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THE COLLEGE

April 1971

St. John's College
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The College

Cover: John Locke, by Sir Godfrey Kneller. *Inside Front Cover:* McDowell Hall, Annapolis. *Inside Back Cover:* Statue of Virgil, by Benedetto Antelami (?), Mantua, Palazzo Ducale, ca. 1215.

The College is a publication for friends of St. John's College and for those who might become friends of the College, if they came to know it. Our aim is to indicate, within the limitations of the magazine form, why, in our opinion, St. John's comes closer than any other college in the nation to being what a college should be.

If ever well-placed beacon lights were needed by American education it is now. By publishing articles about the work of the College, articles reflecting the distinctive life of the mind that is the College, we hope to add a watt or two to the beacon light that is St. John's.

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

In the April Issue:

St. John's College Asks John Locke Some Questions*

By ROBERT A. GOLDWIN

John Locke has been dead now for 265 years, but his truth goes marching on. And, unfortunately, so does his untruth. This is a matter of deep concern to us, for to the extent that this nation is a Lockean society, our strengths and our weaknesses are related to the truth and the untruth of the teachings of John Locke—which still go marching on.

As many of you know, I attended St. John's College as a student for four years, and that means that I sat through more Friday night lectures without understanding what the lecturer was talking about than most of you have yet had the opportunity to do. When the time came for me to start lecturing here, I resolved that if I accomplished nothing else at least I would do my utmost to be clear. It is not for me to say whether this lecture will be profound or elegant, but I do not hesitate to claim clarity. I tell you this in advance so that you will know this will not be one of those incomprehensible presentations that cannot be grasped no matter what effort the listener makes. Whoever listens will understand.

My subject, indirectly, is St. John's College and the liberal arts. My subject, very directly, is the political teaching of John Locke, especially his teaching concerning the state of nature. The connection of the two will be made clear, I promise, before the end. The lecture will culminate in two questions directed to John Locke.

But if this lecture is to have the advertised clarity, there is something *you* must do. You must ask the right question as I tell you about Locke's state of nature. To ask the right question is a key to learning, as this College knows full well. Asking the right question is the foundation of this curriculum. You know, for example, that the simple, one-word question, "Why?" is often incomparably useful. Asked with good timing, asked about an assertion that ought to be challenged but rarely is, the perceptive "Why?" can transform your thinking and lead you into entirely new paths.

But "Why?" is *not* the question I advise you to ask about Locke's state of nature. The question I have in mind is longer—in fact, twice as long. It is the question of relevance. It is a question that should be asked, eventually, about almost everything we study; but it must not be asked too frequently, and it must not be asked too soon; but it should be asked eventually. I have in mind the simple, two-word, earthy, challenging, impertinent question, "So what?"

Locke tells us about the state of nature in a book on politics. My advice to you is to be sure to ask him—but he can't answer, so ask his book and ask me and ask yourself—"So what?"

Let me show you what I mean. Some interpreters of Locke say that for Locke the state of nature is a state of war, as with Hobbes. Others say that Locke obviously wrote to oppose and refute Hobbes and that according to Locke the state of nature is a state of peace. I say that Locke meant neither—the state of nature is neither a state of peace nor a state of war but a state of a very different kind, not necessarily characterized by peace or war. And what should you say? You should say, "So what?"

To say, "So what?" is not the same as to say, "Who cares?" "Who cares?" is a nonquestion because it expresses a lack of wonder, a lack of concern, a lack of curiosity, a disclination to inquiry. "Who cares?" is the false-face of an unquestioning mind.

On the other hand, to ask, "So what?" means to ask, "tell me why I should care." That is a request for evidence that the subject is worth your time and thought, not because you are lazy but because you want to spend your thought on those things of the greatest importance to the building of your life and the flourishing of your mind.

I am certain that Locke wanted you to ask him probing

* This was Mr. Goldwin's first Formal Lecture to St. John's College as Dean; given in Annapolis, October 16, 1969.

and impertinent questions. I am certain that he hoped to attract just such questioning readers. In fact, since he—as many of the great authors—had a towering ambition to transform the world and thus save it from folly, he thought the future safety and prosperity of mankind depended on his attracting the most able readers, who would be persuaded only by the strongest arguments and the most useful teachings. He wanted readers who would say as they read, "You say the state of nature, Mr. Locke, and I say, So what?" And Locke wrote to instruct such readers and rouse them to action—to lead them to a new understanding of politics and to stir them to build a new and better kind of political society.

And I ask you, in the same spirit, to be sure to ask of my teaching, the same disrespectful "So what?", because I, in the spirit of Locke, also hope to guide you and others away from a folly that endangers us all. The folly I hope to warn you of has its origin partly in the teachings of John Locke, one of mankind's most influential teachers and greatest subverters. We must try to save ourselves from him—but to do it we must first understand his teaching, and what it has done to us.

Locke published the *Two Treatises of Government*, in 1689, soon after William of Orange and his Mary ascended the throne as the culmination of what is known as the Glorious Revolution of 1688. This is the same King William in whose name King William's School was founded in Annapolis in 1696. It has long been said that Locke wrote the *Treatises* to justify the Revolution, which involved deposing a legitimate monarch, a somewhat ticklish matter to justify; as a matter of fact, Locke tells us in his Preface that he is presenting this book "to make good" the title of King William to the throne and "to justify to the world the people of England" though they did depose their former king. The evidence is clear, however, that Locke wrote most of the book about ten years earlier, and did little more than add a few topical paragraphs and the preface just before publication in 1689.

The book was written as one work divided into Book One and Book Two, but very few readers study the *First Treatise* now, and in fact the *First Treatise* is a lengthy, somewhat tiresome analysis of an earlier book, *Patriarcha*, by a man named Sir Robert Filmer. Filmer is a deservedly little-known author who would be absolutely and completely unknown, I believe, if Locke had not chosen him as an explicit opponent. Filmer's book was, however, in 1680, in England, a bestseller, and he was the darling of the Establishment because he argued the divine right of kings. Locke might have been thinking of publishing his refutation at the time he wrote it, about 1681, but Algernon Sidney beat him to it; he published an attack on Filmer and was hanged for his trouble. Locke, a prudent man, put his manuscript away for another day. In 1683 an Establishment was really an Establishment, and since Locke was thought to be the sort of man who would write something disagreeing with the divine right of kings, and was friendly with men who were known to be enemies of the throne, the king's police were after him. Locke escaped to Holland just before they came to arrest him, and remained there until his enemies were dethroned and his friends put in their places. Even so, he was so cautious that when he did publish in 1689, with his friends occupying the highest seats of power, the book was issued anonymously. All three editions printed while Locke was alive bear no author's name on the title page. Not until his death, in the codicil to his will, did Locke acknowledge that he was, indeed, the author of *Two Treatises of Government*. Was it, as it seems, a dangerous book? Did it threaten anyone? If so, whom?

The *Second Treatise* begins with a one-page summary of the *First Treatise*. I will not go into the substance except to say that an argument that had little plausibility as it issued from the pen of Filmer, that all kings rule by right descended from Adam, is mercilessly refuted by Locke. But Locke acknowledges a certain obligation to mankind. If he has destroyed the thesis that all present

Thus, in the beginning of the *Second Treatise*, we are presented with Locke's grand question: What is political power?

rulers rely on—divine right—to justify their right to rule, does he not have an obligation to explain how they do have a right to rule others? Filmer had expressed or attempted to express, with reasoned argument, what everyone had agreed was the title of kings to political power. Locke had shown that, when examined, Filmer's arguments do not stand up. But how does anyone come to have political power? Some men rule other men. By what right? Is "all Government in the World . . . the product only of Force and Violence"? Do "Men live together by no other Rules but that of Beasts, where the strongest carries it"? The man who answers yes to these question lays "a Foundation for perpetual Disorder and Mischief, Tumult, Sedition and Rebellion," and Locke would not want to be guilty of those crimes. He acknowledges, therefore, that he "must of necessity find out" another explanation of how government rises, what the origin of political power is, and how we can know "the Persons that have it" (section 1).** Thus, in the beginning of the *Second Treatise*, we are presented with Locke's grand question: What is political power?

That question does not mean, "What is power?" The emphasis is on the word *political*. Locke wants to distinguish political power from the other kinds of power that men are observed to exercise over others. In the course of the book he discusses the power of husbands over wives, parents over children, and despots over slaves, and he shows that although there are similarities and that sometimes they are mistaken for and spoken of as political power, they differ from political power. He does this by showing what the origin is of political power, who has it, for what duration, for whose sake, for what purpose, and on what terms.

He begins by defining political power as "*a Right*" to make laws and enforce them "for the Publick Good" (section 3). A man may make rules for others and enforce them, but if he doesn't have the *right* to do so, his power isn't political. Locke begins with his definition of political power. The rest of the book is an explanation of what that definition means.

His explanation begins this way. "To understand Political Power right," he says, "we must consider what State all Men are naturally in"—"a *State of perfect Freedom*" and "also of *Equality*" (section 4)—a state of nature. The liberty and equality are but two faces of the same thing. Men are born equal: nobody is set over you, authorized by nature to tell you what to do. That is, your equality means you are naturally free from subjection by others. In short, the essential fact of the state of nature—the "State all Men are naturally in"—the essential fact is that there is no natural boss. What Locke means more than anything when he says state of nature is, the absence of some "decisive power to appeal to" on earth. "Men living together . . . without a common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge between them, is *properly the State of Nature*" (section 19).

In other words, the state of nature is a nonpolitical condition. Why does Locke think we must first consider men in a nonpolitical state in order to understand what political power is? To this perplexity we must add that the argument not only begins with consideration of man outside of political society, it also ends that way. The final chapter, the longest in the *Second Treatise*, is on "The Dissolution of Government," and there once again Locke discusses the state of nature. Why does a book on government begin and end with man without government?

Let us go back to Locke's earlier phrase: the "State all Men are naturally in." Did you notice the tense? He doesn't say "were"; he says, "are." Throughout the book, the predominant use of the present tense in discussing the state of nature is quite consistent. Somehow or other we must figure out how we are in the state of nature if we are

** All section references are to the *Second Treatise*.

to understand what Locke wants to tell us about political society.

Primitive, prepolitical men may have lived in the state of nature, but the state of nature may exist now, too. It does not have to be a primitive condition of mankind. The first example Locke gives of men in the state of nature is of heads of independent states—rulers, princes, presidents (section 14). In relation to one another, they are in the state of nature because there is no "common Superior on Earth with Authority to judge between them." President Nixon and President Pompidou are, according to Locke, in the state of nature in relation to one another, although they both are—you must admit—highly political men. The state of nature need not be primitive or prepolitical.

Let me give another example of the state of nature, this time within political society. Suppose that you are walking alone down an isolated street in any large American city, at night, and off in the distance you see a figure of a man approaching. It is ominously quiet; you see no one else around; you realize that there are no homes on the street; you recall that a police patrol passed five minutes ago and so you have no hope that they will be back for quite a while—not soon enough for you in case you should need help. Now, then, as the two of you approach, there is no common superior to intervene in case of controversy who can intervene in time. For all practical purposes, the two of you are in the state of nature although, in another sense, you are also in civil society.

In this state-of-nature situation you obviously have a right to defend yourself if necessary, and even to injure or kill the other if he attacks you. But what if he is bigger? What if he is male and you are female? What if he has a knife? The man approaching may be as frightened of you as you are beginning to be of him, and he may turn and go in the opposite direction; or you may do the same before he does. But suppose the two of you buck up your courage, and stride on toward each other, and then pass with no incident whatever—was that the state of nature? According to Locke's description of it, emphatically yes. The state of nature is not defined by the presence or absence of violence. It is defined only by the presence or absence of someone with authority to settle controversies that might arise.

The way Locke defines the state of nature, it cannot be the opposite of the state of war, although it is very different from the state of war. The state of war, Locke says, occurs when force is used without right, without authority (section 19). For instance, if the stranger on the dark street pulled a knife and threatened you with it to steal your wallet, that would be the state of war, for he would be using force without right. The state in which force is not used without right is a state of peace. The definition of the state of nature has nothing to do with whether force is used. The opposite of the state of nature is not the state of war; it is civil society—a state where men live together *with* a common superior to judge between them. Whoever tells you that according to Locke the state of nature and the state of war are opposites has the matter in a hopeless jumble.

Locke's teaching is simply this: if there is no judge, that's the state of nature. If there is a judge, that's the state of civil society. If force is used without right, that's the state of war. If force is not used without right, that's a state of peace.

Of course, if you want to know whether the state of nature would be peaceful or whether there would be war, just think about that dark street. Is force more likely to be used without right under such circumstances—whether out of malice or fear or misunderstanding makes little difference—when there are just the two of you and no police around? Common sense and Locke agree that war is more likely to occur in such a situation and likely to end only with the escape, defeat, surrender, or death of one of the parties. Thus, though the state of

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nature and the state of war are very different, one can safely say that the state of war is very likely to occur in the state of nature.

And so Locke tells us that the state of nature is "not to be endured" (section 13). It is "full of fears and continual dangers" (section 123). It is one long, dark, dangerous, unpatrolled city street, and who would not be willing to make some sacrifices to change it for the sake of safety?

Men seek to escape the state of nature and put themselves in civil society, to establish a common authority to judge between them. In the state of nature, every man must rely on himself to take care of himself; as Locke puts it, in the state of nature every man must have the executive power of the law of nature in himself. In a state of nature, each of us has certain powers, chiefly two: first, "to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others within the permission of the *Law of Nature*"; second, "*to punish the Crimes* committed against that Law" (section 128). Every man has a natural power to do what he must to save himself, and a natural power to punish criminals. These two *natural* powers of every man in the state of nature become the source of *political* power—Locke says they are "the original of the legislative and executive power of civil society."

Now, there is an important difference to be noted about these two fundamental natural powers, which are crucial in Locke's description of the transformation from the state of nature to civil society. The second natural power, the power to punish, we surrender entirely to the common superior when we enter civil society. When the civil authority is functioning, we cannot take the law into our own hands. But the other natural power, "*of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the Preservation of himself*" (section 129), cannot be wholly surrendered. Locke says not that "he wholly gives up" that power, but rather that he gives it up "so far forth as the preservation of himself, and the rest of that Society shall require" (section 129). Thus this remnant of the state of nature survives in civil society. The effort of men to get out of the state of nature and into civil society cannot be completely successful. The fact that we do not give up the right to judge what is good for our own safety stems not from some opinion of Locke's or judgment of what he thinks ought to be; he says that is the way human beings are. The natural power of every man to judge what is necessary for his own preservation is not wholly given up because it cannot be wholly given up.

The natural powers of men in the state of nature are transformed into the political powers of civil society. Men contribute their natural powers to make political power, and they do it for a reason—protection. The fundamental purpose is self-preservation. Since the purpose was to remedy the uncertainty and the danger of the state of nature by providing settled laws for the protection of all the members, the exercise of unlimited power is not and cannot be considered *political* power:

> Absolute Arbitrary Power, or Governing without *settled standing Laws*, can neither of them consist with the ends of Society and Government, which Men would not quit the freedom of the state of Nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their Lives, Liberties, and Fortunes; and by *stated* Rules of Right and Property to secure their Peace and Quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do, to give to any one, or more, an *absolute Arbitrary Power* over their Persons and Estates. . . . This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of Nature, wherein they had a Liberty to defend their Right against the Injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it. . . (section 137).

Locke, starting from the principle of self-preservation as the rock-bottom foundation of civil society, shows again and again that absolute power is no remedy at all for the evils of the state of nature. To be subject to the arbitrary power of an uncontrolled ruler without the right or strength to defend oneself against him is a condition far worse than the state of nature: it cannot be supposed to be that to which men consented freely, for "no rational Creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse" (section 131). Therefore, Locke says, absolute monarchy is "no Form of Civil Government at all" (section 90). In short, dictatorial power is not political power.

Political society is a human invention and contrivance, but this artificial thing once made has a nature of its own and hence has an applicable natural law. Society is "acting according to its own Nature" when it is "acting for the preservation of the Community" (section 149). "The *first and fundamental natural Law . . . is the preservation of the Society*" (section 134). The first obvious consequence of this natural law of society is that all of the political rights of its members must be consistent with the preservation of the society. No society can concede to any of its members any political right that would lead to its destruction. To do so would threaten the preservation of its members, whose safety depends so much on the protection the society affords them.

Now we come to a very great difficulty, and we must be very attentive to make sure that Locke does not put something over on us. Locke says the people are the supreme power even after the government is formed. He also says that the legislative power, once established, is and remains the supreme power so long as the government continues to exist and function. Now how can there be two supreme powers? If the government is supreme, then we have *not* retained some natural power or right; we have lost *all* of the freedom and natural power of the state of nature, and then what is to keep government within limits? On the other hand, if the people are supreme, what authority will the government have in time of crisis? And if the government cannot function with authority, how will it fulfill the purposes for which men established it in the first place? Here is Locke's answer. It is true that the supreme power remains always in the hands of the people, but not, Locke says, "as considered under any Form of Government" (section 149). In short, both the government and the people are said to be supreme, but not at the same time.

Under government, the supreme power of the people, which cannot be transferred away, is completely latent and never to be exercised until by some calamity or folly the government might cease to exist. "This Power of the People," Locke tells us, "can never take place till the Government be dissolved" (section 149). As long as government exists, the legislative is the actively supreme power. But the power of the people does not cease to exist, it only remains latent, and if the government should come to be dissolved, the supreme power will be wielded directly and actively by the people.

Men transfer their natural powers to form political society, to live under laws that are humanly enforceable by an authority on earth set up by themselves. Political power originates from the people, from their natural powers, and it has for its purpose, their good: their safety and well-being. Now, what is the situation, according to Locke, when the government misuses its powers, when the ruler or rulers use their power tyrannically, for their own benefit and not the good of the people? Locke answers by comparing the good prince and the tyrant.

First he tells us that at some times the prince must act without the direction of the law:

> . . . the good of the Society requires, that several things should be left to the discretion of him, that has the Executive Power. For the Legislators not being able to foresee, and provide, by Laws,

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> for all, that may be useful to the Community, the Executor of the Laws, having the power in his hands, has by the common Law of Nature a right to make use of it, for the good of the Society . . . (section 159).

The executive may act not only without the sanction of the law, he may also make the laws "give way" to his power where blind adherence to them would be harmful, and he may go so far as to act contrary to the law for public good. "This Power to act according to discretion, for the publick good, without the prescription of the Law and sometimes even against it, is that which is called *Prerogative*" (section 160).

The necessity for the executive's prerogative is obvious, but the danger is no less obvious. The prerogative has always grown most extensively in the reigns of the best princes. The people trust a good and wise prince even while he acts beyond the limits of the law, not fearing for their safety because they see that his purpose is to further their good.

But even the best princes are mortal and have successors, and there is no assurance that one of them, claiming the precedent, will not make use of the enlarged prerogative to further his own private interests at the peril of the people's safety. "Upon this is founded that saying, That the Reigns of good Princes have been always most dangerous to the Liberties of their People" (section 166).

According to this argument, what characterizes the wisest and best princes is not their obedience to and enforcement of settled law, but their service to the people. The scope of executive discretion is limited only by the proviso that it be used for the public good; a prince "who is mindful of the trust put into his hands, and careful of the good of his People, cannot have too much *Prerogative*" (section 164). But at this point, it seems to me, we encounter a severe difficulty. Since tyrants have always used "the public good" as their pretext for exceeding constitutional powers, "the good of the people" seems a dangerously vague test of whether the executive prerogative is being properly used.

The good prince and the tyrant are alike in that they both act outside the law and even contrary to it; but one acts for the good of the people and the other for his own good. Is there some practical test to tell them apart? And who can be entrusted to make that test? Locke answers that the determination is made "easily" (section 161) and that the judgment lies with the people—"*The People shall be Judge*" (section 240).

A tyrant is not simply one who uses political power outside the law; the best princes do that. A tyrant is one who pursues his own advantage at the expense of the people's safety and well-being, by means of the power they have entrusted to him. He uses their power to further his advantage at their expense. He makes his good separate from theirs; he takes himself out of their community. He puts himself outside their society, into a state of nature with regard to them. If he then uses force against them, it is without authority or right; he thus places himself in a state of war with them.

The tyrant, by this argument, wars on the people and thus destroys their government and threatens their society. The power he uses was entrusted to him by the people, but only for other ends; and thus the power he wields is not political power, and he is no longer a political ruler. The people, naturally, defend themselves and their society, and their resistance to him is perfectly consistent with the preservation of society. The one who brings war again, who literally rebels, is the tyrant, and the people who resist him are acting as any men must who are in the state of nature and subjected to the use of force without right.

Locke's teaching is addressed primarily to those who hold political power, for they are the ones most likely to fall into rebellion, and, he says, "the properest way to prevent the evil is to shew them the danger and

injustice of it, who are under the greatest temptation to run into it" (section 226). But the teaching is also available to the ordinary run of men and Locke also, clearly, has a teaching for them. For those who are ruled rather than rulers, under any form of civil government, Locke has a teaching of alert suspicion. A people who know that they are the source of political power, that theirs is the supreme power (even though latent), and that they shall be judge of when the government has been dissolved by the prince, is more likely than other peoples to insist on limiting political power. As James Madison put it, "It is proper to take alarm at the *first* experiment on our liberties."

What is Locke's teaching to the people? In the state of nature, all men have the natural power to be the judge of what is necessary to their preservation. The right to judge when your life is in danger cannot be wholly given up to society. In a certain sense it is inalienable; what power can legislate out of a man the sense of danger and the inclination to save himself? Locke says this right to judge is reserved by all men "by a Law antecedent and paramount to all positive Laws of men." But does this provide an excuse for perpetual disorder? No, Locke says, because "this operates not, till the Inconvenience is so great, that the Majority feel it, and are weary of it, and find a necessity to have it amended" (section 168).

Is the government threatening the safety of the people? That is the question of which the people shall be judge. We may consider it an extremely difficult question for even the most highly trained, highly intelligent, and completely impartial judge to answer, but the people, Locke says, answer it "easily." How? Not by reasoning, but by feeling. Words and ideas do not influence such matters. Arguments or doctrines have no effect, he says. "Talk . . . hinders not men from feeling" (section 94). Natural forces are unaffected by doctrines (sections 224 and 225).

Whether there will be resistance to the rulers depends on what the people see and feel. When the great majority of the people feel that their lives are in danger, "how they will be hindered from resisting illegal force, used against them, I cannot tell," Locke says. All governments feel this "*Inconvenience*" and Locke calls it "the most dangerous state which they can possibly put themselves in" (section 209), but then he adds that it is a state which is very easy to avoid. The prince who understands this matter avoids, as his greatest danger, allowing the people to see and feel a threat from him to their lives, liberties, and estates. He must make his good intention toward them manifest, so manifest that the people see and feel it. If he fails in this, and the people come to suspect him, he may be able for a time to maintain his place by force, but his political power is gone. Locke asks,

> When a King has Dethron'd himself, and put himself in a state of War with his People, what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who is no King, as they would any other Man, who has put himself into a state of War with them (section 239)?

The king is no king. The government is dissolved. The prince is a tyrant, a rebel against society, and the people use their power to resist the tyrant, to preserve their society. Thus Locke's argument comes full circle, from the state of nature and back.

What have we learned? We all are presently in a state of nature except to the extent that civil authority exists and functions for our protection. It works and has force because we have contributed our natural powers to it. We give up the exercise of our own efforts at self-protection on the understanding that civil society will do the job for us.

But human nature is such that we cannot give up all of our powers to society. We are never entirely *in* civil society; we are never entirely *out* of the state of nature. When situations arise such as the one described earlier, the dark city street, we find that the natural powers are

still there, and we will use them. And if the danger seems to come not from a single stranger there in the dark but from the political authorities, then we will react in the same way. If we feel ourselves vitally threatened, we will act, naturally, to preserve ourselves. A man who does not is a kind of living corpse, a zombie, or—as Locke describes a slave—so completely without the right to own anything that he does not even have the first claim to his own life.

Locke sees this something held back, this vital and ineradicable remnant of the state of nature, as the principal clue to understanding what political society is. The inclination of self-preservation is thus, for Locke, the basis of civil society.

The double strength of the teaching is obvious, and we in this country have long been its beneficiaries: rulers who are very concerned not to make the people feel threatened; citizens who are alertly suspicious of every action of their government, watching always to assure themselves that their powers are used for their good. In short, in nations taught by John Locke, limited government is likely to prevail, supported for opposing and complementary reasons by those who govern and those who are governed.

What, then, is the weakness of which I spoke? What is the untruth? How can I call Locke one of the great subverters of mankind? Let me respond first by reminding you of another teaching you all know, or, in the case of the Freshmen, soon will know. When Crito tried to persuade Socrates to escape from prison, Socrates persuaded Crito that he must not escape—not even to save his life when the rulers were about to take it—because, he said, he was a child of the Laws, a slave of the Laws, and therefore he must not injure them to save himself. Socrates persuaded Crito—or at least silenced him—by the argument that everything he was he owed to the Laws of Athens.

But surely we cannot be persuaded of that, for if ever there was a man whose essential being was not owed to civil society, that man was Socrates. In fact, the death sentence was pronounced because he would not give up everything to Athens. Socrates held back something that his nature would not allow him to surrender to the *polis*.

But compare what Locke says we hold back—life—and what Socrates holds back—not mere life but the examined life—and we begin to see the character of Locke's subversion. It is a subversion by subtraction, by diminution. For example, it is well known that Locke defined property as "life, liberty, and estate." Many have commented on how this definition expands and elevates the concept of property. But consider, also, how Locke debases and diminishes life and liberty by reducing them to property. Locke impoverished everything he touched; he was a kind of backwards Midas. What does he tell us of virtues: of temperance, courage, wisdom, justice? The words hardly occur in his political book. What does he write of morality, ethics, friendship, generosity? He doesn't speak of them in his political book. It is as if to say by his silence that these are not essential to an understanding of the political, that they are not relevant to political power.

Let us consider, as especially relevant for us of St. John's College, a liberal arts college under liberal, limited government, what Locke says and fails to say about education in his political book.

It would not be accurate to say that he does not mention education, but it is true to say that he doesn't say very much about it. He does speak of it in a chapter entitled "Of Paternal Power," and there his purpose, chiefly, is to make clear the distinction of paternal power and political power. To accomplish this distinction, he explains just why it is and how it is that parents have a rightful claim to authority over their children. The reason, it turns out, is that children need guidance until they can "shift for themselves." Once they can be presumed to have reached the age of reason, that is, old enough to "shift for themselves," Locke argues that parents cease to have the right

to rule their children and even cease to have the power to rule their children, except for those parents who have property, and can control their sons by the prospect of an inheritance.

Thus, when Locke says that parents are "under an obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate the Children," he means that they are under an obligation to teach them to take care of themselves, to preserve themselves. Here again we see Locke's amazing capacity to impoverish everything. He reduces education to its lowest and most basic aspect and connects it with self-preservation.

Finally, we must observe that Locke speaks of education, even in this modest form, only in the portions of the book that have to do with the state of nature and the law of nature. In the portion of the book that considers political society and government, education is not discussed. In short, education is thought to be of no political consequence; in a book that claims to set forth the origin, extent, and end of civil government, education is not worthy of consideration.

Now—need I urge you to ask, So what?

In a Lockean society, there is no essential place for liberal education, for education understood as something well beyond learning to "shift for yourself," for education understood as necessary for the examined life rather than mere life.

But perhaps I draw too much, too quickly, from Locke's silence. Perhaps it will be more useful and more instructive for us to leave it at a question, from all of us to John Locke: In your society, what place would there be for St. John's College?

I said at the outset that "this is a matter of deep concern to us, for to the extent that this nation is a Lockean society, our strengths and our weaknesses are related to the truth and the untruth of the teachings of Locke—which still go marching on."

The extent to which this nation is a Lockean society is uncertain and debatable. I know we are not entirely Lockean, for a purely Lockean civil society would not be viable, could not survive its first hostile challenge. But I return to Locke's strange Midas touch. Our greatest danger and our greatest weakness seems now to be a widespread malaise, an uneasiness that great things are lacking in our political scheme of life, that in the midst of our unprecedented affluence we are the victims of a grave impoverishment. My conclusion is that Locke is in great part responsible for both the affluence and the impoverishment.

But once again let me retreat from the assertion to another question. To my first question let me now add this one, which may be the key to everything: Is it true that a man is in his natural condition when he is without government?

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Logic and Reason*

By

EDWARD SPARROW

Significant of one of the attitudes prevalent in the modern age is the frequent use by intelligent people of the words "logic," "logical," and "logically" in a deprecatory sense. We hear often of something being "all very logical" but, for all that, opposed to common sense. We hear people say that something or other follows "all very logically" from something else, but is, nonetheless, totally wrong. One sometimes hears the phrases "according to that system of logic," "according to your logic," or "according to the rules of logic which you adopt." And one even hears remarks to the effect that "you can prove anything with logic."

Simultaneously with the growth of the use of such modes of expression arises a sort of obsession with the emotional, the paradoxical, the irrational, and interestingly enough, as if the depreciation of the logical were somehow connected with the depreciation of the public, the intimate. Not only is logic thus put into the coffin of the dry, the implacable, and the relentless. It is also, like a public enemy, unceremoniously buried, and on its tombstone is inscribed "the misleading," "the false," the "inhuman." Many do not even bother to look at the tomb, for it has for them become "the irrelevant," that is to say, "the meaningless."

One thing, however, it is curious to note: the words "reason," "reasonable," and "reasonably" have not yet become as thoroughly subject to the same depreciation, although there are signs that such a development is not to be unexpected. Now because the Latin *ratio* from which we get "reason" translates in part the Greek *logos*, which is of course the root of "logic," one would expect that the neglect or odium attaching to the one would necessarily attach itself to the other as well. And so the difference in the esteem in which the two groups of words are held makes an interesting subject of speculation. One is led to suspect that what should be a very warm embrace between the science, logic, and its object, reason, may be turning instead into the kiss of death; or that logic, which, in at least one tradition has some relation to life, has in the course of time become estranged from reason, so that it resembles nowadays nothing so much, in the manipulation of its symbols, as the rattling of the dry bones in the valley of destruction.

Now it is not my concern to anatomize logic or to discourse to you about Goedel's theorem and symbolic logic, for my ignorance of these things is only matched by my admiration for those who have mastered them. Nor is it my concern to show that the properly mysterious may be as much above the logical as love may be above justice. But since the neglect or odium which attaches itself to the "logical" in the minds of many has not yet totally polluted their estimation of the "reasonable," I should like to discover whether there may not be more life in the logical than many would grant; to put it another way: I should like to learn whether it may not be a ghost of logic that so many have buried as false, inhuman, and meaningless.

To this end, I should like us to begin by examining together and possibly criticizing a certain formulation of the relationship between two quite distinct things, validity and truth. For the understanding of the relation of validity to truth which we shall examine lies very close to the root of those estimates of logic as dry, false, and irrelevant. I should then like to examine what people seem to be doing when they argue and see what the implications of this enterprise may be. And if it turns out that we can say something significant on these two themes, I should like to combine them into at least a beginning of the understanding of hypothesis. Finally, I hope we can say something about the true and the false and that some relationship may appear between thought and, if I may use the word, reality.

* A lecture given at St. John's College in Annapolis in 1961.

I. "Valid" is a term which in logic is predicated of arguments, inferences, and some of the "moods" of the syllogism. And "true" is something which is said of individual premises and conclusions. So there is no opposition between them. But a question does arise about their relationship to one another. What is the relation between the truth of the premises of an argument and the validity of the argument of which they are premises? Or, more exactly, can there be validity without truth? To introduce the discussion I am going to read a few selections from some contemporary writers on logic in order that you may see how the relation of validity to truth is presently understood and in order that the position which we shall examine this evening may be put in front of us in the words of those who maintain it.

Augustus de Morgan in his book, *Formal Logic*, writes as follows:

> Logic has so far nothing to do with the truth of the facts, opinions, or presumptions, from which an inference is derived; but simply takes care that the inference shall certainly be true, if the premises be true. Thus, when we say that all men will die, and that all men are rational beings, and thence infer that some rational beings will die, the logical truth of this sentence is the *same whether it be true or false that men are mortal and rational. This logical truth depends upon the structure of the sentence and not upon the particular matters spoken of.* (p. 1)

Alonzo Church, in *Introduction to Mathematical Logic*, says:

> Traditionally (formal) logic is concerned with the analysis of sentences or of propositions and proof with attention to the form in abstraction from the matter. This distinction between form and matter is not easy to make precise immediately, but it may be illustrated by examples. "Brothers have the same surname; Richard and Stanley are brothers; Stanley has surname Thompson; therefore Richard has surname Thompson." *The argument, it may be held, is valid from the form alone, independently of the matter, and independently in particular of the question whether the premises and the conclusion are in themselves right or wrong. The reasoning may be right though the facts be wrong,* and it is just in maintaining this distinction that we separate the form from the matter. (p. 1)

Our own sophomore logic manual puts it this way:

> Minor logic is therefore concerned only with the *formal validity* of reasoning and not at all with its factual (material) truth.

All these writers seem to consider logic, or, at best, "formal logic," to be concerned with logical form; and it would appear that a companion, if not a child, of this logical form is something called validity, correctness, logical truth, or, as in the case of Church, right reasoning. And it would further appear that this element, while not exactly opposed to truth, belongs, as it were, to another and possibly higher realm than truth. This would be so because of its close affinity to form, since form is traditionally a much nobler thing than matter; and truth is merely a predicate of logical form combined with logical matter. If, after all, one can show that the "A-A-A" form in the first figure or the "p implies q; p therefore q" form is valid regardless of truth of the major and minor premises, then it becomes possible to have a science of valid and invalid forms. And this knowledge, since it will bear on something necessarily prior to any determination of content, will be of greater import and significance than any knowledge of any particular argument.

But before we go on to a more detailed consideration of the relation between truth and validity, I would like to try to justify very informally the remark that the understanding of the relation between the valid and the true which our authors have articulated lies close to the root of those estimates of logic as false and meaningless. If false premises can underlie a valid argument, logic will clearly be concerned with valid forms and lose its concern for truth. It will come to consider the very *logoi* through which we are human as unworthy of its attention compared to the symbols for wordless x's, p's and q's which it will push around on paper. Formal deductive systems will flourish, the authors of which, disavowing any concern for truth, will ground their enterprise on valid inferential forms. Great enterprises of the past, whose authors considered the validity of their reasoning as adding rather than subtracting from the merits of their work, will be reinterpreted as "formally deductive systems" as arbitrary in their starting points as those more recently constructed, essentially tautologous, and unworthy of serious attention except as logical exercises. Lastly, in the eyes of many, a writer will tend to become the more respected the less "logical" he is, for being logical will have become synonymous with being consistent with a certain set of arbitrarily assumed starting points, i.e., with being valid, and the self-evidence of premises will have become a question for psychology, not logic. When the form will thus have swallowed the matter, the valid annihilated the true, it will not be surprising that the searcher for truth will look elsewhere

than in argument and reasoning, will canvass the emotional in music and art, will seek it in novels, esoteric poetry, and direct experience, and will ransack the private, the intimate, and the irrational, for that essential kinship to himself which he has given up the hope of finding in the reason.

Now let us ask whether the relation between the validity of an argument and the truth of its premises admits of the simple solution offered by the writers mentioned, namely, that validity and truth have nothing to do with one another; that a valid argument may have false premises, and that false premises can yield true conclusions.

Let us begin by looking at a very simple argument. Suppose you were to overhear the following conversation:

A: Of course Socrates deserved to die.
B. Why?
A: He corrupted the youth of Athens.
B: He did not. He was trying to educate them.
A: So what?

You might be tempted to join in the argument. But you might also be interested in analyzing it. In that case, you would note the following reasoning:

A's argument: (Anyone who corrupted the youth of Athens deserved to die.)
Socrates corrupted the youth of Athens.
Therefore Socrates deserved to die.

B's argument: (No one who tried to educate the youth of Athens corrupted them.)
Socrates tried to educate the youth of Athens.
(Therefore Socrates did not corrupt them.)

A's reply: (Someone who tries to educate another may corrupt him.)

It is evident in the first place that A gives the minor premise of his argument, that Socrates corrupted the youth of Athens, as an answer to B's question, "Why did Socrates deserve to die?" It is also clear that in doing so he intends to give the reason for his conclusion that Socrates deserved death. He thereby indicates his awareness that his bare assertion that Socrates deserved to die cannot, since he is not God, compel the assent of B or of anyone else without a reason. And he also shows his awareness that to refuse or to be unable to give a reason to B, since they are on the same level, would be a sign either of intolerable pride or of pure prejudice.

In the second place, it is evident that B recognizes that A's argument must carry the day and determine the question, even though to B's mind, the conclusion is surprising and doubtful, unless it can be shown, and he, B, will undertake to show it, that one of A's premises is false. Else he would not argue with A. Since he accepts A's implied major premise, that anyone who corrupted the Athenian youth deserved death, he must concentrate on proving the minor false. And this he does by trying to prove that the contradictory of it is true. In other words B also recognizes that A's argument will collapse if one of his premises *is* proved false. And so B sets up his own argument, the implied conclusion of which, resting on his own implied major premise, is that Socrates did not corrupt the youth. Now B thinks that by having contradicted A's premise, with a reason of his own, he has established the falsity of it and hence has invalidated A's argument.

A next, by his remark, "so what" implies that there might have been a "so . . . something," that B might have produced an argument which would have invalidated his own. But he also indicates that B has not in fact done so. But why does B's argument fail in A's eyes? Clearly it is not because A disagrees with B's minor premise, that Socrates tried to educate the youth of Athens, for he admits it. What A denies is that together with the implied major, that no one who tries to educate another can corrupt him, produces the implied conclusion, that Socrates did not corrupt the youth. Now why should A think that the argument fails to produce the conclusion? The form of B's argument is perfectly valid; it is E-A-E in the first figure. It can only be that A thinks that the major premise of B's argument is false. By saying "so what?" he is in effect contradicting A's major by impliedly asserting the truth of its contradictory, to wit, that someone who tries to educate another may corrupt him. And obviously if someone who tries to educate another may corrupt him, the fact that Socrates tried to educate the youth of Athens can in no way determine the question whether or not Socrates corrupted the youth. A thus recognizes that B's argument must also collapse if the major premise of B's argument is false.

Now the interesting thing about this argument for our present purpose is to note that in the minds of the disputants there is a real relationship between a valid argument and true premises. B recognizes, as does A, that A's argument is no longer valid if one of his premises can be proved false. And A recognizes, as B does, that B's argument also collapses if one of *his* premises can be proved false. In the minds of both, as, I daresay, in the minds of all of us, when we are not thinking about thinking, there is no possibility of such a thing as a valid argument one of whose premises is false. What makes A's argument valid for him is his conviction that his premises are true, and what makes the same argument invalid for B is his conviction that one of them is false. Validity, in the minds of these disputants, seems to be so intimately related to truth as to be almost the offspring of it.

But, someone might say, whatever intimate relationship A and B might assert between the validity of an argument and the truth of its premises is of no consequence as far as the formal logic of the argument is concerned. The logical form of A's argument, A-A-A in the first figure, is valid *per se* regardless of the truth of the constituent premises. But we must then ask this person what he means by "valid." He would reply, I believe, that a valid argument is one the conclusion of which follows necessarily from the form and relation to one another of the premises regardless of their truth. Such necessity would be called logical necessity and the argument would be called logically true. Very well then, let us agree to call an argument with true premises a good or sound argument and one with the proper form but true or false premises a valid argument. And let us concentrate on distinguishing a valid argument from a sound argument.

If the valid is distinguished from the sound by the fact that the premises of a valid argument may be either true or false while those of a sound argument must be true, the validity of a valid argument obviously accrues to it by virtue of the form in which it is cast. Let us then examine a bare form of a valid argument, say A-A-A in the first figure, one from which anything that could introduce the true and the false has been removed. Now since the matter has been left behind, and truth and falsity accrues to a premise by virtue of form *and* matter, it would seem to follow that both premises, MaP and SaM, are beyond the true and the false. So let us inquire whether the major premise, MaP is in fact beyond the true and false.

A moment's thought will reveal to you that it is not beyond the true and false. For only what admits the true and the false can be contradicted. So that if the form we have under study does not admit the true and the false, it cannot be contradicted, any more than a pencil, an eclipse, or an auditorium can be contradicted. And if it cannot be contradicted, it can have no contradictory. And this is very strange indeed. For if *it* can have no contradictory, neither can any given universal affirmative major premise have a contradictory. Just as if area is denied to circle as such, it must be denied of any given circle. For if a given premise could have a contradictory, while the form of every one of them all could not have one, the property of having a contradictory would have to accrue to a given one from the particular matter of which it was made up. But the property of having a contradictory accrues to a given one from its combination of quantity and quality and not from the matter which makes it up. And any given universal affirmative does have a contradictory. One is therefore forced to conclude that the MaP form is not beyond the true and the false.

Well then, if it is not beyond the true and false, how does it have the true and the false in it? It must be either true or false but indeterminately neither. If so, it admits of a contradictory, *MoP*. Now of two contradictories it is well known that they cannot stand together. If one is true, the other must be false and vice-versa. Suppose MaP now to be false. *To make that supposition is to recognize that MaP has turned into MoP, its contradictory, under our very eyes.* For there is no motion of the mind involved in going from the assertion of the falsity of one contradictory to the assertion of the truth of the other, To say that MaP *is* false is to deny MaP, and that very denial *is* the assertion to MoP. To say that a statement is false *is* to assert the contradictory of it. To think not MaP is to think MoP.

Consequently it may be said that to consider MaP false is to make MoP the major premise. But from MoP and SaM in the first figure (both true), nothing follows. Consequently if MaP is false, the argument is not valid. And the same thing can be shown for all the other

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Can there be validity without truth?

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moods of the first and other figures. Each one requires for its validity that the premises be true. Consequently the distinction which was set up between a sound argument which had true premises and a valid argument which had premises which could be either true or false and hence which derived its validity from the mere form alone turns out to be specious: every argument with true premises will be valid and every valid argument has true premises and will be sound.

To illustrate this point with reference, this time, to a specific example, let someone offer an argument in A-A-A in the first figure with a false premise which he asserts to be a valid argument regardless of the falsity it contains. Thus someone may say in order to make this point:

"Every duck is a man, and every man is a fowl. Therefore every duck is a fowl." One instinctively and rightly wants to say, "No, that's not true. You're talking gibberish. No duck is a man and no man is a fowl. Therefore the

conclusion doesn't follow (two negatives yield nothing)." Let us have the courage to voice our protests to our logician. Then indeed the argument does not prove the conclusion and the example does not exemplify what it was designed to exemplify. But our friend has not given up, for he will say to us, perhaps a bit patronizingly, "Sure, sure, I agree with you about the matter of these premises, but what we're concerned with is the fact that if every duck is a man and every man a fowl, then it follows necessarily, logically necessarily, I might add, that every duck is a fowl. And it doesn't matter whether a duck is in fact a man or a man in fact a fowl in order for the conclusion to be formally necessary. Nor does it matter whether we think of ducks, men, or anything else. The form 'if all x is a y and all y is a z, then all x is a z is eternally valid.' Now then, be a good fellow and suppose that every duck is a man and every man is a fowl. Don't you see that you must affirm that every duck is a fowl?"

But we may then reply to this fellow, "Indeed, if it were conceivable that every duck be a man and every man a fowl, every duck would be a fowl. But what are you doing when you say 'If every duck is a man,' and what are you asking me to do when you ask me to 'suppose that every duck is a man?' Have we not agreed that those beings which are rational, featherless, terrestrial, bipeds, of a certain average size, are called 'men', and that those beings which are of another size, irrational, winged, feathered, and aquatic, are called 'ducks'? And are you not therefore supposing by your 'if' and asking me also to suppose, that is, think, that all those things which are rational, featherless, and terrestrial are also irrational, feathered, aquatic, and smaller than themselves? Are you not in short asking me to think the unthinkable? You are, and I cannot do it. Nor can you, in my opinion, in this case or in any other case where you take premises which you know to be false. The false, *qua* false is unthinkable and self-contradictory. As for your bare form, I have already showed you that your premises have to be true, and that your x's have to be in fact y's, and the y's in fact z's before the form can be valid. And that means that your symbolism is impossible and misleading, for the only thing that can distinguish x from y and y from z is that none is either of the other two. But that is illegitimate; for by your 'if' you are asking me to suppose that that to which any name, symbolized by x, has been given, can also be that to which any other name, which you symbolize by y, could be given. And that can't be done. Let x be the scale of C sharp minor, and y the Empire State Building. I cannot conceive, nor can you, of that which is called the scale of C sharp minor being that to which the name Empire State Building is given. I can make the noises, if you wish me to, but nothing else. And you would be the first to say that logic is not the study of noises. You must devise a more accurate set of symbols."

It is justified, therefore, to say that a valid argument is impossible unless the premises be true and that validity rests on truth. It can further be said that in any pure logical form exhibited symbolically on paper, such as A-A-A, there is a very restricted range of interpretation for various symbols. For any S only a certain amount of M's or P's are possible, namely those that can be conceived as belonging with that S. For those M's and P's which cannot be conceived as belonging with that S result in a false premise, and, as we saw, if the premise is false, the argument collapses. And conversely, for any M or P, only a certain limited range of S's are possible, namely those which can be conceived as being able to admit those P's and M's.

It may also be said that since validity rests on truth and truth on form and matter, that validity rests on matter, i.e., on the conceivability, compatibility and incompatibility of what is thought about much more than it does on form. In fact, what the bare form SaM, MaP, SaP really means is that if you think about anything P as being predicated of something M, and that other thing, M, as being predicated of a third thing, S, then you cannot help thinking of that first thing P being also predicable of S. The validity, in short, of Barbara rests on the thinkability of predications, P of M and M of S, and only where such predications are thinkable will the form be valid. The *dictum de omni* as a principle of the syllogism should therefore be properly formulated as the *cogitum de omni*. And consequence, therefore, or the property of reasoning with which logic is primarily concerned, rests on what is thought about.

It is hence incorrect to think of every valid argument as *homogeneous* with every other, such that Barbara, for example, could be the common form of all universal affirmative arguments in the first figure. The truth of one argu-

Every argument with true premises will be valid and every valid argument has true premises and will be sound.

ment is only *like* the truth of another, so that Barbara only reflects the *analogical* identity of every valid argument in that form with every other. It thus only reflects the identity of the activities that each mind goes through as it in any given argument moves through the predications which lead to the conclusions. Similarly, the truth of one statement is only *like* the truth of another, so that SaP only reflects the *analogical* identity of every true universal affirmative to every other. Truth is not univocal.

In the last place we may go a bit further than do most logicians who maintain not only that true premises produce true conclusions but also that false premises can yield true conclusions. Since the false cannot yield the true, true conclusions only follow from, if they follow from anything at all, true premises. Furthermore, if as we have said, the false, *qua* false, is unthinkable and self-contradictory, a false premise will also disintegrate as will a false conclusion. And so nothing will follow from a false premise and a false conclusion will not be a consequence of anything.

An hypothesis is thus a premise the doubt about whose truth is to be removed by the process called, appropriately, verification.

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II. Now let us return to the example of Socrates and of his disputed deserving of death in order to explore the implications of A's thinking of himself as giving B a reason for his statement. You will recall that when B asked A why Socrates deserved to die, A replied that Socrates had corrupted the youth. In saying that, A thought he was giving a *reason* for his statement. And in A's argument, you will notice that after the premises the word "therefore" occurs. "Therefore" is the same sort of word as "thereat" or "thereafter." It is a compressed prepositional phrase with a demonstrative pronominal object "there" and a postpositive preposition "for." It means, in short, "for this." For what? Clearly "for this reason" is implied. A could just as well have said, "Socrates deserved to die, for he corrupted the youth of Athens." Now a little reflection will reveal that Socrates did many other things for which he did not deserve death, and that if anyone other than Socrates were to have corrupted the youth, he too should have met the same fate. Consequently we may say that although it is the whole predication or minor premise, Socrates corrupted the youth, that is the reason why Socrates is worthy of death, it is "corruption of the youth" that reveals why anyone, including Socrates, is worthy of death. But "corruption of the youth" is the middle term in A's argument. So that the argument, in answering the question why, gives in the middle term, the reason. It gives, in other words, that through which the predicate of the conclusion, being worthy of death, attaches to the subject of it, Socrates. The major premise of A's argument sets out the reason with its consequences; corruption of the youth has as its consequences meriting death. The minor shows that the subject is subsumed under the reason; Socrates corrupted the youth. And the conclusion sets out the obvious, that the consequences necessarily attach themselves to the subject; Socrates deserved to die.

But there is another interesting thing about argument: A could equally well have said that Socrates deserved to die *because* he corrupted the youth of Athens. And if one were to ask A what is the cause of Socrates deserving death, A would reply "Socrates's corruption of the youth of Athens." Corruption of the youth thus may be said to have among its *effects or results* the being worthy of death of the one who corrupts, and Socrates's corruption of the youth is the cause of the effect, Socrates's being worthy of death. Thus it seems that the middle term, which we identified previously with the reason, also in some sense intends the cause, so that reason and cause seem to be identical. And the major term, which we previously identified with the consequences of the reason, also intends the effects, so that consequences and effects also seem to be identical.

Now if we examine what we think when we think "cause" one of its salient notes is that it is that *through which* or *by which* something is or happens. Of caused things, we say that they don't happen "by themselves," and that must mean that they happen, if they happen by anything, by something other than themselves. Hence if it be correct to say that the middle term intends the cause, it will not be surprising to find that the *middle term* is also that by or through which the effects intended by the major term, being worthy of death, inhere in the minor term, Socrates. For the middle term is also a mean or through which between the minor term and the major term.

Thus in A's argument, the major premise gives the cause, corruption of the youth, and the effect, being worthy of death, without any specification of the one

in whom these are manifested. The minor premise gives that in which the cause is, Socrates, and the fact that the cause is in it, corrupted the youth, a finite verb *agreeing* with its subject. And the conclusion through the middle term gives that in which the effect is, Socrates, and the fact that the effect is in it, is worthy of death, again a finite verb agreeing with the subject. In the same physical subject then, one might say, is the person, Socrates, the cause, his corruption of the youth, and the effect, his being worthy of death. And in the same logical subject, is the minor term, Socrates, the middle term corruption of the youth, and major term, being worthy of death.

If such is the structure of cause and if it be truly revealed in the structure of argument, one will look in vain for causes as visible events occuring temporally prior to their effects. One will find them only revealed through the *contemporaneous* presence of logical middle terms. They will also necessarily be invisible and accessible only by thinking. And Hume will be quite wrong; the notion of cause will not arise from habit, but from reflection on the structure of reasoning, that is, giving reasons.

But, someone might say, you have not got the cause through the middle term at all, because if anything is true of cause, it is that a cause must be sufficient to produce its effects. It is not enough for something to be a cause of something that wherever it is present its imputed effects are present. It is also required that the effects cannot occur without the cause. Logically speaking, the consequences, major term, must be consequences of the middle term and they will not be consequences of the middle term if they can exist without it. But in your example, being worthy of death cannot be an effect or consequence of corrupting the youth, since others are also worthy of death who have not corrupted the youth. So having corrupted the youth is not the cause of deserving death. And this is revealed in your not being able to convert your major premise completely, into "everyone who is worthy of death has corrupted the youth." Therefore the middle term does not intend the cause. The point is well taken.

But to meet it, we need only search for such a middle term as, in combination with the predicate, being worthy of death, will result in an universal affirmative *fully convertible* major premise. For full convertibility of such a premise will be the logical equivalent of the full commensurability of cause and effect. To say what such a middle term is is difficult, and if none can be found, those who advocate the abolishing of the death penalty will have made their point. But let the following be suggested: the commission of such an act by a normally intelligent person as by its nature leads to the destruction of those things which men should seek to preserve by their living together among their fellows. Such a term might be fully convertible with being worthy of death, and if it were, any one who had committed such an act would be worthy of death and anyone who was worthy of death would have committed such an act.

If the above analysis is right, it should be possible to convert the universal affirmative fully convertible major premise so as to make the consequent-effect now its subject and the reason-cause its predicate. Thus, everyone who deserves death has committed such an act, etc. And then, given a subject exhibiting the new middle term, Socrates deserves death, deduce the presence of the cause in the subject: Socrates has committed such an act, etc. In such a case one would be inferring a cause from an effect. And the middle term would intend not, as before, the reason-cause, but instead, the effect. It would intend not that through which the effect was present, but that *through which the cause came to be known*. In other words, it would intend a *sign;* for a sign is that through which something other than itself is known. Socrates's deserving death would be a *sign* of his *having committed* such and such an act. But in order to know that deserving death *was* a sign of having committed such an act, one would have antecedently to know the major premise; that is, one would have to know that everyone who deserved death had committed such and such an act.

Now it is possible for us to know that things may be signs of other things, or that they may be effects of causes, and such knowledge comes to us from the observation of concomitant variations and the reflection that it is highly unlikely that things which vary concurrently are self-caused or things that happen by themselves. But the knowledge that such and such a thing is an effect of *that* cause or signifies *that* thing is not come by so easily. For we stand in the middle of things and we do not see the causes, i.e., the fully convertible major premises. But the measure of our knowledge is the extent

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The false in itself strictly is not: it is only in the true, as negation.

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to which we come to view more and more things about us as effects of particular causes, that is, as conclusions from premises. We express facts through sentences, and as we think these, we realize that they are either self-evident, to be made evident through middle terms, or else not to be made evident at all. For this is the same as saying that the things we apprehend are either self-caused, caused through or by something other than themselves, or simply uncaused, that is, by chance.

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III. It is at this point the search for the unseen causes—that is, for the fully convertible major premises—, that what we have said about the true being only consequent on the true comes together with what we have said about the reason-middle term of an argument intending the cause. They come together in the hypothesis and in that form of reasoning called the hypothetical syllogism.

For what, after all, is an hypothesis? In its most simple form, it is a premise in which what manifests something is temporarily conceived or thought under some sort of middle term, a middle term whose conceptually necessary consequences are the very effects which are sought to be explained. If light be wave motion, interference patterns are possible. If the heavens move spherically, the stars may be seen to rise and set. If the elements be composed of more or less indivisible bits of matter, two substances can react in definite proportions by weight. It is a premise, further, about whose truth one is in doubt, but the truth of which can be known, if, from assuming it as true, the facts can be deduced. For the facts take the form of conclusions. And a conclusion, as we have seen, if it can be shown to be a consequence at all, can only be a consequence of the true, since it cannot be a consequence of the false. It is thus a premise the doubt about whose truth is to be removed by the process called, appropriately, verification.

But it is not sufficient for the hypothesis to be true that the effects can be deduced from assuming it as true. Since a cause is commensurate with its effects, the middle term to be sought must be such that those effects are the necessary consequences of it and of nothing else. Since the appearance of the rising and setting stars can also be explained by a rotating earth, neither is the proper middle term between the stars and their rising and setting. The true middle term and true cause of that particular thing would have to be something common to both middle terms: not only would a necessary consequence of it be the rising and setting stars: it would also be true that no other motion could have the same consequence for an observer stationed on the earth.

Logicians are right, therefore, since truth can only follow upon truth, when they say that it is valid to affirm the conclusion when the hypothesis has been affirmed. But since they do not often stress that what makes the conclusion follow at all is the fact that the predicate-effect is *folded into* or *implied by* the middle term, they are led to deny the validity of affirming the hypothesis after the conclusion has been affirmed. But this is not invalid at all, provided that the middle term is a true cause; provided, that is, that the middle term and effect are fully convertible: that the effect is truly a consequence of the middle term. Thus, in the case of Socrates and his being worthy of death, if we were to pick as middle term the commission of such an act . . . and if his being worthy of death is given as true, the hypothesis can be validly and truthfully placed beyond the realm of doubt. For only the true breeds the true.

Furthermore, we can now see why it is right, if the conclusion is denied, to deny the hypothesis. For to deny the conclusion is to say that what seemed to be a conclusion is false. But as we have seen, all that means is that some *other* conclusion, its contradictory, the observed facts as formulated in a sentence, is true. And since the true can only come from the true, and the true can only yield the true, the false can only be rooted in the false. Hence anything which made the false conclusion a consequent and to the extent that it did so, must also not be. Such is the rationale of a *reduction ad absurdum* proof. Take the following hypothetical sentence and assume the implied major, that anyone who corrupted the youth deserves to die. "If Socrates corrupted the youth, he deserved to die. But Socrates did not deserve to die. Therefore he did not corrupt the youth." From the falsity of the conclusion, Socrates deserved to die, it is right to deny the hypothesis, that Socrates corrupted the youth; for if not, we would have to maintain that Socrates both did and did not deserve to die.

But it is equally true that it is proper to deny the conclusion if the hypothesis is denied. But only to the extent that the hypothesis makes the conclusion follow from it as a consequence. Suppose now that Socrates did not corrupt the youth but *did* introduce new divinities and that such an introduction made him worthy of death: "If Socrates corrupted the youth, he deserved to die. But Socrates did not corrupt the youth." It is valid to deny that Socrates deserved to die to the extent that his deserving of death is a consequent of his corrupting the youth. And if deserving death were truly a consequence of corrupting the youth, that is, if corrupting the youth were convertible with being worthy of death, it would be valid to deny Socrates's deserving death. But deserving death is not truly a consequence of corrupting the youth: it is a consequence of commiting such an act as by its nature tends to the destruction, etc. Since, therefore, deserving death is not a true consequence of

corrupting the youth, Socrates's deserving death can stand despite the falsity of the hypothesis. But one has only to think of something which would be convertible with corrupting the youth of Athens in order to see the validity of denying the conclusion after the hypothesis has been denied. Thus, "if Socrates corrupted the youth of Athens, he injured their souls. But Socrates did not corrupt the youth of Athens." It is perfectly valid to conclude that he did not injure their souls. And this because corruption of a youth and the injury to his soul are convertible terms.

We may say as a result of this investigation that consequence seems to reside in fully convertible major premises, and that only because it does reside there is it possible for reasoning to move from one statement to another. But if that is so, any symbolism of hypothesis such as if p then q; p therefore q is radically deficient. The reason is not only that p, and at least r, and possibly s and t as well, must be true before q can in fact be implied by p, but also that p and q cannot be any premise and any conclusion different from one another only to the extent that each is not the other. Both must be restricted to such premises as conceptually lead to such conclusions and to such conclusions as are in fact consequent on such premises. And that means that there must be a fully convertible r in there somewhere.

The thing thought must be purely significant of the thing that is.

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IV. It would seem appropriate at this point, since we have spoken so much about the true and the false, and since logic takes the true and the false as absolutely fundamental, to try briefly to make a few remarks about each of them and then to try to think about the relation between truth and—reality.

The false, you will recall, was unthinkable in itself. It was self-contradictory. We saw that it immediately resulted in a negation of the false assertion, which negation itself was a true negation. Its characteristic manifestation is therefore "not. . . ." Now "not . . ." is an adverb, that is, it is always used to modify something. If we want to think of it as stripped of its adverbial trappings, we have to think no, pure and simple, and that is not to think at all. To try to think pure "no" is just like trying to see pure darkness. And just as darkness is only apprehended through illuminated things, so *no* is only thought through true affirmations of negation. The false in itself strictly is not: it is only in the true, as negation. It is even too much to say that the false is not, for we are saying that it is not. One should rather say "false not" or, even better, nothing at all, for even that much is mere noise. We can, therefore, drop the word "false" from the vocabulary since we do not mean anything by it other than true negation. But that we may keep.

And what of the true? What do we think when we think that a thing is true? Let us attack the problem this way. What is the difference between saying "I am lecturing" and "It is true that I am lecturing." It would seem to be the same as the difference between requesting someone to assume that the earth moves around the sun and that it is true that the earth moves around the sun; or as the difference between asking "Are you lecturing?" and "Is it true that you are lecturing?" And there does not seem to be any difference at all. Any affirmation or assumption or even question is at the same time an affirmation or assumption or question of its truth. The phrase "It is true that . . ." does not add anything to an affirmation. We may therefore also drop the word "true" from the vocabulary, although we may retain "affirmation," understanding thereby necessarily affirming something. Now what is the relation between an affirmation and a negation? Is there any priority of the one over the other? A moment's reflection will reveal that affirmation is prior, for even a negation is an affirmation of negation. And if someone were to say that that is a specious argument, because it is just as possible to say that an affirmation is a negation of a negation? He would be wrong, for even a negation of a negation is an affirmation of that negated negation.

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V. Let us now turn to the great question, what might be the relation of affirmation to "reality," "what is," or "being"?

The first thing we should look at is the hypothesis again, but this time from a fresh point of view. If, as we have been maintaining, an hypothesis is a premise which we do not know whether to affirm or deny, but which, if affirmed, gives the middle term through which the conclusion follows, it follows that we can speak about premises being *in themselves* and prior to our coming to know whether to affirm or deny them, either affirmable

or deniable. The enterprise of hypothesis and verification is inconceivable without this supposition. And indeed, not only is hypothesis impossible, but any question at all is impossible if such is not the case. But we have seen just now that pure negativity is unthinkable and self-contradictory and that we can only apprehend it in the form of an affirmation of negation. Therefore if it is possible to speak about premises that are in themselves, it can only be affirmable premises that are in themselves.

But what in the world can it mean to have a premise that is affirmable *in itself?* A premise can only be in the one who thinks it, if it is *in* anything. But what is it then that is in itself and that one doubts whether it should be affirmed or denied? When we want to find out whether something is true, what is the something about which we want to make the determination? If it is not the premise, and that it cannot be, it can only be that which the premise asserts. But the premise asserts what something is. Consequently, what is in itself and prior to our coming to know it, must be what something is, i.e., being. And the affirmation, the premise, must be the being in us of what is also in itself.

But how is this double mode of being possible? We have been suggesting it during the whole course of this evening, identifying facts with conclusions, middle terms with causes, and predicates with effects. And every time we spoke of intentions—of middle terms intending causes, of major terms intending effects, and of minor terms intending physical subject. We seemed to have been moving swiftly from thought to being and back again and "intending" has been our vehicle of passage. But what is it to intend? And how does it solve the problem?

Let us return to the example "every man is a duck." I take it as fixed and given that none of us, no matter what we may be or what our habits may be, invariably says "quack-quack" or paddles about on the surface of the water. Now you will recall that when we had that example before us we asked our logician friend the following question: have we not agreed that those beings which are rational, featherless, terrestrial, bipeds, of a certain average size, are called "men," and that those beings which are of another size, irrational, winged, feathered, and aquatic, are called "ducks"?

We pick this example because of the relation which it reveals between the name and the named. Clearly enough the voice-sounds "man" and "duck" are each names; but their being called names can only mean that insofar as they are names, they name something which is not itself a name. They point to something or tend to something. Or rather, since the activity of tending or pointing is more properly in the speaker or thinker than in the name itself, one who uses them uses them to point to or tend. A name, in other words, is such only in its use. The speaker intends something *through* the name. Now to intend is exactly the same thing as to mean: we use them synonymously, e.g., I didn't mean to do that; I didn't intend to do that. Both are verbs referring to activity. The status of the word then is clear: it is in the gap between me and what I mean, what I intend, or that to which I want to point. It itself is used as a mean between these two extremes, and it is highly doubtful whether I can mean, intend, or point without it. Its use is to help others and myself to come to mean what I mean. The end of its use is that both come to mean the same thing.

If the above analysis is correct, it follows that if what is meant is self-contradictory or unthinkable, the name through which it is intended will be a mere voice-sound, a mere word; for since what is self-contradictory cannot be entertained, there will be nothing to intend. Thus if the voice-sound, "the square root of two" is used to mean "that number which, multiplied by itself, is equal to two," and it can be shown that there is no such number, number, again, being used to intend "a plurality of units" (and it is not altogether clear what else the word is used to mean), "the square root of two" will be mere noise, acoustically different from "the square root of three," but every whit as meaningless, i.e., lacking in a meant.

So far, then, we have three things, the speaker, the word or name, and what the speaker means. But now our question arises again: what is the relation between what he means and what is?

Now as a synonym for what a speaker means, let us use "what a speaker thinks." For we use these phrases synonymously: What do you mean? What do you think? Say what you mean; say what you think. To the meant, then, and to the intended and the pointed to will correspond the thought, which is the analogous *passive participle* of the active verb to think. *It is not a noun intending, I don't know what, a rather opaque blur,* such as in the phrase "Greek thought." *It is a passive participle,* and this indicates that what it modifies is being acted on by the one thinking it. So now the question

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To ask a question is to seek for being.

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has become, what is the relation between the thing thought and what is?

Let us put the question in another form. What is includes this auditorium, you, the patient and long-suffering audience, John Glenn's space capsule, and many other things as well. For of each of them I can say "it is." Now these are all things that we think of or *about*; so that as a synonym for "what is," "being," or "reality," I feel free to speak of the things of or about which we think. So the question narrows down to this: what is the relation between what we think and what we think about. Or rather it is this: what is the relation between the thing thought and the thing thought about? Only one answer seems possible. They must be the same, and yet the thing thought must be *about* or of the thing thought about. But what kind of relation is that?

To try to answer this question, we must ask what sorts of things are of or about other things. Now newspaper articles are about things, books and lectures are about things, and photographs and images generally are of or about that of which they are photographs and images. And what all these have in common is that they are means through which one can move in order to get to something else. In other words, they are signs, for a sign, you will recall, is that through which something other than itself is known. Their significance precisely lies in their power not to be themselves. The more they are themselves, the less they are significant. And so what I think must be a sign of what I think about.

But these other signs also share something else, namely, that they must all be known in themselves before what they signify can be known through them. One must learn what people use words to intend, and the sound and appearance of those words before one can use them either to mean things by them or to learn what others intend by them. One must find the article before learning what someone says is going on in Algeria. There is a kind of obstruction or opacity in the thing itself which must be overcome before the thing becomes transparently significant. Since this is so, one may call these imperfect signs.

But I do not have to know you, this audience, as a thing thought before I can know this audience as a thing thought about. Indeed, the existence of a thing thought is only arrived at after one begins to reflect on the possibility of thinking about anything. I am never aware of things as things thought. What I think when I think this audience takes me directly and transparently through to this audience. If it did not, I could never get to make the distinction between thing thought and thing thought about at all; for I could never have the occasion to think that what I thought might be different from what I think about. The sign therefore must be such as not to hinder the proceeding in any way. It must therefore be a perfect sign; and the relation between what I think and what I think about or of therefore must be one of pure significance. The thing thought must be purely significant of the thing that is. It might be possible to carry this analysis out for affirmations and arguments as well as names, and in each case it would probably turn out that the relation would have to one of pure significance. But I think it is now time to stop and, bearing in mind our initial resolve to seek for life in logic, emphasize a few of the conclusions which this study of the implications of reasoning seems to lead us to affirm.

The first is that logic is permeated throughout with logos and ratio. We meet them not only in the triple sense of argument, word and reason. We also meet them in the sense of relation, where the word is a mean between myself and what I mean through it. We meet them in the middle term which unites the minor term with the major term, in the cause, which unites the subject with the effect, in the sign, which unites the signified with the one for whom it is significant, and again in the middle term as a mean between a thinker and the why of things. Last of all, we meet them in the thought itself, a mean between being and the thinker.

But in the second place, we must also notice that every affirmation is true. But we must add that it is possible to utter many sequences of words which are not affirmations. It is possible that the ignorant, the bigoted, and the deceiving, can trespass on the good will, credulity, and compassion of others by making them think that the noises they make are significant. The road to the revelation that not everything that is sayable is thinkable is a long and hard one. But it is there. For dialectic is with us, and she can reveal to us the ultimate absurdity of our false opinions and the meaninglessness of the sentences by which we try to signify them.

But finally, and perhaps most significant of all, is the understanding which we get of a question. For a question is in truth a questing, that is, an activity, the activity of searching and seeking. But we can see now that it is also a seeking for affirmation, and that this is inconceivable without the existence of the affirmable. To ask a question, in other words, is to seek for being. Doubt is rooted in possibility.

Edward C. Sparrow, Jr. received his B.A. degree from Harvard College and his LL.B. degree from the Harvard Law School. He then served for a time with the New York Legal Aid Society. He received his M.A. degree from Teachers College at Columbia University. A Tutor at St. John's College in Annapolis since 1957, he served as Acting Director of the Integrated Liberal Arts Curriculum at St. Mary's College, California from 1964 to 1966.

NEWS ON THE CAMPUSES

PAUL MELLON GIVES ST. JOHN'S $1,000,000

St. John's College received a major gift of one million dollars from Paul Mellon, Class of 1944, in December, 1970.

In transmitting his gift, Mr. Mellon, an Honorary Fellow of the College, strongly endorsed the Annapolis and Santa Fe colleges.

"St. John's has demonstrated through the lives and careers of its alumni the validity of its distinctive program in the liberal arts, begun some three decades ago," he said.

"St. John's stresses the essential unity of knowledge," Mr. Mellon stated. "To my mind, the College's program constitutes a cohesive and challenging learning experience for young men and women."

Mr. Mellon also noted with approval the decision of the St. John's Board that the College remain small so that a close personal relationship could be possible between students and Tutors. He cited the fact that certain large universities were now seeking to establish colleges of the size and character of St. John's within their own campuses.

"I consider it extremely important that St. John's College attain as firm a financial base as possible over the next several years, since its mission on the American educational scene was never more important than today."

Mr. Mellon's interest in St. John's dates to 1940 when he enrolled as a freshman in order to experience for nearly a year the College's unique liberal arts curriculum. He had previously graduated from Yale University and had received an M.A. degree with honors in history from Cambridge University in England. Over the years his interest in the College has been evidenced by personal gifts and by grants to its endowment fund, building program, and current budgets from Old Dominion Foundation, of which he was the founder. Most of these grants have been on a matching basis.

In 1958 the College's Board of Visitors and Governors named the new science laboratory building Mellon Hall in his honor. At that time he was also named an Honorary Fellow of the College.

Presently he is serving with Mr. Mark Van Doren and Mr. Richard F. Cleveland as Honorary Co-Chairmen of the National Committee for St. John's College. This Committee was created in anticipation of the 275th anniversary celebration planned for the fall of 1971. Mr. Mellon expressed hope that his gift would serve as a catalyst and a challenge for others.

Paul Mellon

In accepting the gift, President Richard D. Weigle expressed the deep gratitude of the College for Mr. Mellon's support and confidence. At a time when private colleges are confronting grave financial difficulties, Dr. Weigle said that the Mellon gift would greatly strengthen the academic program on both campuses.

President Weigle indicated that the Santa Fe share of the Mellon gift, which totalled $651,000, would be used, first, to eliminate debt there, and to ensure against a deficit in the current fiscal year. The remaining amount will be placed in a special fund to be drawn on to match gifts raised during the Anniversary campaign.

Announcement in Santa Fe of Mr. Mellon's gift was received with appreciation by the local community as well as the College.

An editorial in the Santa Fe newspaper, *The New Mexican*, quoted Mr. Mellon's statement on the distinctive program being demonstrated through the lives and careers of the alumni.

The editorial commented, "This is high praise indeed, and well merited, in our opinion." The writer added, "It is also noteworthy that the St. John's concept of liberal education has inspired other colleges and universities throughout the country to offer variations of the St. John's program."

Santa Fe Presents Radio Series

A series of conversations between St. John's Tutors and students at Santa Fe are now being broadcast every other Saturday morning by a local station, KTRC. "A College in Action" is the title of the half-hour programs, as suggested by Dean William A. Darkey, who was a participant in the first discussion and introduced the series.

The conversations are representative of the various types of classes which constitute the College's unique liberal arts curriculum. Their purpose is to demonstrate the dialectic approach to learning used at St. John's and to encourage the listener to read or reread the subject works.

The first three programs were based on a comparison of the Declaration of Independence and the U. S. Constitution, Robert Frost's poem "The Draft Horse," and Euclid's definition of a straight line.

Tutors leading these discussions included Mr. Darkey, Robert M. Bunker, Frank K. Flinn, David C. Jones and Ralph J. Quintana. Participating students were seniors Jonathan L. Brewer, Maya Contractor, R. David Esdale and James F. Scott; junior Mark D. Jordan, and freshmen Claire Kurs, Michael Beall, Dan Blake, Dobbie Kerman, Mary Ridout, and Celia Yerger.

Graduate Institute Awards Fellowships

Eleven New Mexico school teachers will receive fellowships this summer to the Graduate Institute in Liberal Education held each year on the Santa Fe campus. Each fellowship will cover all fees for the four summers required to complete the advanced course. Graduate Institute Director Robert A. Neidorf said they are looking for promising teachers who are interested in the Institute's unique liberal arts curriculum and who appear to be committed to a career of classroom teaching in the area where they now reside.

Discussing the first "Civilisation" film during a reception are James P. Underwood, President of the Annapolis Fine Arts Foundation (left), Mrs. James L. Motley, and Robert A. Goldwin, Dean of the College in Annapolis. The two institutions are co-sponsoring the film series. *Photo: Anthony Drummond.*

"Although the program differs markedly from the conventional teacher-training curriculum, we believe it has been an unqualified success as a source of enrichment and inspiration for its students, and ultimately for their students," Mr. Neidorf said.

Inaugurated in 1967, the Institute offers an eight-week program of studies based on the curriculum and seminar methods of St. John's College. The four subject areas are Literature, Philosophy and Theology, Politics and Society, and Mathematics and Natural Science. They may be taken in any order, one per summer.

"Civilisation" Comes to St. John's

Santa Fe was one of the first communities in the nation to show the "Civilisation" film series, under the auspices of St. John's College and the Museum of New Mexico. The national program of free distribution of the films to small colleges is sponsored by the National Gallery of Art, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Xerox Corporation. Mr. Howard Adams, Deputy Administrator of the National Gallery, came to Santa Fe for the January 10th opening.

The renowned color film series on the cultural life of Western man, written and narrated by art historian Kenneth Clark, is also being shown at the College in Annapolis until May 23rd. The series is being sponsored by the College and the Annapolis Fine Arts Foundation.

At the opening of the Annapolis "Civilisation" series, Mr. P. James Underwood, President of the Annapolis Fine Arts Foundation, and Dean Robert A. Goldwin, were hosts to over 800 persons at a reception following the film. On both campuses two showings of the series have been arranged because of the overflow audiences each Sunday afternoon.

Campus Notes

Laurence Berns, Tutor, published a review of Yves Simon's *Freedom of Choice* in the *Review of Politics*, January, 1971. The book was translated and edited by Peter C. Wolff, Class of 1944, former St. John's College Tutor. Mr. Berns spoke of the book as "very lucid, with a most interesting discussion of freedom and causality."

The old Santa Fe Association has commended Tutor *John Chamberlin* for his work in investigating and charting the route of the *Acequia Madre*, a 360-year-old irrigation ditch which runs through the city. As a result of his work the *Acequia Madre* has been included as a historic landmark in the State Registry of Historic Properties. The local newspaper, *The New Mexican*, cited his activities in a full-page article with photographs.

Geoffrey J. Comber, Tutor and Assistant Director of the Graduate Institute in Liberal Education, attended a meeting of the Maryland State Teachers Association in Baltimore in October to recruit students for the summer program in Santa Fe. In addition he organized two seminars for previous Graduate Institute students in Baltimore and Washington, D. C.

Tutors *Geoffrey J. Comber*, *Alvin Main*, *Nicholas Maistrellis*, *John Sarkissian*, and *Robert L. Spaeth* are conducting the Spring 1971 Adult Community Seminar using Chaucer's "Canterbury Tales," Freud's "A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis," Joyce's "Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man," Mann's "Tonio Kruger," Nietzsche's "Geneology of Morals," Shakespeare's "Measure for Measure," and Shaw's "Man and Superman."

George Doskow, Tutor, has been serving as the Administrative Vice-President for the Anne Arundel County Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union.

Annapolis Treasurer *Charles T. Elzey* attended a meeting of the Eastern Association of College and University Business Officers in Toronto, Canada, in November. During December he attended a National Association of College and University Business Officers Investment Workshop in Chicago. Topics under discussion included college insurance problems, the impact of tax reform legislation, the total return concept in the investment field, and the new trend toward unionism in the academic sector of higher education.



Annapolitans participate in life figure drawing classes sponsored by St. John's. The classes, which are open to students and the general public, are conducted by the College's Artist in Residence Robert A. Cole. *Photo: Ed Boyce.*

Tutor *Harry Golding* and St. John's students participated in the 1970 Science and Technology Exhibition sponsored by the Annapolis Chamber of Commerce in November.

Board member *LeRoy E. Hoffberger* has been elected Chairman of the Board of Union Federal Savings and Loan Association in Baltimore. An active civic leader, he is also chairman of the Baltimore City Hospitals Commission, president of the Hoffberger Foundation, a director of the Walters Art Gallery, and a board member of the Associated Jewish Charities.

An article entitled "The Missing Sense of the Past" by *Robert A. Neidorf*, Tutor and Director of the Graduate Institute in Liberal Education in Santa Fe, was published in the January 1971 issue of *The Center Magazine*. On February 28th he delivered a lecture "Love of Form" at St. Mary's College in California.

Thomas Parran, Jr., Director of Alumni Activities, has begun his second year as chairman of the Partner-Membership Campaign for the YMCA in Severna Park, Maryland, handling that organization's fund-raising for its operating expenses. He also serves on the Committee of Management, and is the representative to the YMCA (Anne Arundel) County Board of Directors.

Tutor *Robert D. Sacks* of Santa Fe will begin his sabbatical this summer by going to Israel to start writing a commentary on the book of Genesis.

W. Kyle Smith, Tutor Emeritus, is a member of the Board of Directors of the Westminster Foundation of Annapolis, Inc., and a member of the Local Advisory Committee of the

foundation. He also has completed going through Calvin's works for his views on War and has written a brief introduction to these views which will be one of a series on War sponsored by the Local Committee of the foundation.

Robert L. Spaeth, Tutor and Asssistant Dean in Annapolis, attended a conference on campus disruptions at the University of Michigan Center for Continuing Legal Education in August 1970. At St. John's he is the director of the February Freshman Program. The Mayor of Annapolis recently appointed him to the City's Board of Housing Appeals. Mr. Spaeth is also a member of a City-County Joint Committee on the Property Tax Differential.

John S. Steadman, Tutor and Assistant Dean at Santa Fe, participated in a panel on "Education for the Future" at a January 13th meeting of the Los Alamos, New Mexico, chapter of the American Association of University Women. Mr. Steadman read a paper entitled "Why Schools?".

Leo Strauss, Scott Buchanan Distinguished Scholar in Residence in Annapolis, has completed a book entitled *Xenophon's Socrates*, and an introduction to *Simon Kaplan's* translation of Hermann Cohen's *Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism*. He has published an article on Plato's *Euthydemus* in *Interpretation*, Summer 1970 issue. During March 1971 he gave a lecture at the Baltimore Hebrew College on Hermann Cohen. Next fall and spring he intends to give a course on Nietzsche at the College.

President *Richard D. Weigle* was selected "Boss of the Year" by the Annapolis Chapter of the National Secretaries Association in January. Nominated by Mrs. *Isabelle Simpson*, his secretary for fifteen years, Mr. Weigle was honored at a dinner attended by members of the College and the Annapolis community. His name will be submitted to the international "Boss of the Year" program.

An article entitled "H_α Photography of the Orion Nebula with a Half-Angström Filter" by *Ray Williamson* (with R. R. Fisher) appeared in *Astronomical Journal*, Volume 75, Number 5, 1970. Mr. Williamson received a National Science Foundation Summer Research Participation Fellowship for College Teachers which he took during the summer of 1970 at the University of Maryland. He also has received a National Science Foundation Academic Year Extension Grant for Astronomy Research from December 1970 until September 1972.

Santa Fe Associate Elected President of Mystery Writers of America

Richard Martin Stern, who is chairman of the St. John's College Library Associates in Santa Fe, has been chosen president of the Mystery Writers of America for the coming year. He will be installed during the annual convention dinner in New York City on April 30th.

He has directed the successful Book and Author Luncheons conducted by the Associates in Santa Fe for the benefit of the College Library and St. John's in general. They are now in their third year, with the 1971 spring series scheduled for April 16th and May 14th.

Mr. Stern won an MWA "Edgar" for his first mystery novel some years ago. His latest book, *Murder in the Walls*, is due for publication by Scribner's in April.

Twenty-Three in February Freshman Class in Annapolis

Twenty-three students, mostly transferees from other colleges and universities, began their college educations again as freshmen at the College in Annapolis February 1st.

The February freshman class included students from nine states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and British Columbia.

Some of the nine [illegible] teen men transferred [illegible] from Antioch Col[illegible] Mellon University, C[illegible] versity, Hood College, [illegible] lege, Reed College, [illegible] of Music of the [illegible] Rochester, the Univers[illegible] the University of Iow[illegible] versity of Maryland [illegible] vision.

Approximately twenty-[illegible] of the new class receive [illegible] Six students were Na[illegible] Scholarship Finalists, and [illegible] letters of commend[illegible] students attended publ[illegible] attended parochial or p[illegible] and one received a [illegible] equivalency diploma. T[illegible] are early entrants to St. [illegible] to the College before [illegible] high school. Two are [illegible] alumni, two have a f[illegible] enrolled at the Colleg[illegible] married to a St. John's [illegible] former students also re[illegible] teen students were in the [illegible] their graduating class i[illegible]

A student who transfe[illegible] begins as a freshman and [illegible] credit for courses taken [illegible] student who enters the [illegible] February will continue [illegible] courses in a summer prog[illegible]

Students Form Search Rescue Unit

Santa Fe students have [illegible] Search and Rescue Unit f[illegible] locating and aiding pe[illegible] nearby mountain area[illegible] pants are receiving expe[illegible] aid, survival and other [illegible] niques. They are on ca[illegible] law and emergency [illegible] needed.

The Santa Fe campu[illegible] the foothills of the Sa[illegible] Mountains of northern [illegible] which include the Pe[illegible] area and many outdoor re[illegible] including ski slopes, [illegible] and camp grounds.

First Annapolis Provost Named

Mr. Paul D. Newland, first Provost of the College in Annapolis, assumed his duties at St. John's on February 1, 1971.

Following a regular meeting of the Board of Visitors and Governors in early December, Mrs. Walter B. Driscoll, Chairman of the Board, announced his appointments as Provost and Tutor.

Mr. Newland's appointments were recommended by President Richard D. Weigle following four months of search, interviews, and consultations with a joint Faculty Search Committee. Tutors from both campuses served on the Committee.

The Provost, a newly created position, has executive authority for the instruction, discipline, and government of the College in Annapolis and is responsible to the President.

Prior to coming to St. John's, Mr. Newland was Executive Vice President at Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, where he also served as Assistant Secretary of the Board of Trustees. In addition he is President of the Middle-Atlantic Educational Research Center (MERC), a computer consortium of small colleges.

For twelve years prior to his appointments at Franklin and Marshall, Mr. Newland held executive positions with the Hamilton Watch Company. He was successively Director of Public Relations and Director of Merchandising.

From 1961 to 1967 Mr. Newland was President and Treasurer of Standard Time Corporation in the Virgin Islands where he negotiated the acquisition of that firm for the Hamilton Watch Company.

He was an assistant instructor in fine arts at Ohio State University and associate professor in fine arts at Mount Union College, as well as the Director of Academic Schools of the United States Marine Corps.

From 1950 to 1952 he was an informational specialist with the Federal Civil Defense Administration, serving as writer, producer and director of radio and television shows, and speeches on civil defense matters for Congressional and celebrity personalities.

Photo: Edward J. Edahl.

Paul D. Newland
Provost, St. John's College in Annapolis

In 1952 he won first prize award for the best network education program for children presented by the National Association of Education by Radio and Television.

Mr. Newland received a B.A. degree from Heidelberg College in Ohio and an M.A. degree from Ohio State University where he also studied for a doctoral degree. In addition he attended Denison and Catholic Universities.

He and his wife Beth are parents of three children, Paul, Jr., 23; Alice, 17; and Claire, 13. The family expects to move to Annapolis at the end of the 1970-71 academic year.

College Hosts "Indian Table"

A group of Santa Fe citizens, faculty, and students interested in discussing Indian history and culture meets at the College once a month on Wednesday evenings for dinner and a talk by an authority in the field. New Mexican Indians occupy nineteen pueblos and three reservations in the state. Tours to nearby pueblos along the Rio Grande also are offered to students at the College from time to time. Speakers at the suppers so far have included Bertha Dutton, Director of the Museum of Navajo Ceremonial Art, and Douglas Schwartz, Director of the School of American Research.

In a related vein, exhibits are scheduled in the St. John's Gallery during March and April by Seymour Tubis, artist and instructor at the Institute of American Indian Art in Santa Fe, and by students of that Institute.

Students Perform Anouilh's "Antigone"

A student group at Santa Fe presented Jean Anouilh's version of the ancient Greek tragedy "Antigone" in December. The play was performed one night for the College community and another for the public.

The title roles of Antigone and Creon were played by sophomore Mellanie P. Morgan and freshman Joel Harris. Production was under the direction of sophomore J. R. Thompson.

Others in the cast were: Chorus, Mark Belanger; Ismene, Rebecca A. Brinkley; Haemon, Hal Hensley; Eurydice, Paula Brumley; nurse, Jennifer Jordan; messenger, Kevin E. Snapp; page, Jim Willis; guards Steve Thomas, Philip Weathers and Thomas Alex Lawson. Laura J. Kelly was technical director and Gregory J. Ford, technical assistant. Set decoration was by Robert M. Hampton, and Miss Brumley was wardrobe mistress.

Famous Photographer Shows African Slides

Famed photographer Eliot Porter showed slides taken on his recent trip to Africa at the College in Santa Fe on January 22nd.

Mr. Porter, who is well known for his outdoor photography for the Sierra Club on behalf of wilderness conservation, is preparing a book on the wildlife of East Africa. He is the father of Santa Fe student Patrick Porter, a junior.

Students Speak at Santa Fe Church

Four St. John's students will deliver lay sermons this spring at the Episcopal Church of the Holy Faith in Santa Fe. Paul F. Bustion, Gail Hartshorne, Mark D. Jordan, and James F. Scott were invited by the minister, the Rev. Dennis Walker, to participate in services during March and April.

Santa Fe Receives $10,000 From the National Science Foundation

The National Science Foundation has awarded a $10,000 grant to St. John's College in Santa Fe. The "Institutional Grant for Science" was given to the College in connection with a research grant received earlier by one of its Tutors, Roger S. Peterson.

Institutional Grant funds may be used for any aspect of a college's academic program in the natural and social sciences, including research and education.

State Board Holds Meeting at College

St. John's in Santa Fe was host to the March meeting of the New Mexico Board of Educational Finance, which supervises the financial operations of State institutions of higher education. Vice President J. Burchenal Ault spoke briefly to the board about the College's finances and the finances of New Mexico's three accredited private colleges.

The New Mexico legislature is prohibited by the State constitution from appropriating money to educational institutions not controlled by the State. A recent law does allow students in private colleges to apply for loans from the State Student Loan Fund.

Santa Fe Chamber Orchestra Combines Students and Town's People

The St. John's College Chamber Orchestra is a new movement on the Santa Fe musical scene. "A group of Santa Fe adults and students from nine states have learned to make music together," the *Albuquerque Journal* recently commented in an article on the orchestra and its musical director, Richard B. Stark, a Tutor at St. John's. "It is a labor of love for both the Santa Fe musicians and the students, who receive no pay or academic credit for participation and [who] practice and perform on their own time," the newspaper noted.

The orchestra's concerts are built around soloists from both the College and the community. A program last October featured a Vivaldi guitar concerto with Philip T. Ansteth, a junior from Tulsa, as soloist. Anne Hemmendinger, sophomore from Santa Fe, was soloist in a Marcello concerto for oboe and strings. That program also included a suite composed by junior student Steve M. Whitehill of Chestertown, Maryland.

One of the high points in the group's drive for improvement was a week-long workshop in January with international conductor Eleazar de Carvalho, climaxed by a concert featuring the orchestra and De Carvalho's wife, pianist Jocy de Oliveira. De Carvalho is conductor of the Brazilian National Symphony and the Pro Arte Symphony of Long Island, New York.

Eleazar de Carvalho discusses his workshop with the St. John's College Chamber Orchestra with William A. Darkey, Dean of the College in Santa Fe. A harpischord constructed by Mr. Darkey had its debut at the concert conducted in Santa Fe by Dr. De Carvalho. *Photo: Robert Nugent.*

This concert also saw the debut of a harpsichord constructed by William A. Darkey, Dean in Santa Fe.

The group has been helped by gifts of material and equipment from two former local orchestras, the Rio Grande Symphony and the Santa Fe Sinfonietta. Rehearsals and performances of the Chamber Orchestra are open to the public without charge.

Students in the orchestra include: Violin—Ellen Usner, sophomore; Margaret E. Jacobs, senior; Jennifer A. Wicke, sophomore and Marcia E. Greenbaum, sophomore. Cello—David H. Sherman, freshman; Eric O. Springsted, sophomore; and David Wallace, freshman. Double Bass—Robert C. Norberg, junior. Flute—Janet E. Buchbinder, sophomore; and Christina Pierce, freshman. Oboe—Anne Hemmendinger, sophomore, and Thor Sigstedt, freshman. Clarinet—Gary D. Greene (also manager), sophomore, and Donald Merriell, freshman. Harpischord—Fred Sturm, freshman, and Anthony B. Jeffries, junior.

Modern Theater Group in Annapolis Presents Comedy

The Modern Theater Group of St. John's College in Annapolis is planning to present "The Lady's Not For Burning," a comedy by Christopher Fry, on Saturday, April 17th, and Sunday, April 18th.

The play is directed by sophomore Rand Lee, son of the late mystery writer Ellery Queen and radio serial star Kaye Brinker. St. John's College Playwright - Producer in Residence Alvin Aronson '52 is executive producer.

The Caritas Society of the Friends of St. John's College has lent the theater group funds for the performance and will sponsor the play on Sunday evening. Proceeds will benefit the College's scholarship fund.

Appearing in the comedy will be juniors Dana Netherton and Christel Stevens; sophomores Peter Aronson, Peter Ellison, Jeanne Harrison, Craig Mooring, Thomas Robinson, and Charles Brian Scott; and freshmen Edmund Raspa, Deborah Ross, and Eric Scigliano.

Sophomore Lee Elkins is in charge of lighting; senior Sarah Harrison and freshman Linda Sharp, costumes; and sophomores Bryant Cruse and Nicholas Patrone, sets. Sophomore Susan Conlin is the assistant to the director.

Santa Fe Students Publish Tabloid

The student publication at Santa Fe is called Seven. Published monthly, it is printed on newsprint and includes reviews of lectures, drama, films, and concerts as well as a calendar, campus news, essays, photographs, advertisements, cartoons, and poetry. Chief editor is J. R. Thompson, a sophomore. Co-editors are senior James Scott and sophomore Della Manning.

The subscription rate is $2.50 per academic year.

St. John's Students Win Danforth and Watson Fellowships

Richard Delahide Ferrier, a senior in Annapolis, and James Frederick Scott, a senior in Santa Fe, have been awarded the Danforth Graduate Fellowships for College Teaching Careers, and Holly Carroll, a senior in Annapolis, has been named honorable mention.

Mr. Scott and another Santa Fe senior, Steven M. Moser, also won the Thomas J. Watson Fellowships for Foreign Travel.

Thus St. John's two senior classes with a total of only 80 members received two of the 107 Danforth Fellowships granted this year and two of the 70 Watson Fellowships.

The Watson Fellowships provide $6,000 for an initial postgraduate year of independent study and travel abroad.

The Danforth Fellowships program was established in 1951 with the aim of giving personal encouragement and financial support to selected college seniors and recent graduates who seek to become college teachers. The Fellowship provides tuition and living expenses for up to four years of study toward the doctoral degree in preparation for a career in college teaching.

Mr. Moser, whose parents live in Haiku, Hawaii, plans to travel to Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Israel, and Germany in con-

Richard Delahide Ferrier, Danforth Graduate Fellowship winner, and Holly Carroll, honorable mention. *Photo: Thomas Parran, Jr.*

nection with his study of "the status of the Jew in the modern world." He eventually hopes to attend medical school.

At St. John's he received the best junior essay award and the Duane L. Peterson Scholarship, presented annually to a junior for academic achievement, constructive membership in the College community, and commitment to postgraduate study.

Mr. Scott, son of Mr. and Mrs. Floyd B. Scott of Pueblo, will use his Watson Fellowship to travel to England, Germany, France, India, Afghanistan, and Tibet. His study topic is "a personal and poetic odyssey." His Danforth grant will further his studies in psychology.

While at St. John's he won the awards for the best sophomore and junior essays. He also received first prize for the best English poem one year, tied for first place another year, and also received second place another time in the same category. A publisher is interested in a number of his poems.

Both students have worked at the State Mental Hospital. Mr. Scott also has helped conduct studies at the State Penitentiary. He entered St. John's in 1966 after two years in a Trappist monastery in Snowmass, Colorado, and a brief time at a junior college in Pueblo. After purchasing a set of the great books for his personal reading, "I learned there was a place where they were used as texts." Because of an illness it was necessary for him to complete his junior work in two years.

The Danforth Fellowships are open to men and women who have a serious interest in college teaching careers, and who plan to study for the doctoral degree. Special attention is given in three areas in considering candidates: 1) evidence of intellectual power which is flexible and of wide range, and evidence of academic achievement which is a thorough foundation for graduate study; 2) evidence of personal characteristics which are likely to contribute to effective teaching and to constructive relationships with students; and 3) evidence of concerns which range beyond self-interest and narrow perspective and which take ethical or religious questions seriously.

Based on a college's enrollment, the number of candidates nominated may be two to five. St. John's College is limited to two nominations from each campus.

From Eugene, Oregon, Mr. Ferrier is the son of Mr. and Mrs. Herbert H. Hunt, Jr. He is presently team-teaching physics and seminar at The Key School in Annapolis with Tutor Thomas K. Simpson as well as attending classes at the College.

At St. John's he was a member of the Delegate Council, and in the spring of 1970 he was treasurer of the Polity. He has appeared in several dramatic productions including "Henry IV, Part I," "Love's Labour's Lost," and "Twelfth Night." In 1969 he received the book award from Teachers College of Columbia University.

After fulfilling alternate service, Mr. Ferrier plans to study the history of science at either the University of California at San Diego or Princeton University.

Miss Carroll is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Alexander Spicer Carroll, Jr. of Indianapolis, Indiana. A member of the Instrumental Ensemble, a chamber music orchestra, she was also a member of the Small Chorus. In 1970 she received the book award from Teachers College of Columbia University.

Miss Carroll plans to take off a year to work for an environmental agency. She then may study environmental engineering perhaps at The Johns Hopkins University.

More than 1,800 college seniors from colleges and universities throughout the United States were in the Danforth Fellowship competition. Approximately 400 students were chosen to be interviewed, with only 107 awards made. The selection of the Danforth Fellows is made annually by a national panel of educators.

Steven M. Moser, winner of Thomas J. Watson Fellowship for Foreign Travel



James Frederick Scott, winner of Danforth Graduate and Thomas J. Watson Fellowships



PLEASE NOTE!

The December 1970 cover of the magazine has been reprinted as the inside back cover of this issue for those of you who are interested in collecting the covers. We sincerely regret the poor reproduction on the December cover and regret any inconvenience it might have caused. (Ed.)

ALUMNI ACTIVITIES

Dear St. John's College: 5 February 1971

Your announcement of Mr. Mellon's latest donation to the college moves me to [a] rather different communication from that which I had at first intended.

Your inclusion of me as an alumna with the attendant circumstances of pleas for money (of which I have very little anyway) had up to now annoyed me slightly, since of course I was at St. John's for less than a year. It was a shock to find that Mr. Mellon's stay was equally short. Even though his other academic achievements make further comparisons futile, his example of concern with the affairs of St. John's has given me [cause] to think.

My anger toward St. John's—a feeling perhaps familiar to others who have left the college in a confusion of academic and personal conflicts—has largely evaporated, leaving me now able like Mr. Mellon to consider myself in some way connected with the college despite my non-graduation, and to wish to continue that connection simply because I agree with 'the St. John's idea.' I only wish I could express these feelings as lavishly as Mr. Mellon.

But please accept this rather smaller token, and if my example will encourage other 'alumni' like me, please feel free to use it.

Sincerely,

Linda Rodman Dewing '68x

PS My current activities, should any old cronies be interested, include a happy marriage and study leading to a degree in nursing at Simmons College here in Boston. Love to all. LD

Alumni Board of Directors

The Board of Directors of the Alumni Association has been increased by four members since the elections at Homecoming. As provided in the By-Laws of the Association, President William R. Tilles has appointed the following:

Miss *Allison G. Karslake* S'68, a teacher at the Key School in Annapolis, and the first Santa Fe graduate ever to join the Board;

Mrs. *Barbara (Brunner) Oosterhout* '55, whose husband, John '51, is a member of the Board of Visitors and Governors;

Thomas G. Casey II ('65) '71, student representative, back for his senior year after an Army hitch and several trips to Vietnam; and

Joseph P. Cohen '56, alumnus Tutor at the College since 1962.

In other action, the Board voted recently to vary the format of its monthly meetings. Rather than business meetings every month as in the past, on alternate months the Board will hold discussion periods.

The first of these took place on February 16th, when the Treasurer of the College, Charles T. Elzey, discussed the non-academic operations of the College. Provost Paul D. Newland also attended the meeting.

In future meetings the Board will hear from chapter chairmen, past presidents of the Association, and other officers of the College. All of these meetings are designed to improve communications between the Association and the College, as well as between various elements of the Alumni body itself.

Chapter News

"An Interview with Scott Buchanan and Stringfellow Barr" was the feature presentation at the February 2nd meeting of the *New York City Alumni* Group. The 40-minute film, produced under the guidance of Harris Wofford, was made at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in California, and was completed only a few days before Mr. Buchanan died in 1968. Mr. Wofford, now president of Bryn Mawr College, attended the showing and introduced the film.

The *Annapolis Alumni Chapter* continues to hold monthly luncheon meetings at the College on the second Friday. Recent speakers have been Hersey D. Taylor, executive director of the Anne Arundel County YMCA, Judge Matthew S. Evans '31; Temple G. Porter '62; College Treasurer Charles T. Elzey; and Provost Paul D. Newland.

CLASS NOTES

1907

Robert Anderson has advised us that the percent response of the class to last year's Giving Campaign should have been 67%. *Miguel Ferrer*, we have found, died in 1966, so he could not be counted among the possible donors.

1916

In November the College was presented a transcript of an interview with Lt. Gen. *Thomas*

E. Bourke, USMC (Ret.). Originally taken on tape under the auspices of the Historical Division of Marine Corps Headquarters, the interview was one of a series with all general officers of the Corps, active and retired. The collection supplements official reports already on file, and provides many personal views and insights not reflected in official documents.

1921

Lt. Gen. *Milton G. Baker* and Col. Josephine Louise Redenius were married December 5, 1970. Gen. Baker is founder and superintendent of Valley Forge Military Academy and Junior College. Mrs. Baker had been director of publications and development at the Academy. The Bakers make their home in Wayne, Pa.

1922

C. Edwin Cockey this year has two sons at the Annapolis campus: James, a senior and Richard, who entered with the February freshman class.

Benjamin C. Willis, former superintendent of schools in Chicago and more recently head of an educational consulting firm, is now superintendent of schools of Broward County, Florida.

1923

Through *Luther S. Tall* '21 we have received a request from *Carlos V. Urrutia, Jr.*: he would like copies of the 1920 and 1921 *Rat-Tat*. His copies were lost in a fire in his house, and he would like to replace them. Mr. Urrutia's address is Calle 2, Sur Oeste, Caparra Terrace, San Juan, P. R. 00921.

1928

A. Olin Grimes retired January 31st after more than 41 years with Armco Steel Company. He started in the Melting Department of the Baltimore plant in 1929, and became manager of Baltimore operations in February, 1968, the position he held at retirement.

Professor *Louis L. Snyder* must indeed be the most published of St. John's alumni; his *Frederick the Great* was published in January by Prentiss-Hall. It is one of a series entitled *Great Lives Observed*.

1930

Edward J. Dwyer, president of ESB, Inc., in December was installed as 1971 board chairman of the National Association of Manufacturers. Active in Philadelphia United Fund work since 1965, Mr. Dwyer is chairman of the Finance Committee of the Board of Visitors and Governors. He first joined the Board of the College in 1959.

1931

Stanley S. Hall in January was promoted to general manager of The Fritz & Hawley Co., New Haven, Conn. Mr. Hall joined the optical and photographic equipment store in 1928, and became manager of its Photographic Equipment Department in 1933. He is also assistant treasurer of the firm.

1935

David E. Nopper has been promoted to general manager, Washington office, for the advertising firm of Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc.

1937

Willard O. Ash, formerly chairman of the Mathematics and Statistics Department, University of West Florida, Pensacola, has accepted the position of Dean of Arts, Sciences, and Technologies, University of North Florida, Jacksonville.

On Saturday, January 16th, Mrs. John Stuart Smart, Jr., of Westfield, N. J., was married to *Ferris Thomsen* of Holderness, N. H. Mrs. Thomsen was attended by her daughter and was given in marriage by her two sons. Mr. Thomsen's two sons served as best men. Head lacrosse coach at Princeton University through last season, Mr. Thomsen is director of Camp Deerwood for Boys in Holderness.

1939

Col. *M. Worthington Bordley* was awarded the Legion of Merit upon his retirement from the Army last fall.

1943

A most interesting letter from *A. Scott Abbott* reports that after two years teaching at Colorado Alpine College, he spent last year teaching in a Steamboat Springs (Colo.) preparatory school. Now that their youngest is "on her way," he and his wife Kate are thinking seriously about teaching among the Indians. This year he is trying to outline an historical geography of Colorado, perhaps a first step toward such a study for the whole country. All this recent activity Mr. Abbott describes as "being foolish at fifty."

1944

Registration day for the February freshman class brought a welcome visit from *John C. Smedley*, as he brought his son Webb down to join the College family. Mr. Smedley, after many years in social work, most recently at the Children's Village at Dobbs Ferry, N. Y., has now embarked on what he hopes will be a career as a writer. A novel for Doubleday is in the works, as well as several others in various stages of development.

Pete C. Wolff's son Theodore is a member of the freshman class which entered in September.

1945

The Danville (N. J.) *Citizen of Morris County* in November carried an interesting profile about *Robert C. Campbell, Jr.* Mr. Campbell went to work for *Life* magazine immediately after St. John's, starting as a reporter-researcher, and leaving to free-lance in 1957. He has compiled a long list of credits in *Life* and *Sports Illustrated*, and has written a number of award-winning films. He, his wife, and two sons live on a farm in Rockaway, N. J., where he indulges his hobbies of composing music and restoring a classic Bugatti automobile.

Stewart A. Washburn '51

1950

Margaret Frame '74, daughter of *James H. Frame*, joined her brother Matthew '73 on the Annapolis campus last September.

Dean *Robert A. Goldwin's* daughter Elizabeth is a sophomore and her sister Jane is a senior on the eastern campus.

John L. Lincoln's son John is also a member of the freshman class in Annapolis.

Tutor *Thomas K. Simpson* this year is on 2/3 leave of absence, teaching only senior mathematics at the College, in order to serve as teacher and Curriculum Counsellor at Key School in Annapolis. At the school he teaches physics (team-teaching with *Richard Ferrier* '69), geometry, analytic geometry, seminar, electronics, and has individual students in calculus and modern algebra. Mr. Simpson's son Patrick is a freshman in Santa Fe.

1951

Stewart A. Washburn, vice president and a director of Porter Henry & Co., Inc., a New York management consulting firm, was elected to full membership in the Institute of Management Consultants in December. In an unusual move, he was accorded Founding Member status. In addition to his corporate duties with Porter Henry, Mr. Washburn is the firm's expert on the evaluation and operation of field sales forces and in the use of computers to manage such forces. In addition he is a producer of prize-winning films for the firm's clients.

1952

The October, 1970, issue of *Liberal Education* (the Bulletin of the Association of American Colleges) contained an article by *Harry M. Neumann* entitled "Plato's *Defense of Socrates*: an Interpretation of Ancient and Modern Sophistry." Mr. Neumann, who holds degrees

from the University of Chicago and The Johns Hopkins University, is professor of philosophy and government at Scripps College and Claremont Graduate School.

1955

Alexandra Culbertson is now teaching at a school in Germany, the Zinzendorf Schule in Postfach.

Mr. Weigle has passed on to us a long, informative letter from *Hugh D. McKay, Jr.* Mr. McKay and his wife *Joan (Gilbert)* taught at the Colorado Rocky Mountain School from 1956 to 1959. In the latter year they were separated and subsequently divorced. Meanwhile, Mr. McKay started writing TV scripts and planning for his own film. Attendance at film school at UCLA taught him a great deal, he says, and now his three part film is in production. The title of the production is "The I of the Beholder," and the first feature-length section should be completed by 1972. Mr. McKay also hopes to open a theater for showing the film, revolutionizing standard motion picture distribution procedure by eliminating normal distribution costs. He is now married to a former actress turned teacher turned text-book writer, and while not working on his film, teaches at the Art Center College of Design and at Barnsdall Art Center in Los Angeles.

1961

We are informed that *John C. Kohl, Jr.*, is now an assistant professor of biology at Trenton (N. J.) State College. The cut-back in federal science spending forced termination of his federally-funded research contract at Harvard last June.

Stephen Morrow, transferred and promoted by United Press International, is now Overnight Editor in UPI's division headquarters in Pittsburgh. He is responsible for the "overnight report" (stories written the day before for afternoon newspapers) for seven states, including Maryland.

Eyvind C. Ronquist is back in Chicago, working in Library Resources, Encyclopaedia Brittanica.

1962

Ann (Davidson) Fastner and James Q. Blimmel were married this past fall, and are making their home in Hyattsville, Md.

1963

A note from the mother of *Elliott A. Rosenberg* states that her son is a social work supervisor in Bellflower, Calif. Mr. Rosenberg entered social work in the Watts area shortly after the riots there, and plans to return to school in September for graduate study.

Edward C. Webby, for the past two years senior management assistant with the Anne Arundel County (Md.) Bureau of Community and Industrial Affairs, took on a new job January 11th. Mr. Webby was named administrative assistant to County Executive Joseph W. Alton, Jr.; this seems a good position for one who does not deny that he has political aspirations.

1964

James P. Nach is now Second Secretary of the U. S. Embassy in Saigon, assigned to the political section. His first post with the Foreign Service was as vice-consul in Calcutta. Before going to Saigon Mr. Nach spent a year of Vietnamese study in Washington. While in Calcutta he frequently saw his former roommate, *Roger Wicklander* (see below).

James M. Toney, Jr., according to a note from his mother, was recently made chief deputy district attorney for Yolo County, Calif.

Roger V. Wicklander, last reported in the pages of the newsletter "about St. John's" as teaching at the American International School in Calcutta, is now at the American International School in New Delhi.

1967

A business card from *David C. Dickey* announces that he has entered the practice of law in Stanardsville, Va. Our congratulations.

Clark Lobenstine, whose membership in a Christian commune in Baltimore was reported in September, writes that he has finished his alternative service at Spring Grove State Hospital. He plans to enter a seminary in the fall, and to pursue a joint program with a school of social work. This would lead to B.D. and M.S.W. degrees in a total of four years.

1968

William Randall Albury has been awarded a Woodrow Wilson Dissertation Fellowship, one of approximately 200 to be awarded this year. Mr. Albury is a doctoral candidate in the history of science at The Johns Hopkins University.

Steven Shore (SF) writes that he is the second member of Santa Fe's class of 1968 to receive an advanced degree, his an M.B.A. from Columbia University Business School. He is now a financial assistant to the Division Controller (Pipe Division) of Johns-Mansville in New York. Mr. Shore says that he would welcome the chance to give (and to receive) advice to (and from) St. John's students and alumni about careers in business.

1969

A long holiday period at the University of Texas at Austin allowed us the pleasure of a visit from *Philip G. Holt*. A graduate student in the Department of Classics at Texas, Mr. Holt talked more about *B. Jeffries Cothran, Jr.* than about himself. Mr. Cothran manages the Logos Bookstore in Houston, under the auspices of the Episcopal Church of the Redeemer, and is a member of an interdenominational community devoted to Christian life and service.

1970

The holiday period also brought us an informative Christmas card from *Steven* and *Theda (Braddock) dos Remedios* (and daughter Jennifer). Both parents have now completed undergraduate college, he with a major in government from the University of San Francisco last July, she as a history major at Mills College in December. Both are now applying to law school.

Jeffrey D. Friedman sends a short note from Jerusalem, giving his address as Yeshivat Chafetz Chaim. He wrote that he had met *David Sackton* (SF '68) at the yeshiva on Mt. Zion in Jerusalem.

Arthur H. Luse III writes that he has been in the Army since enlisting last November. Having completed his basic training at Ft. Dix (N. J.), he is now stationed at Ft. Gordon (Ga.), receiving advanced training in Signal School.

In Memoriam

1900—George B. Girault, Washington, D. C., April 5, 1970.

1905—H. Rodgers Gore, Upper Marlboro, Md., November 24, 1970.

1909—Commodore Charlton E. Battle, USN (Ret.), Miami, Fla.

1909—Allen H. St. Clair, Rocks, Md., January 9, 1971.

1916—Brig. Gen. James T. Duke, USA (Ret.), Morganza, Md., December 19, 1970.

1917—John M. Storm, Baltimore, Md., October 26, 1970.

1917—Col. N. Dodge Woodward, USA (Ret.), Cambridge, Md., January 3, 1971.

1922—Dallas B. Lumpkin, St. Michael's, Md., December 5, 1970.

1924—Jay S. Price, Owings Mills, Md., November 13, 1970.

1931—Alfred H. Cockshott, Briarcliff Manor, N. Y., November 4, 1970.

1935—Gordon K. Boucher, Sudbury, Mass, December 30, 1970.

1936—Paul J. Kesmodel, Severna Park, Md., December 17, 1970.

1937—John T. Hopkins, Charleston, S. C., February 1, 1971.

THE COLLEGE

St. John's College
Annapolis, Maryland
Santa Fe, New Mexico

December 1970

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Annapolis, Maryland 21404

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