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first, DE:DF comp. CA:AG, upright:transverse,

second, pllg AP = gnomon AHJ.

The first follows from the proportion DE:DF :: AU:AN,
since AU:AN comp. AU:AB, AB:AN, and since AB:AN :: AC:AG, therefore

DE:DF comp. CA:AG, upright AU:transverse AB.

The second is shown in 4 steps:

1. Since pllg NP = pllg GH (by congruent triangles) therefore pllg MP = pllg GQ.
2. But pllg GQ = pllg AL (since GN=AG),
3. and pllg AL = pllg JM (pllgs about dia.),
4. therefore pllg JM = pllg MP, and gnomon AHJ = pllg AP. Q.E.D.

Since all these steps are convertible, the generalization of I.12 is proved from I.41 by writing this proof backwards.

ANALOGY AND UNDERSTANDING

Robin Smith '68
Freshman Prize Essay
(Santa Fe)

[The quotations from the Republic in this paper are mostly from Paul Shorey's translation. However, I have occasionally made slight alterations to suit myself.]

Part I

Probably the most commonly used - and, indeed, the most effective - means of explaining is the analogy. Analogy, generally speaking, explains the unfamiliar and unknown by means of similar things which are familiar and known and which have the same relationships among themselves as the unfamiliar things. Unfortunately, this definition tells us that analogy explains the unfamiliar and unknown in terms of familiar and known things which are analogously related, for "in the same relationship" may be considered synonymous with "analogously." How, then, does analogy create any understanding of some matter? The answer to this question seems to be contained in the Republic, in the three important comparisons of the sixth and seventh books: the simile of the sun and the good, the analogy of the divided line, and the allegory of the cave.

The simile of the sun is introduced at 506E as an account of "what seems to be the offspring of the good and most like it." Socrates describes the good in this indirect manner because he fears the insufficiency of his powers for a direct description: ". . . I fear that my powers may fail and that in my eagerness I may cut a sorry figure and become a laughing stock." However, Socrates has just finished describing the corruption of philosophic natures and how the philosopher is useless - in fact, ridiculous - in existing society. Glaucon will later exclaim at the extreme to which Socrates' comparison goes, "Heaven help us, such a hyperbole!" (Ἀπολλονίᾳ δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς). What is to be made of the laughability of Socrates and of the philosopher?

The answer to this question is not immediately forthcoming. However, let us examine this simile which Socrates is offering. In setting it

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Cover drawn by Paul Ollswang '66

ERROR AND SENSE DECEPTION IN DESCARTES' MEDITATIONS

Robert Licht '65
Honorable Mention
Senior Thesis 1965

Preface

It is not our intention in this thesis to reveal the possible paradoxes in Descartes' Meditations. Rather, our effort has been directed to an attempt to bring to light one significant end for which the Meditations was written. To accomplish this we found it necessary to undertake a somewhat laborious analysis of certain arguments, mainly in the fourth and sixth meditations. For this reason, our argument for the most part is a kind of discontinuous commentary. This is unfortunate since the continuity* depends mainly on the continuity of the text of the Meditations. Therefore, as an aid for the reader we have placed page and paragraph references in the left-hand margin of those sections which deal with the fourth and sixth meditations. Since the Dover edition[1] has been used throughout, except where references are made to the French and Latin edition[2], the reader is respectfully requested to consecutively number the paragraphs of the fourth and sixth meditations of his copy.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

> ". . . so soon as I had acquired some general notions concerning Physics . . . I observed to what point they might lead us, and how much they differ from the principles of which we have made use up to the present time, I believed that I could not keep them concealed without greatly sinning against the law which obliges us to procure . . . the general good of all mankind. For they caused me to see that it is possible to attain knowledge which is very useful in life, and that, instead of a speculative philosophy . . . we may find a practical philosophy by means of which, knowing the force and the action of fire, water, air, the stars, heavens and all other bodies that environ us . . . we

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* of our argument

1) Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. I, Trans. by E. S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross, 1931 ed., Dover Publications, N. Y.

2) Meditationes De Prima Philosophia-Meditations Metaphysiques, Latin text with French translation of the Duc de Luynes, 5th ed., Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 1960

> can . . . employ them in all those uses to which they are adapted, and thus render ourselves the masters and possessors of nature. This is not merely to be desired with a view to the invention of an infinity of arts and crafts which enable us to enjoy without any trouble the fruits of the earth and all the good things which are to be found there, but also principally because it brings about the preservation of health, which is without doubt the chief blessing and the foundation of all the other blessings in this life."
>
> -Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, p. 119, Dover edition

Introduction

It is hardly possible to discuss, or even mention, Descartes' Meditations without referring to the "problem" of doubt. We are not so original that we have found a new path, without doubt, into the Meditations. Indeed, we begin, openly, with doubt.

The plan of this work is simple. In this introduction we make some general observations about the first two Meditations with a view to laying the groundwork for the arguments that follow. Our main considerations are doubt and its origin and limitations, then certainty, and finally, the cogito. We then proceed to a discussion, in some detail, of the fourth Meditation and its arguments on the subject of error, and then a similar, but more extensive discussion of the sixth Meditation. We close with various conclusions about certain arguments, and some discussion of the implications of others. While we have not here examined closely the difficult and important arguments of the third and fifth Meditations, we have not neglected them either. Where relevant we refer to particular arguments that they contain. Further, we have prefaced our discussions of the fourth and sixth Meditations with some considerations of their "place" in the work, which has entailed some attention to the third and fifth. If the objection were raised that the Meditations cannot be fully understood without reflection on the third and especially the fifth, we would not disagree.

Doubt and Its Origins and Limitations

> "But it may be that although the senses sometimes deceive us concerning things which are hardly perceptible,

> or very far away, there are yet many others to be met with as to which we cannot reasonably have any doubt, although we recognize them by their means. . . And how could I deny that these hands and this body are mine, were it not perhaps that I compare myself to certain persons, devoid of sense, whose cerebella are so troubled and clouded by the violent vapours of black bile. . ." (p. 145)

This passage contains both the immediate origins and the limitations of doubt. It does not contain the purpose of doubt, which is bound up with its opposite, certainty. It is a question of appearances, The deepest origins of doubt however, do lie primarily in its opposite, for the purpose of the Meditations is clearly stated in the opening paragraph:

> ". . . I must once for all seriously undertake to rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted. . . . if I wanted to establish any firm and permanent structure in the sciences." (p. 144)

Again, it is a question of appearances. Having discovered that many of his former opinions are false, which he once held as true, and that he had accepted as most true those he had "learned either from the senses, or through the senses" (p. 145) he is inclined to doubt the senses. For his senses have, in the past, occasionally deceived him about appearances, "and it is wiser not to trust entirely to anything by which we have once been deceived." (ibid). Thus the immediate origins of doubt are in the knowledge that he has, in the past, been deceived by his senses. Certainly, although the particular deceptions of sense are not specified, other than things, "which are hardly perceptible, or very far away", they cannot, on the face of it, be very serious, that is, so serious as to disrupt significantly the course of his life. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assert that "it is wiser not to trust entirely" to things that have once deceived us. But if we consider the end in view, that is, the desire for certainty, then we may justify elevating doubt to a more serious position. This "elevation" is to raise doubt to a rule: ". . . reason already persuades me that I ought no less carefully to withhold my assent from matters which are not entirely certain and indubitable than from those which appear to me manifestly to be false." (ibid). But, in elevating doubt, we must not forget its limitation - he is not mad, he does not "deny that these hands and this body are mine."

Thus we have the immediate origin of doubt in the fact that his senses occasionally deceive him. And this doubt is limited for, in the world as it appears to me "normally," that is of things which are neither "hardly perceptible" nor "very far away" there are many other sensations "as to which we cannot reasonably have any doubt." But the deeper origin of doubt becomes a powerful lever.

In the search for certainty, the fact that the senses deceive us takes on a new significance:

> ". . . owing to the fact that the destruction of the foundations of necessity brings with it the downfall of the rest of the edifice, I shall only in the first place attack those principles upon which all my former opinions rested." (p. 145)

Methodological Doubt and the Search for Certainty

We have stressed the humble origins of doubt for reasons which will become important as we proceed. However, the fact that the senses deceive us, if only occasionally, is at first a tool for the discovery of certainty, and in the end, deeply revelatory of nature. As a tool, doubt supplies us with two rules to carry forward the program set out initially. The first is to "withhold assent" from all opinion, and the second, to consider as false all opinion, that is in the least doubtful. With this beginning Descartes proceeds to apply doubt as a method for the sake of certainty. Two conclusions at which he arrives are (a) that there "are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep. . ." (p. 146), and (b) that it is possible that God is a deceiver. From (a) he draws a further twofold conclusion, namely, that in sleep his ideas "are but false delusions" (ibid) (when we dream) but that even so the ideas "are like painted representations which can only have been formed as the counterparts of something real and true." (ibid) And, although a painter can paint fantastic imaginary figures, he must derive the parts from something "real and true" although the form may nowhere exist. But we are dreaming and thus the appearance of things in our dream do not come directly from our senses and, on that level at least, we cannot be certain that the appearances represent anything real in form.

> ". . . although these general things, to wit, a body, eyes, a head, hands . . . may be imaginary, we are bound . . . to confess that there are at least some other objects yet more simple and universal which are real and true. . ." (p. 146)

And this is true of "all those images of things which dwell in our thoughts." (ibid) Of these "objects . . . more simple and universal" than the appearances "pertains corporeal nature in general, and its extension, figure, of extended things, their quality or magnitude and number . . . also the place . . . the time which measures their duration," etc. (ibid)

The twofold conclusion of (a) is, therefore, that there seem to be two classes of ideas; the composite, of which appearance is formed, and the "more simple and more universal" i.e., (to anticipate) the ideas of nature that correspond to mathematics. He then alludes to the dubious state of the natural sciences "which have as their end the consideration of composite things," (p. 147) comparing them with the mathematical sciences "which only treat of things that are very simple and very general without taking great trouble to ascertain whether they are actually existent or not, contain some measure or certainty and an element of the indubitable" and the truths of which are certain "whether I am awake or asleep." (ibid)

Implicit in this conclusion, which is admittedly lacking in demonstration, is the greater part of the arguments in the rest of the Meditations. Here on one side we have the appearance of composite nature brought to the mind through the senses, which appearances are at least doubtful and hence without certainty. On the other we have the certain, necessary ideas of mathematics, to which the composite appearances in their elements conform. This latter is the first account of the certain and necessary.

However the second conclusion (b), that God might be a deceiver is far more powerful, for His deception might be so persuasive as to deny the very certainty of mathematics. As the more powerful argument, it promises the most devastating attack on the foundations of his opinions. Therefore, to that end he assumes that God is

> "some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful (who) has employed his whole energies in deceiving me; I shall

> consider that the heavens, the earth, colors, figures, sound . . . are nought but illusions and dreams of which this genius has availed himself in order to lay traps for my credulity; I shall consider myself as having no eyes, . . ." (p. 148)

What remains to him, however, is a rule: He may suspend his judgment. We must stress that this radical doubt of all existence is a method which he assumes ("I shall. . . suppose," etc.) Although he may require of himself, for the sake of knowledge, an absolute suspension of belief, common experience, in which the senses occasionally deceive us, does not make that demand:

> ". . . nor will I ever lose the habit of deferring to them (common opinions n. b.) . . . so long as I consider them as they really are, i.e., opinions in some measure doubtful . . . and at the same time highly probable, so that there is much more reason to believe in than to deny them." (ibid)

The balance of this passage asserts what we have stated above, that universal doubt is assumed (". . . for certain time pretend (emphasis added) that all these opinions are entirely false.")

Certainty and the Cogito

The quest for certainty soon ends in the cogito. Even if there is an evil deceiver, "he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I think that I am something." (p. 150) But, he asks, what is this existence now that all body is denied? He considered that he, in the past, conceived of himself as being nourished, moving ("walking"), sensing, which were "attributes of soul." But, nourishment and movement are attributes of body, and sensation also cannot occur without body. Thinking alone cannot be separated from self. Therefore he exists, but "just when I think." Therefore, he is a thinking thing. As a thinking thing ". . . it is very certain that the knowledge of my existence taken in its precise significance does not depend on things whose existence is not yet known to me." (p. 152) Further, a thinking thing is ". . . a thing which doubts, understands, conceives (intelligens), affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels (sentiens.") (p. 153) Now, previously sensation, or "feeling" could not occur

"without body," (p. 151) and yet, in the above description of the faculties or attributes of a "thinking thing," sensation is present (and significantly last in the list, in the original as well as the translation.) Therefore, since the "knowledge of his existence" does not depend on things whose existence is not yet known to him, and that means the knowledge of body, the case for sensation is ambiguous. Descartes then considers the case for sensation:

> ". . . I am the same who feels (sentis). . . who perceives certain things, as by the organs of sense (emphasis added, n.b.) since in truth I see light, I hear noise, I feel heat. But it will be said that these phenomena are false and that I am dreaming . . . still it is at least quite certain that it seems to me that I can see light, etc. . . That cannot be false; properly speaking it is what is in me called feeling (sentire); and used in this precise sense that is no other thing than thinking." (p. 153)

There follows the famous example of the wax (p. 154) which we shall not concern ourselves with, other than to note the conclusion:

> "But what is this piece of wax which cannot be understood excepting by (the understanding) of mind? It is certainly the same that I see, touch, imagine, and finally it is the same which I have always believed it to be from the beginning. But what must be particularly observed is that its perception is neither an act of vision, nor of touch, nor of imagination, and has never been such although it may have appeared formerly to be so, but only an intuition of the mind, which may be imperfect and confused as it is at present, according as my attention is more or less directed to the elements which are found in it, and of which it is composed." (p. 155)

The example of the wax is for the sake of an examination of the senses. The end of that examination is to discover what can be known with certainty. Descartes does not conclude that the wax is not known at all, but that the "perception" falls into two categories: "the clear and distinct" and the "imperfect and confused." It is a matter of the appearance. What arises from the sensation is an idea, and in that sense it is quite clear that it is mind which perceives. But implicit here in the two categories of perception are two categories of ideas. If we recall (p. 146) what we have characterized as the first account of certainty (see above, p. 4), the direction of the mind "to the elements" of the wax, by which means its perception is "clear and

distinct" is to regard the wax as an object of mathematics. This is, of course, at the center of Descartes' arguments in the Meditations, and we will have much occasion to return to it.

However, the discussion of the wax does not clear up the ambiguous status of the faculty of sensation, which, on the one hand, is a mode of thought and thus a part of "thinking essence" (to anticipate a later definition) and, on the other, is intimately connected with body. The difficulty is deepened by the idea that knowledge of his existence "taken in its precise significance" cannot depend on the existence of anything "whose existence is not yet known to one." (p. 152) In its precise significance, then, his existence, as he can know it, is dependent wholly on mind. The "lever" of doubt has established that he can separate in thought, the idea of body, and in separating it, in no way jeopardize the certain knowledge of his existence. Thus, it might be argued, as Descartes eventually does, that mind is independent, and hence distinct from body. But the "realm" of mind, of cogito, since it includes all thought, necessarily includes all the faculties of thought that have ideas arising from corporeal objects. Sensation, as a mode of thought, is obviously most directly related to body: "one cannot feel without body." (p. 151) Hence the ambiguous situation of this faculty.

Examining the problem a little more closely, we find that the problem of sensation is intimately related to the above mentioned division of the categories of perception, or of ideas: ". . . bodies are not properly speaking known by the senses or by the faculty of imagination, but by the understanding only. . ." (p. 157) The categories of perception reveal a distinction among the faculties, and this distinction is not merely that mind may be understood as made up of faculties, but that there is a real "cleavage" between the understanding, which becomes a faculty of innate ideas, and which is the source of all certain knowledge, and the other faculties. Since our theme is the deceptions of sensation, we will return to this discussion.

The "Place" of the IVth Meditation

Certain developments which Descartes' thinking has undergone before the IVth Meditation must be noted. As we saw in our introduction, the cogito includes all faculties of thought, Separated from the cogito, by the method of doubt, is all corporeal nature. Further, we noted there the implicit beginnings of a distinction among the ideas of mind. In the IIIrd Meditation, among other considerations, Descartes begina an examination of his ideas, now explicitly dividing them into categories. Considered from the viewpoint of the first two Meditations this represents an examination of the cogito as regards its various faculties and the ideas associated with them. From the point of view of the IVth Meditation, the distinctions among the ideas, and implicitly, among the faculties, become fundamental underlying assumptions. Before considering the "place" of the IVth Meditation more closely, let us examine certain passages from the IIIrd.

> "Now as to what concerns ideas, if we consider them only in themselves and do not relate them to anything else beyond themselves, they cannot properly speaking be false. . . We must not fear likewise that falsity can enter into will and into affections, for although I may desire evil things, or even things that never existed, it is not less true that I desire them. Thus there remains no more than the judgments which we make, in which I must take the greatest care not to deceive myself. But the principal error and the commonest which we may meet with in them, consists in my judging that the ideas which are in me are similar or conformable to the things which are outside me. . ." (p.159-160)

But of all his ideas all are not all of equal status. "Some appear . . . to be innate, some adventitious, and others to be formed . . . by myself."

And considering "those ideas which appear to me to proceed from certain objects that are outside me" he inquires into "the reasons which cause me to think them similar to these objects," and finds that he is "taught this lesson by nature" and, further, that the ideas do not depend on his will (both these considerations will become important in the VIth Meditation). The "objects" here referred to are the ideas that arise from sense: "I feel heat, and thus I persuade myself that this

feeling, or at least this idea of heat, is produced by something which is different from me."

Although nature seems to teach him that the ideas of objects outside of him conform or correspond to the objects, he notes that the "teachings of nature" are different from the "light of nature." By the former "I merely mean a certain spontaneous inclination which impels me to <u>believe</u> (emphasis added) in this connection." But the light of nature is what enables him to recognize that the idea is true. "But these two things are very different; for I cannot doubt that which the natural light causes me to believe to be true as, for example, it has shown me that I am from the fact that I doubt." (p. 160)

This distinction, between the teachings of nature, and the light of nature, represents a distinction among the ideas in mind, which continues the discussion begun at the close of the preceding Introduction. The distinction is based upon the idea of <u>necessity</u>:

> "And finally, though they (the ideas of objects, n.b.) did proceed from objects different from myself, <u>it is not a necessary consequence that they should resemble these</u>." (emphasis added) (p. 161)

Therefore, we find that the cogito contains two basically different kinds of ideas. (It contains more, apparently, but the basic distinction among the ideas is our present concern.) On the one hand there are ideas which the light of nature causes us to recognize as true. On the other, there are the ideas of objects which nature <u>teaches</u> us to believe conform to the objects. The former ideas are characterized by necessity, or certainty, and the latter by a <u>belief</u> that they indeed represent things as they really are. But, in this latter case, there is no <u>necessity</u> in the judgment. This distinction among the ideas of mind leads to a consideration of the distinction among the faculties. As noted in the Introduction, the cogito, or soul, or thinking thing "is a thing which doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills . . . which also imagines and feels." (p. 153) The cogito is, initially, <u>all</u> the (thinkable) faculties of thought, and they are, through doubt, distinguished primarily from body, from the world.

As we see, there is a progression in the Meditations from this first separation (Meditations I and II) to a consideration of the differences among the ideas and faculties, in the IIIrd Meditation. The crucial distinction between ideas of rational necessity and ideas of "corporeal nature" underlies the discussion of error in the succeeding discussions. Further, the realm of ideas of rational necessity is the understanding or faculty of "pure intellection," and this realm contains the innate necessary ideas - of mathematics and certain "common notions" initially, and ultimately of God. Already, looking back on the doubt of the first two Meditations, we see a developing twofold treatment of corporeal nature in Descartes. That is, the methodological doubt originally postulated will become, because of the distinctions among ideas developed beginning in the IIIrd Meditation, in the fifth and sixth Meditations, and idea put forward as a real doubt. That is, the suspension of belief in the first Meditation, occasioned by a need for a method to attain certainty, will be misrepresented in the last as a serious consideration based upon the lack of certainty in our judgments. But it is our contention as noted previously that, in that sense, Descartes does not doubt the existence of the material world, rather, as we shall show it is the idea or appearance of the world that is held in doubt as to whether it represents nature as it really is. This latter idea is the distinction we will show in its development, commencing in the IVth Meditation.

To return to our discussion of the "place" of the IVth Meditation, and how it follows the IIIrd, the above mentioned distinction among ideas may also be characterized as the distinction between the true and the false. For, as Descartes states: "The principal error . . . consists in my judging that the ideas which are in me are . . . conformable to the things which are outside me." (p. 160) The error in judgment is intrinsically related to the distinction as regards necessity in ideas, as we shall discuss shortly. However, Descartes mentions a further falsity, material falsity, which is, in part, the subject of the sixth Meditation, but which, in the end, has a common ground with error in judgment.

> "For although . . . it is only in judgments that falsity, properly speaking, or formal falsity can be met with; a certain material falsity may . . . be found in ideas, i.e., when those ideas represent what is nothing as though it were something." (p. 164)

This falsity has its ground in a still further distinction among the ideas i.e., as between those ideas of corporeal objects which it is possible to perceive clearly, i.e., as the objects of pure mathematics (e.g., extension, length, etc.) and those which "are thought by me with so much obscurity and confusion that I do not even know if they are true or false" that is, whether they are "the ideas of real objects or not." The former category is, of course, problematic since it represents a meeting ground of innate mathematical ideas and perception. But the latter category, for our purposes in the discussion of the IVth Meditation, is understood as the realm of the ideas among which judgment erroneously chooses, i.e., of formal error. This is only to repeat what has already been established at the outset of the Meditations, but in a slightly different guise, namely the deceptions of sense. In the present instance the ideas are so confused that it is not possible to tell what, if anything, the idea represents. But the case of mistaking the square tower for round is rooted in the same kind of falsity, as we shall show.

Before proceeding with the analysis, one further argument from the IIIrd Meditation should be added:

> "By the name God I understand a substance that is infinite (eternal, immutable) independent, all knowing, all powerful, and by which I myself and everything else, if anything else does exist, have been created." (p. 165)

God, the creator is the revealed God of traditional religion. This is very important from the view-point of the deceptions of sense. If God created us, and He wills the best, why do we err, that is, why are we deceived?

This discussion of the third Meditation does not, in any way, attempt to elucidate it. It simply is an attempt to define the "place" of the IVth Meditation. However, a close analysis of the devious IIIrd Meditation might well reveal that the "place" of the fourth is by no means clear. For example, the argument for God's existence in the IIIrd Meditation is followed by a second argument for God's existence in the Vth Meditation. Why are two arguments required, and why does the comparatively "trivial" discussion of the true and the false intervene?

We will let these questions stand since our purposes here are more modest.

The Problem: "Of the True and the False"

What is "true" has so far been the subject of the first three Meditations. What is true is what is rationally necessary and certain, what indeed cannot, in thought, be otherwise. The "realm" of this truth is the understanding of the "purely intelligible" ideas. The problem of the fourth Meditation is not "truth", but to give an account of the false. And, according to the distinction made in the third Meditation, this account is of "formal falsity," or the errors of judgment. If our senses are "deceived," how are we in error, that is, in what sense are we responsible for the mistake? This is not an idle question, and Descartes' conclusions, that error is, in itself nothing, and that our faculties are not responsible for error, indicates the direction in which we must look for the answer. Error is "formal," and lies in the act of mind only insofar as we disregard its material basis. This, however, anticipates our discussion. First, let us analyze and restate the arguments of the fourth Meditation.

* * * * * * * * * *

In this section we will avoid any initial discussion about Descartes' view of God since we think that more problems are raised than solved by such a discussion. The IIIrd Meditation concludes that God, the creator of all things including man, cannot be a deceiver. However, it is something to be considered "with more care" (p. 171). This serves as the prelude for the discussion in the IVth Meditation.

para. 1, p. 171 - The very first distinction set up in the Meditation, following Descartes' usual synthetic approach, is central to the subsequent discussion. This distinction, significantly, is between the categories of ideas already implicit in the very first Meditation. "Very few thing" are known "with certainty respecting corporeal objects" and "many more are known to us respecting the human mind, and yet more still regarding God himself." For the sake of the subsequent discussion he will not consider "sensible or imaginable objects," rather, he will

concern himself with those that are "purely intelligible" and which are "incomparably more distinct than the idea of any corporeal thing." Since his concern is with "formal falsity" in this Meditation, as we have noted, this distinction is justified.

Reconsidering the fact that he is subject to doubt, which is, in effect, as euphemism for the fact that his senses occasionally deceive him, he finds that he is an "independent and complete being," and that the p. 172 idea of God, of a being complete and independent "presents itself to my mind" as so clear and distinct that he is certain that his own existence is, in every moment of his life, dependent "entirely on Him." God is, in this place, the "epitome" of certain knowledge, and, for that reason, the guarantor of all other certainty. This, of course, continues the discussion of the end of the IIIrd Meditation, where the idea of God allows him to consider "other truths which may be derived from it" (p. 171). The idea of God is the road "to the knowledge of the other objects of the universe."(p.172) The fourth Meditation in this light is the most obvious detour from that road, since if God is perfect he cannot deceive (para. 2) (deception being an imperfection), and further, men (para. 3) having been created by God, they have received their capacity for judgment from Him, and it follows from the fact that God is not a deceiver that the capacity for judgment will not "lead me to err if I use it aright." But if all this is true and correct, it (para. 4) would seem to follow that men are never deceived. In one respect it does follow, namely, "when I think only of God," for then he sees "no cause of error, or falsity." However, he is deceived, as his experience shows him. He is "subject to an infinitude of errors." Now, reconsidering the initial distinction between ideas - on the one hand of certain ideas, e.g., of self as thinking thing, unextended, incorporeal and not "in anything pertaining to body" (para. 1), and on the other, the ideas of "corporeal things," we see that the present discussion is an adumbration of that distinction. The certain idea of God does not admit of error or falsity, but the ideas of experience, i.e., experience throught the senses, does find him "subject" to errors (We should note well the word used: "subject").

To return to the argument, we find the two categories of ideas characterized in a rather strange way. On the one hand, there is the idea of "Supreme Being" and on the other "a certain negative idea of nothing." The latter idea is, of course, very difficult to understand in itself but is meant to suggest the opposite of the idea of God (an idea which we shall place in the category of rational necessity for the sake of future argument). Descartes is "in a sense something intermediate between God and nought, i.e., . . . between the Supreme Being and non-being." Further, "insofar as I am not myself the Supreme Being" and "participate . . . in nought or non-being" he is "subject (p. 173) to an infinitude of imperfections" and thus "ought not to be astonished" that he falls into error. This idea is extremely suggestive. For one thing, an implication of a kind of hierarchy of ideas is in it, with the highest rational necessity on one side, a complete absence of such necessity on the other, and "imperfection" between. This last middle realm of imperfection is where error occurs. Further, upon examination two difficulties are formed in this idea which themselves are fertile. For one, since the idea of God is "implanted" in him, he cannot be said to be strictly between "Supreme Being" and "non-being." Rather, there is an element of the former in him as rational necessity. For another, the idea of "a negative idea of nothing" is troublesome. It is, first of all as we noted, hard to think of in itself. Second it suggests what is furthest from rational necessity, or mind in its "purely intelligible" aspect, namely, what does not pertain to it at all; body. This last idea is perhaps too extreme, that is to connect non-being with body. Nevertheless, the suggestion is here of a polarity between rational-necessity on the one hand, and, accepting the "extreme" idea in part, natural necessity as body, on the other. We shall have occasion to re-examine this idea.

From his "intermediate" status (or inferiority to God) he concludes that error is not a real thing "but simply a defect" and that he falls into error "from the fact that the power given me by God . . . of distinguishing truth from error is not infinite." para. 5 - However, the above characterization has a flaw in that it might suggest that error, as a defect, is a "pure negation" which flaw Descartes wants to correct. As a

defect, error is "a lack of some knowledge which it seems I ought to possess." Descartes then proposes the difficulty that if God is the author of his faculties, then any faculty of his should be "perfect of its kind." Further, had God so willed, man would not be subject to error, and if God wills what is best, then "is it better that I should be subject to err . . .?" It is our opinion that the reconciliation of this difficulty is more important than its setting out. However, before discussing the conclusion, let us examine the origin and intent of the statement of the problem.

On the one hand our certain knowledge of God reveals His perfection, from which it necessarily follows that he cannot be a deceiver. Further He is the author of our being. But experience teaches us that we are deceived, and since God must will the best, it would seem better that we err. If we examine this problem in the light of the initial distinction between the ideas, i.e., let "God" mean the "purely intelligible" ideas, and deception the ideas of corporeal things, or appearances, then the conflict becomes an internal one among the faculties, namely the faculty of understanding, and whatever faculty or faculties responsible for our ideas of corporeal things. (We admit that we are neglecting the problem of God.) Understood in this way, the reconciliation of the paradox (of how God wills the best and we are nevertheless deceived) is extremely interesting.

para. 6 - The reconciliation, simply stated, is that a man's intelligence is "not capable of comprehending why God acts as He does." The terms of the paradox, as we have reformulated them, are rational necessity on the one side and the appearances on the other. Now, because of the inability of man to understand the ends of God's actions, and because God is the creator of nature as we know it, "this reason suffices to convince me that the species of cause termed final finds no useful employment in physical (or natural) things" (emphasis added). This conclusion is of course extraordinary and far-reaching. First, the traditional view (of the scholastics from the ancients), that the form, that is, the appearance, of natural bodies is understood as an end in nature and represents what the thing is (in Aristotle, for example, as thought eternally by active intellect), is utterly denied. It is,

of course, not so important that Descartes here denies the traditional view, as it is that the status of the appearances, the "ideas" we have of nature through the senses, is now such as to have no necessity in themselves. This, of course, is not a new revelation in the Meditations, since it seems the entire argument might be founded upon the denial of any necessity in the appearances, and the location of all certainty in the understanding; this idea is clear enough in the example of the wax in the IInd Meditation. Rather, the implications of this particular statement as regards error, are most important. We will try to draw them out as we continue the argument.

The argument then moves on to a direct consideration of the source of error, and finds that it rests "on a combination of two causes . . . on the faculty of knowledge that rests in me, and on the power of choice or free will - that is to say, of the understanding and at the same time of the will" (emphasis added). Before considering the argument in detail we will state the "mechanics" of error.

First, error is not in the faculties themselves. Second, the will is "subject to no limits" while the understanding "is of very small extent and extremely limited." Third, this "disjunction" of infinite will and finite understanding accounts for error in that the will is not kept within the bounds of the understanding. We will now return to a closer view of the argument and consider the following: The Will and Judgment; The Understanding; Judgment and Freedom.

The Will and Judgment

In the first through third Meditations, error and judgment are quite close. In the first, judgment is suspended through the method of doubt. In the second (p. 156) error is found in judgment. Thus it is somewhat puzzling when Descartes asserts that error rests on the will and the understanding. The question is, what has judgment to do with the will?

First, as concerns the will, error is not found in it (since error is the lack of some knowledge we ought to have, and is thus nothing in itself but represents a defect). Second, it is free and is, (p. 175) apparently, synonomous with free choice. Third, it is, as we noted,

"so extended as to be subject to no limits." For this faculty, when compared with other faculties

> "is . . . so great in me that I can conceive no other idea to be more great; it is indeed the case that . . . for the most part . . . will . . . causes me to know that in some manner I bear the image and similitude of God."

The will is a faculty of action; "the faculty of will consists alone in our having the power of choosing to do a thing or choosing not to do it (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or shun it)." This definition, which is immediately revised, makes it possible to understand judgment as, in part at least a characteristic act of will. However, there are certain difficulties concerned with the freedom of will and judgment which we will discuss in the proper place. The above definition of will is immediately revised to include the notion of freedom: ". . . further, it consists alone in the fact that in order to affirm or deny, pursue or shun those things placed before us by the understanding (emphasis added), we act so that we are unconscious that any outside force constrains us . . ." This freedom admits of degrees, the lowest degree being indifference. We will discuss the problem of freedom more fully in its place. We must keep in mind a question about the "infinite" character of the will: What are the infinitude of objects it may affirm, deny, pursue or shun? How do its objects differ from those of the understanding?

The Understanding

In light of our previous distinction between the ideas, the references to the understanding, and its relation to the will become most important.

p. 174 - "For by the understanding alone I (neither assert nor deny anything, but) apprehend (percipio) the ideas of things as to which I can form a judgment." Further, as in the will, "no error is properly speaking found in it." The remaining characteristic of the understanding, its finiteness, is not explicitly delineated. That is, although we have asked what the infinitude of objects might be that the will acts upon, it is nevertheless plausible that the idea of "free choice" completely justifies the infinite extent of the will. But this same justification is lacking for the understanding. If we ask why the understanding

cannot be infinite as well we are forced to seek out Descartes' intent. It is not too obscure. The example of the wax indicates that the understanding is, as we have characterized it, the realm of rational necessity, the ideas of which as "clear and distinct" and have the quality of "discreetness." That is, it is possible to isolate the ideas and thus enumerate them. This, of course, does not guarantee that there is a finite limit to the possible number of its ideas, as Descartes observes:

> "though there is possible an infinitude of things in the world of which I have no idea in my understanding, we cannot for all that say that it is deprived of these ideas . . . but simply it does not possess these." (p. 174)

It is, further, as the Vth Meditation, the realm of "innate" ideas of which we are able to discover "an infinitude of particulars" (p. 179). Thus the finite character of the understanding has to do with the quality of its ideas; their necessity, clarity and distinctness, and certainty:

p. 175, para. 9: ". . . for since I understand nothing but the power which God has given me for understanding, there is no doubt that <u>all I understand, I understand as I ought and it is not possible that I err in this</u>." (emphasis added)

It is crucial to understand two things about the understanding: It does not err, and its ideas have <u>necessity</u>, what we have called rational necessity.

<u>Judgment and Freedom</u>

Judgment, then is to be understood as the act of free will. But the will must also be understood as being free <u>not</u> to act, i.e., not to judge. As we noted, there are degrees of freedom. The lowest degree is indifference:

p. 175, para.8: ". . . this indifference which I feel, when I am not swayed to one side rather than the other by lack of reason, is the lowest grade of liberty, and rather <u>evinces a lack or negation in knowledge</u> than a perfection of the will."

On the other hand, the greatest freedom is to be found when the understanding places things before the judgment:

> ". . . the more I lean to one" (of two contraries n.b.) " - whether I recognize clearly that the reasons of the good and true are to be found in it, or whether God so disposes my inward thought - the more freely do I choose and embrace it. And undoubtedly both divine grace and natural knowledge, far from diminishing my liberty, rather increase and strengthen it." (emphasis added)

If the reader wonders what has happened to the conflict between freedom and determination here, it is not without good cause that he does so. It is clear that the greatest freedom of the will is in the direction of rational necessity. Indeed, the very possibility of judgment, as the act of affirming and denying, is questionable in the realm of the understanding. For example, the following passage in the Vth Meditation should be noted:

p. 180: ". . . I have already demonstrated that all I know clearly is true. And even though I had not demonstrated this, the nature of my mind is such that I could not prevent myself from holding them to be true so long as I conceived them clearly." (emphasis added)

If the greatest freedom is found in (rational) necessity, where is the least found? The question is much clearer, however, if we ask what the distinction is between the objects of the understanding and those of the will? It is the distinction between ideas, of course, the ideas which contain rational necessity, on the one hand, and those that are of corporeal objects as they appear to us through the senses.

Error

para. 9 - Error, then, is found neither in the understanding, the ideas of which are true, certain and necessary, nor in the will, the ideas of which have no necessity. Error is nothing, it is a defect, a kind of negation. It comes about by precipitous judgment, i.e., by our failure to "restrain" the will within the bounds of the understanding.

p. 176: "Errors . . . come from the sole fact that since the will is much wider in its range and compass than the understanding, I do not restrain it within the same bounds, but extend it also to things which I do not understand: and as the will is of itself indifferent to these, it easily falls into error. . ."

Formal falsity, since it is nothing, properly speaking, in itself, is a most strange phenomenon. We must ask in what way the deceptions of the senses might be relevant to formal falsity? Immediately the possibility is raised that sense deception is "material falsity." Impetus is given to this argument by asking again how it is possible that error, as formal falsity, is not found in the will itself? What does it mean that we affirm or deny something we do not understand? The answer suggests itself that we make a judgment about something which has no ground of certainty in it, i.e., no rational necessity, in short, an idea of corporeal nature as it appears to us. We will return to this in the next section of the paper. However, Descartes gives an example of the "operation" of error that is of great importance as regards the above speculations.

para. 10 - The example is central to the endeavor of the Meditations and occurs throughout in various ways. He has two ideas of himself. One is that by which he is what he is: ". . . when I lately examined whether anything existed in the world, and found . . . it followed that I myself existed . . ." This is his idea of self as thinking thing or essence. The idea presented itself to his mind with such "great clearness" that "there followed a great inclination of my will; and I believed this with so much the greater freedom . . . as I possessed the less indifference to it."

The other idea is of self as a "representation of corporeal nature."

> ". . . and it comes to pass that I doubt whether this thinking nature which is in me, or rather by which I am what I am, differs from this corporeal nature, or whether both are not simply the same thing"

We must consider the implication of this question and its immediate consequences.

In our Introduction we noted Descartes' view that what underlies the appearance of things is something "more simple and universal," and the implications thereof considering natural objects as mathematical. The same distinction lies hidden in the above example. The answer to his question must involve the possibility of bringing the appearances

into the realm of rational necessity. We will discuss the problem as it evolves later in the VI[th] Meditation.

For the present, the immediate consequences of the example also can be found in the first Meditation:

p. 145 and 148 bottom - ". . . reason already persuades me that I ought no less carefully to withhold my assent from matters which are not entirely certain and indubitable than from those which appear to me manifestly to be false. . ."

We might compare this with the following in the IV[th] Meditation:

p. 176, para. 11: ". . . for, however probable are the conjectures which render me disposed to form a judgment respecting anything, the simple knowledge that I have that those are conjectures alone and not certain and indubitable reasons, suffices me . . . to judge the contrary."

p. 177, para. 12 - From this he concludes that "the light of nature teaches us that the knowledge of the understanding should always precede the determination of the will." The contrary is the "inverse of free will," and in that precipitous act is found the "privation" in which formal falsity, or error, consists. We might ask, by way of objection, why Descartes did not make further distinctions between the will and judgment, especially in the light of paragraph fourteen:

> ". . . the will consists only of one signal element, and is, so to speak indivisible . . . its nature is such that nothing can be abstracted from it (without destroying it)."

The will is a faculty of action and error is not found in it, but in its act of judgment, which, if by paragraph fourteen we cannot abstract anything from will, seems a contradictory proposition. The answer to this objection is subtle: The act of judgment clearly, by the light of certainty, is deprived of the necessary vision of the understanding, except when it acts upon what the understanding presents to it, in which case it must affirm it. This "deprivation of vision" (our metaphor), like freedom, contains degrees. The judgment may also be blind as in the example of the desire for food which is poisoned (p. 194). This blindness represents judgment when it is most subject to nature, just

as its perfect vision (the "perfection of will", p. 175), its greatest freedom occurs when it is least subject to nature, when it is within the bounds of the understanding, which has no dependence on body, i.e., on nature. Thus, the suspension of judgment in the face of uncertainty, is the suspension of act, which, as we shall see is the suspension of its "participation" in nature (understood as the "composite" faculties of sensation). This becomes at the close of the fourth Meditation, the "principal perfection of man," that is, the "regulative" principle or "resolution never to form a judgment on anything without having a clear and distinct understanding of it" (p. 178), a principle which, in the first Meditation is the "mechanism" of methodological doubt.

Descartes' argument and statement of the above principle occurs within a discussion that returns to the problem of God and error. ". . . I must not complain that God concurs with me in forming the acts of the will, that is the judgment in which I go astray, because the acts are entirely good and true, inasmuch as they depend on God." In what sense the acts are "good and true" becomes clear in the VIth Meditation. We will note here, however, that the basis on which they are good and true has to do with the distinction between the objects of the understanding and the objects of the will. This distinction evolves in the VIth Meditation. We will note here, however, that the basis on which they are good and true has to do with the distinction between the objects of the understanding and the objects of the will. This distinction evolves in the VIth Meditation as the distinction between self as mind, and self as composite mind and body, and ultimately, the distinction of rational and natural necessity. The objects of will are "good and true" because of their source in the latter, but, as we shall see, cause a "material falsity" as well.

The Imperfections of Man

p. 177, para. 15 - It is an imperfection of man not to use what is in his power, namely, to suspend judgment. It is not an imperfection of God that we fall into error (as formal falsity), since he could not have caused it, as it is, in itself, nothing. But God could have created man so that he did not err. For one thing, to have given to

the existence of material things in a different light. The distinction there, between the realm of certainty and the realm of possible error, raised more troubling questions about the distinction between mind and body than the initial doubt of the first Meditation. Initially, the common experience that the senses deceive us occasionally was justification for doubt. Then, for the sake of certainty doubt was raised to radical doubt, the result of this was that there can be no certain knowledge intrinsic in the perceptions of sense, was implicit in the enunciation of the question of the fourth Meditation. But, remembering our remarks in the Introduction, the original methodological doubt did not deny a reasonable basis of belief, in short, did not deny the existence of material things. Thus the stated intent of the VIth Meditation, "to inquire whether material things exist," is misleading. There is no <u>real</u> question of his bodily existence. He <u>is</u> "made up" of hands, feet, flesh, etc. He <u>is</u> sitting before the fire. He <u>is</u> "real". Rather, the question of the IVth Meditation must become more complicated. For on the one hand we have rational necessity, which in itself must be the criterion for all intelligibility and which, is independent of what the senses bring us. But on the other hand, we have numerous other ideas, ideas which in the main come from, or are traceable to, sensation. There is no question of the <u>existence</u> of these ideas <u>as</u> ideas, but there is no rational necessity in them either. That is, although I judge the ideas to be of something "outside" of myself (and although I may not have any persuasive doubt that they are not), I cannot see any necessity in the judgment and hence no certainty in the idea itself, and ultimately, if the idea is my contact with nature, no <u>necessary</u> knowledge of nature. Nature is, as far as my ideas of it are concerned, unintelligible (since the intelligible is the necessary). Therefore our question must now become: How can the (undoubted) existence of nature be brought into the realm of rational necessity? More importantly, what end would this serve? The latter question we shall return to, since Descartes' view of nature and of man may find ground in it. The former question can, for the sake of a general discussion of the <u>Meditations</u>, be re-stated again as: What is the <u>necessary</u> mode of our sensible perception of the existence of nature? And this returns us to the "place" of the VIth Meditation. In the Vth Meditation (the proof of the Existence of God (p. 182) Descartes says:

> ". . . I cannot conceive anything but God himself to whose essence existence (necessarily) pertains;"

and (p. 180)

> ". . . I recollect that even when I was still strongly attached to the objects of sense, I counted as almost certain those truths which I conceived clearly as regards . . . arithmetic and geometry, and, in general, . . . pure and abstract mathematics."

and finally (p. 185)

> "And now that I know Him I have the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge of an infinitude of things . . . of those which pertain to corporeal nature insofar as it is the object of pure mathematics, (which have no concern with whether it exists or not)."

The question of rational necessity and nature would seem to have been answered by the fifth Meditation. If God is the paradigm and guarantor of <u>all</u> existence, then, insofar as I can consider nature as the object of pure mathematics, the certainty of which has always been known to me and which is guaranteed by God, I can have knowledge - rational, necessary knowledge - of corporeal nature. The catch, however, is the last clause;

> "which have no concern with whether it exists or not."

Knowledge of corporeal nature that is in the realm of necessity by the nature of rational necessity, (which has, in itself no dependence on body) has no concern with whether nature exists or not.

For the fact is, that even if corporeal nature can, through mathematics, be brought into the realm of rational necessity (leaving aside the great problem of the <u>basis</u> of this correspondence) this apparently does not account for all the ideas of consciousness, but only for clear and distinct ideas. Consequently, the other ideas of consciousness, those without rational necessity, are not satisfactorily accounted for in the Vth Meditation. Moreover, the IVth Meditation raises the question of the disparate ideas of consciousness by showing that there is no <u>necessary</u> correspondence between them and concluding that, in the absence of certainty, judgment on such matters must be suspended. Now, this question is raised as an example (p. 176) for the sake of the major

conclusion of the IVth Meditation. But both the example and the conclusion are of equal importance, indeed, they complement one another, since the example is the paradigmatic example of all such conclusions. The idea of corporeal nature exists in the meeting ground of body and mind. Mind, insofar as consciousness is of ideas, body, insofar as the ideas seem to be of bodies (he has a "certain representation of corporeal nature" p. 176). But the content of the ideas has no necessity that can be called rational, i.e., that meets the criterion of certainty in the understanding. But they are, and the mode of their existence is, to say the least, mysterious.

Let us re-examine briefly a statement in the beginning of the IVth Meditation:

> "I am . . . something between God and nought, i.e., placed in such a manner between the supreme being and non-being, that there is in truth nothing in me that can lead to error insofar as a soverign Being has formed me; but that, as I in some degree participate likewise in noght, or in non-being . . . I ought not to be astonished if I should fall into error." (p. 172)

The idea of a supreme Being, like the ideas of mathematics, is innate: Is neither derived from the senses nor invented. We are thus "endowed" with a faculty of certain knowledge. And insofar as God is the guarantor of this certainty (as in the Vth Meditation) there can be no error within it. But he is "between supreme Being and non-being." And to the extent that he "participates" in non-being he is imperfect and falls into error. Now, as we have noted, although he is "between God and nought" as a conscious being he is not strictly between, but shares or participates in being as well. Consciousness is divided into two realms as we pointed out in previous discussion. The realm that is properly "between" is the realm in which error and sense deception is possible. Therefore we must ask again what non-being is, and in what way we "participate" in it. The answer now would seem to be that we "participate" through ideas, ideas in the realm of the sensible, ideas that are not clear and distinct, that is, ideas of nature as it is known through the senses. As we shall see, in the VIth Meditation this is the realm of man considered as "composite" of mind and body.

The purpose of this rather long introduction is to discuss the "place" of the VIth Meditation. We have tried to show that the intent: "to inquire whether material things exist," must be understood as an inquiry into the faculties of sensation, i.e., those faculties, or that realm of consciousness which is not the "pure intellect," rather the realm where man is subject to falsity, both formal and material.

The Form of the Sixth Meditation

We have divided the sixth Meditation into three parts. The first, through paragraph five, (p. 187), the second, through paragraph 11, (p. 191), the third, which is itself divided into three parts, includes the remainder of the Meditation.

Part I

p. 185, para. 1 - The distinction developed in our Introduction to this Meditation is noted initially, i.e., "that God possesses the power to produce everything that I am capable of perceiving with distinctness." God is guarantor of certainty, and existence insofar as nature is the object of pure mathematics. The imagination is then considered in relation to existence as initially defined. Since imagination is "a certain application of the faculty of knowledge to the body which is immediately present to it" that "body" must therefore exist.

p. 185, para. 2 - The distinction between imagination and "pure intellection" is then discussed. Two ideas emerge from the discussion. Although the imagination can "image" the objects of geometry, its capacity to do so is limited. What the understanding "sees," without effort, the imagination, if the idea is not too complicated (in which case it becomes confused) can "image" part by part (e.g., a pentagon). This leads him to conclude that the imagination requires "a particular effort of mind in order to effect the act of imagination, such as I do not require in order to understand." Imagination and will are alike in respect of action.

p. 185, para.3 - Further, the faculty of imagination is not a "necessary

element in my nature," because it is different from the understanding, which is necessary and it "depends on something which differs from me." Now, what follows this is most important. Descartes' remarks become subjunctive in mood when a further distinction between "pure intellection" and imagination is considered. If the imagination depends on something different from me "it may be that by this means it can imagine corporeal objects." Imagination and intellection then differ in that the former "turns towards the body" while the "mind in its intellectual activity.. . turns on itself and considers some of the ideas which it possesses in itself." Now, the imagination when it turns towards body "there beholds in it something conformable to the idea which it has either conceived of itself or perceived by the senses." But it is (p. 187) clear that imagination is this way only if body exists. He can only say "with probability" that body exists.

para. 4 - But in turning toward body, the imagination also has "less distinct ideas" i.e., of various sensations (e.g. "colors, sounds, scents, pain"). These ideas have to come to the imagination "through the senses, and by memory." Therefore it is necessary to "investigate the nature of sense perception" which is a (para. 5) "mode of thought, which I call feeling." To this end he will follow a program of investigation which is as follows:

a. Of "those matters which I hitherto held to be true having perceived them through the senses (i.e., his former opinions) and the foundations on which my belief has rested."
b. Of his reasons for doubting (a.)
c. And "which of them I must now believe."

Part II

para. 6 - The above program is closely followed in the succeeding three paragraphs. First he considers "the matters which I hitherto held to be true." These were the following: That he is a body and made up of parts (head, hands, feet, etc.), that he is among other bodies which affected him in various ways and that, therefore, he felt pain and pleasure as well as appetites (hunger, thirst, etc.) and passions (joy, sadness, anger, etc.). Outside of himself he experienced figure, extension,

and motion of bodies as well as other "qualities" (hardness, heat, light,color, scents, sounds, etc.). These "outside" experiences in effect constituted a principle of (p. 188) "otherness," by which he was able to distinguish among bodies. On this basis he believed himself "to perceive objects quite different from my thought." Further, the objects were experienced without his consent. Because these ideas were "more lively . . . clear . . . more distinct than any of those which I could frame in meditation" they did not originate in his mind but from "some other things." He was persuaded that all his ideas proceeded from sensation, and that his body was uniquely his, from which he could not be separated. But he could not account for the consequences of the actions of body on him (why sadness follows pain, "dryness of throat a desire to drink," etc.). He reasoned that "nature had taught me so." Further he considered that "all the other judgments . . . regarding the objects of my senses" (p. 189) had also been "learned from nature." This distinction between "teachings of nature" and "light of nature" should be recalled: (see IIIrd Meditation, p. 160).

p. 189, para. 7 - But these beliefs came to be doubted by other experiences, notably that his senses deceived him and that his judgments based on external sense were in error. Also those based on internal sense, as in the pain an amputee might feel in his missing limb. In addition to this the distinction between waking and sleeping casts doubt on whether his ideas of sensations proceeded from external objects. Further, it was entirely plausible, since he was in ignorance of God, that he was deceived in everything. From this he concluded that he "did not believe that I should trust much to the teachings of nature." And even if the sensations were involuntary that was yet no reason "to conclude that they proceeded from things different from myself."

para. 8 - However, having discovered "more clearly the author of my being" it seems that he should suspend his judgment and neither "rashly admit" what the senses teach us, nor "doubt them all universally."

p. 190, para. 9 - Now the argument that follows in the succeeding two paragraphs is crucial but rather elaborate. Hence we shall attempt to make it clear by dividing it into its elements. This is especially

important in paragraph 10, where the argument rests, in part on arguments from the IIIrd Meditation, which arguments, in turn, are couched in scholastic terms. Now Descartes' use of such terms has been treated as a subject in itself (e.g., Gilson, "Études Sur Le Role De La Pensée Médiévale Dans La Formations Du Système Cartésien" Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris 1951) and therefore we must try to separate the intent of these terms within the context of the present argument from the formal usage as Descartes understood it. First, however, the ground of the argument is established in paragraph 9.

Paragraph 9 begins the consideration of part (c) of the above mentioned program. First, he may be certain that the fact that he perceives things as different suffices to assure him that they are different, since "they may be made to exist in separation at least by the omnipotence of God" and further, that God is the guarantor of his clear and distinct ideas. But the fact that the separation may now be said to "compel" his judgment does not reveal "by what power this separation is made." That is, certainty only pertains to his judgment in this matter, and therefore, "I rightly conclude that my essence consists solely in the fact that I am thinking thing." Further, reconsidering the beginning of the argument wherein he has both a necessary idea of himself as a thinking thing and "a distinct idea of body, inasmuch as it is only an extended and unthinking thing," he is forced to the conclusion that his thinking essence, or soul "is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and he can exist without it." That is, self as thinking thing is a necessary idea; but to think body is not to think it necessarily, since self as thinking thing may always be thought apart from the idea of body. Both ideas exist, but only one has essence to which existence necessarily pertains. It is to be remembered that this definition, which we have drawn out, is Descartes' definition of God (p. 182), that is of supreme Being.

para. 10 - Before considering the arguments in the next paragraph, there is a small but important matter of translation to be cleared up. (p. 190-191) In the Dover edition the first sentence reads ". . . faculties of imagination and feeling" whereas the Latin edition reads "facultates imaginandi and sentiendi." Similarly, in the Dover edition, top of page 191, where it reads "passive faculty of perception" the Latin reads

"passive . . . facultas sentiendi." The French translation (by the Duc de Luynes) correctly uses sentir in both places. We will use sensation for clarity and consistency. Where useful, the Latin and French text will be referred to.

We may organize the argument in the 10th paragraph around the "faculties" which Descartes enumerates. They are as follows:

a. Of imagination and sensation. From the preceding paragraph we may understand these faculties, that is the ideas they produce, as unnecessary on the one hand ("without which I can . . . conceive myself . . . as a complete being") but which, on the other, "cannot be . . . conceived apart from me."

b. Of "change of position"("changer de lieu," "locum mutandi") and "assumption of different figures" ("se mettre en plusiers postures," "varias figuras induendi"). What is meant here is the faculty of locomotion, of bodily motion.

c. Of "a certain passive faculty" of sensation, which receives and recognizes "the ideas of sensible things," but which "would be useless to me" if there were not.

d. An "active faculty capable of forming and producing these ideas." This faculty "cannot exist in me (inasmuch as I am a thing that thinks) seeing that it does not presuppose thought."

Before considering the relation of these faculties, let us consider Descartes' scholastic terms (which clarify the relation of the faculties.)

Substance: (a') "Intelligent substance" (substantia intelligente).

In reference to (a.) the faculties of imagination and sensation, since they "cannot be conceived apart from me" they must "reside" in an intelligent substance. That is, since he is a "substance whose whole essence . . . is to think," all faculties of ideas must be in him considered as in intelligent substance. This is to disregard the problem of whether Descartes has a precise notion of substance. "Thing" (res) and "substance" are equivalent terms, regardless of what a "thing" is.

(b') "Corporeal or extended substance" (substantiae corporeae)

This refers to (b.) the faculty of locomotion, of the movement of self as body. As a "thing" body is characterized by "extension" chiefly. The "faculty" which is involved cannot be that of thought, To think (clearly and distinctly) body is to think "some sort of extension . . . but no intellection at all." Substnace is here too equivalent to "thing," but now understood as extended thing. Intelligent substance means thinking (or unextended) thing (which, of course, is clearly presented earlier in the Meditations, e.g., p. 165) and corporeal substance means extended thing (also found earlier). Corporeal or extended substance is also relevant to (d.) the "active faculty". This faculty, which, if it is to produce the "ideas of sensible things" perceived by the "Passive faculty of sensation," must be external ("different from me") and, since it "does not presuppose thought," must be corporeal substance, or extended thing, or body. (Or "God himself" for that matter.)

Formal and Objective Reality:

We will not concern ourselves with a discussion of these terms other than to note that they arise in the IIIrd Meditation (p. 162) in the context of an argument similar to the present (indeed, Descartes quotes himself here), and, further, that "formal" and "actual," and "objective" and "representation" seem to be equivalent. "Formal" refers to a thing as it is (in its "form," it seems) and "objective" to the thing as idea. Considering the terms in their context, as relevant to (d.) the active faculty, we may understand the author's intent as to establish that the cause of the ideas (which have "objective reality") is in the bodies (corporeal substance in which the faculty resides), which are "real" in themselves and which "reality" is represented in the ideas. That is, this is a periphrastic statement of an assumed correspondence between material nature, or extended things, and mind as ideas (thinking thing.) We say "assumed" because of the equivocal use of the term "reality." On the side of rational necessity, the "real" is the certain, necessary clear and distinct idea, and is necessarily "absolutely distinct from body" (preceding paragraph). That is, if the idea of body is not rationally necessary (although it can be clear and distinct, too,) but exists (and exists necessarily in the sense that he cannot prevent the idea: they occur without his will) then it does not seem "real" in the

cause or result in ideas (although it is not primarily responsible for them). Both faculties (a) and (c) are in the category of "intelligent substance", and for that reason cannot be thought apart from self.

On the other hand, faculties (b) and (d) are in the category of extended substance. In addition, both are "active" and represent action in nature. They are faculties of body, faculty (b) regarding self as body, and (d) regarding bodies other than self.

We will now consider the conclusion Descartes draws from this paragraph. Simply stated: ". . . We must allow that corporeal things exist." However, it is the qualification of this conclusion that deserves our close attention: "However, they are perhaps not exactly what we perceive by the senses . . . as external objects."

The origins of the conclusion, "that corporeal things exist" can be derived from the conclusion of paragraph 9 (that body is distinct from soul) and the beginning of paragraph 10: "I . . . find in myself faculties employing modes of thinking peculiar to themselves." To this must be added the idea (stated in IIIrd Meditation, p. 159) that the ideas of corporeal objects, although they do not necessarily in themselves permit us to judge that the things of which they are ideas exist, nevertheless have an unquestioned existence as ideas. Thus the faculties which produce them as faculties of ideas, cannot be thought apart from self as thinking thing. If we consider the (10^{th}) paragraph dialectically, the author next considers self as body alone by considering what he already knows from experience, that is, he has power ("faculty") of bodily movement. From self as acting body he moves to a consideration of self as body acted upon, implicitly connecting the notion with the notion, that he knows he is "acted upon" by means of sensation. Finally, in considering the "active faculty" he "discovers" that to be "acted upon" something must act.

But it is also clear that these senses deceive us, and since God is not a deceiver, He "does not communicate these ideas to me immediately" but by corporeal objects, which we perceive in an "obscure and confused," way.

But these things which are "conceived" in the senses "clearly and distinctly" i.e., "are comprehended in the object of pure mathematics" must be recognized as external objects."

Are we here any closer to answering the question posed in the IVth Meditation? The answer must be equivocal. It is affirmative if we consider the faculties involved. That is, since the faculties by which one has an idea of self as body cannot be thought apart from self as thinking thing. But, on the other hand, the answer is negative if we consider the idea of self as body in itself. There is no rational necessity in the idea unless we consider it as the object of pure mathematics.

We must weigh carefully the conclusion of the paragraph against its qualification. Whether or not the 10th paragraph "proves" the existence of corporeal objects, we can only repeat, to doubt their existence completely is not a persuasive argument that they do not in fact exist. Initially, universal doubt is a demand intellect imposed upon things for the sake of certainty. The method did not seek to deny the fact of all experience as such, and a "proof" such as the 10th paragraph presents clearly is not meant to "restore" to us the legitimacy of common experience. To imagine that we are without senses, without body, etc., it not to say that they do not exist. It is not that material things that require a proof of mere existence, rather it is a question of how we perceive them. If on the one hand, our perception is "obscure and confused," but, on the other hand the possibility of certain knowledge exists, we are forced to reconsider our faculties of sense and to see whether it is possible for them to bring us certain knowledge of nature. The conclusion, that soul is distinct from body, and that the ideas of body have no rational necessity, denies that the senses as such can bring us certain, indisputable knowledge. This, in turn, forces a reconsideration of the way nature itself must necessarily exist, if it is not necessarily in the way our senses tell us it exists. It is necessary, then, to seek for a common ground for rational necessity, and of the knowledge of the senses to the end that a secure knowledge of nature may be found (since the senses, to reiterate, by the criterion of certainty within us, cannot give us certain knowledge). The last sentence of the paragraph asserts but does not demonstrate that whatever

in the senses may be "comprehended" as a pure mathematical form, can be brought into the realm of rational necessity, that is, a necessary "external object" in the way that such objects necessarily (insofar as it is possible for us to know) must exist.

To recapitulate briefly: the statement, in the IInd Meditation, of the definition of a thinking thing, listed as faculties those of imagination and "feeling," but, we noted in our Introduction, left their situation as regards body somewhat ambiguous. In the fourth Meditation, a distinction between our ideas as perceptions from sense, and those of the understanding, was seen as underlying the problem of error. This distinction was given its most emphatic enunciation in the question of whether the idea of self as thinking thing, and the idea of self as "corporeal representation" could necessarily be understood as one thing, "or whether both are not simply the same thing." Further, this distinction we may now understand as a development of the original ambiguous status of the faculties of sensation though the implicit question raised there as to the differences between the understanding and the will, the latter understood as a faculty of action, which action must, in effect, be suspended to avoid error. In the beginning of the VIth Meditation, the distinction as regards the faculties becomes explicit in the discussion of the differences between understanding, or "pure intellection," and imagination. The latter is seen as "turning toward body" and thus depending "on something which differs from me," while the former "turns on itself, and considers some of the ideas <u>which it possesses in itself</u>" (emphasis added). This discussion, in turn, leads to an examination of "sense perception," which recapitulates the arguments about (a) his former opinions which rested on nature as it appeared to him, (b) the origin of doubt in errors of judgment concerning the external senses, and finally, (c) what he can know with certainty. This last argument is most important to us. In appearance it is merely a restatement of the cogito: "I am a thinking thing (or a substance whose whole essence or nature is to think)." He concludes that his idea of self as thinking thing, is "entirely and absolutely distinct from my body." As a conclusion it is merely an echo of the IInd Meditation. But, unlike the IInd Meditation, a definition of what a thinking thing

is, is not forthcoming. Rather, he finds in himself "faculties employing modes of thinking peculiar to themselves . . . imagination and feeling." The ambiguous status of these modes of thinking is now fully stated. On the one hand they are not necessary to his idea of self as a "complete being," but on the other "they cannot be conceived apart from me." This leads to the discussion we have outlined prior to this recapitulation, which consists in setting up corresponding faculties of body and mind. The conclusion, and its qualification, namely, that corporeal things exist, but that they are "not exactly what we perceive by the senses," in effect sets apart the ideas of sensation from those of the understanding. The conclusion, we have tried to show, is no conclusion at all, since the belief in the existence of corporeal things was not, by the original terms of doubt in the first Meditation, suspended. Rather, we maintain, the qualification of the conclusion (which merely restates what is implicit in the example of the wax, that nature is to be understood as the object of pure mathematics) is the beginning of an attempt to account for the ideas of sensation, i.e., the appearances, in terms of the rational necessity of the understanding. As a consequence, the distinction between mind and body, becomes in part, a distinction within mind itself, and the beginning of the subsequents analysis of self as a composite being of mind and body. The implication of this will be discussed later.

Part III

This last section of the VIth Meditation we have divided into three sections. Paragraphs 11 through 15, part A of section III, concerns the teachings of nature. Part B, from paragraph 16 through 18, deals with the deceptions of nature. Paragraph 15 we consider a transition between the first two sections. Part C is from Paragraph 19 to the end, and deals with the physical basis of error.

A. The Teachings of Nature - p. 191, para. 11: In Paragraph 11 Descartes turns to an examination of sensation as ideas such as they are, that is, (p. 192) as obscure and confused. There must be some truth in the teachings of nature, since God is not a deceiver on the one hand, and man has the ability in himself (from the IVth Meditation)

of correcting his errors. He now defines nature as either "God Himself or the order and disposition which God has established in created things." His own nature is "the complexus of all things which God has given me."

para. 12 - The most important teaching of nature is that he has a body which undoubtedly experiences pain, hunger, thirst, etc., "nor can I doubt there being some truth in this."

para. 13 - From these teachings of nature he concludes that he (as thinking thing) is "intermingled" with body: "I seem to compose with it one whole." The sensation of pain, etc. have a twofold nature; they are both signs and "real" experiences, they are "none other than certain confused modes of thought which are produced by the union and apparent intermingling of mind and body." For a wound is not perceived by the understanding only, but the pain is "felt" as well.

(The idea of self as composed of mind and body is extremely difficult to reconcile in the Cartesian scheme, since it requires the intermingling of two apparently different "things" - extended, corporeal, things, and unextended "intelligent substance," i.e., thinking thing. However, the idea of composite self may be thought of as a physical model, i.e., a model of body as a network of nerves or faculties of sensation. This does not reconcile the ultimate difficulty of the necessary distinction between ideas and bodies that act, but merely provides a scheme for the succeeding discussion.)

para. 14 - Nature teaches him as well that "many other bodies exist around mine" and that he pursues or shuns them. The particular sensations of these bodies themselves have "certain variations which answer" to his sensations. (But, to labour a point, there is not rational necessity to establish this.) Nevertheless,

> "It is quite certain that my body (or rather myself. . . inasmuch as I am formed of body and soul) may receive different impressions agreeable and disagreeable from other bodies which surround it."

p. 193, para. 15 - But, reflecting on what nature has taught him, he finds that some "teachings" have not really come from nature. Rather,

they"have been brought about by . . . forming inconsiderate judgments." Examples of "inconsiderate judgments" are as follows: That where nothing affects the senses there is a void; "That in a body which is warm there is something entirely similar to the idea of heat which is in me," etc. This leads him to re-define (or refine the definition of) nature. No longer is nature "the sum of all things given me by God," because it is necessary to exclude mind, (that is, we assert "pure intellection") since it has given him ideas which are known by a rational necessity, i.e., known by "the light of nature (without the help of body"). An example of "the light of nature" is the idea "that what has once been done cannot ever be undone." Further, the mind can know "matters which only pertains to body" but which are "no longer here contained under the name of nature," e.g., weight (and, obviously, those other aspects of body which can be known as the object of pure mathematics). Nature, then, is now "those things given by God to me as being composed of mind and body," and the teachings of nature so regarded are true in regard to things of self considered as mind and body, i.e., those "confused modes of thought," e.g., to seek the pleasurable and shun the painful, etc. However, conclusions about "things outside us" cannot, in this view of nature, be <u>necessarily</u> reached "without having . . . mentally examined those beforehand." The key word here is "beforehand." Sensation must be informed by mind if it is to know anything with certainty regarding "things outside us."

This distinction here between internal and external can now be understood as the distinction between self as composite mind-body and nature as body. As regards knowledge there seems to be a hierarchy. Body itself is unknowable, until it acts upon us, and then within us, giving rise to "confused and obscure ideas." This constitutes our <u>experience</u> of nature, i.e., the "teachings of nature." Above this is mind itself, i.e., the purely intelligible in itself without regard to body. It is through mind itself that body is made intelligible as the object of pure mathematics, and this can happen only through the medium of sensation. But not the medium of sensation as experience, which must be confused and obscure, but the medium of sensation considered only as the object of mathematics, i.e., the distinct idea of body as having figure, extension,

etc. How this happens is quite mysterious and seems to have to do with the imagination in its dual capacity of "imaging" the mathematical forms, however imperfectly, and turning toward body. This is not our immediate concern. Also, it should be noted that although this scheme seems to represent a hierarchy, it cannot represent an ascent: experience itself is imperfect and must be informed by mind. There can be no continuity between mere experience and the realm of innate ideas - imagination and sensation are not necessary to the conception of self as thinking substance.

B. The Deceptions of Nature - p. 194, para. 16 - The author now considers the teaching of nature more closely. Although our senses deceive about external objects, and therefore "falsity enters into the judgments I make," it seems that his internal senses, i.e., the teachings of nature which he regarded as true, also deceive. For example, we desire food that is in fact poisoned. But there is a better (para. 17)- example in "those who when they are sick desire to drink or eat things harmful to them." The body is like a machine, that obeys "the laws of nature" even when "badly made." This analogy brings him to conclude that the inner deceptions are "natural" to it. That is, thirst is a natural, and in the analogy, naturally necessary sensation, even when, because of other factors, (e.g., ill health), it is harmful to drink. But if health is good and an end to which the body has been made, then this "natural" desire does not "follow the order of nature." But, the author claims, the distinction equivocates about the word "nature." The former example, the analogy of man and machine, is "purely verbal characterization" and hence "extrinsic." The latter, however, is "something which is truly found in things." Therefore what is "naturally necessary" without regard for the good of the whole, is not, therefore, natural in "the order of nature." As a "composite whole" the (p. 195, para. 18) order of nature would seem to mean the continued existence of the thing, and therefore "it is a real error of nature" for it to desire something harmful to it.

Now running throughout this section there has been an argument we have largely ignored, that is, of the goodness of God. If God is good, then

we must ask how it is possible to be deceived. The apparent answer is that God has left it within our power to correct ourselves. But the question returns more intensely, when we consider that our natural faculties, in themselves, when functioning as they should (we have thirst, etc.) do not act for our good. This, says Descartes, is a "real error of nature," and, compared to the error in judgment that we fall into, seems beyond our ability to correct. The former category (of error) can be corrected insofar as self is considered as mind. But the latter category, of self as composite of mind and body, of "confused modes of thought" seems to be enslaved to a blind but necessary nature. For, although Descartes claims that the comparison of body and machine is a "verbal characterization," nevertheless it is clear (and becomes clearer in the succeeding section) that this, too, is nature. We will return to these arguments (the Goodness of God and natural necessity) in the concluding section of the paper.

At the end of the 18th paragraph, Descartes says ". . . it still remains to inquire how the goodness of God does not prevent the nature of man so regarded (as a composite whole n. b.) from being fallacious.

C. The Natural Imperfection of Man - This last section, with its strange emphasis on the mechanics of sensation, seems quite puzzling. For one thing, it is simply an anticlimax. The reader, burrowing through these often devious meditations, with good will and serious intent, finds that, in effect, these metaphysical roots have grown up into the trunk of physics, and now finding himself suddenly above ground, he is not blinded by the light, but rather sees clearly a scene he can never have before experienced, and in fact, which he perhaps cannot "experience."

We shall ask why the concluding pages are this way, but shall hold the question until we have examined them.

p. 196, para. 19 - Man as composite of mind and body, the goodness of God notwithstanding, is "fallacious." Descartes begins his inquiry into the sources of these failings by considering, again, the distinctions between mind and body. Mind is "entirely indivisible" and body "is by

nature always divisible." As a thinking thing he is one. As a composite of mind and body, however, if he were to lose a part of body his mind would not be diminished thereby. As corporeal object he is divisible, ". . . for there is not one of these . . . which my mind cannot easily divide into parts." In addition "the mind does not (para. 20) receive the impressions from all parts of the body immediately, but only from the brain, or perhaps even from one of its smallest parts . . ." and this part, "whenever it is disposed in the same particular way (emphasis added) conveys the same thing to the mind." To this "innumerable experiments" testify.

This paragraph is important in that it begins to establish a mechanical basis for the "passive faculty" of sensation. To demonstrate the idea, the succeeding paragraph uses a mechanical model. The fact that mind and body are "intermingled" makes it necessary to consider carefully the basis of this model. First it should be remembered that mind is distinct from body, i.e., body is not thought necessarily whereas mind is. Second, the "intermingling" of mind and body, or the composite," refers, we argue, to the faculties of sensation which both act and are acted upon. Therefore the limits of the mechanical model, seem necessarily to be determined. That is, when considering the brain in its "smallest parts" (later to be called "inmost") we are necessarily dealing with body which "conveys the same thing to mind." The realm of idea appears to remain distinct from the motions which produce it. (That this is so follows from the major distinctions previously made.)

para. 21 - Turning to body, then, the author discusses movement. The analogy of the cord, which serves as a model for the nerves, is also an analogy and model for efficient causality. In the IIIrd Meditation he argued that ". . . it is manifest by the natural light that there must at least be as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect. For . . . whence can the effect derive its reality, if not from cause?" (p. 162) Returning to the above mechanical model, in light of this understanding of causality, we can begin to speak in a particular way about natural necessity. In terms of the model before us, of the motion of the action of body on nerve, and also in the succeeding paragraph, of the models of the action at its terminus, what

happens, happens necessarily. As in the previous analogy of man and machine (p. 195), the badly made machine "no less exactly observes the laws of nature." (And it should be noted, the laws of nature implicit as that idea is in the work, is nevertheless mentioned explicitly only here, at the end of the treatise, in a discussion of body and motion.) The realm of body is the realm of natural necessity. Returning, however, to the model of the nerve, the important conclusion is as follows: "If we pull the last part that the first part . . . will not be moved in any way very differently from what would be the case if one of the intervening parts . . . (p. 197) were pulled, and the last part . . . were to remain unmoved." And since the nerves must reach from the extremity to the "inmost portions of the brain which is . . . their place of origin," any action upon the nerve in the intervening region will cause the same motion in the brain as if the action had been at the extreme end of the nerve. That motion in the brain is one "which nature has established in order to cause the mind to be affected by a sensation of pain" which is "represented as existing" in the extremity to which the nerve reaches. And this model, "holds good of all the other perceptions of our senses."

We see here the bodily, hence mechanical source of sense deception, and that the deception is not intentional on the part of nature which acts blindly and necessarily to some immediate end. The discussion (para. 22) of this "end," that is the end of the motion is discussed next.

Considering the brain, he finds that the motion set up in it produced (he claims) "one particular sensation only." Further, since there are numerous sensations which arise in the brain, the motion in question "causes mind to be affected by that one which is best fitted and most generally useful for the conservation of the human body when it is in health." (emphasis added) From this, that is from the idea of natural necessity considered in regard to the whole of man, he concludes that God is good. For pleasure and pain, that is the pursuit or avoidance of things, contribute to the conservation of the body, but only "when he is in health." Here, again, the conclusion and the qualifications must carefully be weighed. We suggest here that the goodness of God, if applicable only when we are in health, is suspect. By this argument, to reconcile the goodness of God with illness and death becomes extremely

difficult since it would require going beyond natural necessity as evidence of God's good creations in order to speculate about his ends, which are, we have been told, inscrutable. God has so constituted our bodies that they necessarily seek to conserve themselves, but this same necessity is subject to imperfection, and thus becomes destructive of the body.

p. 198, para. 23 - "From this it is quite clear that, notwithstanding the supreme goodness of God, the nature of man inasmuch as it is composed of mind and body, cannot be otherwise than sometimes a source of deception." When we are in ill health the deception of sense must be a real error of nature, that is of our (composite) nature. Thus the deception of sense, when considered as false opinions in mind are harmless next to their real consequences in the body.

para. 24 - Descartes then draws the Meditation and the treatise to its conclusion. It is significant that the conclusions in this last paragraph do not, in the main, refer to the immediately preceding discussion, but return to the prior considerations, namely the doubt of the existence of material things, which was originally established as a methodological consideration in the first Meditation (p. 148) and which, as we have tried to show, is not the primary concern of the last Meditation, although it was written under that guise. Before considering the significance of this paragraph, let us review its conclusions.

First he discusses the preceding discussion. It has been "of great service" to him in recognizing "all the errors to which my nature is subject." But, more importantly, it allows him to "avoid them or correct them more easily." Now "all the errors" to which he is subject fall into two categories. One, which is the subject of the fourth Meditation, is the errors of judgment. We have already seen that the correction of these errors rests, initially, on the rule by which he suspends all judgment. (Having applied this rule, he can correct the "weakness of not being able to concentrate on one particular thing. Apparently, the more he is able to do this, the greater the possibility of applying the understanding to the idea in question and hence bring it within the sphere of rational necessity, that is, science.) The other category of nature is, of course, the "real errors" of nature. It is clear that

"avoiding" them would seem impossible, and to "correct" them would require a knowledge that, at this point in the treatise remains speculative. However, the very means by which the "real errors" have been subjected to analysis, that is, the application of principles of the understanding (such as the idea of efficient causality), seems to imply the direction and shape such knowledge will take. Simply stated, the operations of body become, ultimately, the "object of pure mathematics." Such a certain, secure knowledge, resting apparently, on the autonomy of mind, has within it the promise of "correcting" the real errors. Thus we find that the closing paragraph begins to bring to a common focus the error of judgment and the "real errors" of nature. This focus is twofold. It is, first, the "rule" which second, allows us to bring the certain knowledge of the understanding to bear on the (confused) knowledge of natural necessity by means of rational necessity (and we must keep in mind that this in turn rests on a correspondence which must exist between the way nature "really" exists and certain knowledge - it is not our intent here to attempt to bring to light the possibility of the basis of that correspondence). The consequence of this knowledge is a secure "practical" science, a science of real effect in the world.

In the first Meditation, in comparing the state of the natural sciences with that of the mathematical sciences, Descartes states that they differ in respect of certainty in that the former had "as their end the consideration of composite things" and hence "were very dubious and uncertain," whereas the latter "which only treat of things that are very simple and very general . . . contains some measure of certainty and an element of the indubitable." (p. 147)

Again, in the second Meditation, after the example of wax, Descartes concludes "that its perception is neither an act of vision, nor of touch, nor of imagination . . . but only an intuition of the mind, which may be imperfect and confused . . . or clear and distinct . . . according as my attention is more or less directed to the elements which are found in it, and of which it is composed." (p. 155)

At the end of the fourth Meditation, he says: "I notice a certain weakness

in my nature in that I cannot continually concentrate my mind on one single thought." (p. 178)

The "model" of sensation at the end of the sixth Meditation is an involuted effort in the direction suggested above. That is, he directs his attention to the source of his imperfection and confusion to see it in its elements. The "model" attempts to isolate the act of nature, to understand it in its necessary obedience to the "laws of nature." The act is the bodily aspect of sense perception, and the result is to isolate the material basis of the deception of the senses, to point out the real imperfection in our nature. Let us review the possible relation of error, and sense deception.

The ordinary deceptions of sense merely affect our judgment, but for that reason have a consequence of some moment for Descartes, which is to keep us from certain, necessary knowledge of nature. This, in turn, can now be seen, in the light of our real imperfections, i.e., of the real errors of nature, as holding us in bondage, keeping us subject to that nature, The greatest freedom of the will is within the confines of necessary knowledge, the least when subject to error which, we now argue, is understood as having a material basis. The greatest freedom is freedom from nature.

The conclusion of the first part of this paragraph, that he "ought no longer to fear that falsity may be found in matters every day presented to me by my senses," we claim is misleading. Our argument for this will not be reiterated here, other than to note that he appears to misrepresent radical doubt for reasons that are not readily discernible. However, we might interpret the conclusion in light of the argument immediately preceding, by asking what falsity he ought to fear? Certainly not "everyday" matters, since it was pointed out in the beginning that there is a reasonable basis of belief: "there is much more reason to believe in them than to deny them." (p. 148) "Everyday" matters might be interpreted as the "usual" course of his life, when he is in health. But there is much to fear from the deceptions of sense when he is in ill-health his "natural" impulse to conserve his body might then be to the detriment of his body.

He then discusses his most "ridiculous" doubt, that of whether he could

be certain whether he is awake or asleep. He answers this by concluding that "when I perceive things as to which I know distinctly both the place . . . and the time at which they appeared to me, and when, without any interruption" he can be certain that he is awake. Why is this particular doubt "hyperbolical and ridiculous?" It must be noted that "place," "time" and continuity are for Descartes three mathematicizable aspects of nature. Nature is not intermittent, for one thing, and for another, when he thinks he knows he exists, and this thinking (on its lowest level) is a continual perception of a continuously acting nature. When he is dreaming there is no continuity of perception, and hence this too is not a problem as regards the distinction. ". . . I ought in no wise to doubt the truth of such matters . . . after having called up all my senses, my memory and my understanding to examine them . . ." and there is nothing in one of them "repugnant to what is set forth by the others" he "ought not doubt the truth of such matters."

> "But because of the exigencies of action(/la necessité des affaires!)often oblige us to examine matters carefully, we must confess that the life of man is very frequently subject to error in respect to individual objects, and we must in the end acknowledge the infirmity of our nature."

The continuity of nature, - which we may understand as "la necessité des affaires", its continuous necessary acting - although it may serve to convince us of the distinguishability of waking and sleeping (but of which common experience seems to be equally convincing) is the source of our real imperfections which "we must in the end acknowledge."

Notes Toward Some Conclusions

First let us clarify some distinctions that have arisen in this paper. The appearances, and their concomitant faculties, the imagination (and memory) and the faculties of sensation, were noted in the crucial tenth paragraph of the sixth Meditation (p. 190) as those "without which I can easily conceive myself clearly and distinctly as a complete being; while, on the other hand, they cannot be so conceived apart from me." This began the development of the distinction between self as thinking thing and self as composed of mind and body "intermingled." As we have noted, this

represents an "inroad" on the "cogito" as originally set forth in the second Meditation (p. 153) but, as we also noted, this "inroad" is the development of an ambiguity already present (p. 151, bottom). Although composite self is an "intermingling" of mind and body, it should be noted again that the distinction between extended and unextended substance (corporeal and intelligent) is not thereby obliterated. The mechanical model of sensation which represents motion to the "inmost" parts of the brain does not account for the idea itself, but is merely its (bodily) origin. We cannot say the the "last motion" of the "inmost" part of the brain is an idea, since it must remain the motion of extended substance. The autonomy of mind must be preserved.

A further distinction within self as composite should also be made clear. That is what the imagination is. First, as we have noted, it is a kind of secondary faculty of the ideas as appearances. This brings us to the necessary understanding that the appearances brought to us through sensation admit of degrees of clarity. They may be "confused and obscure" like mere sensations, or they may be to some extent distinct. The importance of this lies in the claim that one may have a distinct idea of corporeal nature (although there is the crucial qualification that one cannot "derive any argument from which there will necessarily be deduced the existence of body" (p. 187) there is no necessity of existence even in the most "distinct" appearances). This claim seems to be the foundation on which the possibility of understanding nature as the object of pure mathematics rests. A distinct idea of nature is of figure, extension, etc., i.e., mathematical. One might well question the necessity of the basis of this correspondence; is it merely fortuitous? We will not pursue this question.

Error, Sense Perception and Doubt Reconsidered

We have argued that radical doubt is not a denial, in itself, of existence, and for this reason have had to interpret the sixth Meditation as having an intent other than what is stated. Thus we have understood the sixth Meditation as the end of an argument that has divided consciousness into two realms. The one, which we have termed the ideas of rational necessity

(of self as thinking thing, by which he is what he is, that is, to which existence necessarily pertains) is determined by the use of radical doubt as a "lever," that is as a methodological consideration for the sake of the "firm foundation in the sciences." The other realm is of the appearances, of the ideas of nature brought to us by the senses, in which ideas there is no certainty or necessity, that is, to which existence does not necessarily pertain. This is the realm of formal and material falsity, of error and sense deception, and from which the idea of doubt in the beginning is derived by means of reflection on common experience. This doubt, in itself, does not require of us an absolute suspension of belief, rather, there is more reason to believe than to deny the "teachings of nature."

However, our argument about error and sense deception requires us to reconsider radical doubt. Although error is nothing in itself, it lies in the judgments we make about ideas. We have tried to show that the ideas about which judgment errs are in the category of the appearances, since it is not possible for it to err in the other realm. The development of this argument seems to hinge on the example in the form of a question in the fourth Meditation, where it is seen that there is no certain way to determine whether the idea of self as corporeal representation is the same as self as thinking thing. The difficulty, of course, lies in the fact that existence necessarily pertains to the latter, but not to the former. It is at this point that radical doubt may be misrepresented, since the question about the appearances is, if existence does not necessarily pertain to them as ideas, does corporeal nature, what the ideas apparently represent, exist? This is the question that it is the stated intent of the sixth Meditation to answer. Descartes' answer in the form of a "proof" we argue, is irrelevant, and merely restates the initial position, namely, that he has "a very great inclination to believe . . . that they (the ideas) are conveyed to me by corporeal objects." We argued that the existence of corporeal nature was never really the basis of doubt. Rather, the real question lay in the qualifications; ". . . they are perhaps not exactly what we perceive by the senses" (p. 191). From this the argument about self as composed of mind and body developed and the consequent mechanical model of sensation. The

result, we argued, was an understanding of the appearances as having necessity through an examination of their bodily origin, underlying which examination was an implicit "physics" based on principles derived from the understanding. The origin of the appearances then was seen as arising from natural necessity. The argument that followed from this was the understanding of the material basis of sense deception, that is, of the "real errors" of nature and the imperfections of man.

Now, it is this material basis of the deceptions of the senses that requires us to consider the origins of radical doubt. Although it is a "tool" in the beginning of the treatise, in the end it seems justifiable to say that its basis is a radical distrust of nature. Thus radical doubt seems to be a demand of thought for Descartes, notwithstanding its apparently merely methodological use at the beginning of the Meditations. It is inextricably bound up with both the beginnings and the end of his idea of science. The desire for a "firm foundation in the sciences" has as a decisive part of its end a "practical philosophy" and is a desire for freedom from nature by making ourselves the "masters and possessors of nature." In this respect it is not the least puzzling that Descartes found the greatest freedom where he found the greatest necessity, in an autonomous intellect.

What is this "nature" for Descartes that it demands such a science?

Nature and the Imperfection of Man

Nature for Descartes seems to be twofold. On the one hand in its fundamental actions, the action of bodies, it is necessary. This necessity is primarily on the level of the elements of which it is composed (viz. the wax - p. 155, end of paragraph) which elements correspond (somehow) with the mathematical nature of our understanding. On the other hand, the necessity of nature seems to us to be blind, without ends that we can comprehend other than the immediate effects of its continuing efficient causality.

The imperfections of man mirror nature. The example of the dropsical man who desires to drink is an example of both necessity, insofar as the

desire to drink is the result of the necessary action of nature, and blindness, since the end of that act is destructive.

In this view what accounts for man as a whole? Further, in this view, why should the action of the parts be destructive of the whole? The blindness of nature, from our extrinsic point of view, can only appear to us as accident.

For Descartes, the science of nature, which reveals its necessity through the light of our understanding, does not for that reason change its appearance to us. Rather it frees us from our former illusions, and contains the promise of securing a lasting foundation for enjoying the blessings of this life, by freeing us from the accidents and imperfections to which we are subject.

A GENERALIZATION OF APOLLONIUS I. 11-13

John Steadman, Tutor

A generalization of the characteristic property of the hyperbola, given



in 1.12, can be stated:

> Given any pllg on the ordinate, as its other side is to the ordinate, so make a "notright" to the upright. Then the pllg on the ordinate equals the similar pllg on the abscissa and the notright, but exceeds by a figure similar, and similarly situated to the similar pllg on the transverse and the notright.

PROOF:

Let there be a hyperbola with diameter AB, center C, and upright side AU. On any ordinate DE make a pllg with side DF. Draw AN at the same angle, and so that DF:DE :: AN:AU. Then AN is the notright. Join BN and extend to P, where EP is parallel to AN. Complete pllgs AEPO and AEQN.

I say that pllg EF = pllg AP.

For let BU be joined and extended to W, where EW is parallel to AU.

Complete rectangles AEWV and AEXU. Then sq. DE = rect. AW.

Now EP:AN :: EB:AU, so EP:EW :: AN:AU :: DF:DE, so also rect. AE,EP:rect. AE,EW :: rect. DF,DE:sq. DE.

But sq DE = rect. AE,EW, therefore rect. DF,DE = rect. AE,EP.

However as rectangles are to one another so are similar pllgs on the same sides (since they are in duplicate ratio of their sides).

Therefore pllg EF = pllg AP. Q.E.D.

It is clear that when DE=DF, and the angle is right, then the pllg becomes a square, the notright becomes an upright, and this property becomes that in I.12.

The analogous property of the ellipse follows from this same proof, by drawing the appropriate figure.

The analogous property of the parabola follows immediately from I.11 since if DE:DF :: AU:AN, then sq. DE:rect. DE,DF :: rect. AU,AE:rect.AN,AE. But in the parabola sq. DE = rect. AU,AE, so that rect. DF,DE = rect.AU,AE and the similar pllgs on the same sides will be equal also.

Apollonius does prove one proposition involving arbitrary pllgs on the ordinate, namely I,41, which is given for the sake of certain lemmas needed for finding diameters and their uprights. It is equivalent to the property given here, since each can be deduced from the other.

With pllg EF and notright AN given as before, I.41 can be proved by bisecting the notright at G, joining CG and extending to H, completing pllgs CAGJ and CEHK and then showing that:



first, DE:DF comp. CA:AG, upright:transverse,

second, pllg AP = gnomon AHJ.

The first follows from the proportion DE:DF :: AU:AN,
since AU:AN comp. AU:AB, AB:AN, and since AB:AN :: AC:AG, therefore
DE:DF comp. CA:AG, upright AU:transverse AB.

The second is shown in 4 steps:

1. Since pllg NP = pllg GH (by congruent triangles) therefore pllg MP = pllg GQ.
2. But pllg GQ = pllg AL (since GN=AG),
3. and pllg AL = pllg JM (pllgs about dia.),
4. therefore pllg JM = pllg MP, and gnomon AHJ = pllg AP. Q.E.D.

Since all these steps are convertible, the generalization of I.12 is proved from I.41 by writing this proof backwards.

ANALOGY AND UNDERSTANDING

Robin Smith '68
Freshman Prize Essay
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[The quotations from the Republic in this paper are mostly from Paul Shorey's translation. However, I have occasionally made slight alterations to suit myself.]

Part I

Probably the most commonly used - and, indeed, the most effective - means of explaining is the analogy. Analogy, generally speaking, explains the unfamiliar and unknown by means of similar things which are familiar and known and which have the same relationships among themselves as the unfamiliar things. Unfortunately, this definition tells us that analogy explains the unfamiliar and unknown in terms of familiar and known things which are analogously related, for "in the same relationship" may be considered synonymous with "analogously." How, then, does analogy create any understanding of some matter? The answer to this question seems to be contained in the Republic, in the three important comparisons of the sixth and seventh books: the simile of the sun and the good, the analogy of the divided line, and the allegory of the cave.

The simile of the sun is introduced at 506E as an account of "what seems to be the offspring of the good and most like it." Socrates describes the good in this indirect manner because he fears the insufficiency of his powers for a direct description: ". . . I fear that my powers may fail and that in my eagerness I may cut a sorry figure and become a laughing stock." However, Socrates has just finished describing the corruption of philosophic natures and how the philosopher is useless - in fact, ridiculous - in existing society. Glaucon will later exclaim at the extreme to which Socrates' comparison goes, "Heaven help us, such a hyperbole!" (Ἀπολλονιᾳ δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς). What is to be made of the laughability of Socrates and of the philosopher?

The answer to this question is not immediately forthcoming. However, let us examine this simile which Socrates is offering. In setting it

out, he first separates those things which are into two classes: (507B) "We predicate 'to be' of many beautiful things and of many good things. . ." and later, ". . . we speak of a good in itself and a beautiful in itself . . .". There is here the replacement of many (good) things by one idea (of the good). Moreover, the idea we call "that which each really is". "And the one class of things," Socrates continues, "can be seen but not thought, while the ideas can be thought but not seen." Thus, we have the division of what is into the class of visible objects and the class of ideas, and we have the tacit assumption that the ideas are the more real.

The setting out now becomes more specific. It is to refer to the visible world, to the world of sense perceptions. Socrates observes that sight is unique among the senses in that it requires, in addition to the organ of vision and the object seen, a third element - light - before it can operate. Now, Socrates lays down the immediate specifications for his simile. First, the sun is the source of light and therefore the cause of vision. Second, neither vision itself nor the eye is the sun. Third, the eye is the most sunlike of the organs of sense. And fourth, the sun, while it is not itself vision, is, as the cause of vision, beheld by vision itself. Here Socrates tells us that this was what he meant by the offspring of the good, which, as he says at 508C, "the good generated in a proportion with itself: as the good is to reason and the objects of reason in the intelligible world, so is the sun to vision and the objects of vision in the visible world." He explains the proportionality further: when the eyes are "turned" on the objects of the night, rather than those of the day, they appear as if vision were not in them. However, when the eyes are "turned" on the objects of the day, vision appears to be in the same eyes. Thus, the same eyes will appear to possess or not to possess vision as the light of the sun is present or absent. Likewise, when the soul is directed at that place "where truth and being shine", it knows the objects there and appears to possess reason; but when it is turned from there to the place of "becoming and passing away", it appears to be without reason. Now, Socrates draws the conclusion he has been aiming for: "Then this, which gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of

knowing to the knower, you must call the idea of good, and you must think of it as being the cause of knowledge and of truth insofar as it is known."

Here it seems to me that the analogy has come to its natural conclusion: the sun is like the good in that the one makes objects in the visible world visible, while the other makes objects in the intelligible world knowable. But Socrates has got his proportion, whether it is a true one or not, and he is, at least for the moment, going to treat it like one. Accordingly, he goes on to say that, while it is not just to conceive of either the truth or knowledge as being the good, but only like the good, nevertheless they are the most like the good of any ideas - just as the eye and light, though they are neither of them the sun, are nevertheless most like the sun of things in the visible world. Glaucon's reaction to this seems very significant to me: "An inconceivable beauty you speak of, if it creates knowledge and truth but is itself more beautiful than they. For you surely cannot mean that it is pleasure." Laucon indicates here that the conversation is leaving him somewhat in the dark now; Socrates has left the simply understandable bounds of the "proportion". In fact, rather than try to elucidate Glaucon's confusion, Socrates continues to extend the comparison: "The sun not only gives the power of being seen to visible objects, but it also provides for their generation. Likewise, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive their being known from the good, but also that their being and essence are provided to them by it, though the good is not itself essence." Glaucon is now utterly at a loss to see how the discussion has arrived at such a statement as this, though it started as a simple likening of the sun to the good. Therefore, Glaucon laughs; part of his laughter is surprise, but the explanation of the rest will have to be reserved for later.

In the simile of the sun, it should be noted that, first, Socrates is not really justified in carrying the proportion as far as he does; second, that the entire analogy is constructed with reference to sensory phenomena. The significance of this will become clear in a later context.

Part II

The discussion now turns back to the question of the nature of the good and its relation to the intelligible world. The simile of the sun, whatever it may have of immediacy and vividness, is limited in its extension: it cannot be carried beyond a certain point without strain. Therefore, Socrates resorts to a mathematical object for his comparison, and this time he constructs a genuine proportion.

The primary consideration is identical to that of the previous consideration, the worlds of the visible and the intelligible, ruled over by the sun and the good. However, this time Socrates chooses to represent them by a line divided into unequal parts according to "the ratio of their comparative clarity and obscurity." (509D) He then divides each section again in the same ratio as the sections themselves. Now, he considers what the divisions of the sections are to represent. For the two parts of the visible section, he suggests the interpretation of shadows and reflections generally (images) for one section, and those things of which they are the images, as the other. Socrates asks Glaucon if he agrees that "the division in respect of truth and falseness is that, as the opinable is to the knowable, so is the likeness to that of which it is the likeness?" Glaucon agrees, and thereby agrees that the visible world is an image of the intelligible. In effect, this is a hypothesis to which Glaucon is assenting, However, Socrates has prepared for this hypothesis with his assertion that the sun is the offspring of the good. There is a similarity of relationship between parent and offspring, model and copy, a thing and its likeness; and Socrates asserts that the same relation holds between ideas and visible objects, between being and becoming. It is the perception of this sameness which is the understanding of the truth in the analogy.

Next, it is necessary to turn to the section of the line representing the intelligible world. On one part of this line, we are to consider as images the things imitated in the former part. The hypothetical method is characteristic of this section: the soul proceeds "from hypotheses, not up to a first principle, but down to a conclusion." However, in the other part of this section, the soul "goes from the

hypotheses up to an unhypothetical beginning," and moves through the realm of pure ideas, making no use of images.

This last statement - that the soul makes no use of images in the last part of the intelligible section - is particularly significant in terms of the discussion leading up to this point, for the entire discussion is a use of images. In them, an imperfect understanding of the ideas is helped by the perception of relationships like those among the ideas also occurring among things in the visible world. The essential nature of analogy is evident here: that it explains the familiar in terms of the unfamiliar. However, whether the perception of a same relationship can be reduced to any simpler terms is as yet unanswered.

On the last section of the line, images are no longer employed, or, in other words, the soul perceives that which is not an image of anything; the unhypothetical idea of good. Glaucon is understandably mystified by this, and therefore Socrates turns again to the first part of the intelligible section, to clarify the nature of it with an example. Considering the study of geometry, Socrates points out that geometers postulate those things which they intend to use in their investigation and then proceed from them consistently to conclusions, all the while taking the existence of those things postulated as being beyond question. Further, he notes that geometers employ visible objects as illustrations of the ideas they are talking about. In other words, geometry exactly fits the conditions of the objects on the first part of the intelligible section: it treats the visible objects as images of its own and proceeds by the hypothetical method. In this section, for some reason, the soul is unable to rise above its hypotheses and move in the realm of pure ideas, unaccompanied by images, up to the unhypothesized first principle. The upper part, by contrast, is those things which "the reason itself lays hold of by means of the power of dialectic, treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses (τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις), underpinnings, footings, and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting point of all, and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense but only of pure ideas

moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas."

Glaucon's reaction to this is much different from his reaction to the conclusion of the simile of the sun. Rather than laugh, he tries to grasp what is being said, and indeed he returns a good account of it to Socrates. Thus, the analogy of the divided line and the relative positions of the activities of reason, thinking, belief, and imagining on it compose an analogy that is much clearer than the simile of the sun for two reasons: first, because the object now used to explain the good is an ideal object, instead of a physical one; and second, because the proportion is used only in its true sense. Still, it must be borne in mind that the simile of the sun is responsible for getting us where we are. Though reason is superior to vision, vision is prior. Yet Plato has here a clear statement of the relation between sense experience and thought. Sense experiences can only cause knowledge of ideas in the way that a things' shadow can cause vision of the thing itself. Sense experience is thus the imitation of knowledge, and its objects are the imitations of knowable objects; but only knowledge and its objects are real.

Part III

The simile of the sun gave us, at least in a way, the relationship between the good and the objects in the world of being; the analogy of the divided line explained the relationship between the world of being and the world of becoming. Now, Socrates prepares to make the ascent from the visible world to the ideal world - an ascent which he will describe as education. He begins in 514A to construct his allegory: "Compare our nature in respect of education and the lack of it to such an experience as this." He presents us with men chained as prisoners in a cave where sunlight never enters. They are unable to move or turn their heads, and all that they can see is the shadows thrown on the wall of the cave by objects held before a fire. Men in such a situation, if they had been there all their lives, would imagine the cave to be the real world, and the shadows and the fire to be true objects and true light. Wisdom, for these, would be the ability to discern the shadowy shapes and to remember their customary sequences.

Socrates now begins to describe the ascent. What would be the prisoner's reaction "when one was freed from his fetters and compelled to stand up suddenly and turn his head around and walk and lift up his eyes to the light, and in doing all this felt pain and because of the dazzle and glitter of the light was unable to discern the objects whose shadows he formerly saw, what would be his answer if someone told him that what he had seen before was all a cheat and an illusion, but that now, being nearer to reality and turned toward more real things, he saw more truly?" The first step of the ascension is the turning of the prisoner's vision away from the shadows to those things of which they are the shadows, and this step will be painful to him. The description of this as a "turning around" is important; the same language has been used many times already by Socrates, for instance, to describe the turning of the soul from contemplation of the world of becoming to the world of being. Apparently, this turning around comes only through constraint.

The man in the cave would be pained by looking at the unfamiliar objects, and he would be still more pained by looking at the light of the fire directly. Rather than stay and look at these things, he will turn again and flee to the shadows he is familiar with, regarding them as more real than these other things he has seen with such pain. In short, he will flee the unfamiliar objects and turn again to the familiar ones. There is a resemblance between this behavior and the "doglike" behavior which is to be ingrained in the guardians in the ideal state: the guardians are to love and protect what is familiar, and to hate and destroy what is unfamiliar. Perhaps there is here a suggestion that this doglike temperament will have to be utterly destroyed before the guardians can become philosophers.

Whatever the case may be in this matter, Socrates next has his prisoner dragged up into the light of the sun - an experience that would be most painful of all for this prisoner, and which he would resist as much as he could. When he reached the outside, where the sunlight, the cause of true vision, is abundant, his vision would be overwhelmed and he would be blinded by the light, unable to see any of what we call the real things, Then, gradually, his vision would become accustomed to the light; at first, he would be able to look at shadows and reflections,

then the actual physical objects, and finally the sun itself. Ultimately, he would understand that the sun is the cause of generation and growth and nurture in the visible world.

But now, Socrates would have this man descend again into the cave. Obviously, he would not want to; he would have no desire at all for the honors and merits he might gain among them disputing about shadows. Nevertheless, should he make the descent, he would find himself blinded by the darkness and unable to discern the shadows he once considered real. If he should be required to speak about the shadows while still in this condition, he would appear ridiculous to the men in the cave, and they would think that his vision had been corrupted (the verb used is διαφθείρω, which is also used in the charge against Socrates in the Euthyphro and the Apology "corrupting the youth"). Furthermore, they would kill anyone who attempted to lead them out of the cave, if they were able.

Now, Socrates proposes to apply this allegory to "all that has been said." He constructe the comparison as we might expect: as the cave is to the visible world, so is the visible world to the intelligible world. However, this time Socrates is careful to put his allegory in its proper perspective: "But God knows whether it is true." He proceeds within this more or less hypothetical framework and attempts to reach up to the good once more, this time with a firmer understanding of his method. At once, he tells us that, "in the region of the known, the last thing to be seen, and seen with difficulty, is the idea of good" and that "this (the idea of good) is indeed the cause of all things, of all that is right and beautiful." Exactly what is meant by this is clarified by the last statement Socrates makes about the good: ". . . anyone who is to act wisely in public or in private must have caught sight of this." Here is the real significance of the entire discussion about the idea of the good: without a vision of the ultimate human good - for clearly that is what Socrates means by the good - there is no wisdom or even significance of any intelligible sort in the world, as far as men are concerned.

Just as the man in the cave would not want to descend again, once having

lived in the light, so the philosopher who has contemplated the good and understood it as the true cause of everything of value will not want to argue about the shadows of justice and virtue which are seen by the ordinary men. The philosopher will appear ridiculous because of his inability to opine as ordinary men do about these shadows. It is important to remember that vision is obscured in two ways: by coming from light into darkness and by coming from darkness into light. Therefore thinking that the same thing happens to the soul, a sensible man will not laught at a confused soul until he determines which sort of blindness is affecting it. "And so he would deem the one happy in its experience and way of life, and pity the other; and if it pleased him to laugh at it, his laughter would be less laughable than that at the expense of the soul that had come down from the light above."

Perhaps, then we now have an explanation of Glaucon's laughter. Socrates has taken Glaucon and, after examing with him those things of the visible world in which he has confidence, rudely turned his soul from that world to the world of ideas, directly confronting him with the idea of the good. Glaucon is blinded by this - however dim his perception of it may be - and his perplexity only grows as Socrates persists in expanding the "proportion". Therefore, he laughs both at the ideas Socrates is presenting him and at his own inability to comprehend them. He is shocked into laughter by the unfamiliarity of Socrates' statements (for unfamiliarity is closely akin to ridiculousness), but at the same time he strives to see more clearly the thing that is blinding him. In this way, he is also inclined to laugh at himself.

The allegory of the cave has thus combined the simile of the sun and the analogy of the divided line, creating an image of these two images in order to explain to movement of the soul between the worlds of becoming and being. It seems that the allegory takes the two previous comparisons as hypotheses of a sort, and then develops them, drawing conclusions about the world of becoming from ideal hypotheses. The cave is, in a sense, an image of the line, but it is a dynamic image, portraying motion along the line. The allegory is not yet finished; it has yet to yield its most important comparison.

Part IV

In 518C, Socrates applies the allegory of the cave to the process of education: "Our present argument indicates that the true analogy for this indwelling power of the soul and the instrument whereby each of us apprehends is that of an eye that could not be converted from the darkness to the light except by turning the whole body. Even so this organ of knowledge must be turned around from the world of becoming together with the entire soul . . ." But if this is education, it is also the business of the ideal state in the Republic, for the body of that work is taken up with a discussion of the education of the guardians, If this is the case, then there is a great deal of difference between the education of the guardians and the true education, for the true education seems to be a violent and painful process, one in which a man is required to look at objects which deny the truth of his former beliefs and whose truth and goodness are painful to his unaccustomed soul.

Let us consider for a moment what education is. Certainly, it is in its truest sense the production of virtue. The education outlined in the allegory of the cave, however, is intended to direct the wisdom in a soul aright. Might, then, the true nature of virtue be that it is wisdom, and consequently cannot be taught but only directed aright? Indeed, Socrates describes the other virtues as "akin to those of the body. For it is true that where they do not pre-exist, they are afterwards created by habit and practice." Wisdom, on the other hand, is different: ". . . of a more divine quality, a thing that never loses its potency but, according to the direction of its conversion, becomes useful and beneficient, or, again, useless and harmful." The only virtue that truly belongs to the soul of a man is thus wisdom - a virtue which, strictly, cannot be taught. However, the process of education is the turning of this wisdom, together with the entire soul, from the images and shadows of the world of becoming to the ideas themselves in the world of being.

Now, it is possible to answer the initial question of this paper: how an analogy can create understanding. First, it appears that all men are doglike in a certain sense, in that they trust the things they are familiar with more than unfamiliar things. From this, we immediately

understand the painfulness of education: the progress from the familiar to the unfamiliar is of necessity painful. If, however, we can introduce the unfamiliar objects from the vantage point of the familiar - foreshadowing them, in effect - we will ease the pain of the process and encourage progress along the path of education; for, while traveling in a region of unfamiliar things, the man being educated will see all around him those relationships that he has become familiar with. The sudden turning around in the cave is painful, because it emphasizes the difference of the worlds; the analogies given by Socrates are inspiring, because they show us the sameness.

THE WHITENESS OF TRUST

Veronica Soul '66

Now all is at a winter's end. I'll come.
You call me briar rose because I bloom
Behind the unwashed glass of greenhouse panes
And fear to tread the icy surfaced lake
When winter's rage has made its solid stand.
Don't think I never dance or run or walk
My way to this chilled county's edge of wave,
Nor stop at every dandelion gone
To seed. Don't think I never look on youths
Without the will to shower them with white
That isn't cold like snow or lovers gone.
I stripped the spring of flowering weeds to stop
The fall of seeds of trust upon my hair,
Until I watched a stone among the stones,
Milk gray and worn, half hidden by its peers.
Because that heavy gray can't come to me,
I'll seek it out along my walking ways.
Each barren day I'll rush to see it still
Until it's bruised away by rain and wind.
When you outdraw that stone in strength, don't think
I'll never dance until our ways are one --
Unless you will to dance a separate piece,
Deny each dandelion gone to seed.
Then white on white confuses memory
When snow and seed mix seasons and love's blown.

INVOCATION

James Mensch '67

The viol provencial
breaks foreward with its sweet song
into the quiet night air parting it
with the breath of its spirit,
as that first spirit moved on the stillness of the waters.
Who will answer it?
Will the powers so impregnated give birth
to a new creation in joyful spontaneity,
recalling that first command;
or is it that song of the maiden weeping
for the false marriage of her sister;
so sweet her song,
    the night takes it for a love's complaint.
Who will answer it?

THE NIGHT THEN

James Mensch '67

If I could reenter the womb of things,
if I could breathe the air expanded
(the breath of angels)
and like a spirit disembodied
soar over the earth covered with snow
If I the secret places of things could enter
the lighted windows, magic lanterns, of the houses below;
If I could open my mouth
so as to swallow the moon
and sing (not breaking the curious stillness of the night but
becoming it)
and if my song could enter all the places
of the snow like the moonlight and linger o'er the drifts
and if I could become my song....
Or in late summer, be the wind after the rain
making of the leaves voices to sing
the whisperings of secrets
and be the cricket's comment
and be the fallen leaves painted
and the wind
blowing over the house tops and the chimneys
and the brick gardens with the closed
yet exhalent sweetness of night flowers;
and laying the egg as in the parting of the
breasts of chaos,
nose about the damp, dark, and empty places,
and be the exhausted sleep of lovers,
the empty fountains pricking the pregnant quiet of night
which cascades onto the plains of joy all unbroken
while she weaves her embroidered cloth
of wheeling stars upon the womb of darkness...

AT THE MID HOUR OF NIGHT

Anacreontea

Μεσονυκτίοις ποθ' ὥραις,
στρέφεθ' ἡνίκ' Ἄρκτος ἤδη
κατὰ χεῖρα τὴν Βοώτου,
μερόπων δὲ φῦλα πάντα
κέαται κόπῳ δαμέντα,
τότ' Ἔρως ἐπισταθείς μευ
θυρέων ἔκοπτ' ὀχῆας.
"τίς", ἔφην, "θύρας ἀράσσει;
κατά μευ σχίζεις ὀνείρους."
ὁ δ' Ἔρως, "ἄνοιγε," φησίν.
"βρέφος εἰμί, μὴ φόβησαι·
βρέχομαι δὲ κἀσέληνον
κατὰ νύκτα πεπλάνημαι
ἐλέησα ταῦτ' ἀκούσας,
ἀνὰ δ' εὐθὺ λύχνον ἅψας
ἀνέῳξα, καὶ βρέφος μὲν
ἐσορῶ φέροντα τόξον
πτέρυγάς τε καὶ φαρέτρην.
παρὰ δ' ἰστίην καθῖσα,
παλάμαις τε χεῖρας αὐτοῦ
ἀνέθαλπον, ἐκ δὲ χαίτης
ἀπέθλιβον ὑγρὸν ὕδωρ.
ὁ δ', ἐπεὶ κρύος μεθῆκεν,
"φέρε," φησί, "πειράσωμεν
τόδε τόξον, εἴ τι μοι νῦν
βλάβεται βραχεῖσα νευρή."
τανύει δὲ καί με τύπτει
μέσον ἧπαρ, ὥσπερ οἶστρος·
ἀνὰ δ' ἄλλεται καχάζων,
"ξένε δ'," εἶπε, "συγχάρηθι·
κέρας ἀβλαβὲς μὲν ἡμῖν,
σὺ δὲ καρδίην πονήσεις."

AT THE MID HOUR OF NIGHT
(Anacreontea)

James Liljenwall '68
Greek translation prize
(Santa Fe)

Once, in the middle of night,
when the Bear
was turned 'round
near the hand of Arcturus
and the races of men
lay broken by toil,
Eros halted at my door
rattling the bar.

"Who is hammering on my door;
who tears me from my dreams?"

"Open up! Don't be afraid.
I am a child, wandering
alone through the moonless night,
and I am soaked."

Quickly I lighted a lamp,
taking pity
at his words.
Then I opened wide the door,
and a child it was!
with wings, a quiver,
and a bow.

I sat him down near the fire,
warming his
artful hands,
drying his long-flowing hair,
until at last,
when the chill had let go,
Eros spoke:

"Here, let's give the bow a try
to see if it prevents my shot
with a string that is wet."

But he easily strung the bow
and shot me
in the breast:
I was certain he was mad!
But laughing he leaped up, saying:

"O Friend, brighten up!
The arrows are harmless for us,
though you will suffer in your heart."

THE SON OF GOD AS WORD

John Wetlaufer '67
Honorable Mention
Sophomore Essay '65

> Indeed, men cannot speak properly of such matters. For who can unfold in cogent enough fashion this statement, that, "the Word became flesh and dwelt among us," so that we should then believe in "the only Son of God the Father Almighty, born of the Holy Spirit and Mary the Virgin.
>
> -- St. Augustine

Before trying to draw out the implications that lie within the opening verses of The Gospel According to St. John, the endeavor of explication of these passages must be defined. So many integral problems are involved with such discussion that the meanings implied in the passages to be considered overlap with the premises upon which discussion is based. For instance, on some immediately apprehendable level the mystery of the trinity, or rather the notion of unity and plurality of persons in the Godhead, is present in those passages. This in turn casts dubious light on such things as the law of the excluded middle, for we find ourselves saying, "God is one and God is three," and, "God is the Father of the Son, and the Son of the Father, the Son and the Father being one. " To what can the reason fasten when that law, which has been a veritable rock in previous contexts, is shown to be a heretical idol with feet of crumbling clay? The entangling vine of nonsense spreads its creepers and grasps the human mind, befuddling and reducing it to perplexity. However reason should not be forsaken but, instead, submitted. It cannot be indulged in, for pride and curiosity, the motions of a dead soul,[1] originate from indulgence. But it must be passive, awaiting the perfection of God's gratuitous light. For the words in the first chapter of John contain that from which articles of faith are derived, and articles of faith, or principles, are not proved but are used to prove something else.[2] Moreover one does not seek to understand those passages to the

1) St. Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine, Bk. XIII, Ch. 21
2) St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Q. 1. a.8

end of belief, but believes them in order to understand.[3] Therefore we must remember that Holy Writ

> is called higher because it leads to higher things by manifesting what are above reason, and moreover because it came down from the Father of Lights by inspiration.[4]

and that when we use words in describing God

> The supreme Being is so above and beyond every other nature that whenever any statement is made concering it in words which are also applicable to other natures, the sense of these words in this case is by no means that in which they are applied to other natures.[5]

How then are we to infer the truths in the Word of God and in the words of Holy Script? First we must explain why the sense of the words we use cannot be taken as they are applied to other natures. As understood by St. Thomas[6] the words of sacred doctrine are each to be taken literally and spiritually. In the spiritual sense the signification made is not only that thing that the word names, but also that which the thing named signifies. (Spiritual signification gives rise to three interpretive senses; the allegorical, in which we are instructed in belief, the moral in which we are instructed in charity, and the analogical whereby we are taught what to hope for.) Thus it is seen that the words used are signs and that which they point to is not single. But there remains a question as to the nature of the sign.

Again as St. Thomas writes, there is "nothing necessary to faith contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward clearly by the Scripture in its literal sense."[7] For it is written

> He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life and he that believeth not on the Son shall not see life but the wrath of God abideth in him.[8]

> a new commandment I give unto you, That ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another.[9]

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3) St. Anselm, Proslogium, Ch. 1.
4) St. Bonaventure, On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology, pg. 5
5) St. Anselm, Monologium, Ch. LXV
6) St. Thomas Aquinas, Q. 1. a.10
7) ibid
8) John 3:36
9) John 13:34

(The first is taken as showing in what we are to believe and for what we are to hope, while the second is the commandment unto charity.) So the signs that are spiritual seem not so much to tell us in what to believe and hope, and how to behave. Rather they are to clear the darkness of the human intellect so that man might be a seer of the Light, even though it be "through a glass darkly." Therefore the signs, or, symbols, are meant to point to, or manifest, what He is. Now the reason for being unable to apply the senses these words have in other natures beside the Supreme nature is becoming more clear. For the words whereby man signifies things are images, in that they separate the form from the thing signified. Though the form is separable, the thing signified does not exist apart from its form, but with its form in whatever it is informed. However the existing thing itself is a likeness, and this likeness is made through or after the Divine exemplar, made materially from nothing and existing entirely in the Creator. In effect the being of the thing signified is entirely in an Image, this Image being the only properly called image. It is derived, but same in essence, and through it are all things derived. Thus our representations, made with analogies to created things, are at least three steps away from what is. Or, stated another way, our metaphors are like an alternated proportion that originally was between magnitudes not of the same kind. However, as Aquinas quoting Dionysius says, "it is more fitting that divine truths should be expounded under the figure of less noble than nobler bodies".[10] This, in part, is the case because man is less apt to error, being freed from notions of actual representations of Divine truths. (Here Aquinas is speaking of the method, that is, the method of the metaphor, and it is of this he is speaking when he says "less noble". For instance, manifesting truths by metaphor, a poetic device, is less noble than by a philosophic method. In no way do we say that God should be expressed by what is base or even in a method that is base. Rather we must proceed in humility, resisting the temptations of pride.

There remains another way of predicating something of God which has not been dealt with, namely a statement made substantially. That is, if we take the example of St. Thomas, "God is good."[11] By this we do not

10) St. Thomas Aquinas Q. 1. a. 9
11) St. Thomas Aquinas, Q. 13. a. 2

mean that he is the cause of all goodness, nor do we mean it in a negative sense, that is, "God is not non-good." Instead it is an imperfect attempt of the created thing to represent the perfection of that from which all perfection is derived. So, though it is not properly in the form of a metaphor, it retains that same limited characteristic that all words applied to the Supreme nature possess. In fact it could even be given the form of an analogy: As the created world is to goodness, so is God to the Good. All our symbols and figures of speech are representations of incomprehensible relationships. By this I mean they are relationships that man is comprehended in but comprehends not. These limitations made clear we have shown to what any endeavor of explication of Holy Writ is restricted. We are in a position of discussing, discursively passing from principles to conclusions, about that which is not discursive but manifest. To what end, then, can such an endeavor be?

For what need has Holy Writ of feeble comment that is necessarily less representative of the Truth than it is? It can have none. Further, is it not the case that this endeavor is simply that which we have said it should not be, a work of curiosity and pride? Should we not be like St. Anselm, who writes, "I do not endeavor, O Lord, to penetrate thy sublimity, for in no wise do I compare my understanding with that"?[12] But if we also add what follows this statement the purpose beeomes less obscure. "But I long to understand in some degree thy truth, which my heart believes and loves." This in turn is similar to St. Augustine when he writes, "Let me know Thee, O Lord, who knowest me; let me know Thee as I am known."[13] (When first considered this may seem full of pride, for Augustine is known as he is, and thus he would appear to be asking to know God as He is. But this, as will be shown later, is possible only to the persons of the Godhead, and can we say that St. Augustine hopes for the understanding that the Godhead possesses? Though it is written that we are all Gods[14] it is only in so much as we are limbs in Christ. Thus Augustine is asking to know God as He is known to the mind of man made into Christ. This is to say, "not in

12) St. Anselm, Proslogium, Ch. 1
13) The Confessions of St. Augustine, Bk. X, Ch. 1
14) John 10:34 and Psalms 32:6

a mirror," that is the mind of man, "darkly," but in the mind of Christ, his exemplar, and clearly. St. Augustine asks not to comprehend God, but to see His light in itself and thus become light.) Thus the endeavor is not one of curiosity but one which is based on what is to be hoped for.

Further it is appropriate that Augustine's words should be in the CONFESSIONS, following his conversion but preceding his exposition of Genesis I. For when he speaks after conversion it is a confession of that which he believes in and hopes for, and it is done in order to

> rouse up twoards You my own affections, and those of other men who read this, so that all of us might say, "the Lord is great, and exceedingly to be praised." 15)

and again

> For, first of all, it was your will that I confess to you, my Lord God, because you are good, and your mercy endures forever.16)

In such descriptions and discussions man engages in an aspect of his most important function, praising and giving glory to God. By confessing aloud the words of faith and hope that are in the heart, one's hope is increased even more and one cherishes more that which one has faith in. If allowed to remain in the depths of the heart, the words often become obscured and fallen away from, but by bringing them up one is strengthened and refreshed, for in His words are "the spirit and the life." Secondly, by discussing the words one makes reason a participant in the mysteries of belief, thereby making belief more secure and immune to rational attacks from non-believers. What has been tentative and confused in the mind, though the mind has been certain in commitment, is dispelled and peace of mind replaces it. Lastly we are led away from what is base and turned toward the Image of which our mind is the Image. That which was meant to be subjected to man is again restored to its proper position and man is freed from the tyranny of created things.

Now we are ready to consider the first chapter of John. This we do in

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15) The Confessions, Bk. XI, Ch. 1
16) ibid

the same spirit as St. Augustine, not stating an opinion as true and excluding all others, but writing with the fear of falsity in us, hoping to grasp a portion of the truths present. For "God has adapted the sacred writings to many men's interpretations, wherein will be seen things true and diverse."[17] Finally we proceed knowing that "in no other subject is error more dangerous, or inquiry more laborious, or the discovery of truth more profitable."[18]

II

In discussing the implications of the Son as Word there are three necessary considerations: (1) in respect to the Godhead or "and the Word was with God and the Word was God," (2) in respect to the made things or "all things were made by him and without him was not anything made that was made," (3) in respect to his taking on manhood or "and the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us."[19] But before these can be discussed there is a preliminary discussion; and that is whether we are to consider the Word as a proper name of a person in the Godhead, or as a metaphor. (Person will be explained in the section dealing with relationship in the Godhead.)

For St. Thomas,[20] Word is a personal and proper name for the Son. This itself is curious for why should the Son have any other name proper to Him beside Son. As is pointed out by Aquinas himself it "signifies an emanation of the intellect"[21] and thus the notion of begotten is transferred from son, in which it is essential, to the notion of word, with all its necessary connotations. This process in one sense is metaphorical. Secondly it is said "word" may be used metaphorically if it "makes something manifest as word."[22] Now this is exactly what is done in the first chapter of John. That which is being made manifest is God, and that which is manifested is essential to God. For in the first case the trinity in unity and unity in trinity is implied, in the second God as creator is implied, and in the third God as the end and

17) The Confessions, Bk. XII, Ch. 31
18) St. Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. I, Ch. 3
19) John, Ch. I; 1,3,14
20) St. Thomas Aquinas, Q. 34. a. 1 and 2
21) St. Thomas Aquinas, Q. 34. a. 2
22) St. Thomas Aquinas, Q. 34. a. 1

life of man. In each case a sense or meaning of the word "word" is used as will be shown. Furthermore it is written

> No man hath seen God at any time: the only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him.[23]

Again the metaphor of "speech" is used, and through it all three relationships are implicit. For "in the bosom" tells us the Son is not alone, but in God, and thus the first consideration is present. Secondly, by being the exemplar, He hath declared the glory of God in creation. The last sense is clear, for since no man hath seen God, the son must take on manhood that man may again be brought to love God.

However the "person" being talked about in each case is the Son and thus, if Word is taken as personal and belonging to the Son alone, we are justified in calling it a name. That is, there are not three distinct persons being referred to, only the Son. That which the Word represents is the Son and could be called a name, with the addition that the name is not arbitrary but in some way representative of the nature of the Son. By calling the Word a metaphor we do not exclude its being a personal and proper name, and we leave open the possibility of truths being revealed by it. We move on to the first consideration, that of the Word's oneness and otherness as God.

This aspect is so difficult and so incomprehensible that ultimately the only affirmative statement that can be made about it is that it is a mystery. Yet in trying to discover what is true we may discover what is not true, thereby freeing ourselves from the worship of a false God.

Before discussing what relationship the Word has to the Godhead we must consider what the notion of relationship means in a simple and Supreme Nature. For notions of relationship among created things are derived from quantity or quality and thus the things related are either not one or they are different in essence. If we look to Aquinas we find that"relation in the Godhead is predicated assentially, and each person is distinct and incommunicable substance."[24] So that personally

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23) John 1:18
24) St. Thomas Aquinas, Q. 29. a. 4.

the Father is the Father of the Son but not the Son. How are they one then? Although the person is incommunicable, "the mode itself of incommunicable existence"[25] is common to the three. Thus, since "in God what he is and that whereby he is are the same,"[26] relation is predicated essentially. However this is little more than saying, "He is, through Himself, three and one, essentially three and subsisting as one, eternal and unchanging." The mystery remains inexplicable and enigmatic. No matter what words we use in trying to express this truth we arrive at the same end. Thus we must ask through what they are other but not alone.

Again we must rely on St. Thomas.[27] Person is primarily derived from the notion of origin, though this of course cannot be taken temporally. First the Father is "from no one" and this includes nothing. For if we were to say he was from nothing, or non-being, then at one time he would have not been, whereas he always is. But the Son is from the Father, begotten not made. If He was made then He would have been made from nothing, and again would have not been at some time, whereas He always is, co-eternal with the Father. Thirdly the procession from the Father of the Son is the Holy Ghost, being from both the Father and the Son. However we must again be careful, for these notions are noticeably similar to those of Plotinus and other Platonists who, we are told, have no knowledge of the Trinity. For in the One overflowing and producing an exact image of itself, different essences are postulated, though they are postulated perhaps with equal degrees of being.

If we consider the person of the Son, it is extremely fitting that the Word should be identified with Him. It is fitting because the origin described is one of conception, and the notion of conception lends itself well to speech. When the mind looks out to what is, the formulation in the mind of what is, is a word. Though this conception is in time for us, that is, there is a time when the conception is not formed, for God it always is. Again, for us the truths signified by words of the mind are many and diverse, while for God they are one and simple, Himself, hence the Word.

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25) St. Thomas Aquinas, Q. 30. a. 4
26) St. Thomas Aquinas, Q. 29. a. 4
27) St. Thomas Aquinas, Q. 29. a. 3

The second case too, the relation of the Word to the creation is easily seen in a meaning or sense of the word, word. But since creator is predicated of God essentially, and not personally, it perhaps is improper to speak of the relationship a person in God has to something common to all persons. However if one takes the pronoun in the third verse as referring to the Word, which seems justifiable with the verses that follow, and understands the preposition "dia" as through, instead of by, this difficulty can be easily explained. For God, that is the entire Godhead, through the Son, the Wisdom and the Truth, made all things from nothing. Similarly when man employs the mechanical arts he makes after the image that is implanted in his mind, what is properly called the word. For instance, when a man sets out to draw a circle, he represents with a mark in or on some thing, that idea he has of a circle, the idea being also signified by the word circle. That is, the word is exemplar, and all perfection of the representation lies in the word. In so much as the made things contain any perfection at all they contain it in Him. Thus the created world cries out to St. Augustine, "I am not he, but he has made me."[28)]

In passing, one further comment should be made concerning the relation of the created world to the Word. For the Wisdom through which God created, comprehends, but is not comprehended by creation. For it "shineth in the Darkness and the darkness comprehended it not." By this we are to understand that world only partakes of the wisdom to a small degree. This is a radical change from the meaning "logos" has had in pagan contexts, where logos not only implied word, but that which made thought and speech possible. It signified an order, or sense, to the temporal world, which man was capable of apprehending. Now however, we are all, in effect, asked the question that was put to Job.

> Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? declare if thou hast understanding.[29)]

So that which is paradoxical and unharmonious is not only present, but inescapable to man as he lives in the temporal world. But just as the paradox is necessary, so is the belief that things which cannot be

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28) The Confessions of St. Augustine, Bk. X, Ch. 6
29) Job 38:4

reconciled with the natural reason are perfectly harmonious in the highest order. It is right then that Abraham should be the father of faith, for in his case the intellect was not only made to assent to what was not apparent, but to that which was apparently not possible. That is, he believed that he was to be the father of generations, and also believed that he would have to sacrifice his only hope for that position, Isaac. Thus it is belief in Him as Word that frees one from material conceptions of God, and prepares one for the supernatural end. The Word considered with respect to created things we move on to consider the final case.

So much has been said concerning the Word made flesh that anything said here cannot be a new understanding of what this means. Also, since there is so much to say concerning it, it is almost impossible to know where to begin discussing it. For in these words

> God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on Him should not perish but have everlasting life.[30)]

lies the whole basis of Christianity. But we have constrained ourselves to explicating the metaphor "word" and what is thereby manifested, and thus can only deal with a very small portion of what is contained in those words just quoted. However, because the position of man in those words is so important and related to our discussion of word, we must clarify what it is that distinguishes man.

That which differentiates man from other creatures is, on one level immediately clear. He is created in the image of God. But there remains a question as to whether he is created in the image of the Godhead, that is the Trinity, or in the likeness of one of the persons, the Son. For the Son is personally and properly called the Image of God.[31)] Either seems acceptable but since it is said, "let us make man in our image, after our likeness"[32)] and since it is through the Son that we have life everlasting, the latter seems preferable. For that in which we are, is the image of what we are. If we truly are, then that whereby we are and what we are is the same, one mind with Christ. Finally, by belief in

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30) John 3:16
31) St. Thomas Aquinas, Q. XXXV
32) Genesis 1:26

His name we will become sons of God and this seems to confirm our being made in the image of the Son.

If this is the case then the Word made flesh corresponds even more closely to the analogy with a spoken word. For the word spoken is, as sound, less than the internal word, but it proceeds from that internal word and exists in subsistance with it. If we compare the sound to the Word made flesh, it in turn becomes a procession from the Word. Since Christ is born not only of the Virgin Mary, but also of the Holy Ghost, this seems a meaningful analogy.

Finally, when the sound rouses up the same internal word in the hearer that it proceeded from, the hearer is unifed with the internal word. Thus man is taken up by Christ, the mortal wound of original sin is healed, and man is born again.

In conclusion it is seen that throughout the whole of the New Testament faith is nearly always talked about in terms of speaking or hearing, as opposed to seeing. This is only natural for faith is of the things non-apparent. It is then most appropriate that the basis for faith and the basis for speech be the same, the Word. Since Faith in time, precedes hope and charity, the Word is probably the most instructive of all words. For what we believe concerning the Godhead, the created world and man's relationship with God, is all contained within that simple metaphor that I have attempted to explicate. Its understanding dispels the darkness that Light might enter, and seeing the Light we might be made light. The Word is not only in the beginning,it is the beginning.

DE BELLIS CAELESTIBUS
(vel ars Sacram Scripturam legendi)

Pheme Perkins '66

Suadendo nobis ne contra superiores nostros bellum geramus, reverendissimus doctor M. Luther non modum auctoritate Sacrae Scripturae in Epistola ad Romanos, et in Libro Proverbiorum, et in Evangelio secundam Matthaeum et in multis aliis locis utitur, sed etiam nobis quinque argumenta dat. At mentionem argumenti gravissimi non facit, id est, argumentum de caelestibus bellis. Primum bellum ex omnibus erat in caelo cum Satanas a Deo defecit. Hoc bellum erat certamen inferioris contra superiorem suum, reapse certamen creaturae contra creatorem suum. Sic contra superiores nostros non certare docemur. Si enim contra superiorem pugnes, Satanam imitatur. Itaque cum Christianus Christum imitari studeat, Satanam non imitatur et ergo numquam bellum contra superiores suos gerit.

Eodem modo de bello inter aequales et de bello superiorum contra inferiores disseramus. De illa Sanctus Ioannes in Apocalypsi nobis dicit archangelum Michaelum in nomine Dei contra archangelum Luciferum suum aequalem iuste certavisse. De hac idem apostolus in evangelio suo nobis dicit Christum suum inferiorem, Satanam vicisse.

Ergo secundum Sacras Scripturas Christiano bellum in nomine Dei contra inferiores aequalesque iuste gerere licet sed bellum contra superiores non licet.

Nihilominus reverendissimum doctorem M. Lutherem rogandi sumus cur Deus permiserit ut bella caelestia essent. . .

sed sat superque

"THE WOLF AND THE SHEPHERD"
(Lecture delivered by Robert Bart, January 7, 1966)

Reviewed by
Jonathan Aurthur '68

The beginning of any serious discussion is a glimpse. Now the person who catches this glimpse may recognise it for what it is, a shadow of an object or a truth, or he may take it to be the truth itself. But either way, he wishes, because he has pride and desire to express his idea, to talk. If he understands the glimpse to be a shadow, he will be humble, and will talk for the sake of learning through examination. If he believes he possesses the truth itself he will bluster, for he wishes others to admit his superiority in intelligence and wisdom. When one sees only blackness, however, when one catches not even a glimpse, he will have no reason to talk, for he is certain of his blackness. Everything else and everyone else is a silly fantasy, and he has no reason to try to impress a dream.

Characters in Platonic dialogues, then, all have glimpses which they wish to express in one way or another. Socrates is humble, Thrasymachus in The Republic prideful. But because he has pride, because he wishes people to applaud him and admire him, he, with his self-truth of the superiority of injustice, is accessible. He talks brutally and argues unfairly, but beneath his brutality and unfairness lies respect for something, for art and truth, or, as he would say, for precision. So despite his enmity and repugnant notions he is, after all, a friend of Socrates, "for both he and Thrasymachus love knowledge." This, I think, is the thesis of the lecture. This is no total privation of truth in the "villains" of Plato's dialogues, but a perversion. For some reason each wants to talk, because each has a conflict within him whether he knows it or not. Thrasymachus' conflict is one between desire for precision and knowledge, and greed.

Thrasymachus begins with a very equivocal definition of justice, "the good of the stronger." He quickly explains to Socrates that he is talking of the ruler, the one who has the power. When Socrates shows him that mere obeisance on the part of the ruled, which Thrasymachus

calls justice because it corresponds to the ruler's will, can be unjust if the ruler makes a mistake and wills what is harmful to himself, Thrasymachus begins to say what he thinks. He claims to have been speaking of the ruler "in the precise sense," that is, the complete and intellectually superior ruler, who does not simply wield indiscriminate power. And this ruler "in the precise sense" makes no mistakes. One begins to see what Thrasymachus admires, art and intellect. Socrates, however, brings him to a contradiction by arguing that the artist, insofar as he is an artist, works to improve not himself but his material. The doctor cures, and the ruler works for the good of the state. Thrasymachus is flatly contradicted. "Justice is the good of the weaker," if the ruler is an artist. It is at this point that Thrasymachus finally becomes completely honest. The ruler, he says, is like a shepherd, not taking care of his flock for their sake but for his own advantage, fattening them up to be slaughtered. The ruler takes advantage of the ruled, defrauding them, taking their money and subverting their will to his, while all the time maintaining a reputation for justice and fairness. The ruler is greedy; he is not satisfied with control over his city alone. Why should he be, if he is completely unjust? The whole world is his, if he has the ability to take advantage of it.

> Nothing less than the whole world in fact is the goal of injustice and even that limit is merely accidental. Greed recognizes no bound because it is grounded in no need and recognizes no standard of what is fitting. It is unlimited by nature: it always seeks to get more and yet more. Since there are natural limits to most goods . . . greed fastens on money as its goal. . . Injustice is good then because it pays in a literal sense and pays more the more completely and perfectly it is practised.*

And because injustice is a desirable thing it is good and leads to happiness. Justice is merely the fear of this good, a device by which men too weak to succeed at acquisition secure protection from stronger men.

> Men may think in the secret places of their hearts that injustice pays, and pays well, but they continue to reserve their praise for justice, for unselfishness and altruism as we put it, the concern for another's good. . . . This praise is only a mask of fear. . . Justice is no virtue but the craven renunciation of the hope of happiness.

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* This and all subsequent quotations are taken from Mr. Bart's lecture.

This is Thrasymachus' position. He sees in the world only possibilities for violence and exploitation. He sees these also in conversation. He uses violence "because he pays no heed to what has been said, and fraud because he does not say what he thinks."

> Thrasymachus sees (himself and Socrates) as struggling to gain unfair advantage over (each other) and come out on top: the figure of the contest dominates his view of the discussion. What is taking place for him is not so much a conversation but a competition in which by violence and fraud he can display his powers in the struggle for victory.

Further:

> He revels in his own superiority. . . Speech has its foundations for him not in opinion but in knowledge.
>
> A conversation is merely a contest between two rivals. . . . In such a debate it is not the truth that is at stake, but the success or defeat of the challenger. Knowledge is hidden riddling, enigmatic declarations like Thrasymachus' opening statement. These emphasize the secret or private character of knowledge.

And this question, whether conversation and behavior in general are attempts to find harmony and agreement, or relative superiority and wealth, causes the discord within Thrasymachus himself. Internal discord, Thrasymachus admits can only cause weakness. "True strength requires a harmony of convictions that produce integrity, oneness." And his discord is caused by the conflict between his greed and his love of or commitment to art. His very presence in the conversation shows that he believes that perfect injustice as he understands it can be presented in precise terms, that it can be expressed as a positive attitude based on art and intellect, and that it can be justified. He is committed to the idea of an art of injustice. And the reason that he eventually falls, that he blushes, is that he and Socrates do after all have a common ground for discussion, the admission of the desirability and universality of art, precision.

> It is through the notion of art that Socrates reaches for the central conflict in Thrasymachus. They may differ radically about justice and what is good, but they have a common understanding of art. Perhaps the only thing in that idea that divides them is whether it can be an ally of injustice. Thrasymachus' claims

> for his own definition show that he considers it excellent because it bears the marks of art. Art is distinguished from habit and experience by universality and precision. He stresses that his account is universal.

But this precision which he so admires is at odds with the end of injustice, victory. Tyranny cannot produce agreement or precision but only victory. "Unjust speech can produce only victory and defeat." And Thrasymachus' tactics, intimidation and lying, are unjust. They give no account. To give an account he must speak reasonably. And he does wish, out of both pride of intellect and desire for knowledge, to give an account. "He is perhaps always in conflict with himself, for it is inconsistent to ask agreement with a theory that in itself subverts all the basis of agreement. It seems that it cannot be consistent to try to <u>justify</u> a theory of injustice."

This contradiction points to the greater contradiction that Socrates leads to, and which finally destroys Thrasymachus: his "art" of injustice is not art at all, but stupidity. Firstly, it is not an art in that it does not improve its subject matter. And it is knowledge of the subject matter, and the subject's definite limitations and possibilities, that gives art universality and purpose. The musician tunes the strings that they might be harmonious: the harmony is the limit - a consonance is limited in conception; it cannot be improved upon, - and the desired end, because it is pleasing and in tune. But for Thrasymachus "(injustice) is a good for the artist, conceived in the strict sense as pure and unlimited greed." And so secondly, injustice can by its nature achieve no perfection or universality, but only relative advantage. "The man who ruled the whole world would still be as greedy as the novice in injustice: both are insatiable and know no limit." In terms of greed the "artist" is never fulfilled, never completed. He keeps getting more but never enough. In true art there is agreement, for art "resides in the definite limits it imposes on the randomness of ignorance." The artist will not compete with another artist: the musician will not compete with the musician in tuning strings, and the just man will not compete with the just man, for both recognize the same limits. They will compete with the unjust man, just as the musician will compete with the non-musician,

who does not recognize the limits or goal of the material.

> If the unjust man is intelligent he will act like an intelligent man. Now intelligent men are artists, that is they acknowledge common limits or bounds and only contend with the ignorant. But the unjust man who has claimed to be intelligent and an artist contends as much with other unjust men as with just men, for he recognizes no limit to his greed whatsoever. On the other hand, the just man acknowledges the welfare of other just men as a limit he respects and does not quarrel with them but agrees with them in the law and makes common cause with them against the unjust man. The consequence is manifest: the unjust man does not act like an intelligent man. Therefore he cannot be intelligent.

Art, or law, cannot exist with respect to lawlessness.

This last argument causes Thrasymachus' blush. "The lack of limit intrinsic to injustice shows that it is not an art." The shepherd is not an artist insofar as his eventual aim is the slaughter of his sheep, but insofar as he cares for them and keeps them healthy. Harm to the material cannot exist in art.

> The refutation of Thrasymachus is complete. He is undone by his desire to unite knowledge and injustice. Knowledge is no less crucial to Thrasymachus than to Socrates, and he is tamed by the discovery that he cannot maintain successfully the position that injustice is the supreme art of intelligence.

Thrasymachus blushes not because he has been led to a contradiction - that has happened before, and he has responded to it with a fresh attack - but because he realizes that he is being stupid. For him stupidity, the contrary of the intelligence which he esteems, is intolerable. But one must remember that in order to blush one must have blood in one's body, and it is this blood, this pride and desire for truth or "precision," that makes it possible for him to be a friend to and a conversant with a man like Socrates. Always lurking in the background is the man with no blood, the man who has not even caught a glimpse of light, who recognizes no precision and no knowledge. who has no greed and no desire. The opposite of white or light is black or darkness, not some other color, ugly as it might be. Perhaps that man is perfectly unjust, or perhaps one cannot even apply the term justice

to him. But Thrasymachus, one finds, is on the wrong track. For where there is greed mixed with pride there is also embarrassment, and the unjust man cannot be embarrassed.

> My chief starting point for this lecture was a desire to understand a little better the reason underlying Socrates' injunction to Adeimantus: 'Don't stir up a quarrel between Thrasymachus and me, now that we have become friends; not that we were enemies before.'

Any man, perverse as he may be, who desires the truth, who, however he may boast and bully, desires sincere agreement with his truth, is not an enemy, and may very well be a friend.

A MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM

Margaret Rottner '66

A Midsummer Night's Dream is one of Shakespeare's most terrifying visions of the world. The apparent irrationality of nature causes humans to suffer a bewilderment largely unredeemed by self-knowledge. The play is about passionate love, elemental nature, dreams and poetry; darkness is common to those themes because at the critical moments all our explanations are bound to fail. The only way to understand them in this play is to surrender ourselves to experiencing them.

If we were to do the play again, this is one of the most important changes in production I would like to see: in the first scene, when Lysander and Hermia are left alone on stage, they talk about the fate of love. Lysander says that it is

> ". . . momentany as a sound,
> Swift as shadow, short as any dream,
> Brief as the lightning in the collied night,
> That, in a spleen, unfolds both heaven and earth,
> And ere a man hath power to say 'behold',
> The jaws of darkness do devour it up:
> So quick bright things come to confusion."

Then he asks Hermia to meet him at midnight in the woods to run away with him, and she swears that she will:

> ". . . My good Lysander!
> I swear to thee by Cupid's strongest bow,
> By his best arrow with the golden head,
> By the simplicity of Venus' doves,
> By that which knitteth souls and prospers loves -"

At this moment, in the middle of her vow, the diction suddenly changes from blank verse to rhymed couplets and remains so to the end of the scene. We have entered the dream world. At this moment the glittering light of the court ought to have begun to fade to an amber glow, with only the two lovers left in a pool of brightness. If there is no surrender to the dream, there is no entering this world which only "the lover, the madman and the poet" apprehend.

Although Theseus and Hippolyta have few of the traits of their mythological namesakes, those very names give a hint about the nature of the world they live in. It is pervaded with the melancholy uncertainty of the world of Greek myths, and reigned by supernatural beings with no more than human judgment but far more than human powers. Oberon and Titania are close counterparts of Zeus and Hera: Titania, like Hera, may have considerable charms but there's not much else good to be said for her; Oberon, like Zeus, is a wise king but not above quarreling with his consort over a little human boy. Like the Greek gods, Oberon and Titania are extremely interested in meddling with human affairs. That interest is sometimes purely selfish, but when Oberon sets about to solve the lover's problems it seems to be genuine benevolence.

Puck is interested only in sport and uses mortals for the butt of his jokes; when we think of him it seems particularly ironic to invoke those gods for the purpose of making sense out of a seemingly senseless world. At its worst we seem to be doing no more than giving names to blind forces, as in the science of Psychology when the question "why does that fellow act like a madman?" gets the answer "because he is psychotic." It might not seem to be different to ask "why did Lysander suddenly fall in love with Hermia?" and be answered, "because Puck put the love-juice in his eyes." But sometimes our lives seem to be full of that kind of question and answer. Either the apparent disorder is a true one, or else we are only pushing the problem to a higher level.

This is in fact what the play suggests we do: for although we may imagine ourselves as being ruled by the spite, the caprice, the passions of these supernatural beings, we conclude that not even they are all-powerful: they are under the sway of even greater forces of nature. In the Iliad Zeus takes out the fatal scales to read which way the war is to go; and so in A Midsummer Night's Dream there are forces which dictate to Oberon. In the midst of the quarrel over the changeling boy, Titania accuses Oberon of monstrous irresponsibility since the elements are punishing the whole world for this discord; the seasons themselves reflect the quarrel:

> ". . . the spring, the summer
> The chiding autumn, angry winter, change

Their wonted liveries, and the mazed world,
By their increase, now knows not which is which.
And this same progeny of evil comes
From our debate, from our dissension:
We are their parents and original."

This suggestion of powers above the gods makes the working of nature more mysterious than ever. If they are to be understood in any way it will be in experiencing them: perhaps in dreams. If they are to be explained in any way, it will be in setting down the experience - in poetry. Nick Bottom is a wise critic of the play: "Man is but an ass who goes about to expound this dream", he says, and we can take that as both a warning and an insight.

We should not confine the dream to the central portion of the play, since the play begins with people acting strangely. Maybe they are already under the general bewitchment brought about by Oberon and Titania's quarrel. Egeus never gives any reason for prefering Demetrius to Lysander as a son-in-law, except that it is his will. As a matter of fact, there is no reason to prefer Demetrius; Lysander is as rich, as well born, and he is beloved of Hermia. Also, he is constant, while Demetrius is charged with having wooed Helena, making her "dote to Idolatry" on him, and then spurning her for love of Hermia. Yet Egeus would rather have his daughter die by the law than go against his will to marry her beloved. This is strange behavior. It is nevertheless believable, since it happens every day. A domineering parent who insists that his love-sick child will marry to suit her fancy "only over my dead body!"; a young man overnight falling out of love with one girl and in love with another; a girl in love, seeing as her only alternatives to a hateful marriage death or eternal chastity: these strange things actually happen to us, and how are we to explain this everyday madness?

Theseus is the ruler of a civilized society. He has no choice but to enact the law of Athens, since five unhappy people are evidently going to find no solution to their problem outside of that law. He has at least to maintain political order by enforcing the law. Oberon is more extravagant. He tries to bring about inward order and blessedness. But even his aid miscarries, for by a strange sequence of blunders Lysander

as well as Demetrius is made to fall in love with Helena. Oberon cannot bring about any order until Titania and himself are reconciled and chaotic nature is restored to harmony. Bottom turns out to be the solution to all problems, and plays an even bigger part than he ever dreamed of; for Titania is charmed into so much love for him that she willingly yields up the changeling boy to Oberon, and once the final reconciliation of their quarrel is accomplished, the fairy magic finally pairs the lovers as it was meant to. Now, since they are at peace, at least among themselves, Theseus overbears Egeus' will, and uses his kingly authority to bind the couples in law, as Oberon used his to bind them in love.

Theseus is the most sensible of all the human beings in the play; he doesn't believe a word of the strange things that the lovers tell him, since he was safe and sane in the brightly-lit court while the lovers were forced by their passions into the heart of the dark forest. "The lovers, madmen and the poets," he says, "are of imagination all compact"; and to Theseus imagination is the disease of seeing what is not there. Imagination, he says, "apprehends/More than cool reason ever comprehends", and he means that if cool reason isn't able to comprehend it, it probably doesn't exist. But those words could mean just the opposite: that imagination has powers beyond reason's; or, that imagination allows us to experience and embrace more than reason ever helps us to understand.

The mechanicals are sensible men too; they are neither lovers, madmen nor poets and live very close to the world of things, for they are weavers, carpenters, tinkers, tailors and bellows-menders. They are used to feeling that they subdue nature and the elements to men's use. They are also communicative men; they manage to talk to one another, ask questions and get answers, better than the lovers do because they are extremely literal-minded. Bottom may be a prize ass, but he has been thrust so completely into the dream of enchantment that when he awakes he is almost a prophet:

> "I have had a most rare vision. I have had a dream, past the wit of man to say what dream it was: man is but an ass, if he go about to expound his dream. Methought I was - there is no man can tell what. Methought I was - and me - thought I had, - but man is but a patched fool, if he will offer to say what methought I had. The eye of man hath not heard, the

> ear of man hath not seen, man's hand is not able to taste, his tongue to conceive, nor his heart to report, what my dream was. I will get Peter Quince to write a ballad of this dream: it shall be called Bottom's Dream, because it hath no bottom; and I will sing it in the latter end of a play, before the Duke: peradventure, to make it the more gracious, I shall sing it at her death."

He cannot explain his dream, he begins and he stops. He knows that it is beyond explanation - "The eye of man hath not heard" is a distant echo of Revelations. "I will get Peter Quince to write a ballad of this dream," is a stroke of genius, because a ballad will not explain but portray in images and figures the experience itself. And though the images of a dream come from a deeply personal world, poetry can move men to see another's personal images as their own.

The mechanicals bring a play to the court, the myth of Pyramus and Thisbe; but they are not the men to let poetry speak for itself. They explain as they play, and they so much fear that the audience will be upset by the terror of it all that they honestly unmask their art and assure the ladies that none of it is the least bit real. The poetry may suffer, but there is still plenty to be learned. The lovers seem to miss all of it, evidently not suffering a blush for the striking resemblances between themselves in their own carrying-on in the woods and the words of the mechanicals' star-crossed lovers.

Theseus tends to humor people less sensible than himself, wanting to judge them only by their good intentions. He probably smiles teasingly at the lovers when he says, "To bed, 'tis almost fairy time." But this is the play's final gentle insistence that, deny it as you will, the inner world of unknown causes does exist. Once the court leaves the stage, the lights are dimmed and the fairies appear by the dark and drowsy fire: dangerous and unknowable, but capable of blessing.

APOLLINAIRE'S LE PONT MIRABEAU

David E. Long '66

Initially, upon reading Apollinaire's Le Pont Mirabeau, I felt a lack of unity in the poem: what was the poet saying? Was Apollinaire writing about a bridge, or the Seine, or his own past love, or about something altogether different? After a first reading it seemed as though love were the theme of our poet, as though he were standing upon his former trysting place, sadly remembering his lost lover, and watching the Seine flow by. In the first stanza the author asks rather rhetorically if his past loves could ever return to him. In the second he recollects some of the actual moments spent on le pont Mirabeau in the arms of his beloved. But something has happened to this love: his lover died, or deserted him for some reason. But, for whatever reason, he is alone now, for in the third stanza he comes to some general conclusions about his life and love: love flows away like the running waters of the Seine. He seems to imply that when there is no love, but only hopes of love, life itself becomes tedious, empty. Finally, in the last verse, Apollinaire answers his opening question: no, past loves, like les temps perdus, never return.

Superficially, this seems to be the "story" of the poem. However, the reading is complicated by the two line refrain:

> Vienne la nuit, sonne l'heure,
> Les jours s'en vont - je demeure.

This appears after every stanza, four times in all. It is as though the author is indicating to us here what the real point of his poem may be, as though he felt he should remind us after each verse of what he means us to understand by what he has just said.

What does the refrain tell us? The first three images are of some sort of motion: night comes, the hour sounds, days go. Yet the author remains; he does not move; he alone among the shifting phantoms of time remains static. But what can this mean - je demeure? Where and in what sense does he remain anywhere? The three preceeding images are about some sort of motion, and especially about the motions of those phenomena

by which we regulate time. The author seems to imply that his remaining is with reference to time. Time flows on, but he remains, somehow unchanging among the continuous variations of nights, days, hours, weeks.

The question I find most difficult to answer is this: is the essential concern of the poem with love or with time? That is, is the theme essentially emotional, i.e., about love; or metaphysical, i.e., about time and its relation to man? I believe the poem is highly metaphysical. The poet is expressing something about the nature of time. The refrain is the poem in microcosm. Throughout we are confronted with various descriptions of motion and with metaphors implying motion: water flowing, days passing, the tired wave, slow life, violent hope. Apollinaire depicts love merely as another form of motion. It comes, persists awhile, then goes away never to return.

Time is the measure of all these motion.s Time measures the days, the weeks, and with them the ebbing of love and the consequent monotony of life. The "éternels regards" of the second verse is an ironic or even a bitter reference to the feelings of the lovers on the bridge. Looks of love are perhaps the most fleeting of all transient occurrences, but while they exist time stands still for those exchanging them. Our poet has at one time known these glances; he too has existed, for a time, in that timeless, motionless world of the lover. In time, yet timeless - a paradox? Perhaps, but so is love. How is it possible for that which is perfect to pass away? But the lover has not lived who would have admitted of the slightest flaw in his perfect love. Swann felt this way towards Odette; similarly Marcel, towards Gilberte. But somehow, at the last, when the motion (or emotion) has run its course, there remains only - ennui. Comme la vie est lente.

The passing of time may be likened to the flow of a great river; in this case, the Seine. Just as all the creeks and rivulets arising from the surrounding countryside merge and become one with the great river, so do all the motions of hours and days, life and love, give themselves to swell the Ultimate River, Time.

But what is it that measures time? Apollinaire has drawn the analoge between the flowings of time and of the Seine: both eternally stream

towards us, past us, away from us; eternally fluctuating, always different, yet in some sense always the same. With reference to the Seine (for the purposes of the poem) le pont Mirabeau is the one fixed point, that to which and from which the river is always flowing, although no part of the river ever stays or fixes itself at the moment it passes the bridge. The river is never "at" the bridge. During every instant the water is flowing to the bridge, or from it, but there is never a time at which the river may be said to be "at the bridge". The Mirabeau Bridge is the focal point of the poem, not the Seine. That the author intended it so is even borne out by the title: the poem is named after the bridge, not after the river. And the measure of time itself? Time is measured only by the human mind. It is purely a subjective phenomenon. As Saint Augustine so beautifully demonstrates:

> "It is in my own mind, then, that I measure time. I must not allow my mind to insist that time is something objective. . . I say that I measure time in my mind. For everything which happens leaves an impression on it, and this impression remains after the thing itself has ceased to be."[1)]

We see, then, that amidst the flux of time the only fixed point, as it were, must be the author himself, his mind and memories. Apollinaire himself is the measure of time and thus in turn of the ever-changing movement of the universe. As the Mirabeau Bridge measures the Seine, so does Apollinaire measure time. It is now more clear, I hope, what the poet means by "je demeure". He has identified himself with the bridge, as an unchanging point of reference. He is, like the bridge, "an ever-fixed mark" watching all things go by, never to return.

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1) Confessions XI, 27