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## On the Misuse of Analogy

It occurs to me that when an analogy is made between any two objects . . . between a concept and a series of actions, for instance . . . in order for it to be worth more than a nice exposition of wit, this analogy must be concerned with shedding light for deeper understanding, and with persuading for better actions. Now if the analogy is concerned primarily with deepening the understanding, then it is an explanation in itself. Plato's analogy of the sun to the "good" is an example of this kind of use.

On the other hand, if the purpose of the analogy is to encourage better actions, then the grounds for the relevance of the analogy must be argued. Mr. Hammond's lecture on "Happiness and Divine Illumination" seems to me an example of this use of analogy. For surely the parallelism he demonstrated between God's relation to man as the concept, and man's various "partial" activities as the actions, did not deepen the understanding of the concept of God's relation to man. On the other hand I believe that Mr. Hammond used his analogy to argue for a certain way in which a man could act in exercising his "partial" activities. But if what I said above is true, then it would have been necessary for Mr. Hammond to show the relevance of his parallelism. In so far as he developed the subject, he did not, nor I believe, could he have argued the validity of the analogy. He just made the analogy, and that was that. It is for me to show why I think the analogy is not well taken. What I say is not to be interpreted as refuting the *position* of where Mr. Hammond stood, but rather his *argument* for standing there.

His argument was roughly that God—the Christian God of sin plus grace plus redemption—penetrates into all of man's various activities, and gives them order and direction . . . namely, towards Himself. Mr. Hammond devoted himself to illustrating how this was the case by listing man's "partial" activities alongside the activity of theology. The "partial" activities are medicine, psychoanalysis, economic, political, and acquisition of knowledge. In each of these activities he discovered a sin, an act of grace, and a redemption which he likened to the theological concepts of sin, grace and redemption. This he said is a way of demonstrating how theology—and hence God—penetrates and orders man's fields of action. Further, he said it would be good if we acted accordingly. This was the essence of his argument as I see it.

Underlying Mr. Hammond's argument is the definition of sin, which he explained as the endowment of a part with the importance of the whole; the whole in this case being divine illumination. Thus to act rightly we perform all of our "partial" activities toward the final end—the whole—of divine illumination. Our sins are thus expiated and we move toward happiness.

But suppose we change the "whole," or end, from divine illumination to full development of the individual self. Sin then becomes a development of some part of the self to the exclusion of the development of the full self. Under this supposition our "partial" activities of health, self-knowledge, material acquisition, social intercourse and learning processes are ordered and given direction by the idea of the full development of every individual self.

Mr. Hammond found the "sin" in each of man's activities at that point where the action becomes "self-centered," opposed to the "self" losing itself in a universal concept—or God. To illustrate the several cases of sin he took an example of a diseased individual operating in each of the given fields. For instance, he took a sick person in the realm of health, a debtor in the realm of economics, a criminal in the realm of politics, and so on. One would infer from this approach that the healthy individual—or one moving towards health—acting in psychoanalysis, politics and the others, was therefore moving towards "sellessness"—getting rid of a view of the world with the "self" at the center. In other words, he was saying that the path to healthy participation in the "partial" activities is to identify one's aim with a goal beyond one's "self"—that is, divine illumination. However, it is not difficult to conceive of healthy and balanced activity being achieved with no goal beyond the concept of the fulfilment of the "self." Indeed it can and always has been present in human endeavor.

We have, then, two of the possible arguments for the manner of bettering our human action and achieving happiness: by moving away from the "self" toward the divine illumination, or by moving toward the "self" for self-fulfilment. Mr. Hammond argues for the theological direction by interpreting the various fields of human action in such a way that they are analogous to the field of theology. On the other hand, these same fields of action can be looked at in the entirely different way I have mentioned; namely, as controlled by the goal of self-fulfilment. This way definitely does not allow the analogy to be made with the theological activity. Because one of the terms of the analogy can be interpreted so as to defend tow opposing positions, I do not consider the analogy a very useful one in establishing Mr. Hammond's position.

I have not "overthrown" Mr. Hammond in his *position,* nor have I attempted to establish a position of my

own. I have argued against Mr. Hammond's trying to *establish* his position by the use of a certain analogy.

It may be said that this is an unduly harsh treatment of an analogy, but since the one Mr. Hammond made was directed toyard persuasion of a certain kind of action, and also made up the bulk of what Mr. Hammond said, I feel it warrants analysis. For, as the proverb has it, "Mony a mickle maks a muckle." S. LINTON.

## The Inferno

Whom do we find in Dante's Hell? No strangers to us, that's sure. I propose to talk about some of them and will start with those we find in upper Hell. Here is the excessive love of the incontinent, who do not exercise the control of reason over the natural appetites, and their sins are carnality, gluttony, avariciousness and prodigality. The carnal sinners are twin love birds in a tempest, who hope that they will not be separated by the buffeting winds, but who cannot hope that they will cease to be buffetted: their whole desire is to be together and this very desire is their tempest, for they will to be sustained only by each other, whereas only God sustains. Therefore they are led by their love hither and thither, but find no rest. The gluttonous pollute their bodies, and the stench is diffused through their souls, so that they cannot profit therein. The soul of the avaricious is full of the prodigal's goings, and the prodigal' full of his, and both are empty thereby.

As was said, "love is the seed of every virtue in us, and of every deed that deserves punishment." The loves which are the seeds of virtue in us are those that are proper to the intellect: that love by which the intellect is perfected and which is towards God Himself, and that love which directs the intellect to His splendour, which is, for Dante, the light of God reflected in the things that are made. For God made all things that they might cry "I am," and hence they are good in themselves. Yet when they are pursued as the incontinent pursue them, the soul becomes "a place void of all light," for then the good of the intellect is lost. Our knowledge of things excels our love of them except in the case of God, for our love of Him excels our knowledge of Him. But the incontinent alter this, seeing that they love what it is the intellect's business to know, and make their love excel their knowledge of it.

The proper object of the sense of sight is color; of hearing, sound; of touch, bodies; of smell, odors; of taste, that which has taste. The proper office of the senses is to notify the soul by the impressions that come through them, so that the soul may delight therein and the intellect abstract what the thing was that was perceived. But in the incontinent the whole soul is poscessed by the love of objects proper only to the senses, and is so affected by this lust that the intellect cannot operate. For the whole is rendered turbulent by the rule of such affections, and the good of the intellect is surely lost. The good of both the sentient and intellectual faculties is smothered and ill-used—must not the soul be sorely punished then, if these goods are swamped, as it were, in a howling tempest? The form of man, the intellectual soul, becomes less than it ought to be, and in the same degree the man becomes less a man. Such is the punishment of the incontinent.

The sinners whose loves pervert them are more hateful to God and are punished in the lower regions of Hell. These commit the sins of malice, by which we injure those whom we should love even as ourselves. What is the cause of malice except love? but, because they love evil objects, the men are evil. Here they love the imaginations of their own hearts—imaginations which have to do with honor, power, glory, wealth. They worship their own idols instead of God and they vainly presume on His offices. Here they act as tho' they were their own masters—but there is a Master over us all. Here they seek mastery over other men—but all men are in the image of God, and it is not for a creature to meddle with it. Here all is done with regard to the opinions of men—but only God judges. It is no wonder that God hates the excesses of upper Hell less than these: those love God's splendors that reflect His light, tho' to excess, but these set up their own idols in the place of God and imagine themselves to be something other than the creatures He in fact made them.

What a fine lot we find in Dis! The hypocrites are bright in gilded cloaks, but within are heavy as lead. The flatterers befoul themselves continually and never change their diapers. The foxes of this earth are taken by their own counsels. The thieves run about naked and terrified, hounded by all that know them, or by the fear that they will be known; and so they take no pleasure in the things that are made, not to mention their Author. The things that should delight men are not very much enjoyed by these, to mention only a few of those who live by this rule. They are so full of their own idols, or of other men's opinions about this or that, that they cannot taste the salt of the earth for their own dung. Their eyes cannot see, nor their ears hear, nor their intellects know, for they are always fornicating with their own inventions.

The sinners we have mentioned just now are examples of simple fraud, according to Dante's classification; they break "the bond which Nature makes," that bond by which men are one and all in the image of God, and therefore not to be injured by violence or by fraud. Those guilty of "treacherous" fraud break not only this bond, but also the bonds that tie man to man over and above this. Such are the bonds of love and friendship, of comrades and citizens, of kinship and hospitality. When treachery is dealt, men renounce the image of God in them for an idol of their own invention. These renounce their manhood, for it is because their manhood is in the image of He who by His mercy makes covenants with men, that some worth is imputed to the covenants that men make with each other. They are frozen in the ice of Cocytus and their loves with them. The loves which make men men are frozen by their sin, and they are hardly alive. There can be none worse than they unless it be the trimmers, over whom even the frozen have some glory. For the Trimmers never had desires at all; or rather, they had them from God, but so neglected them that they used them for neither good nor evil. There is ro report of them and they lived without blame and without praise. We are creatures of love and intellect, and tho' all the blamed lose the good of the intellect and the treacherous have their loves frozen, yet these do not even have something that can be frozen; they cannot be said to desire anything, and therefore cannot be said to know what must first be desired, and so they are, and yet never were, alive. They are found in great numbers busying themselves; but you needn't ask them to what end, because they will not know. But enough of ice and dried up creeks!

We also find the violent among the perverted in Dis —the violent against God, Nature and Art. Their sin is sometimes hard to perceive; outwardly, they have so much to recommend them. The clerks so overpower us with their learning that we do not reckon that they despise God's gift to all of us in the things that He made. All of God's creation was given us for our delight when He made us sentient and intellectual, but they are unnoticed by those who seek in erudition, honor and renown. They burn the midnight oil and find no delight in men, women or anything that He made, but in what *they* make and do. Such, (for despising God's works and therefore also God Himself, for it is by His works that we know Him), have for reward their "ill-strained nerves," which are as burning sands to them.

The same sort of thing is true of those who seek honor in war and in counsel. They are indeed great-souled and great respect is due them; yet their fiery spirits so scald our eyes that we cannot see their sin for the glory they have with men. Can they not be lusty men and very much concerned with the good things of this life? Perhaps, but the lover of honor will discard them for honor's sake. Perhaps they seek the opinions of men rather than God's judgment? This too is true but we will not class them with the hypocrites and such ilk—there is nobility in them, and courage; and men follow them as heroes. How then do we see what sin is in the lovers of honor, if there is any in them? Especially, how do we dispel our awe of such as "quel grande" Campaneus, "that great spirit," who in his pride is sufficient unto himself? He is the one who is violent against God, at one and the same time acknowledging His power and blaspheming Him? Tho' God slay him he will maintain his own ways before Him; and, unlike Job, he puts no trust in Him, but meets his death standing and despising. How can we help but stand in awe of him? How does he not make humility to seem servility only, and the humble man a mean and worthless soul?

The same, says Dante, which enables us to see through all the lovers of honor enables us to see through him. We traverse the burning sands of the violent and great souls only by a path cleared by the smoke of the rivulet whose waters are the tears of the human race. There is an old man who stands in a hollow mountain of Crete, and except for his golden head his whole body drops the tears of the pathos of the human race. For all except man's Golden Age gave cause for tears. The infirmity of man since the fall gives cause for tears, and there has been no man since who did not partake of this infirmity. But the noble flights of the imaginations in the hearts of the great spirits obscure the infirmity present therein, and they live a lie both to themselves and to others. Proud and furious Roland, who to his friends was sweet and gentle, is in Paradise. But his trust was in God, in whose name he fought and who helped him, and he wept when the Peers and the other knights were laid out row on row.

Only through the smoke of the pathos of human history, then, by the tears of men born to suffering, can "quel grande" be seen. All the rivers of hell are of these waters—waters which show that men do not sustain themselves. These are the tears that came with Adam's sin, and they are added to by all those who follow him. Yet they are despised by all sinners, for they are all, their fear changed to desire, eager to cross Acheron, that they may sin on the other side. The sullen, with their morose looks and morbid sweat (there where they should be joyous) make a bog of these waters—the marsh of Styx. They bathe in the mud they have made of the tears God assigned us, tears that are honest as clearly depicting our nature. The angry, heedless of the tears they stand in, some up to their necks, fight with one another, and by their thrashing make it muddier. All these waters pour into the rivulet by which we traverse the burning sands of Hybris; but the rivulet is red, for Phlegethon stands between it and the marsh; and in Phlegethon the tyrants and murderers boil in the blood that reddens it. And this is only proper if we consider that, tho' the heroes are not tyrants or murderers, still it is the sword that chiefly serves honor, and blood the sword.

It is the smoke of the boiling rivulet whose waters are tears and scowlings and wrath and blood that clears the the lie that the great-souls live in the world of their air so we may see what pride is made of. It is a lie, the lie that the great-souls live in the world of their own making, as if they who were made were the makers; for the imaginations of our own hearts are lies. No man is sufficient unto himself, but they do everything as if they were, and so renounce the God Who made them and to Whom they owe all their gifts and all their fortune.

EDITOR'S NOTE: *The preceding article is a selection from an essay which interpreted Dante's Inferno as a*

*Hell on this earth; i.e. that the character of each of the sinners we find in the* Inferno *together with his condition or, rather, his plight is drawn from the lives sinners actually lead in this life, and need have nothing whatever to do with a Hades that awaits us after death. It is contended that it is highly improbable that any of us are wholly removed from the plight of someone of the sinners here described. Perhaps the treatment deficient in itself, will encourage each of us to open Dante's book again to see what part of hell we are in.*

*This is a matter which appears more in keeping with the present self-examining temper of the community than the omitted portions of this essay which dealt with Dante's doctrines concerning love and intellect or reason.*

*Written by Edmund di Tullio, it was judged the best undergraduate thesis of 1947-48.*

## Roots in Hell

Mr. Mallett had a fresh, although not well organized, approach to the Divine Comedy. He emphasized an allegorical aspect, shied away from the anagogic and built up an analogy with epistemology. In Hell we have the certainty of our sense-impressions, all too certain. In Purgatory we become aware of the defect of sense, and by prayer and fire are purged of the cobwebs over our vision to let new vistas open up. In Paradiso, there is a burst of intuition into things independent of sense.

The Divine Comedy has a geography. There is the inverted funnel of Hell, the upraised seven story mountain of Purgatory, and the heavenly essences moving round a luminous point on a wheel of fire.

The point of reference in Hell is the icy core. In Purgatory it is terrestial paradise won after a long ascending pilgrimage and in paradise, the point of brightness.

The concept of motion plays a leading role in the Divine Comedy. The kind of motion proper to Hell, Mr. Mallett called 'writhing.' It is significant that the trimmers outside Hell have enforced mobility. At the core, motion is reduced to the sluggish flapping of Satan's wings. The tendency of motion is thus to greater and greater stasis as we descend.

In Hell one is imprisoned in his respective circle forever. In Purgatory you *move* up the stories. One moves, Mr. Mallett suggested, linearly from hypothesis to hypothesis, supplanting a relatively good one for a relatively better. History happens in Purgatory and only there. In Paradiso there is rhythm forever.

The moral philosophy of Hell is an egotistic hedonism. Egotistic is intensive since any hedonism is self-centered. It seems to solve all the moral problems easily. The corresponding epistemology is a 'solipsism of the specious present' as beautifully described by Santayana. If solipsists are men whose point of reference is themselves, who do not accept the 'reality of the universe, men radically isolated, this is an anagogic meaning of Hell as Mr. Mallett recognized in question period.

The story of Purgatory is the story of any hypothesis From Hell to Purgatory is the transition from the second to the third stage of Plato's divided line. Hypotheses are respectable but not sufficient, and one needs to make the leap to paradise, the fourth part of the line.

There is the comedy element. As Oedipus, the tragic hero replaces hypothesis with hypothesis until he gets a realization of events which is both beyond his control and his understanding. He gets the illumination which is the condition similar to a comic hero, but he is enmeshed in history. He sees he must get disengaged from his past but can't help himself. Purgatory's journeymen likewise need to go beyond themselves and are helped by gifts to the theological virtues—gifts not obtainable thru sheer effort.

In comedy, diverse, irreconcilable parts jive together and somehow get reconciled. In the Divine Comedy love harmonizes all elements, even Satan survives thru his love, however decayed, for God. In the comic vision, there is harmony, togetherness, all the parts mirroring the whole, as in the Monadology.

Leibniz is a comic poet as are all mathematicians. The mathematician selects his point of reference and exercises complete free wheeling provided he honors the law of contradiction. There is a lot of Euclid in Dante. He needed him just as the demiurge did, to create a universe.

FRASCA.

## "Roots in Heaven"

Was Dr. Irwin Strauss pulling our leg? What he was saying did sound a little ridiculous, but he said it in a way which made one want to listen attentively. There was something in his manner of expression which made one feel that he was saying important things. The feeling one had was the same kind an upperclassman might have in the first reading of Leibniz' Monadology. One could understand little of what Leibniz was saying but it was clear that he was saying something worthwhile. Strauss' meaning soon became clear and during the lecture he gave a reason for this first affection that some of us felt. He emphasized the expression with which words are framed into sentences and that often times that expression exceeds in meaning any possible understanding which the words themselves might bring.

Strauss attacked one of the most cherished ikons of physical anthropology today. He denied that the upright posture of man is detrimental thereby making him less fit for his existence. On the contrary, his point was that this upright posture is the most important expression of man's existence. It is toward this upright posture that all men tend. This is not to say, as he pointed out in the question period, that any deviation from that position is departing from man's nature, but rather that from any non-erect posture man always endeavors to arise upright. In Dr. Strauss' own terms one could disagree with him on this point.

It seems to me that since it is man alone who assumes

this upright posture, and that it is in this position that man is most noble, dignified, self-assured, it follows that any bending from that position makes him less a man and more like other animals. But one may rightfully ask if love is animalistic? Strauss mentioned the incongruity of a man professing his love to a woman without deviating from the upright position. However, if man's essence is rationality, although no *man* can be wholly rational, one is more a man when he is as completely divorced from the passions as he can be and therefore the more upright one can maintain himself the less he is subjected to animality. This is the way in which Plato would couch Strauss' lecture. Of course, it is true that all men are partly animals, but insofar as man can draw in the reins of the black horse, that much more is he a man.

However, in opposition to this, Strauss' point is that this rationality, this awareness of space and time, springs from the most important aspect of man's biological structure, the upright posture.

Strauss' idea was not a new one for Plato in the 'Timaeus' says (Cornford: 90B):

"As concerning the most sovereign form of the soul in us we must conceive that heaven has given it to each man as a guiding genius—that part which we say dwells in the summit of our body and lifts us from earth towards our celestial affinity, like a plant whose roots are not in earth, but in the heavens. And this is most true, for it is to the heavens whence the soul first came to birth, that the divine part attaches the head or root of us and keeps the whole body upright."

Plato here answers the question which Strauss did not. Why is it that the child does try to stand upright? Strauss was more concerned with the fact that the child does stand upright and what the consequences of such an action mean.

At any rate it is refreshing and worthwhile for us to take off on this idea of man being the way he is (in a large measure) because of this biological phenomenon. Strauss points out that the emptiness of one's hands, the gesture of shrugging the shoulders are both evidences of man's dissimilarity with other animals. Can we say then, that he who works with his hands is therefore less man? For is not this desire for full hands somehow related to man giving up in his opposition to the forces of nature and desiring to have his whole body at one with the earth? Strauss' answer to this seems to be, no, that filling one's hands with work requiring skill is not the same as hunching over on all fours.

Let us take Oedipus and this notion of the upright posture: At the beginning of the play, Oedipus is proud and self-sufficient, but flexible enough to bend from the upright posture in expressing the love and warmth of a good king. Confronted with Teiresias and later Creon, he loses this happy faculty of being able to bend from the erect position. Emotion has overcome him so that instead of his bending his body he has iced into an inflexible, irrational being. But now we are saying that because of emotion, man is sometimes not compelled to bend from his upright posture, but rather to fix him in that position so that he cannot deviate from it.

It appears then that there are many emotions which work in opposite directions. Perhaps we have thus far confused the action with the effect of the action. In order to love, one must be flexible, but the effect of love may very well give us that feeling of sufficiency which would make us tend toward the upright posture.

What then about this emotion which iced Oedipus? I choose to call it fear and immediately we see that here the emotion can not be explained away so easily. A weak person does indeed bend from fear, vainly clutching with those empty hands, for some support, some security (earth). The strong man, however, feeling secure within himself, never having need to return to earth for renewed strength battles his fear without help and consequently remains upright.

Dr. Strauss is a delightful man and although many disagree with his thesis, none can doubt that his idea is a fascinating one.

BOB GOLDBERG.

## Hints and Guesses

"What shall I do to inherit eternal life?"

Mr. Mollogen, lecturing on "Law and Grace," gave the historical development of the Christian requirements for eternal life. First there was man in a state of innocence, without conscience. Moses brought man under the law; this was the second state. But with the law came the knowledge of sin, for man willfully transgresses God's commandments. Christ offers man the third state which is grace. The fourth and final state is the inheritance; the peace of God which passes all understanding and which comes through the resurrection of the body.

Without law man could not sin for there was no knowledge of right and wrong action. God's revelation to Moses gave the true criterion for action. Under the Mosaic Law it was enough if one did not commit murder, or steal, or commit adultery. If one could restrain the urge to transgress the commandments, the scribes would hold him guiltless. Christ came teaching the law of love which is not so much a law, as a principle of action through which one may find the inner and absolute law of God. This principle forced a different interpretation of the commandments. They formed a basis for social justice but Christ shifted the emphasis from the social to the individual sense of justice. It is no longer enough merely to refrain from committing murder or adultery. The anger in a man's heart, which prompts him to contemplate murder, is as serious to God as is the act of murder to the civil courts. The committing of adultery in the heart is to God as serious as is the act itself to society. And this, the lecturer remarked, "makes adulterers of us all."



While the third state is an interpretation of the law, the fourth state is a fulfillment of the law. The peace of God comes with the resurrection of the body because it lies outside of time. It is beyond history. Most philosophical and political systems, either implicitly or explicitly, point toward an ultimate fulfillment of man in history. This is impossible in Christian terms, for Christ's very interpretation of the law emphasises the inherent tendency of man to sin. A law which penalizes an action thereby demonstrates that the nature of the action is evil and also that the inner motivation which prompts the action is evil. Even when man does develop his best potentialities, he also heightens the possibilities for sin which lie about him. Since man in time and history must sin, the fulfillment of man must of necessity lie beyond these. As to what the fulfillment is, one can not be too explicit. When the promise of fulfillment is pressed too far, absurdities of dem-golden-slippers-on-golden-streets variety, result.

Christ sums the Ten Commandments into two; "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind." The second is: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." On these two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets. Thus, by observance of this commandment, the Mosaic Law is transcended. The scribe's social interpretation is not discarded but is embraced in a larger definition. If one truly loves God, he must love his neighbor. Not because there is an inherent goodness in the neighbor, or for the possibilities in him, nor for the attrition of love, but because God also loves the neighbor and as a child of God one desires to imitate his Father. Through imitating the Father, who is the God of Love, the thoughts which would prompt sinful action are impossible. It is only in so far as the child fails to imitate that sin is possible.

An action is good only to the degree that it is prompted by love. Even doing the right thing is not enough if the reason governing the act is without love. As an example of right action for wrong reasons, the lecturer cited the Tempters and Thomas a'Becket in Eliot's "Murder in the Cathedral." The first three Tempters offer him power and wealth which Thomas easily refuses. The fourth Tempter, however, tempts Thomas with his own thoughts; "Seek the way of martyrdom, make yourself the lowest on earth, to be high in heaven." Almost in despair, he answers in terms of the Christian paradox, "Can sinful pride be driven out only by more sinful? Can I neither act nor suffer without perdition?" Mr. Mollogen answered this with an emphatic "No." Man's good actions prompted by love become sinful through human pride. To demonstrate this the lecturer invited the listeners to try a test. Try giving a large donation to a charity, and see how long you can remain quiet about it. In this respect, the Christian is not much farther along than the Pharisee who practiced his piety before men and received his reward.

What then is the Christian answer to this paradox? If, even knowing the law, man transgresses, if right action alone is insufficient, if sinful pride is purged only by greater pride, how is man redeemed? Through the Grace of Jesus Christ, and through faith, these sins of pride and ignorance are forgiven. Eliot, in another work, "Dry Salvages," points towards the solution of the problem saying: these are "Hints and guesses, hints followed by guesses; and the rest is prayer, observance, discipline, thought and action."

G. H. COLLINGWOOD.

## Looking-Glass

Every man at St. John's is a creator . . . or should be. This program is a skeleton, that indomitable, age-old skeleton man—stript bare and refabricated and given life by every man that really lives. He's here, lying perhaps within us. But our proposition at this school is that we can best look at him through Alice's looking-glass . . . the world of the great books. But, and this must not be forgotten, the looking-glass only gives an image, and a strange one at that. Just the image of a skeleton. As we step through the looking-glass we are "temporarily" absolved of time. But we are creators . . . and creation takes place in time. So we've got to pass back and forth through the strange mirror, first gazing at the skeleton-image and seeing its bones and their articulation, and then coming out and putting flesh and blood and a heart in the real one, and finally, breathing life through its nostrils.

This poor, bleached spector lying on the sands within us, is the same one that Plato found, or any of the others. But when he is given the muscle fabrics and nerve fibers, when his heart starts to pulse and he stumbles to his feet—then he is single and particular; one man and one man alone. One act of creation.

We are glad for our St. John's looking-glass. But don't forget that what lies on the other side is not alive, not by itself. And it isn't worth a thought unless it is the basis for something to come to life.

So where does the tissue, the blood pulse, the vital breath come from? I don't mean the originals, I mean the particulars for this particular act of creation—you and me. Where from. From the wind, I say, from the wind. From that gleeful, warm breath, from that howling round blast, from that wistful sigh, from that soft whisper at night. Listen to the wind that fans your flame. Listen with attention. Listen in quiet. Listen with courage. Then you will be able to create.

S. LINTON.