FILE

THE COLLEGE

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The College

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The College is a publication for friends of St. John's College and for those who might become friends of the College, if they came to know it. Our aim is to indicate, within the limitations of the magazine form, why, in our opinion, St. John's comes closer than any other college in the nation to being what a college should be.

If ever well-placed beacon lights were needed by American education it is now. By publishing articles about the work of the College, articles reflecting the distinctive life of the mind that is the College, we hope to add a watt or two to the beacon light that is St. John's.

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

In the September Issue:

Reasonable Politics and Technology

By LAURENCE BERNS

Admiration for the intelligence, the courage, the discipline, and the prodigy of organization that made the moon exploration possible has led many to form expectations for similar spectacular successes in dealing with more pressing social, political, and economic problems. It may be salutary, surely not novel, to refer to the dangers that can arise from such unreasonable expectations.

First, moderate, workable, partial, or gradual, solutions get condemned as unsavory compromises or as myopic. Extreme alternatives come to pre-empt the field of action. Second, to turn to the human consequences, compromise or failure breeds frustration; frustration, for some, leads to paralyzing despair; for others, more dangerously, to hatred of their political opposition as the imagined causes of the failure, and finally, to political fanaticism. The workability of parliamentary, republican government is directly proportional to the strength of that philosophical temperament that can accept and appreciate the idea of a "loyal opposition," of honest and honorable disagreement.

So far the major premise of this argument, that the expectations are unreasonable, has only been assumed. On what grounds?

I

As a goal, landing a man on the moon would seem to be uncontroversial. Whether resources should be allocated to it or not may be controversial, but the goal itself is hardly controversial. There are few, if any, political goals about which this can be said. Dispersion of authority makes for inefficiencies, but allows more scope for individual initiative and for the exercise of individual judgment; concentration of authority may be more efficient, but induces regimentation and, by eliminating checks and balances, makes the abuse of authority more possible. In different circumstances the weight of these different considerations will be different; and probably in all circumstances different men can conscientiously and reasonably differ about their relative importance.

Socrates, the political scientist *par excellence*, elucidated this state of affairs by referring to the distinction between opinion and knowledge, and by arguing that in the cognitive element of political life opinion rather than knowledge will always predominate. Socrates may have hinted, but did not insist, that full knowledge of the political good was unattainable; but he certainly did argue that such knowledge was extremely rare, hard to come by, and well-nigh impossible to put into political practice. As far as I can tell, the variability of the subject matter, the power of the human passions, and the relative strengths of rational and irrational powers in most men, the central facts these arguments rest upon, have not been changed in any decisive way by the technological development. To refer to the distinction between opinion and knowledge, of course, is not to deny that some opinions are better than others.

II

Because opinions are essentially disputable, and because political disputes, by the passions they arouse, can often be more harmful to society than the original difficulties prompting them, it is frequently more important for political practice to maintain reasonable procedures for settling and dispensing with problems than it is to be certain that the solutions to the problems be correct solutions.[1] Imperfect solutions are not necessarily unreasonable solutions in a free society: what is most to be avoided is action that could destroy those procedures and institutions for compromise and debate which, by the discussion attendant upon them, open up the way for reason to make the limited but saving contribution that it might make to free political life.

For a *government* to be free, constitutionally authorized governmental and party officials should be free from the kind of coercion, intimidation and pressure that prevents them from making maximum use of their own capacities for rational discourse and debate. This freedom, more

[1] Cf. Aeschylus, *Oresteia*, especially *Eumenides*.



particularly, the privileges and immunities with regard to their political speech which had been won for members of legislative bodies in their respective legislatures, became the paradigm, it has been suggested, for the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly laid down by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: that is, privileges and immunities with regard to political speech, which till then had been granted only to members of legislative bodies in their legislatures, were guaranteed to all citizens; the entire citizen body as far as its political speech is concerned is conceived by analogy to a free deliberative assembly.[2] If this most generous conception is correct, it might provide us with a solution, in principle at least, to the pressing problem of conflict between the right and duty of duly constituted government to govern and the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment: it would not seem to make sense to allow what was meant to serve as an instrument of something analogous to unintimidated rational deliberation to be used to destroy the conditions for rational deliberation in those places where not something analogous to it but unintimidated rational deliberation itself is required.

Some seek to mitigate the increasingly technocratic character of modern life by means of what is being called participatory democracy. To the extent that this means transferring authority to local political institutions wherever possible, it is in harmony with —to the extent that it seeks to by-pass or dispense with the direction of leadership by direct democracy, it is in tension with what

[2] Cf. George Anastaplo, *The Constitutionalist: Notes on the First Amendment*, to be published in 1970 by Southern Methodist University Press, Dallas, p. 5, and chap. 5, sec. 9, esp. pp. 115-120.

As a goal,

landing a man on the moon

would seem to be uncontroversial.

we regard as the more adequate philosophical psychology of the Declaration of Independence, *The Federalist*, and the Constitution of the United States. According to the Declaration of Independence governments derive their just powers not from the will but from the consent of the governed. Our governors, our representatives, should represent not the "passions" nor the "inclinations" but the "interests," the well-being, of the represented.[3] They are to be provided with the best possible conditions and resources for reasonable, well-informed deliberation; for determining what, under the Constitution, the best interests of their constituents and the country as a whole are, and how those interests can best be served. Because they are to be put in the best position for deciding, they are the representatives, not the delegates, of the people. The people, on the other hand, are understood as qualified periodically to judge by means of elections their leaders and the general effects of the policies formed by their leaders. In this way, among others, they check and influence their leaders. They do not, however, make policy; they are not regarded as some mystical repository of political wisdom or virtue. The formation and execution of policy is to be carried out by those best situated and best qualified to carry it out, by a democratic leadership.

A liberally educated leadership, in the classical view, fosters enlightened government and justly secures its own position 1) by controlling the overambitious, the demagogic and the autocratic, within its own ranks, 2) by dispensing justice, and 3) by providing moral examples, moral leadership, for the great bulk of the population.

[3] Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, *The Federalist*, Nos. 49 and 71.

Whether resources should be allocated to it or not may be controversial . . .

The winning, the survival, and the extension of freedom are seen to depend not only on sound laws and institutions, but also upon the abilities of the recipients of freedom to use freedom well. More importantly, not only the survival but also the value of any freedom is dependent upon the same abilities, that is, upon the virtues of the citizens, and, primarily, upon the virtues of those who are fit by nature, by training, and by education to guide the rest.

III

The temptation to seek technical, or mathematical, solutions to political problems was noted at least as early as Aristotle's somewhat humorous description of the preciousness of the first non-professional political projector, Hippodamus.[4] The description seems to suggest that mathematical studies unaccompanied by humanizing philosophic and literary studies, not only do little to dispel the mental effects of love of honor, or excessive political ambition, but when coupled with the latter seem to produce a distinctive perversity of their own. The general lesson Aristotle draws from reflection on Hippodamus is that it is unreasonable to expect political life, which cannot abstract from habit and custom, from human passion, prejudice and stupidity, to be able to proceed in as reasonable a way as the arts and the sciences.

One might argue that the situation Aristotle described can be remedied by universal education. Are all, or most, or even many men educable in that way? The question concerning educational capacities might perhaps best be left open, but, as the first part of this paper indicates, unreasonable expectations can be at least as dangerous as undue pessimism.

IV

Technological progress has brought along with itself certain unprecedented problems: overpopulation, pollution of the physical environment, pollution of the spiritual environment by the mass media and advertising, to mention only a few. The technocratic controls required to remedy these ills may make, or have already made, a certain loss of individual liberty unavoidable; every effort should be made to reduce such losses to a minimum.

Technology makes it easier for more and more people to gratify all kinds of desires, some grand and presumably harmless, like going to the moon, some abominable, like those of the recent tyrants of Russia and Germany, and very many very petty desires. No responsible scientist (microbiologists included) or engineer has claimed that technology can provide men with the wisdom to desire what is good for them. The most responsible use of technology, of the science of means, would be to free men for the fuller development of their spiritual, or mental, capacities. Yet from within the scientistic perspective these higher purposes are hardly visible, and the spiritual energies of more and more men are being absorbed and monopolized by technique and technical tasks. Knowing how crowds out learning why.

The disproportion between human power and human wisdom grows apace. What originated as instrumental carries us along in the wake of fortuitous and unpredictable developments. To be in a position where human error is intolerable, where the very conditions of existence of the race as a whole are at hazard, can be fatal for more than political liberty. The problematic character of the great project for the conquest of nature is becoming increasingly obvious. What would seem to be required is a thoroughgoing reconsideration of the principles of that project, of the science which gives it life, and of the alternatives to that science. That reconsideration might well begin by turning to the serious study of those who have devoted themselves most humanely, most industriously, and most intelligently to the exploration of the human psyche, to seeking the science of ends—that is, to Homer, to Aristotle, to Plato, to Shakespeare, and to the authors of the *Bible*.

[4] Aristotle, *Politics*, bk. ii.

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Personal Freedom*

By THOMAS SLAKEY

In the political jargon of the day, no word comes so easily to the lips as the word "freedom." We call ourselves free men, citizens of a free country, the leaders of the free world. The civil rights marchers used to sing of a time when "We shall all be free," and now, more stridently, they call for it, "freedom now." We are fond of quoting, "You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." And yet some of what passes for truth among us helps to destroy our freedom. That is, it destroys our understanding of freedom, and therefore, I believe, helps to destroy our freedom itself. I can perhaps best illustrate what I mean by referring to a debate between the psychologists B. F. Skinner and Carl R. Rogers which took place in 1956 and was reported in the magazine *Science* at that time.[1] Skinner is best known as the author of a Utopian novel, *Walden Two*, which describes a community designed and controlled by expert psychologists. Rogers and Skinner agree that the sciences of human behavior, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and so on, are rapidly growing in their ability to predict and to control. They are beginning to establish laws about human beings which have the form of laws about physical particles, such that "the existence of certain describable conditions in the human being and/or in his environment is followed by certain describable consequences in his actions" (*Readings*, p. 128). To give an example of predictability: a certain test on the perception of a dim spot of light in a dark room can be used as a predictor of race prejudice. To give an example of control: the use of subliminal or unconscious perceptions. A face is shown on a screen. The viewers are asked to note how the expression changes. Then the experimenter, without changing the image of the face, flashes the word "angry" on the screen at exposures so brief that the viewers are completely unaware of having seen the word. They tend, however, to see the face as becoming angry. Then the experimenter begins to flash the word "happy" on the screen in similar fashion. Now the viewers see the face as becoming more happy.[2]

What are the consequences of such growing power to predict and to control for the ancient belief in the freedom of the will? For Skinner the consequences are obvious: the conception of human freedom is simply an illusion. In fact he welcomes a future in which expert psychologists will exercise a greater and greater control over their fellow human beings, somewhat in the fashion of his novel *Walden Two*.[3] Rogers, on the other hand, does see a difficulty. He asserts that alongside the growing evidence that human behavior is subject to laws, there is also the direct and immediate experience of "responsible personal choice, the most essential element in being a person. . . . To deny the experience of responsible choice, is to me as restricted a view as to deny the possibility of a behavioral science" (*Readings*, p. 136). And yet Rogers, in this debate, could see no way to reconcile freedom and behavioral science. He thought that the assertion of both must remain a paradox, "The great paradox of behavioral science," comparable to the paradox in physics of the wave and particle theories of light: we assert both that light behaves as if it were composed of waves and as if it were composed of particles without in any way being able to reconcile the two assertions. Similarly, Rogers says, we assert both that man's behavior is predictable and that it is free without in any way being able to reconcile the two assertions (*Readings*, p. 136). Later, in his book *On Becoming a Person*, Rogers sketched a partial solution of the paradox and I will speak of it later.

But it is not only among professional psychologists that there is difficulty with the concept of freedom. Consider the emphasis in modern literature on abnormal and erratic

* A lecture delivered at St. John's College, Santa Fe, February, 1968.

[1] My quotations are from the reprint in *Readings in Abnormal Psychology, Human Values and Abnormal Behavior*, W. D. Nunokawa, ed., Chicago, 1965, pp. 122-139 (hereafter cited as *Readings*). Rogers later returned to this subject in his book *On Becoming a Person*, Boston, 1961.

[2] Examples from *On Becoming a Person*, pp. 369, 373.

[3] See *Readings*, pp. 122-139 *passim*, and esp. pp. 136, 138.

behavior. In part this emphasis expresses what poets have always expressed, an interest in unconventional characters and a rebellion against stale and meaningless traditions. But I think there is something more involved: a rebellion not only against stale reasoning from the past, but against reason as such. In her lecture earlier this year on Jean Paul Sartre, Miss Hazel Barnes spoke of a man standing on the edge of a cliff. Most probably he will not jump off. But he could jump off, she insisted, he really could jump off. Why should she insist on this possibility? Because she feels that to guide one's actions by reasoning about alternatives, to explain the actions of others by giving reasons for what they did, and perhaps most of all to predict the actions of others by figuring out what reasons might lead them in one direction or another, all of these are hostile to our freedom because they show that our actions are determined in some way. We do not freely perform an act; we are led to it, driven to it, restricted to it by reasons.

Even in a book like Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, which is written within the conventions of the 19th century novel, whose characters are fairly conventional in ideas and behavior, one finds an attack on the use of reason. Tolstoy shows us Pierre Besuhov, fumbling, foolish, always constructing elaborately reasoned plans for the best use of his great wealth. Yet after the war and his experiences of suffering, after his mysterious friendship with the simple peasant Platon Karataev (note the name Platon), Pierre finds himself a changed man. Tolstoy says of him,

> Now to his own surprise he found that he had no more doubt or hesitation on all such questions. Now there was a judge within him settling what he must do and what he must not, by some laws of which he was himself unaware (Modern Library ed., no date, p. 1033).

Similarly, Nikolay Rostov, before the war always worrying about what to do and usually behaving badly, after the war becomes a very successful farmer, skilled at handling his serfs. Tolstoy says of him,

> He could not have said what his standard was of what he ought and ought not to do; but there was a standard firm and rigid in his soul (p. 1068).

The novel as a whole fills out and lends plausibility to this view. We see battles, complex, vast, involving thousands of individual men. Who can plan them in any detail? Who can predict their outcome? On the other hand, we see men and women falling in love. Who can say why Andre loves Natasha? Various reasons can be given but they do not add up to a full explanation. The whole is larger than the sum of the parts. Somehow we feel that if Andre could catalogue all of his reasons for loving Natasha, his love would be sterile, perhaps even destroyed.

Thus while there is surely some truth in the view that we cannot guide our lives by fully articulated reasons, yet the anti-rationalism of the novel is very heavy, heavy despite Tolstoy's own rich and subtle understanding of the people he portrays. Why? The long philosophical Epilogue at the end of the novel shows us why. Tolstoy sees a conflict between free will and determinism, between acting freely and guiding one's life by determining reasons. He says, speaking in his own person in the Epilogue, "once admit that human life can be guided by reason, and all possibility of life is annihilated" (p. 1054, and see pp. 1101-36 *passim*).

Finally, if we move from the world of behavioral science and the world of literature to our own familiar experience, I think we find all about us the pursuit of the irrational. I will only mention two of the most obvious manifestations: experimentation with the so-called "mind expanding" drugs, and fascination with the non-rational aspects of religion, especially with the non-rational aspects of Eastern religions.

Thus I assert again that there are difficulties with the concept of freedom, and most fundamentally with two questions: what does "freedom" mean? and, what does the guidance of one's life by "reasons" mean?

I would like to begin my attempt to discuss these two questions by examining something which Skinner takes as an obvious fact: that predictability is incompatible with freedom. Is this the case?

Consider an example. Socrates is ordered by the government of the Thirty to take part in the arrest of another citizen. This was a technique used by the Thirty to force prominent people into a public acceptance of their rule and a public affirmation of their authority. Socrates studies the case and decides that the man is innocent. What will he do? We know Socrates' character well enough to predict that he will refuse to take part in the arrest. We know the reasons that guide his life and we know how strong he is. Does the fact that we can predict what he will do make his action less free? Consider the alternative possibility. At the decisive moment Socrates is afraid of death and yields to the Thirty. Thus he does not conform to our prediction. Does this make his action more free?

Why then does Skinner see a conflict between predictability and freedom? I think that his view of the matter, and I suspect that he does not realize it, is essentially that articulated by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. What Skinner takes as an obvious fact, needing no discussion, has seemed obvious, I believe, only since the time of Kant. Let us examine what Kant says.

Kant defines "freedom" as "absolute spontaneity," as "a power of absolutely beginning a state."[4] He means by this an action which has no cause whatsoever in the events and circumstances prior to it in time. He considers the example of rising from one's chair (B. 479) an example which could have had its origin in a lecture hall like this one. Anyone of you could at this moment rise from his chair and leave the room. This might be due to the oppressive heat of the room, a sudden pain, a recollection of something you had to do, etc. But if your action is due to any such event or circumstance, Kant sees it as caused and for him this means not free. Only if your action is such that it begins a completely new sequence of events in space-time which has no relation whatsoever to any previous events can your action be called free.

Kant sees, of course, with his characteristic courage and strength to follow out his ideas to their ultimate logical consequences, that such a conception of free human acts takes them completely outside of any possible scientific consideration. "Science" here means not only the science of Skinner and Rogers, who try to set up laws of human behavior which are modeled on the laws of physics, but also "science" in the broader sense of knowledge about human behavior of the kind one finds in Aristotle's *Ethics*, or Plutarch's *Lives*, or even the kind of knowledge one finds in countless novels and plays.

Kant discusses, for example, "a malicious lie by which a certain confusion has been caused in society" (B. 582). He sees that we can study the history of the man who lied, considering his upbringing, his friends, his natural disposition of shamelessness, perhaps, or of levity and thoughtlessness. But none of this is in any way relevant to our judgment of his lie as a free act. For this consideration, "we presuppose that we can leave out of consideration what this way of life may have been, that we can regard the past series of conditions as not having occurred and the act as being completely unconditioned by any preceding state, just as if the agent in and by himself began in this action an entirely new series of consequences" (B. 583). Furthermore, all judgments of morality are concerned only with actions as free. Kant again draws the logical consequence, "The real morality of actions, their merit or guilt, even that of our own conduct, thus remains entirely hidden from us" (B. 580).

Given such a view of freedom as absolute spontaneity, how is it possible for Kant to assert its existence? It is obvious that at least the vast majority of human actions have some relation to prior events and circumstances. Kant's reply is that any human action can be considered under two quite different aspects. It can be considered as taking place in the world of space-time, the world where causes operate, the world of the natural sciences, the world of most of our ordinary experience. But it is a mistake to think that this world is the only existing reality. Behind this world of experience, of appearances, of phenomena, which is essentially a human construction, lies another world of what he calls "Things in themselves." It is in this world, as real as or even more real than the world of phenomena, that the free human act exists, that the immortal soul exists, that God exists. It is the concern of the entire *Critique* to establish the plausibility of the world of Things-in-themselves, and I cannot review Kant's arguments here. I will only point out that those who accept Kant's conception of freedom as absolute spontaneity but who do not accept his argument for a world of Things-in-themselves separate from the empirical world end by either denying the existence of freedom, like Skinner, or by seeing the existence of freedom as an absolute and incomprehensible paradox, like Rogers. I believe that if one accepts the terms in which Kant discusses the problem, if one accepts the concept of freedom as absolute spontaneity, then there are no other alternatives.

Let us consider, then, why Kant conceives of freedom in these terms. We began with writers of our own century. We sought the roots of their thinking in Kant. We now must take a further step backwards and seek the roots of Kant's thinking in Hobbes. Hobbes takes as his model for the understanding of human behavior the new mechanical philosophy of the 17th Century, which explains events in terms of matter in motion. Thus in a chapter on method from his *De*

[4] *Critique of Pure Reason*, Norman Kemp Smith, tr., London, 1953, p. 474, B. 473.

The vast majority of human actions have some relation to prior events and circumstances . . .

Corpore, he asserts that "motion cannot be understood to have any other cause besides motion" (VI, 5). He first discusses the motions considered by physics, and then asserts,

> After *physics* we must come to *moral philosophy;* in which we are to consider the motions of the mind, namely, *appetite, aversion, love, benevolence, hope, fear, anger, emulation, envy, etc.;* what cause they have, and of what they be cause. And the reason why these are to be considered after *physics* is, that they have their causes in sense and imagination, which are the subject of *physical* contemplation. (VI, 6)

Note what Hobbes casts together here in a single group. Let me repeat the list: "appetite, aversion, love, benevolence, hope, fear, anger, emulation, envy, etc." All of these are motions produced by causes, specifically by prior motions in sense and imagination. No distinction is made among *kinds* of motions produced by *kinds* of causes. Motions of love and benevolence are of essentially the same type as motions of appetite and anger. If my child is hurt and I comfort him in an effort to help him stop crying, this is to be understood in essentially the same terms as when, annoyed by his crying, I shout at him and strike him. Or, to return to our earlier example, when Socrates stands against the judgment of the Thirty and refuses to cooperate in the arrest of an innocent man, this is to be understood in essentially the same terms as if, through fear, he yielded.

The interpretation I have made of the quotation from *De Corpore* can be supported from the chapter on "Voluntary motions" in *Leviathan.*[5] Hobbes distinguishes in animals two sorts of motions, *vital* motions, such as the motion of the blood through the body, breathing, nutrition, and so on, and *voluntary* motions, such as walking, moving our arms, speaking, and so on. Voluntary motions are defined as motions "first fancied in our minds" (VI, p. 31). The beginning of a voluntary motion is called an "appetite" or "desire," if it is toward something, and an "aversion," if it is away from something. "Good" and "evil" are defined in terms of appetite toward and away from. The only difference Hobbes sees between "pleasures of sense" and "pleasures of the mind" is that "pleasures of sense" arise from present objects which we can directly perceive, whereas "pleasures of the mind" arise from the expectation of pleasures of sense from some object which is absent (VI, p. 34). Thus no distinction is made among kinds of pleasures or kinds of voluntary motions.

Given such an account of pleasure, how does Hobbes think that we deliberate among pleasures, how do we choose? Hobbes considers deliberation simply as a succession of appetites and aversions. First we incline toward some object, then we incline away from it, due to a fear of some evil consequence. "The whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and fears continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call *deliberation*" (VI, p. 37). Choice, or "will," is simply "the last appetite in deliberating" (VI, p. 38), the appetite which is immediately followed by motion toward the object. Again, no distinction is made among kinds of objects which move the will.

Such a conception of choice is evident in a popular tendency to place an action like giving money to the poor or risking one's life to save a drowning man on essentially the same level as eating a piece of candy or taking a ride on a roller coaster, classing all these actions as the same because they produce a kind of "pleasure" or "satisfaction," with no distinction made among kinds of pleasure or satisfaction. Such supposed psychological sophistication is to be contrasted with the naive judgment that some human actions are genuinely "altruistic," that is, fundamentally directed toward others, *alteri.*

I turn now to Hobbes' account of freedom.

For Hobbes the question of "freedom" or "liberty" offers no difficulty whatsoever. "Liberty" is defined simply

[5] Page references are to the Blackwell edition, Oxford, 1957.

as "the absence of opposition"; and "opposition" means "external impediments of motion" such as walls and chains (XXI, pp. 136, 137). Thus, unless a man is actually tied down or confined within a certain space, he is said to be free. In this sense of "freedom," as Hobbes sees clearly, animals are free in the same way that man is, and even water, when it is not constrained to flow within certain banks, can be said to be free (XXI, pp. 136, 137). Thus, to say that a man has "free-will" means simply that "he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do" (XXI, p. 137). But what of the freedom of the will itself, when a man chooses to do one thing rather than another? Hobbes denies that a creature having the power of thought and judgment might be free in a sense in which animals and inanimate objects are not. Finally, when he goes on to discuss political liberty, he is able to say that it makes sense only for a state as a whole, which succeeds in operating without constraint from other states. Within a state, there is as much or as little liberty in a monarchy as there is in a democracy, since both states constrain men to abide by the laws. Hobbes says that the idea of political liberty is essentially an illusion inherited from the Greeks and the Romans! (XXI, pp. 140, 141)

Now, what is the line of development from Hobbes' discussion of deliberation, choice and liberty to the Kantian difficulties about freedom? Despite the vast differences in the conclusions they draw, I think the line of development is very simple and direct. Kant does want to affirm the presence in man of a kind of freedom which is not simply the absence of external restraints. It is a freedom to do what one knows to be right despite one's upbringing, despite one's desires, despite the conditions in which one is acting. It is a freedom which is the basis of moral choice. Nevertheless, Kant accepts the terms in which Hobbes has discussed the problem. Kant makes no distinction among the kinds of causes which act on the will. Everything which acts on the will is a kind of mover, or "motive," which produces a certain motion as its effect, analogous to a physical particle producing a physical motion. Whether a man does something for good reasons, or does it in a fit of rage it is all one, an action which is caused and could have been predicted. The only kind of freedom Kant can see is a complete absence of causation of any kind, an "absolute spontaneity" which has no reference whatever to anything prior to it in time. Kant affirms that such freedom exists, but it is an affirmation which depends on a world of "things-in-themselves" lying outside experience.

Up to this point, my argument has been largely negative. I have tried to describe a conceptual problem and to show what its origins are. At several points I have suggested that the fundamental error which gives rise to the problem is the failure to distinguish among *kinds* of human actions, among the kinds of things which lead men to act, that is, the tendency to class everything indifferently as a "motive," as a mover of the human will analogous to a billiard ball producing motion in another billiard ball.

I wish now to make a fresh start by considering a thinker who stands completely outside the tradition which begins with Hobbes and whose discussion of human behavior consists primarily in distinguishing among kinds of men and kinds of human actions. I refer to Aristotle and particularly to his *Ethics*.

The first thing to notice is that Aristotle brings to his discussion of human behavior not a single model of causality, as does Hobbes, but a distinction of four kinds of cause, that is, four ways of answering the question "why?" Only one of these is described in terms of motion, namely, the efficient cause, or that from which motion begins. Answers to the question "why?" can also be given in terms of the components of a thing, the material cause, or in terms of the nature or definition of a thing, the formal cause, or, most important in the present context, in terms of the end or goal, the *telos*, at which something aims, called the "final" cause. It is interesting to note that this distinction is obscured in a crucial way by the English translators of the *Ethics*, who are themselves fully in the grip of the Hobbesian tradition. Thus Aristotle speaks of "the principles" of human action. His word is *arche*, which means simply "beginning." W. D. Ross, in the translation familiar to most of us, the one published in the one volume *Basic Works of Aristotle*, writes "moving principle" (1110a 2). The Loeb translator goes still farther. At a point where Aristotle speaks of the *telos* or goal of an action, he writes "the end or motive" (1110a 14). In some sense these translations are not incorrect, and yet I think they illustrate the difficulty that both of these translators had in reading an ancient text without bringing their own habits of mind to it, and the still greater difficulty for one whose only reading of an ancient text is filtered through translations.

Let us proceed. We move from the general classification of causes, which deals with all kinds of events in the inanimate as well as the animate world, to the particular discussion of human behavior. Aristotle's first concern is to define "voluntary" action, but the order in which he proceeds is extremely interesting. He begins by considering "involuntary" action, perhaps because he finds it easier to identify and to describe. Involuntary action is, first of all, action which is compelled or forced, and what this means is made clear by examples. A man riding in a boat which is carried off course by the wind, or a man physically dragged along by stronger men is said to act under compulsion. Aristotle defines this as action in which the *arche*, the principle or beginning of the action, is outside the person (*Ethics*, III, 1, 1110a

We presuppose that individuals

do have control over their own actions . . .

1-4). Involuntary action is, secondly, action done through ignorance, and again what this means is clarified by examples. A trainer thinks that a spear he is using in practice has a blunted point. In fact the spear does not have a blunted point and the trainer kills his pupil. His act was done through ignorance; that is, in a literal sense, he did not know what he was doing. If had known the spear was pointed he would not have done what he did (1110b 17-1111a 20).

Aristotle is now in a position to define voluntary action. I quote:

> Since that which is done under compulsion or by reason of ignorance is involuntary, the voluntary would seem to be that of which the *arche*, the principle, is in the agent himself, he being aware of the particular circumstances of the action (1111a 21).

Thus two conditions are required for an action to be voluntary. First, the principle of the action must be in the agent himself. This means simply that the agent is not compelled. Second, the agent must know what he is doing. This means simply that the agent is not ignorant of the circumstances of his action. In other words, voluntary action is defined negatively. An act is voluntary *unless* it is done through compulsion or ignorance, unless, that is, it is involuntary. Voluntary action means action which is not involuntary.

In the course of his discussion, Aristotle moves from the clear cases of involuntary action to the ambiguous cases. What about someone who, to avoid sinking in a storm, throws his goods overboard? Is not his action in some sense compelled? (1110a 8) Or what about someone threatened with terrible punishment if he does not do what he is told? (1110a 5, 20-33) Or could one not even say that all pleasant and noble objects have a kind of compelling power which forces us from without? (1110b 9) Or again, what of a man who is drunk or a man in a violent fit of rage? Is he not in some sense ignorant of what he is doing? (1110b 25) And could one not say that any man, who does not know that what he is doing is wrong, is in a sense ignorant of what he is doing? (1110b 29-34)

Aristotle's response to these ambiguous cases and the questions which arise from them is in a way dissatisfying and yet interesting. He acknowledges that a man who throws his goods overboard in a storm or who pursues pleasure is, in some sense of the word, "compelled." But he refuses to assimilate this to the case of a man who is compelled in the sense that he is physically dragged along. Aristotle sees that a man in the sway of passion is in a sense ignorant of what he is doing, and yet he refuses to assimilate this to the case of the trainer who thinks that the spear he is using is blunt (III, 1, *passim*). Aristotle does not aim at theoretical simplicity. Again and again he returns to particular examples, and I have mentioned only a small number of those he actually describes. In any case, let us postpone for the moment the difficulties arising from the ambiguous cases, and follow Aristotle's analysis to its next stage, which is a discussion of choice.

For Aristotle not all voluntary actions are chosen; for example, actions done in anger. He ascribes voluntary action to children and animals, but not choice. What then distinguishes choice? Again Aristotle has a simple criterion. He describes the activity of *bouleuesthai*, which means taking counsel, planning, advising. (The word commonly used to translate *bouleuesthai*, "deliberation," is of Latin origin and has the specific sense of deciding among alternative courses of action, that is, of weighing alternatives on a balance, *libra*.) Aristotle points out, for example, that we do not take counsel or make plans concerning eternal things, such as mathematical propositions. We investigate them and think about them, but we do not consider what to do about them. Similarly concerning natural events which always happen in the same way, such as the rising of the sun. Similarly still about chance events, like stumbling on a buried treasure. And finally concerning things impossible for us, like becoming emperor of Persia, we do not make plans, we do not deliberate. For none of these things come about "through us," *di'hemon*, through our efforts. What then do we deliberate about? We deliberate about things which "are in our power and can be done," as Ross translates it, *ton eph' hemin kai prakton*, "which are ours and which are do-able" (1112a 19-30). With this description of deliberation as a basis, choice is then simply defined in terms of deliberation. When is an action chosen? When it follows deliberation (1112a 15).

Note that this definition presupposes that actions which are chosen are actions which "belong to us" as Aristotle puts it, *eph' hemin*, or as Ross translates it, "are in our power." What are actions "in our power"? Again the meaning of the expression comes negatively from examples of things *not* in our power: mathematical propositions, the rising of the sun, stumbling on a buried treasure, and so on. Yet Aristotle does go on to explicitly

consider the question whether good and bad actions, acts of virtue and vice, are really "in our power" in a deeper sense.

He first points out that both in our private lives and in our laws we presuppose that individuals do have control over their own actions, for we punish those who do evil acts and honor and praise those who do good acts, as though we meant to deter the one and to encourage the other (1113b 22-5). He also points out that we excuse those who acted under compulsion or in ignorance, when both are taken in the strict sense defined earlier. For ignorance in a looser sense, for example when ignorance is due to drunkenness, one is not excused and in fact the penalties might even be increased. This is because we feel that the person was responsible for his own ignorance (1113b 30).

But now comes the difficult question. One can agree with all that Aristotle has said and accept the accuracy of his definitions and the claim that they reflect the practice of our lives. But one can still ask whether the apparent power that we have over our choices might not be an illusion. For one can still ask whether the way in which possible alternatives appear to a person is really in his power. Does not paying his debts appeal to one man because of the way he has been brought up, whereas cheating appeals to another man? Aristotle does raise this question, but his answer might seem too obvious and too close to our ordinary experience to be very impressive. He reverts to his general discussion of virtues and vices, which are simply states of character or habits acting in certain ways. Before one has acquired a habit, Aristotle asserts, one does have the power to act differently. After one has acquired a certain habit, for example the habit of drinking heavily, one does not have the power to change, at least not to the same degree (1114a 3-22). How does one acquire good habits? How does one become temperate and courageous? The answer is simple but the task is difficult: one becomes temperate or courageous simply by repeatedly performing acts of temperance and courage (*Ethics*, II, I, 4; III, 5).

This point is filled out by the discussion of *akrasia* in Book VII of the *Ethics*. *Akrasia* means simply "lack of strength" but is usually translated as "weakness of will" or "incontinence." With regard to sensual pleasures, pleasures of food, drink and sex, Aristotle makes a three-fold distinction. On the one hand there is the virtuous man who enjoys such things to an appropriate degree and at appropriate times. On the other hand, there is the intemperate or vicious man who enjoys them to excess and at inappropriate times. In between there is the man of *akrasia*. He has good principles, he knows what he ought to do, and yet he is unable to follow his principles. In the particular situation, he is carried away by his desires and indulges more than he intends to. He is a man for whom there is still hope of virtue because he can, by repeatedly restraining his evil desires and performing the individual acts of virtue, finally acquire the habit of doing good, that is, the virtue itself. For the vicious man, on the other hand, there is no hope, because he not only acts badly in the particular situation and under the influence of overwhelming desire, but his very principles have been corrupted. He believes that self-indulgence is a good thing and goes ahead to act on that belief. He is, in one respect, like the man of virtue, in that he acts on his principles. His trouble is that he has acquired bad principles. (See Book VII, Ch. 1-10, *passim*.) Thus, Aristotle says that "the incontinent man is like a city which passes all the right decrees and has good laws, but makes no use of them," whereas "the wicked man is like a city that uses its laws, but has wicked laws to use" (1152a 20-24).

Thus Aristotle's discussion of voluntary action and choice simply follows our ordinary experience of human behavior. As far as I have observed, nowhere in this discussion is a word used which could be translated "free," and he does not speak to the problem of freedom and determinism posed by Kant because this problem does not arise for him. For him there is no abstract theoretical standpoint from which men could be said to be free or not free. Nevertheless I have mentioned those passages where Aristotle speaks of actions as *eph' hemin*, as "ours" or "in our power," and I think we can construct from these passages the direction of Aristotle's reply to Kant. Asked if man is free, Aristotle would not try to answer the question in general, but would discuss whether particular men in particular situations are free and to what degree. To what extent did they understand the circumstances of their action? Did they think about what they were doing before they acted? Or did they act on impulse? Were they angry or agitated at the time the decision was made? Were they drunk? From the replies to these questions we can say to what extent they chose to do what they did. And to say that they chose is, in Aristotle's terms, to say that the action was "theirs," "in their power," and, I would add, it is to say that the action was "free."

Suppose we then ask, "But what about the choice itself? Was that free?" Again Aristotle wants to know the particular sort of person we are considering and the particular history he has had. Are we offering a drink to a man who enjoys drinking but does not get drunk, to a man who does not often get drunk but who on this particular occasion has been drinking heavily, or to a confirmed alcoholic who is at this moment licking his lips in impatience? It is obvious that in some ordinary sense of the word "free," there are degrees of freedom of choice among these three men. To say that none of them is free is simply to obscure the distinction we would want to make among them. If we refuse to use the word "free" to make this distinction because we are reserving it for some high theoretical meaning, then we have to find

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

1969 1970

Through the past year of campus dissension and unrest across America, the students and Tutors of St. John's College distinguished themselves by their sane and rational behavior. Almost all of them were gravely concerned over the war in Southeast Asia and the crisis at Kent State University. To express their dissent from national policy they chose what they considered to be proper and appropriate means—a letter to the President signed by individuals and delivered by hand to the White House, a twenty-four hour peace vigil, letters and visits to congressmen, and an extra day of classes on Vietnam and on the general problem of dissent.

St. John's College believes that there is grave danger to higher education in this country if colleges and universities as entities take political stands. Such politicization could well result in the subversion of these institutions into action agencies and in the ultimate loss of real academic freedom. St. John's students and Tutors correctly insisted that their opinions be understood as those of individual citizens and that the College not be officially or implicitly involved.

In the words of the letter to the President, "St. John's College is devoted to the life of the mind, to reason, and to dialogue. We cannot subscribe to irrational and violent methods of dissent, since they imply an abandonment of the fundamental principles for which a college or university should stand. . . . We shall continue with our regular academic program. We believe that our primary responsibility as students and teachers is to continue to study and learn."

A college or university must be a place where any idea or opinion may be expressed, entertained, examined, or criticized. Complete freedom of inquiry must prevail. The goal must be the search for truth. The rules must be the rules of reason. The tools are the liberal arts, the thinking skills. To prescribe a position, a dogma, a doctrine, or a political stand is to vitiate freedom to question, to discuss, to study, and to learn. The contemporary trend of making colleges and universities action institutions to deal with society's problems and woes is fraught with real danger. A college like St. John's must continue to adhere steadfastly to principle in these matters. Nor does this mean any lack of concern for the outside world. St. John's will have failed in its full mission if its graduates are not inspired or impelled to meet their full responsibilities as citizens of the Republic.

It is interesting that St. John's students declined during the critical days to judge their fellows in other institutions. Some thought that they might have acted differently had they not been at St. John's. As one student put it, striking against St. John's College would be senseless, for students here already have most of what students elsewhere are seeking—small classes, genuine dialogue with Tutors, a sense of the dignity and worth of the individual, full opportunity to participate in class, and serious and thoughtful discussion of the great questions of human existence. Indeed, the vague smoldering disenchantment with the conventional academic experience appears to me to be at the root of the problem for students in many colleges and universities. This discontent is capitalized upon by the relatively small and vocal minority of dissident radicals, who associate it with political issues to which it is at best remotely relevant.

In my opinion no palliative or remedy of the ills of higher education can be found in the contemporary movement to involve students in the governance of our col-

leges and universities through board membership, or to make them partners in planning the curriculum. A college cannot and should not be a democracy. In fact, a college is not a political organization of any sort. One of the vital tasks of colleges should be to preserve the distinction between an educational community and a political community. Each segment—board, faculty, and students of the college community—has its assigned role. Responsibility rests by charter with the board and is delegated by it to the president. He in turn delegates it to deans, administrators, faculty, and students. Students must indeed be listened to on all matters, and their ideas, proposals, and suggestions should be seriously and thoughtfully considered. But a college faculty cannot evade or surrender its basic responsibility for prescribing that course of study which in its opinion is most likely to result in a liberally educated man or woman. Nor can a board, a president, or a dean yield to expediency or pressure and fail to maintain those conditions which are considered most conducive to real learning.

A college, to be true to its purpose, should be a community of learners. It is significant that the word "community" is derived from the Latin *communis*—*con* meaning "together" and the root *mu* meaning "to bind." From the same origin comes the word *communico*, meaning "to divide a thing with one, to impart, or to communicate." As a community, then, a college is a society or body of disparate individuals bound together by the common goal of learning. In such a body communication, the full sharing of thoughts and ideas is paramount. There must also be a proper ordering of the body if its laudable ends are to be achieved. Hence the need for clearly defined functions and working relationships.

Quinquennial Polity Revision

The year just ended at St. John's College witnessed a further development and refinement of the College's basic constitution, the Polity. It has been a major accomplishment that every five years a mandatory reveiw of this document has been completed to the general satisfaction of the various segments of the college community. This year notable progress was made by broadening the concept of the Faculty to include not only Tutors, the teaching members, but Associates as well, that is, administrative staff members. Sections defining the role of the students were amplified, and, for the first time, the alumni were included as part of the College. Both campuses were accorded equal status. A major change in administrative structure was instituted by the creation of the position of Provost on the Annapolis campus. This new post will have presidential powers, though the incumbent will report to the President of the College rather than to the Board. The objective is to relieve the President of many administrative details and to assure greater attention to the developing needs of the Annapolis campus. A search for a suitable candidate for the provostship is now in progress.

The Annapolis Campus

Robert Goldwin brought to the deanship a high degree of vigor, imagination, and judiciousness. With remarkable success he gave high priority to four matters: the attrition of student enrollment, the recording of the instructional program, the rules of residence for students on campus, and the College's relations with the world outside the campus. It is gratifying to report a net loss of only three students throughout the year. The February freshman class and returning students almost replaced the number who left during the year. The significant point is that many fine students, who might have been lost to the College, were apparently satisfied with the progress of their education and stayed on.

At the initiative of the Dean, Tutors kept records of what happened in every seminar, and "archon" or "gauleiter" Tutors did the same for tutorials and laboratories. As a result a complete account of what is done in every class in every year is now available for the use of new Tutors. These reports are in no sense rigid guides but rather starting points for the further improvement and refinement of the curriculum. In similar fashion, a careful record has been kept by Elliott Zuckerman, Secretary of the Instruction Committee, of all its deliberations and decisions. Copies of his report for the year were circulated to all Tutors.

Much time and energy were expended in deliberations over possible revision of the rules of residence. A liberalization of the rules resulted. Curfew was eliminated for women students, except for freshman women during the first semester. Visiting hours were extended somewhat, but the College would not accede to the request of some students that dormitories remain open for intervisitation twenty-four hours a day. The general problem will undoubtedly continue to trouble the College. It may be relieved somewhat as a larger proportion of students are permitted to live off campus.

As part of his effort to improve relations with the outside world, the Dean instituted two series of seminars. One series was conducted combining St. John's students and midshipmen of the United States Naval Academy. Co-leaders were drawn from the two institutions. A second series was conducted for public figures in Washington and led by the Dean. Tuition for this series was the requirement that participants visit the Annapolis campus and speak on national affairs before the Student Forum. These seminars contributed helpfully to a new understanding of the College by people outside it.

Finally, mention should be made of a most significant innovation in the area of instruction. Under the direction of Hugh McGrath, one of the College's most senior Tutors, a six-week New Tutors School was conducted on campus this summer. Five of the seven newly appointed Tutors participated to prepare themselves for the shock of meeting their first classes. The Dean and I are both

confident that the quality of teaching by these new Tutors will be greatly improved as a result.

The Santa Fe Campus

Dean William Darkey reports that notable progress has been made on the western campus in broadening general faculty competence in all areas of the program. Classes were scheduled during the year so as to permit maximum opportunity for auditing. Many Tutors availed themselves of the chance to observe their fellows teaching. As a corollary it is gratifying that almost all requests for teaching assignments for the coming year included at least one subject new to the Tutor. The criterion of extending one's competence in the St. John's Program is already being taken very responsibly.

A special study group of music Tutors was set up and met regularly throughout the year. As a result, a syllabus of carefully selected materials was prepared for use in the Music tutorial. Furthermore, three "non-musicians" can now be assigned to the Music tutorial for the coming year. The Dean also reports that six Tutors without previous experience in teaching biology have now successfully taught in that part of the laboratory program, and that a half-dozen faculty members studied elementary Greek for eight weeks this summer. Thomas Slakey instructed the group under the auspices of the Graduate Institute in Liberal Education. Some Tutors learned the language for the first time, others reviewed their previous acquaintance with it.

The Dean notes that for the coming year the teaching slate will be somewhat tight, though a ratio of eight students to one Tutor will be maintained. The Dean urges a policy of earlier interviews with prospective faculty members and earlier appointments another year. In general, he concludes that the morale of the faculty has been good on the Santa Fe campus and that the quality of the teaching has been high.

Richard Scofield

The entire St. John's community has been saddened by the death of Richard Scofield, one of St. John's greatest and most beloved Tutors. He had retired at the end of June following 43 years of service on the St. John's Faculty. Educated at the University of California and at Oxford University, where he held a Rhodes scholarship, he was first appointed to the St. John's Faculty in 1927 as a member of the English Department. When the New Program was introduced he undertook diligently and enthusiastically the varied duties of a Tutor. Since 1959 he had held an Addison E. Mullikin Tutorship. The scroll honoring Richard Scofield upon his retirement read in part as follows:

> In these years nothing has been more trusted by students and colleagues alike than his patience, his modesty, his calm perseverance, his subtle understanding, and his unswerving rectitude, nothing more admired than his urbanity and elegance and, above all, his capacity for warm friendship. In his company other persons have felt themselves somehow at their best.

The Tutors

The selection and training of the best possible faculty members continues to be a matter of prime importance both in the east and in the west. This year each campus received approximately 300 applications for teaching positions. Seven new Tutors have been selected for appointment at Annapolis and three at Santa Fe. Two teaching interns have also been appointed at Santa Fe, both of whom will work toward Master's degrees.

Appointed to the Faculty on the Annapolis campus for the coming academic year are Steven Crockett, who holds a Ph.D. degree in the History of Culture from the University of Chicago; William DeHart, who has a doctorate in biology from the University of Rochester Medical School, and who has been an assistant professor at the Medical College of Virginia; Robert Licht, a young St. John's graduate, who has been teaching philosophy as an instructor at Bucknell University; Brian Patrick McGuire, who has just completed his D.Phil. at Oxford University in History; Alfred Mollin, whose doctorate is in Philosophy from the Penn State University; William O'Grady, who has a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in Political Science; and Jonathan Skinner, whose doctorate at the University of Massachusetts was in the field of mathematics.

Additions to the Santa Fe faculty are John S. Chamberlin, who has completed work for a Ph.D. at the University of Toronto in Medieval Studies; Frank Flinn, who has a B.A. from Quincy College and a B.D. from Harvard Divinity School; and Edward H. Porcella, a St. Mary's College graduate, who holds the M.A. degree in Philosophy from the University of California at San Diego. The two teaching interns on the Santa Fe campus are Mrs. Toni Katz Drew, who graduated from St. John's College in June, and Paul D. Mannick, who completed his undergraduate studies at California State College at Long Beach this year.

During the year just ended Douglas Allanbrook, John Kieffer, and J. Winfree Smith were all on sabbatical leave while Gisela Berns, George Berry, Clarence J. Kramer, and Henry Larom were on leave of absence for all or part of the year. Mr. Berry resigned during the year because of the pressure of family business. Peter Brown, Vassilios Christides, Alan Cotler, Carl Linden, Robert Mueller, and George Vahanian, all completed the terms of their appointments and leave the College for other positions.

The Students

The following excerpt from Dean Darkey's report well

summarizes the student situation on both St. John's campuses:

"The quality of campus life at St. John's is as difficult to assess with confidence as it is on any campus. On the one hand, we have escaped the more obvious manifestations of student unrest that have troubled campuses throughout the country. It is certainly safe to say that our advantage is due in part to the essential nature of St. John's itself, that is to its deliberately small size, to the intellectual soundness of its curriculum, and to the high quality of its teaching. Much of the current campus unrest is certainly aggravated by the impersonality of the enormous universities and by the curricular chaos into which students are thrust with the assurance that they will receive an education. By contrast our curriculum provides a common intellectual experience in a community small enough to permit an easy dialectical consideration and assimilation of that experience. These conditions and the fact that the curriculum has deep roots in the larger tradition of our society produce community to an unusual degree within the College and this is a source of great strength.

"But we must recognize that our students come to us from the same world that other college students come from. Ours are a highly selected group of sensitive and intelligent young men and women who are responsive to the tensions that properly enough trouble all young people today, and although we have escaped the more openly destructive manifestations of those tensions, St. John's is, nevertheless, profoundly affected by them. For example, it is beyond any reasonable doubt that our so-called problem of attrition is a symptom of the general unrest. The student who withdraws, declaring as many do that he has no really serious criticism of St. John's—indeed he usually avows his intention to return in time—is, in most instances, deeply troubled by the same causes that produce demonstrations on other campuses."

St. John's on both its campuses had its largest enrollment to date. Attrition at Santa Fe was somewhat higher than at Annapolis. Figures for the year follow:

Annapolis	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*
Freshmen	71	54	125
February Freshmen	14	7	21
Sophomores	56	41	97
Juniors	40	26	66
Seniors	35	24	59
Total	216	152	368
Santa Fe	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*
Freshmen	71	54	125
Sophomores	40	36	76
Juniors	13	15	28
Seniors	21	12	33
Total	145	117	262
Grand Total	361	269	630

A major factor contributing to good morale on the Annapolis campus this year was a rejuvenated *Collegian*. Under the able editorship of Daniel J. Sullivan, of the Junior Class, some thirty weekly issues appeared. The publication was partly newspaper and partly magazine. At Santa Fe the greatest positive contribution to the life of the students was the establishment of the SAO, the Student Activities Office, under the direction of Istvan Fehérváry. All sports and other activities fell under the purview of this office, whether soccer, skiing, rafting, and fencing, or photography, the theater, jewelry-making, or the publication *Seven*.

Students were confronted with an increasingly serious problem in the area of financial aid. For Maryland students the State's new scholarship program worked to the disadvantage of those selecting an independent college like St. John's. This is graphically demonstrated by the sharp decline of awards to students attending St. John's over the past five years:

Year	*Number of Students*	*Total Scholarship Funds*
1965-66	59	$119,125
1966-67	50	99,000
1967-68	45	90,850
1968-69	30	53,800
1969-70	24	32,350

Every effort must be made to alter the system so that a more equitable share of these scholarship funds are made available to Maryland residents desiring to attend independent institutions.

In spite of the reduction of state scholarships, the College sought to provide as much financial aid as possible out of its current budgets on both campuses, as the following table shows:

	Annapolis	*Santa Fe*	*Total*
Student Assistantships	$ 43,740	$ 48,933	$ 92,673
Grants-in-Aid	67,191	49,464	116,655
Maryland Scholarships	32,350	—	32,350
Southwest Scholarships	—	58,500	58,500
Staff Children's Scholarships	3,900	1,950	5,850
Other Scholarships	41,340	1,000	42,340
Educational Opportunity Grants	13,165	6,682	19,847
Work-Study Program	—	5,992	5,992
	$201,686	$172,521	$374,207

These figures include no financial aid through loans, either by local banks or within the National Defense Student Loan program.

In June the College awarded 75 Bachelor of Arts degrees, 27 of them on the Santa Fe campus and 48 of them on the Annapolis campus. Five Annapolis seniors received recognition in the form of degrees *magna cum laude*, that is "with great praise." Fourteen seniors earned *cum laude* degrees, that is "with praise," nine in Annap-

olis and five in Santa Fe. These two most recent classes bring to 935 the total number of St. John's graduates of the New Program.

Admissions

This has been a disappointing year from the standpoint of admissions. In contrast to the 508 applications of last year, only 450 prospective students completed final applications for this fall. Instead of two capacity classes of 125 students each, Annapolis expects to enroll 120 students and Santa Fe 108. Apparently experience at St. John's parallels that of other independent liberal arts colleges. Undoubtedly higher college fees, the depressed state of the economy, and the relative scarcity of loan funds have all contributed to the decreased numbers.

In May Douglas Price resigned from his position as Director of Admissions in Santa Fe to become Assistant to the President at the University of Hawaii. Earlier in the year Edward Godschalk had relinquished his responsibilities as Assistant Director of Admissions in Annapolis in order to pursue graduate study. Both men made substantial contributions to the success of the admissions program over the past several years. Gerald Zollars has been appointed Director of Admissions at Santa Fe replacing Mr. Price.

The Graduate Institute in Liberal Education

Under the able directorship of James Shannon, Vice President of the College, the Graduate Institute in Liberal Education completed a successful fourth session this summer and graduated 28 teachers and other adults with the degree of Master of Arts. Full-time enrollment rose from 84 to 120, an increase of nearly half. Graduate Institute students came from 20 States, with the largest number registered from New Mexico and Maryland. It is clear that the Institute is performing a useful service and that every effort must be made to publicize it more widely, particularly in certain of the larger cities in the Midwest.

Eighteen Tutors constituted the faculty for the summer, each of them teaching two assignments. Most of the Tutors were drawn from the two St. John's campuses but two Tutors were appointed from other institutions, A. Lowell Edmunds of Harvard University and Mrs. Chaninah Maschler of New York City. Once again generous compliments were paid by the students to the faculty and to the calibre of instruction. This was the final year of the helpful funding grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The Graduate Institute received as well a supporting grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. This was made possible by generous matching grants from the Cafritz Foundation of Washington, D. C.; the Hoffberger Foundation of Baltimore, Maryland; and of the Richardson Fund of New York City.

The Libraries

Hugh P. McGrath, a Tutor at the College since 1948, gave the address at the re-dedication of Woodward Hall at Homecoming, October 18, 1969. The new building has found immediate favor with students and Tutors alike on the Annapolis campus, though staff members continue to be baffled by gremlins in the mechanical equipment. During the summer months especially the availability of quiet air-conditioned space for reading, study, and seminar discussion has been a godsend for the February freshmen and others.

A truly significant accession to the Library holdings during the year was a gift from Mr. and Mrs. Peter H. W. Jackson, of Cedar Hills Plantation, Rutherford, North Carolina, of some 500 volumes published in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. Mr. Jackson was a member of the Class of 1943.

In Santa Fe the year has been one of re-organizing procedures, systems and routines within the Library. A comprehensive staff procedure manual was produced and will be amended as necessary. Notable gifts of music were received from Miss Amelia Elizabeth White of Santa Fe, Professor S. Ellsworth Grumman of New Haven, Connecticut, and Mr. and Mrs. Donald McCormick, of Tulsa, Oklahoma. The Library Committee of Santa Fe citizens, under the dynamic chairmanship of Richard Stern, continued its successful Book and Author luncheons, drawing sell-out crowds for the benefit of the Library.

The Associates and the Staff

After only a year as Vice President on the Santa Fe campus, James P. Shannon has resigned to undertake study of the law. He won many new friends during the year for his work in the Greek tutorial, for his counseling, and for directing the Graduate Institute. His role in development is also greatly appreciated. Appointed to replace Mr. Shannon in the vice-presidency is J. Burchenal Ault, of Oyster Bay, Long Island, the unanimous recommendation of the Faculty's search committee and of the College's administrative officers.

Other departures from the Santa Fe staff include Marie Winterhaler, Registrar and Acting Assistant Dean, and Frank McGuire, Director of Development. Mrs. Winterhaler was the first staff appointee at the new college in 1962. She remains at St. John's as the wife of a Tutor, Roger Peterson. Mr. McGuire undertakes work with the Indians. He did yeoman service for the College in bringing it closer to the Santa Fe community. The College records its gratitude to both, and also to John T. Rule, who served an interim one-year appointment as Assistant Dean.

In addition, the following personnel changes should be recorded: Mrs. Emily Van Horn was appointed secretary to the Director of the Graduate Institute. Mrs.

Esther Lopez and Mrs. Marilyn Copelan were added to the staff of the Development Office, replacing Mrs. Van Horn and Mrs. Louise Tamotzu. In the Library, Mrs. Holly Tani was succeeded by Mrs. Beth Floyd. Her position on the switchboard was filled by Mrs. Ruth Archer. Another library appointee was Miss Linda McCormick. Charles Webb managed the College Book Store.

At Annapolis Charles Finch, who had been Assistant Dean, was appointed Director of Financial Aid and Placement. Dr. Robert Biern and Dr. Charles Kinzer were named College Physicians and Dr. Sigmund Amitin College Psychiatrist, succeeding Dr. Gerard Church and Dr. Robert Ward. Mrs. Julianna Rugg was appointed College Nurse. Mrs. Kathryn P. Kinzer was appointed Assistant Librarian, and Mrs. Josephine B. Thoms served for the year as Director of the Fine Arts Studio. Mrs. Leanore Rinder was named a secretary in the Dean's Office, while in the Development Office Mrs. Violet R. Keily was replaced by Mrs. Renée Jabine, who was in turn succeeded by Mrs. Emalea E. Noyes. Everett Whitehead resigned as Library Assistant at the end of the year.

During the coming academic year Miss Barbara Leonard, Assistant Dean, will be on sabbatical leave. Geoffrey Comber will serve as Acting Assistant Dean in her stead, while her place in Campbell Hall will be filled by Miss Charlotte King, of the Class of 1959, who will be Resident Head and Student Counsellor for the year.

The Alumni

By all available measures the year just ended was a good one for alumni activities. The stage was set with a successful Homecoming. This was followed by re-vitalized and informal chapter activities in Annapolis, Baltimore, Washington, and New York. The program of counselling of undergraduates has involved a considerable number of alumni, to the profit of the graduating seniors. Finally, it is noteworthy that 838 alumni gave a total of $26,140 in the annual giving campaign, by far the greatest number of donors and the largest amount contributed to date.

Again the affairs of the Alumni Association were in the capable hands of Darrell Henry, of the Class of 1961, as President. J. S. Baker Middelton, of the Class of 1938, and Myron L. Wolbarsht, of the Class of 1950, were each re-elected by the Alumni for second consecutive terms on the Board of Visitors and Governors of the College. The Alumni Award of Merit was presented this year to Dr. Louis L. Snyder, of the Class of 1928, Professor of History at City College of the City University of New York.

Finances

From a financial point of view the past year was a major disaster for the Santa Fe campus, which failed by $251,828 to balance its current expenditures and appropriations of $1,527,961. Income from fees was lower by $50,000 than the budget estimate, but the main problem resulted from a failure to develop new unrestricted gifts. The depressed state of the stock market was undoubtedly a major cause of the College's difficulty. Every effort must now be exerted to develop substantial new sources of support, for the new college's borrowing power has been exhausted.

The Annapolis campus fared somewhat better but still ended the year with an excess of expenditures over revenue in the amount of $13,687. On this campus fees from students and gifts considerably exceeded budget estimates, but greater expenditures for faculty salaries, for student financial aid, and for plant operation and maintenance more than offset the gains. The Annapolis campus now also faces a difficult current cash situation, as its reserve for future operations has been nearly depleted.

The book value of the College's endowment fund dropped to $8,776,198 while the market value reached a low point of $7,141,642 at the end of the fiscal year. The investment portfolio realized losses on the sale of securities in the amount of $345,405. The sum of $190,211 was drawn from earlier reservation of profits to make up the necessary draw of 6% for current budget purposes. It is good to report that the Brice House mortgages of $25,000 and $15,000 respectively were paid in full during the year. A purchaser was found for the Glendale property. If the sale is consummated as anticipated, a loss will be taken but the net annual income to the College will be greatly increased.

Development

Julius Rosenberg, Director of Development, calls the year just ended as the year of the breakthrough for St. John's College in Annapolis. Town and gown relations were the best in many years, thanks largely to the work of the Friends of St. John's College and to the founding of the Caritas Society, its women's auxiliary. Various social functions were held involving College people and townspeople, the largest of which was an "Evening with Greer Garson" in May. Nearly 500 guests were attracted to the campus for the showing of two of Miss Garson's films and for the reception for her and her husband, Mr. E. E. Fogelson, former member of the Board. The gratitude of the College is extended to the many individuals in the Friends and in the Caritas Society who worked to make the various affairs so successful.

As a matter of policy the College has now consolidated its publications program in a single quarterly, *The College*. Under the editorship of Laurence Berns, Tutor, and the managing editorship of Mary Jean Felter, Director of Public Information, *The College* combines articles and lectures with news from both campuses and with alumni notes. It is proving itself an effective vehicle to reach alumni, parents, and friends as well as more immediate members of the St. John's community. Meanwhile, an active program of news releases continues. St. John's re-

ceived most favorable publicity from coast to coast this spring as a result of the mature and rational actions of its students.

Gifts, grants and bequests to the Annapolis campus totaled $284,268 during the year, representing contributions from 1,231 donors. The largest amount was for current purposes: $25,000 from The Hodson Trust in Morristown, New Jersey; $8,700 from other foundations, $6,885 from business corporations, $4,045 from Board members, $2,465 from parents, $3,271 from friends, $26,140 from alumni, and $17,878 from Maryland business firms and corporations through the joint appeal of the Association of Independent Colleges in Maryland. Gifts for endowment purposes totaled $93,934, $47,046 of which represented matching funds from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Restricted current gifts in the amount of $49,643 were received as well as gifts toward the Library totaling $29,576 and toward Harrison House totaling $16,732.

On the Santa Fe campus the Boards of Associates in Santa Fe, Los Alamos, Albuquerque, and Denver continued to function helpfully in building good will and understanding of St. John's College in the Southwest. Local groups were encouraged to hold luncheon meetings and other gatherings on campus so that their members might become familiar with the College. An active program of news releases about the College events was pursued. It is apparent that word is reaching an increasing number of people, for the flow of visitors on campus steadily increases.

As already noted, gifts and grants to the Santa Fe campus were sharply reduced from the total of the preceding year. The sum of $402,551 was received for general purposes and $71,173 for scholarships and other student financial aid, making a total of $473,724. Apart from cash contributions the College received many gifts in kind. Noteworthy among these was a gift of ten acres of land contiguous to College property and lying just north of Camino de Cruz Blanca. This generous contribution from Mr. and Mrs. LeRoy Manuel assures the College of adequate protection for its campus for many years to come. To these and to all donors to both campuses the College expresses its heartfelt gratitude.

275th Anniversary

Next July will mark the 275th anniversary of the granting of a Royal Charter to King William's School in 1696. Faculty committees on both campuses are preparing for appropriate activities to celebrate this significant anniversary. It is planned as well to inaugurate a major fund-raising drive to be known as the 275th Anniversary Fund. The campaign will open in 1971 and continue for three years, the final years of the Decade of Development.

It gives me a great deal of pleasure to announce the first major commitment in this program which envisions the raising of $5,000,000 for the Annapolis campus and $10,000,000 for the Santa Fe campus. Mrs. Duane L. Peterson, of Baltimore, Maryland, a devoted member of the Board of Visitors and Governors, has pledged one and a quarter million dollars over a period of years. This will cover the cost of constructing and furnishing the student center at Santa Fe, for which funds were borrowed from the Annapolis endowment fund seven years ago. Mrs. Peterson's commitment will therefore assure the repayment to Annapolis of most of the outstanding loan upon which the Santa Fe campus has been paying interest over the years. I am also pleased that the Board has taken action to name the building "The Peterson Student Center" in honor of both Mrs. Peterson and her late husband, Duane L. Peterson. This is a good omen for the future.

* * *

I was pleased to be selected by the Danforth Foundation as one of the recipients of its Short-Term Leave Grants for College and University Administrators. Mrs. Weigle and I appreciate the willingness of the Board to allow us a four-month leave of absence for this welcome period of study and refreshment. We hope to be away during the early months of 1971.

As I conclude this, my twenty-second report, let me again express gratitude to all of those associated with the College—Board members, Tutors, Associates, Staff members, students, alumni, parents and friends. Your work for the College and your commitment to it account for whatever we have been able to achieve on the two campuses. Because of you the presidency of St. John's never ceases to be a deeply satisfying and challenging experience.

RICHARD D. WEIGLE
President

September 8, 1970

ST. JOHN'S
Annapolis, Maryland
BALANCE SHEETS,

ASSETS

	Annapolis	Santa Fe
CURRENT FUNDS		
Unrestricted		
Cash	$ 54,648	$ 5,917
Accounts Receivable	4,947	46,003
Due from Other Funds	.....	20,284
Due from SJC—Santa Fe	37,722	.....
Prepaid Expenses	125	32,929
Miscellaneous	.....	22,418
Bookstore Inventory	23,013	.....
Total Unrestricted Funds	$ 120,455	$ 127,551
Restricted		
Cash	$ 50,907	$ 64,381
Investments	58,129	3,226
Loans Receivable	840	.....
Due from Other Funds	.....	16,160
Total Restricted Funds	$ 109,876	$ 83,767
Total Current Funds	$ 230,331	$ 211,318
LOAN FUNDS		
Cash	$ 2,394	$ 13,856
National Defense Student Loans	124,987	147,196
Other Student Loans	2,871	1,000
Total Loan Funds	$ 130,252	$ 162,052
ENDOWMENT FUNDS		
Cash	$ 231,210	$ 155
Accounts and Notes Receivable	7,283	2,985
Faculty Home Loans	129,460	.....
Loan to SJC—Santa Fe	1,461,000	.....
Due from Other Funds	49,792	.....
Miscellaneous	870	.....
Investments	.....	.....
Securities—at cost	6,616,080	59,507
Mortgages on Real Property	49,755	.....
Real Property	234,000	.....
Total Endowment Funds	$ 8,779,450	$ 62,647
PLANT FUNDS		
Cash	$ 12,069	$ 15,623
Investments	44,000	.....
Notes Receivable	.....	11,000
Due from Other Funds	2,395	67,000
Retirement of Indebtedness	.....	103,332
Land and Campus Development	375,677	313,615
Buildings and Improvements	5,168,920	4,766,839
Equipment and Furnishings	394,221	421,787
Land and Buildings—Other	.....	77,343
Library Books	.....	95,613
Total Plant Funds	$ 5,997,282	$5,872,152
ANNUITY FUNDS		
Due from Current Fund	.....	$ 21,241
Due from Plant Fund	.....	193,064
Total Annuity Funds	.....	$ 214,305
Total Funds	$15,137,315	$6,522,474

COLLEGE
Santa Fe, New Mexico
June 30, 1970

LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL

	Annapolis	Santa Fe
CURRENT FUNDS		
Unrestricted		
Notes Payable	$	$ 310,000
Accounts Payable	3,664	36,881
Deferred Income	51,984	83,101
Due to Other Funds	52,187	103,836
Due to SJC Annapolis	.....	37,669
Reserve for Future Operations	12,620	.....
Cumulative Fund Deficit	.....	(443,936)
Total Unrestricted Funds	$ 120,455	$ 127,551
Restricted		
Fund Balances	$ 109,876	$ 83,767
Total Restricted Funds	$ 109,876	$ 83,767
Total Current Funds	$ 230,331	$ 211,318
LOAN FUNDS		
Fund Balances	$ 130,252	$ 162,052
Total Loan Funds	$ 130,252	$ 162,052
ENDOWMENT FUNDS		
Principal—Investments	$ 7,880,672	$ 62,647
Reservation of Profits—Sale of Securities	895,527	.....
Unexpended Income	3,251	.....
Total Endowment Funds	$ 8,779,450	$ 62,647
PLANT FUNDS		
Invested in Plant	$ 5,938,817	$2,099,067
Federal Dormitory Bonds	.....	1,722,000
Due to Other Funds	.....	200,065
Notes Payable	80,000	1,461,000
Retirement of Indebtedness	.....	103,332
Unexpended	(21,535)	93,624
Total Plant Funds	$ 5,997,282	$5,679,088
ANNUITY FUNDS		
Annuity Funds	$	$ 214,305
Due from Other Funds	.....	193,064
Total Annuity Funds	$	$ 407,369
Total Funds	$15,137,315	$6,522,474

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE

Annapolis, Maryland Santa Fe, New Mexico

CONDENSED STATEMENT OF REVENUE AND EXPENDITURES

Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1970

	Annapolis	Santa Fe
REVENUE		
Educational and General		
Tuition	$ 686,393	$ 496,272
Endowment Income	444,747	3,099
Gifts and Grants	91,667	473,724
Scholarships	115,850	.....
Miscellaneous	10,443	6,355
Total	$ 1,349,100	$ 979,450
AUXILIARY ENTERPRISES		
Bookstore	$ 45,760	$ 27,061
Dining Hall	164,072	131,774
Dormitories	143,429	111,446
Total	$ 353,261	$ 270,281
OTHER NON-EDUCATIONAL INCOME	.....	$ 13,974
Organized Student Activity	.....	12,428
Total Revenue	$ 1,702,361	$1,276,133
EXPENDITURES		
Educational and General		
Administrative and General	$ 312,194	$ 292,585
Instruction	691,213	515,742
Student Activities	16,974	24,634
Operation and Maintenance	279,131	138,592
Total	$ 1,299,512	$ 971,553
Auxiliary Enterprises		
Bookstore	$ 49,578	$ 28,085
Dining Hall	150,520	98,947
Dormitories	.....	121,474
Total	$ 200,099	$ 248,506
Student Financial Aid	$ 192,294	$ 172,522
Other Expenditures	$ 24,143	$ 114,933
Appropriations		
National Defense Student Loan	.....	$ 1,302
Capital Outlay	.....	19,145
Total	.....	$ 20,447
Total Expenditures	$ 1,716,048	$1,527,961
Excess Revenue (Expenditures)	$ (13,687)	$ (251,828)

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE
Annapolis, Maryland
PERMANENT ENDOWMENT FUNDS
June 30, 1970

	Gift of Donor	*Old Dominion Foundation Matching Gift*	*Total Fund*
TUTORSHIP ENDOWMENTS			
Addison E. Mullikin, 1895	$1,989,953	$ 500,000	$2,489,953
Arthur deTalma Valk, 1906	150,215	150,000	300,215
	$2,140,168	$ 650,000	$2,790,168
SCHOLARSHIP ENDOWMENTS			
Annapolis Self-Help	$ 15,000	$ 15,000	$ 30,000
George M. Austin Memorial, 1908	25,000	25,000	50,000
Chicago Regional	3,070	3,070	6,140
Class of 1897	8,672	.....	8,672
Class of 1898	87,933	.....	87,933
Dr. Charles C. Cook	13,705	.....	13,705
Corporal George E. Cuniff, III, 1930	135	135	270
Faculty	23,124	2,359	25,483
John T. Harrison, 1907	25,025	20,025	45,050
Hillhouse High School, 1927	8,667	7,367	16,034
Richard H. Hodgson, 1906	150,250	150,250	300,500
Alfred Houston, 1906—Student Aid	42,787	2,500	45,287
Houston Regional	500	500	1,000
Jesse H. Jones and Mary Gibbs Jones	36,000	36,000	72,000
Robert Edward and Margaret Larsh Jones	28,333	.....	28,333
Arthur E. Landers and Hilda Combs Landers	2,000	.....	2,000
Massachusetts Regional	22,685	22,685	45,370
Philip A. Meyer II, 1938	19,362	9,000	28,362
Oklahoma Regional	26,000	26,000	52,000
Thomas Parran, 1911	6,165	.....	6,165
Pittsburgh Regional	560	560	1,120
Reader's Digest Foundation	12,500	.....	12,500
Clifton H. Roehle	7,055	.....	7,055
Murray Joel Rosenberg Memorial	2,726	.....	2,726
Hazel Norris and J. Graham Shannahan	3,070	.....	3,070
Clarence J. Stryker	3,643	3,413	7,056
Friedrich J. von Schwerdtner	1,552	.....	1,552
	$ 575,519	$ 323,864	$ 899,383
STUDENT LOAN FUND ENDOWMENTS			
George Friedland	$ 25,035	$ 20,000	$ 45,035
John David Pyle, 1962—Memorial	4,569	1,470	6,039
	$ 29,604	$ 21,470	$ 51,074
ALUMNI MEMORIAL ENDOWMENTS			
Granville Q. Adams, 1929	$ 1,100	$	$ 1,100
Charles Edwards Athey, 1931	5,825	.....	5,825
William C. Baxter, 1923	25	.....	25
Drew H. Beatty, 1903	300	200	500
Dr. William Brewer, 1823	125	125	250
Frederick W. Brune, 1874	854	507	1,361
Benjamin Duvall Chambers, 1905	2,638	.....	2,638
Henry M. Cooper, Jr., 1934	1,000	1,000	2,000
Walter I. Dawkins, 1880	58,683	.....	58,683
Robert F. Duer, Jr., 1921	3,265	335	3,600
In Honor of: Dr. Philip Edwards, 1898	1,135	985	2,120
Joseph W. Fastner, Jr., 1960	2,000	.....	2,000
Allen Lester Fowler, 1915	500	500	1,000
Edna Gable and Roscoe E. Grove, 1910	16,545	.....	16,545
Charles W. Hass, 1927	40	.....	40
Dr. Amos F. Hutchins, 1906	658	633	1,291
Clarence T. Johnson, 1909	100	.....	100

Clifford L. Johnson, 1911	100	.....	100
Helen Barnes Jones and Robert O. Jones, 1916	18,357	7,563	25,920
Jonathan D. Korshin, 1966 (Library)	200	.....	200
Oliver M. Korshin, 1963 (Library)	200	.....	200
Dr. W. Oscar LaMotte, 1902	5,140	.....	5,140
J. H. E. Legg, 1921	23,166	.....	23,166
William Lentz, 1912	1,020	1,020	2,040
Leola Burnette and Thomas Watkins Ligon, 1916	5,000	.....	5,000
Col. Harrison McAlpine, 1909	325	325	650
James McClintock, 1965	432	.....	432
Robert F. Maddox, 1876	550	.....	550
William L. Mayo, 1899	12,219	.....	12,219
Ridgley P. Melvin, 1899	100	100	200
William S. Morsell, 1922 (Athletic Fund)	5,000	5,000	10,000
John Mullan, 1847	10,000	10,000	20,000
Walter C. Mylander, Jr., 1932	4,933	.....	4,933
H. Keith Neville, 1905	1,000	1,000	2,000
Dr. John O. Neustadt, 1939	1,108	.....	1,108
Blanchard Randall, 1874	850	330	1,180
Susan Irene Roberts, 1966	402	.....	402
Leroy T. Rohrer, 1903	100	100	200
Harrison Sasscer, 1944	3,270	.....	3,270
C. H. Schoff, 1889	500	500	1,000
Henry F. Sturdy, 1906	28,633	.....	28,633
Rev. Enoch H. Thompson, 1895	3,000	3,000	6,000
John T. Tucker, 1914	2,500	.....	2,500
Dr. Robert S. G. Welch, 1913	125	125	250
Dr. Willis H. White, 1922	625	625	1,250
Amos W. W. Woodcock Fund, 1903	2,000	1,000	3,000
	$ 225,648	$ 34,973	$ 260,621
OTHER ENDOWMENTS			
Hertha S. and Jesse L. Adams Concert Fund	$ 60,000	$ 60,000	$ 120,000
Alumni Memorial Book Fund	355	.....	355
Philo Sherman Bennett Prize Fund	308	.....	308
Benwood Foundation Library Fund	25,000	25,000	50,000
George A. Bingley Memorial Fund	14,897	.....	14,897
Scott Buchanan Memorial Fund	5,770	.....	5,770
Helen Cropsey Davidson and George Davidson, Jr.	20,025	.....	20,025
Fund for Tomorrow Lectureship	3,000	3,000	6,000
Floyd Hayden Prize Fund	77	25	102
Mary Safford Hoogewerff Memorial Library Fund	31,683	.....	31,683
Library Fund	560	400	960
Monterey Mackey Memorial Fund	200	.....	200
Emily Boyce Mackubin	75,192	.....	75,192
Ellen C. Murphy Memorial Library Fund	1,500	1,500	3,000
Henry H. and Cora Dodson Sasscer Newspaper Fund	1,500	.....	1,500
Adolph W. Schmidt Fund	10,569	.....	10,569
Mrs. Blair T. Scott Memorial Prize Fund	518	.....	518
Kathryn Mylroie Stevens Memorial Prize Fund	1,250	.....	1,250
Elma R. and Charles D. Todd Memorial Library Fund	19,500	19,500	39,000
Clara B. Weigle Memorial Fund	1,196	.....	1,196
Daniel E. and Jessie N. Weigle Memorial	2,500	.....	2,500
Jack Wilen Foundation Library Fund in memory of Murray Joel Rosenberg	1,000	.....	1,000
Victor Zuckerkandl Memorial Fund	19,321	.....	19,321
Alumni Endowment	205,480	186,309	391,789
General Endowment	522,429	.....	522,429
	$1,023,830	$ 295,734	$1,319,564
PERMANENT ENDOWMENT FUNDS			
Old Dominion Foundation Grants Not Applied to Named Funds		$2,559,858	$2,559,858
Reservation of Profits, Sale of Securities	$ 895,527		$ 895,527
Total Endowment Principal	$4,890,296	$2,885,899	$8,776,195

There is a distinction between a "reason" for and a "cause" of an action . . .

some other expression to distinguish the relative freedoms of the three drinkers. Our word "free" has lost its use in ordinary language, that is, it has lost the meaning it had. If a philosopher like Kant claims to have a meaningful use of the word "free" in his theoretical system, then the burden of proof is on him. And one should always be suspicious of the meaning of words used in special or technical ways. It is not easy to give words a clear meaning.

In these last few remarks, I have shifted from the style of Aristotle to the style of the so-called "ordinary language" philosophy initiated by Wittgenstein. Yet I think the two are congenial, despite the recent charge from this platform that the ordinary language philosophers are misologists or haters of reason. I myself would say that they are haters only of abstract theories which generate what they regard as pseudo-problems. They are against the kind of system building in philosophy which prevailed from Descartes through Hegel, but they are for looking closely at the way people talk and the way people behave. I have argued that this is the style of Aristotle, and in fact many of the ordinary language philosophers see Aristotle as a man from whom they can learn.

I will pursue this digression a bit further. There is a well known distinction in contemporary philosophy which I think makes essentially the point I have found in Aristotle, namely a distinction between a "reason" for a certain action and a "cause" of an action. For example, we can ask why Socrates is heading for the market place, why he left the party early, and so on. We expect to be told the answer in terms of reasons why he did what he did. The search for causal explanations of human behavior arises only, and this is the important point, arises only where the explanation in terms of reasons breaks down. For example, if we know that Socrates loves parties and never chooses to leave a party early, we might conjecture that he was caused to leave by a sudden illness, by an irrepressible hatred for someone who just entered the room, or by some other such cause over which he had no control. Explanation in terms of causes is also appropriate for such things as facial twitches, pains, laughing and crying; in short, for behavior which is not chosen. A case of special interest is that of slips of the tongue, for which Freud provides his ingenious causal explanations in terms of an hypothesized unconscious mind.[6]

Now, to put my argument about human freedom into terms of the distinction between "reasons" and "causes": To think of all human actions as not free is to think of them all as if they were caused. It is to think of an action done for carefully considered and good reasons as being on the same level with a facial twitch or an outburst of crying. Why should all human actions be assimilated to such a single model? Why should one seek such theoretical simplicity at the cost of ignoring the variety and complexity of human behavior?

Let us return now to Carl Rogers. I began this discussion of freedom and determinism with an account of a symposium between Carl Rogers and B. F. Skinner. Both men felt that predictions and explanations of human behavior were hostile to human freedom. I argued that both accepted an essentially Kantian conception of freedom as absolute spontaneity in which the free human act has no antecedents in preceding space-time. Skinner looked forward to increasing predictability and control of human behavior. As for human freedom, he regarded it as an illusion. Rogers, on the other hand, wanted to assert the existence of free human choice as the most important aspect of being a person, but he could see no way to do this except as an absolute paradox. He wanted to assert that men are free and yet he saw that their behavior could be predicted and explained, and he saw no way to reconcile predictability and freedom.

In his later book, *On Becoming a Person*, Rogers describes what he sees as a partial solution to the problem of free will and determinism (p. 193). This partial solution comes from Rogers' conception of a "fully functioning person," one who is living his life well. When a fully functioning person chooses to act in a certain way, he takes account of everything in his present situation and in his past experience which is relevant to his action. He is to be contrasted with what Rogers calls the "defensively organized" person, who shuts out elements of his own past and of the situation around him. He cannot face certain aspects of himself or of his world. Thus he denies or distorts some of the data relevant to his actions. Now the significant point of this contrast for the problem of free will and determinism is as follows: one could say that the person who chooses by taking account of all relevant data is in a sense "determined" by those data, and yet Rogers claims, on the basis of his clinical work, that such a person "experiences the most complete and

[6] For an excellent discussion of the distinction between causes and reasons, see R. S. Peters, *The Concept of Motivation*, London, 1958, Chapter 1. Peters is both a psychologist and a philosopher influenced by the Wittgenstein school. See also his reference to Hobbes, p. 1, and to Aristotle, p. 157.

absolute freedom." The defensively organized person, on the other hand, who shuts out some of the relevant data and is therefore *not* determined by them, is "not free to make an effective choice." Thus Rogers concludes that where there is more determinism, there is, surprisingly, more freedom, and where there is less determinism, there is less freedom. Rogers himself does not follow out the implications of this discovery. In this very passage he still speaks of freedom as "spontaneity" (p. 193), and at the end of *On Becoming a Person*, where he returns again to discuss his earlier symposium with Skinner, he repeats in practically the same language as before that the problem of free will and determinism presents an absolute paradox (p. 400). Despite the force of his own experience and despite his efforts to break out, Rogers is still in the Kantian box. But what he is moving towards, I think, is a distinction among *kinds* of determinism. Asked whether free will is incompatible with determinism, one must first ask, "What kind of determinism?" Is it determinism by careful thought which takes account of all the factors in a situation? With Rogers, I want to say that such determinism also constitutes the freest human action of all. And yet, unlike Rogers, I do not feel a paradox here because I do not think of freedom as spontaneity, as implying complete lack of relation to previous events in space-time. Instead I think of free action simply as action which is intelligently chosen, and where the choice is not hampered by vicious habits.

I could stop here. I have given a solution to the problem of free will and dterminism which satisfies me and which I think would have satisfied Aristotle had he posed the problem for himself. That is, I have argued that the problem of free will and determinism is essentially a pseudo-problem, resting on an inadequate conception of freedom and a failure to distinguish among kinds of determinism. And yet what I have said is perhaps not adequate to satisfy Rogers or to satisfy most of you. I want therefore to extend Aristotle's analysis one step further. In the discussion of choice, Aristotle remarks in passing that children and animals are not capable of choice (1111b 8). In the discussion of weakness of will he remarks that animals are not capable of weakness of will. The reason he gives is that animals cannot grasp universals, but only particulars (1147b 5). The greatest of the Aristotelian commentators, Thomas Aquinas, develops these remarks into an argument for the freedom of the human will.

What does it mean to "grasp a universal"? It means to grasp some particular thing not merely in terms of its particular sensory qualities but as falling in some larger class where the essential attribute of the class must be understood by an act of mind. It cannot be perceived by the senses. I can perhaps make the point clear by example.[7] Consider a man who regularly takes his dog fishing with him. He arrives at his boat to find that he has forgotten the sponge which he always uses to bail out the boat. Since he does not wish to return to the house for the sponge, he makes motions of bailing out the boat while saying to the dog, "Sponge. Sponge. Go fetch the sponge." The dog goes back to the house and returns with the sponge. Is this a case of grasping a universal? No. The dog merely associates some particular thing, a sponge, with a particular act, bailing out the boat. But, if the dog had not been able to find the sponge, and had returned instead with a bucket, then he would have grasped a universal. The point is that he would have had to abstract from the particular, the sponge, to the universal class under which it belonged, namely, things useful for getting water out of a boat. Most men could easily make this abstraction. Few, if any, animals could.

Now, what are the implications for human freedom of the capacity to grasp universals? When a man is considering a possible action, he considers it not merely as a particular, as something he could do which is pleasant or painful. He sees it as a means to some end, as one particular way of achieving that end. Animals too are capable of selecting means to ends, but not in the same way. Since an animal, at least for the most part, grasps only particulars, he cannot compare the particulars with each other to decide which best serves the universal end. He cannot compare a sponge and a bucket and decide which is the best instrument for bailing out a boat. He can only associate in his memory the particular, sponge, or the particular, bucket, with the particular act of bailing out the boat. To compare them he would have to grasp the non-sensory universal under which both fall, something useful for bailing out the boat. Since he cannot do this, he cannot in any meaningful sense choose between bucket and sponge.

The end of bailing out the boat is itself a means to a further end, going fishing. This can in turn be a means to a still further end, obtaining food, or it can be an end in itself, something done for its own sake. Ultimately, acording to St. Thomas, the end for which we do things is the most universal category of all, namely, the good. In this life, he argues, man is never presented with anything which is completely and perfectly good in every way. The activity of fishing, for example, attractive as it is in some respects, takes time, costs money, involves the risk of getting wet, and so on. Presented with the possibility of fishing, we can always consider it under those aspects under which it is not good, under which it does not attract us. Therefore we are always capable of rejecting it. Our minds are capable of choosing something else which better approximates the universal good.[8]

[7] The example is actually drawn from William James, *Principles of Psychology*, New York, 1904, Vol. II, pp. 349-350.

[8] It is difficult to give a good single reference for St. Thomas' doctrine of free action. Cf. *Summa Theologica* I, Qq's 82-3; Ia IIae, Qq's 6-17; *De Veritate*, Q. 24.

This concludes my argument for the freedom of the will. Let me review what I have said by considering the various senses which have been given to the word "free."

The first sense of "freedom" is total and complete spontaneity, a complete lack of relation to anything prior in space-time. I showed the paradox to which this concept of freedom gives rise and traced its origin to Kant.

The second sense of "freedom" is lack of external constraint. This is the sense in which Hobbes defined "freedom," and it makes no distinction between the way in which men are free and animals are free, or even water flowing down a hill is free.

The third sense of "freedom" is that actions are "ours" or "in our power" in the sense that we can deliberate among alternatives and choose what we will do, and in the sense that our choices themselves are not limited by inadequate understanding or by vicious habits. "Freedom" in this sense is compatible with the fact that our actions and even our choices are completely predictable. This is the sense of freedom I found in Aristotle.

A fourth sense of freedom, suggested by St. Thomas' analysis, accepts the account of freedom as dependent on choice, a choice guided by reason and unobstructed by vice. But it shies away from accepting complete predictability as compatible with freedom. It holds out for the idea that given any possible course of action, a human being could always have chosen differently. Thus I characterize this fourth sense of "freedom" as requiring that a person "could have done otherwise." This is part of what is involved in the concept of spontaneity, and in fact it may even be the essential point that Kant and others want to maintain, that a man's behavior is not *completely* determined by his situation and his past life, that he *could* always have done otherwise than he does. If so, this fourth sense of freedom satisfies the demand for freedom as spontaneity, but does not go to the extreme of saying that a free human act has no relation to anything prior to it in space-time. Whether or not I ought to argue for an element of spontaneity in human behavior, I do not know. As I have said before, I am inclined to think that complete predictability is compatible with complete freedom and that there really is no conflict between them, *provided that* one distinguishes among kinds of predictability. Predicting that Socrates will refuse to cooperate in the arrest of an innocent man is a totally different thing from predicting which way a rat will run in a maze.

I wish to close with a few remarks about the practical consequences of this discussion of freedom. In a way the practical consequences are unimpressive. There is no theory which can tell us exactly what we ought to do in the extremely varied and complex circumstances of our lives. The ultimate particular action must be grasped by an act of perception; it cannot be deduced from any rules. And yet there are certain general principles which follow from a conception of freedom like the one I have sketched.

For one thing I have tried to remove a paradox which in my opinion gets in the way when one is trying to decide what to do. I mean the belief that predictability and freedom are incompatible with one another. This belief is, I think, at least partly responsible for the various phenomena of irrationality which I mentioned at the beginning of this lecture, for Tolstoy's statement that a life of reason is hostile to a truly meaningful life, for Miss Barnes' feeling that being able to jump off a cliff is an important and valuable aspect of human life, and so on. To remove the paradox is not to tell a person precisely how to act, but it does free him to use his reason in deciding what to do. It frees him from the feeling that the use of his reason restricts and limits his freedom, that his action must be absolutely spontaneous if it is to be free at all.

As a second practical consequence, consider the following. Suppose we are trying to influence someone else's actions. Do we use the techniques of modern advertising, which is content to move people with flashy pictures, with glamour, with subliminal devices of which they are not even aware? Or do we proceed with arguments, with persuasion, with reasons which respect the capacity of the person to understand the facts of a situation and to himself make an intelligent choice? The expert psychologist Skinner is content to blur this distinction. He is content with any kind of what he calls "reinforcers" of human action, as long as they get a person to behave in a certain way (See p. 124 of the debate cited in the first paragraph of this article). In fact even some of our political leaders seem to be content to motivate the citizens of a supposedly free country by techniques which have more and more of the stink of modern advertising and less and less of the clean air of rational discourse. But one who understands and values human freedom will not allow himself to use such techniques. How will he proceed? I have tried to say in general, but I cannot say in detail, and certainly not in a few words. I can say, however, that reflecting on Aristotle's *Ethics* or Shakespeare's plays or Tolstoy's novels will help. For the answer is at once as obvious and as difficult as bringing up one's children, as obvious and as difficult as education, as obvious and as difficult as achieving personal freedom for oneself.

Thomas J. Slakey is a graduate of St. Mary's College, California. He received an M.A. degree in philosophy from the Université Laval, Quebec, and a Ph.D. degree in philosophy from Cornell University. He became a Tutor at St. John's College in Annapolis in 1959 and moved to Santa Fe when the College opened there in 1964. He has lectured on the concept of "form" in Plato and Aristotle, and on St. Paul's *Epistle to the Romans*, and has published in *The Philosophical Review*.

Marion E. Warren

Richard Scofield

1898-1970

Richard Scofield, one of St. John's' greatest teachers, died Thursday, July 16th, at The Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore. For seven years he had been afflicted with cancer but had gallantly and cheerfully surmounted both pain and discomfort to continue his tutorial duties at the College.

His luminous intelligence, his learning, his gentleness, his humor, his love of excellence, and his sure knowledge of when to speak and when to be encouragingly silent—these have made him as nearly ideal a Tutor as the College is likely ever to have.

In all these years nothing has been more trusted by students and colleagues alike than his patience, his modesty, his calm perseverance, his precise and subtle understanding, and his unswerving rectitude; nothing has been more admired than his urbanity and elegance, and, above all, his capacity for warm friendship. In his company, other persons have felt themselves somehow at their best.

From The Habit of Literature

The College, December 1969

"...I have come increasingly to see that intellectual virtue in general, which is the goal of a liberal arts college, requires, as a condition for its existence, that sentimental and moral education without which we are barbarians, not fully human . . . poverty and vulgarity of feeling, more than stupidity, put humane letters beyond the mind's reach. . . .

"Love without knowledge is blind; there is no better way to avoid the excesses of ignorant and fanatical love than patient study of the causes and consequences of choices. But without love, power and knowledge are worthless and dangerous . . .

"It is not necessary to choose the life of action as against the life of thought, society as against contemplation. These are arbitrary and artificial alternatives. The life of good will embraces them all. And the measure of good will is what we do, not what we think or feel, though without thought and feeling, what we do had better for the most part be left undone. . . .

"Literature is not a substitute for action. It is an invitation, in the midst of action, to withdraw from it for a moment and to look at it, but as essence and as possibility rather than as existence. In these moments, as if out of time, there are no decisions that have to be made. 'The falcon hood of morality' need not be worn though the discourse itself were moral. Literature makes for serenity and for confidence, not for the passionlessness of philosophy, not for the peace of religion. It may point beyond itself to superhuman and to supernatural goods; it does not attain to them. Its consolation arises out of life and is for the benefit and use of life. It returns you to action, ready, restored. The habit of literature is the college's special and best gift to you. . . ."

NEWS ON THE CAMPUSES

Graduate Institute Awards 28 M.A. Degrees

The Graduate Institute in Liberal Education completed its fourth successful summer at St. John's in Santa Fe, August 14th, with the awarding of M.A. degrees to 28 candidates.

The commencement address was given by Dr. Benjamin Henley, acting superintendent of schools in Washington, D. C. Several of the graduates are teachers in his district.

Receiving degrees were students from the following areas:
Maryland — Baltimore, Grace P. Bennett, Walter Dudley, William Eldridge, Joseph Hines, and Daniel Mowrer. Washington, D. C.—Isaac Block, Marjorie Harper, Otto Jordan, Joyce Ann Matthews, Helen Scott, Governor Stokes, and Malcolm Tillett. New Mexico — Santa Fe, Rosalie Bindel, Sarah Connelly, Wendy Gray, LaVera Loyd, Correen Najjar, Sandra Purrington, and Edwin Reel; Albuquerque, Velma McConnell; Alameda, Simmie Gibson; Cuba, Jacob Martinez. Others—James H. Childers, Colby, Kansas; William Douglas, Williamsburg, Virginia; Muriel McCown, Pueblo, Colorado; Sara Macina, Midland, Texas; Fred Schwendimann, Richardson, Texas, and Andrew Treacy, Patchogue, New York.

The Graduate Institute was opened in 1967 to provide advanced training in the liberal arts for school teachers and other interested college graduates. There were twelve graduates last year at the first awarding of degrees.

There were a total of 123 students enrolled this past summer from eighteen states and the District of Columbia. Most of the Tutors come from the St. John's faculties in Annapolis and Santa Fe. James P. Shannon of Santa Fe was the director.

The four sections of the curriculum are "Literature," "Philosophy and Theology," "Politics and Society," and "Mathematics and Natural Science." One may receive a degree on completion of all four sections of the program, or on completion of three sections if one has nine graduate credits to transfer from another college or univerisity.

Each eight-week section includes a tutorial, a seminar and a preceptorial which includes the writing of a paper. Readings are generally from the St. John's seminar lists of great books. The school teachers who participate say they learn a great deal about teaching methods simply by participating in the discussions and by observing how the Tutors use the art of questioning and listening to develop a student's thinking and learning abilities. They testify the St. John's methods can be applied at all levels from first grade through high school. Discussing what they enjoy about the Graduate Institute, they say: "The program is valuable to adults in a period of transition in their vocational lives." "Most universities and colleges have numbers. Here you remain a person." "It is a fantastic experience to have the freedom to express your ideas, to participate." "You can relate to other people as you've never done before; it is almost impossible to withdraw from others in the community." "The program emphasizes the dignity of man, that he's more than a biological being" (From a medical student).

Tutors this year included Robert Bunker, Thomas Harris, David Jones, Harvey Mead, Michael Mechau, Michael Ossorgin, John Steadman, and Ralph Swentzell of Santa Fe; Joseph Cohen, Geoffrey Comber, George Doskow, Nicholas Maistrellis, Benjamin Milner, Thomas Simpson, and J. Winfree Smith of Annapolis; Lowell Edmunds, of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Mrs. Chaninah Maschler of Forest Hills, New York.

James P. Shannon, Benjamin J. Henley, and Richard D. Weigle (left to right) are shown in front of an Indian weaving in the Santa Fe student center following the Graduate Institute in Liberal Education commencement, which was addressed by Mr. Henley.

Playwright in Residence and Seven New Tutors Join Annapolis Faculty

This fall Alvin Aronson became the playwright in residence at St. John's College in Annapolis, and Steven B. Crockett, William D. DeHart, Robert Arthur Licht, Brian Patrick McGuire, Alfred Mollin, William W. O'Grady, Jr., and Jonathan B. Skinner became members of the faculty.

Mr. Aronson attended St. John's College from 1948 to 1950 and Columbia University from 1950 to 1951. He is the author of two off-Broadway plays, *Nighthawks* and *The Pocket Watch* (725 performances). He was an assistant to Alan Jay Lerner for three years, and actor and sound technician at Circle-in-the-Square for three productions.

Mr. Crockett received the A.B. degree in 1965 from Earlham College where he was also elected to Phi Beta Kappa. In 1967 he was awarded the A.M. degree from The University of Chicago where he was a Woodrow Wilson Fellow and a Ford Foundation Fellow. He is currently a doctoral candidate at the University. During 1969 he was an instructor in the humanities at the Central YMCA Community College in Chicago and an advisor to undergraduate students on the Committee on General Studies in the Humanities at the University.

Mr. DeHart graduated from Allegheny College with a B.S. degree in 1955 and was certified to teach by Clarion State College in 1959. The University of Rochester granted him a Ph.D. degree in 1965. After a year as a teaching fellow in the Department of Physiology at the University of Michigan Medical School, he joined the Department of Physiology at the University of Rochester Medical School as a graduate physiological trainee. From 1965 to 1966 he was Senior Neurophysiologist at Smith, Kline, & French in Philadelphia, and from 1966 to 1970 he was Assistant Professor in the Department of Physiology of the Medical College of Virginia. He is a member of the New York and Virginia Academies of Science, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the International Union of Physiological Sciences, and Sigma Xi.

Mr. Licht received a B.A. degree from St. John's College in 1965 and an M.A. degree in 1967 from the Pennsylvania State University where he is a doctoral candidate in philosophy. At the University he was a graduate assistant and a National Defense Education Act Fellow. He was a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Bucknell University from 1969 to 1970.

Mr. McGuire received his B.A. degree from the University of California at Berkeley in 1968 and is a doctoral candidate in history at Oxford University. From 1968 to 1970 he was a Fulbright Scholar in Balliol College at Oxford University. He is married to the former Ann Kirstin Pedersen of Copenhagen.

Mr. Mollin is a 1965 graduate of Western Illinois University. From 1966 to 1969 he was a National Defense Education Act Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania where he received an M.A. degree in 1967. He was a Richard M. Weaver Fellow from 1969 to 1970 at the University of Pennsylvania where he is a doctoral candidate in philosophy.

Mr. O'Grady graduated *summa cum laude* from the University of Notre Dame in 1966. He received the M.A. degree in 1966 and the Ph.D. degree in 1970 from the University of Chicago where he was a Woodrow Wilson Fellow, a Danforth Fellow, and a University of Chicago Humanities Fellow.

Following graduation from Carleton College in 1963 with a B.A. degree, *Mr. Skinner* received an M.A. degree from the University of Michigan in 1964. After two years as an instructor in mathematics at Hope College he was a teaching assistant, an instructor in mathematics, and a lecturer at the University of Massachusetts where he was a doctoral candidate. While at the University of Michigan he was a Woodrow Wilson Fellow. In addition he is a member of Pi Mu Epsilon and Phi Kappa Phi.

New Catalogue Policy

When the 1970-72 College catalogue is published this month, there will not be a general mailing to alumni.

There has always been some question about alumni needing or even wanting each issue as it appears. Each copy costs $.60. Then, too, the copies required for one alumni mailing would supply the needs of the Annapolis Admissions Office for an entire year. Hence, the expense of a general mailing to alumni does not seem to be warranted.

Alumni who are serving as Admissions Volunteers will each receive a copy of the catalogue. Other alumni can receive them by sending a request to the Publicity Office, St. John's College, Annapolis, Maryland 21404.

The new catalogue will again contain the site plans for the two campuses as well as new material on financial aid and admissions.

President Weigle Replies to Presidential Commission on Campus Unrest

President Richard D. Weigle of St. John's College has cited general student dissatisfaction with their education as a basic cause of campus unrest in America.

The computerized approach to education has led to discontent and disillusionment among students, President Weigle said in reply to a questionnaire from William W. Scranton, chairman of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest.

Students, Mr. Weigle said, were being short-changed in their education because of fragmentation of learning, neglect of undergraduate teaching, lack of "real dialogue," and failure of institutions to instill in their students "a sense of history." He credited the lack of violence at St. John's to its traditional liberal arts curriculum, emphasis on learning through discussion, and the personal involvement of each student in his education.

"The sheer force of numbers, particularly in the state-supported insti-

tutions, results in a computerized operation, which the individual student resents and finds dehumanizing," the President noted.

"Compartmentalization of knowledge through, and even within, departments has fragmented faculties and student bodies, so that true community of learning is difficult if not impossible to achieve," he added.

Santa Fe Receives Ford Foundation Grant

The Ford Foundation has approved a grant of $150,000 for St. John's College in Santa Fe to be used at the President's discretion. The grant of $50,000 annually for three years will be used in a variety of ways to strengthen the overall academic program.

President Weigle said that several projects were being considered. One possibility would be to create a top-level committee of St. John's Tutors to work with academic specialists in studying certain subject matter fields to discover whether they might be included in the St. John's curriculum.

The President cited the library and lecture programs as other areas in which portions of the grant might be used to improve the overall development of the College at Santa Fe. Funds also are needed to provide more frequent interchange of faculty members between the two campuses.

February Freshmen Attend Summer Classes in Annapolis

Twenty students who matriculated on the Annapolis campus in February concluded their freshman year during the summer.

They attended seminars led by Tutors Douglas Allanbrook, Bryce Jacobsen, William Pitt, John Sarkissian, Robert L. Spaeth, Robert Williamson, and Elliott Zuckerman.

The summer classes began on Monday, June 15th, and continued through Friday, August 21st.

The twenty freshmen began their sophomore year with the regular class in September.



J. Burchenal Ault

Vice President Appointed in Santa Fe

J. Burchenal Ault of Oyster Bay, New York, has been appointed Vice President of St. John's College in Santa Fe.

President Richard D. Weigle said the College's Board of Visitors and Governors approved the appointment which was effective September 1st.

Mr. Ault is responsible for administrative supervision of the Santa Fe campus except for academic matters and student welfare, which remain the province of the Dean.

He will represent St. John's in Santa Fe in the absence of the President and he will be responsible for the development, public relations, and fund-raising programs of the College.

Mr. Ault, who has a B.A. degree in English literature from Yale University, has had extensive business executive experience in New York. He was President of Burlington Industrial Fabrics Company for six years. From 1964 to 1969 he was Vice President, Treasurer, President, Director and Chairman of the Executive Committee of Radiation Research Corporation in Westbury, New York. He presently is a director of two businesses.

Mr. Ault has been active in educational and civic affairs in the East. He is a member of the Alumni Board at Yale University and Chairman of the Alumni Fund at Phillips Academy, Andover, Massachusetts. He is a Trustee of Hofstra University, St. Paul's College, Chatham Hall, and the Foundation for Education of the Episcopal Diocese of Long Island. He is President of the Pro Arte Symphony Orchestra Association of Hempstead, New York, and a Trustee of the Goldovsky Opera Institute.

He is a former Mayor, Trustee and Chairman of the Planning Board of the Village of Upper Brookville, Long Island. He served in the U. S. Marine Corps in Korea and held the rank of Captain when released from active duty.

The 44 year-old executive is married and has five children. His father, Bromwell Ault, is a former chairman of the St. John's Board of Visitors and Governors.

New Tutors at Santa Fe

Three Tutors and two interns joined the Santa Fe faculty this fall. A former Tutor, Henry N. Larom, rejoined the faculty after a two-year leave of absence.

The new Tutors are John S. Chamberlin, Frank K. Flinn, and Edward H. Porcella. The interns are Mrs. Toni Drew and Paul D. Mannick. Tutors Dean R. Haggard and Charles G. Bell are on leaves of absence.

Mr. Chamberlin received his B.A. degree in English from Haverford College in 1964, his M.A. degree in Medieval Studies from the University of Toronto in 1966, and his Ph.D. degree in Medieval Studies from Toronto in 1970. He has lectured on Old English, Chaucer, and Forms of English Literature, and has served as archivist at the Centre for Medieval Studies of the University of Toronto. He was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and received two Woodrow Wilson Fellowships.

Mr. Flinn received his A.B. degree from Quincy College, Illinois, in 1962, was graduated *magna cum laude* from Harvard Divinity School (B.D.) in 1966, studied at the University of

Heidelberg as a Fulbright Fellow in 1966-67, and did graduate study in Near Eastern Languages and Literatures at Harvard (1967-68) and the University of Pennsylvania (1968-69). He served as Assistant Professor at La Salle College Graduate School of Religion, Philadelphia, 1969-70; Instructor at Boston College, 1967-68; and Lecturer at Newton College of the Sacred Heart, 1965-66.

Mr. Porcella has a B.A. degree from St. Mary's College and an M.A. degree from the University of California at San Diego, where he was a doctoral candidate. He has been an Instructor in philosophy at the University of San Diego College for Men from 1969 to 1970, Teaching Assistant in humanities at the University of California, 1965-70, and Lecturer in literature and theology at St. Mary's, 1967-68.

Mr. Larom was an education director for the Peace Corps in Ethiopia and Elementary Language Arts Director for the State of New Mexico during his leave of absence. He taught at St. John's in 1967-68. He received his B.A. degree from the University of Montana and his master's degree from Idaho State University. He taught in the Nokuru Secondary School in Kenya, East Africa, in 1963-65 under sponsorship of Teachers College, Columbia University.

Mrs. Drew received her B.A. degree from St. John's in Santa Fe this year. *Mr. Mannick* completed his freshman and sophomore years at St. John's in Santa Fe. He received his B.A. degree in Comparative Literature and Philosophy from California State College at Long Beach this spring.

Neidorf Appointed Director of Graduate Institute in Liberal Education

The Board of Visitors and Governors has approved the appointment of Robert A. Neidorf to succeed James P. Shannon as Director of the summer Graduate Institute in Liberal Education. Mr. Shannon has resigned as Vice President of St. John's College in Santa Fe and Director of the Institute to enroll in the School of Law of the University of New Mexico.

Robert A. Neidorf

Mr. Neidorf has been a Tutor in both Annapolis and Santa Fe and in the Graduate Institute as well. He is a member of the Instruction Committee, and will continue to serve as a Tutor in the College.

Mr. Neidorf received his B.A. and M.A. degrees from the University of Chicago and his Ph.D. degree from Yale University. He served as Associate Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Binghamton and was an Instructor and Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Bucknell University.

Santa Fe Receives $5,000 From Foundation

St. John's College in Santa Fe has received a $5,000 grant from C.I.T. Foundation of New York.

To qualify for the grant, St. John's had to raise an equivalent sum through donations from local business organizations and funds. The check was presented to Santa Fe's treasurer, Kirk C. Tuttle, by Donald George, regional representative for C.I.T.'s Tuition Plan, Inc.

The Foundation's annual awards go to privately supported, four-year nonspecialized liberal arts colleges and universities that were accredited or had accreditation restored in the previous year by one of the six recognized regional U. S. accrediting associations.

St. John's in Santa Fe was accredited independently last year by the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools.

Campus Notes

Charles T. Elzey, Annapolis treasurer, was elected president of the Annapolis Fine Arts Festival Board for 1970-1971. He recently served as treasurer of the 1970 Fine Arts Festival. The College was one of the focal points of the June festivities with opening ceremonies in the Francis Scott Key Memorial Hall, poetry readings in McDowell Hall, art and sculpture exhibits in Iglehart, and an outdoor cafe.

James E. Grant, business manager in Annapolis, and three colleagues—Robert Welzenbach, Donald Stratton, and Fred King—recently won first prize in the international barbershop quartet competitions in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The Oriole Four quartet won the highest award on June 27th after twelve and a half years of dedicated work. The Society for the Preservation and Encouragement of Barbershop Quartet Singing in America (S.P.E.B.S.Q.S.A.) contest is sponsored annually by the International Society as a tribute to Owen C. Cash who founded the society in 1938.

John S. Kieffer is at home recovering from major surgery.

The Annapolis 1970 graduation address by The Reverend *J. Winfree Smith* has been published in the *Congressional Record* on June 30th and July 8th.

Edward G. Sparrow represented the College at the inauguration of Dr. Clarence C. Walton as the first lay president of The Catholic University of America in Washington, D. C., in November.

Marie Winterhaler, one of the first staff members of St. John's College in Santa Fe, resigned August 7th as acting assistant dean; she and Roger S. Peterson, a Tutor at the College, were married on August 23rd in Los Angeles, California.

ALUMNI ACTIVITIES

Alumni Delegates

During the academic year 1969-70, a number of alumni across the country were called upon to represent the College on ceremonial occasions at other institutions; we are grateful to the following for their help:

John S. Price '31, at the sesquicentennial celebration and inauguration of Thomas A. Bartlett as president of Colgate University, September 25th, 1969; *Kendon L. Stubbs* '60, at the 150th anniversary convocation at the University of Virginia, October 21st; *Alice G. Chalmers* '67, at the inauguration of Arthur G. Hansen as president of the Georgia Institute of Technology, November 29th; *Thomas Parran, Jr.* '42, at the 100th anniversary convocation and inauguration of Jacqueline Grennan Wexler as president of Hunter College, February 11th; *Charles L. Van Doren* '46, at the 100th anniversary convocation at Loyola University of Chicago, March 9th; *Robert A. Licht* '62, at the inauguration of Robert J. Nassen as president of Bloomsburg (Pa.) State College, April 18th; *Jonathan E. Brooks* '49, at the centennial convocation at the University of Akron, May 8th; *Paul R. Comegys* '41, at the inauguration of Frank N. Elliott as president of Rider College, May 16th; and *Fred Bielaski* '16, at the dedication of the new campus of the University of the Americas, Puebla, Mexico, July 16th.

Alumni Set New Giving Records

Although the final report on Alumni Annual Giving will be published in detailed form soon, our readers might enjoy a few highlights of the 1969-70 Campaign which ended on June 30th.

New records were set as 828 alumni responded to the appeals of Chairman Myron L. Wolbarsht '50 and his team of volunteer workers. Unrestricted gifts amounted to $26,139, or 4.5 per cent in excess of the announced goal.

There were 87 King William Associates during the year, up from 83 the previous year; 56 of these were enrolled for the second time. (Membership in the Associates is limited to alumni who make an unrestricted gift of at least $100.)

The total response was 29.2 per cent, comfortably passing the goal of 25 per cent, and up from 22.5 per cent last year. Thirty-six of the active classes exceeded the 29.2 per cent figure, while 50 classes went over the 25 per cent goal. And for the first time in many years, every class was represented by at least one donor.

Danforth Fellowships for Women

This year for the seventh time the Danforth Foundation has announced competition for its Graduate Fellowships for Women.

The objective of the program is to find and develop college and secondary school teachers among American women whose preparation for teaching has been postponed or interrupted. Recipients of the Graduate Fellowships are expected to undertake full-time teaching upon completion of their degrees.

Thirty-five new appointments are available annually, with the maximum award for 1971-72 set at $3,000 plus tuition and fees, or for heads of families, $4,000 plus tuition and fees. Appointments are for one year beginning September, 1971, and are renewable annually.

A brochure, Danforth Graduate Fellowships for Women, provides fuller information about this program. Write:

Graduate Fellowships for Women
Danforth Foundation
222 South Central Avenue
St. Louis, Missouri 63105

Homecoming October 16-17

Building on the success of last year's record-breaking attraction, this year's Homecoming Committee is planning another two-day event. Chairman Jack A. Nadol '57 has announced the general schedule of activities, and this appears on the back cover of this issue.

The highlight for many alumni will again be Alumni Seminars on Saturday morning. (The specific readings will be announced in a special mailing about mid-September.) Those who attended last year will note that there is no conflict with this year's seminars.

For those who are inclined toward golf, tennis, or sailing, Friday's schedule offers opportunities to enjoy the outdoors. For those whose interests are less athletic, the week-end offers a variety of other activities.

Again this year, certain classes will be holding reunions at Homecoming. Special emphasis is being placed on the "decade" classes, and on the 5th and 25th year classes. Plan now to join these and other classes in October.

CLASS NOTES

1924

Coleman M. Anderson, known to generations of students at Baltimore's Forest Park High School as "Andy", has retired after 46 years of service to scholastic athletics in Maryland. During his years at Forest Park, Mr. Anderson coached five sports, and among his young charges were many future St. Johnnies.

1931

On June 30, 1970, Lt. Gen. *Lewis J. Fields* retired after 39 years' service in the United States Marines. Gen. Fields received his professional education in various Marine Corps schools and at the Army's Field Artillery School at Ft. Sill, Okla. At the time of his retirement, Gen. Fields was Commanding General, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Va. Gen. and Mrs. Fields now make their home in Fairfax, Va.

1940

Robert H. Reynolds on August 7th received his master's degree in Social Studies from Shippenburg (Pa.) State College.

1947

A good note from *John Brunn* advises that he has just completed a year's sabbatical leave, studying mathematics at California State College at Hayward. He will again be teaching mathematics and physics at Chabot College in San Francisco. Mr. Brunn adds that in the spring he will work with an interdisciplinary program using great books; he will have the physics, mathematics, and astronomy portions of the program, and will lead one of the five discussion sections.

The August 3rd issue of *Time* contained a brief write-up about *Eugene V. Thaw*, as part of a story on private art dealers in New York City.

1950

The Rev. *David C. Streett II* in July became Administrative Director of the Augusta (Ga.) Planned Parenthood Association. He will also continue as vicar of All Saints' Church in Beach Island, S. C.

1955

Donald A. Phillips joined the National Council on Alcoholism, Inc., in June as Assistant Director of the Labor-Management Services Department. For seven years preceding this latest appointment, Mr. Phillips was Sales and Service Manager for Malco Plastics, Inc., in Baltimore. He and his family make their home in Fanwood, N. J.

1958

Christina (Sopher) Neumann in June received her M.A. degree in German from the University of California at Riverside, and has started work on her doctorate in the same field.

1961

Darrell L. Henry, President of the Alumni Association, former Zoning Hearings Officer for Anne Arundel County (Md.), and now in law practice in Annapolis, was a Democratic candidate for the Maryland Senate in the September, 1970, primary election.

1962

Susan (Cliver) Eames and Lt.Comdr. Lucian B. Purinton II were married last October 18th, and at present are stationed in Portugal.

1963

Paul C. Cochran, recently graduated from the General Theological Seminary in New York, is now vicar at the Church of the Holy Cross, San Antonio, Tex. He was ordained deacon on June 14th. Mr. Cochran and his wife, whom he met and married when he was in Greece, are parents of a year-old daughter, Anastasia.

S. David Krimins graduated in June from the Hahnemann Medical College in Philadelphia. Dr. and Mrs. Krimins and their year-old son, Ethan Marc, are now living in Richmond, Va., where Dr. Krimins is an intern at the Medical College of Virginia Hospital.

1964

Sara (Hobart) Horneyer, who so thoughtfully sent the information about Paul Cochran (see 1963), writes that her husband has been assigned to Altus Air Force Base, Okla., from San Antonio.

John F. White, a graduate assistant at the New School for Social Research in New York, delivered the Friday lecture for the February freshman class on August 14th. Mr. White's subject was "On *Mimesis* (Poetry and Politics)."

1965

Susan (Liebersohn) Ginsburg writes that husband *Jay* is now a partner in A. A. Ehrlich and Associates, a Washington, D. C., firm engaging in individual and business financial planning. The Ginsburgs are the parents of a year-old son David, and expect another addition at the end of the year.

1966

William N. McKeatchie last Trinity Sunday became a deacon in the Church of God in a ceremony in Toronto, Canada, Mr. McKeatchie will serve in the Cathedral Parish of St. James in Toronto until October, and will then become Assistant to the Chaplain and a D.Phil. candidate at St. John's College, Oxford.

Douglas C. Proctor and Miss Roberta Ruth West of Rockville, Md., were married July 18th in Silver Spring, Md.

1967

William F. Cone has been appointed Assistant Headmaster of the middle grades at the Key School. He has taught mathematics at the Annapolis school since graduation from St. John's.

Roger B. Glad and Miss Rowena E. McDonald of Port Hueneme, Cal., were married on June 20th. Mrs. Glad is a student at the University of California at Los Angeles, while Mr. Glad is employed in the Los Angeles area.

Clark E. Lobenstine, his wife Joy, and two Episcopal clergymen have begun a Christian commune in Baltimore. Their desire is to show that peace in this world must start at the neighborhood level, where people, with their basic differences, show that they can live together in harmony. Mr. Lobenstine, who is working at Spring Grove State Hospital as an alternative to military service, hopes to become a Presbyterian clergyman.

Hope Rosemary Zoss left the single ranks when she and Jon Wayne Schladen were married on May 31st at her parents' home in Minneapolis. Both Mr. and Mrs. Schladen have been reading specialists for Independent Education Services of Princeton, N. J. In addition, Mrs. Schladen has conducted a master course in reading development at the Chaplain's School, Newport, R. I.

1968

Bruce R. Baldwin (SF) received his M.A. degree in Urban Planning from the University of Michigan on May 2nd. So far as we are aware, Mr. Baldwin is the first Santa Fe graduate to receive an advanced degree. Information from the Santa Fe campus indicates that Mr. Baldwin was to have entered Peace Corps service on July 6th.

1968

Ann Blaine Garson is now a graduate student in pathology at the University of Pittsburgh.

The engagement of *Stephanie Prigge* and *George F. Kramer* SF '66 was announced in July. An August wedding was planned. Mr. Kramer is a law student at the University of New Mexico.

1969

Jonathan D. Sackson and *Penelope R. Rowe* '71 were married August 8th in Cincinnati, with *Andrew A. F. Garrison* '70 serving as best man. The Sacksons will live in Annapolis this year.

Hugo B. D. Hamilton (SF) and Miss Georgia Marodes Weyer were married on June 27th in Santa Fe. Mrs. Hamilton is a native of Santa Fe, and is Registrar of the Museum of New Mexico. The Hamiltons will make their home in Santa Fe.

In Memoriam

1910—P. Y. K. Howat, Washington, D. C., July 19, 1970.

1921—Beverly S. Roberts, Fredericksburg, Va., March 25, 1970.

1922—John H. Schwatka, Chestertown, Md., June 29, 1970.

1923—Albert Sydney Deringer, Chestertown, Md. July 17, 1970.

Thomas S. Phoebus, Richmond, June 24, 1970.

1929—The Rev. Charles M. Robinson, Jarrettsville, Md., July 14, 1970.

1943—Peter H. W. Jackson, Rutherford, N. C., July 8, 1970.

HOMECOMING ACTIVITIES

Friday, October 16th:

Morning:	**Golf Tournament**
Afternoon:	**Golf Tournament**
	Tennis Matches
	Sailing
Night:	**Lecture**
	Informal "Welcome Aboard"

Saturday, October 17th:

Morning:	**Registration**
	Alumni Seminars
Noon:	**Luncheon with students**
Afternoon:	**Annual Meeting**
	Graduate School Counseling
	Alumni - Student Soccer Game
	Movie
	Cocktail Party
Night:	**Annual Dinner**
	Alumni Parties

The College
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Annapolis, Maryland 21404

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