Please fill out and return in order that we may complete our records on former Rosenwald Fellows:

Name: Beck, Lewis W.

Present position: Asst. Prof. of Philosophy, University of Delaware.
(On leave to Library, Hercules Powder Co., Wilmington, Del.)

Address: 102 E. Main St., Newark, Del.

Significant recent activities: I will shortly publish a translation of some of Kant's works which I studied while in Berlin as Fellow. Unfortunately, the J. Social Philosophy, which had accepted the article I wrote as Fellow, has ceased publication, and therefore this work may not be published. At this late date it would require considerable revision. L.W.B. (Use additional sheet if desired)



1937

LEWIS WHITE BECK (24 years old)

FELLOW IN PHILOSOPHY, DUKE UNIVERSITY (Stipend of $600)

White Southerner | Special Field - Philosophy | Seeks Ph. D. at University of Berlin or University of North Carolina (1 year)

Digest of Application

Born in Griffin, Georgia, 1913. Single.

A. B. from Emory University 1934. A. M. 1935 from Duke. Held scholarship 1934-35 of $400; fellowship 1936-37 $600.

Assistant at Duke University $550.

M. A. thesis: "Moral Judgment According to Aristotle, Kant, and Butler." Ph. D. thesis: Synopsis, an epistemological study (near completion).

Seeks further training for professorship in philosophy.

Budget Summary

Total amount needed	$ 1400
From applicant	____
From fund	$ 1400
Granted	$ ____

Brilliant record - 3 of during graduate years at Duke

Morgan says, however, "I do not think him a man of genius & I sometimes wonder just how deep his thinking goes" Is one but a genius - at least a profound thinker - should attack the problem he proposes.

A
SDS

Lewis W. Beck

STATEMENT OF PLAN OF WORK

If elected to a Rosenwald fellowship, I propose to investigate the concept of race as a category in ethics, particularly as it appears in recent German social philosophy, and to seek to apply an evaluation and to find implications for American racial problems. This study would involve the determination of the influence which American racial laws have exerted on recent German thought (as shown in the works of, for example, H. Krieger). American social thought (such as that of John C. Calhoun) has undoubtedly affected German thought, and American studies of race in connection with immigration problems have undoubtedly been influential in Germany. It may very well be that the direction of influence might be changed by contemporary German racial theory.

In this study I should be interested in drawing distinctions and analogies between the ethical thought concerning racial rights in America and Germany. As German thought is now more articulate that the racial ethics in America, the writings of German philosophers should be studied and evaluated, and then inferences could be made concerning the ethical problem of race relations in this country, and especially in the South. At the present time I believe, an interesting contribution could be made which would have close reference to both the German and the American situation.

Thus far I have dealt with this problem only in an incidental way, but it has frequently come up in my other ethical studies. I have worked over some bibliographies and believe from my preliminary study that the research could be limited to one year.

Of this time, much of it would be spent in Germany, but perhaps about three months in America at some university in the South studying negro problems should be included in the year. Of the time spent in Germany, some of it should be given over to lectures in the University of Berlin by Prof. Hans F. K. Günther and any other professors dealing with racial questions; and just as important as that would be direct observation of present day German life and propoganda. In the United States, the University of North Carolina would perhaps be most suitable for my purposes.

A monograph or a series of articles, I believe, would result from this study. The articles would be suitable for such periodicals as The International Journal of Ethics.

After spending a year in Europe studying I hope to obtain a chair in some southern college or university . I have no more definite plans than that.

LETTERS OF REFERENCE

Lewis White Beck

Mr. Goodrich C. White, Dean, Emory University, Georgia

As an undergraduate, Beck impressed me as intellectually one of the most promising men we have turned out in years. He has a mind of unusual flexibility and keenness and an extraordinary capacity to deal with ideas as such, which one rarely encounters, and which, perhaps, is the distinguishing mark of a born philosopher.

His general oral examination on the field of his specialization, i.e., philosophy, in candidacy for his Bachelor's degree, was an extraordinary performance which greatly impressed every member of the examining committee. I think it was, without doubt, the most brilliant examination I have participated in. Without any question, Beck shows great promise as a scholar, and merits every encouragement. He will be definitely a leading prospect for the first vacancy that we may have in our Department of Philosophy; rather I should say, perhaps, for the first appointment to be made as soon as expansion in the department becomes possible.

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Those who have directed his graduate work at Duke University will be able to speak as to his technical qualifications for tackling the particular job he proposes. As to his general qualifications and his promise in the field of scholarship, I can speak without reservation, and I give him my hearty endorsement.

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Mr. G. A. Morgan, Jr., Associate Professor of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.

I have known Mr. Beck since the beginning of the present academic year. He has not been in any of my classes but I have seen him often in my home and have read the rough draft of his doctoral dissertation.

Mr. Beck's outstanding intellectual gifts include unusual dialectical acumen, encyclopedic range of reading and information, and a genuine catholicity of interest and appreciation of divergent points of view in philosophy. He is certainly the ablest of our present graduate students in philosophy, and I am told that he stands equally well among the psychologists. I do not think him a man of genius, and I sometimes wonder just how deep his thinking goes, because his unusual facility in discussing theories at times suggests glibness. But this is only a suspicion. He is certainly not superficial as most students go. Altogether, Mr. Beck's abilities mark him as a man of great promise. It may be ten years before we have another as good.

Mr. Beck is personally agreeable, well bred. I know of no drawbacks in appearance or character to hinder his future career. Above all, he is a man of tireless industry, a tremendous worker. He can be depended upon to finish a job and to do it thoroughly.

His plan of work seems to me a good one. I have no special competence in the field of racial theories, but his proposal is one of

general interest which should prove profitable both to him and to others. The ethics of racial relations is a paramount issue for the South. Mr. Beck would approach the question with much needed objectivity and contribute to our enlightenment.

In conclusion I would like to say that Mr. Beck seems to me to be just the sort of coming Southern scholar who deserves every aid we can give him. I heartily recommend him for a Rosenwald Fellowship.

- - -

Mr. L. E. Loemker, Professor of Philosophy, Emory University, Georgia.

My direct knowledge of Mr. Lewis Beck is based on his undergraduate work at Emory University, where he specialized in philosophy, served as student assistant during his senior year, and graduated with departmental honors. His work with me at that time led me to feel that he was preeminently fitted, in temperament and ability, for research and to encourage him to go on into graduate study.

As an undergraduate his background of information and general interest was unusual; in the Sophomore tests for general information and culture, for instance, he ranked highest. To this he added, as undergraduate, a remarkable knowledge of the field of his chosen specialization.

He is systematic and painstaking in his work, driven by genuine enthusiasm for it, and approaching specific problems with a pretty sound estimate of their general importance. His work as assistant was always done promptly and carefully. I expect him to do significant work in research - an expectation which I understand his graduate work at Duke University has in a degree already justified.

He was well liked by the students, had the gift of presenting ideas clearly and in simple language, and should make an excellent teacher. His personality is pleasing and incisive, his character so far as I know above reproach. I am not able to judge the merits of his proposed project, but am sure that he would do thorough and able work if it is selected.

Reference from A. M. Widgery attached

JULIUS ROSENWALD FUND

4901 ELLIS AVENUE

CHICAGO

Confidential Report on Candidate for Fellowship

Name of Candidate Lewis White Beck

Report Requested of Mr. A. G. Widgery

Duke University

The above named candidate has applied to this Fund for a fellowship and has given your name as a reference. A statement of the candidate's plan of work is attached. Please return it with your statement.

We shall appreciate a frank statement of your opinion of this applicant's abilities and personal characteristics, and an appraisal of his plan of work. An early reply to this inquiry will be of great assistance in allowing the Fellowship Committee sufficient time for an adequate review of the large number of candidates who apply for grants.

Your reply will be held in strictest confidence.

Raymond Paty
Director for Fellowships

REPORT

Mr. Lewis White Beck is a candidate for the Ph.D. degree in June. I have approved of the final draft of his dissertation which I have every reason to believe will be accepted by the examining committee.

Mr. Beck came here with a fine record of undergraduate work at Emory University. He has been appointed in successive years, Scholar, Assistant, and Fellow in Philosophy. That fact will indicate the high opinion which we have of him and of his abilities. He has an excellent knowledge of German and French, and much of his dissertation has involved the use of sources in these languages. I have known very few men of an equal range of knowledge or of comparable intellectual acuteness. He is a strenuous worker and very enthusiastic. He is quite competent to pursue to a good completion the program which he has presented. It is a choice of his own, and consequently one that he should be prepared to give his best efforts to achieving.

Personally Mr. Beck is a gentleman of the highest type, to associate with whom I have found very congenial.

OVER

Is the candidate free from personality handicaps which would make it difficult to obtain and hold a position giving him opportunity to utilize his abilities?

I do not know of any handicaps.

Signed Alban G. Widgery

Position or Title Head of the Department of Philosophy, Duke University

Address Durham, N.C.

Date March 15th 37

(Please return to Raymond Paty, Director for Fellowships, Julius Rosenwald Fund, 4901 Ellis Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Addressed, stamped envelope is enclosed.)

Duke University
DURHAM
NORTH CAROLINA

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Office of the Dean

February 15, 1937.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that Mr. Lewis White Beck was admitted to the Graduate School of Duke University in September, 1934, and received the degree of Master of Arts in June, 1935. Mr. Beck has passed both the language examinations and the preliminary examinations required for admission to candidacy for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Mr. Beck has taken the following work:

1934-1935
Philosophy 205, The Philosophy of History, 3 semester hours, grade E.
Philosophy 221, Spinoza, 3 semester hours, grade E.
Philosophy 209,210, The Philosophy of Religion, 6 semester hours, grade E.
Philosophy 301,302, Seminar in Philosophy, 4 semester hours, grade E.
Philosophy 216, Contemporary Philosophy, 3 semester hours, grade E.
Psychology 308, Seminar, 3 semester hours, grade E.
Psychology 235, Memory, 3 semester hours, grade G.
Philosophy thesis, 6 residence hours.

1935-1936
Philosophy 301,302, Seminar in Philosophy, 4 semester hours, grade E.
Philosophy 207, Political Philosophy, 3 semester hours, grade G.
Philosophy 213,214, History of Aesthetics, 6 semester hours, grade E.
Philosophy 227, Hegel, 3 semester hours, grade E.
Philosophy 226, History of Ethics, 3 semester hours, grade E.
Psychology 225, Contemporary Schools of Psychology, 3 semester hours, grade E.

Summer, 1936
Philosophy research, 6 residence hours.

1936-1937
Psychology 219, History of Psychology, 2 semester hours, grade G.
Psychology 217, Gestalt Theory, 3 semester hours, grade E.
Philosophy 301, Seminar in Philosophy, 2 semester hours, grade E.
Philosophy 302, Seminar in Philosophy, course in progress.
Psychology 228, Psychology of Belief, course in progress.
E, Excellent; G.Good; S,Satisfactory; F,Failed.

Very truly yours,

W.H. Glasson,
Dean.

Edna R. Fluegel

Edna R. Fluegel,
Graduate Recorder.

EMORY UNIVERSITY

EMORY UNIVERSITY, GA.

TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD

THIS CERTIFIES THAT:

Beck, Lewis W. — Last Name of Student

Griffin, Ga. — Home Address

Other Names

Entered THE COLLEGE OF EMORY UNIVERSITY 9-24-31 — Date Admitted

Twelve — No. Quarters Attended

A.B., 1934 — Degree Taken

ENTRANCE UNITS ONLY

(An admission unit represents the equivalent of five recitations per week for thirty-six weeks in an accredited secondary school.)

SUBJECTS	S	E	C	SUBJECTS	S	E	C	SUBJECTS	S	E	C
English	4			Civics				Biology	1		
Latin	1			Algebra	2			Chemistry	1		
French				Plane Geom.	1			Physics	1		
German				Solid Geom.	½						
Spanish	2			Trigonometry							
History	1			Gen. Science	1			Total			

S - By certificate from an accredited school. E - By examination.

Last High School Attended: Griffin, Ga.

Location:

Year of High School Graduation: 1931

Number of Years in High School:

RECORD OF COLLEGE WORK

A, B, C, D—Grades above a pass; E—Conditional; F—Failure.

Session	Dept. and Course No.	Descriptive Title of Course	Hours Lec.	Hours Lab.	Total Weeks	Credit	Grade Fall	Grade Winter	Grade Spring	Grade Summer	Majors Credit
1931-32	Ch 109-10	Organic Chemistry	3	4	24	A	A				2
	Eng 100	Rhetoric and Composition	5	-	12	A					1
	Ger 101-2-3	Elem. and Interned. German	5	-	36	C	B		B		3
	Hist 100	General European History	5	-	12		A				1
	Ch 11m	Organic Chemistry	3	-	12				A		½
	Ch 112m	Organic Preparations	-	6	12				C		½
	Math 100	Introductory Mathematics	5	-	12				B		1
	Biol 201-2	General Biology	5	8	12					A, A	2
	Ec 101	Introductory Economics	5	-	12					B	1
1932-33	Bib 101	The English Bible	5	-	12	A					1
	Ch 225m	Chemical Calculations	3	-	12	B					½
	Ch 226m	Quantitative Analysis	-	6	12	B					½
	Ch 270	Adv. Organic Chemistry	5	-	12	A					1
	Ger 104-5	Reading of Short Stories & Plays	5	-	24	B	B				2
	Eng 101	Intro. to Study of Literature	5	-	12		A				1
	Phil 212	Modern Philosophy	5	-	12		A				1
	Psy 101	Introductory Psychology	5	-	12		A				1
	Astr 201	Descriptive Astronomy	5	-	12				A		1
	Math 105m,106m	Plane Trig.; Anal. Geom.	5	-	12				B, B		1
	Phil 250	Metaphysics	5	-	12				A		1
	Eng 209	The English Language	5	-	12					B	1
	F. A. 221	Survey of History of Painting	5	-	6					B	½
	Phil 201m	Introduction to Philosophy	5	-	6					A	½
	Phil 220m	Ethics	5	-	6					A	½
	Psy 215	Abnormal Psychology	5	-	6					B	½
1933	Math 200	Advanced Analytic Geometry	5	-	12	B					1
	Phil 101	Principles of Valid Reasoning	5	-	12	A					1
	Phil 261	Esthetics	5	-		B					1
1934	Gr 213	Classical Civilization	5	-	12		A				1
	Math 201	Differential Calculus	5	-	12		B				1
	Phil 315	Philosophy of Value	5	-	12		A				1
	Eng 231	Byron, Shelly, Keats	5	-	12				B		1
	Phil 225	Philosophy Since 1860	5	-	12				A		1
	Phil 320	Studies in Cont. Problems	5	-	12				A		1
	Fr 101-2	Elementary French	10	-	12					A, A	2
	Phil 290	Supervised Reading Course								Sat.	1

Transcript completed August 24, 1934. OK

A major is a subject extending through one quarter with five class periods weekly. It is equivalent to a full semester hour.

Conduct record: Satisfactory

Date and cause of withdrawal: in attendance A.B. degree Aug. 23, 1934

Transcript issued: Feb. 26, 1936 to Duke

Honor Points [illegible] by granted.

Signature of Registrar

(A charge of $1.00 will be made for each additional copy of this transcript.)

SCHOLARSHIP

ACCOUNT White Southern Fellowships APPROPRIATION No. 56-31A

NAME OF STUDENT Lewis White Beck

ADDRESS

INSTITUTION ATTENDING

INSTITUTIONAL POSITION Fellow in Philosophy, Duke University

SPECIFIC FIELD Philosophy

STATEMENT OF OFFER

RP to L. W. Beck - 4/15/57:

"It is a pleasure to inform you that you have been selected by the Committee on Fellowships of the Julius Rosenwald Fund to receive a grant of $1500 to assist you in carrying forward your plans for study and foreign travel in the field of philosophy."

AMOUNT OF OFFER $1500 PAYMENT DATES

CHECKS PAYABLE TO

TIME PERIOD OF OFFER One year beginning in July, 1957.

APPROVED BY AUTHORIZED BY

PAYMENTS

DATE	EXPLANATION	AMOUNT	DATE	EXPLANATION	AMOUNT

April 15, 1937

Dear Mr. Beck: It is a pleasure to inform you that you have been selected by the Committee on Fellowships of the Julius Rosenwald Fund to receive a grant of $1500 to assist you in carrying forward your plans for study and foreign travel in the field of philosophy.

While our Committee has some suggestions regarding your plans, about which I shall write you later or shall discuss with you in person, the award is definite. Our suggestions, however, are in the nature of advice and you will be left free to carry forward your work in your own way. A plan covering the details of payments under this grant will be arranged to fit your particular needs.

Please let us know at once if you accept this grant. Official announcement of the Committee's selection for the year will be made soon and can include only those acceptances which have been received.

Very truly yours,

RAYMOND R. PATY

RP:MLU

Mr. Lewis White Beck
602 Buchanan Boulevard
Durham, North Carolina

File in Beck folder

Dr. Georg Kartzke
Deutsches Institut für Ausländer
Universität Berlin
Berlin, Germany

Tannenbaum re Brown
Kartzke re Beck

STATEMENT OF PLAN OF WORK

Lewis White Beck

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Of this time, much would be spent in Germany, but perhaps about three months in America at some university in the South studying Negro problems should be included in the year. Of the time spent in Germany, some of it should be given over to lectures in the University of Berlin by Prof. Hans F. K. Günther and any other professors dealing with racial questions; and just as important as that would be the direct observation of present-day German life and propaganda. In the United States, the University of North Carolina would perhaps be most suitable for my purposes.

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COPY OF TRANSCRIPT — GRADUATE SCHOOL — DUKE UNIVERSITY

February 15, 1937

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Psychology 308, Seminar, 3 semester hours, grade E.
Psychology 235, Memory, 3 semester hours, grade G.
Philosophy thesis, 6 residence hours.

1935-1936

Philosophy 301, 302, Seminar in Philosophy, 4 semester hours, grade E.
Philosophy 207, Political Philosophy, 3 semester hours, grade G.
Philosophy 213, 214, History of Aesthetics, 6 semester hours, grade E.
Philosophy 227, Hegel, 3 semester hours, grade E.
Philosophy 226, History of Ethics, 3 semester hours, grade E.
Psychology 225, Contemporary Schools of Psychology, 3 semester hours, grade E.

Summer, 1936

Philosophy research, 6 residence hours.

1936-1937

Psychology 219, History of Psychology, 2 semester hours, grade G.
Psychology 217, Gestalt Theory, 3 semester hours, grade E.
Philosophy 301, Seminar in Philosophy, 2 semester hours, grade E.
Philosophy 302, Seminar in Philosophy, ~~2~~ course in progress.
Psychology 228, Psychology of Belief, course in progress.

E, Excellent; G, Good; S, Satisfactory; F, Failed.

Very truly yours,
W.H. Glasson,
Dean.

(signed) Edna R. Fluegel,
Graduate Recorder.

SEAL

COPY --- TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD, EMORY UNIVERSITY

This certifies that Lewis W. Beck, Griffin Georgia, entered the College of Emory University, 9/24/'31; attended 12 quarters; A. B., 1934.

Entrance credits: (By certificate from accredited school):

English	4	Algebra	2	Biology	1
Latin	1	Plane Geo.	1	Chemistry	1
Spanish	2	Solid Geo.	½	Physics	1
History	1	General Science	1		

Last High School Attended: Griffin, Georgia. Date of Graduation, 1931.

RECORD OF COLLEGE WORK. A, B, C, D -- grades above a pass; E -- conditional; F -- failure.

1931-32. Chem. 100 109-10. Organic Chemistry. 3 hrs. lecture, 4 lab., 24 weeks, Fall quarter A, Winter quarter A; 2 majors.
English 100. Rhetoric and Composition. 5 hrs., 12 wks., Fall, A, 1 mj.
German 101, 02,03. Elem. and Interm. German. 5 hrs., 36 wks., Fall C, Winter B, Spring B; 3 majors.
History 100. General European. 5 hrs., 12 wks., Winter, A, 1 major.
Chem. 111m. Organic Chem. 3 hrs. lecture, 12 wks., Spring, A, ½ major.
Chem. 112m. Organic Preparations. 6 hrs. lab., 12 wks., Spring, C, ½ mj.
Math. 100. Intro. Mathematics. 5 hrs., 12 wks., Spring, B, 1 major.
Biol. 201-02. General Biology. 5hrs lecture, 8 hrs. lab., 12 weeks, Summer, A, A, 2 majors.
Ec. 101. Intro. Economics. 5 hrs., 12 wks., Summer, B, 1 major.

1932-33. Bib. 101. English Bible. 5 hrs., 12 wks., Fall, A, 1 major.
Ch. 225m. Chemical Calculations. 3 hrs. lecture, 12 wks., Fall, B, ½ major.
Ch. 226m. Quantitative Analysis. 6 hrs. lab., 12 weeks, Fall, B, ½ major.
Ch. 270. Advanced Org. Chem. 5 hrs. lecture, 12 weeks, Fall, A, 1 major.
Ger. 104-5. Short Stories & Plays. 5 hrs., 24 weeks, Fall, B, Winter B, 2 mj.
Eng. 101. Intro. to Study of Lit. 5 hrs. 12 wks, Winter, A, 1 major.
Phil. 212 Modern Philosophy. 5 hrs., 12 wks., Winter, A, 1 major.
Psy. 101. Intro. Psych. 5 hrs lecture, 12 wks, Winter, A, 1 major.
Astr. 201. Descriptive astronomy. 5 hrs, 12 wks., Spring, A, 1 major.
Math. 103m, 106m. Plane trig., Anal. Geometry. 5 hrs., 12 weeks, Spring, B, B. 1 major.
Phil. 250. Metaphysics. 5 hrs., 12 weeks, Spring, A, 1 major.
Eng. 209. The English Language. 5 hrs. 12 wks., Summer, B, 1 major.
Fine Arts 221. Survey of Hist. of Painting. 5 hrs., 6 wks., Summer, B, ½ maj.
Phil. 201m. Intro. to Philosophy. 5 hrs., 6 wks., Summer, A, ½ major.
Phil. 220m. Ethics. 5 hrs., 6 wks., Summer, A, ½ major.
Psy. 215. Abnormal Psychology. 5 hrs., 6 wks., Summer, B, ½ major.

1933. Math. 200. Advanced analytic Geometry. 5 hrs., 12 wks., Fall, B, 1 major.
Phil. 101. Principles of Valid Reasoning. 5 hrs., 12 wks., Fall, A, 1 major.
Phil. 261. Aesthetics. 5 hrs., 12 wks., Fall, B, 1 major.

1934. Greek 213. Classical Civilization. 5 hrs., 12 wks, Winter, A, 1 major.
Math. 201. Differential Calculus. 5 hrs., 12 wks., Winter, B, 1 major.
Phil. 318. Philos. of Value. 5 hrs., 12 wks., Winter, A, 1 major.
Eng. 231. Byron, Shelley, Keats. 5 hrs., 12 wks., Spring, B, 1 major.
Phil. 225. Phil. since 1860. 5 hrs., 12 wks., Spring, A, 1 major.
Phil. 320. Studies in contemporary problems. 5 hrs., 12 wks., Spring, A, 1 mj.
Fr. 101-2. Elementary French. 10 hrs., 12 wks., Summer, A, A, 2 majors.
Phil. 290. Supervised reading. Summer, Satisfactory. 1 major.

Transcript completed, August 24, 1934. O.K., J. G. S. (Signed)
Conduct record satisfactory. Date and cause of Withdrawal, A. B. degree, Aug. 23, 1934
Transcript issued (Feb. 26, 1934) to Duke. (With completion added.)
Honorable dismissal hereby granted. Signed: J. G. Stipe, registrar.

JULIUS ROSENWALD FUND

4901 ELLIS AVENUE

CHICAGO

Confidential Report on Candidate for Fellowship

Name of Candidate Lewis White Beck

Report Requested of Mr. G. A. Morgan, Jr.

Duke University

The above named candidate has applied to this Fund for a fellowship and has given your name as a reference. A statement of the candidate's plan of work is attached. Please return it with your statement.

We shall appreciate a frank statement of your opinion of this applicant's abilities and personal characteristics, and an appraisal of his plan of work. An early reply to this inquiry will be of great assistance in allowing the Fellowship Committee sufficient time for an adequate review of the large number of candidates who apply for grants.

Your reply will be held in strictest confidence.

Raymond Paty
Director for Fellowships

REPORT

I have known Mr. Beck since the beginning of the present academic year. He has not been in any of my classes but I have seen him often in my home and have read the rough draft of his doctoral dissertation.

Mr. Beck's outstanding intellectual gifts include unusual dialectical acumen, encyclopedic range of reading and information, and a genuine catholicity of interest and appreciation of divergent points of view in philosophy. He is certainly the ablest of our present graduate students in philosophy, and I am told that he stands equally well among the psychologists. I do not think him a man of genius, and I sometimes wonder just how deep his thinking goes, because his unusual facility in discussing theories at times suggests glibness. But this is only a suspicion. He is certainly not superficial as most students go. Altogether, Mr. Beck's abilities mark him as a man of great promise. It may be ten years before we have another as good.

Mr. Beck is personally agreeable, well bred. I know of no drawbacks in appearance or character to hinder his future career. Above all, he is a man of tireless industry, a tremendous worker.

OVER

He can be depended upon to finish a job and to do it thoroughly.

His plan of work seems to me a good one. I have no special competence in the field of racial theories, but his proposal is one of general interest which should prove profitable both to him and to others. The ethics of racial relations is a paramount issue for the South. Mr. Beck would approach the question with much needed objectivity and contribute to our enlightenment.

In conclusion I would like to say that Mr. Beck seems to me to be just the sort of coming Southern scholar who deserves every aid we can give him. I heartily recommend him for a Rosenwald Fellowship.

Is the candidate free from personality handicaps which would make it difficult to obtain and hold a position giving him opportunity to utilize his abilities?

Yes.

Signed George Morgan

Position or Title Associate Professor of Philosophy

Address Duke University

Durham, N.C.

Date March 2, 1937

(Please return to Raymond Paty, Director for Fellowships, Julius Rosenwald Fund, 4901 Ellis Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Addressed, stamped envelope is enclosed.)

8

JULIUS ROSENWALD FUND

4901 ELLIS AVENUE

CHICAGO

Confidential Report on Candidate for Fellowship

Name of Candidate Lewis White Beck

Report Requested of Mr. G. C. White

Emory University

The above named candidate has applied to this Fund for a fellowship and has given your name as a reference. A statement of the candidate's plan of work is attached. Please return it with your statement.

We shall appreciate a frank statement of your opinion of this applicant's abilities and personal characteristics, and an appraisal of his plan of work. An early reply to this inquiry will be of great assistance in allowing the Fellowship Committee sufficient time for an adequate review of the large number of candidates who apply for grants.

Your reply will be held in strictest confidence.

Raymond Pathy
Director for Fellowships

REPORT As an undergraduate, Beck impressed me as intellectually one of the most promising men we have turned out in years. He has a mind of unusual flexibility and keenness and an extraordinary capacity to deal with ideas as such, which one rarely encounters, and which, perhaps, is the distinguishing mark of a born philosopher.

His general oral examination on the field of his specialization, i.e., philosophy, in candidacy for his Bachelor's degree, was an extraordinary performance which greatly impressed every member of the examining committee. I think it was, without doubt, the most brilliant examination I have participated in. Without any question, Beck shows great promise as a scholar, and merits every encouragement. He will be definitely a leading prospect for the first vacancy that we may have in our Department of Philosophy; rather I should say, perhaps, for the first appointment to be made as soon as expansion in the department becomes possible.

His proposed plan of work appeals to me greatly so far as the general field in which it lies is concerned. His studies will probably need pointing up and specification as he goes forward; but it seems to me he is working in an area where systematic study is greatly needed. I hope that he will be able to approach the thing

OVER

from the standpoint of the psychological factors involved. There is great need for some systematic and thorough-going analysis of the genesis and development of racial attitudes.

Those who have directed his graduate work at Duke University will be able to speak as to his technical qualifications for tackling the particular job he proposes. As to his general qualifications and his promise in the field of scholarship, I can speak without reservation, and I give him my hearty endorsement.

Is the candidate free from personality handicaps which would make it difficult to obtain and hold a position giving him opportunity to utilize his abilities?

Yes

Signed Goodrich C. White

Position or Title Dean, Emory University

Address Emory University, Georgia

Date March 2, 1937

(Please return to Raymond Paty, Director for Fellowships, Julius Rosenwald Fund, 4901 Ellis Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Addressed, stamped envelope is enclosed.)

P

JULIUS ROSENWALD FUND

Copy

4901 ELLIS AVENUE

CHICAGO

Confidential Report on Candidate for Fellowship

Name of Candidate Lewis White Beck

Report Requested of Mr. L. E. Loemker

Emory University, Georgia

The above named candidate has applied to this Fund for a fellowship and has given your name as a reference. A statement of the candidate's plan of work is attached. Please return it with your statement.

We shall appreciate a frank statement of your opinion of this applicant's abilities and personal characteristics, and an appraisal of his plan of work. An early reply to this inquiry will be of great assistance in allowing the Fellowship Committee sufficient time for an adequate review of the large number of candidates who apply for grants.

Your reply will be held in strictest confidence.

Raymond Patty
Director for Fellowships

REPORT

all

March 4, 1937

My direct knowledge of Mr. Lewis Beck is based on his undergraduate work at Emory University, where he specialized in philosophy, served as student assistant during his senior year, and graduated with departmental honors. His work with me at that time led me to feel that he was preeminently fitted, in temperament and ability, for research and to encourage him to go on into graduate study.

As an undergraduate his background of information and general interest was unusual; in the Sophomore tests for general information and culture, for instance, he ranked highest. To this he added, as undergraduate, a remarkable knowledge of the field of his chosen specialization.

He is systematic and painstaking in his work, driven by genuine enthusiasm for it, and approaching specific problems with a pretty sound estimate of their general importance. His work as assistant was always done promptly and carefully. I expect him

OVER

to do significant work in research - an expectation which I understand his graduate work at Duke University has in a degree already justified.

He was well liked by the students, had the gift of presenting ideas clearly and in simple language, and should make an excellent teacher. His personality is pleasing and incisive, his character so far as I know above reproach. I am not able to judge the merits of his proposedproject, but am sure that he would do thorough and able work if it is selected.

Is the candidate free from personality handicaps which would make it difficult to obtain and hold a position giving him opportunity to utilize his abilities?

Yes.

Signed Leroy E. Loemker

Position or Title ~~Emo~~ Professor of Philosophy

Address Emory University, Georgia

Date March 4, 1937

(Please return to Raymond Paty, Director for Fellowships, Julius Rosenwald Fund, 4901 Ellis Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Addressed, stamped envelope is enclosed.)

LETTERS OF REFERENCE

Lewis White Beck

Mr. A. G. Widgery, Head of Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina

Mr. Lewis White Beck is a candidate for the Ph.D. degree in June. I have approved of the final draft of his dissertation which I have every reason to believe will be accepted by the examining committee.

Mr. Beck came here with a fine record of undergraduate work at Emory University. He has been appointed in successive years, Scholar, Assistant, and Fellow in Philosophy. That fact will indicate the high opinion which we have of him and of his abilities. He has an excellent knowledge of German and French, and much of his dissertation has involved the use of sources in these languages. I have known very few men of an equal range of knowledge or of comparable intellectual acuteness. He is a strenuous worker and very enthusiastic. He is quite competent to pursue to a good completion the program which he has presented. It is a choice of his own, and consequently one that he should be prepared to give his best efforts to achieving.

Personally Mr. Beck is a gentleman of the highest type, to associate with whom I have found very congenial.

Lewis W Beck
Lewis W. Beck

STATEMENT OF PLAN OF WORK

If elected to a Rosenwald fellowship, I propose to investigate the concept of race as a category in ethics, particularly as it appears in recent German social philosophy, and to seek to apply an evaluation and to find implications for American racial problems. This study would involve the determination of the influence which American racial laws have exerted on recent German thought (as shown in the works of H. Krieger, for example). American social thought (such as that of John C Calhoun) has undoubtedly affected German thought, and American studies of racein connection with immigration problems have undoubtedly been influential in Germany. It may very well be that the direction of indluence might be changed by contemporary German racial theory, and should thus be criticised.

In this study I should be interested in drawing distinctions and analogies between the ethical thought concerning racial rights in America and Germany. As German thought is now more articulate than the racial ethics in America, the writings of the German philosophers should be studied and evaluated, and then inferences could be made concerning the ethical problem of race relations in this country, expecially in the South. At the present time, I believe, an interesting contribution could be made which would have close reference to both the German and the American situation.

Thus far I have dealt with this problem only in an incidental way, but it has frequently come up in my other ethical studies. I have worked over some bibliographies and believe from my preliminary review that the research could be limited to one year.

Of this time, much would be spent in Germany, but perhaps anout three months in America at some university in the South studying negro problems should be included in the year. Of the time spent in Germany, some of it should be given over to lectures in the University of Berlin by Prof. Hans F. K. Günther and any other professors dealing with racial questions; and just as important as that would be the direct observation of present day German life and propoganda. In the United States, the University of North Carolina would perhaps be most suitable for my purposes.

A monograph or a series of articles, I believe, would result from this study. The articles would be suitable for such periodicals as The International Journal of Ethics.

After spending a year in Europe studying I hope to obtain a chair in some Southern college or university. I have no more definite plans than that.

602 Buchanan Blvd.
Durham, North Carolina
April 20, 1937

Mr. Raymond Paty, Director for Fellowships,
Julius Rosenwald Fund,
4901 Ellis Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois.

Dear Mr. Paty,

I am very appreciative of the honor of being selected a fellow of the Julius Rosenwald Fund, and I am delighted to accept the appointment. I shall be very glad to receive the advice and suggestions of the Committee and I am sure they will be a great help to me.

Yours sincerely,
Lewis White Beck.

602 Buchanan Blvd.
Durham, North Carolina
April 23, 1937

Mr. Raymond Paty,
Director of Fellowships, Rosenwald Fund,
Chicago, Illinois.

Dear Mr. Paty,

Since replying to your letter of April 15, in which you said that soon a public announcement of appointments would be made, it has occurred to me a public statement of my research project would be likely to interfere with the carrying out of my work. If also a list of research projects is to be published, I wonder if it would be possible to state merely that my purpose is to study German philosophy, or at most some relationships between American and German philosophical thought? To state publicly that my intention is to investigate the philosophical background of racial ethics might, I believe, have an undesirable effect on the prosecution of this research, perhaps excluding me from some lectures.

I am offering this only as a suggestion; and in asking you to consider this "reticence", I hope I am not asking an improper favor.

Yours sincerely,
Lewis White Beck

Beck, Lewis W

April 27, 1937

Dear Mr. Beck: Following the suggestion in your letter of April 25, in our public announcement we are simply stating that the award is given for the study of philosophy in Germany. It is understood, however, that the study will be directed along the lines suggested in your plan of work.

Mr. Henry Allen Moe of our Committee informed us that Dr. George Kartzke, of the Deutsches Institut fur Auslander, Universitat Berlin, is now in the United States. Mr. Moe felt that Dr. Kartzke could be of some assistance to you in offering suggestions about your study in Germany, and I suggest that you write Mr. Moe, asking him about the possibility of your getting in touch with Dr. Kartzke while he is here. Mr. Moe's address is the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation, 551 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

The members of the Committee also felt that it would be good for you to get in touch with Dr. Robert Park, formerly of the University of Chicago, and Dr. Charles S. Johnson, both of Fisk University, Nashville. These men are very much interested in the study you are proposing and could offer valuable suggestions.

If it would be convenient for you, we shall be glad to pay half of your grant before you leave for Germany, the balance in whatever instalments you suggest.

I am delighted that you are going to be able to continue your study and hope that I shall have an opportunity to talk with you some time during the summer.

Sincerely yours,

RP:MLU

Mr. Lewis W. Beck
602 Buchanan Boulevard
Durham, North Carolina

602 Buchanan Blvd.,
Durham, N. C.
May 10, 1937.

Mr. Raymond Paty, Director of Fellowships,
Julius Rosenwald Fund,
Chicago.

Dear Mr. Paty,

Thank you very much for making the public announcement of my appointment in the way you did. I have not gotten in touch with Dr. Hartzke, however, for the same reason; according to my friends who have been recently studying in Germany, it seems that the fewer who know of the nature of my investigations, the easier my stay in Germany will be. I should prefer to work on the problem rather quietly for a while in Germany, attending lectures and seminars, before coming in direct contact with scholars who are in places of authority and who might hinder my inquiry as much as help it. I met Dr. Hartzke when he was in Atlanta at Emory some years ago, and I look forward to meeting him again in Berlin.

I am very grateful for your suggestions that I get in touch with Dr, Park and Dr. Johnson, and I shall do so as soon as possible.

I hope that it will be possible for me to talk with you about my plans this summer. Since completing my work here at Duke I have been devoting much of my time to studies of the literature on the race problem, and I do not believe now that it is advisable for me to register anywhere for summer school, as I first suggested. I do not know how much freedom you meant to allow me in changing some

of the details of my plan, but in view of the unexpected fact that I am now able to devote much of my time to the problem here in the Duke library, I think it would be more profitable for me to go on to Europe rather earlier in the summer than I expected. In Paris in August there is a meeting of the International Congress of Philosophy, and there will be many German philosophers there to read papers, some of which bear very immediately on my own problem. For that reason, if it is allowable that my itinerary be fixed in such a fashion, I should like to go to France in July, and then go on to Germany in late summer before the universities open.

I hope also that your letter means that I am not definitely destined by Jena University. Due to a shifting around of various professors, which generally takes place in July, it seems to me to be better to wait until then to choose definitely what universities to attend. At present, the prospects for the university of Munich or the university of Leipzig seem defintely better than those in Jena.

These, though, are merely tentative suggestions or rather questionings, for I should like your advice concerning all of these matters. I shall be in Durham until about June 10, and if you approve of these plans, I should like to sale early in July. Your suggestion as to the payment of the stipend is very satisfactory to me.

Again, I hope that it will be possible for me to discuss these and other questions with you in more detail this summer. I am glad to inform you that two days after I received this Rosenwald Fellowship I passed my final examinations for the Doctorate in Philosophy.

Yours sincerely,

Louis White Beck.

602 Buchanan Blvd.
Durham, N. C.
June 4, 1937

ok RRP

Mr. Raymond Paty,
Director for fellowships,
Julius Rosenwald Fund,
Chicago.

	RRP	9	RP	9
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Dear Mr. Paty,

After our pleasant conference last Saturday I reserved passage on the Deutschland sailing July 15. As I shall wish to get a round-trip ticket, I should like to get slightly more than half of my stipend before sailing, in accordance with your advice when we were together. The ticket must be bought June 24, so I would consider it a favor if you could send me a check for eight hundred dollars before that date.

After June 7 my address will be 583 South Hill Street, Griffin, Georgia.

Yours sincerely,
(Lewis White) Beck

SCHOLARSHIP

June 9, 1937

Dear Lewis: Mr. Embree has had a letter from Miss Jessie Douglass, Secretary of the Student Bureau of the Institute for International Education, in which she says that the Institute would be glad to have any of the Rosenwald Fellows call at their office on their way abroad. I think the Institute might be able to make some valuable suggestions to you, and it would be a good contact for you to make if you can conveniently do so. The address is 2 West 45th Street, New York.

I have passed your letter of June 4 on to our Comptroller and a check will be sent you within a very short time.

Sincerely yours,

RP*MLU

RAYMOND R. PATY

Mr. Lewis White Beck
602 Buchanan Boulevard
Durham, North Carolina

FORM 122

Julius Rosenwald Fund

4901 Ellis Avenue
CHICAGO

SCHOLARSHIP

To Mr. Lewis White Beck
583 South Hill Street,
Griffin, Georgia

Payment Voucher No. 5283

Date June 10, 1937

First payment on fellowship granted 4/15/37 - - - - - - - - - - - $800.00

Ck.#17928

Accounts	Appropriation No.	Debit	Credit
White Southern Fellowships	56-51A	$800.00	

Prepared by	Checked by	Posted by	
AM			Comptroller

SCHOLARSHIP

June 11, 1937

Dear Mr. Beck: In accordance with the request in your recent letter to Mr. Paty, I am enclosing our check for $800 representing the first payment on your fellowship grant. The balance will be paid to you in two instalments sent on request in the form of a foreign draft drawn on a bank in the vicinity in which you are staying.

Very truly yours,

DOROTHY A. ELVIDGE

Mr. Lewis White Beck
583 South Hill Street
Griffin, Georgia

7-14

Apartment 28, 414 West 121 street,
New York, N. Y.

Comptroller, Julius Rosenwald Fund,
4901 Ellis Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

Dear Madam,

With reference to your letter of June 11, I wish to make final arrangements for the payment of the remainder of my stipend as a Rosenwald fellow. On account of the impossibility of buying cheap marks in Germany, and because of the undesirability of my corresponding with the Foundation during my stay in Germany (I have discussed this matter with Mr. Paty and have his approval), it seemed wise to handle my money through an American bank with German correspondents.

The J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation, 46 William Street, New York, will be my banking agent during the next year, and I have asked them to take charge of the next two checks from you, putting them, in cheap marks, to my credit in their corresponding banks in Germany. Therefore I wish to request you to send this bank a check for $350 on December 1, 1937, and a like amount on March 1, 1938; and I have conferred with this bank on the best means of transferring the money to me. Correspondence with this bank concerning my account should be directed to the attention of Mr. Faltin.

My address for the next few weeks will be
c/o Mmme Lionel Laming,
14 Rue Campagne lère,
Paris, 14-ème arrondissement,
and I should like to be advised if this arrangement is satisfactory to you.

Yours truly,

Lewis White Beck

Lewis White Beck

SCHOLARSHIP

583 South Hill Street
Griffin, Georgia
June 25, 1937

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Comptroller,
Julius Rosenwald Fund,
Chicago.

Dear Madam:

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of a check for eight hundred dollars, as first payment on my stipend as a Rosenwald Fellow.

Due to the difference in value of the German marks bought in the country and abroad, may I request that the other payments be made in the form of drafts in marks which can be bought in this country? The travellers marks, which I shall use, cost about half as much as the Reichsmark, but I do not think they can be bought in Germany, which would be necessary if your draft to me were in the form of dollars. Next week when I am in New York I shall consult some international banking firm about buying these cheap marks, and I hope then I can make my request to you more definite, naming the bank, etc.

Yours truly,

Lewis White Beck

Lewis White Beck

EXECUTIVE OFFICES
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
OF B'NAI B'RITH
130 N. WELLS ST. SUITE 1415
PHONE FRANKLIN 2221

CHICAGO,

July 6, 1937

Beck, Sewis White

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Mr. E. R. Embry
Rosenwald Foundation
4901 South Ellis Ave.
Chicago, Illinois

Dear Mr. Embry:

We were recently advised that the Julius Rosenwald Foundation had financed a fellowship for the study of philosophy in Germany and that this award had been made to a professor at Duke University in North Carolina. This award possessed peculiar interest for us in view of contemporary conditions in the academic life of the Reich.

Numerous statements have been made by outstanding American academicians deploring the low state to which university life in Germany has fallen. Comment has been frequent concerning the exile from Germany of so many of the leaders of thought in various fields. Much expression has likewise been given by men of unchallenged reputation concerning the subordination of all branches of learning to the political purposes of the Nazi Reich and the utilization of the universities for the advancement solely of the ideology of the Nazi leaders. In view of the very definite limitations which have been imposed in Germany, we were particularly interested in ascertaining why Germany, of all countries, had been selected for this work in philosophy. We would deeply appreciate any information that you might feel free to give us in connection with this matter.

Very sincerely yours,

Richard E. Gutstadt

Richard E. Gutstadt
Director

REG:EF

July 7, 1937

Dear Mr. Gutstadt: The fellowship awarded by the Julius Rosenwald Fund to Lewis White Beck, a research fellow at Duke University, is specifically for the study of race prejudice. While the prejudice which this Fund has tried to counteract in the South is chiefly between the white and colored races, it has seemed to us important to get knowledge of how race attitudes are developed in other parts of the world. This is the subject which this brilliant young Southerner is undertaking to explore.

We were anxious not to hamper his work in Germany. We therefore made a very general announcement as to the subject of his study. He has high standing in the field of philosophy, and it seemed to us that his work in Germany would go forward with less opposition if we announced his fellowship simply as in the realm of philosophy.

Very truly yours,

EDWIN R. EMBREE

ERE:McK

Mr. Richard E. Gutstadt
Anti-Defamation League
150 North Wells Street
Chicago, Illinois

Apartment 28
414 West 121 Street,
New York, N. Y.
July 10, 1937

Dear Mr, Paty,

I have just written to the Comptroller asking her to handle the remainder of my stipend through the J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation in New York, sending this bank checks for $350 on December 1 and March 1, 1938. This bank will take care of the exchanges.

I have spent several days at the University of North Carolina, and since arriving here I have called on Miss Douglas at the Institute of International Education, and Mr. Moe, at the Guggenheim Foundation. From both of them I received helpful advice. The professors at Fiske left school before answering my letters, but I expect to hear from them in the fall.

After the congress in Paris, I shall leave for Germany, probably staying in Munich until the semester opens in Berlin. It seems most likely that Berlin and either Bonn or Munich will be the universities where I shall study. If the coast seems clear, or rather if the frontier is open, I shall write you further when my work has progressed further; if not, I will write you as soon as I get out of Germany.

My address in Paris will be:
c/O Mmme Lionel Laming,
14 Rue Campagne lère,
Paris, 14 -ème arrondissement.

If it is necessary to write to me, I think I can get letters in Germany through either the American Express Co. or the bank.

Yours sincerely,
Louis W. Beck

July 14, 1937

Dear Mr. Beck: Your letter has arrived during Miss Elvidge's absence from the office. Regarding payment of your fellowship, I can see no reason why the arrangements suggested in your letter should not be satisfactory. Future checks will be made payble to the J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation, account of Lewis White Beck.

Very truly yours,

AM.

AM:RW

Mr. Lewis White Beck
414 West 121st Street, Apartment 28
New York City

FORM 122

Julius Rosenwald Fund

4901 Ellis Avenue
CHICAGO

FELLOWSHIPS

To
J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation

A/C - Lewis White Beck

J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation
46 William Street
New York City
Att: Mr. Faltin

Payment Voucher No. 5849

Date November 30, 1957

Second payment on fellowship granted 4/15/57 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $550.00

Ck.#18607

Accounts	Appropriation No.	Debit	Credit
White Southern Fellowships	36-51A	$550.00	

Prepared by	Checked by	Posted by	
AM			Comptroller

November 30, 1937

Dear Sir: Enclosed please find check in the amount of $350 to be deposited to the account of Mr. Lewis White Beck.

Very truly yours,

aw.

J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation
46 William Street
New York City

CO. 1

J. HENRY SCHRODER BANKING CORPORATION

CABLE ADDRESS: SCHROBANCO

46 William Street

New York

IN YOUR REPLY PLEASE REFER TO

Currencies

Julius Rosenwald Fund,

December 6, 1937

4901 Ellis Avenue,
Chicago, Ill. Att.: Miss Alice A. Merrill.

Re: Lewis White Beck $ 350.-.

Dear Sirs:

We acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 30, 1937, enclosing :

1 Check in the amount of $ 350.00

for a/c of Mr. Lewis White Beck.

Very truly yours,

J. HENRY SCHRODER BANKING CORPORATION

12. II. 38

Dear Miss Schroeder,

In accordance with your letter of July 14, 1937, I have advised the J. Henry Schroeder Banking Corporation in New York to expect three hundred fifty ($350) dollars on my account with them on March 1. With best thanks for your attention,

Yours truly,

Fannie White Beck

	DC		DC	2/23

Julius Rosenwald Fund

4901 Ellis Avenue
CHICAGO

FELLOWSHIPS

To

J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation

-A/C - Lewis White Beck

46 William Street

New York City

~~Att: Mr. Feltin~~

Payment Voucher No. 6345

Date February 23, 1938

Final payment on fellowship granted 4/13/37 - - - - - - - - - - - - -$550.00

Ck.#19177

Accounts	Appropriation No.	Debit	Credit
White Southern Fellowships	38-21A	$550.00	

Prepared by	Checked by	Posted by	
AM			Comptroller

Lewis Beck · FELLOWSHIPS

Hamburg-American Line

On Board Deutschland
July 4, 1938

Dear Mr. Paty: Now that I have left Germany I am able to make a kind of preliminary report of my year as Rosenwald Fellow.

While I was in Paris I met a number of German scholars, and on the basis of their advice and the impression those from Berlin made upon me, I decided to attend the University of Berlin. First I went to Munich, where I had an opportunity to improve my German and at the same time work in one of the most important German libraries. While in Munich I studied most of the important works of the national socialists, and in this way oriented myself in the new way of life.

On October 1, I went to Berlin where I remained, with the exception of Christmas, until the middle of March. In Berlin I worked in the Prussian State Library and attended the University. In Berlin I heard the following courses which were closely related to my research topic, which remained unknown except to a small number of colleagues:

Professor Thurnwald's "Race and Folk"
Professor Hartman's "Ethics"
Professor Spranger's "Philosophy of Culture"
Professor Baeumler's seminar on "The Concept of Wholeness"

Besides these I took part in two seminars on Kant and heard one series of lectures on logistics which, of course, bore no direct relation to

to my research problem, but were very valuable to me.

At the end of the semester, however, I could not see that the work at the University was of any great value to me, and I believed that it was more worth while to travel and at the same time keep up with my work. This was possible because I stayed long enough in each city to "settle down" as it were. In the time from March 12 to June 1, I visited Sschaffenburg, Oberfranken where good friends lived who were very hospitable to me, Munich, Gurmisch, Florence (where I remained two weeks), Vienna, and Budapest (where I remained a week). It was extremely interesting in Vienna, of course, to see the way national socialistic "ethics" is applied. I returned to Berlin June 1, where I again worked in the State Library. On June 23, I sailed for England, remaining in London a week. Now I expect to arrive in New York July 8 and go directly to Atlanta, where I shall be on the Emory faculty for a year.

It was my intention to write a report of my researches while still in Germany, but I soon discovered this to be impossible. Several books which I needed most for my work, though published in Germany since 1933, have been censored in Germany and cannot be gotten there in any way; consequently I felt it wiser to wait until I can see these in America. I have very complete and well organized notes, as well as a number of the most important German works on racial ethics, and I

expect on the basis of these to be able within a short time to write an article embodying my results. I expect to submit it to the International Journal of Ethics for publication. Any information I have which the Foundation needs, of course, I am ready at any time to give.

In conclusion, I wish to express my deepest appreciation to the Rosenwald Fund which made this year possible for me, and to you and the other officials who made the arrangements so frictionless. I feel very grateful for this year which, I am sure, has been very profitable as well as pleasant for me, and I hope the information I have gotten will be of interest to others and draw their attention to the very difficult problem I have devoted myself to.

With best greetings to Mrs. Paty and hopes that we shall see each other soon in Atlanta,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Lewis W. Beck

HAMBURG-AMERIKA LINIE

An Bord Deutschland
den July 4, 1938

Dear Mr. Paty,

Now that I have left Germany I am able to make a kind of preliminary report of my year as Rosenwald Fellow.

While I was in Paris I met a number of German scholars, and on the basis of their advice and the impression those from Berlin made upon me, I decided to attend the university of Berlin. First I went to Munich, where I had an opportunity to improve my German and at the same time work in one of the most important German libraries. While in Munich I studied most of the important works of the national socialists, and in this way oriented myself in the new way of life.

On October 1 I went to Berlin where I remained, with the exception of Christmas, until the middle of March. In Berlin I worked in the Prussian State

library and attended the University. In Berlin I heard the following courses which were closely related to my research topic, which remained unknown except to a small number of colleagues:

Professor Thurnwald's "Race and Folk."
Professor Hartmann's "Ethics."
Professor Spranger's "Philosophy of Culture."
Professor Baeumler's seminar on "The Concept of Wholeness."

Besides there I took part in two seminars on Kant and heard one series of lectures on logistics which, of course, bore no direct relation to my research problem, but were very valuable to me.

At the end of the semester, however, I could not see that the work at the University was of any great value to me, and I believed that it was more worthwhile to travel and at the same time keep up with my work. This was possible because I stayed long enough in each city to "settle down" as it were. In the time from March 12 to June 1 I visited Aschaffenburg, Oberfranken where good friends lived who were very hospitable to me, Munich, Garmisch, Florence (where I remained two weeks), Vienna, and Budapest (where I remained a week.) It was extremely interesting in Vienna, of

course, to see the way national socialistic "ethics" is applied. I returned to Berlin June 1 where I again worked in the State Library. On June 23 I sailed for England, remaining in London a week. Now I expect to arrive in New York July 8 and go directly to Atlanta, where I shall be on the Emory faculty for a year.

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With best greetings to Mrs. Patty and hopes that we shall see each other soon in Atlanta,

Yours sincerely,
Lewis W. Beck.

FELLOWSHIPS

July 15, 1938

My dear Beck: I have been much interested in reading your letter written on board the Deutschland which has come to me since Mr. Paty, to our deep regret, has left the Fund to become president of Birmingham-Southern College. I am sure you got a great deal from this exciting year. We look forward eagerly to reports on your studies and visits in Germany.

Very truly yours,
EDWIN R. EMBREE

ERE:JW

Mr. Lewis Beck
Emory University
Emory University, Georgia

FELLOWSHIPS

Emory University
Emory University, Ga.

Department of Philosophy

November 1. 1938

Mr. George M. Reynolds,
Director for Fellowships,
Julius Rosenwald Fund,
Chicago.

	GMR	11/4 Pon 480		

Dear Mr. Reynolds,

At present I am on the faculty of Emory University as instructor in philosophy. I accepted this position while I was in Europe as a Rosenwald Fellow, and began work in July. My appointment is temporary, and will last only until Professor L. E. Loemker returns from Europe next summer after being a Rosenwald Fellow.

I wrote a short account of my work and experiences in Europe to Mr. Paty just before I returned to the United States. At that time I had not written a formal report of my research. In the meantime I have done this and sent it to the International Journal of Ethics, which declined it on account of its length. If this article is not accepted by some other magazine I shall send it to you in manuscript form as a report of my work. I should like to wait until I know the fate of the article before making a report of my research, but I shall in any case write you the report you asked for within a short time.

Yours sincerely,
Lewis White Beck
Lewis White Beck.

November 4, 1938

Dear Mr. Beck: In Mr. Reynolds' absence from the office I am acknowledging your report. Thank you very much for sending it so promptly.

I have a question regarding your work for the doctorate. Was your degree conferred before you left for Europe? You wrote that you had passed the examinations but I have no notation the the degree having been conferred. As I should like the correct listing for the annual report I shall appreciate hearing from you as soon as possible.

Very truly yours,

MARGARET L. UTLEY
Secretary to Mr. Reynolds

Mr. Lewis W. Beck
Emory University
Atlanta, Georgia

Emory University
Emory University, Ga.

FELLOWSHIPS

Department of Philosophy

November 7, 1938

Miss Margaret Utley,
4901 Ellis Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois.

MLU

Dear Miss Utley,

I was granted the Ph.D. degree by Duke University on June 7, 1937, about a month before I sailed for Europe.

Yours truly,

Lewis W. Beck

Lewis W. Beck

Emory University
Emory University, Ga.

Department of Philosophy

February 25, 1939

Mr. George M. Reynolds,
Julius Rosenwald Fund,
Chicago.

Dear Mr. Reynolds,

When you wrote me in the fall for information about my year's tenure of a fellowship, the question of publication was so far from being decided that I could give you little definite information. Now it has been settled, and I should like to answer your questions in your letter of October 28.

As soon as I was appointed to the fellowship, I began work in the Duke University Library and in the Library at Chapel Hill, so that by the time I sailed I was well acquainted with most of the important literature in English. I went first to Paris, where I attended meetings of the International Congress of Philosophy. While in Paris I met a number of German refugees, and from some of the German professors in Paris I was able to make up my mind where to study in Germany. Towards the end of August I went to Munich, where I remained until October 1. In Munich I worked in the BayerischeStaatsbibliothek and improved my German sufficiently so that when I went to Berlin I was exempt from all language examinations.

In October I went to Berlin, where I remained until March. The semester at the University lasted from November to February; the remaining part of the time in Berlin I spent at the Preussische Staatsbibliothek. In the University I found a number of the workers in the racial field quite unapproachable, especially Professors Guenther and Clauss. I was able to take work under Professor Thurnwald, who is perhaps the most reputable anthropologist remaining in Germany. From him I heard lectures in comparative anthropology, the theory of races, and the concepts of culture. Also related very closely to my special research was a set of lectures on Philosophy of Kultur, by the distinguished Professor Spranger. I was also a member of Professor Baeumler's seminar privatissime on "The Category of the Whole". Although

Emory University
Emory University, Ga.

Department of Philosophy

this was primarily epistemological, Professor Baeumler is not a man who can separate politics from philosophy, and because he is thought of as a leading Nazi philosopher, I found this work very profitable. Besides this I took two seminars in Kant, a lecture course in logic, and a lecture course in ethics from the distinguished philosopher Hartmann.

At the end of the semester I discussed with my teachers the advisability of remaining another semester, and they were about equally divided as to whether I should profit more by attending the university or travelling. I decided to travel, and from March 12 to June 1 I travelled widely in South Germany, Italy, Austria, and Hungary. I each place I observed the conditions as well as I could and met newspaper men and scholars who were able to tell me much I could not see. Early in June I returned to Berlin, where for nearly a month I worked again in the Staatsbibliothek and made the first general outlines of a complete report. The last week in June I went to London for a holiday, and returned to New York on July 8.

It is quite out of the question for me to express to the Rosenwald Fund my gratitude for this year abroad. I do thank all of those concerned, but I feel this is very inadequate return for the outstanding opportunity I was given.

The Journal of Social Philosophy has accepted an article embodying the results of my research, and it will be published within a few months, I think. I wonder how many copies of this article, "German Racial Ethics", the Fund would desire? I ask this for the following reason: The off-prints of the article are going to be rather expensive -- about $16 a hundred, I think -- and if the Fund wants any number of copies for distribution I wonder if we can divide the cost between us. A small number of off-prints, such as the twenty-five or fifty which I should want, will cost practically as much as the whole hundred, but in the former case, of course, there would be very few copies to distribute. I am sorry that I do not feel financially able to buy the whole quantity.

With best thanks again for making all of this possible to me, I am

Sincerely yours,

Lewis White Beck

Lewis White Beck.

February 28, 1939

Dear Mr. Beck: Thank you for your very interesting letter of the 25th, which I am acknowledging in Mr. Reynolds' absence from the office.

We should like to have fifty copies of the reprint of your Journal of Social Philosophy article. I assume that they will cost somewhere in the neighborhood of $8.00, plus carriage charges, and if you will let us know the exact amount we shall be glad to send you a check.

I shall, of course, bring your letter to Mr. Reynolds' attention when he returns to the office, and he will write you. Mr. Embree was delighted with your report, and we all send greetings and best wishes.

Very truly yours,

Secretary to Mr. Reynolds

Mr. Lewis White Beck
Department of Philosophy
Emory University
Georgia

P.S. Are you planning to send Mr. Paty a copy, or shall we?

Mr Ecubace

Does the trade want any of Mr Beck's reprints of German Social Ethics

Geo - Ginn & Co think we might pay (from profits of sales) around $3 for 50 copies having Beck to pay a similar amount for the remainder of 100 reprints

T A E

JULIUS ROSENWALD FUND
4901 Ellis Avenue
Chicago

The enclosed material which you submitted with your application for a fellowship is being returned to you, since you may have some further use for it.

COMMITTEE ON FELLOWSHIPS

March 15, 1939

Dear Mr. Beck: I am delighted to have your letter of the 25th, and to know of the excellent results of your work abroad. I am looking forward with eagerness to reading your article, "German Racial Ethics."

Sincerely yours,

GMR:MLU

Mr. Lewis White Beck
Emory University
Georgia

FELLOWSHIPS

Julius Rosenwald Fund

Edwin R. Embree
President
Margaret S. Simon
Secretary
D. A. Elvidge
Comptroller

4901 Ellis Avenue
CHICAGO

NEGRO HEALTH
Director
M. O. Bousfield, M.D.
Consultants
Franklin C. McLean, M.D.
Clifford E. Waller, M.D., U.S.P.H.S.

MLO

September 25, 1940

Dear Mr. Beck: Our trustees have a continuing interest in the work and progress of those who have held Rosenwald Fund fellowships, and we are now in the process of preparing a report for the fall meeting. We will greatly appreciate your bringing us up to date on your career since you were awarded a fellowship, and to expedite your furnishing this information we have listed several questions at the bottom of the page. Will you please answer these and return this sheet to us at your earliest convenience?

If there has been no change in your status since you gave us information last fall, simply write "no change" at the bottom of the sheet and return it to us in the enclosed envelope.

Very truly yours,

Eugene Lyman

Director for Fellowships

Mr. Lewis White Beck
Department of Philosophy
Emory University, Georgia

Present position:

Address:

Have you received a promotion or a salary increase since your fellowship was awarded?

Publications, if any: Book reviews in Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research and in Philosophical Review. Also an article in Journal of Philosophy.

Special honors or activities:

General remarks: Professor Moses Aronson, editor of Journal of Social Philosophy, has written that my study on "German Racial Ethics" will be published during the coming editorial year. This is the result of research done under my fellowship.

NICOLAI HARTMANN'S CRITICISM OF KANT'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

By

LEWIS WHITE BECK

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Reprinted from Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, June, 1942

NICOLAI HARTMANN'S CRITICISM OF KANT'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE[1]

Early in life, Nicolai Hartmann was a representative of logicistic Neo-Kantianism, but as early as 1915 he began his apostasy from the tenets of Marburg. So strong was the Kantian influence and so strong has it remained, however, that opposing Kant was no easy task for Hartmann as it had been, unfortunately, for those realists who did not think Kant worth the trouble of attentive reading. Thus, instead of ignoring Kant and instead of attacking him outright and from the ground up, it was Hartmann's difficult task to say precisely where he thought Kant was in error. It would not be far wrong to say that every one of his books is, in a degree, an *Auseinandersetzung* with the Kantian philosophy. He has given an outline of a book on Kant "which must be written, and which I see as a task for our time, but which I myself shall not write."[2] And no one has been in a better position than Hartmann to give such directions, not only because of his unsurpassed learning in the letter of Kant's text and his old sympathy with the critical philosophy, but even more because he does not fall under the ban by which all metaphysicians have been "ceremoniously and officially suspended from their occupations"[3] until they can answer the question as to how synthetical judgments *a priori* are possible—for Hartmann, almost unique among modern realists, has attempted to meet this question.

That Hartmann has discovered many weak points in Kant's philosophy cannot be denied. That he has cogently argued for the inevitability of many of those difficulties which have been pointed out by others, by showing how they are rooted in Kantian fundamentals and are not due, as many have hoped, to mere carelessness of expression—neither can that be denied. But no exposition of these points is needed; it would be indeed presumptious for another writer to undertake to defend Hartmann or even to give another exposition of his views when Hartmann himself is so convincing in his own argument and so well able to deal with all who disagree with him. And if the writer mentions Hartmann's specific arguments only to disagree with them, that is no sign of lack of sympathy with or respect for those positions which are not mentioned.

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1. It was the author's privilege, as Julius Rosenwald Fellow, to be a member of of Professor Hartmann's seminar on the *Critique of Pure Reason* at the University of Berlin, 1937-38.

2. "Diesseits von Idealismus and Realismus." *Kantstudien*, vol. XXIX, p. 161. Hereafter referred to as "Diesseits."

3. *Prolegomena*, Sect. 5.

I. THE PROBLEM OF STANDPOINTS

The subtitle of Hartmann's Kantgesellschaft lecture of 1922, "Diesseits von Idealismus und Realismus," reads, "A Contribution to the Differentiation of the Historical and Transhistorical in the Kantian Philosophy." This indicates accurately the form of Hartmann's treatment; it is not critical in the sense that it marks a complete renunciation of Kantianism, but rather in that Hartmann is interested in distilling out of Kantianism that which is of lasting value and thus free from the limitations of Kant's standpoint in history. The "historical" and the "transhistorical" in this study refer to the same elements in the works of a philosopher which Hartmann has distinguished respectively as the "systematic" and the "aporetic" moments in philosophical construction. "Whatever in philosophy in transhistorical," he says,[4] "must necessarily be above all standpoints." "Arbitrary presuppositions," such as idealism and dogmatic realism, are always *standpunktlich*.[5] The standpoint, as such, always determines a *system*, because its acceptance by a philosopher means that all problems will be dealt with from a previously assumed perspective, which will sometimes involve distortion or force the philosopher to do violence to a particular problem so that its solution can be brought into a harmonious whole whose structure has been decided upon in advance. Thus when Hartmann distinguishes between the historical and the transhistorical in Kant, he means to distinguish between the systematic and the aporetic, or between the constructional and the "phenomenological" (in his very broad usage of this latter term). With reference to Kant himself, that means that he will search out those parts of his philosophy which are determined by Kant's "arbitrary assumption" of transcendental idealism, reject them because they are "historical" and systematic, leaving the rest of the philosophy as a result of the pre-suppositionless aporetic or phenomenological method which bases itself solely on the temporary "standpoint" which the specific and single problem and the present phenomena afford. This resulting philosophy will be a fund of phenomena which have no specific reference in themselves to their function in Kant's actual systematization.[6]

But there are several questionable points in this ideal. First, a

4. "Diesseits," p. 162.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

6. Here is a noteworthy resemblance between the evaluations by Hartmann and by Ledger Wood ("The Dialectical Method," in *The Heritage of Kant*). Whether Hartmann specifically has influenced Wood I do not know; but it is a fact that many of Hartmann's opinions may be illustrated equally well by quotations from his own works or from Wood's essay.

formal question may be asked. Can the aporetic method proceed without presuppositions? To be sure, there is a difference in method which is important; Hegel and Kant are sufficient proofs of this in themselves. But is the ideal of presuppositionlessness attainable, and even we may ask, is it meaningful? As to its attainability, perhaps only a history of the further refinements of phenomenology can decide. No one can claim, I think, that it has been attained, and Hartmann does not assert categorically that it has. One has to read only the first sentence of Hartmann's *Metaphysik der Erkenntnis* to see his presuppositions: "The following investigations proceed from the conception (*Auffassung*) that. . . ." It is well to have such suppositions on page 1, but that does not make them any less of a presupposition. In Hartmann's case, this "presupposition" is that knowledge is a knowledge of something independent, and further on he argues that his "standpoint" is not necessarily realism simply because it makes this supposition. The belief is not a "schlechtweg hingenommenes Vorurteil" but only a "vorgefundener Ausgangspunkt" which will be held only as long as it is adequate to the problem.[7] The expressed readiness to give up the conception does not render it less of a presupposition, but it is only a confession of such a philosophical seriousness as a systematist like Hegel might make.

In a word, it is difficult or impossible to see how, without a standpoint of some kind, any question could arise from a conflict of phenomena, how an *Aporie* could be acknowledged, or how any situation could be recognized as problematical. For why should the world "make sense"? Without presuppositions that it does, it is the most obvious thing that, *prima facie*, it does not. Only the general presupposition that a philosophy is possible, that the wonder and curiosity of the lover of wisdom can in some way be at least partially satisfied, makes it possible for us to leave even for a moment the rhapsodic phenomena and to hunt for their "meaning."

And to go a little further, there is a more specific and peculiar presupposition. (I call it "peculiar" because it is less generally held than the first, which is the *a priori* beginning of all philosophizing.) It is that a systematic approach to philosophy must do violence to some of the problems it touches. Granted that there may be no such thing as a consistent and true system of philosophy, it does not follow that we should reject systematicity altogether, nor that we should, as Hartmann says we should, relegate systematic thinking to the end of the endless task: the antidote for bad systems is better systems, Hartmann is proud

7. *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, second edition, 1925, p. 193. Hereafter referred to as *Metaphysik*.

of his aporetic method because it does not look "longingly for results."[8] But this wise caution against enthusiastic haste in metaphysical speculation which would lead to some preconceived and uncriticized goal amounts to an actual fear of solution of problems in Hartmann's own thinking. To take some examples: Hartmann holds that all of Kant's antinomies are unresolvable because they involve a relation of phenomena to noumena, and this relation is "irrational." "All attempts to solve the antinomies are merely perspectival (*standpunktlich*) and artificial."[9] And when idealism has an answer to the question of the relation of the subject to the object in *a priori* knowledge, Hartmann fears it because of its lack of mystery, its ease. "Idealism weakens the meaning of the thesis [that principles of the object are identical with those of the subject] since it takes the object into the subject, even though only into the transcendental. The identity of categories is then almost self-evident. But if one lets the object stand as real beyond the subject, even the transcendental, the whole burden of the difficulty falls to [the principle of] the identity of categories to bind the subject and object together as they are in *a priori* knowledge. That the identity of categories can do this constitutes its strength."[10] To object to a philosophical principle because it is "almost self-evident" is almost unique in the history of philosophy. *Prima facie* it would appear that Hartmann avoids the "almost self-evident" principle in order to show the strength of another interpretation, but this strength consists in overcoming difficulties avoided by Kant's own expression.[11] Again, Hartmann's fear of solution leads him to say, "Ontology makes the attempt to assume the absolute minimum of hypothesis for the consideration of the philosophic problem. The criterion of its legitimacy lies in the question, how well does it succeed in taking up the irrational loose ends of problems into its insight and putting them in the place in the connection of the entire system, into which, in spite of their irresolvability it does introduce them? A closed rational system can never satisfy this demand. But an open system, which closes itself only beyond the limits of knowability, has within itself room for this

8. "Diesseits," p. 164.

9. *Metaphysik*, p. 233.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 187. Here the concept of "identity of categories" is introduced only as a part of a typical example of Hartmann's argumentation. It will be discussed in its own right in section iv, below.

11. That Kant avoids them will be shown later. Hartmann refers later to the objectivity of the *Metaphysik* as having been an *ultima ratio* to be defended in other ways. But the defense, as we shall see, is only of "gnoseological being," of the object as different from the subject in knowledge, and not of "ontological being," i.e. of real being without any dependence on the knowledge situation itself.

possibility."[12] Examples could be multiplied indefinitely to show Hartmann's fear that *solution* means *rationalization*.[13]

A more material objection can be made to Hartmann's own interpretation of what the Kantian "system" is. It is not too much, I think, to say that many of the views and emphases Hartmann attributes to Kant are largely Hartmann's own presuppositions which he is now for the first time rejecting. That is to say, the "Kantian system" Hartmann rejects is a Neo-Kantian system. Hartmann is, no doubt, quite correct in saying that there is in Kant a "decisive preponderance" of the aporetic over the systematic tendency.[14] After this is admitted, what is it that remains to be attacked? It is Kant's "systematic moment" of idealism, which is merely a historically conditioned vestige of rationalism. But it is significant that this is the moment which is decisively preponderant in Marburg Neo-Kantianism. When Hartmann denies the "systematic consistency" of the Kantian philosophy for the admitted presence of the thing itself, ought not his criticism perhaps be directed more at his own teachers than at Kant himself? For have we any reason to believe that critical idealism is the proper name for Kant's ultimate philosophy? Marburg Neo-Kantianism could not, to be sure, admit the thing in itself without falling victim to Hartmann's attack, but that is because it was professedly an ultimate idealism. Hartmann sees in the thing in itself the "preeminently critical concept" in Kant[15]—but Kant had no very different opinion of it. Kant had a transcendental idealism, but it did not extend to the "noumenon in the negative understanding"; nevertheless, the latter is still there. Does that then mean,

12. *Metaphysik*, p. 306. "Ontology," in this sense, is largely a project, not a product. It is the "neutral" treatment of subject and object, and conceivably of *mere* appearance, as forms of being. As such a project, "It follows, as a matter of principle, only the problem, and allows only that to stand in the picture of the world which is demanded by the problem. It moves as little as possible away from the natural standpoint, and it preserves its point of view as far as it is valid. . . . Its results must bear the stamp of some standpoint: its methods can remain this side of all standpoints and pre-decisions." (*Ibid.*, pp. 179, 180.) Thus we may say that ontology, as understood in the passage quoted, is the "aporetic standpoint" itself, if such a term is permitted. Though the text is not always unambiguous in this point, it seems necessary to separate ontology in this sense from Hartmann's own substantive ontology, which is the system or science of the principles of being and which is largely realistic.

13. It is well to point out here the meanings of *rationalization* which may be confused in this attitude of Hartmann's: it may mean *systematization* (which is acceptable at the end, if it is possible); a *renunciation of the irrational* in its various senses (whose recognition *as such* constitutes the metaphysical problem of knowledge as Hartmann sees it, as he, by implication, describes his work as "eine Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis als Wesensanalyse des Metaphysischen im Erkenntnisphänomen"—*Metaphysik*, p. 36); or a *false systematization*, a "standpunctual" act of violence in an almost psychoanalytical sense. But that all systematic procedures are bad rationalizations in the last sense seems to be assumed by Hartmann without any grounds.

14. "Diesseits," p. 165.

15. *Metaphysik*, p. 220.

as Hartmann seems to believe, that Kant was not systematic, but aporetic? *If* Kant's ultimate systematic attempt was in the direction of idealism, we should have to agree with Hartmann that in this concept the problem triumphed over the system. But we have no right to say that Kant' ultimate system *was* transcendental or critical idealism. To be sure his "refutation of idealism" does not affect his transcendental idealism, but the immediately following chapters on the distinction between noumena and phenomena would hardly have been written by a metaphysical idealist. Hartmann himself recognizes the possibility of a "systematic realism" in Kant.[16]

Nevertheless, this is precisely the form of criticism which a member of the Marburg school would be expected to make if he ever rejected "Kantianism." We should be very sure what it is which suffers from the attack. The critical philosophy as a whole does not; those parts of it which may be described as idealistic *may*—though this is a matter we shall have to discuss in greater detail later; but only a Kantianism which stops at the beginning of the dialectic, or a Neo-Kantianism which is wholly transcendental and idealistic will be utterly destroyed by Hartmann's argument concerning the necessary position of the "realistic" elements in Kant, if it prove successful.

One more question of "standpoint" needs to be considered before we go into the details of Hartmann's criticism. Every age reads history and the historically significant in terms of its own needs and interests. When we separate the historical from the lasting in a philosophy, are we not in danger of merely disetinguishing between the "old fashioned" and the "new fashioned," even though the latter will be just as "historical" in its way as the former was? Adolf Seelbach [17] raises this question, and in the symposium of the Kant Society in 1931 Emil Utitz implied that he thought Hartmann's shift to realism was "zeitbedingt." Hartmann's answer to his critic on that occasion is worthy of study. "I would regard it as misleading," he said,[18] "to see the problem of reality itself as merely an expression of a passing time. It is a very old basic problem of philosophy, which periodically again and again comes to the fore. And rigorously taken, all and every philosophy must deal with it. . . . From this standpoint [and not from the standpoint of fashion] the investigations I have presented take their origin. They should not serve a 'movement' but a timeless demand."

16. *Metaphysik*, p. 148-49.

17. *Nicolai Hartmann's Kantkritik*, Pan-Verlag, 1933.

18. "Zum Problem der Realitätsgegebenheit," (*Philosophische Vorträge* veröffentlicht von der Kantgesellschaft, no. 32, Pan Verlag 1931) p. 96. Hereafter referred to as "Problem."

When one goes into Hartmann's discussion of the problem of reality and its evidence, it is easy to see how it is a "timeless demand"—it is the demand that philosophy not be absurd on its very face. For the "timeless demand" for reality is so little speculative, and so indiscriminate in regard to the reality which will satisfy it, that the sort of reality Hartmann provides is of little or no distinctive use in the *Wendung zum Realismus*.[19] Ontology, the assertion of being, "has a standpunctual indifference to idealism and realism, and the same distance from them even though it is not equally visible in the two cases."[20] The ontology which is assumed as *ultima ratio* in the *Metaphysik der Erkenntnis* and argued for in the symposium of 1931 as part of the shift to realism is wholly negativistic; there must be being, but what it is the argument does not and cannot show: "Being is the common sphere in which subject and object stand over against each other."[21]

II. EMPIRICAL REALISM

It is from the proof of the givenness of the real that we must begin our detailed discussion of Hartmann's strictures on Kant. Hartmann does not directly charge Kant with failure to account for empirical reality, and for that reason it might seem, at first, as if the argument in *Zum Problem der Realitätsgegebenheit* would be irrelevent to our problem. Perhaps ultimately it is; but strictly speaking this entire paper by Hartmann seems to me to be irrelevant to his own position too. Nevertheless he thinks his realism is strengthened by the argument, and if his position is strengthened, Kant's more "extravagant" metaphysics can be attacked by implication. Only when we see what Hartmann attempts to prove and how, can we say how significant it is for Kant's position.

For the establishment of realism it does not suffice merely to throw the responsibility for proof upon the shoulders of the skeptic and "idealist," for as Hartmann said in his reply to Moritz Geiger, the grounds for the displacement of the burden of proof must be shown forth in some phenomenon, and the exhibition of this phenomenon is itself productive of evidence for the givenness of reality.[22] This is of course Kant's own procedure against the idealists in his Refutation of Idealism, but it is easily seen that this refutation does not really meet Berkeley's problem at all. Kant accepts the "reality phenomenon" of empirical realism just as much as Hartmann does, though Hartmann

19. Cf. *Metaphysik*, p. 138.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 300.
21. *Metaphysik*, p. 138.
22. "Problem," p. 85.

does have objections to this assumption on the part of Kant. Hartmann holds to an *a priori* certainity of empirical reality, and he says, "Kant satisfied himself in showing how empirical realism was compatible with his idealism as one of its corollaries. But if he had seen it as *a priori*, then precisely according to his own concept of apriority it would have been necessary to demonstrate, in addition to this compatibility, also the conditions of its universality and necessity. For its claim to universal validity is perhaps naïvely obvious, but not philosophically obvious. It is the precise problem."[23] Let us see, then, why Kant does not carry through an *a priori* justification of the assumption of empirical reality. It is safe to say he never thought of it at all, since the givenness of reality is not a *formal a priori Sachverhalt.* Therefore "according to his own conception of apriority," which was formal justifiability, he is not required to "deduce" the belief in empirical givenness; and if the mere givenness as such of reality were *a priori* for him, needless to say his conception of apriority would have had to be different; he would have had to be just a phenomenologist. To make this requirement of Kant with his own conception of apriority would be to require him to use an ontological argument to deduce givenness.

Hartmann had begun his *Metaphysik der Erkenntnis,* as we have seen, with the supposition of reality. There it was taken as an *ultima ratio,* as he himself later says. His argument here, in the *Zum Problem der Realitätsgegebenheit,* is supposed to bear this assumption out and justify it. The argument moves from "emotional-transcendent acts," phenomena which are so constituted that they "transcend their own phenomenal character," or phenomena which have the marks of self-transcendence within themselves; but it merely establishes the fact that the concrete man is in a real environment. And this has never been denied. He tells us nothing about the reality which confronts man, except that it is as real as he. This failure to determine its nature is a consequence of the nature of the phenomena to which he appeals. "This mode of givenness of reality is not only different from that of knowledge, but occurs independently of it. Being affected by something does not wait for the occurrence as such to be known. It is immediately there. Of course knowledge of the situation can follow it, but it need not. What it really 'was' which happened to me or affected me can remain hidden to me." But the *that* and the *what* do not appear equally visible: "The weight of the givenness of reality in an act is the greater the more indissolubly the reality of the object is

23. *Metaphysik,* p. 132.

connected with the act-phenomenon."[24] In other words, the more concrete and immediate the experience of reality, the less we *know* about it and the more certain we are that it *is*. Cognition containing a theoretical element has less certainty in the *more* it asserts than a mute *Erleben* has in its mere acknowledgment that something has happened somewhere. The only ground which we have for supposing that which we do think to be real is that we can apparently have emotional and cognitive acts related to the same thing, in other words, that there is one reality and not two.[25]

But why, we may ask, so great a devotion to the emotional-transcendent acts? That Hartmann's phenomenological analysis of them is subtle and thoroughly accurate no one denies, but why does it occur here? In order to show both the strength and the weakness of his position, let us compare what he says about these acts with what might be or has been as truly said about cognition. "This confrontation (*Betroffensein*) is thoroughly real and is experienced as real. And because it is a confrontation with 'something,' immediately behind it must stand the happening (*Widerfahrnis*) itself, by which the subject is touched and as the real thing which is experienced in the act."[26] To be sure, if the experience of having something befall you is *accurately* described in these words, then there must be the thing there which does as a matter of fact befall you. But in knowledge the argument can be phrased in precisely the same way, and with as easy and obvious a phenomenological justification. Let us say: "Cognition is thoroughly real, and in every experience it is known as real. And since it is a cognition of something, so there must be immediately behind it the 'cognized' itself, which the subject cognizes, and which is the real thing which in knowldege the subject does as a matter of fact cognize." The only way to avoid this analogy is to say that, in Lockean terms, it is the idea which is cognized while the thing may be felt (as reminiscent of the function of intensity and "sensible knowledge" in Locke); but

24. "Problem," pp. 18, 30.

25. The interpretation at this time does not bring it out, but here we have a "Zwei-Instanzen System" as criterion of truth as this has been presented in Hartmann's earlier works. In a word, if two "ideas" of a thing agree they may both be wrong; but if we have two "sources" of experience and their deliverances agree, then their agreement in diversity is a criterion of their dependability. Hartmann uses in his other works the different sources of apriority and aposteriority as the two instances, but if in any way he could separate emotion and cognition, the argument could be employed very usefully here. But in this lecture, more than in any of his other writings, Hartmann is close to a kind of *Lebensphilosophie* or anthropology, and he emphasizes the errors introduced into the theory of knowledge by the mistake of isolating knowledge from other life-functions. For this reason, the fact that we *erfahren* and *erleben* the "same world" cannot be used as a criterion of its actuality.

26. "Problem," p. 16.

Hartmann of course explicitly rejects this anti-phenomenological construction (as for example in his sharp attack on Leo Polak.) Further: "In this occurrence, self-obtrusion, oppression (*Zustossen, Sichaufdrängen, Bedrängen*) the happening (*Widerfahrnis*) shows a weight of reality which the subject cannot defend itself from. This reality is in a sense given; and against this, skeptical and idealistic attack must remain mute." But Berkeley's argument for reality is precisely the same: I am acting in putting myself into a position to experience (I open my eyes) but what I experience cannot be my product and is not affected by my desire or dislike of its own nature. "Whatever more there is, as that I experience such a particular smell, or any smell at all—this is independent of my will, and therein I am altogether passive."[27] That Berkeley thinks of it not as having an altogether independent existence (in his sense, *matter* and in Hartmann's, *Ansichsein)* does not affect either the cogency of the argument or its relevance to Hartmann's position, for both are interested here not in the ontological status of the thing but solely in its existential position with reference to the concrete and particular subject. And for both of them it is equally real and equally evident that it is real; but for Hartmann to infer *Ansichsein* and ultimately realism from it is a subreption, essentially like Dr. Johnson's refutation of Berkeley, and no more justified.

But it is further argued that *Erfahren* in the broad sense of *Lebenserfahrung* is in its own nature "the act-correlate of the happening *(Widerfahrnis)"* and it is immediately known as such. "I have not spoken of subsequently breaking through the subjective limit, either in transcendent acts or anywhere else." And in cognition this phenomenological description also holds. For in the phenomena of knowing, we do not experience the object as "idea" or "modification of mind," but without saying anything about the ultimate dignity of the object, we have in cognition an experience of "objects." If we do not, "object" is merely a *flatus vocis*.[28]

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27. *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, I.

28. For this reason, it seems to me one may rightly suspect some of Hartmann's phenomenological descriptions of knowledge. Especially noteworthy here are the descriptions of the *Satz des Bewusstseins* and the *Bild des Objects im Subjekt*. (*Metaphysik*, 1. Teil, 2. Abschn., 5. Kap.) The fact is that one of the great apories of his system arises from the conflict of this *Satz* and intention. The antimony of consciousness (p. 6), the conflict between "*knowing* consciousness" (*Satz der Erkenntnis*) and "knowing *consciousness*" (*Satz des Bewusstseins*) may appear to many to be artificial, since it is based on the statement, "Zum Wesen des Bewusstseins gehört es, dass es nie etwas anderes als seine eigenen Inhalte zu fassen bekommt, nie aus seine Sphäre heraustreten kann" (p. 59). The antinomy, which Hartmann overcomes only at great metaphysical expense, seems to me to be phenomenologically ill founded.

When the givenness of reality is on such a firm foundation in our theoretical experience, where the object is not only given as real but also as definite, why go to another form of argument for reality? It is a practical matter. "In experiencing [in this broad sense] or suffering, it would be senseless to understand the happening *(Widerfahrnis)* as merely supported by the act *(aktgetragen)*, standing and falling with it, and thus as unreal." But this would be no more nonsensical (and no one has ever supposed that solipsism or even skepticism was *practical)* than to do the same thing with the act of observation. If one does make this supposition, "One does not at all understand the act, does not comprehend its phenomenon, and has playfully mistaken the seriousness of human life."[29] But is the seriousness of human life more directly or obviously threatened by the failure of this defense than it would be if a solipsism were intellectually founded? For to attack this argument, like the defenses against intellectual solipsism, is still possible, if one cares to go on. Skepticism can "certainly again and again validate the view that happenings, obstructions, fates *(Widerfahrnisse, Widerstände, Schicksale)* are only self-created forces. But such stereotyped argumentation becomes less and less significant *(wesenloser)* the stronger the phenomenal transcendence of the act becomes. It is pushed more and more into empty abstraction. And so it exhausts itself, in that it becomes objectless *(sic!)*." But is this last *Potenzierung* of the skeptical argument any more arbitrary and "objectless" than the first one was, since the very first attack of the hypothetical skeptic is an attack on act-transcendence in its most naïve and outstanding form? *C'est le premier pas qui coûte.*

In fact, though it must be admitted that all arguments against skepticism of this variety are futile so long as the skeptic makes his stereotyped reply, still the single judgments have a greater "objectivity" or "possibility of meeting the object" if emotional transcendence is forgotten. Moritz Geiger, in fairly close agreement with Hartmann, argued that since illusion could be discovered only by a comparative study within experience, experience as a whole could not be illusory, that such a statement would be not only false but meaningless. But Hartmann doubts the reality-evidence of these judgments which are clarified and abstract enough to be tested in this way, and it is true, though neither Geiger nor Hartmann argues in this way, that Geiger's disproof of the possible illusoriness of all experience will hold whether

29. "Problem," p. 31.

knowledge is a *Realitätzeugnis* as they believe or only a *Sinneinheirt*.[30]

Empirical realism then can be neither dialectically proved nor refuted. But why is a proof needed? Helmut Kuhn pointed out that every form of realistic argument grows out of a polemical situation since it is always directed at some specific form of *Realitätsbezweiflung*. Hartmann's argument is directed against the "pseudological" form which characterizes ancient skepticism's recognition of the possibility of deception but it neglects the more modern critical limitations. Opposing purely empirical skepticism, Hartmann's attack can lead only to empirical realism. But that this empirical *Ansichsein* (which is not denied by idealism) can hold its own against Kant's or even Berkeley's attack—that possibility is not even touched by Hartmann. Thus we may say, if the realism Hartmann is here arguing for were metaphysical and not merely phenomenological, it would be systematic, conditioned by a standpoint in the stream of history as Utitz and Seelbach say, and therefore it would according to Hartmann lack weight. But realism of this kind is not systematic, and it is to be sure one of the timeless demands we may make on any philosopher or sane man. But then it does not touch Kant, even by implication.

The idealists were quick to realize this. During the symposium Willy Moog said that a phenomenological analysis of the acts could be built into an idealistic as well as into a realistic system, and thus Hartmann's polemic did not touch really critical idealism.[31] Hartmann's answer is revealing in that it shows how far he had gone since he expressed the opinion that *Sein* was a neutral category including subject and object and therefore *jenseits* idealism and realism, which is his position in the *Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*. "Such a true idealism would have to draw, however, also the further consequence, and allow the 'acknowledged' reality of the world, and indeed of the empirical world, to hold as existing in itself," but he doubts if it could be called "true idealism" if it drew this consequence.[32] But Hartmann is here confusing his own useful concepts of gnoseological and ontological *Ansichsein;*

30. But one may ask what is the criterion in Hartmann's scheme? Every emotional act, except perhaps "moods," claims a certain transcendence and objectivity. But what of pathological cases? And Hartmann explicitly refuses to base an argument for the existence of God upon the mere emotional conviction. "In regard to the religious experience, I do not indeed mean that from it one could directly 'prove' the existence of God, though perhaps that in it the reality of God could be immediately given. But even this only if there is a religious experience in the sense of a *wirkliches Erfasstsein* of a higher power . . ." ("Problem," p. 88.) But this does us no good at all, for every such experience claims to be a *wirkliches Erfassen*.

31. "Problem," p. 30.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

and from the first, which is proven, we cannot infer the second without begging the entire question. Hartmann goes even further in his attack on the idealists who would allow this much of "realism" in their system, and thus he by implication attacks Kant.[33] Against Liebert, who like Hegel thought of the true idealism as being the only true realism, and who sought a synthesis beyond perspectival distinctions (as opposed to Hartmann's *epoché* this side of idealism and realism), Hartmann replied, "The opposition of matter and spirit is not a contradiction, as that of views from a chosen standpoint is; they may easily be united in one world view. Therefore there is no need for a 'standing beyond them,' even if they are both fully autonomous; nor is there any need for a dialectical synthesis. Both of them are rather included in the same reality. And whoever is aware of that stands already on the foundations of realism."[34] And against Heinz Heimsoeth, he continues, "The great idealists have all of them only sublated one reality for the sake of another."[35]

This is a noteworthy argument, meaning that all philosophers are realists. But if this is the case, realism is a wholly nondescript philosophy, a tautology. The ontology of realism can only be the idea of an ontology in general. If every idealistic attack on the metaphysical *Ansichsein* of objects, beginning with Berkeley, is to be met by this realistic supererogation, we may paraphrase Hartmann's own argument against skepticism: such realism is always a formal possibility, but this stereotyped argumentation becomes less and less significant the more idealistic that "being" is whose "reality" is asserted. The argument is analogous to, and as futile as, Parmenides' strictures on talking about non-being. It is unfortunate that Hartmann thought what he said was an attack on anyone, let alone Kant.

III. THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS

We are ready to turn to specific points in Hartmann's *explicit* attack on Kant's idealism, now that we have seen idealism in general, and Kant's transcendental idealism in particular to be unaffected by any "proof" of empirical givenness. The question is, can those specific parts

33. The writer must confess that he regrets having had to spend so much time disgcussin a problem which he considers ultimately irrelevant to Kant criticism. But here Hartmann, who never accuses Kant of neglecting empirical realities, implies that this phenomenological analysis is opposed to Kant's system. It is this belief of Hartmann's which has necessitated this already too long discussion.

34. Thus obviously the "Wendung zum Realismus" may be supposed as having taken place *after* the *Metaphysik der Erkenntnis* in which *Sein* was "equally distant" from the hypostatizations of idealism and realism. Are we then to suppose that "realism" is proven by "Realitätsgegebenheit"?

35. "Problem," p. 89.

of Kant's philosophy which are called idealistic be considered so *peculiarly* idealistic as to be affected by Hartmann's philosophy of being? I shall make no futile attempt to defend Kant's idealism by deprecating the importance of the thing in itself; Hartmann, I think, is quite correct in his censures of those who, like his Marburg teachers, tried to explain the noumenon as a *Grenzbegriff* whereas Kant only argued that the *concept* of the noumenon is a *Grenzbegriff*.

The major problem lies in Hartmann's attack on the supreme principle of synthetical judgment, or rather on the idealistic interpretation Kant gives to this principle. Here again I shall have to neglect many important points in which I think Hartmann is correct: his construction of the principle "A is not A" as a complement to the principle of analytical judgments, "A is not non-A"; his emphasis upon the non-judgmental character of much *a priori* knowledge, etc. These points are important, but they are more by way of supplements to Kant's own theory and do not materially affect the main points in his theory.

That the conditions of experience should be at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience is a statement which can be read in many ways. In order to avoid them, Kant has another and more careful statement of the principl. "Any object stands under the necessary conditions of a synthetical unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience."[36] However, we may interpret Kant to mean term "possibility of experience" is to be preferred to "possible experience," and at B 195 we read, "The possibility of experience is thus that which gives all our knowings *a priori* objective reality."[37] Possible experience has its own laws, the laws of its own possibility, and these laws are the necessary conditions of any actual knowledge; but it would be a mistake to interpret them, in this section, as merely the formal conditions of experience; nothing in this section is asserted specifically about *a priori* synthetical judgments, and what is said is applicable to all synthetical judgments provided they be true. Because its laws are the same as the laws of our actual (true) experience as empirical subjects, and because its formed content is the empirical reality we actually experience, we have the possibility of the coexistence of empirical reality and transcendental ideality if grounds for the latter can be found. It does not prove that we have this coexistence actually; it merely means that, so long as we consider objects as objects of experi-

36. K. d. r. V., B, 197.

37. It is odd that Hartmann does not emphasize the preferability, in Kant's own thinking, of "conditions of possibility of experience" to "conditions of possible experience," since it seems to bring Kant closer to his way of thinking; this subtle point has been elucidated by Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, vol. ii, p. 90.

ence, the transcendental ideality of the conditions would not prejudice the empirical reality of their specifications in actual experience. Because the possibilities of experience do not extend to the things in themselves as they are (or, in Hartmann, since they do not cover the entire *Ansichsein* of the object), we do not have *a priori* knowledge, or indeed any knowledge, of what is not under these conditions. Because there is no higher principle which unites the possibility of experience with the possibility of the existence of things in themselves, phenomena, says Kant, do not contain *a priori* determinations of things in themselves.

Thus we have in Kant a three-level system of the relation of the subject to its counter-part:

empirical realism—the objectivity of this or that spatial object and of this or that psychological subject; corresponding, in Hartmann, to *gnoseologisches Ansichsein, Realitätsgegebenheit.*

transcendental idealism—the ideality of the phenomenal object in a possible experience; the thesis that the conditions of the empirically real are, in part, conditions which underlie the possibility of experience; and according to Hartmann, the "dogma" that these principles are transcendentally subjective or ideal.

metaphysical dualism—the speculative but unavoidable assumption of the ultimate duality of the transcendental subject and the thing in itself which "affects" it, a dogma which is denied by neo-Kantianism in favor of the transcendental subject (idealism) and modified by Hartmann in favor of the supreme sphere of being (ontologism).

If the discussion in the preceding section has any value at all, it shows that the first level does not properly concern us now. We must restrict our attention to the second and third. The third concerns us first. Kant assumes the ultimate duality not only to "limit knowledge in order to make way for faith," but also to provide for the material contents of experience which he did not believe were capable of an *a priori* justification. That existence is not dialectically derivative is an opinion shared by Hartmann, and it is not only made on empirical grounds (the failure of science to deduce particulars), but also in order to avoid an ontological argument, Hartmann preferring the former ground and Kant perhaps the latter. Hartmann's monism is an objection to this dualism from the other side, however, since he holds the common principles of the subject and the object are common principles of *being,* and since the subject *is,* it must be under these conditions. Several objectionable features of this doctrine can be seen immediately. We have already pointed out the poverty of this concept of being; if it

were a real concept, and not just a limit, we should run into certain of the difficulties I shall point out in regard to the second level. If it is not a real concept, not a "punctual unity," but a catch-all for *all* principles, I can see no legitimate objection one may raise against it except that it is as empty as Parmenides' being. But let us forget for the moment being in general and consider the being of the subject. Hartmann is quite clear that Kant did not mean the transcendental consciousness to be a hypostasized existent,[38] yet he just as often argues against it as an unnecessary *being*. He says, "The vehicle of appearing must have reality, else there could be no such thing as appearance as such. Thus a 'thing in itself' would be made the foundation of the system, and indeed its knowableness would be recognized as a matter of principle, though Kant has declared the things in themselves to be unknowable." [39] Obviously if "thing in itself" is to be interpreted as equivalent to being, Hartmann is no longer talking Kant's language and the objection does not meet the issue. On the other hand, if they are not the same, and they certainly were not for Kant, Hartmann's argument likewise fails.

The notion of being has the disadvantage of allowing us to think that we have made a beginning towards categorization, though this is a delusion for it leaves "all cows equally black." Thus no material objection can be made to Kant or to any other system on the ground that its highest principle is not being; the only objection which can be legitimately made is on a "lower level" and concerns what this being is. Hartmann's ontology is, as we have seen, negativistic: "The possibility of ontology remains, independent of the adequacy of its concepts." [40] Any attempt to qualify Being seems to be either too specific or not to have sufficient evidence behind it. Hartmann's particular objection to idealism is that it does not allow *Seinsprinzipien* which are not *Erkenntnisprinzipien*.[41] We must consider Hartmann's objections to idealism's equation of these two. To do so will lead us to the detailed study of the second level we mentioned above.

A fundamental difference lies here. Kant says that the principles of actual experience must be like the principles of possible experience, that is principles from which the *a priori* character of actual experience can be derived, but not principles of any ultimate *Ansichsein*. Hartmann, on the other hand, says it is sufficient if some of the principles

38. Cf. Kant's letter to Marcus Herz, February 1772, and *Metaphysik*, p. 146.
39. *Metaphysik*, p. 150.
40. *Metaphysik*, p. 280.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 362.

on the two sides of the knowledge-situation, imbedded in a common sphere of being, be the same, so that objective *Ansichsein* is at least under the partial domination of principles which also hold for the subject as a particular *Seinsgebilde*. Thus Hartmann, in effect, eliminates the second level altogether, regarding the empirical subject-object situation as metaphysically derivative from the peculiar nature of the being of the subject, placing over this duality a monism of common ontological principles which are neutral as regards this distinction between subject and object. The degree of identity of principles on both sides is the degree to which knowledge can be extended; beyond that limit there is ineradicable ignorance. But the principles which give the mind a necessary isomorphism with empirical existence are no more adequately described as principles of experience than as principles of being. The subject *überhaupt* is a fiction, a prejudice Kant has taken from his standpoint to idealism. "The subject in general is a pure fiction of a standpoint, and with it idealism falls into the atavism of the dogmatic systems it has struggled against, in which the fiction of the *intellectus infinitus, archetypus,* or *divinus* had played the same role. And so far as all these *Potenzierungen* of the intellect, whether hypostasized or not, nevertheless are finally constructed only by analogy to the only intellect known to us men, so there is hidden in it, as probably in all epistemological idealism, a vestige of an old anthropomorphism." [42]

Hartmann's argument against this conception of Kant, constituting the central theses of his own epistemology, may be summarized in three theses: (a) Principles which are to provide for knowledge of objects are neither objective nor subjective in any definite sense, though they may appear almost indiscriminately on the subject and object sides in knowing. (b) Since these principles are not products of the *ratio,* that they should be rational or knowable does not lie in their essence, and *a fortiori* the *a priori* need not be known *a priori.* (c) The object side in knowledge is homogeneous; that is we do not know a mere phenomenon, with the being which has *Ansichsein* remaining heterogeneous with it and necessarily unknowable. What we know of an object is that part of it which is under principles which our knowing mind is under, and more specifically that aspect of this part which is not too "distant" from the subject and which lies within its own psychological or metaphysical limits of actualization.

IV. THE IDENTITY OF PRINCIPLES

"Only an identity of principles can bridge the duality of subject

42. "Diesseits," p. 171.

and object without abolishing them; and therefore it is indifferent whether these principles are primarily principles of the object or of the subject, or stand neutrally above both of them." [43] "That which is philosophically valuable in the *intellectus infinitus* is not the *intellectus* but the *infinitum.* It is not clear why this incontestable *infinitum,* which goes beyond the human *ratio,* should be attached to an intellect." [44] Thus argues Hartmann against the subject in general. At times he seems willing to allow it as a possible interpretation, as a matter of personal belief, but to be neither refutable nor provable and therefore to be a "transgression against the critical minimum of metaphysics." At other times he objects to Kant's formulation of the supreme principle as not even adequate to its own task; for example, apparently forgetting that Kant's principle is restricted to "objects of *experience,*" he asserts that it stands "in obvious contradiction to his theory of ideas" since the latter points out the divergence between subject and object conditions.[45] But for the sake of argument let us grant all of Hartmann's restrictions of the use of this principle in Kant, and then let us face the issue in its simplest form. Hartmann says, and I take this to be the central disharmony between him and Kant, "Principles of knowledge . . . are ontic *(seiende)* principles of knowledge, which is possible only if knowledge itself has a being, is a kind of being.[46]

What are the ontic principles which thus cover knowing and being known as well as unknowable being? Hartmann does not say that the principles of being, or our knowledge of them, are wholly empty; it is only the *unity* of all principles about which ontology can say nothing.[47] In fact, a very great deal can be said about being in extension; and we do know that some of the principles or conditions of knowledge are conditions or principles of beings known. They are ontic principles because knowledge is a being. They are not "ideal." They are shared first of all by all subjects as peculiar kinds of beings (the root of intersubjective apriority) and by some aspects of all subject-beings and some aspects of all object-beings (the root of transcendent apriority). This part of Hartmann's ontology is not negativistic, since we know a great deal about these beings we call knowers and some of their principles, or at least our conceptions of them.

We have then to ask this question: Does the ontological assertion

43. *Metaphysik,* p. 151.
44. *Ibid.,* p. 301.
45. *Metaphysik,* p. 350.
46. *Ibid.,* p. 253.
47. *Ibid.,* p. 310.

of the primacy of being to knowing hold its own when we come to specific and pregnant beings we call subjects? In other words, do the characteristics which make being the fundamental and ultimate, even if intensionally empty, concept obtain also for particular things which we call specific beings (*Seinsgebilde* as contrasted with *Sein*)? Is it not rather that general ontological characterizations retire to the background as soon as the emphasis is placed upon the *Gebilde* which are, or which have being? And do we not find some *Gebilde* which are beings in the ultimate and empty sense, but not beings in any pregnant sense of the word? The last two questions must, I think, be answered affirmatively as far at least as the knowing subject is concerned.[48]

Kant's entire philosophy is a denial that the subject and its knowledge are beings under laws characteristic of things which are known "to be." Mind, the root of knowing, is not a thing among things or a being among beings; it is the knownness of being *(Bewusst-sein)*. This known-ness is the condition of the assertion of being in any pregnant modal sense. Being as modally pregnant is a *Sinneinheit*, even though as a noumenon in negative understanding it is more than this, and that despite the fact that a science (ontology) of this empty being is, for Kant, impossible. The transcendental possibility of experience has a being, but its modality is empty, since modality has a meaning only through relation of an assertion to other possible experiences of the same thing; the significance of possible experience is to be found in its relation to actualized experience, in which being is known, and not to empty being itself. The objection may be made, of course, that knowers are existents; this is, in fact, the meaning of Hartmann's own "Copernican revolution." [49]

But this raises the issue of the status of knowledge in a world of existence or being, and we mean here the world of being in a pregnant, assertible, and identifiable sense. Hartmann's solution to the problem as to how a knowing subject can be and find its principles in a being-world raises more questions than it answers. It leads unavoidably to a confusion between psychological categories (being-principles in a pregnant sense) and logical or epistemological categories (which are being-principles only in an empty Parmenidean or indeterminate sense). In the midst of phenomenal being we are introduced to "transcausal determinations" whose being is wholly irrational and can never be understood; these transcausal relations lend to logic and ontology a spurious effectiveness *in their own right*. To be sure this is an error of post-

48. Cf. my "The Psychophysical as a Pseudo-Problem," *Journal of Philosophy* vol. xxxvii, 1940, pp. 561-571, where this point is argued in detail.

49. *Metaphysik*, p. 277.

Kantian idealism too, but it is not an error in Kant since he held to a sharp distinction of spheres, with relations to each other obtaining between them only as wholes, not as an interpenetration of their "effects." The error is introduced by Fichte and is present in Hartmann; what Hartmann finds as the Plotinian and "chorismic" errors in Kant's philosophy, that the categories are transcendent and their "application" to experience must be justified, shows itself to be one of the strongest points in Kant's doctrine since it sets up limits to various types of explanation.[50]

Hartmann avoids psychologism and anthropologism by not interpreting the knowledge principles as primarily principles of subject-beings, though the inter-subjective *a priori* is psychologically conceived and all the *a posteriori* is existential and anthropological. The only way to find out whether a principle which is given with *a priori* evidence is transcendently *a priori*, that is, also a principle of objects, is to test it perhaps empirically so as to eliminate prejudices which are also *a priori*, but only subjectively so. The principles which are eliminated are not illusory and of no metaphysical significance; they are rather metaphysical principles of being which apply only to some things (some or all subject-beings) and tell us much about *them*, rather than what they purport to assert.

Here in this differentiation Hartmann is merely using an ontological language to describe what Plato discovered and Kant repeated: namely, that the *a priori* is a principle of knowing and of the known, whereas the empirically general characteristics of the empirical ego do not have this universality and objectivity. Hartmann is introducing into the negativistic sphere of empty being all of the distinctions Kant discovered, so that being in the pregnant sense (the only sense in which Kant used the word) is in effect distinguished from the necessary conditions of its own knownness, which have being only in the negativistic but, to be sure, imprescriptable sense. And having once made this distinction, Hartmann goes on further in a Kantian way, distinguishing the knowable from the unknowable in the object by reference to the functions of the subject, admitting that the antinomies may be dependent upon discrepancies between subject-conditions and world-conditions in the sphere of pregnant being and making the world as a whole (mere *Sein)* antinomial in its own intrinsic nature.[51]

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50. How badly such a principle is needed by Hartmann is shown in his wholly un-Kantian attempt to solve the third antimony. Cf. *Ethik*, second edition, pp. 590-595.

51. "Wie ist kritische Ontologie überhaupt möglich?" in *Festschrift für Paul Natorp*, 1924, pp. 174-5.

To summarize: Kant and Hartmann differ primarily only in the names they give to the principles at the second level; all of the distinctions pointed out by the former are admitted by the latter. Kant, however, considers being as a phenomenal, i. e., a pregnant, determination, and therefore inapplicable to the conditions of its own knownness. Hartmann uses being and principles of being in a much broader sense so that it applies to both. But since the boundaries between transcendental conditions and phenomenal being coincide with that between being in an empty and in a pregnant modal sense, there is no real point at issue. All of the serious problems in this part of Kant's philosophy—turning on the point of how actual experience is related to possible experience or to the possibility of experience—are left where they were by Hartmann. Transcausal determinations, categorial fundamental relations, and psychophysical fundamental relations do not aid us in solving the problem of the relation of the phenomenal to the supersensible, or of pregnant to tautological being.

V. THE RATIONALITY OF CATEGORIES

The second major ground on which Kant is criticized is his belief in the rationality of the principles of knowledge. By rationality here is not meant logical deducibility, for everyone is clear on the point that the ultimate principles even of logic are not "deducible," and Kant admits that the characters of space and time are not "logical," else they would be concepts and not intuitions. By rationality in this case Hartmann means knowableness, and if the *a priori* forms are not ideal, i. e., not functions or productions of the *ratio,* Hartmann thinks they need not be known at all, and certainly their knowableness is not an *a priori* character of them, even though they must be known *a priori* if they are to be known at all. Some of them, he thinks, may be irrational in a preeminent sense, that is, both alogical and unknowable. It is one of the strong points of Hartmann's writing that he does not confuse these meanings of the irrational.

Let us examine Kant's theory of the status of the formal *a priori* elements in experience. For there to be an apriority, Kant requires that there be two characteristics: a certain trait or structure must be pervasive in experience and known to be such, and second it must be a condition of experience so that the occurrence of experience *however characterized or categorized* would be impossible without it. These two features (illustrated, for example, in the third paragraph of the Metaphysical Exposition of Space, B 38-39) must coincide, and this is the distinctive feature of the Kantian *a priori.* The transcendental method of Kant is to take the former (as found in his "phenomenological"

description of space and time, the Aristotelian table of judgments, the axioms of natural science, etc.) and to make a critical regression upon their conditions. To make this clearer, let us consider space as an example: Kant says spatiality is a universal characteristic of all external experience, and he says so on grounds of his phenomenological (to use Hartmann's own description) report of the experience which he imaginatively varies to see what happens if spatiality were abolished; and also on the basis of his dogmatic assertion of the validity of geometry (as in the analytical or regressive method in the *Prolegomena).* This is space as an intuited form of experience; it is known *a priori* as a feature of experience as we have it, thought it is not asserted to be a form to be intuited in all possible experience of a being otherwise constituted for experiencing and not to be a form necessarily present in things apart from all experiencing. Kant is here asserting an absolute minimum of formal apriority; if it were originally with the weight only of a *de facto* generalization from experience, it is nevertheless taken as a criterion of our sane human experience, and if it failed, experience as the stuff analyzed by Kant disappears; thus it becomes a kind of presupposition for future experience, giving the futurity which is a necessary even if not sufficient condition of apriority. Now Kant asks how we can assert this apriority which is an absolute minimum, or, to put it in another way, why *is* space *a priori?* He might have said space is valid of objects in themselves and in some way it migrates into experience, or he might have said it is an *a posteriori* human generalization; but in addition to the reasons (largely "phenomenological") he had for not doing so, there are deeper reasons lying in his transcendental method. They do not follow solely from the impossibility of an *a priori* knowledge of things in themselves nor from the impossibility of the Humean denial of *a priori* synthetical knowledge; they are dictated by Kant's desire for a metaphysical minimum, his desire to state what he finds in experience as only an experiential necessity. Kant says this intuited form can be said *a priori* to characterize all our experience, but at the same time to be known definitely as characterizing only this experience, if it is at the same time a form of intuition. Thus central to the Kantian argument is a principle which is formally like the supreme principle of synthetical judgments: the intuited forms are likewise the forms of intuition. *Mutatis mutandis,* this is Kant's assertion of the identity of categories, but materially it is far different from Hartmann's "minimal" reading of this supreme principle. If the transcendental condition, without which experience as it is constituted would be impossible, were not identical with the conditions which are necessary for the objects as experienced,

we should have no grounds for connecting *a priori* necessity with universality. To be sure in Kant these conditions are not wholly rational; but they are necessarily knowable.

Hartmann attacks Kant here at almost every point.

(a) *Erkenntnisgesetz* is not the same thing as *Gesetzerkenntnis;* the former is the *prius* of knowledge, the latter the *posterius.*[52] This is not a significant objection to Kant, however. The *a priori* is not first in order of time or obviousness; and if it asserts more than this, it erects metaphysical (ontological, but at least non-epistemological) principles which are constructs or hypotheses to account for that which is known directly. Hartmann's grounds for doing this lie only in his interpretation of experience as a kind of being, which conception we have already discussed. And interpreted most narrowly, the statement is a truism. Kant would completely agree with the following assertion of the means of knowing conditions of knowledge: "Conditions are certainly, if at all, known with *a priori* evidence, though this evidence is not immediate, but mediated through that regressus *(Rückgang resp. Rückschluss)*." [53]

(b) The concepts we make of those conditions underlying the possibility of experience are and remain concepts *of* categories; they are not themselves categories. "Knowledge of principles is related to the principle which is in the same way that knowledge of objects is related to the transcendent object.[54] "Concepts of categories are nothing but attempts to comprehend a category or to progressively formulate it. Between them and the categories themselves there is the same tension of the progress of knowledge as obtains between the knowledge of the object and the object itself." [55] These statements are dependent again upon Hartmann's basic ontological theory, that the principles of knowledge are ontic principles of being which are shared by the object in itself and by the knower as a kind of being. To be sure, then, they are not correctly labeled psychological or cosmological principles or conditions of knowing an object; but formally, ontological and gnoseological formulation of these principles is like the existential and psychological. That is to say, there are certain partially or wholly unknowable conditions which are partially or wholly identical for the knowing-being and for the known-being. We do not know the principle as it is or the object which it dominates; we know only that aspect of the principle which we intuit in that object. This principle is indicated or suggested, and on account of its compulsiveness it is inferred to dominate also our

52. *Metaphysik*, p. 350.
53. *Metaphysik*, p. 253.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 251.
55. *Loc. cit.*

experiencing the object, since experience is also a kind of being under universal ontological laws. Thus the principles of the *a priori* structure (and for Hartmann, also content) of knowledge are not specifically subjective or objective, but neutral; still objective (realistic) or subjective (idealistic) interpretations could equally well account for the phenomenon of apriority. They would, however, assert more than we know about the *a priori* than we can know *a priori*, which is merely that there is an identity of principles on the two sides of the knowledge situation. Nevertheless, because Hartmann thinks this identity extends also to the real object (thing in itself) he is asserting more than experience justifies, for the partial identity of principles is, at the very least possible, a partial identity of the appearance and our experience, in the duality we directly know. (Whether this is justified will be discussed in the last section, on the distinction between appearance and reality.)

(c) Kant's theory of the transcendental consciousness is involved in his identification of the conditions of experience with the necessary features found in the experience; but Hartmann says that there is an identity of subjective and objective conditions in being, though these conditions appear only in a disguised form in *a priori* evidence *in* experience. Thus to Hartmann it appears that Kant's transcendental consciousness as the "source" of these principles is merely an hypothesis, a metaphysical speculation unnecessary to Kant's own justification of the *a priori*.[56] If the interpretation of Kant is correct whereby these conditions must be identical in the three phases but have no relevance (as they cannot if the distinction between appearance and reality, however interpreted, is valid) to things in themselves, then this is not an hypothesis but, as Kant thought, the sole sufficient condition of experience.

Thus Hartmann's apriority is always merely hypothetical since it is a construction of being beyond experience, whereas Kant's apodicticity is found in a regressus upon conditions, found as it were beneath experience; Kant's apodicticity is therefore not hypothetical when regarded only in terms of that experience based upon it, and not in terms of a neutral or objective ontology. To infer characters of being from experi-

56. It is here that Wood's criticism most nearly approaches Hartmann's. "The critical epistemology is not incompatable with the transcendental idealism, yet Kant's argument from the one to the other is certainly inconclusive. I am convinced that the really significant insights of the critical epistemology could be preserved even if the whole transcendental paraphernalia were either abolished altogether or else translated into psychological terms. Kant's *metaphysical* idealism—for it is that despite Kant's professed repudiation of all dogmatic metaphysics—is, in relation to his critical rationalism, a mere suppelmentary hypothesis which has to compete on terms of equality with the rival hypothesis of realism." ("The Transcendental Method," in *The Heritage of Kant*, p. 18.) For "psychological" read "ontological," and the agreement is perfect.

ence (and by this being one must mean a modally pregnant being, another being than experience itself), is to construct an hypothesis which goes beyond the fact of experience. Thus, though it can be said that Kant's transcendental idealism is an ontological hypothesis, it is an hypothesis giving the minimum conditions of an actual experience. Hartmann's assertion of being is, since it contains non-experiential determination of both experience as a being and the being experienced, in contrast with it, speculative and dogmatic. In a word, Hartmann hypostasizes being as necessary in a way in which he admits Kant does not have to hypostasize the transcendental subject as a being in any pregnant sense.[57]

Kant does not hold there may be no unknowable principles of *Ansichsein,* nor does he hold there may be no unknown aspects of the twelve categories and two forms. All that he denies is that there may be unknown principles which are *a priori* for experience as it is constituted. (We know this from his assertion of the exhaustiveness of his analysis.) But his theory in its essentials would not be adversely affected, as Ledger Wood has shown, by regarding the list of categories as merely a *de facto* analysis just as his statement of the forms of intuitions was. All that is essential is the assertion that every necessary principle in experience corresponds to a necessary condition of experience; as to the manner of discovery we need make no restrictions.

VI. THE THING IN ITSELF

Finally, we come to the last decisive problem, that of the status of the thing in itself. Though Kant expresses himself sometimes loosely in regard to it, for purposes of evaluating Hartmann's criticism several easily documented theses may be taken as expressive of Kant's views:

(i) The thing in itself is that which "affects" the senses to produce the "presentations of the things which are unknown in their nature," and these presentations are phenomena.[58]

(ii) What we do know is the phenomenon which is under conditions which do not hold for the things in themselves but only for our own experiencing; therefore it is not only possible but also necessary that there be *a priori* knowledge of appearance.[59]

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57. Cf. Seelbach, *op. cit.*, p. 14. On the hypostasis of being as a necessary fact, cf. my review of Weiss's "Reality," in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. I, pp. 114-119, 1940.

58. K. d. r. V., B, p. 164.

59. K. d. r. V., A, p. 29.

(iii) But the thing in itself, not falling under these conditions, is not known *a priori*.[60]

(iv) Furthermore, there is no resemblance between the quality of the phenomenon and that "character" of the thing in itself which "excites" the specific sensation in me; in fact, such a conception is meaningless, and no *a posteriori* knowledge of the thing in itself is possible, or at least no *a posteriori* knowledge of it as it is in itself is possible.[61]

(v) Nevertheless, the thing in itself is real, because it is logically required that the appearance be of something real. It is the "other side of appearance."[62]

The first of these theses requires little attention. It has long been realized that Kant committed a subreption in applying causality beyond possible experience. Furthermore, it is also generally recognized that a causal theory of knowledge is inadequate, regardless of the status of the entities supposed to be concerned in knowledge; and in this first thesis, and also in part in the fourth, Kant has not completely resisted the seduction of Locke's analysis. Hartmann is rightly insistent upon the "transcausal" character of the knowledge relation.

Moreover, there is agreement as regards the fourth thesis in so far as Hartmann thinks of sensuous material as a system of symbols of that which is not sensuous [63] and Kant holds that an "empirical ideality" can be attributed to the *a posteriori* sense contents.[64] They agree that there is no "migration" of the characters of things in themselves into sensation, and that there is no resemblance between a sensation and its correlate. Hartmann holds, however, that there may be an "intersubjective apriority" of the sense material; such a belief is not expressed by Kant, but there is no fundamental reason why he might not accept that view. Nevertheless, Hartmann does argue that there may be *a posteriori* knowledge of the thing in itself, for all true knowledge is of an *Ansichsein;* therefore their disagreement here is a mere corollary of their divergent views concerning the second thesis.

Similarly, little discussion of the last thesis is required. In both systems, appearance is of a real thing which is not limited to the sphere of experience. For Hartmann, the *Ansichsein* includes the "objectified" and the "transobjective" as continuous parts, with the boundary between them being shifted in the direction of the latter in the progress of

60. K. d. r. V., B, p. 56.
61. *Prolegomena*, sect. 13, note 2.
62. K. d. r. V., B, 55; A, 391. Hartman would, of course, say "phenomenologically required."
63. *Metaphysik*, pp. 382-387.
64. K. d. r. V., B, 52-53.

knowledge. For Kant, however, this boundary is fixed, being that between the phenomenal world and the noumenal. The progress of knowledge occurs wholly within the former, with the transcendental object a mere x which is to be progressively characterized. The thing in itself, in its own nature, does not appear, if we mean by that that it becomes phenomenal. It is at most the substratum of experience. It is here that Hartmann makes an illicit criticism. He says, "If the thing in itself is the partially appearing behind the appearance, and in its unknown and infinite remainder but the continuation of the known, then it would be an astonishing coincidence if the accidental limits of possible experience were the same as the limits of the validity of the categories in it." [65] But for Kant there is not this continuity which Hartmann hypothesizes and which he finds only on the basis of his original *Auffassung*[66] and because of his empty assertion of the community of all being. Therefore the limits of the former are not accidental for Kant, and their coincidence with the limits of the categories is not astonishing. In fact, they are essentially related as two different expressions of the basic heterogeneity between appearance and that which is (ambiguously) said to "appear" in it.

Hartmann, however, is here arguing from his own thesis of the ontic continuity which Kant denies in the second thesis. But the force of Hartmann's thesis of homogeneity is considerably weakened by one consideration. We have already seen how the concept of being is unable to effect any actual synthesis or categorization of "everything which in any sense is," and the spurious unity of Being is disrupted by the various tensions which Hartmann finds within it. Here he asserts that the unknowable aspects or parts of the object depend, for their unknowableness, not on any intrinsic peculiarity they have, but solely on the incapacity of the subject-being or the knowledge relation to "bridge the gnoseological distance" from the subject, and he admits that there is an undetermined point dependent only upon the nature of the being of the subject, and not on any intrinsic peculiarity of a specifically "unknowable" being, beyond which this boundary cannot be pushed. Thus the world of Being itself develops the heterogeneities he had decried in Kant's separation of appearance and reality.[67]

Once again, the looseness of the unification through the concept of

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65. *Metaphysik*, p. 227.

66. Cf. above, p. 474.

67. The distinction between appearance and reality returns in Hartmann with almost the same force as is in the *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, sect. 77, "Von der Eigentümlichkeit des menschlichen Verstandes . . ." For it is merely a peculiarity of knowing, says Hartman, that it takes its object from a perspective, and "Appearance is the objective structure of consciousness differentiated from the object."—*Metaphysik*, p. 225.

being is obvious when Hartmann comes to the problem of the antinomies. It was the discovery of the antinomies which led Kant to abandon rational ontology after he had written the dissertation of 1770. Kant's attempt to solve the antinomies does not fail to do justice to the *Aporie* itself; it is an attempt not to deny the antinomial character of the different aspects of experience, but rather to use these to show the distinction between phenomenally appearing and ontologically being. Hartmann, in denying the ultimacy of the distinction, is faced with the same kind of problem (with a different coefficient, as it were), which Berkeley would have had to struggle with had he known of the antinomial character of his metaphysical assertions. That is to say, when the distinction between appearing and merely being is regarded as accidental, then *esse,* whether interpreted as *percipi* or *Ansichsein,* itself becomes antinomial. Thus Hartmann develops, as the only alternative to Kant's distinction which will not rationalize the antinomies away, the highly speculative and uneconomical theory that "being itself is disharmonious, and conflict is the form of its being. In this case we must assume that the principle of contradiction does not actually, or at least only conditionally, obtain for the sphere of the ontic real." [68] Here, with the logical law as a form dominating only the *ratio,* the distinction between appearance and reality is surreptitiously introduced even after being has been made antinomial and chaotic.

We have now seen that the divergences with reference to each of these theses, where they do exist, depend upon Hartmann's rejection of the second and third of Kant's views which I have listed at the beginning of this section, or at least that part of them which says that the *a priori* conditions of phenomena are not conditions of things in themselves. But this thesis is absolutely central for Kant, and its rejection is decisive for Hartmann. Each philosopher gives an essentially similar picture of the *fact* of phenomenation; what Kant cannot do and what Hartmann attempts in spite of the acknowledged antinomies is to generalize beyond these phenomena as kinds of being to a general ontic continuity. This ontic continuity is not, however, as we have seen, necessary for accounting for the reality-phenomenon or for empirical realism.[69] In Kant, the thing in itself provides only for aposteriority;

68. "Wie ist kritische Ontologie ümberhapt möglich?" pp. 174-175. Though it cannot be dogmatically asserted that this is Hartmann's final view, nevertheless at that (1924) it was the only alternative to Kant's theory which he gave more than a mere nod to.

69. Kant is quite insistent upon the adequacy of his concept of object to satisfy all the phenomenological demands, and Hartman concedes this in admitting Kant's empirical realism. The fact that it is not *a priori* does not, as we have seen, touch any relevant point here.

but to construct an *a priori* theory which is to apply to it is to assert more about it than we know, and indeed more than we need to know in order to understand the phenomena. Therefore Hartmann's ontology, which tries to do this, is speculative and, in Kant's sense, dogmatic.

LEWIS WHITE BECK.

EMORY UNIVERSITY AND
THE UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE