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In This Issue:

"The parrot wipes its beak, although it is clean."
-- Pascal, Pensee 343

Does It Matter By Whom or When A Book Was Written?

Caritas Society Luncheon Address
Eva T.H. Brann

"Does it matter by whom or when a book was written?"—that is the question I have posed for us, and I am planning to give the straightforward answer "No."

But first let me tell you how I come to raise the question with you and from what point of view I am giving my answer.

Some of you may know that departments of literature and philosophy throughout Europe and America are debating this question. It could well be said that it is the chief intellectual issue of the last ten years. Courses are established and appointment decisions are made around it. Even if that were all there was, you might wish to hear about it, just to keep up with the trends of the times.

But there are more and better reasons why you might want to understand the lines of battle. I know that you are here not only as supporters of St. John's but as hard workers in its cause. I could take this occasion to thank you for all your efforts which are not only useful to us materially, but give us a sense of living among friends.

Now as it happens, this college has willy-nilly gotten itself into the forefront of these battles, which are a part of what is sometimes called "the culture wars." When I say "willy-nilly," I really mean it. We are a faculty very busy with learning the program and guiding our students, for whose sake the college exists, through their studies. We were happily going along, when our ways were challenged by a group of intellectuals who were an avant-garde a quarter century ago, but who have since become the academic establishment, at least in the better known colleges. I shall offer a rather harsh aside here: It seems to me that in this land the most steadfast, serious, straightforward but deep study is often done in the small or obscure schools. St. John's is no longer obscure, but we are surely small — a mere fly on the elephant of higher education — but what a fly, a gadfly.

Let me remind you what our ways are, the ways that we ask all tutors teaching here to accept. But better, let me begin by telling you what we have

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no institutional opinions about at all. We are a non-sectarian school, in fact, one of the earliest in the American republic. We preach no religious dogma, though quite a few of our students become interested in religious matters. That may partly be because we take readings concerned with divinity very seriously. Of course we take all our books seriously.

We do not have any institutional doctrine regarding politics either. Nor do we have any dogma about any other matter. What we do require our tutors and our students to accept for their time here are certain ways of choosing and approaching books. Let me try to set these out for you. Many of you are, of course, already quite familiar with these, but you may not have heard them set out so baldly. Bald speaking of this sort is, of course, one of the duties—I wouldn't say privileges — of the dean.

First, we do all think that some books are very much better than others, and some books are even great. Saying that implies that we are competent to tell which these are. We do think that though as a community we might sometimes fail to do justice to one book or overrate another, and, worst of all, that we might be ignorant of it altogether, we can somehow find and recognize the really great ones. Partly we trust the tradition handed down to us, which conveys the opinions of mankind, partly we trust our own judgment. We have even developed some criteria. For example, we think that a really first-rate book almost always stands on its own feet, that it is self-sufficient, so that the attentive reader is given right in the book whatever is needed to understand it. Another criterion is that the book considers questions (if it is philosophical) or paints characters (if it is literary) that might be of their time, but are never only for their time.

Second, we as a community think that it is best for students — for almost all students — to study exactly these books. We think that a close acquaintance with high quality is in itself good for us all, and especially for our young.

Furthermore, we think that the best way to learn, at least in the beginning, is through books of high quality rather than through textbooks. The reasons is that these books contain all the original ambiguities and enigmas inherent in important subjects, problems that textbooks make smooth and flatten out. To be sure, the original books are often harder to read than the derived textbooks; for example it is easier to study a textbook on classical physics than to read Newton's discovery of its laws and propositions in the original. Still it is much more rewarding to do the chewing yourself than to swallow what is pre-chewed.

Third, we think that hard and often crankily original though our books are, we, students and tutors alike, should approach them directly. Our principle

is: "A cat may look at a king." The usual way in academia is for the professor to deliver a lecture on the background of the book and then to assign a few articles about it. The students come on a book so well wadded in background and interpretations that they are prevented from grappling with it directly. We, on the other hand, do our best not to stand between the book and the student. For that reason we replace classroom lectures by the seminar, where students must themselves talk about their reading. Moreover, each seminar is led by two people who show the students that good readers may well differ from each other. They are not called professors but tutors, not people who profess and pronounce authoritatively but people who guard and protect — for that is what the word tutor means — the learning of each student.

Now perhaps you might think that these three convictions of ours are simple and sensible rules of college learning — that there is not much to fight about here. In that case you might be surprised to hear that each of them is under strong, sometimes violent attack in much of the rest of the academic community.

Before I tell you what the attack is about, let me summarize the three convictions concerning books.

We think there are outstandingly great books and that a community of willing colleagues can discover them. We think that such reading is the best beginning for students. And we think that it is best to approach these books directly, without background or prior interpretation from a professor.

Here is a brief account of the point of view that has more or less taken over the universities. You will see right away that our convictions have to be anathema to those who follow this new trend.

They believe, first of all, that we are making unwarranted and invidious distinctions when we call some books great and others perhaps merely respectable or interesting or even mediocre and tendentious. They ask where we think we got the right to make such choices for our students. They attack our reliance on the tradition as a sort of self-subjection to a dominant and also domineering power structure. They say that these books were written by people, mostly white, often European, largely dead and almost totally male, who exercise what they call a "cultural imperialism," over the education of institutions. They say that the tradition that we rely on has marginalized other books that are also good — that is to say, that these books have been falsely regarded as peripheral to the mainstream of thought. They do not necessarily wish to argue that these marginalized books are often as good as the ones we choose. Instead they make quite a novel argument, namely that all written texts, but above all those written by people victimized by the powers that be, should be re-

garded as documents of the human condition, and are, as such, valuable. They think that who writes a book and what times or conditions it was written under matters as much or more than what it objectively seems to say. In short, they think that no book is to be taken as an independent attempt at truth-telling but that the authors' social circumstances, their gender, class or race, makes all the difference. No book can be trusted, for all have a hidden agenda, often unknown to the authors themselves.

Secondly, they certainly do not think that students should be required to read these books. They give several reasons why not. Students' heads should not, they think, be filled with the preoccupations of elites, especially not with the kinds of studies that are done for their own sake. Among the studies that are not necessarily done for any immediate practical purpose could be the consideration of purportedly perennial and deep philosophical questions, the study of everlastingly grand if somewhat alien poetry and the demonstrating of timelessly beautiful mathematical theorems. Partly they think that there may be no such questions, such poetry, such mathematics. Partly they think that the world is best run not by people who are educated in the goods of the tradition but by those who have been aroused to anger with it.

Third and last they think that the direct study of books is a kind of naive folly, and that readers should be prepared by being given tools for understanding correctly, and if necessary exposing, the books they read. Therefore even undergraduates should be taught the instrument of "critical theory," a mode of approach to texts through sophisticated intellectual interpretations. They do not think that it is bad that these interpretations are strongly ideological; on the contrary, they think that no approach to a text can escape being politically motivated, least of all the one that claims to leave students quite free to form their own opinions.

You can see that these opinions are all directly opposed to what St. John's believes in. How do we — or better, how do I, as one representative of the college — answer? We say any number of things such as: That for people who actually read the books it is not so difficult to agree on a reading list — nowadays called a canon — of the best ones, and that it is even possible to list some criteria for establishing such a list, criteria that have nothing to do with who wrote the book or when. That those who want to make the world better need above all to know something worthy and fine, and that the confrontation with the world's evils will be more effective for those who know something of the world's timeless goods. That we know from our own experience that any attempt to come between a student and a grand work of art or of thought by explaining it away in terms of its author's biography or its situation in time cannot help but blunt its impact and put the teacher in the role of an ideological tyrant. And finally we must simply say that what we do works, and ask the others whether what they do also works. No, we would say, it does not matter by whom or when a book was written.

Since no one wants to hear a long lecture on the current intellectual situation over lunch I have been very brief about a very disturbing subject. I thought that I might make up for this brevity by inviting you to raise questions — any questions whatever, simple or sophisticated, that come to your mind. You do know, don't you, that question-asking is the soul of the college to which you show so much devotion.

Chains

The gates about the garden he made fast
Until from this cruel errand I return,
The desolate plain before me stretches vast,
This barren wasteland for my parched bone yearns.
Yet I could cross this desert in one stride
If but one draught of love were mine to take
But that sweet vial carried at my side
Must stay intact, another's need to slake.
I must fulfill my task, held in his sway,
Forbidden, though, to drink, what hope is mine?
My tale and self now yours, and yours to say
If you will give provisions less unkind.
Save me from his bonds, grant what I ask,
To let me quench my thirst with your heart's flask.

—SUZANNE VITO

An Essay on Women Smoking

My attention has been compelled to rest upon women who smoke cigarettes. Although it initially seems baffling that something so thoroughly disgusting and anatomically destructive can so overwhelmingly convince me that it is graceful and beautiful, there is a distinctive, fascinating aura about a woman who holds a cigarette that cannot be matched

by any other glow. There is a cool nonchalance and natural smoothness of motion when she moves the hand that holds the cigarette toward and away from her mouth. The squint that accompanies exhalation, it is seductive. The concentrated expression on her face when her lips wrap around the cigarette endows her with the appearance of wisdom. The smoke, it glides, it is keen, enchanting, pervasive and yet also blinding, irritating, enervating.

Her lungs are the source of chaos. There is utter unpredictability in the clouds of smoke. Each time she exhales, she expels an infinite number of possibilities. As tendrils of smoke diffuse into the atmosphere from her mouth comprehension is blurred by contemplation of the endless and exponentially increasing randomness. And it is *she* who has created this chaos. But, afterwards, when she speaks, she forms unified, tight, consistent, strong dialogue; for a woman who smokes has time to think between breaths (whereas the man to whom she speaks often seems to think only between breasts).

Still, there is a readily apparent and frustrating inconsistency between the perceived beauty and grace of a cigarette smoker and the reality. She who smokes, her scent is polluted. Her close presence is almost unbearable. The cigarette is a jealous lover capable of defending his mate with a bitter attack. The cigarette in this way *protects* his woman and yet she is always finding herself a new lover, one after another. When her blaze with one has smouldered and died, she ashes one last time, puts him out, and finds herself a new lover.

And these lovers follow her in packs. Nevertheless, she makes no fuss about selection, for they are all the same. She applies no high standards when choosing. She is far from discriminating. Any one of them will do. This frustrates me the most, for I want to replace her lovers, those droves of nicotine sticks; but with men she is extremely discriminating and meticulously selective. Rather than wish that she would accept me in the same way that she does one of her cigarette lovers, I want to show her that I can be just as addictive, equally satisfying and nerve-calming, and at the same time arouse far more interest in her than have any of her copycat tobacco amoratos. My taste may not be consistent, my high not always something to be counted upon, but all the better—I have originality and diversity and a score of other desirable traits. In the end, I simply want to prove either to the smoking woman or myself that I am worth more than a pack of Marlboros.

--SETH MILLIKAN

yeah he said
it was from drinking
her brain was just falling apart.

I.

and the stars of women are
Orion's nipples the dry
implements of suck used
perhaps only in the
direst of circumstances.
we cannot see them.
we are foreigners among
the constellations
offering new names to
old faces to old bodies
to the orbits of the gods
here we can smell Cassandra's
weeping and the creaking
of Orion's belt. here the
dipper rains down
leaves of demons and
demigods and our eyes cross
under the unbearable
intoxication. it was
home that we were
seeking but we lost
our concentrations to
curiosity and fell
like children away from
the path home.

II.

and I wonder if god too
is destroyed in creation if
like us he must diffuse
himself in drunkenness
perhaps this is why the
universe is expanding
the synapses separating
one by one slowly as the
organism reels and
hums in perpetual labor
its pain dimmed its
cries recorded and
bound within us its
heartbeat multiplied a
thousandfold as
the drink directs its
ecstasies memberless
to the blind idol being.

—KATHY STOLZENBACH

Submissions for next issue are due by Wednesday Nov. 3, 1993

Feminine Logic (La Logique Féminine)

André Barbera

(1) All men are mortal.
(2) Socrates is a man.
(3) Therefore all mortals are Socrates.

Propositional logic, predicate calculus, modal logic, algebraic logic. In our institutions of higher learning, one can study many kinds of logic, but you cannot study the kind that you need to derive line (3) above from lines (1) and (2). The derivation of line (3) requires feminine logic, or *la logique féminine*. You must pick up *la logique féminine* on your own, or perhaps you possess it intuitively.

* * *

Un Petit Excursus sur les Choses Françaises

One hears a lot of lamenting these days about the budget deficit, not to mention the national debt. To both deficit and debt are attributed the vast majority of our ills, from economic torpor to erosion of family values. But most of the weeping and moaning concerns just one small part of the national debt, i.e., our fiscal indebtedness. What about our cultural debt? It is a well-known fact that we Americans are deeply indebted to the French for many cultural appropriations: kisses, fries, ticklers, poodles. (Actually, all dogs are French, and they betray their nationality with their kisses.) Only recently have Americans taken significant strides in an effort to repay this debt. Our first big step toward a balance of cultural payments with the French is the establishment of Euro Disney in Marne La Vallée. Some snobbish European nay-sayers have referred to this grand opening as a "cultural Chernobyl," but they will come to see that Euro Disney is the most appropriate kind of repayment we could ever make to the French.

So what's the French connection to feminine logic? Those familiar with the subject know that French is the native language of feminine logic. In fact, anyone who has counted to eighty in French has received an inkling that the French way of thinking is, let us say, different from ordinary thinking. What happens with the products manufactured by Groupe Bull, the French computer company, when you enter: 4 x 20 = ?

We reflect the way we think with the way we count and speak. Mark Twain makes this point vis-à-vis French (*The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*, Ch. 14) when he has Huck and Jim consider what the Dauphin of Louis XVI might have done had he immigrated to the United States. Huck, the defender of the French language, naturally resorts to feminine logic in his argument.

"Well, I don't know. Some of them gets on the police, and some of them learns people how to talk French."

"Why, Huck, doan' de French people talk de same way we does?"

"*No*, Jim; you couldn't understand a word they said—not a single word."



"Well, now, I be ding-busted! How do dat come?"

"*I* don't know; but it's so. I got some of their jabber out of a book. S'pose a man was to come to you and say Polly-voo-franzy—what would you think?"

"I wouldn't think nuffn; I'd take en bust him over de head—dat is, if he warn't white. I wouldn't 'low no nigger to call me dat."

"Shucks, it ain't calling you anything. It's only saying, do you know how to talk French?"

"Well, den, why couldn't he say it?"

"Why, he *is* a-saying it. That's a Frenchman's *way* of saying it."

"Well, its a blame ridicklous way, en I doan' want to hear no mo' bout it. Day ain' no sense in it."

"Looky here, Jim; does a cat talk like we do?"

"No, a cat don't."

"Well, does a cow?"

"No, a cow don't, nuther."

"Does a cat talk like a cow, or a cow talk like a cat?"

"No, dey don't."

"It's natural and right for 'em to talk different from each other, ain't it?"

"Course."

"And ain't it natural and right for a cat and cow to talk different from *us*?"

"Why, mos' sholy it is."

"Well, then, why ain't it natural and right for a *Frenchman* to talk differ-

ent from us? You answer me that."

"Is a cat a man, Huck?"

"No."

"Well, den, dey ain't no sense in a cat talkin' like a man. Is a cow a man?—er is a cow a cat?"

"No, she ain't either of them."

"Well, den, she ain't got no business to talk like either one er the yuther of 'em. Is a French man a man?"

"Yes."

"*Well*, den! Dad blame it, why doan' he *talk* like a man? You answer me *dat*!"

* * *

Back to logic. If you look it up in the dictionary, you will find logic defined as the science that investigates the principles governing correct or reliable inference. The word logic is often used synonymously with reason or sound judgment. As a science, logic makes explicit an aspect of reason. Kant would call this aspect pure general logic. As a discipline, logic formalizes and even symbolizes reason, that peculiar characteristic of human beings.

So special, solid, and permanent are reason and logic that we must admit to being oxymoronic when we speak of logical errors or errors in reasoning. This is not to deny Kant's notion that reason tends to overstep its bounds, for he is talking about something much broader than principles of reliable inference devoid of any empirical content. There are no errors *per se* in logic. Rather than the discipline of logic, it is the human being who makes errors in his attempts to be logical. What is logical and rational remains the same. We are the ones who screw up. With feminine logic, however, even human error is removed. In that respect, feminine logic is perfect: no errors of any kind.

The history of the discipline of logic is curious, consisting of enormously long plateaus from which a handful of majestic mountains erupt: Aristotle, Peter Abelard, William of Ockham, Leibniz, and then a bunch of smarty-pants spread out over the past century: Boole, Cantor, Frege, Russell, Gödel, Tarski. This latter group has done much to symbolize logic, and the modern discipline of symbolic logic is largely their creation. Unfortunately, none of these famous logicians has attempted to symbolize feminine logic, or for that matter has addressed our subject at all.

In modern logical parlance, it is common to refer to a logical system as a language, and to represent the language with a symbol. Let us use ♀ to represent the language of feminine logic, and let us assume the traditional logical connectives. In keeping with the systematizing of logic in the twentieth century, it may be worth our while to give a complete list of axioms for feminine logic. Fortunately, this can be done for ♀ with brevity unequaled in any other kind of logic. All the theorems of feminine logic can be derived from one axiom.

$P \rightarrow Q$

The usual reading of this expression is: if P, then Q. As a logical sentence or statement, $P \rightarrow Q$ is traditionally considered to be true in all cases except for that in which P is true and Q is false. With feminine logic, much more is claimed. $P \rightarrow Q$ is not merely a sentence of the language but in fact its only axiom. In other words, given any set of conditions (call them P), by employing feminine logic one can derive any set of consequences (Q). It ought to be clear why this sort of logic is not taught in the schools. It would not take very long to teach the single axiom, and then what would the teachers do?

Before addressing the name of , let us turn our attention to purely systemic matters. There are three aspects or qualities of logical systems that most logicians deem desirable. In other words, most good logical systems possess all three aspects. These are: soundness, completeness, and consistency. Soundness and completeness are complementary notions, the former insuring the truth or reliability of the system's mechanistic derivations, and the latter attesting to the power of the logical mechanism itself. To prove that a system possesses these aspects, especially completeness, can be a long and complicated task. In this regard, feminine logic is a delightful surprise.

In order to evaluate feminine logic according to these aspects, we must first introduce the notion of consequence, or logical consequence. Let us assume that we can determine the truth or falsity of each proposition, sentence, or utterance, in other words, that we are dealing with well-formed declarative sentences. We shall continue to designate our sentences with P and Q, and let us use Π to identify a set of sentences. One sentence, P, is a consequent of a set of sentences, Π, provided there is no interpretation that evaluates as true each sentence of Π while simultaneously evaluating or interpreting P as false.

A system is sound only if, for any sentence P that is derivable from a set P of sentences, P is also a consequent of P. The system is consistent provided that no sentence and its negation can both be derived without assuming contradictory premises. Finally, the system is complete only if every consequent of a set of sentences is in turn derivable.

Let's skip to the good news, systemically speaking, right away. is complete, and this is so obvious that the proof is trivial. After all, any and everything is derivable in ♀ , so of course any sentence that is a consequent of a set of sentences is derivable from the set.

is not consistent. No surprise there. This *is* feminine logic that we are talking about. It should not be too hard to derive both P and -P (read: not P) in this system.

Finally, there is soundness. According to the conventional interpre-

tation, ♀ is not sound. In other words, from a set of sentences we can derive a sentence that, strictly speaking, is not a consequent of the set. Let's take, for example, the set ∏ that contains only the sentence P (P ε ∏). From this set, according to our axiom, we can derive Q. Q, of course, can be anything. Let it be -P (not P). A conventional evaluation of this result would claim that there is no interpretation under which P is true and -P is also true. Thus we have derived a sentence that is not a consequent of the original set.

According to these conventional (masculine?) criteria of soundness, consistency, and completeness, ♀ nas not fared well. It possesses only one out of three. But isn't this narrow thinking? Might not there be other, perhaps more subtle ways of evaluating feminine logic? Let us consider the name itself.

We use adjectives that refer to the female gender to modify all sorts of nouns in our language. This is not remarkable. Many languages distinguish between the nouns themselves according to gender. When studying one of these languages, perhaps Latin, or Greek, or French, one eventually wonders what is masculine about one noun, e.g., jet, and feminine about another, e.g. whale. (*Logic* is feminine in most modern languages including French.) But we are looking at the use of gender to modify nouns semantically, not syntactically. And we are looking at things described specifically as feminine: in poetry, rhyme and end ing; in music, cadence; in every day life hygiene. Although *masculine hygien* looks like a meaningful expression, isn't.

If we take the musical example we find that cadences are rhythmically differentiated according to whether th musical phrase ends on a strong or wea beat. Strong beat cadences are know simply as *cadences*, although one ca find them designated as *masculine ca dences* in books on music theory. Wea beat cadences are called *feminine ca dences*. The origin of the description obvious: men are strong, women ar weak. This is pejorative sexist termi nology, isn't it? Could that also be th case with feminine logic?

What is there about feminin logic that causes this discipline to b named so? If you look up *feminine* i the dictionary, you will find as a firs definition: pertaining to a woman or girl. This definition alone, with it reference solely to gender, can't be th answer. If that were the case, then w would have to assume that women wer solely or primarily the practitioners o feminine logic. It is true, for most of us that our initial encounter with feminin logic was in discussion with a woman. Furthermore, this encounter was nearly identical for each of us. Specifically we were embroiled in a contentious dialogue that concluded with: "Becaus I'm your mother!" But surely women are not the sole practitioners of femi

ine logic. We must inquire further egarding those characteristics common both women and girls on the one hand nd to feminine logic on the other hand.

The dictionary gives examples uch as *feminine beauty* and *feminine ress* as typical uses of the adjective, nd certainly beauty as manifested in he human body has long been identi- ed with women. The dictionary goes n to cite as feminine those qualities aditionally ascribed to women, such s sensitivity or gentleness. Now let us eturn to feminine logic to seek beauty, ensitivity, and gentleness there.

♀ is indeed a beautiful system. ne of the most important aspects to athematical elegance and beauty is revity of articulation and proof. What ould be briefer than the exhaustive list f axioms for feminine logic: P→Q? The ther really important aspect to math- matical beauty is power of expression. hat could be more powerful than →Q? From any set of conditions hatsoever, you can derive any conse- uence you like. Now that is power!

Is also sensitive and gentle? ou bet. A sensitive person is keenly ware of the feelings of others, attuned their needs. And a gentle person is nd, soft, mild, and often desirous of reserving and cultivating the self-es- em of others. The feelings of others re not to be disregarded or belittled, ut rather respected and included in eliberations. Like a sensitive and gentle erson, ♀ includes rather than excludes. Not only are everyone's feelings taken into consideration by the system, but also, literally, everything else. No one, no thing is excluded. Every one and every thing is included. Talk about sensitivity? No one is ever slighted.

Thus we can conclude that traditional interpretations of logic are not nearly subtle enough, nuanced enough, to characterize feminine logic. Where is the gentleness, the beauty, the inclusiveness? There must be room for both P and -P, and there is in feminine logic.

What good is ? In discussion and argument, you can use it to reason your way out of or into any position you like. Keep this in mind the next time someone accuses you of not making sense. And the next time you feel that your ideas and opinions have been slighted or excluded from consideration, rest assured that there is always room for you and all that you think, and everything else, in ♀. Feminine logic renders us all reasonable.

* * *

Appendix

Real life presents us with numerous situations in which "masculine" logic is a useless human faculty. My daughter, Erica, who understands and employs feminine logic intuitively, enjoys pointing out to me the limitations of non-feminine logic.

Erica is fond of swings, and so we have attached one to the maple tree in our back yard. Often while swinging, Erica will ask me: "May I swing too

high?" Apparently I am a non-intuitive practitioner of feminine logic, and so I resort to traditional logic in an attempt to understand and answer her question. Invariably I find her request exasperating (it is the same one every time), and I have taken to calling it "Erica's Conundrum."

When it comes to swinging in the back yard, *I* am the arbiter of height. Erica has permission to swing up to a certain height, and she is forbidden to swing any higher than the maximum permitted. Those higher heights are too high. Of course, she is capable of swinging too high, and there would be no problem if she were simply to ask: "Can I swing too high?" This is a Yes-No question seeking factual information, the answer to which is "yes." (That's why we have the height limitation in the first place.) Similarly, there would be no problem if Erica were to ask: "May I swing to a height of twelve feet above the ground." This is a Yes-No question seeking permission, the answer to which is "no." But Erica is asking for permission to perform the impermissible. Were I to permit the act, it would no longer be impermissible. So the answer seems to be "no."

Erica's Conundrum is similar to certain messages that appear in dialogue boxes with Macintosh comput software. For example:



The phrasing indicates that you hav choice at this point, and I suppose y do. You can click on "OK" there erasing your hard disk or you can t off the computer and walk away. W you cannot do is to answer "No! N OK" within the context of the compu program. What initially appeared to a Yes-No question turned out to be entirely different kind of question statement. This, I believe, is also case with Erica's Conundrum.

Masculine logic treats Eric utterance as a Yes-No question. have already seen that answering "y necessarily leads to a contradicti "No," on the other hand, is the respo of a reiterative idiot. On many aft noons I have stood next to the swing the back yard and denied Erica perm sion to perform an act that by definit I had already denied her permission perform.

May four times twenty eq eighty? No.