

“YOU ARE THAT!” **The *Upanishads* Read Through Western Eyes¹**

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The *original* title of this lecture—“You Are That!”—was a quotation, from the *Chāndogya Upanishad*, of an exclamation made several times by a man named “Uddālaka” to his son Śvetaketu. The “That” refers to a realm or state of being, known as “Brahman.” One who experiences it is called a “knower of Brahman” (*brahmavid*). Uddālaka was a knower of Brahman, speaking to his son out of his direct experience.

The classical *Upanishads* are expressions of and invitations to this direct experiencing. So, understanding them is a matter of understanding what that experiencing is like, not a matter of believing or knowing some truths about the world. Thus, the lecture, in elucidating the meaning of its title, will convey a sense of the experience of Brahman, which is *what* the *Upanishads* as a whole are about.

But, of course, their ultimate aim is not simply to produce understanding in this sense, but rather to eventuate in the actual experiencing of the Brahman-realm. Even Śankara, the most highly esteemed expositor of the *Upanishads*, a man noted for his theoretical acumen, wrote:

One should consider theoretical reflection as 100 times more efficacious than oral instruction, and meditation as 100,000 times more efficacious than theoretical reflection. As for [the direct experiencing of the Brahman-realm], it has consequences which defy all comparison.

The *revised* title of the lecture is: “‘You Are That!’: The *Upanishads* Read Through Western Eyes.” For I have followed Aristotle’s recommendation to begin with the things best known to us, where ‘us,’ in this case, refers to the St. John’s community. Thus, Part One will give a sense of what the Brahman-realm is like by elaborating on an analogous experience in Homer and Aristotle. Part Two, much of which will be delivered on Tuesday afternoon in the Conversation Room, will elucidate the experiencing of Brahman in a more direct way.

Finally, many of the writings in the *Upanishads* are dialogues involving a knower of Brahman. Yājñavalkya is the central figure in the conversations in the oldest *Upanishad*. In working on this lecture, I have asked him, as a knower of Brahman, for some help. So, during the lecture Yājñavalkya will be providing us with his sense of what it is in Homer or Aristotle that is analogous to the Brahman-realm.

Part One: νοεῖν and اتصال (Conjunction)

A. Homer

Homer frequently refers to human beings or gods waking up to, or realizing, the full significance of a situation (νοεῖν) or to their ability to do so (νόος in some uses).²

Paradigmatically the verb in the aorist expresses an individual's sudden flash of insight.

Resisting his parents' entreaties, Hektor has held his position, as he watches Achilles coming toward him. He is pondering what might happen should he retreat or should he offer to return Helen; but then Achilles closes upon him: "And trembling took hold of Hektor when the realization suddenly struck him [what single combat against Achilles really meant], and he could no longer stand his ground there, but ... fled, frightened..." (I, 22.136-37).³ When the progressive aspect is used, it conveys the process of pieces gradually fitting together to form a wholly new picture, as when Theoklymenos tells the suitors that the realization is dawning upon him that there is an evil on the way which they will not be able to avoid (O, 20.367-70).

Because of the intensity of the character's involvement in the situation, the experienced shift in significance is often accompanied by strong emotion, as seen in the Hektor-example earlier. When the insight concerns an individual object, instead of a situation, then the realization is *always* accompanied by such emotion; it is as if the shift in the meaning of the situation were compressed into a single thing or person. So, Menelaos, having caught sight of Paris, leaps down from his chariot. Then "when [Paris] realized the full significance of Menelaos standing there among the champions, the heart was shaken within him" (I, 3.29-31)—the full significance being that Menelaos is drawing near, full of an overwhelming desire to kill Paris.

‘Realization of significance’ has a variety of meanings that spread over a directional arc.⁴ A character begins in a situation in which he has already seemingly recognized (γινώσκειν) the surrounding things or people as definite individuals that are familiar. Then their real significance is awakened to, a corresponding emotional impact is experienced, and a way of dealing with the newly perceived situation comes to light and the will to do so arises. Thus, the present naturally extends itself into the future. When the primary meaning is at either end of this arc, the other parts of the arc are co-present. Thus, when the emphasis is on present clarity of mind, as when Kirke tells Odysseus that no magic can work on his ability always to realize what is the real meaning of the situation in which he finds himself, the insightful character of his future aims, plans, and actions is also on her mind (O, 10.329). Or when the accent is on willing an action in the future, it involves a clear vision in the present (e.g., I, 144-49).

The realization of significance may or may not be prepared for by a thought process. But when it is, it itself is distinct from the preceding reasoning, in the same way as ‘seeing’ one of Euclid’s proofs is different from figuring out how it is justified in terms of previous propositions. Yājñavalkya now observed to me that realizing Brahman, too, could be characterized as including an emotional response, joy (ānanda), and a way of acting, calm responsiveness to the whole situation.

The realization may penetrate to great depth and extend far in space and time, like Theoklymenonos’s referred to earlier or like that involving Athena when she speaks to Achilles as he is drawing his sword to kill Agamemnon—the breadth and depth of which took a whole Dean’s Lecture to elucidate a couple of years ago.

The more intense the situation and the deeper and broader the realization, the more likely it is that the characters are raised above their ordinary abilities, so that they are able to see almost

all the implications and consequences of the situation with unusual clarity and to act with extraordinary foresight. This experience of being raised above the ordinary is a divine manifestation.⁵

Homer most often mentions Athena and Apollo in such moments. For instance, Odysseus's sudden realization of the true meaning of return—its being the right time to reveal himself to Telemachos—is the presencing of Athena (O, 16.155ff). And Hektor's sudden waking up to danger when he was about to oppose Achilles is Apollo's manifesting himself (I, 20.375ff). These two examples point to the difference between the two gods. Athena remains untroubled and serene in the midst of action while she is discerning at every juncture what the instant requires, is planning the deed with precision, and is poised and ready to bring it about energetically. Apollo, on the other hand, is associated with a cognitive attitude of stately objectivity and a ranging gaze, distance and freedom, clarity and good form. He is the god of the saving, or preserving, awareness (σωφροσύνη) expressed in the Delphic dictum, "Know thyself," meaning, 'Realize what human beings really are, that is, how great a distance separates them from the omnitemporal gods' (HG, 216-17, 215, 52, 57, 59, 78-79, 66). Yājñavalkya remarked that such traits as serenity in the midst of action, the freedom of a ranging gaze, and saving, or preserving, awareness pertain to the Brahman-realm as well.

In a manifestation of Athena or Apollo, the god is revealed as the very essence of the realization. That is, the realization's ultimate meaning is that it is a ray of the divine illumining human life. Homer realizes that the complete lucidity in which we sometimes act is a connection with something superior to us, even though we think of it as a quality of our own minds. In decisive moments what a warrior realizes is both himself and the deity together (HG, 7, 247, 174, 184-85). Yājñavalkya commented that in the *Upanishads*, this non-separateness of the human

and 'divine' is known as "non-duality" (*advaita*; BU, IV.3,32): "Whoever meditates on a divinity that is other (*anyām*) [than himself], thinking, 'This [god] is one (*anyah*), I am another (*anyah*),' does not know ['I am Brahman']" (BU, I.4.10).

Homer's recognition of moments in which the divine and the human are non-dual is sharply opposed to a view that would see Athena and Apollo as external 'causes' of the events he is narrating (HG, 213). Yājñavalkya said that, somewhat similarly, we are invited to awaken to Brahman not as an external cause but rather as what is most profound in our experience.

When the god is present in moments of non-duality, the warrior's ego and personality recede into the background (HG, 241f). That sort of impersonality, which also characterizes our moments of experiencing the truth of a Euclidean proposition, is inherent in the Brahman-realm, according to Yājñavalkya.

The divine coming-to-presence has been said to occur at "the critical moment when human powers suddenly converge, as if charged by electric contact, on some insight, some resolution, some deed." Lightning comes forth from the clouds to strike buildings or trees which have risen from the earth; so, too, the divine suddenly emerges from the background to shock an individual only when the individual has gone forth from himself toward the background (HG, 6, 210, 195). Yājñavalkya noted that the instant of recognition of the Brahman realm is also compared to "a sudden flash of lightning" (BU, II.3.6; cp. KeU, IV.4). Moreover, he thought that the going-forth toward the background might be, in some way, analogous to a 'moving-towards' Brahman, going-forth involved either in practicing meditation or in coming to wonder, 'Who am I?'

While, in the examples given so far, the divine manifestation has come in an awakening to significance or in an elaborating of a plan, this should not lead us to think that deity is

encountered in the inward turn. The appearance of the goddess is not, for instance, Achilles's pondering whether to kill Agamemnon or to check his anger (I, 1.193), but rather the resolution of his introspection in a flash of certitude (HG, 174, 48). Yājñavalkya agreed that introspection neither characterizes the Brahman-realm nor is a means thereto. However, there is, he said, a different sort of inward turn which *can* facilitate its realization.

There are many instances in which a god is there, at a moment when none of the characters is aware of it. But at times, when awakening to the full significance of his situation, a warrior may realize that his very awakening is itself the manifestation of a god. An interesting example occurs when Poseidon appears to the Aiantes in the likeness of Kalkas. At first neither brother is aware of the presence of a god; but, after Poseidon departs like a hawk, Aias son of Oileus realizes that some god, whom he does not recognize, has addressed them, while Telemonian Aias notices only his own increased strength and energy (I, 13.43-80). On other occasions the human being recognizes the god by name--sometimes only after the encounter, but sometimes already at its inception (HG, 207-08).

A god may be especially 'close' to a particular individual in that the human being regularly displays the qualities of the particular god, as Athena acknowledges Odysseus does (O, 13.330-32; HG, 192-95). There is even one person who seems to be *fully* awake to divine presence—Homer himself, who

sees events through and through even when the participants see only the surface. And often when the participants sense only that a divine hand is touching them the poet is able to name the god concerned and knows the secret of his purpose. (HG, 195-96)

According to Yājñavalkya this variation, among human beings, in the frequency with which, and degree to which, they notice the divine presence in moments of waking up to meaning matches a corresponding variation in noticing Brahman.

So far in Homer we have emphasized *cognition*. This is appropriate in that cognition in a broad sense is the way in which we come to realize Brahman. However, it gives a distorted picture of the world as Homer depicts it. For there are many gods—Ares, Aphrodite, Poseidon, Hera, and others—who manifest themselves in the world in addition to the two who are especially associated with realizing significance. Moreover, the appearance of a deity often involves an inner phenomenon *other* than awakening, as when Hektor’s body is “packed full of force and fighting strength” (I,17.211-12) or when Athena puts “courage into the heart” of Nausikaa (O, 6.140). Yājñavalkya said that these phenomena of enlivening, energizing, and strengthening were included, along with realization, in what the *Upanishads* call the “Inner Controller” (*antaryāmin*; BU, III.7.1).⁶ Also, that Homer realized that they, too, were divine manifestations shows that he did not think of non-duality as limited to cognition.

Second, a deity often manifests itself by affecting a character from outside. Most notably, Patroklos’s *aristeia* was put to an end by Apollo, who “stood behind him, and struck his back and his broad shoulders with a flat stroke of the hand so that his eyes spun” (I, 16.791-92). Yājñavalkya pointed out that events like this might be echoes of Brahman as “pouring forth,” or “emitting,” all things (MuU, I.1.7). He added that just as Homer recognizes the one Apollo both in his striking of Patroklos and in Hektor’s realization referred to earlier, so the *Upanishads* express the realization that the inner controlling and the outer emitting are one, in stating: “This Self is ... Brahman” (BU, II.5.19).

B. Aristotle and Averroes

Now for help in thinking through the experiences highlighted by Homer, we turn to Aristotle. In moments of realization, we are in a state of what he called “being-at-work,” what I’ll call ‘activity.’ Activity is “complete over any time whatever”; it is not a *temporal* phenomenon. In distinction from it, a motion “is in time and directed at some end ... and is complete when it brings about that at which it aims” (NE, 1174a15-21). For example, whereas the activity of dancing is ‘all there’ at each moment, the motion of learning to dance is complete only when you’ve actually become a dancer.

Homer’s gods Athena and Apollo are manifested in activities of ours which would be “choiceworthy in themselves” (NE, 1144a1) even if they didn’t make anything in addition. The active state of our ability to awaken to significance is what is best and most powerful in us and is “either divine itself or the most divine of the things in us.” When it is directed toward the most divine, timeless things, it is a pure beholding (NE, 1177a13-21).

One living in this state of activity would be living a life that “is divine as compared with a human life.” Hence, Aristotle said, “one ought to immortalize” (NE, 1177b25-34). That is, one ought to be as much as possible in this best state of activity, that of the immortals, like Athena, in Homer or that of the impersonal divine in Aristotle. When we are in that state, we are for a period of time in the same state as the divine itself is in, over the whole of time.⁷ Moreover, “each person would even seem to *be* this [best state of activity]” (NE, 1178a1). “[A]nd so the person who loves and gratifies this is most a lover of self” (NE, 1168b33).

Yājñavalkya commented that the Brahman-realm, too, has the characteristics of not being a temporal phenomenon, of being a sort of pure beholding, and of being our true self. Moreover, it, too, is impersonal, not divided up into essentially different Athena-moments and Apollo-

moments. Finally, knowers of Brahman, living the life of their true self, are leading a life that transcends the human. Thus, most of us live in ignorance of our true self.

But whereas Aristotle agrees *formally* with the implication of Apollo's "Know thyself," that we are ignorant of our true self, yet Aristotle's recognition of the true self as divine seems to contradict Apollo's insistence on the separation between the human and the divine. Yājñavalkya said that when a similar contradiction is voiced in his tradition, the response offered is that the contradiction is only apparent. Someone who took the "You" in "You are That!" to refer to his ordinary sense of self, would be engaging in self-inflation. Students are encouraged to ponder 'Who am I?' as a practice, in order to shift them from the ordinary to the true sense of self. So, Yājñavalkya said, he and Aristotle could both take "Know thyself" in a double sense: 'With respect to your ordinary sense of self, think mortal thoughts, but recognize that the true you is divine activity.'

In *On the Soul* Aristotle began to sketch what might be entailed in realizing the Aristotelian analogue to "You are That!" namely, the immortalizing involvement in the best activity. One of Aristotle's foremost interpreters, Averroes has worked out a detailed portrait in color, which fills in Aristotle's black-and-white sketch in a way that has interesting parallels to the Upanishadic picture. To that portrait we now turn.⁸

We shall now refer to this best state of activity by its customary name in philosophical texts, "intellection." In Aristotelian fashion Averroes began his account of intellection with what is clearer to us and ended it with what is clearer by nature. There are three main figures in his initial portrait—the "*material* intellect," the "*disposed* intellect," and the "*agent* intellect."

Averroes followed Aristotle's comparison of intellection to the action of a craft, in which some material, like clay, receives a form, say, that of a bowl (OS, 430a10-14). When I acquire a

simple intelligible, such as, ‘straight line,’ it is received as form by the *material intellect*—which, not being corporeal, is material only in the sense that it serves as material-for. My *disposed intellect*,⁹ now having the acquired intelligible as an active disposition (‘ἐξίς), is in what Aristotle calls a *first* state of maintaining itself (‘ἔχειν) in (‘εν) its completed condition (τέλος), with respect to this intelligible. Henceforth, we shall misleadingly say that it is ‘in first actuality.’ The accomplished dancer, when not actually dancing, is a dancer in first actuality. When she is actually dancing, she said to be a dancer ‘in second actuality.’ So, too, when I am actively contemplating the intelligible ‘straight line,’ perhaps in the course of a demonstration, my intellect is in second actuality.

According to Aristotle, “the soul never engages in intellection without an appearance” (431a24), which Averroes takes to mean imaginative appearance.¹⁰ Thus, when I am led up to (‘επαγωγή) a particularly suggestive instance, say a good image of a straight line, that image is what specifies that the material intellect will receive the intelligible ‘straight line.’ Averroes said that the material intellect, as so determined by my imagination,¹¹ is “conjoined” with it and that my disposed intellect *is* precisely this conjunction of the material intellect with my imagination.

One of the unusual features of Averroes’s interpretation is that according to him there is only *one* material intellect. My disposed intellect and your disposed intellect are the results of its conjunctions with the different images in our respective imaginations; we actualize it differently. In this way the one material intellect is said to be incidentally many.¹² Moreover, since my imagination is corporeal, therefore, the intelligibles of mundane things in me and, consequently, my disposed intellect itself are generable and corruptible.¹³ Yājñavalkya observed that one might also say that the one Brahman is incidentally many individual selves (*jīvātman*).

Now, before the intelligible ‘straight line’ can be received by the material intellect, what is irrelevant in the image in which it is ‘embodied’ must be taken away (‘αφαίρεσις’). This abstraction brings it into the state of actual intelligibility. To elucidate this act of abstraction, Averroes referred to another of Aristotle’s comparisons: The passage from potential to actual intelligibility is like a color’s transition from potential visibility to actual visibility when the lights in a room are turned on. The ‘light’ that illumines the darkness of the image, producing the abstraction of the latent intelligible, is the *agent intellect*.

However, this picture of the agent intellect as shining from the outside onto a potential intelligible embedded in an image is only the way it first appears to us. Averroes said that if we consider its role in the intellectual insights we have when we draw conclusions from the intelligibles that we have acquired—perhaps, that one and only one straight line may be drawn between two points—we come to a deeper view. In reality the agent intellect is related to the intelligibles of my disposed intellect as form to material. It is somewhat as though the agent intellect were a light ‘full’ of Color itself. What really happens when it shines on an image is that the image’s conjunction with Color itself draws out of the latter a particular color, one which had been potentially within Color itself. Then that particular color is received by the material intellect. Even in my acts of intellecting simple intelligibles in the world, the agent intellect is incidentally in *partial* conjunction with my imagination.¹⁴ I am to a degree intellecting it, so that it, then, is at work as the form of my disposed intellect.¹⁵

For Averroes this understanding of the agent intellect meant that it is itself the source of the intelligibility of the corporeal world. For since the image arose on the basis of sense perception of things in the world, the potential intelligibles in my imagination are due to the potential intelligibles in the things in the world. Consequently, he took the agent intellect to be

Aristotle's unmoved mover from the *Metaphysics* (1072b18-30; 1075a5-11). Hence, there is only one agent intellect; and it *is* its very activity of unchanging, eternal self-intellection.

Correlatively the potential intelligibles of things in the world are their actualities, their being-at-work maintaining themselves in their respective states of completeness. The agent intellect is responsible for their potential intelligibility in the following sense. For each of them its state of completeness is the closest state to the agent intellect's self-intellection that its materials are capable of attaining.¹⁶ Yājñavalkya noted that the agent intellect as responsible for all intelligible being is somewhat analogous to the one source of all existence in his tradition.

But how *can* the self-directed intellection of the agent intellect be responsible for our intellection of the intelligibles in things outside of itself in the world, when it and the object of its intellection are absolutely one? As reflexively turned toward itself, it is not aware of the multiplicity of the potential intelligibles of mundane things as such. Yet it nevertheless does comprehend them, somewhat in the way that the craft of pottery-making, in a sense, comprehends the forms of all the bowls for which it could be responsible. But to be actively responsible for the intellection of *this* intelligible on *this* occasion, the agent intellect must also be 'turned outwards,' as it were, away from itself, in order to shine on the appearances of mundane things, in human beings' imaginations.

As outward-turned, prior to illuminating the appearance, it *seems* to be lacking any intelligible. And yet any one of them can be brought into focus from itself by an image. Thus, surprisingly, the agent-intellect-as-turned-outward is pure potentiality, pure material-for; it *is* the material intellect. In order to appear as such, that is, as empty of intelligibles of mundane things, it must become "temporarily ignorant of itself."¹⁷

This self-forgetfulness is concretely realized by its conjunction with our imaginations. By virtue of that conjunction, the agent intellect becomes ‘ignorant’ of being the self-intellecting source of all intelligibility; it appears, instead, in each of us in a double form—first, as our partially actualized receptivities for intelligibles (our disposed intellects) and, second, as light eliciting those intelligibles by abstraction from our images. At this point Yājñavalkya interjected that the agent intellect’s ignorance of itself seems to be in amazing agreement with the role of ignorance in the *Upanishads*: A knower of Brahman “knows knowledge and ignorance, both of them, together” (IU, 11). For Brahman, too, turns outward, so that ignorance, that is, awareness of multiplicity, is one of its aspects.¹⁸ But Brahman is both knowledge and ignorance; the two are inseparable.¹⁹

From the human point of view, as I learn more, the agent intellect becomes the form of my disposed intellect to an ever greater degree. In this way my three principal differences from it will decrease. First, in acquiring *more* intelligibles, my disposed intellect becomes less and less a *partial* view of the agent intellect. Second, in advancing to intelligibles which are less and less referred to the *corporeal* world, my disposed intellect becomes more *pure*.²⁰ Third, in coming to ever more *encompassing* intelligibles, it approaches the agent intellect’s *unitary* vision.

Ultimately, while still “in this life,”²¹ I may arrive at the point where I have acquired all the intelligibles.²² Then I will have achieved a state of *complete conjunction*²³ with the agent intellect. My disposed intellect will have lost all traces of individuality,²⁴ which are what made it *my* disposed intellect; it will have perished as such. All of me that is not intellect is “cut off” from my intellect, which is identical with the agent intellect.²⁵ In this sense the state of complete conjunction has been said to involve an “existential break” from the world.²⁶ Once again

Yājñavalkya was surprised to recognize in this existential break an analogue in the Aristotelian tradition, at such a deep experiential level, to a prominent feature of the realization of Brahman.

In complete conjunction I experience myself permanently²⁷ as shining forth intelligibility, but this ‘myself’ is not the self I used to think I was. For the conjunction removes what had been preventing my recognition of the agent intellect as being my form.²⁸ Averroes said that then the agent intellect, united with us as our form, functions as our sole operative principle.²⁹ We might wonder what life in this state of conjunction would be like. One suggestion is that I might experience it as “a wakeful loss of rationality,” a loss of consciousness of my humanity.³⁰ I would not be engaged in thinking things out; I would not be conscious of myself as an individual, as a member of the human species.

Alternatively, guided somewhat by his own experience, Yājñavalkya proposed that perhaps I might be aware of myself (what Aristotle in the *Ethics* pointed to as my true self) engaged in self-intellection, while simultaneously being aware of experiencing my ordinary self involved in its everyday activities against this backdrop. Yājñavalkya mentioned two possibilities, the second of which was *not* analogous to his own experience. First, in each instance of intellection, I could perhaps experience the agent intellect as transitioning from unitary self-intellection to the offering of an aspect of itself to my imagination. Second, analogous to the end of the path outlined in the *Yoga-Sutras* (that is, *kaivalya*),³¹ it could be that engaged in self-intellection I ignore and desist from everyday activities, and so, ultimately, wither away and die.³²

¹ NEH-supported lectures given at St. John's College, Annapolis, on February 15 and 19, 2008 and dedicated to the memory of Ralph Swentzell, who did so much to further the study of Eastern Classics at St. John's College.

² This and the following few paragraphs are based on K. von Fritz, "NOOΣ and NOEIN in the Homeric Poems," *Classical Philology* 38 (1943), 79-93.

³ The translations from Homer are based upon those listed in the bibliography.

⁴ This "directional arc" is analogous, at a higher level, to Merleau-Ponty's *arc intentionnel* on the level of sensing (Merleau-Ponty, 158).

⁵ The following few paragraphs are based on W. Otto, *The Homeric Gods: The Spiritual Significance of Greek Religion* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1954).

⁶ The Inner Controller is depicted mythologically as follows:

He entered in here right to the tips of the nails, as a razor slips into a razor-case....
When he breathes he is called 'breath'; when he speaks, 'speech'; when he sees, 'eye'; when he hears, 'ear'; when he thinks, 'mind.' They are just the names of his actions. Whoever meditates on any one of these does not know [the Self], for [the Self] is not completely active in any one of them. One should meditate on them as [being] simply the Self. (BU, I.4.7)

⁷ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1075a7-11: "So, the condition the human intellect ... is in at some period of time ... is the condition the intellection that intellects itself is in over the whole of time." Cf.: "For the gods, the whole of life is blessed, and for human beings it is so to the extent that there is in it some likeness to such a state of activity" (NE, 1178b25-26).

⁸ I am indebted to my colleague, Michael Blaustein, for a very fruitful recent conversation about Averroes. This section is based upon the works of Altmann, Black, Blaustein, Hyman, Ivry, Leaman, and Zedler listed in the bibliography. Leaman and Zedler have been particularly helpful for the early part, but I have taken most of it from Black. In the later part I have relied heavily on Blaustein's working out of the details of the relation between agent and material intellects and have made significant use of Altmann and Ivry, especially the latter's thoughts about conjunction while we are still alive. However, responsibility for any errors that there may be in the interpretation of Averroes is mine alone.

⁹ عقل ب الملكة ('*aql bi al-malaka*), which means intellect in natural disposition, aptitude, faculty; *intellectus in habitu*.

¹⁰ Also: "the intellective [part of the soul] intellects the [intelligible] looks *in* appearances" (431b2).

I accept Nussbaum's (1978) suggestion about the meaning of φαντασία. It is based on such passages as the following 428a1, 7, 14ff, & 29ff; b30ff), wherein the link between φαντασία and φαίνεσθαι seems compelling.

¹¹ In fact, for Averroes the imagination or, more properly, the cogitative power—which, together with the imagination and memory, prepares what is given in sensation, so that, when illumined by the agent intellect, the intelligible look can appear through and in-form the material intellect—is a fourth intellect, the passible intellect (LC, 449.174, cp. 409.640).

"The cogitative power has the following functions: it can make an absent object appear as though present; it can compare and distinguish the *re*-presented objects with each other; it can judge whether a given *re*-presented object bears a relation to a directly presented sense intention" (Zedler, 1954, 441).

¹² Zedler, 1951, 175.

¹³ Yet because the human species is eternal, the succession of human souls in which intellection of intelligibles of mundane things occurs ensures the continuity of intellection in the material intellect and the omnitemporality of the intelligible looks of mundane things *as such*. Through the repeated presentation of potential intelligibles in imaginative appearances, this succession "provides a replica in time and in matter of the eternal" intellection of the agent intellect (Zedler, 1951, 173). It is possible that the belief that souls migrate into different bodies in succession is a reflection in the form of popular myth of the truth of the omnitemporal unity of the material intellect in the multiplicity of disposed intellects (Altmann, 82).

¹⁴ The agent intellect in this incidental connection would be what Aristotle referred to as the intellect that enters from outside the door": "It remains then that intellect alone enters additionally into [the seed of a human being] from outside the door (θύραθεν) and that it alone is divine, for corporeal being-at-work has nothing in common with its being-at-work" (*De Gen.* 736b27). Cf.:

But the intellect seems to come to be in [us] while being an independent thing, and not to be destroyed.... [I]ntellecting or contemplating wastes away because something else in us is destroyed, but it is itself unaffected (without attributes). But thinking things through and loving or hating are affections (attributes) not of the intellect but of that which has intellect, insofar as it has it. For this reason, when the latter is destroyed, the intellect neither remembers nor loves, for these acts did not belong to it but to the composite being which has perished; the intellect is perhaps something more divine and is unaffected (OS, 408b18ff).

What Averroes actually says is that the incidental connection constitutes a “disposition” [استعداد (*Isti‘dād*), which means readiness, willingness, preparedness, inclination, tendency, disposition, propensity; *dispositio*] of the agent intellect, but one located within human souls. It is a disposition to receive the intelligible looks of mundane things. Thus, the material intellect is in reality the agent-intellect-as-having-such-a-disposition-in-human-beings.

¹⁵ “[T]he material intellect is perfected by the agent intellect and intellects *it*” (Blaustein, 285; italics added).

¹⁶ Based on Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1072b12: “[I]t is beautiful and in that way a source.”

¹⁷ Blaustein, 214-15.

¹⁸ Aurobindo, 61-62 and 94.

¹⁹ Aurobindo, 58 and 72.

²⁰ When my disposed intellect is actively engaged in intellecting an intelligible look, it is also intellecting itself, since, as Aristotle points out, the intellect is one with what it intellects, in that the second actuality of both is identical, as lumber’s being built is one with the activity of building. In contemplating itself as informed by the intelligible look, my intellect is also directed toward the image, which specified which look was to be received, in the same way in which, when we look at a painting, we are directed toward the scene which we see in it. However, since the mundane thing toward which the intellect is directed via the image is not pure intelligibility, therefore, the disposed intellect’s self-intellection is not *pure* self-intellection; its act of intellection is not absolutely one with its object of intellection (Blaustein, **). In this way it differs from the self-intellection of the agent intellect. For the object of the agent intellect’s intellection does not point beyond itself.

²¹ Ivry, 83.

²² What had been my intellect would now be either fully (Blaustein, 272, 283) or partly assimilated to the agent intellect. That is, either ‘I’ would be engaged in intellection of everything intelligible or, having abandoned all the contingent aspects of my intellection, I would be focusing solely on its formal aspects, which are supplied by the agent intellect, so that I would be participating in *an aspect* of the formal governing source of the whole (Leaman, 101-03).

²³ اتصال (*ittisāl*) = connectedness, unitedness, union; juncture, conjunction, link; connection; contact [from وصل (*wasala*) = to connect, join, unite, combine, link, attach]. *Continuatio* = a following of one thing after another, an unbroken series, a connection, continuation, succession [from *continuate* = to join together in uninterrupted succession, to make continuous]. *Wasala* may be a reformulation of Aristotle’s θίξις.

Altmann (83) states that the notion reflects Plotinus’s συνάπτειν [= (tr.) join together; II (intr.) border on, lie next to; combine, be connected with]. Consider: “[W]e lift ourselves up by the part [of the soul] which is not submerged in the body and by this conjoin at our own centres to something like the Centre of all things.... [W]e must suppose that [our souls conjoin] by other powers, in the way in which that which is engaged in intellection naturally conjoins with that which is being thoroughly intellected and that that which is engaged in intellection ... conjoins with what is akin to it with nothing to keep them apart” (Plotinus, VI.9.8.19-30).

Altmann (83n) also mentions that Plotinus refers to his experience of union as a contact (‘αφή). However, in Averroes “conjunction” is to be distinguished from “union”: اتحاد (*ittihād*) = oneness, singleness, unity; concord, unison, unanimity; combination; amalgamation, merger, fusion; union [from وحد (*wahada*) = to be alone, unique; II to make into one, unite, unify; to connect, unite, bring together, amalgamate, merge]. In Greek the corresponding word is ἐνώσις = combination into one, union.

²⁴ In its perfected state as engaged in intellection of the agent intellect, the disposed intellect is called the “intellect that has arrived” (*intellectus adeptus*).

²⁵ Blaustein, 272.

²⁶ Altmann, 74, characterizing the position of Averroes’ teacher.

²⁷ Ivry, 83.

²⁸ Blaustein, 284. Cp. further: “[T]he material intellect’s awareness of itself even when it is not thinking of any intelligible form.... is itself a kind of actuality, however empty. Averroes claims that this kind of self-awareness is in fact the obverse of the [agent] intellect’s fully conscious awareness of itself; the material intellect’s awareness of its own potentiality is a dim awareness of its actuality as the [agent] intellect.”

²⁹ It is interesting to note that with respect to conjunction, the agent intellect exercises all four kinds of responsibility that Aristotle describes in the *Physics*. It is responsible for my attainment of conjunction in functioning as my end (τέλος). Moreover, it is responsible for the motion of learning, by which I approach conjunction; for my learning is really *its* producing intelligibles in me by revealing itself to me as the form of my disposed intellect (Blaustein, 276-77). Since the agent intellect is what I am more and more coming to intellect and, so, to be, it is also responsible for conjunction in the way a form is. Finally, it is also responsible as material, since the material intellect is ultimately identical with it. The same could be said of Brahman, with the key difference that its responsibility is not limited to the realm of intelligibility.

³⁰ Blaustein, 272.

³¹ Patañjali, IV.34; see also Feuerstein’s comment (p. 145). Kaivalya is “the aloneness” of seeing.

³² Finally, as far as Averroes’ position with respect to individual immortality goes, there are two interesting possibilities. He may have thought that the only immortality was the impersonal immortality of the state of conjunction and that philosophers were orienting their lives accordingly. The belief in personal immortality on the part of ordinary people would then be the closest approximation to the truth of which they were capable. On the other hand, he may have held that while a few *intellects* may attain conjunction of, all *souls* are immortal (Zedler, 1954, 451-52). There is a somewhat similar divergence in the Upanishadic tradition between Śankara’s position that the individual self is in a sense unreal and Rāmānuja’s view that individual selves, while not independent, are real.

Part Two: *Cit* (Pure Awareness)

To begin the final section, we return to Aristotle. In the *Nichomachean Ethics*, he states:

[O]ne who is seeing is aware (ᾠσθάνεται) that he is seeing, and one who is hearing [is aware] that he is hearing, ... whenever we are perceiving [we are aware] that we are perceiving and whenever we are engaged in intellection (νοῶμεν) [we are aware] that we are engaged in intellection (1170a29-31).¹

To what aspect of experience is Aristotle pointing here? The prevalent view has been that he means that, say, perceptual consciousness is accompanied by a reflection on, or a thought about, that consciousness:² ‘I know that I’m looking at you seated there before me.’ However, this seems to occur only intermittently. Hence, an alternative interpretation has been proposed³ that perceptual consciousness is always selfaware, *aware* (of) itself,⁴ but not *conscious* of itself, although, at any given time, we may *notice* selfawareness to a greater or lesser degree.

Yājñavalkya emphasized to me that it is only through diligent practice that I could learn to recognize the difference between reflective consciousness and selfawareness in my own experience.

To clarify the difference between selfawareness and reflective consciousness, we shall draw upon some descriptions of experience by the philosopher J.-P. Sartre.⁵ Consciousness is necessarily always aware (of) itself, but precisely *as* being conscious of an object beyond itself. “[T]his awareness (of) consciousness ... is not *positional*; that is, consciousness is not for itself its own object. Its object is outside of it by nature.... We shall call such a consciousness ‘consciousness of the first degree’ ...” (S, 23-24). In this lecture ‘consciousness’ will always mean positional consciousness, consciousness of an object.

Let us take as an example of first-degree consciousness my perceptual consciousness-of-the-microphone-on-the-lectern—say, in the mode of staring-at.⁶ That perceptual consciousness is not an object for itself, whereas the mike-on-the-lectern is an object for it. But in each such

act of consciousness, there lives an attentive presence by virtue of which the consciousness is aware (of) itself. When, as is usually the case, the attentive presence goes unnoticed, we experience only a *dim* awareness (of) consciousness.

Yājñavalkya interjected that in his tradition this awareness is called the “witness” (*sākshī*; ŚU, VI.12-14) and the selfaware quality of consciousness is called “self-luminousness” (*svajyotir*). He added that this is what he was referring to when he said: ““You cannot see the seer of seeing; you cannot hear the hearer of hearing; you cannot think of the thinker of thinking; you cannot perceive the perceiver of perceiving”” (BU, III.4.2). And: ““It is the unseen seer, the unheard hearer, the unthought thinker, the unperceived perceiver. Other than this there is no seer, ... hearer, ... perceiver”” (BU, 7.23). I responded that Sartre seemed to agree with him that this awareness cannot be the object of consciousness: This sphere “is a sphere of *absolute* existence, that is, of pure spontaneities, which are never objects...” (S, 77).

As opposed to this selfaware, first-degree consciousness-of-objects, which makes up most of our waking lives, there arises from time to time “a consciousness directed onto [the first-degree] consciousness, [that is,] a consciousness which takes [the first-degree] consciousness as its object.” Sartre calls it a “second-degree” or “reflecting consciousness.” Whereas in the previous case there was no duality at all to synthesize, here “we are in the presence of a synthesis of two consciousnesses, of which one is consciousness *of* the other.” When I think, ‘Staring at this mike on the lectern is wasting time,’ this act of reflective consciousness involves a synthesis of the thinking consciousness and the reflected-upon consciousness-of-the-microphone. Moreover, just like a first degree consciousness, second-degree consciousness, here, my thinking, is selfaware (S, 28-29).

When the thinking consciousness posits the previously unreflected-upon staring consciousness as its object, it is not *its own* staring that it is positing. What the reflecting

consciousness exclaims about the staring, concerns not itself, but the staring consciousness, which is reflected upon. Hence, what reflecting consciousness *is* turns out to be selfaware consciousness of another, prior, selfaware consciousness, which, in turn, is consciousness of an object that is not a consciousness. It is truly re-flecting, that is, bending backwards, to look at an earlier moment of consciousness.

The fact that it is not *its own* staring that the thinking consciousness posits in reflecting on the staring consciousness raises the question whether the *I* that seems to be thinking “is that of the consciousness reflected upon” and not, in fact, an *I* supposed to be “common to the two superimposed consciousnesses.” Indeed, one suspects that the reason why every reflection possesses a sense of self is that the reflective act itself gives birth to the sense of self in the consciousness that is reflected upon (S, 28-29).⁷ Sartre offers an example in order to test this hypothesis:

...I was absorbed just now in my reading. I am going to seek to recall the circumstances of my reading.... Thus I am going to revive ... also a certain thickness of un-reflected-upon consciousness, since the objects were able to be perceived only by that consciousness and remain relative to it. *That consciousness must not be posited as the object of my reflection*; on the contrary, I must direct my attention onto the revived objects, but *without losing sight of* the un-reflected-upon consciousness, while maintaining a sort of complicity with it and making an inventory of its content in a non-positional way. The result is, not in doubt. While I was reading, there was consciousness *of* the book, *of* the heroes of the novel, but the *I* was not inhabiting that consciousness... (S, 30; second set of italics added)

Here Sartre reawakens the original selfaware consciousness and dwells in the awareness.

That awareness is also a precondition for reflection. Should he reflect, ‘I was absorbed in my reading,’ then, instead of dwelling in the awareness-component of the original consciousness, he would, as it were, transform it into an act of consciousness, the object of which is the original consciousness, (of) which the awareness was aware. An *I* is present to that second-order consciousness.⁸ So, we may call it ‘self-consciousness.’

Sartre goes on to propose how, based upon this *I* of reflection, I go on to construct a sense of self as a unity, first, of states, like, for example, my hatred of Peter, then, of actions, like my playing a piano sonata or driving to DC, and, finally, of qualities, like my spitefulness. For instance, let us suppose a first-order consciousness of disgust and anger, together with the perception of Peter. If the self-consciousness reflected only on what was appearing in the first-order consciousness, it would be thinking, ‘I feel disgusted with Peter.’ But instead, the angry disgust at Peter appears as a profile, or perspectival view, of a disposition, ‘hatred of Peter,’ similarly to the way in which a house will show itself to me in different profiles, depending upon where I am standing. The hatred appears to be showing a ‘side’ of itself through the momentary experience of angry disgust. For the self-consciousness the angry disgust appears to be emanating from the hatred. On a later occasion, perhaps, the hatred will itself appear to reflection as an actualization of a quality of spitefulness, which is in Me (S, 45-46, 51, 53). But in neither case does the self-consciousness realize that the hatred or the spitefulness is arising in the moment of reflection; rather it supposes that the state or the quality was already there in the first-order consciousness.⁹

This process resulting in a sense of self leads me to say things like “*my* consciousness,” when in fact “[t]he *I* is not the owner of consciousness; it is the object of consciousness” (S, 77). Yājñavalkya noted that a process of construction of the sense of self (*aḥam-kāra*) figures prominently in the Upanishadic tradition, too. It leads to the arising of many fears and desires, which, in turn, function as barriers to the realization of Brahman by keeping us ‘glued’ to objects. I responded that here, too, there is a remarkable agreement with Sartre, who wrote: “But perhaps the essential role [of the sense of self] is to mask to consciousness its own spontaneity.... Hence, everything happens as if consciousness ... were hypnotizing itself over that sense of self, which it constituted” (S, 81-82).

Usually we do not notice the awareness-aspect of consciousness because we are so taken up with what is appearing to consciousness. Yet on occasion awareness may stand out in our experience. For instance, some people are engaged in a heated discussion at an outdoor café. A nearby car suddenly backfires. Several of the participants may be so caught up in the conversation that they don't even notice the loud sound. Others may be startled and shift their attention to the street. But someone who was anchored in awareness would notice, but not be jarred by, the sound.

Another example: On a good day the football quarterback Joe Montana, at the top of his game, would experience a pass play as follows.¹⁰ He was conscious of the linemen rushing at him, of his receivers running downfield, and so on. But instead of looking with hurried, anxious glances, he experienced an awareness spread over the whole unfolding scene. All the players seemed to be moving in slow motion, and everything appeared with great clarity and distinctness. He was keenly aware of his own body, the motions of his limbs and an overall sense of relaxation, as his arm drew back and the ball headed toward the receiver.¹¹ Taken by itself this example may mislead us into thinking that awareness is dependent on the attainment of a certain level of skill, in this case, that of an MVP quarterback. But the previous example and the following one make it clear that this is not the case.

A third illustration: Some automobile drivers—when they are not too distracted by their thoughts—experience freeway traffic as follows: 'First, one driver cuts *me* off; then a slowpoke is holding *me* up. My consciousness narrows to focus on the offending driver; and, irritated, I react by honking or suddenly changing lanes.' Another driver may perceive the same cars on the beltway as if they were moving in a force field. She is aware of that field as calling forth the alterations in her driving required in order to maintain a smooth flow of traffic.

A fourth instance: “Surgeons say that during a difficult operation they have the sensation that the entire operating team is a single organism, moved by the same purpose; they describe it as a “ballet” in which the individual is subordinated to the group performance...”¹²

The following story shows a transition out of awareness into consciousness:

Suppose a woman is engaged in sewing something. A friend enters the room and begins speaking to her. As long as she listens to her friend and sews in [awareness], she has no trouble doing both. But if she gives her attention to her friend’s words and a thought arises in her mind as she thinks about what to reply, her hands stop sewing; if she turns her attention to her sewing and thinks about that, she fails to catch everything her friend is saying, and the conversation does not proceed smoothly. In either case she has transformed [awareness] into thought. As her thoughts fix on one thing, they’re blank to all others, depriving the mind of its freedom.¹³

This example enables us to avoid the misconception that awareness is incompatible with words. For it was a shift in the *way* in which she attended to speech, or to her sewing, that led to the woman’s loss of the ability to attend to both simultaneously.

A final case, as described by Merleau-Ponty (1945): Being most of the time in the consciousness-mode, we live in a world that “only stirs up second-hand thoughts in us.” Our mind is taken up with “thoughts, already formulated and already expressed, which we can recall silently to ourselves and by which we give ourselves the illusion of an interior life. But this supposed silence is in reality full of words rattling around.” However, occasionally we may “rediscover primordial silence, underneath the words’ rattling around.” Then we pass from the mode of consciousness-of-objects to dwell in awareness. We experience “a certain emptiness,” “a certain lack which seeks to fill itself,” to be transformed into speech (213-14). Then there can emerge “an authentic word, one which formulates something for the first time”—such as “that of the child who is pronouncing her first word, of the lover who is discovering his feeling” (207-08), or of “the writer who is saying and thinking something for the first time” (214). In the mode of awareness, we can live through a sort of original emergence.

Words usually serve to keep our thoughts moving within already formulated articulations. They could be said to function like “precipitates” (*Niederschläge*)¹⁴ of previous ‘chemical reactions,’ whether our own or others’. However, when awareness becomes prominent, it acts as a catalyst, which facilitates a fresh chemical reaction.

All the examples manifest an awake, keen involvement in experience together with an absence of the sense of self and of self-focused emotions and motivations from the foreground. And each of them foregrounds a different property of awareness in turn—‘unstuckness’ to objects, ‘spaciousness,’ not merely in the spatial and the temporal senses, responsiveness to dynamic qualities of the surrounding field, organic connectedness with who or what¹⁵ is in the field, moving out of awareness with the arising of a directing I, and a sense of emptiness out of which newness arises spontaneously.

We might say that a good seminar could give evidence of some of these signs of increased awareness. If over time the participants have developed seminar skills, as the surgical team developed surgical skills, it could become experienced as a ballet. Along with the development of those skills, some of the members may have cultivated their awareness to some degree, paralleling the range of levels of awareness in the operating team. That cultivation may enable them to experience “a certain emptiness,” from which an “authentic word” may emerge with greater frequency.

Such characteristics of awareness as those listed above have led people in certain pursuits, such as martial arts, to seek to cultivate it, so that it will become reliably foregrounded. In developing a painterly vision,¹⁶ for instance, one must learn to forget *what* things are, in order to see *how* they are actually appearing to the eye, which means, how they are coming into being before our eyes. As Merleau-Ponty says of Cézanne: “It is the mountain that he interrogates

with his gaze. What exactly does he ask of it? To unveil the means, visible and not otherwise, by which it is making itself a mountain before our eyes.”¹⁷

We might expand on this account in the following way. As a potential painter’s awareness becomes more prominent, she no longer sees things as already ‘finished off,’ but, instead, as having a potential for greater ‘aliveness.’ It is as if they were calling to her to join in their emergence. Then she may heed the appeal and begin to paint. Now it is this particular piece of fruit before her that she captures “coming into being before [her] eyes” in such a way that it can do so later before our eyes.¹⁸

Another example of the cultivation of awareness is found in psychoanalysis. Freud, in his recommendations on the proper attitude to be adopted by the analyst, counsels a state of mind characterized by, first, the absence of reasoning or

deliberate attempts to select, concentrate or understand; and [second] even, equal and impartial attention to all that occurs within the field of awareness.... This technique, says Freud, “...consists simply in not directing one’s notice to anything in particular and in maintaining the same ‘evenly suspended attention’ (as I have called it) in the face of all that one hears...”¹⁹

That is, the analyst deliberately withdraws from consciousness-of-objects and dwells in the awareness component of consciousness. This open attentional attitude is to be distinguished, on the one hand, from a merely passive attention, in which the mind wanders freely from object to object, and, on the other, from a focal attentional attitude, searching for a particular meaning.²⁰ Partly because evenly suspended attention was criticized as unattainable,²¹ Freud’s prescriptions to practice it did not become integrated into psychoanalytic training programs.

However, Wilfred Bion, probably the most thoughtful psychoanalyst of the latter part of the twentieth century, forcefully advocated this practice in the following terms:

[T]he capacity to forget, the ability to eschew desire and understanding, must be regarded as essential discipline for the psycho-analyst. Failure to practise this discipline will lead to a steady deterioration in the powers of observation whose maintenance is essential. The vigilant submission to such discipline will by degrees

strengthen the analyst's mental powers just in proportion as lapses in this discipline will debilitate them.

* * * * *

To attain to the state of mind essential for the practice of psycho-analysis I avoid any exercise of memory.... When I am tempted to remember the events of any particular session I resist the temptation.... If I find that some half-memory is beginning to obtrude I resist its recall....

A similar procedure is followed with regard to desires: I avoid entertaining desires and attempt to dismiss them from my mind. For example, ... it interferes with analytic work to permit desires for the patient's cure, or well-being or future to enter the mind. Such desires ... lead to progressive deterioration of [the analyst's] intuition.

* * * * *

[There is an aspect of ultimate reality] that is currently presenting the unknown and unknowable [in the consulting room]. This is the 'dark spot' that must be illuminated by 'blindness' [that is, ignorance]. Memory and desire are 'illuminations' that destroy the value of the analyst's capacity for observation as a leakage of light into a camera might destroy the value of the film being exposed.²²

The effect of not following this discipline is to interpret what the patient says in terms of what the analyst wishes or already 'knows,' thus closing her off from what may be emerging for the first time in the current hour. Bion's psychoanalytic state of mind is comparable to Socratic ignorance. Both represent an opening of oneself, in a conversation, to notice possibilities springing up that would otherwise remain unthought.

Another area in which a practice has been advocated for the enhancement of awareness is philosophy. In the early twentieth century, Edmund Husserl proposed pursuing wisdom by following a path that he called "phenomenology." By this he meant an account of the things appearing to you precisely in the way in which they actually appear.

Philosophy students sometimes think that studying phenomenology entails mainly reading books. However, learning to see the things appearing to you precisely in the way in which they actually appear takes *practice*. Martin Heidegger, Husserl's best known student, had great difficulty at the beginning of his study of phenomenology.

It concerned the simple question how thinking's manner of procedure which called itself "phenomenology" was to be carried out.... My perplexity decreased slowly ... only after I met Husserl personally in his workshop.... Husserl's teaching took place in a step-by-step *training* in phenomenological "seeing" which at the same time demanded that one relinquish the untested use of philosophical knowledge.... I

myself *practiced* phenomenological seeing, teaching and learning in Husserl's proximity after 1919.²³

The phenomenological seeing that one would practice is founded on an act called "the phenomenological reduction." While it was instituted in the service of phenomenological *philosophy*, Husserl was aware of the effect it could have by itself upon the person practicing it:

Perhaps it will even turn out that the total phenomenological attitude, and the [reduction] belonging to it, essentially has, first of all, the vocation of effecting a complete personal transformation, which would, in the first place, be comparable to a religious conversion, but which beyond that contains within itself the significance of being the greatest existential transformation to which humanity as humanity is called.²⁴

Yājñavalkya noted that the designation "greatest existential transformation"—like the earlier "existential break" associated with conjunction in Averroes—fits the experience of "waking up to" (*pratibodham*) Brahman as well (KeU, II.4).

In characterizing the phenomenological reduction, I shall borrow the descriptions of the later Husserl's closest collaborator, Eugen Fink, because they are vivid and strongly suggestive of awakening to Brahman.²⁵ The phenomenological reduction is a two-part act (F, 41). Husserl called the first component of that act a "disconnection" (*Ausschaltung*), or an "epoché," a suspension (ἐποχή), of the "natural attitude," the attitude in which we take things for granted, or as a matter of course (*selbstverständlich*).

Disconnection means that you deliberately abstain from all beliefs; you inhibit your accepting of all the things you take as what 'counts' (*Geltendes*) for you (F, 39-40). You cease living in acts of positional consciousness in Sartre's sense. As we observed Sartre doing, while remaining disconnected you turn your attention from the objects of consciousness to the consciousness-of-objects. You are not caught up with objects, but are attentively 'spread' over the whole of consciousness-of-objects, without positing that as an object. And you alter your mode of attention from an active searching-for to a receptive letting-things-come. You are

learning to do something involuntary, somewhat like preparing to receive “the visitation of sleep,” which comes in the way as the god Dionysus visits his followers, when they no longer are distinct from the role they are playing.²⁶ You are not gradually acquiring things in the way the disposed intellect acquires intelligibles.

The disconnection includes the “nullification” of the sense of yourself as an empirical human being—it “un-humanizes” (*entmenschlicht*) you—in that it “lays bare the ... onlooker” “already at work” in you, into which you now “fade away” (F, 40). In the terminology of this lecture, you disidentify with your sense of self; and you pass into awareness rather than in consciousness. Yājñavalkya interjected that, involved in the realization of Brahman, there is a similar correlation of the “de-construction of the sense of self” (*nir-aham-kāra*) with a fading away into the onlooker, that is, the “witness,” which was already at work.

You are now in a position to notice precisely what appears to you in just the way in which it appears. As with Freud’s *evenly* suspended attention, all the phenomena are treated equally; none is assumed in advance to have priority over the others. As in the case of painterly vision, you are not imposing your knowledge on your experiencing; you are operating ‘prior’ to your identification of things or events. Your going backwards involves a sort of reversal of the outward-turning action of the agent intellect. For, viewed on one level, the agent intellect elicited intelligibles from their latent state in the appearances, while the disconnection goes back behind those intelligibles, which, due to language, are already at work in our ordinary experience of the appearances. In its receptive attentiveness the disconnection has an ‘empty’ relationship to experience, perhaps somewhat like the agent intellect in its ‘empty’ state as material intellect.

The second component of the phenomenological reduction is a leading-back, the reducing proper.²⁷ In it, “while explicitly inquiring backwards behind the acceptednesses ... with respect to your belonging to the world,” the onlooker blasts open (*sprengen*) with insights your

“being held captive by your captivation” (*Befangenheit*) with the world. You experience this as a “breakthrough” (*Durchbruch*; FK, 348). As a result you discover for the first time that underlying all of your experiences has been a primordial conviction (*Urdoxa* in Husserl), an unformulated, implicit acceptance of the world and of yourself as belonging to it (F, 40-41). Here “world” refers, not to the collection of all things, but to what is originally given as a universal background, in the way a horizon is given for vision. While particular beliefs of yours may have occasionally broken down, that did not shake your implicit acceptance of the horizon.

You are now sharing in the onlooker’s awareness of the world, which is the “universally flowing and continuing [world-]apperception,” the “underground” (*Untergrund*) out of which every act of consciousness springs up. In this sense phenomenology is said to make the ultimate ground of the world available to an *experience* (FK, 349, 352, 340),²⁸ one in which we experience “how ... the world is coming about for us.”²⁹

Yājñavalkya accepted that painterly vision, evenly suspended attention, and the phenomenological reduction are at least partial Brahman-experiences, ones that go beyond the spontaneously arising Brahman-moments on the football field or on the highway. However, he pointed out two differences. First, they are cultivated in the service of other ends, painting, healing patients, or pursuing wisdom, whereas realization of Brahman is the supreme end (BU, IV.3.22), pursued for its own sake. Second, in the other contexts awareness is to be actualized only on particular occasions, before the canvas, in the consulting room, or in the phenomenological “workshop,” whereas one remains continually in the Brahman-realm.

I responded that, according to Husserl, in going about the course of ordinary life, the phenomenologist has the epoché as “an active-dispositional³⁰ attitude to which we resolve ourselves once and for all” and which “can be actualized again and again,”³¹ like the dancer’s repeated re-actualizing of the dancing that she has as a first actuality. I told him that this raised

the question for me whether the knower of Brahman could be said to be Brahman in this dispositional sense.

In the Upanishadic tradition you may engage in a meditative practice, in which you could pass through several stages. At the beginning you deliberately concentrate and turn your consciousness inward, while endeavoring to dwell more and more in awareness.³² You need to keep reminding yourself to notice the awareness, which is always there. Initially you cannot accomplish this while you are doing something else, because a thing or event always captures your attention.

After a while you will be able to maintain this centering of yourself in awareness. While your mind gradually has become dominated by awareness, you still occasionally experience moments of conscious reflection on the immediately preceding moment of awareness.³³ You are now “allowing the mind to fluctuate.”³⁴ The following analogy may convey some sense of what that is like. “Suppose a neighbor were to ask you to look after her children.... When the children come you could take one of three different courses of action.” You could abandon responsibility by telling them that they can do whatever they want as long as they don’t bother you. Or you could try to control them by telling them what to do and not to do. Or, finally, you could

allow the children to play. This “allowing” is not active, since you do not interfere. It is not passive, since *you are present with the children ... in a total way*. It is like a cat sitting at a mouse hole. It appears to be asleep, but let the mouse show but a whisker and the cat will pounce. It is only by allowing that one truly understands what allowing means.

‘Allowing’ brings awareness to the fore in a way that pushing away and controlling do not.³⁵

You are aware of movements from focused to unfocused consciousness, of shifts from perceptual to thinking consciousness, of fluctuations from consciousness-of to empty awareness, and so

forth, as well as of the reversals of all these. “Allowing is ..., so to say, what fluctuating awareness is ‘made of.’”

Eventually no reflection is experienced any more; this total wakefulness, completely purifies one of the ‘sleepiness’ which is what the ‘habit’ of consciousness really is.³⁶ To be aware you don’t have to be conscious *of something*; nor do you need to *be someone*, much less someone special.³⁷

Positional consciousness-of-objects, which was first for us, here shows itself to be, in fact, a derivative of non-positional awareness, which is what is first in itself. Initially consciousness seemed to have the component of awareness; but now we may say that awareness sometimes manifests itself partially in the form of consciousness-of-objects, while in itself it is *pure* awareness (*cit*). Again, this is quite analogous to what Averroes said of the agent intellect. In itself it is pure, having no reference to the world; but, through its outward turn, it conjoins itself to our imaginations, resulting in the emergence from it of particular intelligibles.

Upon emerging from this absolute silence, you may be so forcefully struck by something in the world that you *consciously recognize* that you *are* just pure awareness.³⁸ You momentarily become conscious of this objectless being “present with the children ... in a total way” as yourself. You are now conscious of having arrived in the Brahman-realm.³⁹

Yājñavalkya interjected that this recognition is what is expressed in the words: “I am Brahman!” (BU, I.4.10). He added that this experiencing of pure awareness is what he was referring to when he had said:

“Though then he does not see [any thing], yet he does not see *while seeing*. There is no cutting off of the seeing of the seer.... But there is no second (*dviṭīyam*), no other (*anyad*), separate from him, that he *could* see.... When there is some other (*anyad*), then one can see ... the other.” (BU, IV.3.23 & 31)

I said to Yājñavalkya that, according to this account, pure awareness seemed to be empty. He responded that while it is empty of objects, it is full in the sense that it is an experiencing of the moment-to-moment “going forth of things in different directions” (*vyuccaranti*), like “sparks from a fire” (BU, II.1.20). Alternatively it is an experiencing of the whole’s springing forth (*sambhavati*), which is like a spider’s emitting (*srjate*) of a thread of its web or like plants’ springing up from the earth (MuU, I.1.7). It is as if in pure awareness we had ‘gone backwards’ to a point just ‘before’ things, self, and world emerge. I told him that what he’d said reminded me of a passage in Sartre: “Thus, each instant of our conscious life reveals to us a creation *ex nihilo*.... this inexhaustible creation of existence of which *we* are not the creators” (S, 79).

Yājñavalkya continued by pointing out that what he had just said about pure awareness being full is conveyed by the traditional name for the Brahman-realm, ‘*saccidānanda*.’ The three parts of the one word express the oneness of pure existence (*sat*), pure awareness (*cit*), and pure joy (*ānanda*). Since there is no ‘of,’ as in ‘consciousness-of,’ awareness *is* pure *sat* rather than being conscious *of* it. I said that Fink seemed to be giving voice to the same experience when he referred to the unique identity of the onlooker and the universally flowing world-apperception (FK, 355). As “there is ...no other (*anyad*), separate from him, that he *could* see,” so there are no objects to separate the onlooker from the flowing world-apperception.

Yājñavalkya’s report about the oneness of existence and awareness brought to my mind something in the Thomistic branch of the Aristotelian tradition, which could make that oneness partly understandable to me. I mentioned it to Yājñavalkya: Thomas understood each of us to exist by virtue of a separate act of is-ing (*esse*), which is other than our essence, our humanity. A human being *is*, not by virtue of being human, but by participation in, or reception of, is-ing from, absolute Is-ing, just as a piece of wood that is afire is so by participation in Fire (ST, Q.3, A.4r). Absolute Is-ing is like the Sun, and a human being is like some part of the air. Each

individual instantiation of the intelligible human essence remains illuminated, that is, continues *is-ing*, only as long as absolute *Is-ing* is shining on it (ST, Q.8, A.1r). That is why Thomas states that what we *call* ‘creation’ is, in fact, an ongoing “flowing out, arising, springing out” (*emanatio*) (ST, Q.44, A.1r) from absolute *Is-ing*. This much of Thomas’s view can help us to understand how the Upanishadic experience of *cit* is an experience of *sat*.

Jacques Maritain applied Thomas’s understanding of the distinction between *esse* and essence to interpret the experience of the knower of Brahman in the following way.⁴⁰ In reflecting consciousness we experience our soul in its acts. What we experience in reflection is not our intelligible essence but rather our self “prisoner of the mobility, of the multiplicity, of the fugitive luxuriance of the phenomena and the operations which emerge in us from the night of the unconscious—prisoner of the apparent self”(145-46). But, as we have seen, the cultivation of awareness, instead of consciousness or reflecting consciousness, enables those on the path to realizing Brahman to pass from ordinary self-conscious experience “to an exceptional and privileged experience, emptying into the abyss of subjectivity,... to escape from the apparent self, in order to reach the absolute Self”(146). These practitioners “strip themselves of every image, of every particular representation, and of every distinct operation to such a degree that ... they reach not the essence of their soul but its existence, substantial *esse* itself”(148), “by an... annihilating connaturality”(146), in the absolute silence of total wakefulness.

[F]rom the fact that existence is ... limited only by the essence that receives it ... one can understand that this negative experience, in reaching the substantial *esse* of the soul, reaches, at once, both this existence proper to the soul and existing in its metaphysical profusion and the sources of existing, according as the existence of the soul ... is something that is emanating and is pervaded by an inflow from which it holds everything.... It is the sources of being in his soul that the human being reaches in this way.” (153-54)

Thus, through practice, in experiencing pure awareness (*cit*), the knower of Brahman has come to experience herself as the inflow of *is-ing* flowing out from absolute *Is-ing*

(*sat*). One might say that the transition from experiencing myself as witness to recognition of pure awareness is like going from having my finger *on* the pulsing of the world to recognizing my finger *as* the pulsing of the world. Yājñavalkya added that Maritain's interpretation at least clearly distinguished the Sun of Averroes's outward-turned self-intellection of intelligible essences from the Sun of outflowing selfaware existence.

Now we are in a position to say that when Śvetaketu realizes “You are That,” he is experiencing himself as the outflow of *sat* and recognizing as his true self pure awareness (of) the moment-to-moment flying out of sparks, which are ‘on the way’ to becoming things—and that this recognizing *is* that very going forth. Moreover, in this recognition Śvetaketu is what is recognized: “One who knows the supreme Brahman becomes that very Brahman” (MuU, III.2.9; cp. BU, IV.4.13) and “becomes this All” (BU, I.4.10).

As earlier we wondered what the daily experience of the state of complete conjunction would be like, so now the analogous question arises with respect to the Brahman-realm. In the discussion of the phenomenological reduction, I had raised the possibility that we could acquire pure awareness as a first actuality, in the sense of an active disposition. The knower of Brahman would then alternate between pure awareness and consciousness-of, in the way that I can ‘turn on’ my contemplation of the Pythagorean Theorem as I wish. This suggestion would parallel Aristotle's experience that we are for intermittent periods of time in the same state as the divine itself is in over the whole of time. The difference would be that instead of turning from one mode of consciousness, say, perceiving or thinking, to a different one, intellecting, the knower of Brahman would alternate at will between two different ways of total experiencing, between consciousness and pure awareness. It would be somewhat analogous to looking at the well-known duck-rabbit ambiguous figure and seeing it now as a duck, now as a rabbit.

However, Yājñavalkya said that living in the Brahman-realm is, instead, like a hypothetical *double* seeing of both the duck and the rabbit *at once*, rather than like a seeing of them in alternation.⁴¹ The knower of Brahman is engaged with consciousness-of while *simultaneously* remaining in the realm of pure awareness. The following analogy conveys something of this:

The ordinary person only sees the reflection in the mirror but the realized person sees the reflection *as well as* the mirror. “For instance you see a reflection in the mirror and the mirror. You know the mirror to be the reality and the picture in it a mere reflection. Is it necessary that to see the mirror we should cease to see the reflection in it?” Similarly, the realized one *continues to experience the world* in his realized state. Thus the realized person appreciates “the distinctions” of sound, taste, form, smell etc. “But he *always* perceives and experiences the one reality in all of them.”⁴²

Brahman-knowers’ experiencing of the everyday world in the mirror of purified awareness enables their keen yet calm involvement in that world. In the analogy we could take ‘seeing the reflection’ to stand for consciousness of the world, and ‘seeing the mirror,’ for pure awareness. When I see the mirror along with the reflections, the latter are not being viewed ‘from outside,’ as they are in the mode of consciousness, but rather as *emerging out of* awareness. One might also apply the analogy to the self by saying that knowers of Brahman experience their ordinary selves, too, as being virtual images cast by the mirror.

The mirror analogy may be applied to the modes of experiencing other than those encountered specifically in meditative practice. Consciousness-of-objects—whether perceiving, sensing, emoting, evaluating, thinking, and so on—and self-consciousness, too, are like a vision of things in the virtual space of the mirror. There are two fundamentally different modes of consciousness-of-objects, depending upon whether or not the object in question is an object in the true sense. When it maintains itself throughout a succession of acts of consciousness of it, it is an object in the etymological sense that it is something set or put (*-jectum*), before or over against (*ob-*) the act of consciousness. This setting-over-against is what is meant by ‘subject-

object duality.’ Such an object shall be referred to henceforth as an “Object.” It has an identity, to which we may return again and again.

The following example illustrates the different layers that may arise in perceptual consciousness-of-Objects. It begins with the emergence of an implicit Object from the background, continues with a prepredicative explicating of it, and goes on to various layers of predicative development in the following way. While I am engaged in seminar, someone’s coffee cup may emerge from the margins of my consciousness and may attract my attention and become an explicit object of consciousness. My attention may travel from its color to a figure on the side, and then to its overall shape, and so on.⁴³ Then my interest may awaken sufficiently, so that I think, ‘The cup has a circular figure on the side.’ This shift represents a transition from the cup’s just previously having become *implicitly* determined as having a circle on its side to its being grasped in an *active identification* as determined by the circle on its side.⁴⁴ Then I may think, ‘The fact that the cup has that circular figure on its side is puzzling. I wonder what it stands for.’ My thought may subsequently be led to such Objects as ‘the circular,’ ‘shape in general,’ and ‘property.’⁴⁵

‘Prior’ to such perceptual consciousness of Objects and its developments, there is a sensory consciousness of objects, which has been vividly described by Erwin Straus.⁴⁶ We sense objects in the same way in which we respond to the dynamic quality of a tone, which is “a state of unrest, a tension, an urge, almost a will to move on, as if a force were acting on the tone and pulling it in a certain direction.”⁴⁷ We are in a symbiotic relation (200) with the ‘tones,’ to which we respond with incipient movements as we do to dance music (239). This pre-linguistic, flowing realm is the ground from which Objects emerge (204). We live simultaneously in the Objective and the sensory and may experience the tension between them, as the latter resists being fit into the former. Some people may be especially attracted to the loss of their stance

over-against Objects, of their self-consciousness, and of the sharp distinctness within the Objective realm (284, 275). Precisely because of its lack of subject-Object duality and self-consciousness, sensory consciousness is occasionally mistaken for awareness by beginners. However, it is just another mode of vision of the reflections in the virtual space produced by the mirror.

All of the above are distinctions that can be clearly seen in the vision of that virtual space. In addition to seeing these, the knower of Brahman sees the virtual space and its reflections *as emanating* from the mirror. This second sort of seeing is pure awareness. While awareness is never totally absent from our experience, we notice it to varying degrees.

Usually the degree to which we notice it is very minimal as when we seem to be, in Sartre's words, "hypnotized" by what we are conscious of. This is our 'default' mode of experiencing. When we are reading, thinking, conversing in seminar, dancing, gazing at a sunset, or "even stretching out a hand to open the door," we are absorbed in that moment's action.⁴⁸ When we are self-conscious, we are also absorbed in the self-consciousness. In absorption, awareness seems to have gotten lost; but it has only receded into the deep background.

In some special moments, which have been called moments of "flow,"⁴⁹ awareness becomes prominent in an *incidental* way. We have not deliberately pursued it; it just happens. The flow experience may be spontaneous, as in the earlier examples of the driver and the woman sewing; or it may be skill-related, as in the examples of Joe Montana and the surgeon. One might say that, in the case of the skill-related flow experience, through practice the body's usual resistance to intended action is overcome. As a result consciousness as over against the body disappears, allowing awareness to become prominent. We move out of flow when the over-

againstness arises as the ‘I’ becomes active either in reaction—‘Wow! This is so exciting!’—or in action—‘If I bear down, I can keep this going.’

As we saw in relation to painting, psychoanalysis, and phenomenology, prominence of awareness may be *deliberately* cultivated in order to be able to engage in some pursuit. Here awareness is practiced, so that the practitioner comes to experience the witness as a disposition. Having it as a *first* actuality, he or she can then activate it when engaging in the activity for the sake of which it was developed.

Finally, in the double seeing of the knower of Brahman, pure mirror-awareness is permanently prominent as a *second* actuality; and there is a ‘loose,’ ‘unstuck,’ clear consciousness-of-objects as well. This is said to be the state of one “freed while alive” (*jīvanmukta*; cp. BU, IV.4.7).

In virtue of the oneness of sat and cit, this double seeing is one with the out-flowing of existence. Thus, the freedom manifests itself in that one’s awareness is active, or creative, with respect to the world, on the one hand, and one’s action is responsive, or receptive, with respect to it, on the other—a reversal of the usual receptivity of consciousness and activity of action.⁵⁰ In the realm of action, this freedom is freedom to respond without a ‘hitch’ to the vectors in the field of experience, which are analogous to the directional arc involved in realizing the full significance of a situation mentioned in Part One. These field vectors include what Yājñavalkya takes Aristotle to be referring to when he speaks of feeling feelings or performing actions as required (δεῖ), in the required cases, with respect to the required people, in the required way, and for the required reasons (NE, 1106b17-27).

Another way of putting this is to say that the freedom of the knower of Brahman manifests itself in the ability to be able to move freely through the world with grace and effortlessness, which is called ‘saving awareness,’ σοφροσύνη.⁵¹

For σοφροσύνη is precisely the virtue of general and unself-conscious self-possession, of universal grace and effortless command neither specified by particular action, which would transform it from σοφροσύνη to some particular virtue, nor checked by any opacity, which would translate it into a mode of self-control. What could work better for its model than a pure [awareness]?⁵²

Knowers of Brahman have no inner barriers, which could get in the way of their spontaneously allowing what is called for by the current moment to emerge.

In conclusion, we note certain *formal* parallels between the role of Brahman in the *Upanishads* and that of the agent intellect according to Averroes. First, each is the source—Brahman, of all existence, and the agent intellect, of all being, that is, of all intelligibility. Second, both are “self-luminous” and are responsible for ‘seeing’ in some sense. Third, the non-dual relation between the individual self and Brahman is like that between the disposed intellect and the agent intellect. Fourth, a ‘self-forgetting’ ‘outward turn’ ‘occurs’ in the case of each of them. Fifth, both the experiencing of Brahman and the experience of intellection could be said to involve a breaking-free from my ordinary captivation by the images on the walls of a cavelike dwelling, an engagement in a practice, and, ultimately, an existential breakthrough to “immortalizing.” In that breakthrough, in both cases, I deconstruct my ordinary sense of self and discover my true self as being both non-private (that is, not mine alone) and non-dual with respect to the true self of others.

However, there are fundamental differences in other respects. Whereas in the one case the captivation is by opinions and by the perceptual world and is broken through in becoming free for intelligibles, involving a gradual movement of theoretical study, in the other case it is captivation by the mundane way of experiencing objects, whether in sensory, perceptual, or *intellectual* consciousness; and it is broken by a sudden shift from involvement in consciousness, whether first-degree or reflective, to pure awareness, a shift which may be experienced on a path of cultivation of awareness. Moreover, the nature of the one, impersonal, true self of us all, in

which we share non-dually in our immortalizing, which for Averroes is the self-intellection of the agent intellect, is pure awareness according to Yājñavalkya. Finally, on the one hand, the material intellect may realize conjunction with the agent intellect, which is the source of all intelligibility in the world. On the other hand, in the Brahman-realm pure selfawareness realizes that it is non-dual with the continual springing up of all existence, both sensory and intelligible, of the world as a whole, including but not limited to the intelligible realm.

Yājñavalkya thought that the following comment on Aristotle by Mr. Klein might provide a fruitful direction to pursue in the question period: The receptive aspect of “*voεiv* ... is the state of wakefulness, a state of preparedness and alertness.... *Novς* ... when it is ... *one* with the *vonητά* [o]nly then can be said to be wakefulness ‘at work’...”⁵³ Looking back to the beginning, Yājñavalkya wondered how Homer’s realization of the full significance of a situation,⁵⁴ Aristotle’s reception of an intelligible, and Averroes’s complete conjunction with the agent intellect’s self-intellection would compare, with respect to their degrees of wakefulness, with dwelling in pure awareness.

I asked him how he would respond. He said: ‘Perhaps the major difference between the *Upanishads* and our three Western thinkers might be that for the former the state of empty receptivity is supreme, that is, even more wakeful than “wakefulness at work.”’

I rejoined: ‘I’m not sure that I’ve really understood Averroes. But it might be that his account of complete conjunction is a good *partial* depiction of Brahman. Insofar as Mr. Klein was directing us to the experiential living-through of the moment in which the empty, receptive intellect is one with the revelation of what is a profile of the full, unitary agent intellect, we do seem to be pointed toward a face of Brahman, as it were, namely, the intellectual one.’

Yājñavalkya had the last word: ‘What you may be overlooking is that the empty, receptive material intellect is an appearance of the outward turning of the full source of

determinacy, the agent intellect, whereas, in the case of Brahman, the full and determinate is an appearance of the outward turning of the empty.’

¹ Compare: “Since [in all cases of seeing and hearing] we are aware (᾿αἰσθάνομεθα) that we are seeing and hearing, it must either be by sight that we are aware [for example] that we are seeing or by some other [sense]” (OS, 425b11-12). “To each sense there belongs something special and something common. For example, what is special to sight is to see, [what is special] to hearing is to hear, and similarly with the rest. But there is also a certain common power that goes along with all of them, by which one is also aware that one is seeing and hearing (for it is not, after all, by sight that one is seeing that one is seeing...).” (*On Sleeping and Waking*, 455a12-5)

² We may speak of self-consciousness in the sense of consciousness of myself only ‘after’ the construction of the sense of self, which is discussed below.

³ By Kosman, who also made reference to Sartre’s *La Transcendence de l’Ego*. I had been planning to use Sartre to introduce the notion of selfawareness (see n. 4) as an alternative to anything in Aristotle. However, Kosman’s article, which I came across a couple of months ago, made it possible to cite Aristotle himself in order to introduce this notion.

⁴ I write ‘selfawareness’ and ‘awareness (of) itself’ to suggest that the relationship between awareness and what it is aware (of) is not the same as that between consciousness and the object of consciousness. I am following Sartre’s practice in *L’être et le néant* (pp. 18-20), where he writes ‘conscience (de) soi’ to refer to what I am calling ‘selfawareness or ‘awareness (of) itself’.

⁵ In *La Transcendence de l’Ego*, from which the quotations are taken, Sartre uses only one word, ‘conscience,’ which I have rendered as ‘consciousness’ when it is positional and as ‘awareness’ when it is non-positional. Moreover, he does not here write ‘conscience (de),’ as he did later (see footnote 4).

Gurwitsch (1941) endorsed most of Sartre’s position, to which Schütz then objected. They debate this issue further in Schütz and Gurwitsch.

⁶ What is said will apply as well to consciousness that is imagining, remembering, judging, thinking, intellecting, feeling, or evaluating.

⁷ See footnote 9.

⁸ The last two sentences represent my understanding of Gurwitsch (1985), 5, second paragraph).

⁹ Gurwitsch (1941) pointed out that this account of the arising of the sense of self is inconsistent with the fact that reflection can accomplish no more than to render explicit the content of the reflected-upon consciousness (332-33). He later (1985) offered a corrected account of the construction of the psychical empirical sense of self (15ff). It is based on the recognition that both states and “qualities designate psychic constants, i.e., regularities of experience ... rather than mental facts which themselves fall under direct experience” (15), as they do in Sartre.

¹⁰ I remember many years ago reading an article by him in *The Washington Post*, in which he described his experience in somewhat these terms.

¹¹ These characteristics are similar to those in the example of the violinist in Csikszentmihalyi: “A violinist must be extremely aware of every movement of her fingers, as well as of the sound entering her ears, and of the total form of the piece she is playing, both analytically, note by note, and holistically, in terms of its overall design” (64).

¹² Csikszentmihalyi, 65.

¹³ Bankei, 58. I have substituted “awareness” first for “the Unborn” and then for “it,” referring to her Buddha-mind.

¹⁴ This is Husserl’s word (1964), *passim*.

¹⁵ It need not be living beings with respect to which we experience the connection: “The [mountain] climber, focusing all her attention on the small irregularities of the rock wall that will have to support her weight safely, speaks of the sense of kinship that develops between fingers and rock...” “This feeling is not just a fancy of the imagination, but is based on a concrete experience of close interaction with some Other...” (Csikszentmihalyi, 64).

¹⁶ A popular book on learning to draw, tells us of a subjective state that artists speak of, which is characterized by “a sense of close ‘connection’ with the work, a sense of timelessness, difficulty in using words ... a lack of anxiety, a sense of close attention to shapes and spaces and forms that remain nameless.” It is important for the artist to experience the shift from the ordinary state to this one. The student is encouraged to set up the proper “conditions for this mental shift” and to become “able to recognize and foster this state in” himself (Edwards, 46). These characteristics correspond quite well with the qualities of a consciousness in which awareness is in the foreground.

¹⁷ Merleau-Ponty (1961), 166, translation modified.

¹⁸ The articulation in this paragraph emerged in a conversation with Nina Haigney, just a few minutes before I delivered this lecture. It was an example of the sort of thing it attempts to articulate—a conversation, with awareness to some degree in the foreground, allowing for the experience of “a certain emptiness,” followed by the emergence, in two people, of an, at least relatively, “authentic word.”

¹⁹ Epstein, 194. The quotation from Freud is from “Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psychoanalysis” (1912).

²⁰ Epstein, 195.

²¹ By Theodore Reik in 1948; see Epstein, 199-201.

²² Bion, 51-52, 55-56, 69.

²³ M. Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, quoted in Ihde, 15; italics added and translation corrected at one point.

²⁴ Husserl (1962), 140.27-33; to maintain consistency of terminology, I substituted “[reduction]” for epoché.

²⁵ The same view is conveyed, in different language, by Husserl himself (1962), Sections 37-42.

²⁶ Merleau-Ponty (1945), 191, where, however, the expression is not being used to characterize the phenomenological reduction.

²⁷ The distinction between disconnection and reducing proper parallels that in the Buddhist tradition between mindfulness (*sati*) and seeing distinctly in detail (*vi-paśyana*).

²⁸ Cp.: “And so also must the gaze made free by the epoché be ... an experiencing gaze” (Husserl (1962), 156.13-15).

²⁹ Husserl (1962), 147.29-32.

³⁰ I take *habituell* to correspond to an adjectival form of ‘ἔξις.

³¹ Husserl (1962), 153.36-37 and 140.19-20.

³² Sekida, 62 and 93. This stage in the yogic tradition involves eight members, the last three of which are concentration, meditation, and in-stance (*samādhi*), which is opposed both to ex-stasy and to our ordinary counter-stance vis-à-vis objects (Patañjali, II.29).

³³ Sekida, 93; cp. Patañjali, I.42 and 44: coincidence with hreflection (*savicārā samāpattih*)

³⁴ The quotations in this paragraph are taken from Low, 149-50; italics added.

³⁵ When allowing the children to play, you are not caught up in their playing; so, you have a kind of distance from it. Yet you are ‘with’ them, accompanying them. Thus, your distance is of a different kind than the distance that occurs in Objectivation, where the Ob-ject is over against you (discussed below).

Moreover, while it might seem as though the Objective, perceptual world were free of captivation, when compared to the dynamic, sensory realm (discussed below), in fact, the former is grounded in the primordial doxa of the latter.

³⁶ Sekida, 62 and 94. The role that this experience of pure awareness plays in the upanishadic tradition parallels that of the “aloneness of seeing” (*drśeh kaivalyam*; Patañjali, II.25) in the yogic tradition (Patañjali, III.50; IV.26 and 34).

³⁷ Low, 40.

³⁸ Sekida, 95.

³⁹ This account of realization of Brahman is based on zen sources. However, as Shear points out, this experience of awake, pure selfawareness lacks any empirical qualities or content. As a result differing references to it as the Brahman-realm or Buddha-nature are not pointing to qualitative differences in the experience (1983, 57-59; 1990, 392).

⁴⁰ The page numbers given in this paragraph all refer to Maritain, *Quatre essais*.

⁴¹ Carter, 54. Sekida, 91-97, also depicts the corresponding state in the zen tradition in this way.

Carter proposes the comparison with binocular vision. It is interesting that Bion, too, uses this analogy (Grinberg, Sor, and Tabak di Bianchedi, 35-36).

⁴² Sharma, 43; first two sets of italics added. The quotation is from Ramana Maharshi as reported in D. Goodman, ed., *The Teachings of Sri Ramana Maharshi* (NY: Arkana, 1985), pp. 42, 41.

⁴³ Cp. the description in Husserl (1964), 124-25

⁴⁴ Cp. the description in Husserl (1964), 206-08

⁴⁵ Cp. the descriptions in Husserl (1964), §§58-61, 80-82, 86-87 and in Husserl (1950), #10.

⁴⁶ The page references in this paragraph are from Straus, *Vom Sinn der Sinne*.

⁴⁷ Zuckerkandl, 19.

⁴⁸ Sekida, 91.

⁴⁹ Csikszentmihalyi.

⁵⁰ YUASA, 68.

⁵¹ I believe that Kleist had the same phenomenon in view when he reported Herr C.'s words after two anecdotes, one about a graceful dancer who lost his grace when self-consciousness arose and the other about a bear, who effortlessly parried every thrust of Herr C.'s rapier with a graceful swipe of his paw:

‘... [I]n the same degree as, in the organic world, reflection becomes more obscure and weaker, grace emerges there ever more radiant and supreme.—Yet just as ... the image in a concave mirror, after withdrawing to infinity, suddenly comes right in front of us again, so when consciousness has, as it were, passed through an infinite, grace will again put in an appearance. Hence, it appears most purely in the human bodily structure that has either no self-consciousness or an infinite self-consciousness...’
(Kleist, 67)

That is, in our terms, grace emerges in the realm of animal, sensory consciousness, a realm which we can experience, but not enter completely (Straus, 284). And it emerges again in the realm of pure self-awareness, in which we are no longer caught up in first- or second-degree consciousness.

⁵² Kosman, 516; the ending in the original is “a pure, objectless knowledge.”

⁵³ Klein, 65.

⁵⁴ Another question to pursue might be whether Homer’s realization of full significance became narrower and more limited in passing over into intellection.

ABBREVIATIONS

- BU *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*
- CU *Chāndogya Upanishad*
- F Fink, E., *Sixth Cartesian Meditation: The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method*.
- FK “Die Phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der Gegenwärtigen Kritik.”
- HG Otto, W., *The Homeric Gods: The Spiritual Significance of Greek Religion*.
- I Homer, *Iliad*
- IU *Īśā Upanishad*
- KeU *Kena Upanishad*
- LC Averroes, Long Commentary = *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima*.
- MuU *Mundaka Upanishad*
- NE Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*; translation altered in some places.
- O Homer, *Odyssey*
- OS Aristotle, *On the Soul*; translation altered in some places.

- S Sartre, J.-P., *La Transcendance de l'Ego: Esquisse d'une description phénoménologique*.
- ST St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Latin text, Volume II, containing I^a, QQ.2-11.
- TU *Taittiriya Upanishad*

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