

# To Accelerate Transportation Progress

## **The New York State bond proposal**

New York State proposes to issue \$2½ billion in transportation bonds: \$1¼ billion to speed highway construction, \$1 billion to modernize commuter railroads and expand and improve transit systems, and \$250 million to facilitate air travel.

The money is scheduled to be spent in the next five years.

The bond money will not replace federal aid—the State expects to get its full share. However, some federally-aided projects may be initiated before federal money is allotted, in order to speed the work. When the federal grant is actually disbursed, the money will be returned to the bond program fund so that the full \$2½ billion will be spent for the State's share of transportation projects.

**THE REGION'S SHARE.** The State Administration has established a formula for highway investment from the bond program which would allocate about 51 percent of the money to the thirteen counties in or related to the New York Metropolitan Region. The population of these counties is about 67 percent of the State's total. The difference between the share of highway funds and population will be made up by heavy investment in public transportation in the Region so that we can expect at least two-thirds of the State bond investment to be placed where two-thirds of the State population now lives.

A VOTE ON THE BOND PROPOSAL will be held November 7, 1967. Regional Plan Association strongly urges that it be approved.

## **A new transportation era**

The program to be financed by the proposed bond issue effectively begins a new era in urban transportation that has been dawning since the early 1960's.

The continuing importance of public transportation to carry people to work in urban areas is now widely accepted by state and federal officials. They also recognize the need to plan public transportation together with highways and both in relation to a consciously chosen pattern of development.

We have a new United States Department of Transportation, and New Jersey and New York have established state departments of transportation, bringing together policy-making on almost all aspects of moving

people and goods. In 1961, the federal government began providing capital grants for public transportation for the first time (responding, in part, to Regional Plan's commuter transportation study for the United States Senate), and each of the three states of the Region has initiated systematic support for commuter railroad service and has made plans for its modernization, which also reflected Regional Plan recommendations. In New York State, a single agency, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, soon will be in charge of the subways and of that portion of commuter rail service operated by the State as well as parts of the highway links to Manhattan. New York State also has a new Office of Planning Coordination, which will relate State capital investment to urban plans. New Jersey's new Department of Community Affairs will fulfill a similar function, and Connecticut has a full-scale State planning program.

Potentially most important, the Tri-State Transportation Commission has been established (after a decade of pressure by Regional Plan Association) to plan the entire Region's transportation based on a conception of good future development. Tri-State is empowered to review all federal aid proposals for projects affecting regional development patterns.


All that is missing to make this new planning and coordination effective in shaping urban development is money. The proposed New York State bond issue for transportation will provide funds in sufficient amount to make substantial progress on a metropolitan transportation system for this Region and related transportation improvements elsewhere in the State. Regional Plan has urged New Jersey to take a similar step. (See page 10.)

## **The highway program**

The New York State Administration estimates highway needs for the next five years to be \$3.984 billion. Of this, federal contributions are expected to total \$1.470 billion during the five-year period.

This program represents about a 40 percent speed-up in highway spending throughout the State, compared to the five years ending in 1966. The acceleration is justified because urban development will not wait. Regional Plan projects a population in the metropolitan





Map 1



area around New York City of 30 million by 2000, compared to 19 million in 1965. By 1975, there will be 15 percent more households than there were in 1965. And a systematic limited-access highway network has not yet been completed on which a well-planned metropolitan region can be formed.

The bond issue will apply to the regional highway system rather than to local streets, and principally to the work-horse of urban travel, the limited-access highway. In this Region, these highways carry about 30 percent of all vehicle miles of travel, though they cover less than 10 percent of the land devoted to public rights-of-way.

While a planned highway network will not guarantee a region free of uncoordinated sprawl, it is a necessity for any reasonable alternative to sprawl.

For example, the pattern of development which Regional Plan Association has been testing as a basis for its Second Regional Plan for the New York metropolitan area could only work if money were available for expressways. The tentative Regional Plan proposal calls for a series of new or enlarged major centers of commerce, education and culture—some in outer parts of New York City, some in present suburbs, some in areas still rural but soon to be developed. These centers would never be built or enlarged without adequate expressway access.

According to the Association's analysis, such centers will be important to the economy of the Region and the State because the types of jobs that can be expected to be added in the Region over the rest of the century will be almost entirely in offices rather than in factories. Traditionally, offices tend to cluster, usually along with other services and activities, in downtowns and newer versions of downtowns. Without efficient transportation on which such clusters can be developed, some office establishments would be likely to seek other urban areas where there were urban centers.

A limited-access highway network planned in accordance with a considered pattern of urban development can actually cut the amount of land required for rights-of-way while increasing the speed of travel—if the network is built before haphazard urbanization destroys the possibility of a planned development pattern. The sooner rights-of-way are acquired, the less disruption of homes and businesses is necessary. Throughout the State, residential areas, parks, stores and factories are now threatened by necessary highway widening and new arteries. By acquiring rights-of-way in advance of urbanization, this can be avoided.

With adequate regional planning, this proposed highway investment will not simply build wherever added highway demand is anticipated, in the process inducing more demand which then gradually leads to more and more highways. In the context of the new look at urban transportation in the nation and the State—the new emphasis on public transportation along with highways and on coordination of transportation with broader




Recent suburban expressways in New York State: Northern State Parkway extension in Smithtown, L.I., and the interchange of Interstate Routes 87 and 84 with State Highways 6 and 22 near Brewster in Putnam County.

planning, it seems likely that the bond issue will produce the kind of highway system that will contribute to a well-planned region.

**HIGHWAYS FOR THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN REGION.** Key links are still missing in the kind of metropolitan highway network conceived in the Association's first plan, the 1929 *Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs*. Particularly important missing links are the Cross-Brooklyn Expressway, Lower Manhattan Expressway, an expressway network for Staten Island, and the unfinished portions of the Clearview and Nassau Expressways in Queens, of the Bruckner Expressway in the Bronx, and of the Wantagh-Oyster Bay Expressway in Nassau County.

In addition, urbanization in the Region extends about fifty square miles more every year, and the highway network should be kept a step ahead of that development to minimize disruption and assure optimum alignments. Extending the Long Island Expressway to Riverhead, continuing the Sunrise Highway eastward in Suffolk County, building Interstate 84 across Dutchess and Orange Counties from Connecticut to Pennsylvania (at Port Jervis), providing expressway service from the Beacon area to the New York State Thruway in central Westchester and arterials in the Poughkeepsie area are needed extensions planned by New York State.

Without endorsing any particular alignment or design, Regional Plan supports new or extended highways in these corridors as parts of a total regional highway system.



Louis B. Schlieve

Two contrasting solutions to the urban expressway: A depressed and an elevated section of the Brooklyn-Queens expressway in Williamsburg. An urban expressway does not have to be ugly or blighting, but good design and integration with the surrounding community do cost money.

Recently proposed bridges across Long Island Sound would **not** be financed by the bond issue, the State Administration has stated. The proposals for these bridges call for financing by revenue bonds through a public authority.

The missing links in Brooklyn and Lower Manhattan have particularly broad ramifications.

In highway service, Brooklyn's population is the most underserved in the Region. This has two significant effects on the problems of New York City: (1) slow automobile travel is one reason middle-income people move out of the City—it is another missing amenity; (2) poor truck access is an important reason why employers move out of the City. This is equally true for Lower Manhattan. The local streets between the Holland Tunnel and the Williamsburg and Manhattan Bridges carry the heaviest truck traffic of any comparable stretch in the world. But at speeds of eight miles per hour, goods movement is costly for manufacturers on the Lower West Side of Manhattan and in Brooklyn, adding to the other limitations of City sites. This forces more unskilled jobs out of the City, where many are inaccessible to the unskilled workers living in the City. This is the principal reason for a Lower Manhattan Expressway.

In these instances, well-planned highways would preserve the urban fabric rather than destroy it. The

City's efforts to maintain middle-income families and unskilled jobs would be aided by construction of these two links.

### The public transportation program

Public transportation needs for the 1967-72 period are estimated by the State Administration to cost \$2.1 billion. Some aid is expected from the federal government.

Most of the public transportation funds from the bond issue will be invested in the New York Region's rail system, according to Administration statements, with high priority given to relief of gross overcrowding on the subways. The bond investment will add to the \$200 million already committed for the Long Island Rail Road to nearly double speeds, improve service and enlarge capacity. The bond funds also would provide New York State's share of the rehabilitation of the New Haven Railroad, and the Staten Island Rapid Transit line also would be improved.

In 1961 (at the request of the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee), Regional Plan Association made the case for modernizing the Region's commuter rail network and set the dimension of investment needed for a minimum program of efficiency, comfort and speed. It was then \$800 million; with increased construction costs, this could read close to a billion now. About \$500 million of that money would be needed in New York State, the rest in New Jersey and Connecticut.

In 1966, the Association estimated that the New York City subway system needed \$1½ billion in capital funds for appropriate expansion and modernization. Since some of the State public transportation investment will go upstate and the Regional Plan railroad program was minimal, it is clear that the \$2.1 billion estimate of public transportation needs by the State Administration is not extravagant.

This investment would raise the efficiency of the commuter railroads of the Region so that operating costs can be held in check in the face of constantly rising wages. It would increase the frequency, speed and amenity on both subways and railroads. It could expand rail capacity from Queens and the Bronx and on the East Side of Manhattan, providing, among other things, direct rail access from Long Island to midtown's East Side.

WHY PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION? In New York City, the 1966 subway strike dramatically demonstrated that business could not be conducted there without subways. Even with the beginning and ending of work staggered over some five hours, with people spending extra hours travelling to work, with commuter railroads carrying unusual loads, and with many people not coming to work at all, the system broke down because people could not move within the central business district during the day. Manual workers were stopped for lack of materials; office workers were stopped for lack of face-to-face communication, for which they located in



Manhattan in the first place. The subway strike was decisive proof that this center, at least, could not work without rail transit.

Most other large urban areas have retreated recently from the conviction of the 1950's that all trips could be made by auto. Several are planning or building new metropolitan transit systems, including Los Angeles, San Francisco, Washington, D. C., Seattle, Baltimore, Atlanta, Pittsburgh, Toronto and Montreal. Major extensions and improvements have been made in rail service in the Cleveland, Boston, Philadelphia and Chicago metropolitan areas.

Closely-knit downtowns that require transit are again gaining jobs and activities after a period when many urban facilities had scattered in a search for easier automobile accessibility. The reason for a resurgence of compact downtowns is that they have been found to be more efficient for those enterprises which have a large number of continuing relationships to other organizations, i.e., either frequent contacts with a large number of persons outside the organization who should be within a short time-distance from them or customers shared with other firms which should be nearby. Even though it is slower to get around these compact downtowns—sometimes as slow as the pedestrian speed of three miles per hour—more workers are within a few minutes of each other in a large compact downtown than in more spread business areas where everyone can drive and park easily.

A comparison within the New York Region illustrates.

In central Nassau County on Long Island, there is an excellent example of a spread, highway-oriented "downtown." There, about 100,000 jobs are in a 25-mile square. Travelling by car, as nearly everyone does within this central Nassau commercial area, the average speed on a short trip (i.e., ten minutes) from one work place to another is about ten miles per hour, figuring total travel from desk to desk, including walking to and from the parking lot, starting the car, etc. So a person in or near this densest area of jobs in Nassau County could reach within a ten-minute trip (1.6 miles square) any of 11,000 jobs. This indicates the range of "linkages" an enterprise could have to other enterprises within ten minutes, if it were located in highway-oriented central Nassau.

In downtown Newark, with 90,000 jobs per square mile, one can walk (at three miles per hour) to twice as many jobs (22,500) in ten minutes. In Manhattan's central business district, where half-a-million workers are housed in a single square mile, one can reach 220,000 jobs within ten minutes at a speed averaging four miles per hour, including elevator and walking time. And this has become the supreme business center in the United States. (See Chart 1.)

With increasing office jobs—which are more cheaply and easily brought close together and need to be close together more frequently than factory jobs—closely-knit downtowns are likely to continue to expand.

It had been assumed a few years ago that with enough parking garages and expressways, any center could operate with automobiles alone. More recent experience and design efforts refute this.

Large compact centers require public transportation both for circulation within the central business district and for a large percentage of workers travelling to their jobs. The automobile is bulky; where space is at a premium, it cannot be efficiently driven or stored. Manhattan central business district streets, for example, are virtually saturated throughout the working day, yet only one worker out of twenty drives to work. Most smaller central business districts become nearly saturated with cars, also—and the number of cars entering the densest square mile of most central business districts (densest daytime population) during the working day is remarkably similar regardless of how large the downtown is. Chart 2 illustrates. Newark, for example, has 42,000 cars entering its densest square mile daily, while Manhattan (with 6 times as many workers per square mile) has 46,000. Above that figure, arrivals are by public transportation: 100,000 in Newark's densest square mile, 1 million in Manhattan's.\*

So, for the kind of commercial and cultural centers that fit the needs of a large metropolis, public transportation, both bus and rail, is essential.





Chart 1. Jobs within a ten-minute square of travel time. More of central Nassau County's 100,000 jobs can be reached within ten minutes than Paterson's 36,000 central business district jobs, even though Nassau's are spread over 25 square miles and Paterson's are within a single square mile—because the automobile can operate conveniently in Nassau. But to have many more jobs within ten minutes, a compact center is necessary. More than twice as many jobs are accessible within ten minutes by foot in downtown Newark than in central Nassau by car. In Manhattan, by foot and subway, 220,000 jobs are accessible within ten minutes.

\* Figures from the Tri-State Transportation Commission.



## TRAVEL TO HEART OF CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICTS BY AUTO AND BY TRANSIT



Source: Tri-State Transportation Commission

**Chart 2. Comparison of travel to the densest square mile (daytime population) of large and small central business districts shows that the number of persons arriving by automobile during the day varies much less than the total number of arrivals, e.g., Manhattan arrivals by automobiles are only 50 percent greater than White Plains', but total arrivals are about 2300 percent greater; Newark's arrivals by car are about 30 percent greater than White Plains' but total arrivals are nearly 300 percent greater.**

These figures differ from those in the text, which refer to the number of **vehicles** entering the densest square mile (46,000 in Manhattan, 42,000 in Newark) rather than to the number of persons in those vehicles. There are typically more persons per vehicle entering Manhattan's densest square mile than the smaller central business districts.

**WHY RAIL INVESTMENT IN THE REGION IS NEEDED NOW.** Demand for office space in Manhattan is tremendous. Of all new office space in a 13,000-square-mile area around the Port of New York between 1957 and 1965, over half was built in the 8½ square miles between Central Park and the Battery. But despite this office boom, total employment in the Manhattan central business district remained stable because factory and warehouse jobs declined as office jobs increased. Now, for the first time in a third of a century, the demand to locate office jobs in the Manhattan central business district seems likely to outpace the decline in other jobs.

The demand will be there—but will the transportation? Almost every artery into the central business district is at or very near capacity during peak periods. The only way to enlarge total jobs in the Manhattan central business district is to enlarge transportation capacity. This would be done through the bond program via new subway and commuter railroad capacity.

The economy of the whole State and Region would suffer if this isn't done. It is the top-level executive and professional work of industry, government and national

associations that would be located in Manhattan for the most part if transportation were available, and these jobs are the foundation of the Region's economy.

Added rail capacity to the central business district would be needed without additional jobs, in fact, because standards of comfort already are far too low. The New York City Transit Authority estimates that subways from the Queens and the Bronx are overcrowded by 22,000 and 30,000 respectively—and Transit Authority standards of crowding are far from what most people consider reasonable comfort nowadays. Standards of amenity go up all around us, but they are deteriorating on these overcrowded subway lines. This is one more reason why those who can afford to move out of the City do so, leaving in large areas of the City only those who cannot afford to leave—ultimately threatening the social stability of the Region.

It may even be a reason for the jobs to move from the Region entirely. Top-level office establishments will locate in the Region only if top-level talent is available, and talent can go anywhere and has, in fact, been following the pleasurable life in recent years. (Nevada, Arizona, California and Florida are the fastest-growing states.) So far, New York remains attractive to top-talent jobs, but standards of living must be maintained if this is to continue.

Modernization of commuter rail lines is overdue for two reasons. First, operating expenses keep rising without compensating increases in patronage. Increased productivity, based on modern equipment, is essential. In addition, Manhattan employees are moving farther out

**Some improvements in subway quality:** A new Sixth Avenue subway station (lower right) which will open soon, compared to a typical older subway passage and platform.





Klaus Huboi



in the Region as urbanization spreads, making increased speed important if Manhattan is to continue to attract talent from all over the metropolitan area.

But all the office jobs that will want to locate in the metropolitan area over the rest of the century could not possibly go to Manhattan. At least half, and probably much more than half, of the jobs in office buildings projected for the area under study for the Second Regional Plan—at least 700,000 of 1.4 million—can be expected to locate outside Manhattan. But where? Perhaps two-fifths will be related to Manhattan jobs but will not themselves have to be in Manhattan—for example, routine operations of corporate headquarters. The most convenient location for such activities seems to be in business centers outside of Manhattan which have some outside services needed by these office functions—e.g., business machine services and repairs, messenger service, restaurants, shops attractive to clerical personnel. But their relationship to Manhattan also will require good all-day rail service.

Among likely sites for such new office centers, identified by Regional Plan for further investigation, are downtown Brooklyn, Jamaica and Mitchel Field (central Nassau County), all of which would be strengthened by the Long Island Rail Road's increased speed, more frequent off-peak service and greater comfort that would result from the bond program. While a relatively few workers in the smaller centers will commute to work by train, most of those with business in Manhattan during the day (except those in Brooklyn) would travel there by train if it were convenient and fast.



Map 2. Persons working in each ring. Bars indicate number of persons working in each ring. Percentages show what proportion travels to work by auto.

VALUE TO THOSE WHO DRIVE TO WORK. Nearly half of the Region's work force goes to work by automobile and probably always will. (See Map 2.) How would the public transportation investment help them?

For those who drive to jobs in the Manhattan central business district (about 100,000 of the 2 million daytime workers there), benefits will be swift. In fact, the only way auto traffic can be speeded is by increasing public transportation speed. Experience reveals that any additional highway capacity that is built will quickly be filled until door-to-door travel time by auto again is, at best, just a little shorter than the public transportation alternative. On the other hand, if public transportation speed and attractiveness are raised, some motorists can be expected to switch to rail until highway speeds are raised by decongestion so that travel time by automobile again is slightly shorter than by rail—but everyone has benefitted by higher speeds. In other words, rail and highway speeds are closely related; generally, door-to-door travel speeds on streets and highways are held down by rail speeds.



Klaus Huboi



Philip Israel





Metropolitan Transportation Authority

**Model of new Long Island Railroad Cars:** More comfort and twice the speed are promised for many LIRR commuters.

For the 645,000 who drive to work in New York City outside the Manhattan central business district, all those driving toward Manhattan on major arteries or toward other present or potential job centers (particularly downtown Brooklyn and Jamaica) will benefit from keeping as many rush-hour travellers as possible on rails. Vastly improved subway and commuter rail service can be expected to do this.

Outside of New York City, suburban commuters by auto—who have no public transportation option—also compete, and will increasingly, with motorists who could be on buses or railroads. Those on main inbound arteries may be crowded by Manhattan-bound motorists. Though these Manhattan-bound motorists are few in comparison with total Manhattan employees, they are many in competition for highway space in key travel corridors in the inner suburbs, where there is little room for highway expansion.

But for significant relief from traffic congestion in the inner suburbs, it will be necessary to shift more than the Manhattan-bound motorists to public transportation, and this requires planned arrangements of jobs and highways as well as good public transportation itself.

**WHY SUBSIDIZE THE RAIL RIDER?** It is sometimes asserted that the motorist pays the entire cost of highways, and the rail rider should pay the entire cost of subway and railroad service. But according to research for the Temporary Commission on City Finances, the motorist only pays about half the costs of New York City government attributable to his use of the car. And even if he were paying the total cost, he would never be willing to share the cost of building sufficient highways to bring everyone to his job by automobile. Put another way, rails in the New York Region carry the high cost peak load: about 80 percent of all persons arriving in the Manhattan central business district between 8 and 9 a.m. come on rails. By contrast, automobiles and taxis

together bring in only 9 percent of peak-hour arrivals. Whatever mode is used, this peak-hour capacity, not needed the rest of the day, costs more per user than transportation capacity used more evenly throughout the day. The motorist has just as much responsibility for paying the unavoidably heavy peak-hour costs as the rail rider. Using rail for peak loads is least expensive to the Manhattan central business district, where travel flows are very peaked. Using automobiles would be most expensive.

It was estimated by the Joint Committee on Washington Metropolitan Problems in 1959 that the cost of bringing in 80,000 added Manhattan central business district employees would be 16 times as great by auto as by added Pennsylvania Railroad capacity and for 120,000 more Philadelphia employees, the investment needed to bring them in by automobile would be 7 times as great as the cost of improving Pennsylvania Railroad service to accommodate them. Another example from this Region: the cost of the proposed third tube for the Queens-Midtown Tunnel and expressway approaches would be about \$25,000 per added daily auto entry—figuring total costs, debt service, and maintenance, about \$4 per trip.

In short, if the State refused to take responsibility for maintaining rail service in the New York Region and chose instead to build highways to take care of the peak travel demand, the resulting highway costs would be astronomical, and the motorist of today—everywhere in the State—would share in paying them. (The upstate motorist would lose along with the New York Metropolitan Region motorist because all highway taxes are paid into and out of the same State fund.) If rail service were maintained but fares were forced upward significantly, the Region's auto commuter would lose, too, because each fare rise brings more rail riders onto the highways and almost all highways are operating above design capacity already at peak hours and therefore at low speeds and efficiency. The motorist therefore has both a stake and a responsibility in sharing the peak-hour travel costs. Compared to building highways for this demand, the subsidy for rail service is a bargain for the whole State.


In other words, the bond issue will buy transportation—downstate by a combination of public transportation and highway, which will produce the most efficient travel, upstate primarily by highway, which is most efficient there.

### **Why more money for airports?**




Airport needs for 1967-72 are estimated by the State Administration at \$330 million, of which some is expected from the federal government.

The Port of New York Authority has projected that the number of plane movements in peak hours will exceed capacity at the three major airports of the Region before 1970. Already, rush-hour delays are usual. More important, the mixing of small airplanes and large appears to threaten flight safety.





## STATUS OF RAILROADS

-  PASSENGER SERVICE 1967
-  FREIGHT ONLY
-  ELECTRIFIED LINES



Immediately, general aviation (private aircraft and air taxis) should have its own facilities—where possible, runways at the present airports which do not interfere with airline flights; if necessary, separate fields not competitive in air space with the three major airports.

While no bond funds would finance a fourth jetport for the Region, the general aviation fields would alleviate congestion at the three major airports.

The Tri-State Transportation Commission has proposed developing or improving thirty-two general aviation airports in the Region at a cost of approximately \$38 million. The three-year-old Tri-State report, not yet acted on, could be the starting point for a general aviation airport plan.

Again, time is pressing. The proposed New York State bond issue is the most feasible method of initiating a general aviation airport program quickly.

The other pressing need in handling the rise in air traffic is reorganization of airports for airliners two to four times the size of the largest now flying. Airplanes holding up to 500 persons (Boeing's B-747) are expected soon, with at least as many planes landing during peak hours at each airport as there are now. This means that, at least at Kennedy Airport, rail service to and from Manhattan will become both feasible and essential. Some of the State bond money probably will be needed for this reorganization of passenger movements to and from terminals.

### **But should transportation have a high priority?**

With all the needs of our urban areas—particularly those of the poor—is this investment in transportation justified? Regional Plan believes it is: because it will directly benefit everyone, including the poor, and because it need not compete with other public programs for the poor.

It will benefit the poor, most of whom live in New York City and other old cities, by strengthening the economies of those cities and keeping more jobs there and by maintaining the cities as the center of metropolitan activities. The cities therefore remain important to everyone whether he lives in the suburbs or not. It will insure good public transportation at a reasonable fare. Half of New York City's families have no car. Finally, if the quality of transportation does not keep up with the need and if jobs drift away, middle-income families can move elsewhere with their jobs; the poor often are simply abandoned. Movement of factories out of congested parts of New York City and the difficulty of the unskilled in following them is a current illustration.

### **New Jersey's needs**

The New York bond issue deals with only a segment of a metropolitan transportation system.

Some of the important missing highway links are in New Jersey, including the incomplete portions of Interstate Highways 78, 80 and 95, New Jersey Freeways 21 and 24, the Hoboken Freeway, and an expressway system

for growing Middlesex and Monmouth Counties. New Jersey's Transportation Commissioner has estimated that the State must invest \$1 billion just to catch up with obvious current highway needs, without beginning improvements in speed and safety or preparing for the swift growth in population and jobs that New Jersey can anticipate. The Interstate system in New Jersey is only 43 percent complete, compared to 87 percent in Connecticut, 80 percent in New York State, and 57 percent in the nation as a whole. Some New Jersey Interstate highways have been delayed for lack of State funds even though the federal government pays 90 percent. In addition, Regional Plan has estimated that minimal commuter railroad modernization in New Jersey will cost nearly half-a-billion dollars.

Of the new general aviation airports needed, Tri-State has proposed that ten be developed in New Jersey.

The Association has urged New Jersey, too, to issue bonds to catch up in transportation. Only a demonstration that the State's backlog will be taken care of, that New Jersey will join the rest of the Region in transportation modernization, can assure that sector of a reasonable share of the Region's prospective office jobs and homes of high-level executives, who work mainly in Manhattan. (While only 28 percent of the Region's labor force works in the Manhattan central business district, 40 percent of those who earn above \$10,000 a year do. These people seldom live where transportation is seriously inadequate.)

### **Summary**

Regional Plan Association concludes that all residents of the New York Metropolitan Region have strong reasons to support the New York State \$2½ billion transportation bond issue in the referendum of November 7, 1967:

- It will close important highway system gaps in New York City and other congested areas of the State. It will extend expressways ahead of heavy urbanization, minimizing their cost and human disruption and making it possible to shape urban growth rationally.
- It will provide funds to modernize and expand the New York City subways and commuter railroads, improving transportation both for those using these services and for those who must use the highways and roads of the Region, which otherwise would become intolerably crowded.
- Good transportation is needed to maintain the Region's (and State's) economy, particularly as the major emphasis of the economy shifts from manufacturing to office work.
- Good transportation affects the total quality of life in the Region. It transforms an urban area into a metropolis: without it, urban man gets only the disadvantages of massed population; with it, as the metropolis grows, he enlarges his choice of jobs, housing types and neighborhoods, goods, services, activities and friends, and his access to the countryside.



# BOOKSHELF

**METROPOLITAN COMMUNITIES: A BIBLIOGRAPHY SUPPLEMENT: 1958-1964** compiled by Barbara Hudson and Robert H. McDonald, Public Administration Service, 1967. 536 pp. \$10.00.

The third in a series covering forty years' published output, this annotated bibliography should be known to all who are involved in the study of metropolitan communities. Although the primary emphasis is on government and politics (4720 of 6282 entries), there is a section on socio-economic factors.

**THE STATE'S BIGGEST BUSINESS—LOCAL AND REGIONAL PROBLEMS; Report of the Connecticut Commission to Study the Necessity and Feasibility of Metropolitan Government.** January 1967. 59 pp. Free.


The Connecticut General Assembly established the Commission in 1965 to make recommendations on how governmental structure might be adapted to the economic, social, and political changes accompanying rapid urbanization in that state. This report suggests that the state prepare for a major role in urban and regional development.

The idea of a system of metropolitan governments is rejected in favor of a "regional partnership" under which local and state levels would meet halfway to perform certain services regionally (for example, waste disposal, water supply and distribution). Such services, it is suggested, could be administered under a State Department of Administration and Urban Affairs, which would be a union of already existing agencies such as the Department of Finance and Control, Connecticut Development Commission, and Personnel Department. The primary aim of the proposed Department would be to serve local governments by coordinating certain of their activities at the regional level. At the same time, certain state functions would be decentralized to the regional level.

**URBAN RESEARCH AND POLICY PLANNING** edited by Leo F. Schnore and Henry Fagin. Sage Publications, Inc., 1967. 638 pp. \$20.00.

This book summarizes the aims and progress of planning since World War II. Part I, Urban Research, includes essays on the social, economic, geographic and political segments of the planning process. Part II, Policy Planning, cuts across disciplinary lines to analyze the planning process as it affects decisions which shape urban life in various political arenas. Noted professionals introduce the reader to the newest techniques of urban research, including urban-regional and intra-urban economics, models of travel behavior, and site design in housing, as well as new concepts of planning's role in policy-making. A 27-page bibliography is included.

Janice Stewart



## Regional Plan Association

230 West 41st Street New York, N.Y. 10036 565-1714

*A citizens organization dedicated to the development of an efficient, attractive and varied three state metropolitan region surrounding the Port of New York.*

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

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