, however, the listing should clearly be reversed, since being itself must precede the confrontation of active and passive beings and this split must in turn come before the birth of a perceptible world. The grandest, most "politically" relevant function of the Good is therefore its rule over being, next it acts as the "answerable cause" (aitia) for teachers and learners, while its most private function is that of a father. But in truth neither order holds, for the Good itself is not ordered, being itself the source of all order, arche itself (533 c 8).

5b. The diagram below shows the parts of this order. All the terms but one are taken from the text:



correlative eide of the Same and the Other which extend throughout being, for by being one and the same with itself each eidos remains integral and independent, while by being other than another it becomes the same with that other, i.e., another "other", and capable of participating in it (256 a 10).

Now if the point of view taken is not within but "beyond being", Likeness and Difference perform just such a function as Sameness and Otherness did within being, and, in a way, more adequately. For within being, the secondary, reflexive eidos of the Other was the source of community, while the primary Same was responsible for separate and independent oneness. But the bonding of the whole is achieved precisely because of the Likeness of each thing within it to a pattern beyond and so to each other thing, while Difference is responsible for the separateness of each single thing. The fact is that Parmenides' objection fails if only the pattern is beyond reach, as the Good indeed is: "...it is right to deem both of these [knowledge and truth] like the Good, while not right to consider either of them the Good; rather the condition of the Good is yet more honorable... [and furthermore] the Good is not being but yet beyond being in seniority and exceeding it in power" (509 a 3, b 8).

It is precisely this bond by which the Good makes everything one which, when mathematically expressed, takes the form of a proportion: "and the most beautiful of bonds (δεσμῶν) is that which makes itself and the things bound together as much as possible into one. Proportion accomplishes this most beautifully. For when the middle term of three numbers...is such that as the first is to it, so it itself is to the last,... then necessarily all will turn out to be the same. They will all become one with each other" (Timaeus 31 c 2). We can now see a second reason for the equality of the middle sections of the Divided Line - it is the three-term proportion (i.e. a:b::b:c) which "makes one", and herein lies the power of the "in-between", the metaxý.

5e. Socrates had introduced the sun image with a reference to "the things said earlier [cf. 476] and often spoken of at other times" (507 b 8), namely the many and how they participate in the one idea which is "what is" in these many things (476 a 7, d 1, 507 b 5). In the sun image he leaps from this beginning to that highest point of view, the way to which is sung in the "hymn of dialectic": "when someone leaves behind all sense perception to set out upon that itself which each thing is (ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον) and does not leave off before he grasps by thought that itself which is the Good (αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν), then he is at the very end of the knowable" (532 a 7, cf. 507 b 5,7). Now the repetition of the phrase in which "the Good" is substituted for "each thing" is clearly meant to catch Glaucon's attention and to convey to him something - actually the one most explicit thing in the dialogue - about the nature of the Good. For upon

correlative eide of the Same and the Other which extend throughout being, for by being one and the same with itself each eidos remains integral and independent, while by being other than another it becomes the same with that other, i.e., another "other", and capable of participating in it (256 a 10).

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having grasped what "each thing" is in itself, one would expect to learn what "all things" are together, and it is in place of this expected phrase that "the Good" occurs. This sentence then hints how the Good as the "source of the whole" (511 a 7) will have to be understood: it is not a separable and different being but precisely the oneness of all beings, the All as that Whole which all wholes within mirror (cf. Theaetetus 205 a). As such the Good is indeed the fit pattern of all community, and in the Republic especially of the political community: "using it as a pattern" (παραδείγματι), the rulers are to order the city and private men and themselves" (540 a 9). And finally, it is to be noted that all the terms mentioned above come into their own in dialectic.[36]

5f. One additional observation: What is characteristically Socratic about the sun image is that it is reflexive, an image of imaging which shows how images are possible. But more than that, as an image of the whole, it also shows how such images are possible, how the whole can reappear within itself, how we can "see" the Good. This aspect of the Good is reflected in the central visual image in the closing myth of the Republic:

The place in the Myth of Er where the souls choose their lives (616 b) is not easy to imagine. There seem to be two irreconcilable images;[37] the first one consists of the whole heavens which have a shaft of light passing through both them and the earth (b 5); the second consists of Necessity sitting at the earth's pole whirling a spindle whose whirl is a planetary system and which hangs on chains let down from the heavenly light encircling the whole (c 4). Now if we recall what a spinning woman actually looks like these two images become one. Between her knees she has a long distaff, at the top of which a cloud of white wool is fastened which feeds into the thread she is spinning. This thread is twisted into yarn by the whirling of the spindle, which hangs at the end and onto which the finished yarn is wound; this spindle is weighted with a whirl. In the figure of the myth the shaft of light which is the world's axis represents the distaff, the chain of heaven is the thread being spun, and the whirl of the spindle of Necessity itself is a miniature planetary system, an orrery, a model of the whole, within the sight of which the souls choose their lives.

E.

1. Book VII begins with this invitation to Glaucon: "Now, after this, liken our nature, as far as education and the lack of education is concerned, to the following sort

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of state" (μετὰ ταῦτα δή . . . ἀπείκασον τοιούτῳ πάθει τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι ἀπαιδευσίας, 514 a 1).

The sentence is dramatic. "After this" indicates that what has immediately preceded, that is, Socrates' naming of the pathemata of the soul, the last of which is eikasia (cf. also 511 a 7 for apeikazein), is the necessary prelude to what is now to come; the word pathos has a tragic flavor, and the position of the preposition peri after its noun is poetic (cf. Aristotle, Poetics 1458 b 14). Glaucon is now to use his power of eikasia to see (a 2) the dark drama of human nature under an image. This image will show what human beings are and do within the whole.

Behold, he says, men as in a cavelike underground habitation (οἰκήσει, a 3) with a wide entrance turned toward daylight. From childhood on their legs and necks are fettered so that they can only see straight ahead but are unable to turn (περιάγειν). Their light comes from a fire burning behind them. Between this fire and themselves runs a road, alongside of which a screen wall has been built. Behind this wall men pass back and forth carrying artificial objects. To Glaucon's exclamation "What an out-of-the-way (ἄτοπον) image and what out-of-the-way prisoners" (515 a 3) Socrates replies quietly: "Like us" (ὁμοίους ἡμῖν, 515 a 6). And, he goes on, these prisoners see only their own and each others' shadows which are thrown on the wall they face together with the shadows of the things carried about behind the wall. If they converse it is about these shadows, which are as truth to them; the echo of words spoken behind the screen wall seems to them to be the speech of these shadows. Now suppose a prisoner were released and forced to stand up and turn around, and were compelled to answer questions about the things formerly behind him, he would be perplexed (ἀπορεῖν), his eyes would hurt, and he would regard the shadows as having more being than the things before him. And if someone dragged (ἕλκοι, e 6) him up the steep road out of the cave by force to look at the light of the sun, his eyes would be so pained that at first he could see nothing. But after a while he would be able to see first (πρῶτον) shadows, after that (μετὰ τοῦτο) images (εἴδωλα) of things in water, and at last (ὕστερον) the things themselves. From these (ἐκ δὲ τούτων) he could raise his eyes to see the moon and the stars at night, when the sun itself is absent. And finally (τελευταῖον) he would see the sun in its own place; after that (μετὰ τοῦτο) he would infer (συλλογίζοιτο) that the sun was responsible (αἴτιος, 516 c 2) for the seasons and years and was caretaker of everything. Then if he recalled his former habitation he would feel that he was now happy (εὐδαιμονίζειν). The honors given down there to those who were good at observing, remembering and oracling (c 8) about shadows would be nothing to him and he would do anything rather than live like that (e 2). But if he had to join the competition, his eyes being still full of darkness from

his sudden descent, he would make himself ridiculous. Men would then say that by "ascending upwards" (ἀναβὰς ἄνω) he had ruined his eyes and that it was not right to attempt to go up. And as for anyone who tried to release another, if they could catch him they would kill him (517 a 6).

This image (τὴν εἰκόνα, 517 a 8) must now be attached (προσαπτέον) to what has been said before: Glaucon is to liken (ἀφομοιοῦντα) the "seat which appears through sight" (τὴν μὲν δι' ὄψεως φαινομένην ἕδραν) to the cave-like habitation, the power of the sun to the light of the fire, the forced climb of the prisoner into the light of day to the ascent of the soul and its vision in the place of thought. In a table:

	<u>sun</u>	<u>Good</u>
dialectic	night sky	
	natural objects	place of thought
	shadows and images	
dragging up		
	<u>fire</u>	<u>sun</u>
	screen wall	
conversion	prisoner	place of sight
	shadows	

2. This correlation of the sun and the cave images seems, though brief, explicit enough, from the conjecturing about shadows at the bottom up to the lively motion of the soul in the upper realm. Yet a certain reservation is expressed. If you interpret the ascent (<u>anábasis</u>) in the former to be the upward way (<u>ánodos</u>) in the latter, Socrates says, "you will not fail to fulfill my expectations. But perhaps only god knows if that is what truly is" (517 b 4).

Let us look independently at the interrelation of the two images. The sun image shows how the Good has everywhere prepared places for the soul's knowing. There is motion within these places but not straight ascent - the word <u>anabasis</u> is never mentioned. The cave image, on the other hand, deals with the actual habitation of human nature, that is of the embodied soul, and with the painful steps of its slow ascent. Furthermore, in the first the Good itself is not actually represented but is to be caught by analogy, while in the second the sun <u>represents</u> the Good and an underground fire is in turn contrived to represent the sun. This means that in the given correlation of the images our visible world comes, curiously, to occupy different levels:



Still later in Book VII, after the detailed discussion of the mathematical "arts" which are to "haul" the soul toward

being, Socrates himself blurs this correlation and seems to match the upward trek of the soul into the sun's world with the raising of the bodily eye, the world outside the cave with the place of sight (532 b 6). Furthermore in the sun image the Good is beyond the realms of being and becoming, while in the cave image its representative, the sun, is, of course, <u>within</u> and part of the world. And finally, while the sun image, as explicated by the Divided Line, refers only to different capacities of learning but not to the incapacity of ignorance (cf. 585 b 3), the cave image is explicitly about <u>both</u> education and <u>lack</u> of education (514 a 2) and is very much concerned not only with "mindlessness" (ἀφροσύνη, 515 c 5) and "want of knowledge" (ἀμαθία, 518 a 7) but even with positive deceit. For those who carry "idols" back and forth as puppeteers do their "marvels" (<u>thaumata</u>, 514 b 6 - Socrates plays on the double meaning "puppets : marvels") are indeed engaging in that complex form of dissembling which the orator shares with the sophist (<u>Sophist</u> 268 b, cf. 260 c 8).

3. Now at the very beginning of their conversation Socrates and Glaucon had determined that ignorance (<u>agnoia</u>) must necessarily be assigned to non-being, knowing (<u>gnosis</u>) to being (478 c 2), and opinion (<u>doxa</u>) to an un-named intermediate partaking of both and later identified as becoming. It is to recall this scheme that the main segments of the Divided Line are at one point named <u>gnoston</u> and <u>doxaston</u>. Thus it is obvious that wherever becoming occurs <u>non-being</u> is implied. But since non-being is not explicitly named in either of the images, Glaucon should conjecture that it is present somewhere somehow, in a manner appropriate to "that which is not". The following new correlation, in which the levels of the "sensible world" are made to coincide, does reveal it:



4a. To put in a word the effect of seeing the cave image in this new juxtaposition with the sun image: the cave image takes into account human badness in all its organized obtuseness. This is why it ends with a brusque reference to that most telling crime, the legal murder of Socrates (517 a 6). The introduction of this factor and its management, which is called <u>politics</u>, comes out clearly in the table outlining the cave image (P.50). As opposed to the main segments of the Divided Line with their two subsections, each realm here has a <u>third</u> part, the screen

wall with its puppeteers in the lower realm and the starry night sky with its moon, bright with reflected solar light (cf. 617 a 1), in the world above. We may interpret the former as representing the politicians with their laws and ordinances, their dogmata - we must recall that political deceit is still to be practiced in the just city, only "nobly" (414 b 8, cf. 382 d). The latter will then be their cosmic counterparts, the "laws of nature" (Timaeus 83 e 5) which are best studied in the nocturnal sky - although better yet not studied at all (529 a).

4b. When Socrates first introduced the source of the visible world as a son, Glaucon had immediately inferred that as a parent the Good was a father (506 e 6). The cave image now provides the answer to the obvious question: who is the mother? It is non-being, whose human form is willful ignorance. It is not easy to imagine, for in its elusiveness (Sophist 237 b 10) it is experienced only as a bewilderment of the eye, that positive apprehension of darkness which is experienced after the descent into that infinity of "human evil" (τὰ ἀνθρώπεια κακά, 517 d 5, cf. 445 c 6) which is so feelingly described by Socrates (517 e 3). The cave represents non-being under the guise of a womb where, as in the Phoenician myth (414 c) the "earth-born" race gestates. From the point of view of the human soul struggling with a body and with other men, the Good is not at work throughout the whole, for its light never penetrates into the cave - to the realm of being which it shines on, there is opposed a dark realm of non-being, and between these realms is the steep road along which men "come into being," the road of genesis or birth.

4c. Socrates has a figure of his own for such life as goes on in the cave. That slander against the underworld which he forbade the poets he commits himself against our earth. Earlier he had struck a line from the Odyssey (IX,489), the one in which Achilles as a shade among shades laments, saying that he would rather be "a serf on earth slaving for another portionless man" (386 c 3), but now he himself puts this very line into the mouth of the man forced to descend into the cave (516 d 5)!

Just as in the Phaedo there is proposed a place rather to be taken "as truly the earth" than the hollow in which we live (110 a 1), so in the Republic Socrates points to a true Hades, truly blind and obscure (508 c, 517 a,d) - for the "invisible Hades", the Aides a-ides of after-life, is invisible rather as a place pure of all bodily sight (cf. Phaedo 79 b 7, 80 d 5, Cratylos 404 b 1), a "divine place" (topos daimonios, 614 c 1). Taken as a place for the living soul, the "mortal Hades" thus adds to the "intelligible" and the "visible" a third, the "sightless" place. Its inhabitants live in a dream-like isolation

(533 b 8, cf. 476 c 4) reminiscent of the mindless flittings of the shades in Hades; like the shades in Hades they are incapable of touching each other (Odyssey X,494; XI,204), and some go completely to sleep, having as Socrates puts it "arrived in Hades before they have woken up here" (534 c 7).

What is characteristic of the mortal Hades is the wilfulness of its inhabitants - the Good has prepared other and better places for the soul; it is not necessary to sit below. Perhaps the most important aspect of the cave is that it is not a natural cavern but a "cavelike underground chamber" (514 a 3), clearly an artificial prison made by men for men. The position of the prisoners itself indicates stubborn perversity; they are facing the wrong way round and have a perverted view - that is why they must first of all be "converted" (518 c 8), or that failing, must be dealt with by "persuasion as well as necessity" (519 e 4).

4d. Glaucon should have no difficulty in recognizing the place. He knows something of Pythagorean doctrine (531 a 4), and the notion of the world as a prison and life as a living death are both well known Pythagorean teachings (cf. Gorgias 493 a, Phaedo 61 d); so is that of the "descent into Hades". For Pythagoras himself is said to have "told how he descended (καταβάς) to look on the way of life of those who have gone below, to see how entirely different were the lives of the Pythagoreans" (Aristophon in Diogenes Laertius VIII,38).[38] In fact, the whole dialogue has a Pythagorean undertone, for the lectures of Pythagoras were said to have taken place by night (Diogenes VIII,15, cf. the "nocturnal council" of the Laws, 961) and it must be well into the night when the central part of the Republic is spoken; and what is more, its very form seems to be that of a Pythagorean exercise - it was evidently part of the discipline of a Pythagorean to attempt, before starting the day, to "recollect" within himself whatever conversation he had had the day before in its entirety.[39] This would explain both why the dialogue is told as having taken place not just recently, but "yesterday" (327 a 1), and why Socrates addresses it to no one named at all - he speaks it within himself: Plato, even more truly than Alcibiades, can "open up" Socrates (Symposium 216 d 6). Certainly the recall of a conversation which lasted the better part of a day and a night is a prodigious feat, only to be accounted for by the mastery of a special discipline.

F.

1a. After the cave image Socrates considers with Glaucon the actual education of the philosophers. He begins signi-

ficantly: "Would you like now to see in what way such men will come to be born [in the city] and how one will lead them up into the light, just as some [e.g., Heracles[40]] are said to have ascended up among the gods?" (521 c 1). The sequence of learning, which follows closely the "pathos" of the cave drama has three stages: "conversion" (περιαγωγή, 515 c 7, 518 c 8, d 4, 521 c 6), the "haul" toward being effected by mathematical studies (ἕλκειν, μάθημα ὁλκόν, 515 e 8, 521 d 3, 527 b 9, 533 d 1), and the "divine sights" of dialectic (θεῖαι θεωρίαι, 517 c 4).

"Conversion" is what we are witnessing in the dialogue itself. Since it precedes all education and depends more on a man than on a study, it is not part of the explicit plan. Nevertheless there is an "art of conversion" (518 d 3) which, since this first act is largely a matter of making the soul recognize the shadows on the wall as mere shadows, is clearly an eikastic art - namely Socratic music, the persuasive imagery of truth. It may be said to take the place of that traditional music so emphatically excluded from the philosophical education (522).

1b. The long "haul" into the light of day is accomplished chiefly by the "hauling study" of mathematics (522 c 5 - 531 d 6). The program is that of Pythagorean physical mathematics.[41] In arithmetic the one and the two and the other numbers are distinguished, in plane geometry the surfaces of bodies, in solid geometry the bodies themselves, in astronomy bodies are put in motion, and finally, harmonics studies the audible relations of moving bodies. In this way the cosmos imaged in the Myth of Er, with its heavenly bodies giving out a harmony as they revolve, is constructed. There is only one difference between this Pythagorean cosmos and the Socratic study, but one so deep that it is very hard for Glaucon, who loves these studies, especially astronomy, to grasp. He immediately identifies Socrates' phrase about "seeing the things above" (τὰ ἄνω ὄψεσθαι) with "looking into [the sky] above" (εἰς τὸ ἄνω ὁρᾶν, 529 a 2), and Socrates has to rebuke him: that kind of astronomy really makes its students "look downward altogether" (a 7). Socrates demands that in the serious study of this paradigm of every "study", of every mathema, not only all practical considerations, but even every admixture of sense experience should be put by, and only those true motions and numbers and figures which are grasped by the logos and the dianoia alone should be studied (529 b). Glaucon, who follows the early part of the discussion, the demonstration of the dianoetic power of arithmetic, very well, is somewhat puzzled by what follows (522 d). For indeed it is the effort of mathematics itself which is needed to complete the conversion from sense (533 d 3), and this is still before him.

What is this purged mathematics of Socrates? It is, in fact, a kind of inverse dialectic. It begins with an investigation which in dialectic is the last and greatest, the "study concerning the one" (ἡ περὶ τὸ ἕν μάθησις, 525 a 2), which asks after the "one itself" (524 e 6) and investigates "the one and the [manifold] two and three" (τὸ ἕν καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία, 522 c 5), a study which is "that which is in common" (τὸ κοινόν, c 1) to all others and of which they "partake" (μέτοχος γίγνεσθαι, c 8). It is called "an ordinary little thing" (τὸ φαῦλον, c 5),[42] but it discovers the great dialectical archai of "the Great" and "the Small" and "the Infinite" (523 e 3, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 987 b 19, Philebus 16 d). The final mathematical subject, on the other hand, is harmonics, which presumably deals with such matters as the "marriage number" (546 d 5), a number told by the Muses and built on "agreeable" number relations; although not apprehensible by any reasoning mixed with sense perception, yet rules breeding and birth, and is, in short, concerned with the most concrete and intractable multiplicity, with the lowest matters. The cosmos built with purified mathematics is thus, to be sure, not a model of our sensible world but a "noetic cosmos", and yet, in accordance with the downward motion of the dianoia, it becomes progressively more "palpable" in the process of construction. To put it another way, this intelligible world is built up from the least element, the non-dimensional one, geometrically considered as a point, to a "community" and "affinity" (κοινωνίαν... καὶ συγγένειαν, 531 d 1) generated by dimensional growth, while in dialectic the One is the end of all studies, that which is beyond the sum of things, the whole. It is this inverse relation to dialectic which makes mathematics the "propaideutic" study (536 d 6).

One might add that when this mathematical cosmos ceases to be regarded as a mere pattern (paradeigma) and is elevated into an eidos, a source of being, dialectic yields to mathematics as the science of being, and something of this sort indeed seems to have happened in the Academy.[43] But as long as Socrates is conversing, a mathematical argument remains hypothetical, or as in the Timaeus, mythical (29 d 2). This is still the case even in the Philebus, where in the course of the investigation of the Good a "bodiless cosmos" is built (64 c) from mathematical principles such as the One, the More and Less, and Number (23 c), which principles all come to Socrates in a myth or from a god (16 c, 18 c, 25 b) or in a dream (20 b) - and that, as he says in the Republic, is precisely the way things come to mathematicians: "They dream about being" (533 b 8), just as he himself "speaks oracles" (523 a 8) on the subject.

1c-d. Dialectic itself is no longer accessible to Glaucon; to set out on this road would be to see "no longer an image...but the true itself" (533 a 3). Instead Socrates sings his "hymn" in praise of dialectic (531 d 6),

and with that Glaucon must be content. He has now been given a preliminary synopsis of the synoptic studies which the young rulers are to engage in first (537 c). After this Socrates **addresses** him as a fellow law-giver, while he rehearses with him what he would do "if he were ever to nurture in deed those whom he is now nurturing and ecucating in speech" (534 d 3,8, 535 a 3, 537 c 9), that is, what Glaucon will do once he himself becomes a teacher of rulers. Here it is interesting to note that Theon, elaborating in great detail Socrates' allusion to philosophy as an initiation into the mysteries (Phaedrus 250 c), makes the fourth stage of the initiation, (the stage following the full vision) that which authorizes the initiate to transmit his knowledge to others (Mathematical Matters Useful for Reading Plato, Introduction).

Together they review once more the virtues necessary in the nature of the future philosophers and the danger to the "puppies" (539 b 6) in taking up dialectic too early. In the last image of this conversation Socrates likens them to a son who on growing up discovers that his alleged parents are not his true parents and, consequently, losing trust, begins to ask questions about the traditions in an "eristic" way and to scorn the laws (538 c 5). Note that the source of disillusionment of the precocious dialectician in the image is precisely the content of the Phoenician myth (414 c 4) which is told the dog-guardians to make them conform!

2a. Now they have come to the final question, which Socrates clearly considers of acute importance in the serious execution of his program - this is the matter over which he had before become angry (θυμωθείς, 536 c 4). It is the question of age, the fitting of the progress of study and practice to human growth. The ages Socrates assigns to each stage is best seen in a chart (539 d 8) fitting them to the ascent of the cave image:



After fifty, Socrates says, the time has come for the philosophers to "behold" the Good itself and, using it as a "pattern" (παραδείγματι, 540 a 9), to order (κοσμεῖν b 1) the city and to educate others to live in the city as its guardians. Thereafter they will spend their lives in philosophy whenever possible, but when their turn comes

they will descend and govern, considering it "not as something fair but as necessary" (οὐχ ὡς καλόν τι ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, b 4).

The last phrase recalls one last time that for the philosophers the chief thesis of the dialogue, that justice brings happiness, is suspended - they are just out of mere necessity. It also shows why this is: the "fair city", the kallipolis, has nothing fair for which a philosopher might willingly descend - witness the fact that it is so called insofar as its citizens study solid geometry (527 c 1). In this city geometric is substituted for erotic necessity (546, cf. 458 d 5), and "love" means primarily love of truth, - human eros plays a purely utilitarian part in it (459, 460), though such eros alone might bring the philosopher down willingly. It is necessary that love should be absent here, where the dialogic community is to be displayed as the fundamental political community, but Glaucon receives compensation at another time: it is to him that the speeches made about eros at that famous symposium are recounted; he hears them "going up from Phalerum", Athen's second harbor (Symposium 172 a 2, c 3).

2b. What is most remarkable about the age chart itself is that the rulers' education, although initially founded on the city, always leads them straight out of it and beyond. Practical experience comes to them late. In terms of the cave, it is conspicuous that no mention is made of a "look behind the scenes" of the puppet theatre, of something which might be construed as a political apprenticeship. The counterpart of this lack of practical training is the absence of all political theory from their studies, that is, of such formulations as are abstractions from practical politics - in the dialogue called the "Constitution" the study of constitutions is not advocated. The reason for this is in the nature of such patterns: the pattern of the just city is not an eidos, a being responsible for what is, but an ideal, significantly located not in the "hypercelestial place" (Phaedrus 247 c 2) with the eide but in the sky (592 b 1) with Cloudcuckooland. A paradeigma is only a "hypothetical eidos" (Timaeus 48 e 6), not an object of study or knowledge. Were it otherwise, nothing would be necessary for the young rulers but to study the best constitution - this study would be what is called ideology. Instead they are to look to the one effective pattern, which is that beyond being: the political wisdom of the Republic demands that governing be learned by looking, so to speak, in the other direction; in practice the rulers will literally look at affairs "in the light of the whole" (τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον, 540 a 8). The ability to do this, irreplaceable by any technique or formula, is called human wisdom, phronesis (521 b 8), the virtue containing the political virtues (Symposium 209 a 6), and of all the virtues the loveliest (Phaedrus 250 d 5).

The image of such a man at work, which might be called "Socrates in the city," is found in Xenophon's Memorabilia.

2c. Having come to the end of life, the philosopher kings will at last be allowed to depart permanently to the Isles of the Blessed, and the city will honor them with memorials and sacrifices; if the Pythia permits, as divinities (daimosi), otherwise as happy men (eudaimosi, 540 c 1). Socrates is ending the conversation with a sly reference to himself: he has indeed advocated - with the permission of the friendly Delphic oracle, to be sure - the introduction of "other new divinities" into the city, exactly as the indictment against him was to state (Apology 24 c 1, cf. 21 a 6; he was also, incidentally, honored in Athens after his own death very nearly as he here prescribes, e.g., Diogenes Laertius, II,43).

2d. And now Socrates and Glaucon are emerging from their deeply public private dialogue back into the context of the "city in speech", the guardian city. Socrates himself recalls it with a smiling rejoinder to Glaucon's perceptive praise of his skill as a "maker of men-statues" (ἀνδριαντοποιός, 534 c 4) by his reminder to Glaucon that he can shape women too, for they were to share in this city (545 c 3). Socrates now founds this guardian city with charming offhandedness - all inhabitants over ten years are to be driven out "into the wilds", which will leave a clean slate for the law-giver (541 a 1, cf. 501 a).

Glaucon recalls accurately where they had been when they digressed: Socrates, like the wrestler he is - Heracles is the master of all wrestlers[44] - is to put himself into his former position to continue to wrestle with the account of the degenerate cities.

Socrates, by descending with Glaucon into the mythical setting of the Peiraic underworld, has shown him that he lives his life caught in a mortal Hades. But this demonstration is itself a release, the first step of the rescue - unlike the poets, who fail to wrestle from Hades the shade they desire (Symposium 179 d), Socrates, a new Heracles, knows the way to bring his Theseus up to the world of light.

Yet Glaucon's later life is almost a blank for us; no reputation, either good or bad, survived him - certainly he founded no new Athens. We may be sure that this is meant to reflect on the dialogue, for it forces us to ask whether the labour of Socrates has, in sober fact, been altogether lost - has, after all, come to mere words. The answer, however, to that question will no longer be found in the dialogue but only in ourselves.

Eva Brann
Annapolis
March 1966

Notes

1. Plato's Republic, ed. B. Jowett and L. Campbell, Oxford 1894, Vol.III, p.4; The Republic of Plato, ed. J. Adams, 2nd Edition, Cambridge, 1963, Vol. I, p.1.

2. Liddell and Scott, see Πειραιεύς, p. 1354 b.

3. Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopaedie der klassischen Altertums-wissenschaft, Vol. XIX,i, p. 78.

4. ibid., III,i, see "Bendis" p. 269. The torch race mentioned may be accounted for by the fact that Thracian Hecate had the epithet Φωσφόρος.

5. Adams, I, p. 5.

6. Jowett, III, pp. 2, 7, and 79, on 368 a 3.

7. Also Gorgias 461 a, 466 c; Phaedo 98 e; Phaedrus 228 b. The scholiast to Wasps 83 says that Sosias is imitating Socrates' oath "by the dog", Aristophanis Comoediae, ed. Dindorf, III, p. 460; cf. Plato: Gorgias, ed. Dodds, Oxford 1959, p. 262, also Lucian, Philosophies for Sale, 16, who connects Socrates' dog with Anubis, Sirius, and Cerberus.

8. Pauly-Wissowa, Suppl. III, see "Heracles", pp. 1007 ff., 1018 ff., 1077 ff.; also Aristophanes, Frogs 108.

9. See Jowett, III, p. 7 on Thrasymachus' notorious wildness.

10. Aristophanes actually compares Socrates to Odysseus, another famous visitor to Hades. But in the Republic the comparison is, if anything, adverse. The Myth of Er is offered as an improvement over Odysseus' boring "tales of Alcinous" (614 b 1, see scholia) while his soul, disenchanted with ambition, chooses the perfectly private (620 c 3), the most un-Socratic, life.

11. Cf., for instance, Apology 41 a, Gorgias 523. Justice, Dike, is called a companion of the underworld gods in Sophocles, Antigone 451.

12. See G. Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, Princeton 1960, pp. 3-10.

13. Cf. Hippolytus' opposite proposal for treating children as purchasable goods and excluding women from generation (Euripides, Hyppolytos 616).

14. The old saying is used by Socrates in a similar way in the Apology (34 d). He too, he says, quoting Homer, has a family and is not sprung "from oak or rock", that is, he

too has a private source. The original meaning of the phrase, which occurs in the Odyssey (XIX, 163), was evidently no longer known to the scholiast on 544 d 8.

15. See Adams I, 345 ff.

16. See F.M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, London 1937, pp. 4-5. For a totally different point of view and concomitantly different years for the dramatic date of the Republic see A.E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, Oxford 1928, pp. 15-16,45.

17. A similar case is found in Xenophon's Cyrapaedia and is expressed in the apparent lack of a match between the title, which seems to promise an account of Cyrus' upbringing by the Persians (I.ii,2), and the content, which is rather the education Cyrus gave the Persians. This is because Cyrus, whose name means the "Lord", is at once the beneficiary and the source of Persian customs; Cyrapaedia therefore means "The Lord's Education" both in the objective and the subjective sense of the genitive.

18. Cratinus, from a lost play, The Thracian Women: Τυρβηνέων τι καινὸν ἐργαστήριον. The cult of Bendis evidently was food for comedy; it seems to have been the subject of Aristophanes' lost Lemnian Women.

19. See R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, Library of Liberal Arts, p. 118.

20. An otherwise unlikely ancient story to the effect that the whole Republic was stolen from the writings of Protagoras (Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 1954, II, p. 265), seems at least to indicate that there were certain points of agreement.

21. Adeimantus' Gyges story is a witty transformation of Herodotus' version. In the latter, what is right and lawful is for every man to keep private things private or "to look at his own" (σκωπέειν τινὰ τὰ ἑωυτοῦ, I,8,16); this is tacitly compared to the definition of what is just in the Republic, namely "to do one's own" (τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν), i.e., to find one's public place. Furthermore the main fact about Gyges' crime in Herodotus, that he is forced to do injustice precisely because he is seen in the act imposed on him by the king, is inverted in Adeimantus' story, and by reason of his ring Gyges becomes invisibly and voluntarily criminal.

22. Note that in this context Socrates first acknowledges the natural world as the setting and source of human nature. The character of peoples is, as in Herodotean ethnology, dependent on the clime under which they live: Thracians, Scythians, and northerners in general are lovers of honor, Phoenicians and Egyptians are lovers of money and the Hellenes in the middle are lovers of knowledge (435 e, cf. Timaeus 24 c; Epinomis 987 d).

23. See Adams I, p. 244, note on 435 b.

24. See Charmides 164 c 7 for Critias' version of the Delphic background of this saying.

25. See J. Klein, A Commentary on Plato's Meno, pp. 112-115.

26. See Meno 80 c, ed. Thompson, p. 112.

27. On a much lower level, the reiteration of themes, such as the "oft-told" tale of the one and the many, has the effect of making Glaucon "recollect" (e.g., 507 a 7, 522 b 1) the unity of the argument. Cf. the honor in which this kind of memory and recollection (ἀνάμνησις) was held by the Pythagoreans: "A Pythagorean man does not arise from his bed before he has recollected what happened yesterday. And he performs the recollections in this way. He tries to recover by means of the dianoia what he first said or heard..." (Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras 163,20). The passage goes on to describe the discipline of completely recalling the logoi and erga of the previous day, which was considered part of the training needed for acquiring knowledge. It is obviously a technique Socrates himself had mastered.

28. See J. Stenzel, Zahl und Gestalt bei Platon und Aristoteles, 1959, p. 190 for a list of many of the ancient references to περὶ τἀγαθοῦ and for quotations in his own text.

29. Klein, ibid. pp. 115-125, "The Dianoetic Extension of εἰκασία".

30. Klein, ibid. p. 119.

31. The Pythagorean enterprise of devising numerical ratios to express the relations of the soul's parts, as well as to express the progression of the world's genetic elements, becomes extremely important in the Academy in connection with the understanding of eide as numbers. An instance is the double progression 2:4:8, which has the "one" as its non-numerical source and stands for the dimensional unfolding of the world from point to solid (i.e. 2^3). To the dimensions are correlated the cor-

responding powers of the soul: *nous*, *dianoia*, *doxa*, and *aisthesis* and to these, again, the numbers 1 through 4 (*Epinomis* 991 e, cf. Aristotle *On the Soul* 404 b 20 and Philoponus' commentary on that passage). These are the formulaic results of just the kind of consideration the Divided Line invites.

32. One of the older combatants is Pythagoras who is said to have seen Homer and Hesiod suffering in Hades for what they said about the gods (*Diogenes Laertius* III,21).

33. The objects on the Divided Line are only twice referred to in terms of *mimesis* (510 b 3 and 532 a 3, cf. 507 c 6).

34. In the *Philebus*, the Good is approached as a "third thing", other than and above both pleasure and human wisdom (20 b 8). As a human good it has three characteristics: it is "perfect" (τέλεον), "adequate" (ἱκανόν) and "choiceworthy" (αἱρετός, 20 d); its power, again, cannot be "caught" in one idea but must be captured in three: beauty, symmetry and truth (65 a 1), whose relation is not unlike that of the three effects of the power of the Good, namely world, knowledge and being, in the *Republic*.

35. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, (ed. Ross), p. lviii ff. for further references.

36. For the *homoion* as the bonding principle making knowledge possible, and associated terms like *paradeigma* and *analogia*, in the Academy, see Pauly-Wissowa, III, A,2 under "Speusippos", pp. 1641-1658.

37. Cf. Adams II, pp. 441,470 ff.

38. There is also a curious story about an artificial Hades which Pythagoras is said to have built - a little chamber under the earth into which he disappeared for a long time and then ascended, announcing that he had dwelt in Hades (*Diogenes Laertius* VIII,41).

39. Iamblichus, *Life of Pythagoras*, 165,12; see Note 27.

40. See Jowett, III, p. 326.

41. Adams II, p. 163 ff.

42. Diogenes Laertius remarks on Plato's use of the word φαῦλος, pointing out that he uses it in the two senses of ἁπλοῦς, "simple, honest" and κακός, "bad" (III,63). Actually, of course, Socrates often uses it ironically to mean "the great thing which everyone else overlooks".

43. For instance, Plato is said to have generated the cosmos, i.e., the "animal itself, out of the idea of the one and primary length, breadth and depth" (Aristotle, *On the Soul* 404 b 20). With this passage goes the numerical generation of the soul described in Note 31.

44. Pauly-Wissowa, *Suppl.* III, p. 1007.