THE COLLEGE

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

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ON THE COVER:

Jacob Klein posed for his portrait about the time of his 75th birthday.

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In Appreciation

Mrs. Weigle and I should like to convey through *The College* our deep appreciation for the many honors accorded us upon our silver anniversary at St. John's College. No president and his lady could have experienced more heartwarming recognition than we did. We wish that we could respond with a personal letter of appreciation to each of the hundreds of congratulatory letters which we received. We trust that you will accept this collective acknowledgement instead.

May we also express our thanks for the many greetings that have come to us over the holiday season. We did not send cards from the College this season but put the money into scholarship funds. To all our friends and colleagues we now send warm and affectionate greetings at the start of this New Year of 1975.

Richard D. Weigle
President

IN THE JANUARY ISSUE:

Robert S. Zelenka and Beate Ruhm von Oppen are tutors at St. John's, Annapolis.

Plato's *Phaedo*

By Jacob Klein

There is—as most of you probably know—what we call (in words derived from Latin and Greek) a legend or a myth or (in plain English) a tale according to which certain fabulous events occurred on the island of Crete and in Athens and between these two in the very ancient past. There are different versions of that complex story, but I shall limit myself to the following points.

First: Minos, the king of Crete, has a wife, Pasiphaë, and many children. Pasiphaë falls in love with a wonderful white bull. The famous craftsman Daedalus helps her in a most ingenious way to satisfy her desires. She gives birth to the Minotaur, a monster with a bull's head and a human body. The Minotaur's abode, constructed by Daedalus, is the Labyrinth, a large building consisting of numerous halls connected by intricate and tortuous passages.

Secondly: one of the sons of Minos, Androgeus, visits Athens. The king of Athens, Aegeus, fearing that Androgeus might persuade his father Minos to support a revolt in Athens, arranges an ambush that leads to the death of Androgeus. Many things happen after that. Finally Minos imposes a tribute on Athens: every ninth year the Athenians have to send seven young men and seven young women to Crete as a prey for the Minotaur.

Thirdly: when this tribute is due for the third time, the son of the Athenian king, *Theseus*, decides that he will go to Crete with those fourteen and will kill the Minotaur. He takes with him, as we can read in Plutarch's *Lives*, (Theseus XXIII, 2), not seven, but nine young men, two of them having fresh and girlish faces, but possessed of an eager and manly spirit. These two have to dress and walk as if they were women. As soon as Theseus and the fourteen arrive in Crete, one of the daughters of Minos, *Ariadne*, falls in love with Theseus. She gives Theseus a ball of thread which has to be tied with its loose end to the door of the Labyrinth and which rolls along with the walking Theseus until he reaches the Minotaur. Theseus, after killing the Minotaur, finds his way back through the tortuous Labyrinth by rolling up the thread again. Then Theseus and the fourteen go back to Athens. Theseus takes Ariadne with him, but leaves her on an island before reaching Athens.

Why do I tell you all this? Because the very beginning of Plato's dialogue entitled *Phaedo* refers to these fabulous events. The dialogue consists of a conversation held in Phlius, a city in the Peloponnese, between Echecrates, a citizen of Phlius, and Phaedo, who is not an Athenian either. Echecrates wants to know what Socrates said before he died and how he died. Echecrates has heard that a long time elapsed between the conviction of Socrates and his execution. He does not know why this was so, and Phaedo tells him why. The Athenians, he recounts, had made a vow to Apollo—so it is said—that they would send a mission every year to Apollo's temple in Delos, if Theseus and (58 a 11) "those twice seven" whom he took with him were saved. That's what the Athenians have done ever since. And (58 b 5—c 1) "it is their law that, after the mission begins, the city must be pure and no one may be publicly executed until the ship has gone to Delos and back; and sometimes, when contrary winds detain it, this takes a long time." The ship had left on the day before the trial of Socrates (58 a and c). "That's why Socrates passed a long time in prison between his trial and his death" (58 c 4-5). Answering Echecrates's questions, Phaedo tells him which of Socrates' friends were with him on his last day. Watch, please, how Phaedo does that in the dialogue circumspectly and precisely (59 b—c). He says: "of natives [that is, of native Athenians] there was this Apollodorus [Phaedo had mentioned him just before] and Cristobulus and his father Crito and also Hermogenes and Epigenes and Aeschines and Antisthenes [these are seven], and Ctesippus of the deme of Paeania *was there too*, and Menexenus and some other natives [two more names are thus conspicuously added and some people that remain unnamed]." And Phaedo continues: "But Plato, I think, was ill." "Were any non-Athenians there?" asks Echecrates. And Phaedo replies: "Yes, Simmias of Thebes as well as

This is the text of a lecture given at St. John's College, Annapolis, on May 3, 1974.

Cebes and Phaedonides and from Megara Euclides and Terpsion" [that is to say, five]. To make sure that we realize the importance of all this naming, Plato, who was not there, makes Echecrates ask whether Aristippus and Cleombrotus were present. No, says Phaedo, they were not. Echecrates: "Was anyone else there?" Phaedo: "I think these were about all." It is thus established that fourteen people, whose names are given, namely nine Athenians and five non-Athenians were present plus some unnamed Athenian men. Can we remain unaware of the fact that these correspond to the nine young men, the five young women and the crew that Theseus took with him on his voyage to Crete? The two young men who are conspicuously added in Phaedo's report to the seven first named, namely Ctesippus and Menexenus, have indeed an eager and manly spirit, as we can see when reading Plato's dialogue entitled *Lysis*. But what about Phaedo, the non-Athenian, who supposedly was also present at the last day of Socrates? Well, let us hear what Phaedo says himself about his relation to Socrates. At one point, he says (89 b), Socrates "stroked my head and gathered the hair on the back of my neck into his hand—he had a habit of playing with my hair on occasion. . . ." And a little later on (89 c) he compares the relation between himself and Socrates with the relation between Iolaus and Heracles. Iolaus is the nephew, the charioteer, and the beloved comrade of Heracles. And let us not forget: the thread of Phaedo's narrative in the dialogue goes through a labyrinth of questions and arguments. Can we fail to see that Phaedo corresponds to Ariadne of the ancient tale? Can we remain unaware of the fact that the dialogue does not give a so-called "historical" account of Socrates' death, but gives a mythical presentation of that crucial event, which however is truer than the tale about Theseus and the Minotaur, accepted as true by the average Athenian? In the dialogue the new and true Theseus is *Socrates* and the old and true Minotaur is the monster called *Fear of Death*. But while the Minotaur was, according to Euripides (Plutarch's *Lives*, Theseus XV, 2), "a commingled look and a monstrous babe," in which "two different natures, bull and man, were joined," in Fear of Death an awesome pain of the soul, namely fear, is joined to death which is but a hobgoblin or a bugbear, as Cebes later in the dialogue (77 e) intimates. Let us not forget for a moment that the dialogue is *α δρᾶμα* presenting a Platonic myth. Athenaeus, a writer of the second century A.D., who today would be called a "literary critic," composed a lengthy work named "The Sophists at Dinner," the content of which is mostly inimical gossip. But it is worth noting that Athenaeus makes Phaedo state (XI, 505 e) that he never said or heard what he is supposed to have said or heard in the dialogue named after him. Indeed, what is happening in the dialogue is *invented* by Plato. It is thus that Plato makes us see Socrates' struggle with the Fear of Death. How does he do that? Let us watch.

I. When Socrates' friends enter the room in the prison, where Socrates had been staying all the time, they find him just released from his fetters and his wife Xanthippe sitting with one of their little sons beside him. Xanthippe is crying and Socrates asks Crito to let somebody take her home. Socrates sits up on his couch, bends his leg and rubs it with his hand. The Greek work which I translated with the word "bend" is *συγκάμπτειν*. It can be used to describe the bent position of a foetus in the womb. Since Socrates' rubbing of his leg gives him some *pleasure*, he contrasts this pleasure with the *pain* that the fetters had produced and goes on—calmly and playfully—to imagine how Aesop could have composed a fable about pleasure and pain fastened together by their heads so that they could never be completely separated. Phaedo had mentioned before that he had been overcome by a strange mixture of pain and of pleasure at the thought of Socrates' impending death and at the anticipation of the thoughtful and exciting discussion that was bound to occur in the prison, as it had occurred on previous days. Socrates' mentioning of Aesop reminds Cebes of what Socrates had been doing in his prison days, namely putting Aesop's fables into verse and composing a song to Apollo. Cebes asks why Socrates, who had never done that kind of thing before,

should be doing that now. The poet Evenus had asked Cebes this question a few days previously. Socrates answers that he kept having dreams in his former life in which he was always told the same thing: "engage in the Muses' art and work at it" (*μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου*). He had been interpreting this saying as encouraging him to do what he always had been doing, namely philosophizing, since he understood philosophy to be the greatest art of the Muses. Now, however, while the festival of Apollo delayed his execution, he considered the possibility that the dream might have meant what is usually understood to be the Muses' art (*μουσική*) and he decided not to disobey the dream, but to compose verses. And Phaedo makes Socrates say that *not* being a poet, that is, a man who invents myths, he turned to the fables of Aesop and put the first ones he came upon into verse. Can we forget the many myths that Plato makes Socrates invent in his dialogues? Socrates concludes his answer by begging Cebes to bid Evenus farewell and to tell him that he should follow Socrates as quickly as he can. Simmias intervenes and claims that Evenus certainly would not take Socrates' advice. Whereupon Socrates: "Is not Evenus a philosopher?" "I think so," says Simmias. Then Evenus will be willing to do so, says Socrates, as any one would be who has a worthy share in philosophy. But Socrates adds something to this statement, and while doing that puts his feet down on the ground. What he adds is this: "Perhaps he [that is, Evenus] will not take his own life, for they say that is not permitted." The ensuing conversation is about this addition. How can Socrates claim that philosophers desire to die, while asserting at the same time that it is not permitted to take one's own life? This assertion refers to what Philolaus—and also other people—have been saying. It is necessary at this point to note that the background of the *entire* dialogue is "Pythagorean" and "orphic." A Pythagorean brotherhood is known to have resided in Phlius, where Phaedo talks to Echecrates. Philolaus is the founder of a similar brotherhood in Thebes, to which Cebes and Simmias apparently belonged. The assertion that it is not permitted to take one's own life is—as Socrates intimates (62 b)—a part of an esoteric doctrine of the Pythagoreans, according to which men live in a kind of enclosure, namely the body, and ought not to set themselves free and run away. And in the light of this doctrine Phaedo makes Socrates claim that men are one of the chattels of the gods, who are their guardians, and that the gods would be angry if a man escaped by killing himself. This claim of Socrates forces Cebes and Simmias to wonder why Socrates is so much willing to leave them and the gods by wishing to die. This wonder amounts to an accusation, and Socrates declares that he has to *defend* himself as if he were in a court of law. What follows can, therefore, be called Socrates' "Defense," an *ἀπολογία* indeed, unlike his alleged "defense" in the dialogue called in a dissembling way "Apology."

Before beginning his defense, Phaedo narrates, Socrates has to listen to Crito, the point being that the man who will administer the poison has asked Crito to warn Socrates to talk as little as possible, lest the effects of the poison be diminished so that it would have to be administered again and again. Socrates does not pay any attention to this warning and proceeds to his lengthy defense.

It consists in claiming that a lover of wisdom, a "philosopher," in pursuing philosophy practises nothing but dying and being dead (64 a). Simmias can't help laughing—though reluctantly—, because he thinks of the many in Thebes who would also say what Socrates just said and would add to it that the philosophers do indeed deserve nothing but death. They would be right, says Socrates, although they would not understand their own saying. What the philosopher wants above all is to let the soul alone, itself by itself, consider that which truly is, without being troubled by the body, the bodily sensing, the bodily desires and fears, the bodily pleasures and pains. What truly *is* cannot be seen or heard or sensed in any way. Now, since death is the separation of the soul from the body, as Phaedo makes Socrates say (64 c, 66 e-67 a), the philosophers must obviously desire death, that is, the complete purification of the soul. And Phaedo makes Socrates refer to orphic sayings according to which the thyrsus-bearers

are many, but the initiated and purified are few, and only these few will dwell "over there" with the gods. This is the gist of Socrates' "defense."

II. Quite naturally the question arises whether the soul, when it leaves the body, still exists. Does it not perish altogether? That is the question Cebes immediately raises, and this is the way Socrates answers it, according to Phaedo's narrative.

There is an ancient argument, an "orphic" one, we have to understand, that we go there from here and come back here again and thus are born from the dead (70 c). If this is so, our soul must exist there. And Socrates proceeds, according to Phaedo, to show in a detailed way how that argument might be true. He invites Cebes to consider that in this visible world of ours everything, if there is something *opposite* to it, inevitably comes into being *from* this opposite. He cites examples: the greater becomes greater after having been smaller and vice versa, the weaker is generated from the stronger and vice versa, the slower from the quicker, the worse from the better, the more just from the more unjust, being cooler from being hotter, being awake from being asleep, and so on, and so on. The opposite of living is being dead. It follows that all living things, and that means also all living people, are generated from the dead. Then, Socrates concludes, our souls *do* exist in Hades, and there is such a thing as "coming to life again" (*ἀναβιώσκεσθαι*—71 e—72 a). If that were not so, all things would be swallowed up in death.

III. We may have some doubts about the soundness of this orphic argument, as Cebes apparently has; for he reminds Socrates of another way to show the pre-existence of our souls. As Socrates so often says (we have to assume not only in Platonic dialogues), learning is nothing else but recollection (*ἀνάμνησις*), and that implies that the soul must already have existed somewhere before it came into being in human bodies, so that in this way also the soul appears to be deathless. Simmias wants to learn—that is, to recollect—more about this argument, and Socrates goes on showing—again in a most detailed way—the different cases of recollecting which we experience, up to the case of recollecting *equality itself* (74 a ff.). What is important about this case is that we can never see, never sense "equality itself." We perceive through our senses equal things, stones or pieces of wood, for example. We realize, however, that the equality of two visibly equal things is a deficient one: these things may appear to one man equal and to another unequal. To be able to recognize this deficiency means that we must have previously known perfect equality. And it is this previous, but forgotten knowledge that we *recollect* when, in perceiving visibly equal things, we realize that their equality is merely an approximation, a copy, an "image" of perfect equality, of "the equal itself." We must have acquired that knowledge of perfect equality, Socrates submits (75 c), before we were born. And that applies not only to equality, but to any intelligibile entity, on which we put the seal of "its being *what it is*" (*αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι*). Thus there is the same necessity for our soul to exist before our birth and for all intelligibles, all *νοητά*, to have being. We have to note that the necessity of asserting the soul's pre-existence is understood here, in the dialogue, to *depend* on the presupposed being of the intelligibles, the *νοητά*, the *εἴδη*, the "invisible looks."

Simmias and Cebes now agree that the soul must have existed before our birth. But what has not been proved, they both assert, is that the soul also exists *after* we are dead. Socrates claims that that proof had already been given, referring to the previous orphic argument that every living being is born from the dead. Must not the soul exist after we die, since it must be born again? But Socrates also agrees that the discussion has to proceed. There is some jesting about the possibility that the soul might be blown away by a high wind after we die, and Cebes says that there is perhaps a child within us who has such a fear. This is the moment when he mentions the need to persuade that child "not to fear death as if it were a hobgoblin." What is required for that child, says Socrates playfully and truthfully, are daily incantations until that fear is charmed away (77 e). And the struggle with Fear of Death continues.

IV. The emphasis is now on the distinction between what is compounded and what is uncompounded. The compounded is liable to be decomposed which cannot be said of the uncompounded. That which is uniquely "itself by itself," like "Equality itself," "Beauty itself," "Being itself," "Man himself," "Horse itself," is uncompounded and always the same, while there are things like men, horses, cloaks, that are constantly changing. What is mentioned first, the εἴδη, the "looks" are only reachable in thought, are *invisible*, while what is mentioned later is perceived by our senses, is *visible*. And Socrates asks Cebes forcefully (79 a): "Are you willing then to posit two kinds of beings, one visible, the other invisible (ἀϊδές)?" Cebes is willing. He is willing to admit that the visible is constantly changing and that the invisible is always the same. It is clear to him that the body belongs to the visible and the soul to the invisible. He has to agree that when the soul makes use of the body for any inquiry, that is, makes use of the senses, it is dragged to the things which never remain the same, but when the soul inquires alone by itself, it departs into the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the deathless and the changeless (79 d). And Cebes also agrees that, when a man dies, the soul, the invisible (ἀϊδές) goes to a place which is, like itself, noble and pure and invisible, goes to the true Hades (Ἅιδης), to the good and wise god. And Socrates concludes that the soul departs in purity, if it never associated itself with the body in life but gathered itself into itself alone, that is to say, philosophized in the right way and willingly practised dying. If it did that, it will be happy in Hades and henceforward live there, as the initiated say, truly with the gods. Socrates continues in this pythagorean-orphic vein, describing what happens to the soul of a man devoted to bodily desires and pleasures after this man dies. His soul is dragged back to the visible world, through fear of the ἀϊδές and of Ἅιδης, flits about monuments and tombs, passes into the body of an ass or a wolf or of a hawk or of a kite. The souls of better men, who by habit and practice, without philosophy and true understanding, have lived moderately and justly, pass into the bodies of bees or wasps or ants or of men again. It is only true philosophizing that attempts to free the soul from the prison of the body, from the bondage to pleasure and pain. Only a soul nurtured in this way is not going to fear that it will be destroyed at its departure from the body and vanish into nothingness (80 d—84 b). The soul is entirely indissoluble, "or nearly so" (80 b 10: ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου).

V. There is a long silence after Socrates' speech. But finally Socrates addresses Cebes and Simmias, who had talked to each other, and asks them whether they had any doubts about what had been said. Simmias confirms that they are doubtful, have questions to ask, but hesitate to trouble Socrates in his last hours. Socrates laughs gently, Phaedo narrates, compares himself to the swans that sing most and best when they feel that they are about to die, and urges Simmias and Cebes to speak up and to ask whatever questions they have. Simmias and Cebes comply.

The question of Simmias is this: is not what Socrates had said about the body and the soul comparable to what could be said about the well attuned strings of a lyre and the concord of sounds produced by those strings? If the lyre is destroyed, could it be claimed that the concord will still exist?

The question of Cebes is this: granted that the soul survives when a man dies and even wears out many bodies, might it not *finally* perish altogether in one of its deaths?

These questions, as narrated by Phaedo, are asked in a most serious and circumstantial way. Not only are all the people, who are said to surround Socrates, deeply troubled, but this is also true of Echecrates, Phaedo's interlocutor. It is not unimportant to note what Phaedo has to say at this point. What astonished him most, he says, was "first, the pleasant, kind and respectful manner in which he [Socrates] accepted the arguments of the young men, secondly, his quick sense of the effect their words had upon us, and finally, how well he cured us . . . ." (89 a). This is the moment when Socrates' habit of playing with Phaedo's hair is mentioned by Phaedo. Socrates is doing that right now, while telling Phaedo to cut his beautiful

hair—not the next day, but this very day, as Socrates will also do, if his argument dies and cannot be brought to life again. This is the moment when Iolaus's relation to Heracles is compared to that of Phaedo to Socrates. But this is also the moment when Socrates launches into a lengthy discussion about the danger of becoming misologists, haters of argument, and of believing that there is no soundness in arguments at all (89 c—91 c). Let us note that this discussion is at the very middle of Phaedo's narrative. We have to infer that nothing is more important to Socrates than to keep arguing about a difficult question, never to despair, never to give up the hope of reaching a final and sound conclusion. And after finishing the discussion about misology Socrates takes up the question raised by both Simmias and Cebes.

VI. The doubts and fears of Simmias that the soul may perish first, being a kind of concord, are dealt with by Socrates first. (Let me remark parenthetically that the word "concord" translates the Greek word *ἁρμονία*, which it is wrong to translate by the English word "harmony.") Socrates makes sure that Simmias accepts, as Cebes does too, the argument according to which learning is recollection and that, therefore, he also agrees that the soul must have existed somewhere before it was imprisoned in the body. But a concord of sounds cannot exist before the lyre and its strings come into being. The concord of sounds is the last to come into being. There is no consonance then between the recollection argument and the argument that the soul might be something like a concord of sounds. Simmias is ready to yield. But Socrates goes on demolishing the concord thesis by reasons which are quite independent of the recollection argument. He shows that concords of sounds can be more or less concordant, while souls cannot be more or less souls. On the other hand, a soul may possess sense and virtue and be good, while another soul may be foolish and wicked. Those who claim that the soul is comparable to a concord of sounds will have to claim that the virtue of a soul is another concord and the wickedness of a soul is a discord of a concord. Or, to say it better, if the soul is a concord, it cannot be discordant, cannot be wicked at all. And finally Socrates points to our experience that the soul, if it is thoughtful, rules over its desires and passions and fears, which it could not do if it were like a concord, since that which is concordant depends on its concordant parts and does not rule over them. Does not Homer say of Odysseus (Odyssey XX, 17 f.): "He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his heart: endure, my heart; a worse thing even than this didst thou once endure"? Phaedo makes Socrates say judiciously and probably smilingly that Homer could not have said that, if he had thought of the soul as a concord. This is how the concord theme of Simmias, the Theban, is brought to an end. And Socrates proceeds to meet the doubt of the other Theban, Cebes. Before doing that he appeals, solemnly and playfully, to the graces of the Theban goddess Harmonia, who is the daughter of Ares and Aphrodite, as well as to the graces of Cadmus, who is Harmonia's husband and who, according to the legend, killed that great serpent, out of whose teeth armed men sprang up, clashing their weapons together.

VII. To meet the doubt of Cebes is the most difficult task Socrates faces. According to Phaedo, you will remember, Cebes had insisted on the possibility that the soul, after wearing out many bodies, might *finally* perish altogether. In doing that, he had, in fact, relied on Socrates' own saying that the soul is entirely indissoluble "or nearly so." What can the phrase "nearly so" mean but final dissolution! Socrates pauses for a while, considering something deeply by himself. And then the struggle with Fear of Death reaches its height.

Socrates has to show *why* the soul can never die. Before doing this, he has to make clear the meaning of the word "why." The question "why" comes up whenever we are unable to understand something in our immediate experience. We are asking what is "responsible" for this something, what "causes" it. A crucial distinction is made by Socrates (99 a-b): "One thing is what is truly responsible [for something], another thing is that without which

what is responsible could not possibly become [effectively] responsible." To be unable to make that distinction is a sign of "profound sluggishness" in speaking and thinking. To say, for example, the causes of Socrates' sitting in the prison on his couch with his feet on the ground are these that his body is composed of bones and sinews and that the bones hang loose in their ligaments while the sinews, by relaxing and contracting, make him bend his limbs,—to say that is to fail to mention the true causes of Socrates' sitting in the prison room, namely that the *Athenians* decided that it was best to condemn him and that *he* decided that it was right for him to stay and undergo whatever penalty they would order (98 c-e). The confusion about the meaning of "cause" (*αἰτία*) leads to that special wisdom known by the name of "inquiry about nature" (*περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία*—96 a 8). In his youth, Socrates reports in Phaedo's narrative, he wanted very much to find out, with regard to any single thing or occurrence, what was responsible for its coming into being, its passing away, its being the way it was (96 a). But he could not find any satisfactory answers. Nor could he learn them from anybody else, not even from the great Anaxagoras. The cause of this inability was precisely the confusion about the meaning of "cause." Socrates had to embark upon a different journey, his "next best try," which means he had to take to the oars, since the wind had failed, and seek to find out in a better way "why" things are as they are. He had to "take refuge in the spoken word" (99 e 5), in exchanging questions and answers with himself and with others and in *them* search for the truth of things.

Socrates gives the following outline of the way he now proceeds. On each occasion he chooses as a supposition (an *ὑπόθεσις*) the most reliable statement which would make us understand what remains obscure and concealed in our immediate experience. Whatever appears to be consonant with that statement is to be posited as genuinely true, and that applies especially to what is being said about the "cause" of something; whatever does not conform to the statement is to be taken as untrue.

Cebes does not quite follow. He is not saying anything new, Socrates explains, but rather what he has never stopped saying, at other times as well as in the preceding discussion. And now again he is going to revert to those much babbled-about words and make them his starting point, his initial supposition being that there *is* something named "itself by itself beautiful" and also something "itself by itself good" and something "itself by itself big" and all the rest. Consonant with this statement is a further one of the following type: if there be anything beautiful besides Beauty itself, it will be beautiful for no other reason than that it *shares in*, or *partakes of*, Beauty itself. It is this kind of cause which is responsible for things being beautiful, which "makes" them beautiful. Statements of this type provide the safest answer to the question: "why" are things as they are? In a dissembling and yet truthful way Socrates characterizes this way of understanding why things are as they are as "simple," "artless," and "perhaps foolish." His answer, with all its safety, is a simple-minded, "unlearned" one, as he later adds. Its safety is based entirely on the reliability of the underlying statement that the "intelligibles," the *νοητά*, have being. Everybody present—and also Echecrates who listens to Phaedo's story—agrees. And then Socrates proceeds to show *why* the soul can never die.

The "demonstration" he offers, according to Phaedo's narrative, resembles indeed a most intricate maze. It is ultimately based, first, on the underlying and most reliable statement that each of the intelligibles, each of the *εἴδη* is something which has *being*; secondly, on its corollary that everything else, by "sharing in" those *εἴδη*, derives its *name* from them; and thirdly, on the kindred corollary that this sharing in the various *εἴδη* can be safely understood as the "cause" for everything being as it is.

Socrates takes care to remark that the two ways of proceeding in all this, the one towards *consequences* which spring from the safe supposition and the other towards the very source of the safe supposition, the way downwards and the way upwards, should not be mixed up. But we cannot fail to observe that in Phaedo's narrative these two ways do get mixed up. It is noteworthy, for instance, that

what remains shrouded in darkness is whether the way to the "true Hades" is downwards or upwards.

A long series of examples of true causation is presented by Socrates. I shall mention only a few. A man is big, and is called big and not small, because of his sharing in Bigness or, as we may say, because Bigness is "in" him; a body is hot, and is called hot, and not cold, because it contains Heat; a body is sick, and is called sick and not healthy, because Sickness is "in" it; a number of things is odd, and is called odd and not even, because these things share in Oddness. And now Socrates adds: a hot body may cool off and then again become hot, but the Heat "in" it can never become cold nor the Cold "in" it ever become hot. For Heat and Cold, just as Bigness and Smallness are *by themselves* incompatible with each other.

Somebody among those present interjects full of surprise: what is being said now is opposite to what was said before about opposites, to wit, that the greater is generated from the less and the less from the greater, and that *is* simply the way opposites are generated, namely from opposites. And now it is being said that that can never happen! Socrates listens attentively and then explains: what was said before was said about visible things in this visible world of ours, but now the talk is about intelligibles, about the opposites as they are in themselves, about the εἴδη like Bigness itself, Heat itself, Sickness itself, Oddness itself. But at this point Socrates begins to complicate his simple-minded account of how causation has to be understood by another safe and "more ingenious" (105 c 2) way of answering the question why things are as they are.

VIII. A body is hot not only because of the Heat "in" it, but also because of *fire;* a body is sick not only because of Sickness "in" it, but also because of *fever;* a number of things will be an odd number of things not only because of Oddness "in" it, but also because of the *unit* which makes an odd number odd; and *soul* is going to join the rank of these new entities as a cause of life. What characterizes these new entities? First, their names are entirely different from the names of what they are causes of: fire—hot, fever—sick, unit—odd, soul—life; secondly, these entities are *not* intelligibles, are *not* εἴδη. "Fire" and "fever" have an elemental character. The mode of being of "unit" is highly debatable. And even more so is the mode of being of "soul." Up to this moment in Phaedo's narrative what characterized the soul was its thoughtfulness, its φρόνησις, its ability to deal with intelligibles, the νοητά, the εἴδη, its power to think, to learn, to recollect. Socrates proposes to Cebes twice that they determine what sort of entities these newly introduced ones are. What is said of them is this: the new entities, while not accepting one of two opposites, "bring up" the *other* opposite and impose it on what they approach. Thus Cebes, imitating Socrates' "more ingenious" way, claims that soul, ψυχή, entering a body, will make it a living body (ζῶν). The simple-minded account would have been that Life (ζωή) does that. The account of Cebes follows the pattern set by Socrates: the opposite of Life is Death (105 d 6-9); soul (ψυχή), by itself not "opposed" to Death, "brings up" Death's opposite, Life (105 d 10-11), brings Life to whatever it "occupies"; and since, in analogy to Socrates' examples, "soul" does not "accept" Life's opposite, does not "accept" Death, "soul" cannot be touched by Death; the soul, therefore, will never "die." The demonstration seems to have reached its end.

But Socrates immediately presents the difficulty which is bound to come up. The entities, the "sharing" in which is responsible for certain features of the visible world (according to the simple-minded and the new account)—as well as those sensible features themselves—carry, by virtue of their *not* "accepting" one of the opposites in question, a negative appellation, for instance, "not-even" (ἀνάρτιον), "not-just" (ἄδικον), "deathless" (ἀθάνατον). But these negatives do not tell whether that which they signify "departs" or vanishes altogether whenever the negated opposite approaches. This alternative is mentioned in Phaedo's narrative repeatedly and well in advance of the final conclusion: the *one* opposite *either* escapes, retires, withdraws, goes away or perishes at the approach of the *other*

opposite. Could not the same be true of "soul"? That is Socrates' query. As something to which the appellation "deathless" applies, it might nevertheless share this same fate: it could be "extinguished" and perish at the approach of Death. It would be a "living" soul only *as long* as it exists in a body and no longer. The demonstration, with which Cebes was satisfied (105 e 9), amounts to nothing if one considers that possibility.

It is Cebes who dismisses it. He asks: does not the deathless *mean* that which never dies? And must not that which never dies exist forever? If the "deathless" were subject to destruction, Cebes exclaims in an orphic vein, could there be anything else that would escape it! Whereupon Socrates (106 d 5-7): "The god, at least, life itself by itself (*αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος*), and if there be anything else 'deathless'—that these never perish might, I think, be agreed upon by all." There is as much ambiguity as solemnity in these words. Cebes catches the irony and chimes in (106 d 8-9): "By all men, to be sure, Zeus knows, and even more so by the gods as I, for my part, suppose." But Socrates and Cebes do agree on this: since "soul" does not "accept" Death and *if* thus the soul is indeed deathless, there could be no alternative to its being indestructible; when Death approaches man, what is mortal about him dies, while what is "deathless," retiring before Death, departs safe and unimpaired (106 e 7). "Soul, then, Cebes," Socrates concludes in Phaedo's narrative, "is more than anything deathless and indestructible, and our souls will truly be in Hades" (106 e 9-107 a 1). Let us note that what the word "soul" now means remains unstated. Nor are we told what kind of place "Hades" is.

IX. Cebes and Simmias are satisfied. But Simmias feels bound to make a reservation: considering the human weakness (*ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ἀσθένεια*—107 b 1) as against the magnitude of the subject under discussion, he for one cannot completely trust the argument. Socrates fully approves of Simmias's stand and even extends the distrust (*ἀπιστία*) to the very first suppositions underlying the entire argument. The inconclusiveness of the "demonstration" hinges on Cebes's imitating Socrates' "more ingenious" accounts. The assertion that sharing in "soul," in *ψυχή*, is responsible for Life, *ζωή*, in a body, that "soul" is thus "life-bringing," is rooted in the common identification of "living being" and "animate being," of *ζῶον* and *ἔμψυχον*. The emphasis in the preceding discussion lay on the kinship between soul and the intelligible. What characterized soul was *φρόνησις*, thoughtfulness, and all that this entails. Cebes's "imitating" answer gives *ψυχή* a radically different meaning, relating it not to *φρόνησις*, but to "living," to *ζῆν*. The indestructibility of this soul, as the exchange between Cebes and Socrates shows, and as Simmias confirms, is far from certain.

Does all this mean that the argument, intended to cast away Cebes's doubt and built up with so much care and circumspection, does not fulfill its task? Taken by itself, it fails indeed. But had not Socrates said (77 e 8-9), playfully and truthfully, that daily incantations are required to charm the fear of death away? Are not *all* the arguments of the dialogue a series of such incantations? But will they not, and necessarily so, remain ineffective unless supported by evidence more powerful than the evidence they are able to supply by themselves? This supporting evidence is there, in the very *δρᾶμα* presented by Phaedo. We witness Socrates' behavior during the long hours before he drinks the draught. For it is not only the content of the arguments, their cogency and insufficiency, that mark the struggle with Fear of Death, it is also, *and more so*, the adult sobriety, the serenity in gravity and jest, imposed by Socrates on the conversation. The final story Socrates is telling, according to Phaedo's narrative, shows perhaps more than anything else Socrates' imperturbable calm. He reverts to the kind of journey he claims to have undertaken in his youth. He describes our earth, not as we see it, but as it would appear to us if we were looking at it from above and from within. The story, a long and complex one, is told in complete tranquility and—we have to assume—with recurrent smiles. It presents not so much an "inquiry about nature" (*περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία*) as an "inquiry about the soul" (*περὶ ψυχῆς ἱστορία*). It tells what happens to the

souls of men after death. Socrates does not pretend that his story is a true one, and that's why he probably keeps smiling: "it would not be fitting for a man of sense to maintain that all this is just as I have described it" (114 d 1-2). But since the soul appears to be deathless, a man of sense should take the risk to accept a tale like the one Socrates was telling. "For it is a noble risk" (114 d 6). And one should *continue* to charm oneself in this very way.

X. After finishing this story, Phaedo reports, Socrates is about to go to take a bath. Crito intervenes again. He asks what Socrates wants his friends to do about his children and about anything else, notably his burial. He has nothing to say about all that, says Socrates and, quietly laughing, he explains to his friends that it is difficult to persuade Crito that burying the body, which will remain when he, Socrates, is gone, has nothing to do with him. He will have departed. He then goes into another room to bathe. When he returns, his three children and the women of his family appear. He talks with them, gives them his advice, and then tells them to leave. The sun is setting, the drinking of the poison is near. Phaedo reports a touching scene between Socrates and one of the wardens of the prison. Socrates demands that the poison be brought to him. Crito tries to persuade Socrates to wait a little longer. Socrates says that that would be ridiculous. The poison is brought in a cup. Socrates is told to drink and then to walk till his legs feel heavy. Socrates asks whether he should not pour a libation to a deity. It is hard not to sense the irony of this question. Socrates is told that there is not enough for that in the cup. Socrates prays that his departure from here to there be a fortunate one. And he drinks the poison coolly and calmly.

An outburst of fierce emotions and of tears and of wailing among Socrates' friends follows. Socrates says to them: "keep quiet and be steadfast" (117 e 2). He lies down on his back, and the man who administered the poison as well as Socrates' friends watch death approaching. Uncovering his face, which had been covered, Socrates says to Crito: "We owe a cock to Asclepius; pay this debt and do not neglect it" (118 a 7-8). These are his last words. To sacrifice to Asclepius, the healing god, means to thank him for one's recovery from a disease. Socrates' last words imply that he is recovering from the most disastrous disease, the one that imprisons his soul in his body. He is recovering from this disease because his soul is leaving its prison. Crito closes Socrates' mouth and eyes. And Phaedo ends his narrative by telling Echecrates that this was the end of the best, of the most thoughtful and most just man of his time.

What shall we conclude from all that we have heard? Three things. First, in the struggle we have been witnessing, Socrates, the true Theseus, annihilates the true Minotaur, the Fear of Death. Secondly, it remains completely uncertain whether Socrates' soul is now in the true Hades, the realm of the invisible looks. Thirdly, it *is* certain that *Plato*, through Phaedo's narrative, has made Socrates live forever—or, to be as cautious as possible, has made Socrates live as long as people will be able to read what Plato wrote.

THE RUIN



Wallstone remains, wondrous, broken, alien;
The city fell, the work of giants crumbled

Roofs are caved in, the towers are in ruin,
The gates are torn open. Ice crusts the mortar.
Stormfences are cut down, scored, etched and eaten,
Undermined by age.
The earth holds in its grasp
Wielder and maker. Weary, worn out, they died,
All strength gone. Now a hundred generations
Of men have passed and vanished.
Once this wall stood
Streaked red and grey, while kingdom after kingdom
Withstood endless storms. At last the high arch fell.

There remain . . . rubble . . . heaps of stone . . . shards . . . fragments.
Even the earthrind sank. A man of cunning,
Skilled in metals, bound the wall in wire rings,
Wove stone and wire splendidly together.

Fortresses were bright; there were many houses,
High gabled, filled with the sound of warriors.
There were many meadhalls, filled with human joys,
Until wyrd brought change:
This was a time of plague,
When death took all men; even the strongest fell
Ramparts became desolate, foundations waste.
The high citadel crumbled.
One after one,
Those who would rebuild fell lifeless to the ground.
Therefore these courtyards are grim places. Roof tiles,
Red and curved, lie scattered about; the crossbeam
Is shattered. Destruction fills this world.
Once men
Were glad in heart and bright with gold. In splendor,
Proud, and flushed with wine, their armor gleaming, they
Looked on the treasures gathered here: on silver,
On art-wrought gems, on riches, on precious stones,
And on this city, the seat of wide empire.
Stone buildings stood. Water flowed in hot from wells,
Steaming from the depths; there were bath houses, hearths
Kept warm in winter. A strong wall enclosed all
In safety. That was a proper place for men.

So it is. . .
that is a kingly thing. . .
city. . .

Anonymous—Seventh Century A.D.

(A translation from Anglo-Saxon by Robert S. Zelenka)

Hommage à Dietrich Buxtehude

There is in ancient music peace;
Beyond, the fragments of a world.

The sea returns
against the sand in wavewake
murmuring;
Along the low strand
Tide mark, out to the far thrown jetty,
The night brings driftwood,
remnants of a flood
Distant from here, salt grey, to be rendered smooth
And featureless in time.

The sea reflects
itself at dawn, an image
of the sky.
Along the still, cold
Edge of land I walk, hearing my steps
Measure the movement
and hear nothing else.
I stare out into the growing light and see
The sun and see no thing.

—Robert S. Zelenka

Bach's Rhetoric

by Beate Ruhm von Oppen

Those of you who have read Albert Schweitzer's great book on Bach may remember the genesis of it from the preface by Charles Widor. He describes how he, Widor, told Schweitzer one day when they were playing the chorale preludes that though he could easily see the logic of Bach in his preludes and fugues, he found much obscurity in his treatment of chorale melodies. Why these excessive contrasts of moods? Why the use of contrapuntal motifs that bore no relation to the mood of a hymn tune? Young Schweitzer told the master that all this became clear from the texts. Widor told him which pieces had puzzled him most. Schweitzer told him the texts by heart, and translated them into French on the spot. The riddles were solved. The two then spent afternoons going through all the chorale preludes and Schweitzer showed Widor, as Widor says in his preface, a Bach whom he had only very dimly divined before. He then asked young Schweitzer to write an essay on the chorale preludes for French organists. Schweitzer soon found that he had to include the cantatas and passions, to explain things. And that was the beginning of his book on Johann Sebastian Bach, the *musicien-poète*, or musician-poet, as he called him.

The man who was to have spoken here tonight,[1] Nicholas Nabokov, once said to Mr. Klein, many years ago, that Bach's texts do *not* matter, that they did not matter to Bach. In proof he mentioned the fact that Bach often re-used music with a new text that had previously been composed for another text. I am here to refute that view and I propose to address myself not only to *that* objection to taking Bach's texts seriously, but to other objections too: that the declamation is often not the declamation such texts would have were they read or spoken, even in a heightened form; that often they are submerged in the music, inaudible or unintelligible; and that some of the texts, some non-biblical texts his librettists served up to him, were uninspired, weird, or in doubtful taste.

Let me dispose of this last point straightaway and say that I am not unduly impressed or depressed by it. Tastes have changed since Bach's day and some of the conceits, some banking or cooking or medical metaphors in a few of the texts may strike us as odd—as may some of the loving, almost amorous exchanges between the soul and the savior in others. But one can live with such oddities and they are neither numerous nor important. What *is* important is Bach's musical treatment of them. And I for one am against editing them out, as some people, even Albert Schweitzer, have suggested.

Though Bach could do wonders with almost any text, he was, it seems to me, at his best when setting and interpreting the Bible. Indeed I would not call him a fifth evangelist, as has been the fashion for some decades now, but a church father, an interpreter, an exegete of Holy Scripture.

I could now proceed in Thomistic fashion, giving the other—mostly but not only secularist—objections one by one, and then my answers. What makes that procedure impossible is the fact that I can only detain you for about one hour and that I want to leave half of that to Bach himself. You ought to hear at least as much of what he does as of what I have to say about it. What he does takes time. Music takes time; it works in and with time. To allow Bach to have his say means that one must listen to what comes before a certain crucial point, even if one then brutally cuts off or fades out after that point.

I might as well start with the Nabokov objection, the existence of what are called "parodies." The most massive case of re-use of pre-existing music is the *Christmas Oratorio*. Some writers have argued that this cluster of six

[1] This is the slightly adapted text of a lecture delivered at St. John's, Annapolis, on 27 October 1972, as part of a quartet of musical lectures which also included Mrs. Allanbrook's lecture on "Dance, Gesture, and *The Marriage of Figaro*" printed in the spring, 1974, issue. Others were by Mr. Allanbrook, who dealt with keyboard music, and Virgil Thompson, who spoke on words and music in a way strongly suggestive of agreement with Nabokov, with hilarious illustrations from Handel but only a fleeting reference to Bach.

It may be odd for the work of an editor to appear in a journal. But there was a gap that needed filling, and the editorial board, not the editor, made the decision to fill it with "Bach's Rhetoric."

church cantatas was composed *before* the secular cantatas with which it shares a dozen numbers. I am not convinced. I think that here, too, as in all other known cases of parodies, the secular work came first, the sacred later—though some parallel numbers of the one and the other may go back to a common earlier source.

The *Christmas Oratorio* is not only the most massive case of parody, but it is also the one that comes closest to convincing people that parodies do prove Bach did not really care what words he combined his music with. As far as I am concerned it is, however, the *only* case where one could say an original number was "better" than the later adaptation. For the *Christmas Oratorio* Bach drew fairly extensively on a secular cantata (BWV 213) about young Hercules at the crossroads of Virtue and Voluptuousness (or Pleasure). You will hear the beginning of both versions of a tenor aria. In the secular version it is sung by Virtue who tells young Hercules that on her wings (yes, it is "her" despite the tenor voice) the budding hero shall soar and rise as on the wings of an eagle, towards stars. The soaring, on the word *schweben*, really, sensibly, "soars," hovers, floats in the air, having been lifted up, off the ground, most powerfully and elegantly by the octave swoop to a syncopated tonic and run up to the dominant, all in the first bar, on the words "*Auf meinen Flügeln*"—"*Upon* my wings."

EXAMPLE 1:

Cantata No. 213, *Hercules at the Crossroads*, and *Christmas Oratorio*

In the *Christmas Oratorio* this E-minor aria is lowered to D-minor and the tenor sings it as a song of dedication to the infant savior and asks for strength and courage for a Christian life. The first words are "*Ich will nur dir zu Ehren leben.*" The "*leben*" comes where the "*schweben*" did before. As we shall see later, weightlessness was a feature of Bach's music on the effects of grace. But in this one instance I myself feel the music has a more immediate connection with the *explicit* verbal metaphor "*schweben*" (for "to hover, or glide") than the *implied* metaphor of "*leben*" (for "to live.") (EXAMPLES 2 and 3)[2]

This is the one and only example which I myself consider somewhat superior in the original, secular version. In all the other cases of adaptation I find the sacred "parody" superior to its secular original and, where it is an adaptation of an earlier *sacred* composition, not inferior. The traffic was all one way, from secular original to sacred adaptation or "parody," or from sacred original to sacred adaptation—never the other way round, from sacred to secular.

The four short Masses are cases in point here. They are Greek "Kyries" and Latin "Glorias," short Lutheran Masses, which use music previously composed for German church cantatas. In the original the music often seems tailor-made for the verbal cadence of the German text, with such a close fit that even wordless instruments seem to say the words of the text or at least clearly refer to it. And yet that music re-combines with the different and shorter Greek and Latin texts of the Mass with triumphant success.

Does that prove the texts did not matter to Bach? Not a bit of it. The meanings of both texts are connected and in the setting of the words Bach has been both inspired and meticulous about fit and fitness.

One last word about the *Christmas Oratorio*. You have heard the first bars of the arias sung by Virtue and the Christmas version of it. There is not time—but neither is there need—to play the lullaby sung by Voluptuousness in the cantata about young Hercules and the cradle song in the *Christmas Oratorio*—same song, the one in B, the other in G. One can choose to be shocked or amused by the transformation of the singer of that lovely tune from Voluptuousness to the Virgin Mary. I am amused. But I see no reason why the nativity scene should *not* have the tenderness previously given to the allegorical figure of Pleasure. Neither can I get too excited about the fact that the *Christmas Oratorio* begins with a kettledrum taken over from the original of the opening number, a secular cantata beginning "*Tönet, ihr Pauken,*" or "Sound ye drums." (BWV 214) It was a nice literal touch to delight the groundlings in the secular work. It is in no way out of place in the jubilant first number of the *Christmas Oratorio*, which starts with words that do not have an explicit mention of drums.

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[2] All but one of the examples used and, on the occasion of the lecture, played, are currently available on records. The only exception is the Christmas cantata No. 133. The chances are that some enterprising company may again come up with a seasonable recording of that one, too. The examples played were:

Ex. 1: Beginning of tenor aria "*Auf meinen Flügeln*" from cantata No. 213.
Ex. 2: Beginning of tenor aria "*Ich will nur dir zu Ehren*" from the *Christmas Oratorio*.
Ex. 3: Repetition of Ex. 1.
Ex. 4: Beginning of cantata No. 21.
Ex. 5: Beginning of cantata No. 57.
Ex. 6: Beginning of cantata No. 54.
Ex. 7: Beginning of soprano aria from cantata No. 133.
Ex. 8: Alto aria from cantata No. 64.
Ex. 9: "*Suscepit Israel*" from the *Magnificat*.
Ex. 10: Duet "*Er denket der Barmherzigkeit*" from cantata No. 10.
Ex. 11: Beginning of cantata No. 10.

So much for the problems posed by the parodies. With my next example I want to illustrate *two* points connected with the question of declamation. My other examples will be drawn from the cantatas and the *Magnificat*. To include anything from any Motet would, I decided reluctantly, take too long. The Passion according to St. Matthew I take as read (and heard)—or, for Freshmen and Sophomores, still in the offing—and for the Passion according to St. John there is, alas, no time. Neither is there for the B-minor Mass.

Of the roughly two hundred extant church cantatas only a portion are available on record; of the rough dozen secular cantatas a much higher proportion. You may ask: why restrict the examples to what is available on records?[2] My answer is that the voices, both human and instrumental, are very important for an assessment of Bach's rhetoric and I want to give you as much of them as I can. If you want to read about the subject and try things out on the voice or piano, there are the books by Westrup and Whittaker, Spitta, Schweitzer, Pirro, Parry, Terry, Tovey, and others. And there are all the scores in the library.

And do consider Bach's texts and his treatment of them, listen to what he tried to say when he sang. Consider, also, the problem of translation: The question whether it is better to sing them or to have them sung in a language one understands and what is gained and what is lost by translation.

For words *did* matter to Bach; they assuredly and audibly mattered to him when he set them to music in the service of his church and of his Lord and God, the word made flesh. Most of the cantatas were written when he was cantor of the church and choir school of St. Thomas in Leipzig.

Bach was deeply concerned about the meaning of the scriptural and other texts which he used in his church music. He searched for the meaning and thought about it and conveyed it in a variety of ways, some of them taken straight from the art of verbal rhetoric, some of them not available to that art; but these latter, too, were governed by the word.

Verbal and musical rhetoric were seen as connected arts at his time and rhetoric was still taken very seriously and taught in the schools and universities. The connection with music was made in a whole body of teaching called the doctrine of affects or of figures. The feelings or affects were represented by musical figures, somewhat analogous to figures of speech.

Johann Sebastian Bach—unlike his sons, who in their day became more famous—was a keen and educated rhetorician. This must be clear to any careful listener to his vocal music. It was also attested by Johann Abraham Birnbaum, a teacher of rhetoric at the university of Leipzig, who wrote of Bach that

> He so perfectly knows the parts and advantages which the elaboration of a piece of music has in common with the art of rhetoric, that it is not only a most satisfying pleasure to hear his thorough discourses on the similarity and agreement between the two; but that also one can only marvel at the skilful use he makes of them in his work.

Birnbaum was defending Bach against an attack by a contemporary musician and critic, Johann Adolph Scheibe, who had asked:

> How can a man be faultless as a writer of music who has not sufficiently studied natural philosophy, so as to have investigated and become familiar with the forces of nature and of reason? How can he have all the advantages which are indispensable to the cultivation of good taste who has hardly troubled himself at all with the critical study, the cultivation and the rules which are as necessary to music as they are to oratory and poetry, so that without their aid it is hardly possible to write with feeling and expression?

What Scheibe called "the forces of nature and of reason" was now being asserted against the theology and biblical exegesis of Bach; and the new rhetoric of emotion and expressiveness began to prevail over Bach's homiletics, his preaching oratory.

Scheibe was not alone in his criticism. Rationalism was on the rise and antagonistic to revelation. But quite apart from the content of his vocal compositions, Bach was attacked for their form, too. There is no time to go into the technicalities of the doctrine of figures, though every example that follows could be discussed in technical terms. Suffice it to say that a man like Johann Mattheson, though on the one hand aware of—indeed a writer on—the system of "figures," on the other ridiculed Bach for what he took to be faulty or unnatural declamation. He found a ready target in the opening chorus of the cantata *Ich hatte viel Bekümmernis* (BWV 21) which, as he put it, "for a long time does nothing but repeat"

> I, I, I, I had much grief, I had much grief, in my heart, in my heart. I had much grief . . .

and so on, and so forth. The repetition is undeniable. But the chances are that Bach knew what he was doing. He may have wanted to present the troubled "I" imprisoned in its self-centered grief and in its self-echoing heart—then to contrast it with the consolations of the Lord delighting the soul. The English translation of the German translation of verse 19 of Psalm 94 (and I give you that, because tense and structure differ somewhat) would be: "I had many cares in my heart; but thy consolations cheered my soul."

> *Ich hatte viel Bekümmernis(se) in meinem Herzen; aber deine Tröstungen ergötzten meine Seele.*

It was that *aber*, the "but," that Bach wanted to highlight, the contrast he wanted to bring out, both directly and

indirectly, in the musical treatment of the word itself—a "mere" conjunction—*and* in that of the two halves of the whole statement. It is conjunctions—and I could give you a whole list of them—that show more clearly, perhaps, than anything else how concerned Bach was with sentence structure, grammar, and syntax—and not just with imagery.

Indeed the word *ABER* is put in a musical equivalent of capital letters triply underlined. It could not be more arresting and emphatic. (Very unlike an "*aber*" in Brahms, I would say.) It is preceded by an instrumental *sinfonia* or introduction, slow, sad, with sinuous oboe and violin parts interplaying over a shifting base of sustained and strangely modulating string and organ chords. Then comes the chorus, with the triple exclamation "*Ich, ich, ich,*" followed by quasi-fugal or canonic entries, maintaining the sadness with many suspensions, seconds, and sevenths, and introducing some agitation with hammering syllables.

EXAMPLE 4:

Cantata 21, *Ich hatte viel Bekümmernis*

Ich hatte viel Bekümmernis	I had many cares
in meinem Herzen;	in my heart;
aber deine Tröstungen	but Thy consolations
ergötzten meine Seele.	cheered my soul.

This goes on for thirty-six bars, and then comes that lapidary *ABER*:



It is the pivotal point of this number and the pivot of the message of the entire work. In this chorus it prefaces a lively section on the consolations of the Lord. The rest of the work has the same contrast, which is prefigured in this number, of anxiety and solace, even joy, culminating in a triumphal chorus of great splendor at the end. The whole work—it is Bach's longest cantata—is about that *ABER*.

You may find the first choral portion somewhat repetitious too; but you probably see the point in retrospect. Bach's contemporaries objected to it because it was "unnatural." But can "naturalness" be the sole or even the chief criterion in the musical delivery of a message?

Under that heading there is also the question of the natural stress and length of syllables in speech and what happens to them when speech is sung, or becomes song.

In one of his Motets—that is, as its name might indicate, a vocal composition with words all the time, no independent instrumental parts or interludes—Bach set the text of verses 26 and 27 of Paul's Epistle to the Romans, chapter 8:

Der Geist hilft	The Spirit helpeth
unsrer Schwachheit auf,	our infirmities,
denn wir wissen nicht,	for we know not
was wir beten sollen,	what we should pray for
wie sich's gebühret;	as we ought:
sondern der Geist selbst	but the Spirit itself
vertritt uns auf's beste	maketh intercession for us
mit unaussprechlichem Seufzen.	with groanings which cannot be uttered.

After a cheerful and vigorous first line, clearly indicative of the help given us in our weakness—especially, and most graphically, in a long, low first syllable of *Schwachheit*, which after more than four bars is swung up an octave, in the sopranos, for the syllables "*-heit auf*" (in the German the Spirit helps our weakness *up*), there is due stress on the *need* for such help, in the repeated conjunction "*denn*" (for "for we know not . . .") separated from the rest of the clause by rests and echoing from one choir to the other. After "we know not what we should pray for as we ought" comes: "*but* the spirit makes intercession for us with inexpressible groanings." And what does Bach do? At that "but," just before the word "*sondern,*" he switches from 3/8 to common time (or 4/4) which, however, he treats in a way so *un*common as to lift the listener out of his seat and shift the singer from foot to foot, uncertain where the beat comes, as you can see in the bit of notation I have given you of the clause of liberation introduced by the "*sondern:*"



The declamation on that "*sondern der Geist selbst vertritt uns auf's beste*" is, of course, what the experts of the day —and our day—would pronounce "faulty." The musical accents, put in very deliberately and consistently by Bach himself, do not fall on the stressed words or syllables. It is like a sudden off-beat bit of dance. I put the squiggly line under the word "*vertritt*" because I suspect a pun there: the verb *treten* means "to step," *vertreten* to step in the place of someone or something else. What better way to illustrate the mediation or intercession of the Spirit than by a shift of beat or tread?

Strangely enough the *ABER* in the earlier example was off-beat too. The spoken *aber* is a trochee. And it is inter-

esting that Bach, in the example from cantata No. 21 which I played before, did not bring it in on the downbeat, but on the naturally weak beat after it, and gave both syllables an unnatural, artificial stress.

Albert Schweitzer, though most keen on the imagery and pictorial aspects of Bach's music and quite capable of casting occasional aspersions on Bach's way with words, quite *rightly* referred to the next example we shall hear as one that shows the immediacy with which Bach's music arises from the natural declamation of the text of verse 12 of the Epistle of James:

Selig ist der Mann,	Blessed is the man
der die Anfechtung erduldet;	that endureth temptation:
denn nachdem er bewähret ist,	for when he is tried,
wird er die Krone des Lebens empfangen.	he shall receive the crown of life.

But now, if we do what Schweitzer tells us to do, simply read that sentence with the values and accents given to the syllables by the lengths and stresses of the notes, we discover something rather more interesting than "natural" or correct declamation.



After the threefold "*Selig*" (Blessed, blessed, blessed), the sentence gets going: blessed is the man . . . and straightaway we have misplacements of stress or length. In the relative clause that follows it gets "worse." And the most playful, dancing distortion of the spoken rhythm comes on "*Wird er die Krone des Lebens empfangen.*" The hemiola and its variant on the final "*empfangen*" are not just what one might expect in any dance of those days. It performs a rhetorical function by its very linguistic "unnaturalness." It overcomes gravity by grace. (EXAMPLE 5).

The music is mellifluous and the overall emphasis is on grace, beatitude, and the crown of life.

Compare this with a cantata that also deals with the overcoming of temptation but which does it very differently, both in text and music. It does not start and end with the blessedness that is the reward of virtue, but on the contrary starts with the imperative: "Resist sin!": "*Widerstehe doch der Sünde,*" and supports it not with a promise but a warning: "lest its poison take hold of you": "*sonst ergreifet dich ihr Gift.*" It is all struggle and conflict and even the music is "unnatural" or strained, with the singer, like the fiddles before her, coming in on the leading tone, then going down to the dominant and up to the subdominant, $\hat{7}$—$\hat{5}$, $\hat{4}$, outlining a dominant seventh chord, over an equally astonishing, insistent $\hat{1}$, and an opening chord of 7 D
4 Ab
2 F
1 Eb.

In the opening phrase the root STEH of *Widerstehe*, or "stand," as in "withstand," comes on the repeated subdominant. Later that root syllable is sustained first on the $\hat{5}$, then on the $\hat{1}$, standing its ground against the pressures of changing and conflicting harmonies.

EXAMPLE 6:

After this sombre battle song against sin, with its musical insistence on the need for steadfastness, let me just mention some other words that Bach is apt to stress by long notes, some verbs, notably, like *beten*, to pray, or *halten*, to hold. And he gives them long notes not only when they are in the grammatical imperative, as in cantata No. 67, *Halt im Gedächtnis Jesum Christ* (Hold in remembrance Jesus Christ), or No. 70, *Wachet, betet*

(Watch, pray), but in *any* mood or tense, ever mindful of the need for sustained effort and concentration, vigilance, prayer, and steadfastness. Even the evangelist's reference to Jesus *praying* in the Matthew Passion is lengthened somewhat on *betete*, though in recitative—which is closer to the spoken language—the length must be less than in an aria or chorus.

From this hortatory kind of preaching let us go to something quite different, a rhetoric that works by a choreography of layout, an art of positioning or deployment, almost what one might get in a piece of typography. It comes in the Christmas cantata *Ich freue mich in dir* (I rejoice in Thee, BWV 133). The words of the first part of the soprano aria say: "How sweetly it rings in the ear, this word: my Jesus is born. How it penetrates my heart." Even the repetition pattern of phrases and words may give you an inkling of how Bach went about setting this text:

Wie lieblich klingt es in den Ohren!	How sweetly it rings in the ear
Wie lieblich klingt es, *wie lieblich klingt es in den Ohren,* *wie lieblich klingt es in den Ohren,* *wie lieblich klingt es in den Ohren,* *wie lieblich klingt es in den Ohren,*	
dies Wort—dies Wort—dies Wort:	this word:
Mein Jesus ist geboren—geboren.	my Jesus is born.
Wie dringt es in das Herz hinein!	How it penetrates the heart!

You will hear the loveliness of the ringing before the focusing starts in earnest, on "the word, the word, the word." And when, after all this very pointed preparation, the word comes, "*Mein Jesus ist geboren,*" the first three words of it are delivered on a monotone dominant—the most concentrated way of communicating anything, I suppose, in the midst of moving music—after which the word "*geboren*" (or "born") comes down to the tonic and up again, to remain suspended on a vulnerable $\hat{6}$, then a $\hat{4}$, or subdominant, which may indeed pierce the heart, as much as any verbal or pictorial account of incarnation and nativity. (EXAMPLE 7).

There is another use for the monotone. In the example we have just heard it gave an almost hypnotic concentration on the words "*Mein Jesus ist.*" Another Christmas cantata, No. 64, *Sehet, welch eine Liebe* (See how great a love), has, in its soprano aria, a monotone emphasis on the firmness, durability, eternity of the things that Jesus gives, compared with the vanities of this world, which one can hear going up in wisps of smoke. The words for what endures are *bleibet fest und ewig steh'n* and they are delivered on monotone quarter notes, with the "*stehen*" lasting for over two bars.

The alto aria in the same cantata supplies the opposite extreme: upward leaps of major sevenths, intervals which are hard to sing but have their clear rhetorical function. When the singer sings about gladly giving *up* everything for the sake of heaven, she leaps from the lower tonic to the upper leading tone, on the word "*hin,*" or "up."

The aria is about the insignificance of the world when the inheritance of heaven is assured. Freedom from care and for an unencumbered pilgrimage through life, a dancing pilgrimage, are put to us in the jaunty and at the same time steadfast music scored only for alto, oboe d'amore, and continuo. Over the steady eighths of the 6/8 time the reed instrument and human voice interplay in wonderfully free and varied rhythm and the singer's words are placed, both in time and pitch, in ways that are much more telling than they would be if spoken. "Of the world I'm asking naught"—"*Von der Welt verlang' ich nichts*": spoken German would have very little stress on the "*von,*" none on "*der*" and much on "*Welt.*" But Bach comes down with a bounce, an unprepared downbeat, on "*Von*" and keeps doing it with tireless resilience.

Von der Welt verlang' ich nichts,	From the world I'm asking naught
wenn ich nur den Himmel erbe.	if only I inherit heaven.
Alles, Alles geb' ich hin,	All, all I give up,
weil ich genug versichert bin,	because I am sufficiently assured
dass ich ewig nicht verderbe.	that I shall not perish in all eternity.

The way he dismisses natural gravity and scatters the "*nichts*" sets the world at naught with an inspired and physical immediacy. Bach does not only say it, he *does* it. (EXAMPLE 8).

So much, then, for the delivery of texts with linguistically usual or unusual accentuation and lengths and a variety of pitches and intervals: the rhetoric of declamation and gesture and dance.

It is an oratory of *breathing,* too. In the motet *Singet dem Herrn ein neues Lied* (Sing unto the Lord a new song) Bach not only sings, rejoices, dances, and plays, as the text of the psalm enjoins, but at the end, on the words "let everything *that has breath* praise the Lord"—in German "*Alles was Odem hat lobe den Herrn,*" he enacts, brings home, the breathing, the breath of life, in loud, long, large-lunged "A"s and "O"s, a clear allusion to Alpha and Omega and at the same time a religious breathing exercise. You must listen to it for yourselves one day. Or better still, sing it.

Thus there is preachment, and there is enactment of what is preached. And, of course, the content of the preaching covers the whole range of faith, hope, charity, and the rest. Impossible to exemplify them all; but they are all there, as one would expect, in cantatas for every Sunday and Holiday of the church year.

But there is one more objection to sung sermons as such that I should deal with: not so much that they are ineffectual—and I don't believe they are; on the contrary, I believe they are more effectual than spoken sermons, on the whole—but that they can be unintelligible. I was going to say "inaudible," but actually what I mean is the kind of piece, mostly a choral piece, where the prolifera-

tion of polyphonic parts makes it hard to hear the words.

My answer to that is that indeed the words may at times be indistinct, but that at other times, sufficient times, they are clearly audible. Take, for instance, a very complex piece like the opening number of cantata No. 45 that has as its text Micah 6, verse 8: "He hath showed thee, oh man, what is good; and what does the Lord require of thee but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" The German differs a little and has something like: "You have been *told*, man, what is good and what the Lord demands of you: *namely:* to keep the word of God and to practice loving-kindness and to be humble before your God." The German is: *"Es ist dir gesagt, Mensch, was gut ist und was der Herr von dir fordert, nämlich Gottes Wort halten und Liebe üben und demütig sein vor deinem Gott."* And this is what happens: An angular and fairly agitated instrumental prelude prepares us for a grand choral fugue. The instruments keep on with their introductory music, while the vocal entries over this ritornello do not invariably have one set of music for one set of words and some of their declamation is rather "instrumental," i.e., not exactly tailored for voice or words. But we hear successive fugal entries *"Es ist dir gesagt,"* with a long *"—sagt"* for "you have been *told.*" Then the four voices sing that first phrase all together, homophonically. This happens three times, with polyphonic announcement followed by homophonic repetition. All these come through clearly. After the third homophonic repetition, the sopranos immediately and audibly carry the sentence a bit further: *"Es ist dir gesagt, Mensch, was gut ist und was der Herr von dir fordert"* (". . . What is good and what the Lord demands of you"). The way the other voices come in and combine on those words makes them only moderately audible. But Bach has taken care to get each part of the phrase across clearly somewhere or other. The altos have a clear, slow descent with a half-note to each syllable on *"was der Herr von dir for-dert"* when the agitation of the music seems otherwise too complex for comprehension of the words. But the domination of the "instrumental" rather than declamatory way of writing means that it is expedient for Bach to conclude the instalment on the first part of the sentence more homophonically, with the words more clearly audible in the last bar or two because the voices sing them all together. The orchestra then has a few bars of this angular music by itself before the choir, all voices together, homophonically and with great chordal resonance, crash in with an ultra-audible *"NÄMLICH"* on two half-note chords, followed by a bar's rest and another homophonous *"nämlich"* to launch the rest of the sentence after the "namely:" *"nämlich Gottes Wort halten und Liebe üben und demütig sein vor deinem Gott."* (Namely: to keep God's word and to practice charity and to be humble before your God.) There are long, emphatic notes on "halten," for *keeping*, holding on to, the word of God, and there is a slow and very distinct whole-note descent of the sopranos in the phrase about walking humbly before God. The whole sentence is then delivered again, in a similar though somewhat abridged form and with only one *"nämlich,"* the one that runs into the phrase about what God wants. The earlier more dramatic *"nämlich"*—with the first one quite alone, followed by a pause before the repetition—shows Bach's rhetorical method clearly. That is how an orator might stress it. What preceded it in the cantata might have made the music run away with the words; what follows it is what matters and he has to draw attention to it. So we get the audible conjunction, the "namely," or "to wit." The *biblical* context, what precedes the text of the cantata in the *Bible*, calls for the arresting *"nämlich"* even more: it is a stream of verbose questions about how the Lord may be propitiated: "Wherewith shall I come before the Lord, and bow myself before the high God? Shall I come before him with burnt-offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my firstborn for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?" None of these things, comes the answer, and refers the voluble enquirer to an earlier communication—"you were *told*"—and then, patiently, sternly, spells it out once more: NAMELY: obedience to the word of God, love, and humility. And in case the musical excitement of it all is too great for the congregation to take it in—i.e., the prose of it—as clearly as it should, the tenor, before himself singing his electrifying aria on the consequences of the knowledge of what is due to God, recapitulates what the opening chorus has sung, in the clearly audible (and very expressive) paraphrase of his recitative, stressing the need for fear of and obedience to the Lord, for humility, and love.

From this discussion of the audibility or intelligibility of a text let me finally go on to a much more difficult matter: wordless messages. There are what is known as *cantus firmi* in many of the cantatas. A *cantus firmus* is a hymn tune or chant sung in slow motion in the midst or on top of a polyphonic piece. There is the advantage, here, of simultaneity: you can say several things at once in music. But that is not all.

The ripieno choir's entry with the slow soprano line *O Lamm Gottes unschuldig* in the opening number of the Matthew Passion, on the cue, the word "lamb," provided by the complex double chorus below, is very powerful when it happens. What would be the effect of that passion hymn—a German adaptation of the Latin *Agnus Dei*—if it were not sung, but played on a wind instrument? That, in fact, is Bach's more usual procedure, and the wordlessness of such *cantus firmi* may increase their power—provided, of course, the listener registers them, as any attentive listener will. Bach wrote for a congregation that not only registered but recognized them.

Bach's familiarity with the hymnal was such that he drew on whatever verse of whatever hymn was most apposite at any given moment—witness the reshuffling of the original order of stanzas in the passion chorales, for instance, in the Passions according to St. John and St. Matthew, and, of course, with different, appropriate harmonizations. An instrumental *cantus firmus* is just a melodic line and leaves it to the listener to think of the intended words, perhaps even to choose between two or more possible sets of words.

It is in part this ambiguity and appeal to the listener to think, to articulate for himself, that gives a wordless *cantus firmus* such force. Its increasingly arcane nature, the growing secrecy of the message with the waning of the tradition that Bach could still take for granted in his day, may actually add to its force—provided the listener attends and engages himself. It is less a matter of "research," though that may help, than of *attention*.

Once one knows that Bach is up to such tricks as *cantus firmi*, registering them is the first step to identifying them, either by instant recognition or by a little effort. The immediacy of a lost tradition may be gone, but familiarity with a surviving bit of it may help, and so may familiarity with other works by Bach or by other composers. Let me give you an example.

The traditional tune of the Magnificat is not sung in Bach's Latin *Magnificat*. It is *played* by the oboes over the singers'

Suscepit Israel puerum suum,	He helped his servant Israel
recordatus misericordiae suae.	in remembrance of his mercy.

EXAMPLE 9:
TONUS PEREGRINUS in the Magnificat (Suscepit Israel)

It is, on the other hand, *sung* as well as played in various movements of Bach's so-called German Magnificat, the cantata *Meine Seele erhebt den Herrn* (My soul doth magnify the Lord, BWV 10); and in the alto and tenor duet *"Er denket der Barmherzigkeit und hilft seinem Diener Israel auf"* which corresponds to the Latin *"Suscepit Israel,"* the *cantus firmus* is also given to the oboes while the singers and continuo sigh away in a phrase dominated by descending minor seconds.

Er denket der Barmherzigkeit	He remembers his mercy
und hilft seinem Diener Israel auf.	and helps his servant Israel up.

EXAMPLE 10:
TONUS PEREGRINUS in alto/tenor duet of cantata No. 10

One strange thing about that tune is its age and long history. (And tradition is another kind of simultaneity.) The tune is known as the *Tonus Peregrinus* and was originally, from the 9th century onward, associated with psalm 114, *In exitu Israel*, the one the pilgrims sing in Dante's *Purgatory*: "When Israel went out of Egypt . . ." It now survives in the doxology of some English-speaking churches. I am glad to say that two of Bach's settings of it are included in the Music for Freshman Chorus. And I would like to end with yet another, the setting that *begins* cantata No. 10. The German words mean: "My soul doth magnify the Lord and my spirit rejoices in God my savior. For he hath regarded the lowliness of his handmaiden: for behold from henceforth all generations shall call me blessed." The words are spoken by the Virgin Mary after the annunciation, when she visits her cousin Elisabeth (Luke 1, verse 46-48). But you may prefer to think of the pilgrims in the *Divine Comedy*—or, for that matter, anywhere.

Meine Seel' erhebt den Herren	My soul magnifies the Lord
und mein Geist freuet sich	and my spirit rejoices
Gottes, meines Heilandes;	in God, my saviour;
denn er hat seine elende Magd	for he has his lowly handmaiden
angesehen.	regarded. (German word order)
Siehe, von nun an	Behold, from now on
werden mich selig preisen	shall call me blessed
alle Kindes Kind.	all children's children.

EXAMPLE 11:

TONUS PEREGRINUS in soprano and alto parts of the opening chorus of cantata No. 10.

CAMPUS—ALUMNI NEWS



Dean Robert Neidorf addresses the Graduate Institute at the August 16 commencement.

Institute Graduates 29

The Graduate Institute in Liberal Education concluded its eighth annual session with the awarding of 29 master's degrees. These graduates bring the total number of Graduate Institute degree holders to 143.

This year's institute graduates are: Bruce M. Adams, Paul F. Bitting, Paula H. Cohen, Terrence N. Dilley, Martin A. Drew, Edward H. Fitzpatrick, M. Signithia Fordham, Lorraine Y. Garcia, Paul J. Garrett, Gene M. Handy, Kathleen Horan, Barbara H. Howells, Anne L. Kinard.

Also, Norman E. Levan, Renate J. Lewis, Patricia B. Mager, Lois B. Martin, Virginia S. Newlin, Kenneth A. Parker, Joseph S. Pluchinotta, Mary D. Reed, Sandra N. Robinson, Margaret I. Sansom, Ramona Scholder, Clara L. Small, Cecil J. Smith, Jerome C. Smith, M. Carol Spreitzer, and Laquita J. Wood.

High School Program

St. John's third special summer program for high school students was again held in Santa Fe in 1974.

Coming from racially and geographically mixed backgrounds, the 18 inner-city 10th and 11th graders interspersed twice-weekly seminars and two separate tutorials with horseback riding, Indian dances, museum trips, hiking and camping, a rodeo, and the Santa Fe Opera.

Emphasis in this year's readings was on political works, and on philosophical and literary works which have a bearing on political questions. Once again, the students demonstrated their ability to read and discuss works by authors from Plato and Sophocles through Tocqueville to the framers of the fundamental American political documents.

Mellon Tutorships

Three members of the Annapolis faculty have been appointed to Andrew W. Mellon Tutorships by the Board of Visitors and Governors. They are Bert Thoms, Curtis Wilson and Elliott Zuckerman.

Those already holding such honorary appointments are Laurence Berns, Samuel Kutler, Michael Littleton, Robert B. Williamson, and E. Malcolm Wyatt.

Homecoming

Homecoming 1974 reached its climax at a reception and banquet on Saturday night, November 2nd, when more than 200 alumni and guests gathered at the Annapolis Hilton Inn.

President and Mrs. Weigle, earlier in the day elected to honorary membership in the Alumni Association, received a membership certificate as well as a sterling bowl symbolizing Mr. Weigle's 25 years as St. John's 18th president.

The weekend started with a lecture by Samuel S. Kutler '54 of the Annapolis faculty, followed by a "beer and conversation" gathering in the basement common room of Chase-Stone House. Alumni, seniors, faculty, and others rallied 'round a flowing keg and talked until the very small hours.

A true highpoint of the weekend, and the core of a very successful homecoming, was the silver anniversary reunion of the Class of 1949. Led by Jonathan Brooks and Allan Hoffman, with local coordination by Peter

Alumni Summer Programs

Last summer's program for alumni and their families, held in Santa Fe, was by all accounts a great success. About 40 persons were enrolled during the two-week period, 12 of them for both weeks.

Alumni classes represented ranged from the 40's to the 70's, and several non-alumni spouses participated. All were impressed by the ease with which such diverse ages came together for genuinely good tutorials and seminars.

The obvious success of this first program in Santa Fe, together with the strongly affirmative response to last spring's questionnaire, will lead to similar programs on both campuses for summer, 1975. And while final decisions had not been worked out by press time, the following information is available:

On the Annapolis campus the program will be held during the period June 15 to 29, in Santa Fe from August 3 to 17. As last year, alumni and their families may attend either or both weeks, and alternative tutorials and seminars will be offered each week. There will be ample opportunity for sight-seeing and recreation, and supervised activities for younger children will be available for a modest fee.

Full details for both programs will be sent to all alumni early in February, giving all information on curricula, faculty, and tuition and housing fees. While costs will not be as low as last year, every effort is being made to keep them at a minimum.

Meanwhile, plan now to attend one or the other of these interesting sessions, or both, if the spirit and pocketbook are both willing!

Hamill, 26 alumni and their guests descended on the College in great good spirit.

In a real coup, the '49'ers brought former president Stringfellow Barr with them to lead a special seminar on *The Federalist*. The class then enrolled Mr. Barr into its ranks at the banquet, where he was presented with a hand-illuminated scroll of appreciation. As a special gift he also received a copy of Volume I of the Journals of the Continental Congress, covering the period September, 1774, through December, 1775.

The class also made Mr. Weigle an honorary member, and presented him with a Steuben crystal sculpture inscribed "RDW '49." As Allan Hoffman said so aptly, this brought about what was otherwise impossible: "Winkie" Barr and Dick Weigle became classmates!

Association Annual Meeting

At the Annual Meeting on Homecoming afternoon a new slate of officers and directors was elected.

Bernard F. Gessner '27 and William W. Simmons '48 were reelected president and executive vice president, respectively. Edward F. Lathrop '38 was elected secretary and Carol P. Tilles '59 became treasurer.

Other directors elected were Franklin R. Atwell '53, Mary A. DeC. Braun '58, Garnett Y. Clark '36, E. Roy Shawn '35, and Patricia W. von Schwerdtner '70.

In other action the membership voted to donate $500 to the College for purchase of lighting equipment for Key Auditorium; to recommend that the College obtain rights to Scott Buchanan's printed works and to consider publishing them; and to direct the Board of Directors to review College publications such as lectures, with a view toward listing them in some appropriate publication so that alumni might purchase them.

Award of Merit

One of the most important actions of the Association Annual Meeting on Homecoming Day was the presentation of the Alumni Award of Merit for 1974.

Selected this year were John D. Alexander, Sr., of the Class of 1920, the Hon. Benjamin Michaelson, Sr., Class of 1912, and Ernst O. von Schwerdtner, Class of 1917.

Mr. Alexander, a native of Maryland's Eastern Shore, is a prominent Baltimore lawyer and former law school instructor. For many years he was active with the old Maryland Tuberculosis Association, and is a past president of the St. John's Alumni Association. He is the father of John D. Alexander, Jr., '53, also an attorney in Baltimore.

Judge Michaelson is a long-time resident of Anne Arundel County (Md.). He was for years general counsel for the County Commissioners, and then headed the group which replaced the Commissioners with a charter form of government. At the time of his retirement in 1962 Judge Michaelson was chief judge of the Fifth Circuit Court.

Mr. von Schwerdtner has been a St. Johnnie all his life, since he was born while his father was on the faculty of the College. After graduation as valedictorian of the class he taught in several high schools and four colleges, one of the latter his own *alma mater*. At each of these institutions "Vonnie" combined the coaching of one or more sports with his academic work. In 1968 he retired as head of the modern language department at Towson State College near Baltimore.

This year's recipients join 29 other alumni who have received the Award since it was first presented in 1950. The resolution adopted by the membership at the Annual Meeting, October 22, 1949, reads as follows:

"RESOLVED: That an Award of Merit in the form of a written scroll may be made annually by the Alumni Association and presented by the President thereof during the graduation exercises at the College to an alumnus of the College for distinguished and meritorious service to the United States or to his native state or to St. John's College, or for outstanding achievement within his chosen field."

In 1953 the resolution was modified to provide for presentation at Home-

coming, and in 1970 it was further modified to allow for not more than three awards to be made.

CLASS NOTES

1912

In the past year, *Philip L. Alger* has received two notable awards, the first the Schenectady County (N.Y.) Bar Association's Liberty Bell award for distinguished community service. Then in August Mr. Alger was presented the IEEE Power Society's 1974 Power-Life Award. Established in 1970, this award recognizes power engineers who have made significant contributions in the field of harmonious development of man and his environment.

1921

Dr. *Thomas B. Turner*, long-time member and former chairman of the Board of Visitors and Governors, is the author of *"Heritage of Excellence,"* a book covering a 32-year segment of the history of the Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions. Dr. Turner, dean emeritus of the Hopkins Medical School, presented a copy of his book to the College last spring.

1927

Louis D. Clark writes that *Ira Fulton Catlin*, who taught at St. Paul's School for Boys in Baltimore and at several colleges, is now living in retirement in Almond, N.Y.

1939

James E. "Barney" Boyle returned to the United States this fall from Germany, where he was director of the German-American Institute in Tübingen, West Germany.

1941

Philip H. Dougherty's July 30th column in the *New York Times*, a feature covering the advertising business, devotes considerable space to remarks by *Victor G. Bloede, III*, on the "dirty tricks" in the agency business. The occasion was Vic's farewell as outgoing chairman of the American Association of Advertising Agencies. He is quoted as saying: "I have to believe the people in this business could compete just as vigorously while observing certain civilized standards of business behavior. . . . Come to think of it, dirty tricks may be going out of style anyhow."

1944

The following from *Jake Smedley* is self-explanatory: "We were never much on organization, but '44 salvaged a small last-minute reunion for number thirty. Kitty and *Dave Dobreer* took a break from medical practice in California to come early and visit daughter Sallie, a senior with an eye on a math thesis. Georgie and *Jake Smedley*, your scribe, joined them for Friday dinner and the lecture, bringing news from *Haven Simmons*, who would be in Annapolis later in the month, and *Sig Sorenson*, recently hit with an ulcer operation and unemployment. Sig asks where is *Fred de Armond*; anybody know?

"The Einstein seminar was stimulating but imposing, and it was good to see *Jimmy Raley's* smiling face waiting in the dining room. Still full of blarney, he escaped for a few hours from St. Mary's County, where he is in charge of school construction. Next came *Russ Levering*, still in tobacco but on the government end now, and still in great enough shape to field the strongest foot in the alumni-student soccer game.

"Jim and Russ left, but *Herb Taylor*, our '44 in residence, was on hand, and Eleanor and *Thad Prout* arrived to join in tribute to Weigle and Winkie at the dinner. Thad is chief of medicine at Greater Baltimore Medical Center and active in medical research.

"In a few hours it was over. This was my first reunion in 25 years. Annapolis and the college changes and so do we. Guards hover over the campus and the streets at night are uneasy. We have greyed or balded or slowed a step. Yet there is vitality in the college and in us. Heading back to social work at the Children's Village in Dobbs Ferry (N.Y.), I felt some emptiness: I suppose I had sought the past, but the present is good."

As a footnote: two and one-half weeks after the above-noted gathering, *Howell Cobb* was on campus and stopped for a fine talk in the Alumni Office. He was here showing St. John's to daughter Mary Ann as she sorts and searches through colleges. A post-WW II Virginia law graduate, Howell is in practice in Beaumont, Texas.

1947

Paul G. Sifton, the Early American History specialist of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, has been elected a director of The Manuscript Society, an international group of collectors, curators, and scholars established to foster the greater use of original source manuscript material in the study, teaching, and writing of history.

1948

LeRoy E. Pagano is the new chairman of the Department of Business at Staten Island Community College. He had been a member of the faculty at Newark College of Engineering before moving on to Staten Island.

1949

A clipping from the Yonkers, N.Y. *Herald Statesman* for November 6th contains an interesting profile on *Aaron Bisberg*, who last April became a "corporate drop-out" to open The County Bike Center in Armonk, N.Y. Our thanks to *Jake Smedley* '44 for sending this item to us.

Gordon E. McNamee, film producer, writes that *Robert L. Campbell* '45 wrote the script for "my latest science-thrill movie 'Understanding Underwater Chest Drainage'," and will do another script this fall. It was only after working together for some time that the two discovered their educational connection. (Could the article in the June *Reporter* have helped?)

1950

John J. Logue, director of Villanova University's World Order Research Institute, lectured this past May on "The Future of the Oceans" at the Universities of Stockholm, Gothenburg, Oslo, and Amsterdam.

1951

Last May *Alfred P. Franklin* was awarded the M.B.A.-N degree by Rutgers University.

1955

Barbara (Brunner) Oosterhout is now a student at the Law School of the University of Maryland.

1956

Our very mobile TV news director, *Pasquale L. Polillo*, has become Vice President for News of the TV Stations Group for Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, with offices in New York City.

1958

Nancy (Eagle) Lindley received the degree of Master of Music at the 1974 Commencement at West Virginia University.

1959

After five years as an administrator of a middle school in Tallahassee, Fla., *John E. McDevitt, III*, is now assistant director of the Leon County (Fla.) program for gifted children, and is very excited about the possibilities for this pilot project.

1960

Katherine (Hsu) Haas tells us that she and *Raymond* '58 have sold their ranch in North Dakota, and are now in Annapolis for a while. Both are teaching at Key School, she in elementary school, he in high school. Katherine has just received her B.S. degree from the University of North Dakota.

1961

Michael G. Gold and Rene Selvin were married in New York on April 21, 1974.

Paul Rosenberg is now Information Manager of the Baltimore Region Institutional Studies Center.

John R. Pekkanen, author of the recent book *The American Connection* and former *Life* magazine correspondent, has been chosen for the Drug Abuse Council Fellowship program for 1974-75. John will consider the influences of drug manufacturers on medical school education, a line of investigation arising from his book.

1963

William N. Davis in June was elected vice president of the brokerage firm of White, Weld and Company in Boston. Will, his wife *Jessica (Hoffman)* '65 and, to quote her, "three magnificent sons," Joshua, aged 9, Alexander, aged

6, and Benjamin, aged 2, live in Newton, Mass.

Alan H. Dorfman has joined the Annapolis faculty full-time this fall, after teaching freshman mathematics last year. Alan holds a master's degree in mathematics from Johns Hopkins University.

J. Morrow and Carol (Dimit) Otis have announced the birth, on October 22nd, of Jordan Morrow Hunter Otis.

A memorial fund has been set up in Annapolis by the family and friends of *Elliott A. Rosenberg*, who died in February, 1972.

1964

Advice from Pomona College informs us that *William P. Banks* has been promoted to associate professor of psychology for this academic year. Bill, a member of the Pomona faculty since 1969, holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Johns Hopkins University.

Ralph E. Englesby is teaching at the Pasir Ridge School in Borneo, a school run for the Union Oil Company of Indonesia.

1965

Very late we have become aware of an August, 1973, article in *Business Week* which mentions *Sharon L. Bishop*. Sharon is an associate, and one of the top women, in the management consulting firm of Booz, Allen and Hamilton in Washington, D.C. The company specializes in services to government and nonprofit clients in the social welfare field. Sharon has published in several professional journals.

Grace (Logerfo) Dawson is the co-author, with Thomas Muller, of "The Impact of Annexation on City Finances: A Case Study in Richmond, Virginia," published by the Urban Institute.

Mary Louise (Biggar) Main was awarded the degree of doctor of philosophy by Johns Hopkins University on May 24th. The entire college community was saddened by the death, on June 20th, of Mary's husband, Alvin. He had been a member of the St. John's faculty since 1960, and was on leave of absence at the time of his death. Mary is on the faculty of the University of California at Berkeley.

1966

The guest preacher on Sunday, June 23rd, at St. Anne's Church in Annapolis was the Rev. *William N. McKeachie*, the Diocesan Theologian of the Diocese of Toronto, Canada.

1967

Karen S. Walker was scheduled to receive her B.S. degree in tropical agriculture in December from the University of Hawaii. Her plans were then to go into graduate work in genetics.

1968

Bartholomew Lee paid us a visit in the Alumni Office early in the fall. Bart is now with the law firm of Frederick P. Furth in San Francisco, working "16-18 hours a day," and apparently enjoying every minute of it.

Another new tutor in Annapolis this year is *Deborah Schwartz*. She comes back to the campus with two master's degrees, one in psycholinguistics from Johns Hopkins University, the other in French and linguistics from Georgetown University.

The editorial page of the *New York Times* for July 20th carried a brief article by *Jonathan H. Sinnreich*, questioning the justification for individual state bar examinations. And Jon himself was scheduled to take the New York State version of those examinations on the next two days!

1969

James Cromartie (SF) has completed his Ph.D. degree in ecology at Cornell University, and was due to join the faculty of Stockton State College (N.J.) in late summer as an assistant professor of environmental studies.

M. Richard Stevens, missionary-in-charge of St. John's in-the-Wilderness Episcopal Mission in Allakeket, Alaska, and Miss Linda Epstein were married on June 11th in Allakaket. The service was performed by an Athabascan Indian, the first graduate of Richard's training classes for the sacramental priesthood. The new Mrs. Stevens is Associate Fiction Editor of *Cosmopolitan* magazine. Richard hopes to start work a year from now on an M.A. degree in special education for emotionally disturbed children, possibly at Columbia University.

Catherine (Allen) Wagner has received a fellowship from the Henry L. and Grace Doherty Charitable Foundation, Inc., to study the iconography of ceremonial art in highland Peru during the Incaic and early Colonial periods. The grant covers travel costs for her and accompanying family, a 12-month living allowance and minimum research needs. Cathy is a graduate student in anthropology at the University of Illinois.

1971

Rather indirectly we have learned that *Jane (Goldwin) Bandler* is in Washington, D.C., at the Montessori Institute this winter.

Information reaches us that *Peter Blachly* has become a Sikh, with a new name, Singh Sahib Sat Peter Singh. Peter plays guitar in, and manages, the Khalsa String Band.

Shire Chafkin has been transferred from New Jersey to Colorado by his employer, Tri-Chem, Inc. Shire heads a sales force of 1,100 women in Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico, and Texas.

1972

After a year of accumulating graduate courses in chemistry and mathematics, *T. Alex Lawson* (SF) has accepted a teaching assistant position with the chemistry department at Arizona State University. He is ultimately working toward a Ph.D. degree in organic chemistry.

Ensign *Dana E. Netherton* is stationed aboard the U.S.S. Nathan Hale, a Poseidon-class nuclear submarine now undergoing overhaul at the Bremerton (Wash.) Naval Shipyard.

A card from *Susan (Kiralis) Shipman* tells us that *David* entered the philosophy department of the University of North Carolina this fall, and that son Ezra Lee was one year old about the same time.

1973

Peter Fairbanks and his wife are living in Wexham, Buckinghamshire, England, while he is an apprentice with Sotheby & Co., studying the "art trade." The Fairbankses found a "lovely red-brick orangery" to live in, and hope to stay put until late next summer. They see *John Dean* '70 frequently, and had a visit from *Peter Squitieri* during the summer. The Fairbanks's address in Wexham is The Orangery, Langley Park.

Another recent fellowship winner is *Mark Jordan* (SF), who has received a Richard M. Weaver Fellowship, paying tuition and a stipend of $2,000 to a prospective university teacher committed to the liberal arts. Although the grant may be used at any university here or abroad, Mark has selected the University of Texas for his studies.

In Memoriam

1916—Col. Jacob M. Pearce, Phoenix, Ariz., September 19, 1974.

1916—Col. Guy D. Thompson, Annapolis, Md., November 10, 1974.

1918—Dr. Charles L. Billingslea, Westminster, Md., October, 1974.

1920—Dr. Thomas P. Thompson, Aberdeen, Md.

1922—Heath D. Goldsborough, Severna Park, Md., November 27, 1974.

1922—Richard T. Porter, Salisbury, Md., September 24, 1974.

1925—Edward P. Tickey, West Haven, Conn., September 12, 1974.

1936—John D. Hampshire, Baltimore, Md., September 23, 1974.

1948—Dr. Thomas H. Blatt, Pikesville, Md., October 22, 1974.

1948—Alan S. Maremont, San Francisco, Cal., September 3, 1974.

1974—SF—Max Waite Ball, II, Santa Fe, N.M., September, 1974.

Faculty (SF)—Ingeborg Lorenz Lang, Colorado Springs, Col., September 28, 1974.

Nominations for the Board of Visitors and Governors

Next spring two vacancies will be created for alumni representatives on the Board of Visitors and Governors of the College with the expiration of the current terms of Dr. *Eugene Cozzolino* of the Class of 1929 and *John D. Oosterhout* of the Class of 1951. Dr. Cozzolino has asked that he not be nominated for a second term, and Mr. Oosterhout is ineligible for re-election, having served two consecutive terms.

Accordingly, the directors of the Alumni Association, following procedures established by the Polity of the College and the Association By-Laws, have nominated *James H. Frame* of the Class of 1950 and *William W. Simmons* of the Class of 1948 to fill the positions being vacated by Messrs. Cozzolino and Oosterhout.

Provision is also made in the Polity and By-Laws for nomination by petition of any thirty alumni. This year *Jonathan D. Sinnreich* of the Class of 1968 has been nominated by such a petition.

The result of all this is that there are three nominees for the two vacancies mentioned above. (Their pictures and brief biographical sketches appear elsewhere on this page.) Thus an election must be conducted by mail ballot, with the two nominees receiving the highest number of votes being considered elected. All alumni (graduates and former students whose classes have graduated) are eligible to vote.

A ballot appears at the bottom of this page. Please vote for *two* alumni, no more, no less; the By-Laws provide that a vote for two of the candidates is required for validity. Detach and mail the ballot to me at St. John's College, Annapolis, Maryland 21404, so as to reach me *no later than* March 15, 1974. The results of the balloting will be announced in the April issue of this magazine.

Thomas Parran, Jr.
Director of Alumni Relations

Frame

Jim Frame is Director, Programming Development, Language and Data Facilities, at IBM's System Development Division Programming Center, Palo Alto, Cal. Since he joined IBM in 1956 Jim has held a number of positions, including Programming Center Manager, Raleigh, N.C., and Programming Systems Manager at IBM's facility in Uithoorn, Netherlands. He is now responsible for programming development activities and languages related to data base / data communications products. Jim, his wife Heloise (Albritton) and their seven children make their home in Los Altos Hills, Cal. Son Matthew is a graduate of the class of 1973 at St. John's, while daughter Margaret is a former member of the class of 1974.

Simmons

Bill Simmons is one of three brothers who attended St. John's. After graduation he attended the University of Virginia for a short period. He came back to Annapolis in 1950 to join Fawcett Boat Supplies, Inc., a marine supplier in the Chesapeake Bay area. Bill is currently vice president of the company which is headed by Richard H. Hutchings of the class of 1944. Bill is a member of several boating clubs and organizations, and has been active in a number of civic groups. He has served as treasurer of the St. John's Alumni Association. For the past two years Bill has been executive vice president of the Association. Bill and his wife Anne (McKay) live in Severna Park, Md., and are the parents of two college-age offspring.



Sinnreich

Jon Sinnreich, after graduation in 1968, worked first as a junior high mathematics teacher, then as a technician with the Anne Arundel County (Md.) Office of Planning and Zoning. He entered the University of Virginia School of Law in 1970, and finished there in January, 1974. While in Charlottesville he managed a low-cost housing project, served as a consultant to the State Planning Subcommittee of the Virginia Legislature, and was a winter law clerk with the firm of Arnold & Porter. Jon is now a litigation associate at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison in New York City. He and his wife, Masha (Zager) of the class of 1970, and their young son, Aram Arthur make their home in Manhattan.

CUT ALONG THIS LINE

BALLOT–ALUMNI REPRESENTATIVES BOARD OF VISITORS AND GOVERNORS

I hereby cast my ballot for the two candidates indicated (a vote for two candidates is required to validate ballot):

James H. Frame '50 _____

William W. Simmons '48 _____

Jonathan H. Sinnreich '68 _____

Detach and mail to: Alumni Office
St. John's College
Annapolis, Md. 21404

SALUTE to *The St. John's Review*

The first issue of a new student publication appeared on 18 November 1974. Its name, content, and editorial policy (especially the plan to compose future issues around single topics) are so promising that we would like to welcome it here.

Our salute to this new journal is whole-hearted, though it comes with one auspicious and one drooping eye. *The St. John's Review* will make it even harder for *The College* to get contributions from students past and present. It is the failure of some students and alumni articles to reach me when they were needed that made us resort to J. S. Bach when we might have had something on mythological tapestries or an account of the route taken by Odysseus as recently sailed and seen by a St. John's student or, for that matter, the hoped-for responses to the Commencement addresses of the summer issue. On the whole, however, the *Review* is not only going to be a good thing in itself but likely even to benefit *The College:* by printing interesting contributions and prompting others—perhaps even contributions for *The College* which are eagerly awaited.

B.R.v.O.

The College
St. John's College
Annapolis, Maryland 21404

Second-class postage paid at Annapolis, Maryland, and at additional mailing offices.