

COLLEGIAN

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE

JANUARY, 1964

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Editor.... David Lachterman

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(The Collegian sends its best wishes to Mrs. Audrey Kémp-ton with hopes for her speedy recovery.)

Notes: The deadline for the Collegian's Short Story Contest has been extended until March 12, 1964.

Errors in this issue:

1. 17 should be cited

17 should be cited

18 (letter called an _____) insert

20 footnote 2p = act II, sc. vi l. 24

21 footnote three act IV, sc. i l. 143

22 footnote one act V, scene i, l. 148

23 to return add

28 program should be program; Vanhook ed. add pp. 72-88

In the editorial to the September, 1963 Collegian I suggested that members of the community submit questions or criticisms to our Friday evening lecturers through the medium of this publication. This month Miss Brann and I decided to implement this suggestion by inviting a student to review Mr. Sparrow's lecture Rights, Law, and the Right. In the following weeks students and tutors will be invited to contribute reflections or challenges concerning future lectures. On occasion more than one review of the same lecture will be published for purposes of comparison and controversy. Lecturers will be invited to submit restatements, counter-challenges and elaborations of their positions. The record of such debates will be, I think, of value and interest. Mr. Silverman's comments on Mr. Sparrow's lecture set an unusually high tone for future contributors; it is hoped that what he began others will continue.

Note: The deadline for the Collegian's Short Story Contest has been extended until March 15, 1964.

Errata to this issue:

- p. 17 cheif should be chief
- 17 foivalries and add 'spars'
- 19 (better called an _____) insert *ἀμυρτία*
- 20 Footnote two = Act II, sc. vi l. 54
- 21 Footnote three = Act IV, sc. i l. 145
- 25 Footnote one = Act V, scene i, l. 1-6
- 27 in seiner add *Δήλιος*
- 29 promenus should be promeneur; Vaughan ed. add pp. 75-86

ERRATA TO JANUARY, 1964 COLLEGIAN

The following title was missing from the Table of Contents :

The Relationship Between Appositives, Restrictive and Non-Restrictive
Attributives Pattie Turner '66 12

The following should be added to the second paragraph on p. 32
ending

" ... thus agreeing in part with the traditional liberalism
he was trying to undermine."

Add: One might counter this objection by remarking that those
actions permitted by the laws are approved because the actions
are right. The square is quite explicit on this point.

By calling certain voluntary actions 'right', do not the
laws imply that one is duty-bound to do them ?

To first paragraph on p. 34 after the words "In Plutarch's phrase,
'the peculiar work' "

add: ἰδέον ἔργον

One of the saddest things about the murder of our President is that we do not really or fully know what we have lost. So much of what we admired in the man lay in the promise he held out for future greatness: his intelligence, that is, his capacity to learn; his high style, the grace and fluency of his discourse; his sense of humor, the subdued irreverence of his "deadpan" comic style; his freedom from, or rather, distaste for sentimentality; his sobriety in acknowledging the aspirations of the more articulate members of the polity while at the same time being able to appreciate why the resistance of the less articulate made it wise to forego the implementation of those aspirations.

Being both ambitious and well-bred, he could be at the same time both gracious and hard; happy in the exercise of highest authority, he could be grateful for being provided with the opportunity for living up to, as he put it, that ancient Greek definition of happiness, "the full use of your powers along lines of excellence." Like every natural politician he greatly desired and greatly sought the esteem of his fellows, and like any man whose soul has ever been enlightened by a sense of honor, he knew that the prize was not worth the winning if he did not make himself worthy of that esteem.

II

However, the injunction of our new President obliges us to turn our attention away for a time from memories of John Kennedy to the grim circumstances or conditions of his assassination, to see if we might learn anything from them. We shall in all likelihood never know what was going on in the mind of the President's assassin, to what extent he might have been influenced by the atmosphere of alarm created by the political murders in Birmingham and Mississippi and by the rabid charges propagated by political extremists, charges which gain conviction among the dupes of the extremists because they remain unrepudiated and uncondemned by people who know better. (It is the duty of those who stand to profit politically from such charges to be the first and the most vigorous in denouncing them).

Regardless of what went on in the assassin's mind, the assassination, the murder of Oswald, the events just referred to, all are signs of danger. Are there any general conditions which have been contributing to this tendency to take direct political action, to take the law into one's own hands, this tendency toward the subversion of the rule of law? It is hard to be very exact about such matters, but perhaps the knowledge we seek does not yield itself to overexact methods. It could be that the most articulate elements of the nation and the most prominent objects of their loathing, the right-wing extremists, have been working in unplanned cooperation to bring about the same conditions.

The effects of the extremists and their not so unwitting allies, those who have gone into the tawdry business of investigating political opinions in public, are not too difficult to understand: by sowing

distrust and suspicion they tend to spread the feeling that Americans can no longer trust themselves to behave like free men, that what is required is extensive official supervision by them and their cohorts. The accusatorial atmosphere not only opens up new fields for bullying but is also expected to reform the situation left us by our traditions and institutions of civil liberty. It does not require a great deal of subtlety to see that what they would reap would resemble most of all, in its political essentials, the despotisms admired by their brethren of the far left.

To expect any society to be completely free from fanatics, those brooding enthusiasts, to turn Lincoln's phrase, would be unreasonable. The problem is always one of keeping them under control. So long as they present no clear and present danger to free government, it is probably safest to provide them and their brethren of what they regard as the opposite extreme opportunity for keeping themselves occupied by organizing and meeting peaceably. But wherever unlawful violence breaks out the punishment should be swift and severe. Leniency in such matters is likely to function as encouragement. It is equally or even more important than the control of violence that the leaders of respectable opinion in the nation and in the various communities make it perfectly clear how far removed from the serious political life of the nation these people are. This requires, to repeat, that the primary responsibility for diminishing their influence should fall to those within the pale of respectability who might stand to profit from their efforts. These are the people who are most likely to have some influence on those who are about to join or leave their ranks. It probably is "too much to hope" that anything might "soften the hearts of those who would themselves recoil from assassination, but who do not shrink from spreading the venom which kindles thoughts of it in others." It would be safer to place our hopes in strong anti-toxins.

The case of those whom we have spoken of as more articulate, our writers, social scientists, journalists, artists and "communication specialists", is more difficult and more important. They might be expected to know better. By wallowing in the seamy and sentimental side of life, indulging in and habituating us to that invasion of privacy called pornography, identifying misery with profundity, glorifying vulgar, thoughtless and even perverted passion and preaching its liberation, by all these things our writers tend to undermine the pride, self-respect and self-confidence of the educated public, those who they should be preparing for leadership. One wonders why these supposed divers into the depths of the human psyche never seem to have noticed that it is precisely those peoples who have been most distinguished for self-restraint, self-censorship and self-control, qualities now fashionable to disparage, the English-speaking peoples, who have also been most distinguished for being able to make free republican government work over long stretches of time. Free men need confidence in and encouragement of their ability to control themselves. Our writers and the producers of our mass media dramatic arts for the most part, produce the opposite. To the extent to which free men lose their dignity and self-respect and cease to behave like free men, like men who deserve free institutions, to that extent the

will to preserve free institutions will naturally wane, to that extent it will seem both right and natural to eliminate free institutions.

It is almost pathetic to see how, when some of our writers do strive to present something of the noble or heroic, it often turns out to be of the nearly mindless variety, as if deepened understanding can lead only to the low or bestial. This is not too surprising, for when the writers turn to the authorities, the scientists, the "social scientists", for enlightenment, they find them incompetent, for the most part, to deal with much besides the low, the mechanical and the bestial. To speak of the noble and the base, the good and bad, would entail substantiating "value judgments", and that they say has nothing to do with science. This is not the place to go into the sophisms usually presupposed by those holding to this notion of the science of human things; our concern here is primarily with its effects. Yet perhaps it would not be amiss to suggest that if these social scientists believe that the principles of their science cannot be derived from their own proper subject matter, that they must be borrowed by analogy from the more prestigious natural sciences, it might be more fitting to go not to physics or mathematics but to a science like medicine which makes qualitative distinctions like that between health and sickness.

The effect of the intellectual orientation we have been describing on our journalists manifests itself by the increasing disrespect of respectable periodicals for the privacy of any apparently newsworthy subject. Ought we to be peering into the astronaut's living room, staring at his wife on the day of his flight? Do we have a right to know as much as possible about the private life of every public figure? Are not the press and media men partly responsible for making the Dallas authorities feel that everyone had a right to know all the details of Oswald's transfer to the county jail? Should the question, as to whether the public's "right to know" should be allowed to jeopardize a man's right to a fair trial, even have arisen? Does the press have a duty to reveal to us everything they can possibly find out? Or is it not rather the duty of every responsible reporter and journalist to, at least, consider whether what he says might make his audience better or worse citizens, better or worse human beings? There are times when a personal and private tragedy becomes an occasion where it is appropriate for the public to know about and participate in the events. Such, of course, were the events leading to the burial of the President. The press and the communications media, for those three days, following that example of proud and compassionate self-restraint set by the gallant former First Lady and the Kennedy family, showed us to what heights they are capable of rising by the part which they took in giving the late President the farewell he deserved. One of the incidents for which this writer is most grateful occurred as the dignitaries gathered about just after the President's body had been placed in the Rotunda of the Capital Building. A CBS radio reporter, his voice very low and heavy with emotion, noted that most of the mourners were still dry-eyed. Then he said "Just across the way from me someone's eyes have just filled with tears." He hesitated and finally said, "I don't think I'll tell you who it is."

Unfortunately, we must now turn to the dreariest subject of this essay. Perhaps the best commentary that could be made was made during those three days following the assassination when any person of some sensibility knew that this was no time for cheapness, pettiness and triviality, and consequently that vulgar intruder, advertising, was expelled from the airwaves. Unfortunately the debasing effects of this continual stimulation of and appeal to every kind of petty desire do not end with periods of national mourning. Assassinations are not the only occasions for which serious people have a need, perhaps even a right, to sustain a serious mood. The advertisers realize their purposes most when they imbue their unwary audience, the largest part of their audience, with the feeling that they owe it to themselves, as if by natural right, to gratify the desires the advertisers' products cater to. The American way of life, American freedom, begins to seem to mean the freedom to amass as many possessions, gadgets and creature comforts as possible. We will not elaborate on the kind of invasions of privacy that are perpetrated by the cosmetics industry. Can we afford to allow such as they to play so large a role in forming our tastes? To the extent that the advertisers succeed in forming the national character, it becomes increasingly difficult to insist that we be treated with the dignities befitting free men.

What necessity dictates that the communications media should be dominated by predominantly commercial motives? What about the educational role of the media? Education is gratifying, but, unlike salesmanship, never flattering. The reason is simple: Education involves confronting oneself with minds or spirits that one acknowledges are in some decisive respect superior to one's own mind or spirit, it involves a continual striving to raise one's own understanding to the level of that of one's teachers. Education, then, frequently, if not always, reminds us of our defects in a way that makes us apt to be ashamed of them. It moves us towards overcoming whatever is petty and selfish about ourselves; salesmanship, on the other hand, caters to and thereby encourages the selfish and the petty. Education is not likely to win out on the open market.

The problem is complicated by the fact that a great deal of advertising in this country is not stupid, much of it is rather clever. Obviously considerable artistic, literary and musical talent goes into its production. The sad result is that young budding artists who should be directed towards working for the elevation, perhaps even the exaltation, of the human spirit become inured to the prostitution of their talents.

Someone might reply to the positions we have set forth in this section: Is not our sense of privacy connected to our sense of shame and is not shamelessness after all, both the precondition for and the natural effect of enlightenment? If shame and tact, respect for another's sense of shame, are nature's ways of protecting the intimate, the vulnerable, the naturally exclusive in man, then shamelessness would seem rather to be proof of ignorance. Furthermore, if our self-respect depends upon such protection and our freedom depends upon our self-respect, then our freedom depends as well upon our sense of shame, our sense of privacy.

III

Our concern has been the conditions tending towards the subversion of the rule of law in America. Throughout our history there has been a tension between a tradition of violence and the tradition of respect for the law. Not the least manifestation of our failure to come to grips adequately with the problem of violence is the widespread tolerance for those home-grown forms of military dictatorship called organized and unorganized crime. On the frontier, it has been said, violence was necessary and the tradition made sense. But now there are too many of us and we are too close together to tolerate habits appropriate for by-gone conditions. Yet it would be truly sad if thanks to the progress of medical and technological science we have become so crowded and so interdependent that the very physical conditions for "rugged individualism" and privacy are disappearing. However this may be, it ought to be said that the roots of our tradition of violence are not altogether ignoble. Violence is not in itself wrong, obviously it is required sometimes for the defense of our noblest interests. According to the Declaration of Independence no particular form of government or institution, or adherence or conformity thereto, is sacrosanct. What is spoken of as sacred is honor and certain inalienable rights, properties of separate human beings. Our sacred honor and our natural rights may, under certain very rare conditions, require that rebellion and violence be undertaken on their behalf against the established order. Rather than simply deploring all forms of violence our task would seem to be to try to understand the difference between fanaticism and noble dedication. The two are often confused, for reasons alluded to earlier and because they do share at least one important trait in common: they both seem to involve forgetting about one's self. The difference may have something to do with the reasonableness of the goals of each.

The greatest documents from the most varied sources of our tradition, for example, the Old and New Testaments, Plato's Republic and the Declaration of Independence are unanimous in teaching that perfection is not to be sought for in particular institutions, at least human institutions, that there will never be heaven on earth. They point to what kind of order we ought to aim for, what kind of order should provide us with the standards for improving those actual orders we find in the world, but they warn us not to expect the realization of our highest hopes. The warning serves not only to prepare us against disappointment and frustration but also to help us from being diverted from the pursuit of that perfection which might be feasible for us: for example, in the Republic Socrates shows us why the chances for instituting a perfectly just order among a community of men are completely, or almost completely, nil, but he does it while illustrating in what way it might be feasible for a man to institute such an order, a heavenly order, namely, by instituting it in his own soul. Perfection is not to be expected in the ordering of other men, but, if at all, in the ordering of one's self. The latter, not the former, might be in our power. The fanatic does not make distinctions: he does not distinguish between possessing rights and knowing when it is wise to exercise those rights; he does not distinguish between what is

good simply, what good is realizable generally and what goodness might reasonably be expected in some given situation. The latent fanatic expects heaven on earth. He is inevitably frustrated, and indignation joined to envy and resentment swells into hate against those who he supposes are or represent the causes of his failures. Could one not say that perhaps the nihilism, the bitter resentment against all society exhibited by some of our writers is also a function of their original overexpectation, a function of their divorce from the sobriety of the tradition and hence their failure to consider the immense obstacles that always lie in the path of man's attempts to improve himself and his situation? The fanatic is certainly no respecter of the rule of law, its blessings are far too modest to please him. The rule of law is not going to bring heaven down to earth, the rule of law by itself cannot even produce nobility of soul, though it may go far towards creating the best possible conditions for the cultivation of nobility of soul. Despite these shortcomings a moderate appraisal of those blessings may not be out of order. It might not be too great an oversimplification to say that the trouble with most men is that they tend to bully and or cheat each other. The English-speaking peoples seem to have concentrated on preventing men from bullying each other, and have been blessed with considerable success in this regard, in great part because of those devices and that spirit which we sum up under the head of the rule of law. We must also concern ourselves with the problem of cheating, but not in such a way that we concentrate so much power in the hands of our protectors that they are then in a position to bully us. Besides the fact that he who is in a position to bully us is also in a position to cheat us, bullying hurts in a much deeper way than cheating.

What should we expect from men? Probably one should save one's highest expectations for one's self. One should hope but not expect that men will behave as well as it is possible for them to behave. Yet cynicism is not the answer, for although one should take precautions against the possibility, one should not expect that men will behave as badly as it is possible for them to behave. The proper mean probably lies in acting as if one expected men to behave better than they probably will behave.

What we seem to be recommending is a kind of puritanism, but puritanism with a sense of humor, for high comedy thrives on what the fanatic cannot abide, the disparity between human goals and human achievements. It mollifies our disappointment and our anger while at the same time it keeps before our minds those goals from which we fall short.

Let us sum up this paper with a warning and a suggestion. The warning first: If we want to remain free, we cannot allow ourselves to become vulgar. The suggestion: If we want to become virtuous without becoming dull, we could perhaps do no better than to consider that highest and noblest form of "deadpan" humor, Socratic irony.

VARIA ON APOLLONIUS

Bryce D. Jacobsen

The following article includes three separate items:

- I A construction fitting any ellipse into any cone,
- II The completion of Apollonius' (partial) presentation of circular sections,
- III A classification of sections with respect to the cutting plane.

I

Any Ellipse in Any Cone

Apollonius, in Prop. 52-58 in Book I, solves the problem of generating a cone and cutting it so that a section will be produced whose diameter and parameter are equal to two "given . . . bounded straight lines". He does not, however, address himself to the more general problem of cutting any given cone such that the resultant section is identical to some given section. This form of the problem was mentioned in Mr. Sacks' article in the October, 1963, Collegian, when he said:

"For Apollonius, any size conic may be derived from any given cone and, in fact, any given conic section may conversely be placed back into any given cone."

The problem as stated has solutions for the parabola and the ellipse. No general solution exists for the opposite sections, unless the ratio of transverse side to upright side is given as greater than unity. The solution for the parabola is fairly simple. (We will not present it here, since it makes a nice "original" for those addicted to Apollonius.) We do, however, present the solution for the ellipse. Notice carefully that no restriction whatsoever is put on the cone, or on the given section.

(The fact that, in our given ellipse, the given diameter is the axis, and the ratio of transverse side to upright side is greater than unity is not a restriction on the possibilities of the given ellipses. For, if the "figure" of the given ellipse is not that of the major axis and its parameter, then by II-47 the major axis may be found, and by I-50 the parameter to this axis is given. So an ellipse given by any diameter and its parameter is also given by its major axis and its parameter. And the ratio of major axis to parameter is greater than unity.)

Problem: In any given cone, to pass a plane through it such that the resultant section is identical to a given ellipse.

Let MRN be the given ellipse, with axis MN and parameter MO.

Therefore there exists a circle which can be circumscribed around quadrilateral BAFD. (Converse of Euclid III-22. See Heath's note.)

Therefore AB and FD are chords of this circumscribed circle, and E is necessarily outside this circle.

Therefore rect. DE, EF equals rect. BE, EA (Euclid III-36).

Now $DE : EF :: DE, EF : sq. EF :: BE, EA : sq. EF$
And $BE, EA : sq. EF$ comp. $BE : EF, EA : EF$
Or $BE, EA : sq. EF$ comp. $FL : LH, FL : GL$
Or $BE, EA : sq. EF :: square FL : rect. GL, LH$
Or $MN : MO :: sq. FL : rect. GL, LH$

Now let $sq. FL : rect. GL, LH :: AB : Z$
Therefore the section produced by a plane through AK and XY will be an ellipse with AB as axis and Z as parameter (I-13). And since $AB : Z :: MN : MO$, this ellipse will be similar to the given one.

Now if AB equals MN, the problem is solved.
If AB does not equal MN, then mark off on FL (or FL extended) a line FS equal to MN. From S draw ST parallel to FG. From T draw TW parallel to FL. Therefore TW equals MN.

Now let $sq. FL : rect. GL, LH :: TW : U$
And $sq. FL : rect. GL, LH :: MN : MO$
Therefore $MO = U$

Therefore the section with TW as axis and U as parameter will be identical to the given section.

QEF

(The proof is the same if the point D is taken on the other side of F, thus reversing D and F. In this case the cutting plane and line FL meet the base of the axial triangle on the other side of the base extended. Thus it follows that there are at least two sections in the given cone which are equal to some given section.

It seems probable, moreover, that for any axial triangle in a given cone, a section equal to a given section can be found. If this is true, then there are infinitely many solutions to this problem for a given cone. I will not try to prove this. I leave this for later consideration, or for others to prove, or disprove!

II

Circular Sections

There is a "gap" in the early propositions of Apollonius. In Prop. 5 he proves that:

- If a) in an oblique cone the axial triangle is perpendicular to the base
 b) and the cutting plane is perpendicular to the axial triangle
 c) and the section is subcontrary
 Then the section is a circle.

In Prop. 13 he proves that, in any cone:


- If a) some axial triangle is given (not necessarily perpendicular to the base)
 b) a cutting plane is given whose common section with the base is perpendicular to the base of the axial triangle
 c) and the cutting plane is neither parallel to the base nor subcontrary
 Then the section is an ellipse

The question naturally arises, "What is the section when the following are given"?

- a) an axial triangle, as in Prop. 13
 b) a cutting plane, as in Prop. 13, except that it is subcontrary

It cannot be concluded from Prop. 5 that this section is a circle, since conditions a) and b) of that proposition are absent. Proposition 9 is no help either. The section is a circle, but this is not provable within the Apollonian context. However, a revision of Prop. 5 solves the problem. First note that Prop. 5 is not used at all in proving Prop. 6. Thus we may use Prop. 6 in proving our revised version of Prop. 5. The proof would then be as follows:

If a cone is cut by a plane through the axis, and is also cut by another plane such that, on the one hand, its common section with the cone's base is perpendicular to the base (or base extended) of the axial triangle, and, on the other hand, it cuts off on the side of the vertex a triangle similar to the axial triangle and lying subcontrariwise, then the section is a circle.




Let FGH be any cone, and let axial triangle FGH be perpendicular to the cone's base.

Through F draw IFJ parallel to GH . On IJ take any point D , and then take point E such that $DE : EF :: MN : MO$.

On ED at D set up DQ such that angle QDE equals angle EFG . Now pass the circle EPD through points E and D , such that QD is also tangent to circle EPD . (Only one such circle satisfies these conditions.) Let circle EPD and line FH intersect at B .

Join EB , cutting GF at A . Extend EB , cutting GH (or GH extended) at K . Through K , in the plane of the cone's base, draw XY perpendicular to GK . Through F draw FL parallel to EK . Join BD .

Now angle EDQ equals angle EBD (Euclid III-32).
 Therefore angle EBD equals angle EFG .
 Therefore angle $GFD +$ angle $EBD =$ two right angles.
 (And thus angle $FAB +$ angle $FDB =$ two right angles.)



TWO POEMS

Pattie Turner

Beverly Woodward

I wrote her a long poem in prose. I told her that a pomegranate has many seeds. I told her that it was an agreeable fruit, a fruit which a man could enjoy. --- I wrote that one day when an autumn wind was flowing, not knowing which of the multicolored threads she would choose as the transmitter of her response. I was surprised that she chose to play in so many keys.

The song was simple, pure, free and melodious,
 It did not anticipate it could be frozen
 By the builders of systems
 Made a foundation
 For an immobile structure.
 The song knew no rancour
 It found its new garb very strange
 And then, it had never been meant
 To support such a great weight
 Or to live in darkness under the earth.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN APPOSITIVES, RESTRICTIVES,
AND NON-RESTRICTIVES

Pattie Turner

Although in the grammar manual apposition and restrictive and non-restrictive attributions are discussed quite apart from one another, it appears to me essential to consider all three when discussing any one of them. While apposition is said to be distinct from predication or attribution, it is also explained to resemble a non-restrictive attributive in signifying a "condensed, additional predication". So, obviously, attribution and predication do play a role in apposition. At the same time that a combination of signs may be considered in apposition with another sign, it may also be considered a restrictive attributive as well, although the manual states that it resembles a non-restrictive attributive.

An appositive is described in the grammar manual as a "a substantive signifying the same thing as another substantive....." The substantive which signifies is said also to "resemble a non-restrictive attributive in signifying a condensed additional predication." So, here in this definition, two parts of grammar must be considered. First, the appositive must be accounted for, and secondly, the appositive with respect to a non-restrictive attributive must be considered.

An appositive may be a single word (e.g. a proper noun), a word with a modifier (e.g. noun plus an article or adjective), a phrase in which a combination such as a prepositional phrase is employed and which a combination such as a prepositional phrase is employed and which does not indicate a complete thought, or a clause which does signify a complete thought -- a unit in itself. An appositive may be present in a great many forms since it is the loosest form of combination. However, while, it is the loosest form of combination, it is the most intimate connection of one thing to another, i.e. identity. It is now in order to look at the different types of apposition.

The simplest and perhaps the most frequently used type of apposition is that of one word, e.g. "It is hard to believe that he, Jack Waters, is ten years older than I." In this sentence the proper name "Jack Waters" is in apposition with "he". In other words "Jack Waters" and "he" are one person, an identity. It would be easy, however, to use both terms "Jack Waters" and "he" in a similar sentence and have each signify two entirely different people: "It is hard to believe that Jack Waters is ten years older than he." In studying these two sentences it becomes apparent that the position of the sign in each sentence is different, thus indicating that position in a sentence plays an important role in apposition. In the first sentence where there is clearly apposition, "he" and "Jack Waters" can interchangeably be the subject of the

the clause "that he...." In the second sentence, however, only the proper name "Jack Waters" is the subject of the analogous clause "that Jack Waters.....". Thus the position of the appositive is essential to the meaning of the sentence; in point of fact the appositive is usually set beside that which it describes or identifies. This fact could be considered part of the close relationship between the appositive and that which it signifies.

Similar to the one word appositive is the two word, a noun plus its article, appositive: "We took our pet, a dog, to the veterinarian for a shot." In this example there is no doubt that "our pet" and "a dog" are the same thing, and indeed they are set next to one another as has been shown to be essential.

Next let examples of the other two types of apposition be explored. First, an appositive phrase: "Donald Duck, a creation of Walt Disney, is a favorite cartoon character of children all over the world." Surely, "a creation of Walt Disney,....." cannot stand alone, but it can replace the name "Donald Duck". The phrase as the subject of the sentence would not have as significant meaning as the proper name (this type of complication will be discussed later), although each signifies the same thing. Second, an appositive clause: "The realization, that I was now on my own, was somewhat frightening." Again the subject and the clause are interchangeable, but the use of one is more meaningful than the use of the other.

Since the purpose of this paper is to observe the correlation between the appositive and the restrictive and non-restrictive elements of the sentence, it will be necessary to consider the restrictive and non-restrictive as separate elements and then to examine the connection or subtle associations between the three. Let the restrictive be considered first.

The restrictive is an attributive which is significant and essential to the meaning of the sentence; without this element the sentence would have little or no meaning. The restrictive can be one word, a phrase, or a clause. An example of a single word restrictive is: "The extended curfew was a favour to those who had to travel a long distance." In this sentence the word "extended" is essential to the proposition in which it figures. It indicates that without the increase of time allowance, those who had to be en route for an unusually long time would not meet the requirements of the place to which they were returning. Surely, without the word "extended" the sentence would tend to sound extremely sarcastic, for it is not clear that the curfew alone would be of any help (help in adhering to the rules, that is) to the travellers. Therefore the word "extended" is essential to the meaning of the sentence and must be classified as a restrictive attributive. Similarly, in the sentence, "The prisoners who were sick were sent to the hospital," the clause "who were sick" is essential. If the clause did not appear in the sentence, the meaning of the sentence would change. This new meaning would be that all the prisoners were sent to the hospital. This, however, is not what is meant, and therefore the clause is restrictive.

In the sentence "The girl wearing a pink wig looked particularly peculiar," it is obvious that the phrase "wearing a pink wig" is of cardinal importance to the meaning of the sentence. If the phrase were left out, the girl would look particularly peculiar under any circumstances. Therefore, necessarily, the phrase is restrictive.

Unlike the restrictive, the non-restrictive is neither essential nor particularly significant to the meaning of the sentence. Strictly speaking a non-restrictive is a form of attribution but it may be thought of as a "condensed, additional predication." Let us consider the three most common forms of the non-restrictive: a single word, a phrase, and a clause. The one word non-restrictive is often used more as an attributive which attributes something to a specific word or defines a specific word. Thus it is not meaningful in the light of the sentence, e.g. "The child wore his blue snowsuit outside to keep warm." In this sentence the word to be explored is "blue". As an attributive "blue" indeed defines the snowsuit as far as color is concerned, but it does not define the snowsuit in regard to the purpose for wearing the snowsuit i.e. warmth. As a "condensed, additional predication," the word "blue" certainly says something about the snowsuit, i.e. that the garment partakes of the quality blueness. This participation in the quality blueness, however, is irrelevant in the proposition; whether the snowsuit be blue, red, or green, the child will keep warm. Thus "blue" in this sentence is a non-restrictive.

A phrase also can be a non-restrictive; an example of this is contained in the following sentence: "Having arrived from Boston, the lecturer spoke to us about anabolism and katabolism." Obviously the lecturer's arrival from Boston had nothing to do with the lecture on the constructive and destructive processes of metabolism. Strictly speaking, one might argue with this statement by saying that unless the man had arrived from Boston, there would be no lecture. In this sentence, however, what is important is the material of the lecture. Therefore the opening phrase is non-restrictive in that it is not an intrinsic part of the sentence, but is rather incidental to the significance of the sentence.

A clause too can be a non-restrictive; an example of this is contained in the following sentence: "I heard that Mrs. Martin, whom I dislike, will be at the same party as we." "Whom I dislike" is the non-restrictive clause. It is non-essential to the sentence in that whether I like her or dislike her has no bearing on her anticipated presence at the party. In this sentence the clause is a matter of opinion and is meant as a passing remark.

The relationship of restrictives and non-restrictives to apposition shall now be examined. Three main cases of apposition with respect to the restrictive and non-restrictive must be considered with reference to the attributive and predicative value of each. The three different cases to be accounted for are (1) the appositive as a non-restrictive, (2) the appositive

as a restrictive, and (3) the appositive as a restrictive and a non-restrictive at the same time.

The appositive as a non-restrictive is the most generally accepted case. As a non-restrictive attributive it signifies a "condensed, additional predication." An example of this is the following: Lyndon B. Johnson, the President of the United States, arrived in Washington yesterday after a Christmas Vacation in Texas." In this sentence "the President of the United States...." is non-restrictive in that it really is not essential to the meaning of the proposition in which it figures since it is hoped that the name implies the position of the Presidency. In this case, as in attribution, there is present an "assumption of prior unification." Not only does this identity imply attribution by defining the scope of significance, but it also implies predication in that it says something about something else. It asserts the existence of the Presidency as well as naming it. Thus, this is one case of a non-restrictive appositive which includes attribution and predication.

An appositive may also be restrictive. The best example of this is one which is similar to an example in the manual: "I, Carole Hocker, do solemnly swear that I have received no help on this exam." Is the name needed to clarify the statement, or could it be omitted causing no detriment to the meaning of the oath? Indeed the appositive is an intrinsic part of the significance of the sentence. If "Carole Hocker" were left out, the sentence would read "I do solemnly swear....," To this sort of oath anyone could fix their signature. Therefore, although the personal pronoun is used, the statement remains too general. On the other hand if "I" were omitted, and the sentence read "Carole Hocker solemnly swears...." this indeed would give no indication of personal integrity with respect to the oath, and therefore it would be almost meaningless. Thus the appositive, the name, is of cardinal importance, and the appositive is restrictive.

Under certain circumstances an appositive may be either non-restrictive or restrictive. An example of this appears in the following sentence from the grammar manual: "We saw Keane, the actor." In order to label "the actor" as a non-restrictive or restrictive appositive, it is necessary to deviate from the strict practical rules of grammar and consider the reader. Do "We saw Keane....," and "We saw Keane, the actor," indeed signify the same thing? There are several different ways to look at this sentence. Does the speaker of the sentence want to indicate that he saw a man named Keane who happens to be an actor, or that he saw an actor whose name, on second thought, is Keane (but the name isn't really important because "it's not what you know, but who you know.")? Perhaps "the actor" was attached for those people in the same category as I -- those who didn't know that Keane is an actor --. At any rate it seems that the appositive may be either non-restrictive, for those who are ignorant of the field of acting. It is also both attributive and predicative in that it defines the scope of significance of Keane and predicative insofar as it asserts the

being of Keane not as a person, but as an actor. It is, however, more to my liking to think of it as a restrictive since if it is considered otherwise, it would probably be more appropriately omitted.

Thus, I have endeavoured to show that there is a link which connects apposition to restrictives and non-restrictives more intimately and intricately than the manual allows, and that attribution and predication play a decided role in the use of restrictives and non-restrictives which in turn are an essential part of apposition.

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Under certain circumstances an appositive may be either restrictive or restrictive. An example of this appears in the following sentence from the grammar manual: "We saw Keane, the actor." In order to label "the actor" as a non-restrictive or restrictive appositive, it is necessary to derive from the stated practical rules of grammar and consider the reader. Do "we saw Keane..." and "we saw Keane, the actor..." indeed signify the same thing? There are several different ways to look at this sentence. Does the speaker of the sentence want to indicate that he saw a man named Keane who happens to be an actor, or that he saw an actor whose name, on second thought, is Keane (but the name itself really important because "the actor" what you know but you know it? Perhaps the actor was assigned for these people in the same category as I -- those who did not know that Keane is an actor, and at any rate it seems that the appositive may be either non-restrictive or restrictive, depending on the field of action. It is also worth mentioning that Keane and predicative function as it appears in

CIVILITY AND THE LAW

Daniel Carl Schiff

Near the beginning of the sixth scene of the second act of The Merchant of Venice the masked Gratiano tells the masked Salerio that "all things that are, are with more spirit chased than enjoyed". By this he means that men are more aroused to action and emotions when striving for something they desire than when they are actually enjoying the thing they have sought. It is when he is in serious conflict for something that he esteems that the passions, crafts, and foibles of a man become most evident, and his inner strengths and weaknesses are revealed.

In attempting to throw light on the nature of life in the Venetian Republic (and in fact in all similar societies), Shakespear has taken some fifteen residents of that community and involved them in a series, indeed a labyrinth, of embriolments and conflicts in which every character becomes strained and somewhat misshapen. However they are misshapen only insofar as their dominant characteristics become more dominant, and thus their natures, free from the clouds of unstudied actions, are more easily seen, analysed and understood.

I do not have the time or space to concern myself with all the antagonisms, encounters, rivalries and described in this play or to fully deal with all the combatants. I will chiefly deal with what is commonly considered to be the central theme of the play, that is, the conflict between the sons and daughters of Jacob and their Gentile hosts in the diaspora.

The chief antagonists in this conflict are Antonio, the "Christian" merchant, and Shylock, the Jewish moneylender. Since both of these men are involved in finance and trade on the Rialto, it is necessary for them to have some sort of contact. It is to be expected that the Jew would have ill feelings towards the merchant because Antonio hinders his business by lending money to his friends gratis. It is strange that the two would ever enter into a contract together, and this is only brought about by Antonio's desire to supply his friend Bassanio with enough money so that the latter might become a suitor to fair Portia, "a lady richly left".² Thus, during the first scene, a pleasing picture of Antonio appears. He is a man who, although a trader, has the highest of principles and will only deal in usance when it is necessary to do so for a friend's benefit, and at that time will spare no expense or personal effort to supply his needs.

1 Act II, scene v, line 14

2 Act II, scene i, line 65

The image of Antonio as a Christian gentleman, however, begins to fade quickly when Shylock reveals the true reason behind his hatred of the merchant. The Jew, in his first address to the audience, gives two major causes of his hatred for Antonio; (although both of them are, for Shylock merely manifestations of Antonio's being a Christian). The first is that Antonio in his "low simplicity...lends out money gratis and brings down the rate of usance here with us in Venice".¹ The second is that "he rails...on me, my bargains, and my well worn thrift, which he calls interest".² In other words, Antonio, in his "simplicity" (and for Shylock this is true stupidity) ruins Shylock's business and then, in addition, insults Shylock for not being as foolish as a Christian. (For Shylock a Christian is, not to mention other more despicable things, one who lends money without interest to other Christians.)

When we first see Antonio and Shylock together, Antonio again implies (it is the first time in the play) his contempt of Shylock's money policies by telling the Jew that he (Antonio), under normal conditions, does not borrow or lend by giving or taking excess. Shylock answers this by first getting Antonio involved in the loan, by making him state the term, and then by telling him the story of Jacob and Laban. For Shylock this story implies that a man can do anything to increase his fortune so long as he does not break the law. Antonio's rebuttal is that Heaven and not Jacob controlled the birth of the lambs and that animals are not the same as silver. The two obviously cannot constructively argue Scripture together.

This interlude once again forces Antonio to ask for the loan and Shylock now replies by stating his deepest grievance against the merchant, namely, that Antonio continually insults and degrades Shylock and his tribe. It is in this passage (Act I, scene iii, lines 105-129) and in a similar one (Act III, scene ii, lines 56-76) that Shylock is seen in his most wrathful and vengeful state. It is the wrath of an oppressed man who has his former oppressor at his mercy. When he asks "Hath a dog money?"³ he is striding over the stumbling merchant, for Antonio must either admit that the Jew is not a dog but a man like himself, or that dogs, ewes and lambs have much to do with money, contrary to what he had first said. Antonio's reply that he is likely to spit on Shylock again, sharpens a question that has been looming since the beginning of this scene, i.e. what kind of Christian is this Antonio? Can a man who so openly hates another man, without the least sign of compassion, be in any sense called a follower of Christ? Antonio can act in love towards his fellow Christians and not loan money at interest, but in not even attempting to love the Jew, and to see the image of God in him, it seems that Antonio is definitely failing as a Christian.

1 Act II, scene iii, lines 39-41

2 Act I, scene iii, lines 44-46

3 Act I, scene iii, line 121

It is this failing and its outward manifestation, that is, Antonio's constant rebuke and open show of hatred against the Jew, that has fanned the flame of Shylock's hatred, and this same neglect of Antonio's Christian duty is what nearly cost the good merchant his life, a life certainly not saved by his own sparse wit and fighting nature.

If the animosity between Antonio and Shylock can be laid to Antonio's not being a true Christian, it must also be attributed to Shylock's not being a true Jew, or at least not acting as a Jew should act. Shylock describes the proper role a Jew should fill when dealing with Christians when he tells Bassanio, "I will buy with you, sell with you, talk with you, walk with you, and so following, but I will not eat with you, drink with you, nor pray with you."¹ Shylock realizes that he should only deal with the Christians for the purpose of profit. He must, and does, call a Christian good only if he is substantial, and bad if he cannot pay his debts (see Act I, scene iii, lines 12-25). Shylock should, and even must, ignore all insults and compliments of the Christians that do not affect his commercial standing with them. This is what he seems to do at the opening of this scene.

However, as soon as Shylock sees Antonio, he stops talking about money and profit and starts recounting his hatred. Antonio's constant railings, coupled with his free loan policy, has struck deep at the old Jew. By taking active offence at the Christian, Shylock is committing a grave sin (perhaps better called an _____), for he is engaging a powerfully supported enemy in a method of fighting foreign to Shylock, and is doing it on his opponents battlefield.

Shylock, however, has not completely lost his wits. He realizes that if he is ever to avenge himself against Antonio, it must be within the law, in fact, it must be by the law. He states from the first that if he "can catch him (Antonio) once upon the hip, I will feed fat the ancient grudge I bear him."²

He then enters into a contract with Antonio, a contract which can yield no financial reward for Shylock, but only gives him the hope of hurting, indeed destroying, Antonio. To be sure, Shylock's hope is small, but it is not non-existent, as Antonio thinks it is, for there are, as Shylock himself has said "land rats and water rats, water thieves and land thieves, I mean pirates; and then there is the peril of the waters, winds and rocks..."³ In short, Shylock sees this slim opportunity for revenge and takes his chance. The bond of a pound of flesh is clearly not a "merry bond", and Shylock in arranging it, is anything but a "gentle Jew"⁴, who, to quote the fair Antonio, "will turn Christian" becoming so kind. Thus Shylock has done the seemingly

1 Act I, scene iii, lines 31-35

2 Act I, scene iii, lines 42-43

3 Act I, scene iii, lines 20-23

4 Act I, scene iii, lines 180-181

impossible. He has gotten his arch-enemy to legally agree to terms which might enable Shylock to exact vengeance upon him, with the power of the Republic of Venice helping and protecting the crafty Jew.

Before I examine the trial of Antonio and try to understand the wonderful intercession from Belmont, I feel that it is necessary to examine the other major meeting of Christian and Jew in the play. This, of course, is the marriage of Jessica, Shylock's daughter, and Lorenzo, the Christian friend of Bassanio and Antonio. (Actually Lorenzo is somewhat lower in station than these two gentlemen.)

The first question that comes to mind when trying to understand this couple is how they originally met. The answer to this question is never given in the play. What we do see is that Jessica is the motivator of the elopement. She is the one who arranges the time and the place of the meeting, procures her disguise, and steals the money from her father. Her reasons for loving Lorenzo are easy enough to understand. His life is young, gay, attractive and liberal (with the money stolen from Shylock). This is in sharp contrast to the dreary, stingy life that Jessica lived while in the Jew's house. What young girl would not prefer to go with Lorenzo, rather than stay with Shylock?

The time she chooses to depart is when her father is attending a feast at the house of the Christian Bassanio. This is indeed symbolic, for it shows the extent of Shylock's social involvement with the Christians, and it foretells the utter ruin of his household. If Shylock himself begins to associate with the Christians, in non-financial matters, how can he expect his daughter to stay away? It is obvious that the Christian gaiety and vitality would be much more attractive to a young girl than an old man. So if he goes, she must necessarily follow.

Why Lorenzo loves Jessica is less clear and certain. He says "She is wise, if I can judge her; and fair she is, if mine eyes be true; and true she is, as she hath proved herself."¹ This, coupled with the girl's willingness and her father's money, make Jessica appear to be quite suitable as a bride for the young man.

But Lorenzo does more than simply accept Jessica, he loves her.² I believe that there are two main causes of this. Firstly, Lorenzo desires love itself, and by a clever pun (Act II, scene vi, lines 42-46) indicates that Jessica is obscure, and love is what he is discovering. Secondly, there is mystery, adventure, and intrigue in his courtship of, and elopement with, the Jew's beautiful daughter.

Their love, however, once consummated, is not simple, but complicated by the very causes that engendered it. Jessica is a Jew's daughter and Lorenzo is a Christian that has stolen her away. Lorenzo backhandedly admits that he will have to answer

¹ Act II, scene vi, lines 55-57

to the commonwealth for his marriage (Act III, scene v, lines 30-35), thus showing that he realizes that the political unwisdom in his marriage must one day be accounted for, and that politics will become involved in his love and home. Jessica, sensing this, shows signs of uneasiness, which are shown by the constant sparring of wits between her and Lorenzo. (The question as to whether or not their love can survive is dealt with in the final scene. Since this takes place after the court scene, both according to Shakespear and my argument, I will deal with it after I consider the trial in Venice.)

The marriage of Jessica and Lorenzo and the contract between Antonio and Shylock can be thought of as two polar instances of the associations of Jews and Christians, or of any similarly ethnic groups. In the marriage we see the case in which what should be purely emotional and private, has become involved with political considerations. The tragic aspect of this involvement comes about when political strife, and not merely political action, is introduced.

The contract between Antonio and Shylock is an example of what can be the result of the passions' becoming involved in what should be a simple civil affair, such as business. What could have been a profitable relationship for both parties becomes a senseless battle, a battle from which both sides (particularly Shylock, the villian) limp away wounded.

At the beginning of the court scene (Act IV, scene i) Shylock is at his strongest. He knows that Venice must uphold the bond, because the commerce on which the city depends is itself dependent on foreigners like Shylock, who carry on trade in the city. The city cannot afford to set the precedent of voiding a legal contract, and therefore the bond can only be broken by Shylock's consent. Thus even though the Duke himself desires Antonio's freedom, he cannot overrule Shylock, but must try to convince him to relent.

The Duke appeals to Shylock to show mercy to the downtrodden merchant, and not only forgive the forfeiture, but "forgive a moiety of the principal".¹ The appeal falls on deaf ears, for Shylock has not yet learned about mercy. He has learned to hear and take offence at Christian insults, but he has not learned to forgive with Christian charity. (Obviously Antonio was not a good teacher.) To Shylock mercy merely means giving up what is rightfully his. He knows that according to the laws of Venice, Antonio is in his power. When Shylock tells Gratiano "I stand here for law."² He seems to be remembering only the laws of the commonwealth, and forgetting the Laws of Moses, particularly the sixth commandment.

When the appeal for mercy has failed, Bassanio offers Shylock twice the principal that was originally borrowed.³ (It is

1 Act IV, scene i, line 27

2 Act IV, scene i, line 27

interesting, but of doubtful significance, to remember that Portia said that she would give Bassanio gold to pay the debt twenty times over,¹ and yet Bassanio, at this time, only offers twice the payment.) Shylock refuses this, and says that he will refuse payment even if twelve times the principal were offered. It must be noted here that this was no small sum (a ducat had a purchasing power equal to seven of our dollars), and that Shylock by himself did not even have the original principal of three thousand ducats when he was first approached by Bassanio and Antonio.² Thus Shylock is publicly restating and therefore re-enacting his first sin of forsaking profit for vengeance.

The Duke then tries a slightly different tack, and asks Shylock how he hopes to receive mercy if he does not render it. Shylock quickly answers that he does not need mercy, having done no wrong.

After this reply the Duke seems ready to give in to Shylock. Bassanio then tells Antonio that he will defend him by force³, but does nothing, either then or later on, when matters appear blackest for the merchant, to show that this was anything but an idle threat. Perhaps Bassanio was quieted by Antonio's apparent readiness to die.⁴ The good merchant, having long ago withdrawn from the affair, seems to feel that it is his duty to calm those striving to save him.

At this point the Christians seem to be completely vanquished, and only have one hope left. The Duke has sent for Bellario, a learned Doctor of the law,⁵ to help him with the case. The Christians do not seem to realize that this is the wisest thing that they could have done, that is, fight the Jew with things he understands and fears, e.g. civil and earthly punishments.

Bellarrio, of course, does not come himself, but Portia (Bassanio's wife and Bellario's cousin) disguised as a young lawyer comes to defend Antonio. It is unclear to me how Portia knew that Bellario had been sent for, but the fact is that she does arrive with a letter of recommendation from Bellario.

Portia's first speech again asks Shylock to show mercy, basing the plea on the majesty and beauty of mercy, and the fact that mercy is necessary for salvation. These arguments are more ignored than rebutted by Shylock, whose lack of charity at this point surprises no one. Portia then asks if the Jew will take the principal and forget about the bond. Shylock once again remains adamant.

So far, it appears as if the young lawyer has no new defense for Antonio, and Antonio himself heartily "beseeches the court to

1 Act IV, scene i, line 86
2 Act IV, scene i, line 90
3 Act IV, scene i, lines 114-116
4 Act IV, scene i, lines 118-121
5 Act IV, scene i, line 107

give the judgement.¹" However, there is something very strange in Portia's speeches", at the end of each appeal for leniency she tells the court that it is powerless to alter a decree, and that if Shylock does not relent, the court must rule against the merchant. The effect of these lines is to make any relinquishment on Shylock's part stand as a true act of mercy. Shylock shows none and even refuses to "have some surgeon by²". Thus he clearly shows his murderous intent.

Portia, seeing that the Jew will show no charity, recedes for a few moments, while Bassanio and Gratiano express their love of Antonio. When they are finished, Antonio explains that he is ready for death, fortune having already impoverished him.

Portia, however, is not at all ready to see the merchant destroyed. In fact, it seems as if her initial appeals to Shylock to show mercy, were in themselves merciful offers, which, having been accepted by Shylock, would save him from the onslaught to come.

Portia's defense is principally composed of restrictions of Shylock's actions. The first restriction she cites denies Shylock "one drop of Christian blood³", lest he lose his land and property. Shylock immediately senses his defeat and asks payment of thrice the principal, the sum Bassanio had previously offered and is still willing to pay. Portia, however, will not leave off and let Bassanio pay. She now tells the Jew that he must take exactly one pound of flesh or he will be killed. Shylock asks for the principal, which Bassanio is still willing to give him, but Portia stops him, claiming that the Jew will have only justice and his bond, and none of the mercy he himself did not show.

At this point Shylock wants to give up the suit and leave, not wanting to act against Antonio if there will be reprisal against him for it. Portia and the law, however, are not through, for they "hath yet another hold on him.⁴" For plotting against the life of a Venetian citizen, Shylock must give that citizen (Antonio) half of his fortune, and forfeit the other half to the state, his life being put at the mercy of the Duke. The Duke, in order to show Shylock what mercy really is like, spares the money lender and only fines him, instead of confiscating half of his fortune. Antonio also shows mercy, and agrees only to use the half of his estate that he will receive, and upon Shylock's death to give it to Lorenzo and Jessica, provided that Shylock will do the same with the property the Duke has allowed him to retain. Antonio also makes the further merciful stipulation that the Jew become a Christian. Shylock, however, fails to comprehend the mercy bestowed on him, and only mourns his

1 Act IV, scene i, lines 249-250

2 Act IV, scene i, line 200

3 Act IV, scene i, line 320

4 Act IV, scene i, line 360

fallen position. He is not comforted by the fact that he could have fallen further.

An analysis of Shylock's fall shows a great deal of ironic justice. The most obvious example is that Shylock, the man who claims to champion the law¹, is destroyed by it. The cause of this is twofold. The first is that Shylock tries to use the law for purposes that were never intended by the original lawgiver. Thus in trying to rise above and master the law, Shylock is trying to subvert it, the thing which is most unwise for a Jew, whose only defense is the law.

So it happens that when a wiser person than Shylock becomes his adversary, he is doomed. For this person, understanding the intent of the law, can show where Shylock is misinterpreting the law. (In this case he is trying to use a law to kill someone.) Thus Shylock's only defense is to try to justify misinterpretation and if he succeeds, by the same arguments, the laws protecting him can be misinterpreted. Thus, matched against a thinking adversary, Shylock is doomed.

The second reason that Shylock fails before the law is that he doesn't fully understand its workings. Unlike the Mosaic law (as Shylock sees it), the Venetian statutes, and in fact the Venetian state, require a certain amount of "mercy" and "Christian charity," in order for it to work properly.

Social life has become much more complex since the times of Moses. If every man in Venice were to be prosecuted every time he broke a law, the state could do nothing except arrest its own citizens. Commerce and thus the state would soon disappear.

The way to avoid this problem is to be willing to forgive offenders provided they can be useful to the state. There is no need to rigorously press the people as long as everybody is flourishing, and no one gets too far out of hand. Legal mercy, then, is the great glossing over of irksome details, the oil that helps the state run smoothly and keeps it prosperous. Shylock cannot see the reasons behind it, and so must learn them by harsh example.

The play seems to have reached its logical end with Shylock's becoming Christian, and indeed, if the problems discussed in this paper so far were the only problems, or even the central problems of the play, perhaps Shakespear would have ended it here and not have his characters feel compelled to go back to Belmont. Bassanio and Gratiano go because they believe their loves to be there. I do not know why Portia and Narissa chose to return; perhaps it is because it is their home, or perhaps they feel their love will best flourish there.

When the scene shifts back to Belmont, we see Lorenzo and Jessica, the fugitives from Venice, who stayed behind when everyone else returned to the city, engaged in a strange, sad,

¹ Act IV, scene 1, line 145

but beautifully moving dialogue. Lorenzo begins

The moon shines bright: in such a night as this,
When the sweet wind did gently kiss the trees
And they did make no noise, in such a night
Troilus methinks mounted the Trojan walls,
And sigh'd his soul toward the Grecian tents,
Where Cressid lay that night. (1)

It is no accident that Lorenzo chose the tale of this couple. For although they loved, they met only for a night, not because Troilus did not want to love forever, but because the lovers' fathers were of opponents camps. And so they were separated, and so, uncared for, Cressid proved untrue.

Next the stories of Dido, Thisbe and Medea are told by the lovers. All of these ancients chose their lovers from opposing political camps; all passionately loved for a while, and all ended sorrowfully. Lorenzo and Jessica then recount their own love story, knowing the pattern it has so far followed, and sensing that the end that has come for the others will someday come for them. They know that when they are alone in Belmont under the bright moon, Jessica, under the guise of a teasing lover, can state her fears about the truth of Lorenzo's vows of love, and Lorenzo can forgive her. Jessica's fears are not foolish and ungrounded, for in marrying the Christian she has had to forsake everything else that she previously had. Her father's house, people and way of life are closed to her now; she only has Lorenzo and without him she is completely abandoned. It is no wonder that Jessica fears the end of this bright night at Belmont.

After each of the lovers has given four speeches, they are interrupted by messengers announcing the return of Portia to Belmont. When Lorenzo hears this, he orders the house to prepare for her coming by filling the air with sweet music. This music adds further glory to the night at Belmont, and moves Lorenzo to give two beautiful speeches, one explaining the celestial harmony to Jessica, and the other describing the joys and effect of the less perfect, but still powerful, earthly harmonies.

Portia does not return without a gift for the couple, for with her she brings the news that Jessica and Lorenzo are now heirs of Shylock's fortune, and consequently they are no longer dependent on their parents and friends. They are now able to establish their own home where they can rule themselves. They can now live during the day as well as love during the night.

Thus with Shakespeare's story of the conflict between Christians and Jews brought to a happy close (only thirteen lines before the end of the play itself), perhaps we should ask what, if any thing, can we learn about this struggle from the play. The happy endings do not fool us for a moment, for we realize that the problems were only solved by the mistress of Belmont, wise Portia, a woman of singular virtue. But, as I said earlier,

these two cases are polar extremes, misshapen by embroilment and conflict. In most cases where the emotions become involved in what should be a purely civil affair, a small show of mercy and charity on the one hand, and continence on the other will usually reconcile the antagonists, provided there is some profit for both. There is no need for a Daniel to judge them, nor for one, if not both of the opponents, to be destroyed.

In the case of lovers, seldom is it necessary for them to actually flee their homes and go to Belmont. In most cases their civil problems can be borne through the day and will only serve to sweeten the love they feel at night, when the moon is bright and music prevades the air.

But what if the civil becomes so strong that it begins to strangle love, and not nurse and accentuate it? In that case it seems a pilgrimage to Belmont must be made. How? It is easiest to go with strong friends who know the way, - this is the means Gratiano uses; or to come with one's love to sojourn there for a time, as fugitives from the city - like Lorenzo and Jessica. However, some, and they are usually brave princes or noble gentlemen, make their way alone, driven by a strange sort of love. If this be your journey, be sure that you do not look for Belmont encased in gold as did the black Morrocco and the old Shylock; or search for it thinking that it is your just desert and natural due, as did the foolish Aragon and the merchant Antonio. But if your wish is to be successful like the good Bassanio, you must bravely give and hazard all you have for this strange something, whose casement seems quite worthless. And if you get that far, do not try to make the right choice by your wits alone, but listen to the music in the air, for even if it's spirit does not move you, its inspired rhyme may turn you in the right direction.

ROUSSEAU AND THE ANCIENTS: A REPLY

Parmeniscus

(Editor's Note: The following contribution was received through the college mail under the indicated pseudonym. The note and the mystery surrounding it intrigued me as editor although hardly flattering to me as the author of the paper under fire. I was tempted to find out more, if not about the true author, at least about the pseudonym. After several unsuccessful attempts, I located the following brief mention in the encyclopaedic Pauly-Wissowa Real Encyclopädie der Classisches Altertumswissenschaft, Achzehnter Band, Zweite Hälfte, p. 1569 : Ferner erzählte Semos in seiner , Parmeniskos sei ein vornehmer Mann gewesen, der einestages in die Trophonshöhle zu Lebadeia hinunterstiegen sei und, als er wieder heraufkam, die Fähigkeit des Lachens verloren hatte. (Loosely translated, the sentence reads: "Moreover Semos in his (work on) Delos recounts that Parmeniskos was a man of eminence who one day descended into the cave of Trophon at Lebadeia and when he came up again had lost the ability to laugh.") Whether Semos' Parmeniskos is the same as our contributor's, I do not really know; nonetheless, the humorlessness of his piece seems to me to be in harmony with the name and its classical connotations.)

Mr. Lachterman's paper, Rousseau and the Ancients (Collegian, Dec. 1963) sins, I should say, more by excess than by omission. The comparability of Rousseau and Plato and Aristotle in some cardinal aspects of political thought is established very persuasively through what seems to have been a careful reading of the relevant texts. Nevertheless, this one-sided and at times belabored emphasis on the areas of agreement tends to obscure, to my mind, certain more ambiguous notions which enter nonetheless into the total fabric of Rousseau's political and ethical philosophy. I understand the ambiguity of these notions to have arisen from fundamental tensions in his manner of thinking, the result, perhaps, of his own mode of life, or, quite possibly, of an imprecision and hesitancy determined by the distressing character of the conclusions he seemed led to and for whose modern, more revolutionary offspring he must accept partial responsibility. In order to buttress these critical and, it may seem, unwarranted generalisations, I shall now make brief mention of three instances of ambiguity that lie close to and thereby imperil the heart of Mr. Lachterman's thesis.

Dr. Leo Strauss in his justly celebrated Natural Right and History speaks frequently, in his chapter on Rousseau, of an irresolvable conflict between society and the individual, that is, society and nature. I would say that, although the conflict seemed to Dr. Strauss irresolvable, Rousseau himself thought that he had found a solution in the elevation of the People to an (unjustifiably) high status, making it at once a collective mystical body and the sophisticated voice of political wisdom. Connected with this god-like status of the People is the idea of public enlightenment which Rousseau never fully abandons despite, as Mr. Lachterman argues, the introduction

of an omniscient Legislator in Book II of the Social Contract. To those readers familiar with classical political thought (and Mr. Lachterman appears to be one of these) the myth of the People and its corollary of Aufklärung must seem egregiously out of place in the writings of a thinker so imbued with and "indebted" to the ideas of the ancients. In any case it seems quite clear that Rousseau's assertion that each man in obeying the law follows his own will is rooted in the idea of the People whose general will always act in the interests of all citizens.

The notion of a contract which brings into being this mystic body remains essential to the subsequent elaborations of the general will and the law presented by Rousseau in the Social Contract, notwithstanding the suggestions in the Discourse on Political Economy that moral goodness is the true foundation of political obligation, suggestions which Mr. Lachterman received with obvious and unmistakable relish. The similarities between Rousseau and the ancients in this latter work do not, I daresay, overshadow and ultimately negate the principia of the Social Contract, on the basis of which the whole of Rousseau's work must be evaluated and the relegation of which to a seemingly inconsequential place in Rousseau's political theory is the most disturbing element in Mr. Lachterman's thesis.

The presence of these two contradictory sympathies--with contract on the one hand and the ancient's conviction of the naturalness and moral ultimacy of the polis on the other--creates the first of the aforementioned ambiguities in Rousseau's work.

In the next place, however enthusiastically Rousseau (and Mr. Lachterman) may stress the role of reason in the republic, it is obvious that sentiment rather than reason is the supreme political faculty. Compassion--the sympathy each of us should have for the miseries of our fellows--is inculcated in man by nature and can only be "extirpated" by the onslaught of civilization. Rousseau's "ideal construction" makes it possible for compassion to endure within and indeed hold together society. It is this sentiment which, more than self-interest, is meant to support political obligation. In addition to this, we might mention that in Rousseau--in marked contrast to Plato and Aristotle--there is no ontological and epistemological justification for the supremacy of reason in political society. This shortcoming seriously weakens the force of his assertion that the ideal society is governed by reason incarnate in the Law. At most Reason here can only mean a kind of sentimental wisdom or the common sense of the noble and upright peasant.¹

The final issue I should like to raise with Mr. Lachterman's at times suspiciously naive interpretation has to do with freedom and moral responsibility in political society. Let me say first that encomiums of virtue have a peculiarly unpleasant sound in the mouth of a moral profligate. Maritain's censure of Rousseau's counterfeited moral rectitude seems to me well-intentioned and,

1. Cf. especially Social Contract, Bk. IV, Ch. I, Page 1.

as one sees in leafing through the Confessions, accurate, Freedom meant for him (and continued to mean after him) freedom from constraint and authority and it is on this conception of freedom that the image of the natural and therefore good man is based.¹ The free spirit can never be successfully integrated into society without sacrificing his cherished liberty- a liberty not in the least harmonious with the civil and moral liberty that the contractual society makes possible and indeed enforces.²

To ignore, as Mr. Lachterman has done, this side of Rousseau's character and thought- the side that influenced German and French roman-ticism so greatly - is as much as to close one's eyes to the obvious in the hope of raising the unclear and, it may be, inconsequential to a rank that it scarcely deserves. By this I mean that History saw through Rousseau's pose as the ally of the ancients, while Mr. Lachterman, if he put forth his thesis seriously, did not.

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1. Cf. Les Revenues du promeneus solitaire (Rousseau's last work!) (Vaughan ed of Rousseau's Political Writings)
 2. Cf. Social Contract, Bk I, Ch. VII - a passage frequently referred to in Mr. Lachterman's paper.

COMMENTS ON MR. SPARROW'S LECTURE: Rights, Law and the Right

Larry Silverman

In reviewing and commenting on Mr. Sparrow's lecture, it was necessary for me to paraphrase and deduce from his words. If, in so doing, I have distorted any of his opinions, I can only hope that that distortion will lead to a further clarification of them.

The lecture, on Rights, Law and The Right, began by pointing out the need for its existence. It contended that the present confusion and conflict among civil, natural, social, and economic rights, culminating in the 'unthinkable' proposition that the same thing is both right and not right, may, in the future, subject civil society to a turmoil from which "...neither the reiteration of once-understood relationships nor manifestations of a good-natured sentimentality will be able to extricate us." This crisis seemed to stem from the peculiarly modern notion that the "endless worth" and "infinite dignity" of each one of us entitled him to natural and inalienable rights, "limitless in number." Hence the lecture tried "...to suggest another framework than that of rights within which political issues can be framed and priorities assigned.."

The suggested framework seemed to rest on the notion of the "common good," rather than a theory of private rights. Hence one of the characters of the mythical dialogue expressed surprise and skepticism at hearing that his 'right' to walk down the street was simply the law's approval of that action. This approval "is grounded on the prior determination that it is all right to do the contemplated act ... in view of the common good." The skepticism arose from the belief that each individual man had a natural and inalienable right to exercise his individual will, and that the law's approval is only an implement to that right.

The lecturer traced this notion back to the philosophy of Hobbes and Locke. According to that philosophy each individual desiring passionately to live, "...is conceived as a point surrounded by 'natural rights' some of which he lay down or transfers to a communal authority when he 'enters' society, but others which he retains because of their inalienable character." It is precisely what Mr. Sparrow called the "inhuman necessity" to transfer authority that gives rise to a self-contradiction within this view. For, if the good is defined as self-preservation, and the right as that which naturally enables or empowers a man to preserve himself, how then can an individual man be so powerless as to be forced to relinquish some of his powers in order to be enabled by another to exercise these powers? In other words, my right, or that power which enables me, to walk down the street must be understood concomitantly with the obligation of others not to hinder me. There is no ontological or historical priority of one over the other.

To clarify this argument, Mr. Sparrow made use of something he called the "square of right." (See next page). He used this device to illustrate with some precision the relationship between duty and right. In the top half of the square, the prohibitions and commands of the law become the duties and hence the rights of the individual. This can be seen in the cited example of the policeman, who has a right to direct traffic because he was so commanded. At the same time it is, of course, his duty to direct traffic.


But for all its precision, the square contains two serious defects. In the first place, if we are to isolate duties in the top half of the square, what are we to say of men who insist upon doing their duty not simply by obeying commands but by exercising those rights permitted them by the law. Socrates was perhaps the paradigm of such a man. If the laws, for a time, permitted him to speak freely, he spoke freely, not to exercise his rights as an individual, but to do his duty as a citizen. Indeed, today we are permitted to vote; is it not our duty to do so? Yet Mr. Sparrow, for the sake of logical rigor, restricted duty to the class of obedience, thus agreeing in part with the traditional liberalism he was trying to undermine.


This reply might have validity were it not for the second deficiency in the square. Mr. Sparrow, as was stated earlier, maintained that the so-called approval of the law was grounded in the prior determination that an action was all right. What he meant by 'all right' is still unclear. Here is one of several definitions given in the lecture: "...An action which does not harm or only slightly harms the common good." But voluntary actions which are "all right", (e.g., walking down the street, growing a beard, listening to music, etc.) are very different from voluntary actions which are right. (e.g. voting, speaking one's mind for the sake of the common good, etc.). It can make no sense, therefore, to call all permitted actions 'right', as the square does.

We might overlook the deficiencies of the square and view it as an aid in revealing the absurdity of saying that one empowered by nature is constrained by necessity to enter into an artificial bond in order to obtain his natural powers. But assuming that that statement is absurd there are still many problems before us.

For if one's power stems not from natural rights but from the approval of others, or more to the point, of the state, how then is tyranny to be avoided? Mr. Sparrow might answer that the approval of the laws of a state are properly based upon the notion of the common good and not the arbitrary will of a tyrant, (who is of all men the most private); a tyrant is not evil because he de-prives men of their 'right,' but because he makes men incapable of doing the right. Thus, a man is only free insofar as he is free to be a man; and the faculty of manliness is the ability to do the right, which is defined as action "tending" towards the good, and the inability to do the wrong, or actions tending towards nothing, and hence "meaningless" agitations.

THE MODAL SQUARE OF OPPOSITION UNDERSTOOD AS
THE SQUARE OF RIGHT





But if the faculty of manliness is the ability to do right and that ability is somehow obtained from an external power, are we not then confronted with the same problem as confronted the partisans of natural rights? I think Mr. Sparrow would answer, "No." The reason for this answer is perhaps the most significant and elusive implication of the entire lecture. For the community and the law enable a man to be free not only by authorizing and approving his activities, but by providing a sphere and an object necessary for those activities to take place. In Plutarch's phrase, "The peculiar work of a good man is political." * Thus, a community enables a man to be a man in a way similar to that in which wood and nails enable a carpenter to be a carpenter. There is no longer a contradiction. "...Right and might, necessity and freedom, merge in the depths of the mind and heart of a true human person."

Near the beginning of his lecture, Mr. Sparrow spoke of the 'common good.' As he went on, he somehow managed to unite the common good with the "individual good." Towards the end, the term, "rational supreme good" was introduced. The lecturer seemed to be saying, by implication at least, that in the final analysis the three were one.

This is a most provocative and rather dangerous view. Before we can allow ourselves to dream and to speculate further we must check the danger which was spoken of previously--the danger of tyranny. Could not a sixteenth century inquisitor, adopting Mr. Sparrow's suggested framework, justify his activities by saying, "Some of us have a greater knowledge of the Supreme Good than others do. It is our duty, therefore, to conform the political body and the private man to that Good, with any means whatsoever." How can we repudiate the inquisitor except by replying, No man can be truly free unless he is free in the conventional sense to choose or reject the truth? Whether an harmonious polity can be established in harmony with the Supreme Good, and whether the myth of 'inalienable rights' is necessary for men in order to learn and to will the Good, must remain, for the time being, open questions.

Just beneath the surface of all the lecturer's remarks was a principle explicitly formulated in the last part of the lecture. The terms 'right' and 'wrong' bear to action the same relationship that 'true' and 'false' bear to speech. A false statement is meaningless, and therefore no statement. "If ...transcending, containing, and ordering human ends is possible," he said, "human acts will be constituted as such precisely to the extent that they tend to or mean, that is are means, to it. And hence, for them to be truly human actions, for them to be meaningful, and for them to be right will be one and the same thing." The so-called wrong actions are meaningless and therefore no actions at all. "...What seems to present itself initially as a wrong action is in fact mere agitation." Evil is privation of good.

* Plutarch, LIVES, Cate, p. XIX, 2

This position caused much comment during the question period. Mr. Sparrow's analysis was interesting, but it seemed to deal only with one part of the phenomenon of evil. For surely, Adam, after having eaten of the fruit, became aware of his nakedness, or privation. But it is very difficult to read that story without feeling the reality and the potency of the Serpent. Though the lecturer acknowledged that it is "...all too possible for members of a divided and discordant humanity not only to mutilate being but also to lead others to think that such sub-rational agitations are instrumental to the attaining of the proper end of the human person," he did not succeed in explaining how this is possible.

Furthermore, taking his view, the problem of indifferent or 'all right' actions becomes even more inexplicable. If we are to call the thousands of trivial and harmless acts evil because they are meaningless, we had best get a new word to describe those actions which are really evil.

Mr. Sparrow ended his lecture by saying, "However, it is not quite so clear that it is she (dialectic), revealing the ultimate absurdity of false actions, that by making us at one with ourselves, can lead us out of the cave and so restore meaning to action. I suspect that instead the cure will have to be found in another dimension altogether. The Word may have to be made flesh and come to dwell, to die, among us." Somehow those last sentences gave the lie to those preceding them. It is as if the lecturer were really saying, "Before the nature of man can truly be understood as I would have you understand it, before evil can, in truth, be called privation, some Supernatural Being must descend to earth and teach us the two precepts wherein all the law and all the prophets are contained, and say clearly to each man, 'He that is not with me, is against me, and he that is not against me is for me.'"

AN ESSAY ON DUCKS

Jeremy Carl Leven

Mr. Lamb notwithstanding, this essay shall deal primarily with the animal "imparatis", for the nobility of this animal is most present, not when served, but when serving. I divide my essay, therefore, into six parts: the animal, himself; his relationship to his peers; his relationship to people and vice versa; his influence on the American way of life; his humor; and the duck as an explanation for the order of the kosmos.

The work "Duck" is derived from the Old English 'duce' which meant "a diver". This shows that evolutionarily the Duck has changed relatively little since the days when he spoke Old English, still diving and still enjoying it, if one is to judge by appearances. Much like people, the Duck also belongs to a family, one that is known as "Anatidae", a name that may make a Latin duck quite proud, but currently is so despised among American ducks that they seldom use it; and it has, therefore, become almost obsolete among all but the most conscientious duck-lovers, drakes included.

Generically speaking, we must refer to the Duck as an "Anas", a name which undoubtedly has caused many a web-footed animal of the family Anatidae to turn her head away in a deep crimson blush. Contrary to the opinion of those who have kept these animals as house-pets, there is no relationship, entomologically or otherwise, between the name of the genus and the alimentary canal.

The Duck has often been described (of. American College Dictionary and my friend, Morris' mother) as a "web-footed swimming bird characterized by a broad flat bill, short legs and a depressed body". Perhaps it is better to describe him as a "feathered biped"; this points with pseudo-Platonic directness to the close link between the Duck and the philosopher, a similarity that becomes even more evident when we listen to the speech of both.

This obviously brings us to our next topic: the peer relationships of ducks. As a rule ducks get along with each other no better than do men, or, in other words, not at all. For ducks do not share their food with each other, nor do they assist each other in any way. Even a duck who may fancy himself a leader in an activity such as flying South finds that he is constantly overtaken by other ambitious ducks until he finds himself last in formation. This bureaucracy explains why ducks deem it necessary to start South so early in the Fall and do not return until late Spring, this situation is known colloquially as the ducks' "migratory plight".

Concerning his relationship to people and vice versa little can be said, Ducks are ducks, and people are people. People seem to notice the difference, and the ducks appreciate this perspicacity. Man also seems to revel in the throes of bread-tossing, a splendidly humane sport, enabling the Duck to see his way through the cold Winter, while it is a well-known fact that Man cannot live by bread alone. While on the relationship of Man and Duck, a human acquaintance of mine should be mentioned, a brilliant Audubon scholar by the name of Seymour Duck. It appears that he felt the sole advantages of his name were that it was fairly easy to spell and presented little difficulty with pronunciation. However, Seymour, now the chairman-in-charge-of-reevaluating-the-point-system-of-classification for the American Kennel Club, disliked his name so much that he changed it to "Poodle", and, consequently, was asked to turn in his binoculars. The irony of this is that Seymour can best be described as having a broad, flat bill, short legs and a depressed body.

We now approach the subject of the influence of the Duck on the American way of life, a way of life to which many refer as "ducky", or something to that effect. Ask yourself, what American woman has not wanted to own a genuine duck-feather pillow, a pillow so light that, when one throws it up in the air in delight, it is difficult to realize that what went up can ever be down? And the American Man finds no sport as enjoyable as sitting in cold marshes from six in the morning until dark, waiting for his friend, the Duck, to appear so that he may fill him with virulent lead, a typical show of American affection, a display of human love that calls for ducks to have, if nothing else, a good sense of humor.

This brings us to our next subject: Donald Duck, and I am reminded of a comic strip I read last week which went something to this effect. Daisy Duck to Donald Duck, "Who was that cute-looking duck I saw you with last night?" Donald's reply, "That was no duck; that was my wight*!" This points to the wealth of humor the common duck provides for the common man, bordering only slightly on the esoteric.

And this naturally brings us to the final and most essential topic. From this essay the careful reader could not help but be impressed by the fact that the true value of the Duck, is that in no way does he provide an explanation for the order of the kosmos.

* (Archaic, obsolete) A human being or person