


# BRIDGEPORT:



## Progress, Prospects, Potential and Proposals, 1981

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## FOREWORD

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Bridgeport is brass—tarnished brass. Bridgeport is a grimy mill town. That's the general impression, especially to those who speed by on the New England Thruway and the railroad.

Reconnoiter with us, and you will be introduced to quite a different Bridgeport. We share with you this realistic view of Bridgeport by virtue of a tripartite undertaking: the Bridgeport Area Foundation and allied business community, the City of Bridgeport and Regional Plan Association shared equally in the cost of this investigation.

Association staff conducted the study with the generous assistance of people in the City itself, State officials and people doing business there. (See back page.)

Though the Connecticut sector of our Region includes but 9 percent of its 19 million people, it has been rapidly changing economically. Consequently, the Association has been increasingly active there over the past decade.

A "Future of Southern Fairfield County" conference brought together 1,300 persons at Sacred Heart University in 1970, spotlighting the opportunities for development of downtown Stamford and Bridgeport. GTE's decision to put its headquarters in Stamford was a direct result and initiated the subsequent downtown revival. In 1973, Connecticut provided the largest participation in percentage terms in the Association's talkback television series, CHOICES. A 1975 Association report set out *Connecticut Transportation Issues*. It recommended that the State use transportation to support the resurgence of older city downtowns,

discourage haphazard, spread development and encourage the bulk of new traffic, both passenger and freight, to use rail and buses.

We also have been supporters of Connecticut's pioneering State planning efforts and Governor Ella Grasso's Executive Order establishing an unambiguous pro-city urban policy to guide State agencies. A diverse Connecticut Committee (listed on page 39) advises Regional Plan's Board on affairs within the State.

This report fits Bridgeport into a regional economy and housing market that we view through the lens of **The Second Regional Plan** (1968). The Plan envisions metropolitan centers of offices, health services, retailing, higher education and cultural institutions, linked by rail to the regional center, Manhattan. Downtown Bridgeport is one of those places.

So, we welcomed the invitation of Bridgeport's government and business leaders to assess its prospects as a metropolitan center. We have seen a great deal of achievement in Bridgeport since we began work a year ago. Most important is the much closer rapport among the City, business and civic leaders and the growing pride and confidence in their City of Bridgeport residents and businesses.

As you will see in this report, Regional Plan shares that confidence.

John P. Keith  
President  
Regional Plan Association

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### SPECIAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT

A list of all the people who contributed ideas and information appears on the back, but the following deserve special mention for repeated contribution to our information: Mayor John C. Mandanici; Thomas Gill, Robert Testo and James Crispino from the Mayor's staff; Ross Burkhardt of the Greater Bridgeport Transit District; and civic leaders James Archey, Robert Ledoux, Phyllis Gustafson, Verne King, Parker Lansdale, Joseph McGee, Vincent Musto, Carol Pekar, Christine Stiasni, Charles Stokes and Mary Ellen Tatten.

### STAFF ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The study was directed and written by William B. Shore, Senior Vice President, assisted by Ruth Plawner, Senior Planner, who was the project manager. Louis B. Schlivek, sociologist and photographer, took all of the photographs and provided much of the information and insight underlying the conclusions. Other staff members who reviewed the manuscript and contributed valuable facts and judgment: John P. Keith, President; Robert S. Cumella, Senior Planner; F. Carlisle Towery, Executive Director, Greater Jamaica Development Corporation. Richard T. Anderson, Executive Vice President, was principal liaison to the Bridgeport sponsors. Debra Roane assisted with research and was secretary to the project. Typesetting by William R. Frye. Graphic design by Jerome Pilchman.



## WHY THIS REPORT?

Regional Plan Association here compiles observations about Bridgeport, particularly about the enrichment of its downtown.

The Association is a citizen organization whose research and recommendations since the 1920s have influenced development in the tri-state New York Urban Region, from Trenton to New Haven.

Mayor John Mandanici and the business leadership of Bridgeport invited this reconnaissance.

It is not the usual consultant's report. Regional Plan reserved the right to study all the elements that appeared to us to be important to Bridgeport's enrichment, independent of the sponsors' views, and to make public our observations. The Mayor's willingness to subject the City's potential to this outside scrutiny speaks well for his dedication to the City and confidence in his Administration.

Regional Plan Association sought this project—encouraged by two Bridgeport Board members,

Edward E. Harrison, President of Coulter & McKenzie Company, and Lloyd F. Pierce, President of People's Savings Bank—because the City's immediate goals and the Association's long-term mission coincide. The City's Economic Development Strategy states that downtown revitalization "has become the number one priority of the City." Regional Plan has long argued that recentralizing jobs and services in city centers is essential for the well-being of the whole nation.

Bringing the economic and social mainstream of the nation back through the centers of our cities assures that:

1. The poor, the old and the handicapped in cities have mobility and the best opportunities within reach. Only strong downtowns:
  - Can support good public transit; over a quarter of Bridgeport households do not own an automobile.



Downtowns keep society together and keep opportunities within range of city residents. By contrast, when jobs are scattered far from cities, affirmative action does not work well. Further, suburban residents who come downtown for jobs and services are more likely to pay attention to city problems and help solve them than those suburbanites who say, "I never go into Bridgeport."




Only compact and busy downtowns can support good public transportation—needed mobility for a quarter of Bridgeport's households, which don't have cars.



Precious farm, forest land and energy are saved when demand for outlying housing is slowed. A strong downtown helps hold residents in a city.



Households need a car for every adult when jobs, colleges and services scatter outside a downtown. But a downtown allows convenient riding together, whether by car, bus or train, saving households the cost of an extra car or two.



People who go downtown to work and shop are more inclined to also attend downtown arts presentations or continuing education—enriching their lives and the community.

- Keep American society together rather than separating those who cannot leave the cities from the higher-income majority who can.
  - Allow affirmative action and training programs to provide a step up the economic ladder.
  - Focus the attention and concern of suburban residents on city problems because they use the city for work and services.
2. The American economy is strengthened by providing an efficient arrangement for office and service work and by energy and farmland conservation.
- Downtowns are efficient for business, bringing many regular contacts within walking distance and consolidating support for services like parking, restaurants, a library, business machines maintenance, business supplies and services, shopping and other activities for employees at lunchtime.
  - By making downtown the place where the action is, more people choose to live near it—in the city and close-in suburbs. This leads to less energy use and air pollution because the higher the density, the lower the per capita energy use.
  - By taking advantage of investment already made in these older places, taxpayers are saved from having to build sewers, water lines and roads into open country; there will be less housing abandonment and less pressure to urbanize farm and forest land.
3. Everyone has more choice and a richer potential because:
- Activities are handy to each other, so more people take continuing education classes, attend arts performances and museums, belong to professional or business associations.
  - Public transit can be available, so even those who usually drive have a fall-back.
  - Support for services is consolidated, so the services can be more varied.
  - Workers in a household are likely to be going in the same direction to work so they can choose to ride together, dispensing with a second car.
  - A downtown is an environment that creates unusual and unexpected meetings and experiences and so is stimulating.

## CONCLUSIONS

Here is a summary of Regional Plan Association's conclusions about Bridgeport. A more detailed discussion of some of the issues follows on page 19.

Downtown Bridgeport's failure to attract its share of downtown growth hurts all City residents. Despite the remarkable recovery of the area's industrial economy, office-service work has replaced manufacturing as the economic base of Greater Bridgeport and will continue to increase its share. Those are the jobs a resurgent downtown Bridgeport can expect to attract. Bridgeport is more likely to hold its residents and retain a full range of income groups if it has a strong magnet in the center. Bridgeport's image as a city—including residents' own view—is darkened by the unimpressiveness of downtown. A strong downtown will provide a base for good public transit, expanding the mobility of those who cannot drive and assuring emergency services for those who can.

Downtown Bridgeport, like other mid-size cities, was affected by the anti-city attitude of those locating offices and stores in the 1960s and '70s, in part justified by cities' problems of crime, education and high taxes. A few city centers prospered, e.g., Manhattan, Boston, San Francisco, because they offered sufficient advantages over suburban sites to make up for their problems. The advantages come from a large cluster of office enterprises and services mixed with specialized retailing and high quality arts and entertainment. Other reasons for Bridgeport's failure to capture the magnetism needed to become a strong downtown include first, its reputation and image as a factory city, and second, that Bridgeport was not close enough to New York to be considered by outmoving offices.

Now, the attitude toward cities generally is changing. A distinguished developer-public official Council on Development Choices for the '80s found: "... office development in central city business



districts is very strong . . . . Investors in major commercial projects now frequently take care to see that their projects are accessible by transit . . .” Office outmovement from Manhattan is now reaching the Bridgeport area, as office rents to the west climb rapidly. In the public sector, both Connecticut and the United States government have, for the first time, declared it in the public interest to revitalize downtowns and have promised to marshal their programs to achieve that. Though both those policies were announced by now succeeded administrations and are not yet endorsed by their successors, the arguments are strong and the Connecticut Legislature voted support in response to Governor Grasso’s initiative.

NOTE: This report was completed on April 30, 1981 and does not reflect the considerable progress made since then on many of the issues discussed here.

## STRENGTHENING DOWNTOWN BRIDGEPORT

### GET INVESTORS TO LOOK AT BRIDGEPORT DIFFERENTLY


Bridgeport should inform outsiders of the City’s assets, particularly:

**Downtown access:** By auto, it is at least as good as any rural-suburban site, and parking is plentiful;



Downtown Bridgeport has splendid transportation: highways into downtown from three directions and adequate parking, good bus service from the suburbs as well as from all parts of the City, rail from the suburbs and other cities, and an airport 10 minutes away.

buses focus on downtown from every direction with frequent service from suburban as well as City neighborhoods; rail service connects downtown to Manhattan, Boston, Stamford, Hartford, New Haven and other Connecticut and Westchester cities and suburbs. Bridgeport’s general aviation airport is just 10 minutes from downtown and houses more than 100 corporate jets with space for more. There is some commercial air service. There is summer ferry service from Long Island, and studies of the feasibility of improved year-round service suggest Bridgeport as the mainland terminus.




In a housing-short sector of the housing-short tri-state Region, Bridgeport’s somewhat looser housing market is an asset. The City has an extraordinary array of good housing surrounded by some of the nation’s finest suburbs.

**Housing:** Bridgeport has a variety of high-quality housing at about two-thirds the price of housing of comparable quality in surrounding suburbs. Though real estate taxes are higher in the City, the purchaser of a home costing two-thirds as much as a similar suburban home pays only slightly higher taxes than the suburbanite, not nearly as much higher as the added mortgage payments on the suburban home. The City is promoting town house and apartment construction. A recently constructed development of two-bedroom town houses costs only \$55,000 a unit.

The immediate Bridgeport area has 18,000 students in five **higher education** institutions, the fourth largest college community in New England.

Bridgeport is the fourth largest **banking center** in New England.

There are two very successful examples of **public-private partnerships**, creating confidence that the City can and will cooperate with the corporate community: two Neighborhood Housing Services areas with a good record and the Bridgeport Economic Development Corporation (BEDCO), a quasi-public corporation which has recruited and retained factory jobs by providing space and other assistance. A new partnership, the Chamber of Commerce Downtown Development Board, brings together the Mayor and top business leaders.



And with the aid of federal funds (Section 8) the City has worked energetically to add housing for its older residents that will not only assure good conditions for them but also free up family homes for younger households. Over the last five years, 622 units have been built or rehabilitated (Stratfield Motor Inn at left) and 365 units are under construction.

As further evidence of the City's concern for its senior citizens, the new Dinan Memorial Center and its completely renovated annex provide 500 beds for skilled nursing care.



Bridgeport is the fourth largest banking center in New England, an asset for businesses.



Increasing corporate use of airplanes makes the City-owned airport, just 10 minutes from downtown, a growing asset. The long-term effort to lengthen one runway to allow somewhat larger planes should continue.

Bridgeport has a number of **downtown sites** virtually ready for construction for offices, retailing and hotels.

While the **local media** are sharply criticized by many residents—accused of over-emphasizing the negative, our view is that they have gone out of their way to find much that is positive, too—e.g., the series on ethnic groups and on the waterfront, and news of pending developments such as the YWCA moving downtown, industrial expansion, or new condominiums being built, as well as the newspapers' alert attention to this project. Altogether, Bridgeport's newspapers and radio stations are assets, willing to cover the positive as well as the negative.

Bridgeport has an impressive group of **capable young leaders** dedicated to the City's improvement—many born there, some recent arrivals.

Bridgeport is appropriately nicknamed Park City, with a 2½-mile Long Island Sound-front, beach and other **impressive parks**.

Strong religious and ethnic ties make **strong neighborhoods** in Bridgeport.

Bridgeport's **old-city problems** are moderate compared to most old cities. The crime rate is considerably lower than in Hartford, whose office growth is booming, and somewhat below New Haven's; in any case, daytime downtown crime is low: each person coming downtown is likely to be mugged there once in 165 years, for example. There are virtually no slums compared to other old cities, and many once-deteriorated neighborhoods are being fixed up smartly. Beyond the view from the Turnpike and railroad, Bridgeport is a handsome, pleasant City, well-kept, a fine setting, a City of strong neighborhoods. There is little panic and flight by white residents when black and Hispanic families move in.

Also, progress is being made on education inadequacies. The school system's programs for improving the prospects of poor and minority youngsters have been praised by State overseers and parents, though these remain pilot programs. Bridgeport's tax rate is somewhat lower than New Haven's or Waterbury's and much lower than Hartford's, particularly on nonresidential property. It has a




very low bonded indebtedness. Though Bridgeport's real estate taxes are as much as 75 percent higher than some nearby suburbs, the City has clearly demonstrated that moderating taxes is a high priority; and State aid to schools—rising in response to a court order—will tend to bring City and suburban tax rates closer together over the next few years—though, immediately, the prospective loss of State Urban Problems grants would widen the city-suburb tax gap.

Bridgeport is the principal **health center** between Greenwich and Stratford. Its three hospitals contain half of the hospital beds in the Greenwich-Stratford corridor. All three have been entirely rebuilt in the last decade. They have affiliations with

in business and technical materials among the half-million books, periodicals, films, paintings and cassettes it circulates. It is expanding computer use to become a prime data center.


In addition to publicizing the City's assets, Bridgeport should change the appearance that most outsiders see from the Turnpike and railroad. Present waterfront uses, especially those that are not high priority and could be replaced by higher-value better-looking facilities, including housing, should be identified. A paint-up campaign would help make the corridor that is visible along the Turnpike and railway striking and positive rather than dreary and negative. Perhaps a combination of bright colors on most of the buildings and highway railings



Bridgeport's magnet schools are very satisfactory to their staffs and to the parents of their students but still include only a small share of total pupils.



Bridgeport has four good examples of public-private partnerships: two Neighborhood Housing Services groups, including bankers, neighborhood business people, City officials and neighborhood civic and institutional representatives; the Bridgeport Economic Development Company (BEDCO), which has facilitated expansion and modernization of factories, provided relocation housing and built and operates industrial parks; and, since April 1981, the Chamber of Commerce Downtown Development Board, in which the Mayor participates.



Nearly half of all hospital beds from Greenwich to Stratford are in Bridgeport, not far from downtown, and about a third of those communities' medical care spending is done in Bridgeport.

Yale Medical School. A third of that corridor's medical care spending takes place in Bridgeport. Its Mental Health Center was called by the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services a model facility with an exemplary program. The Dinan Center for senior citizens with medical needs provides a very pleasant environment.

The **central library** downtown attracts more than 20,000 visitors a month, some 8,000 from out-of-town. It is open two nights a week. It specializes

could be interspersed with murals. Landscaping would help many places.

### **FORM A PUBLIC-PRIVATE-CIVIC PARTNERSHIP AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL**

The partnership should include top federal officials in New England, State Cabinet members, and the Mayor, chairmen of Bridgeport and nearby corporations and potential Bridgeport corporations,

institution leaders like the university presidents, as well as some civic leaders. The partnership should begin its work with the potential downtown investors identifying changes they would need to convince them to invest; then each participant should offer to make specific contributions to attain those changes.

This process is very similar to what federal regional officials and the State Office of Policy and Management are calling Negotiated Investment Strategy, except for the addition of outside business people. They are looking for a Connecticut city to try the "Strategy" out. The Mayor, Bridgeport business leaders and State legislators should campaign for Bridgeport's selection by the State. Present formal and informal coordination through Bridgeport Economic Coordinating Commission (BECC), People's Economic Development Committee, the Chamber of Commerce and other relationships should remain at least until the new top-level partnership takes hold.

## SEEK SPECIFIC NEW ACTIVITIES DOWNTOWN

### The Order Of Attention Should Be:

**Offices.** Unlike retailing, office jobs will be growing in Western Connecticut. They attract each other—one or two major office establishments would be likely to draw more. Downtown Bridgeport must compete for them against highwayside office parks and rural campuses particularly, but also against other city downtowns surrounding Manhattan. These jobs probably will be back-office and regional or district headquarters of Manhattan-based firms seeking to decrease the Manhattan space they need in the face of skyrocketing rents. Or, the type of jobs attracted to Bridgeport might be small Manhattan-related firms and nonprofit organizations which cannot pay Manhattan (or Stamford-Greenwich) rents but need frequent contact with New York organizations. Existing office space is less




The view people get from the Turnpike and railroad is part of the City's negative image. A campaign to paint and landscape this corridor to make Bridgeport the bright place between Boston and New York could be a good investment.

expensive in downtown Bridgeport than in Stamford, Greenwich or Manhattan. Another possibility might be segments of corporate headquarters that located over the last decade in Western Connecticut and now cannot expand as intended because housing within a 45-minute drive is inadequate.



**Attracting out-of-towners.** Two-thirds of the hotel rooms in the Bridgeport area are outside of downtown; a proposed 250-room downtown hotel would bring downtown's share to just over half—very important to signal that downtown is where the action increasingly is going to be and to double the number of visitors downtown at night looking for something to do. A feasibility study projected that business visitors would account for three-fourths of the anticipated increase in hotel occupants, but the study emphasized the importance of conventions to support the projected hotel. Conference space could be included in the hotel or in a Civic Center proposed to adjoin it. Reports of site searches for hotels in the vicinity of Bridgeport make it imperative to speed progress on the downtown hotel to capture the increase. The Chamber of Commerce Downtown Development Board has a committee addressing this need.

**Housing.** Increasing households will keep pressure on the Western Connecticut housing market. Attracting people to downtown housing usually depends on providing advantages, like walking to work, good restaurants, entertainment and shopping, to outweigh the disadvantages of living downtown—plus visual pleasures of landscaping and architecture. So adding market-rate housing to downtown usually must await more office jobs, better shopping and more nightlife than Bridgeport has. But Bridgeport's waterfront may attract people to



Water is a powerful magnet for new housing: in Greenwich even wedged between highway and railroad. Bridgeport's near-downtown waterfront might provide suitable unsubsidized housing sites, helping to support downtown activities.





Left: Bridgeport area higher education institutions are shifting their curricula to better serve a business center. A downtown higher-education center would strengthen downtown by signalling to business that college resources are at hand. It probably would attract downtown shoppers and office workers to continuing education. Right: This Newark department store houses a community college in its basement.

Particularly the University of Bridgeport, located next to downtown, could share its enrichment by encouraging students to support downtown activities, co-sponsoring some, and making further efforts to involve the whole community in its campus presentations.

live near downtown before there are downtown values—simply for waterfront values like a marina. Identifying high-amenity possibilities for housing on the waterfront near downtown is a high priority.

**Higher education.** Bridgeport's higher education institutions are making efforts to adapt their offerings to the area's economy and regional students' needs. But their locations muffle the impression they could leave on entrepreneurs seeking business sites. Continuing higher education could well be the most important business service and free-time activity outside the home in coming years—and so it belongs downtown.

The Bridgeport area's five higher education institutions should consider joint downtown premises to reach out to the downtown community. In New Jersey, a Newark department store recently rented space to a higher education institution. Lafayette Plaza has vacant space, and there are other very suitable downtown premises. Such a joint downtown teaching space might encourage joint university sponsorship of lectures of interest to students in all the institutions.

The Board of Higher Education, now discussing a permanent home for Housatonic Community College, should consider possible development packages to go with the College which can help the College better fulfill its mission and complement City development efforts; this dual goal seems possible (1) in downtown, (2) at its present site or (3) at the University of Bridgeport—but it will take joint planning to do it. The State's urban policy encourages and facilitates such joint projects.

The University of Bridgeport should consider added ways in which its proximity to downtown can result in strengthening downtown, e.g., co-sponsoring downtown activities to mobilize student-faculty support—the kind of activities that make college towns more interesting than other cities; making its campus cultural-educational programs

more widely-known and accessible to the public; working with the City and Neighborhood Housing Services in the South End to make walking from the campus to downtown more pleasant and safe.

**Special events and the arts.** A 12,500-seat Civic Center is proposed by the City to house, primarily, high school and college basketball and musical events, coupled with an exhibition hall for auto and boat kinds of shows. Hartford's Civic Center has accomplished what the proposed Center in Bridgeport is meant to achieve, livening downtown, particularly at night. While the feasibility study that projected operating deficits of only about \$75,000 a year is two years old, the expert who did it confirmed his confidence in the Center's projected success in a recent telephone conversation.

However, there are risks: that the City might not be able to attract enough events to justify it, and Bridgeport's success would require cutting into New Haven's coliseum business; that the Civic Center might compete with the proposed refurbishment of the Majestic and Palace theatres for funds, government and business attention and possible bookings. These theatres offer a rare opportunity to exploit the nostalgia-preservation mood of America and reclaim a luxurious heritage. There are almost no first-class concert halls in this Region's suburbs. Bridgeport should not lose the advantage the theatres offer nor delay arrangements for building the downtown hotel to await federal funds for the Civic Center.

There is no clear answer on the Civic Center; the aim is right—the only question is how much risk is worth running to build it now when less risky possibilities with the same intent—livening downtown—are available: e.g., conference facilities in the prospective hotel and refurbishing the theatres.

Bridgeport has unusual achievements, financially and artistically, in its opera, symphony and ballet seasons, Cabaret Theatre, and art museum with an

outreach window in the People's Arcade, but undoubtedly more could be done to (a) relate arts to the downtown, particularly the visual arts, (b) tie into New York Region resources—particularly the museums, (c) make Bridgeport more of a haven for artists, e.g., through more reuse of old factory space for artists' studios (like the Allied Sculptors and Painters' downtown studios) and more facilitation of arts activities through the City's new Arts Council. The Connecticut Commission on the Arts has small grants for technical assistance, and one of the more experienced nearby arts councils (e.g., Westchester's) would be available to pass on their experience. The Arts Council should raise funds more aggressively to be of more service to City arts organizations. Clearly, more staff time would be needed for such a program.

**Retailing** usually follows residents and, to some degree, offices, rather than leading them. Four les-

traction of playful and nostalgic retail facilities. As with office workers, the more shoppers you get, the more you get—so some special attraction that starts the upward cycle is important.

Third, University Square's discount operations demonstrate that people will travel far for what they consider good buys; also, that shopping is, for some people, recreation. Factory outlet stores have been successful not only in the South End but in a large cluster in Reading, Pennsylvania, and in a smaller cluster in Flemington, New Jersey. Adding factory outlets downtown to make a large cluster in Bridgeport might be good retailing strategy. It fits the outsiders' image of the City, and University Square is a good base on which to build a substantial cluster. Discounting is a fast-increasing mode of retailing, anyhow. But that approach should not take attention away from serving office employees downtown as they increase.



Historic buildings and theatres with good acoustics like the Majestic and Palace Theatres on the edge of downtown Bridgeport are assets of old cities. The City, State and business-civic leaders have declared the restoration of these theatres a high priority.



More office workers would strengthen downtown retailing, e.g., two large Newark department stores are supported largely by lunchtime sales. And 20 percent of retail sales are to other businesses.



Some of the most successful retailing recently has been in festive downtown markets like Quincy Market in Boston (above) and Harbor Place in Baltimore.

sons are suggested by recent retailing experiences:

First, while most people go shopping from home, increasingly at night, downtown offices are an important support for retailing. Downtown Newark, for example, supports two large department stores almost entirely by noon to two p.m. sales. Furthermore, about a fifth of all retail sales are to other businesses, a recent Urban Institute study reported—another reason business clusters attract retailing. In Bridgeport, increasing office workers could mean more retail sales if there is more effort to draw them into the stores through better physical links between offices and Lafayette Plaza and related merchandising and advertising. The City and Greater Bridgeport Transit District are suggesting design improvements that would help.

Second, Boston's Quincy Market and similar new downtown shopping areas demonstrate the at-

Finally, clustering, whether factory outlets or other related retailing, has proven successful in many instances. People like to be able to comparison shop conveniently. For example, antique dealers in Manhattan, moved by a public works project several years ago, chose to relocate all together—and did better than ever. Many other specialty retailers come together in Manhattan, also. The Arcade in Bridgeport seems a superb location for a cluster of related retailing like antique dealers; it is even shaped for an auction, one would think. The point is, think comparison shopping and clustering.

One inference to be drawn from these observations is that Bridgeport could seek increased retailing by working on other downtown development, particularly more offices and residences. More housing in the South End also would help downtown



shopping because residents must pass right through downtown to get to downtown's biggest competitor, Trumbull mall; eventually, they can be attracted to stop downtown. Another inference might be that Bridgeport consider downtown retailing the way a shopping center owner might consider his mall—how tie it together so each element contributes to the other's success? What kind of attraction will help them all? The Transit District and City have well-developed ideas for better connecting retail areas in physical design. Similarly, downtown retailers might get together more for joint advertising and complementary merchandising. The Chamber of Commerce is already moving in that direction.

"Central business districts, long the stepchild of retailing, will selectively offer great potential for retailers and developers alike during the decade. Those CBDs with high concentrations of hotel and office space, a strong public transportation system, and an existing retail base from which to build will be the focus of considerable development activity during the 1980s . . . Significant downtown retail developments are under way from Boston to San Diego, with many more in the planning stages."\*

**Health services.** With the dominance of Bridgeport's hospitals in the area's health care, additional


health services might be attracted. Facilitating a downtown location for non-hospital health services could strengthen the health industry in Bridgeport. As more people work, shop and study downtown, the providers of medical care on the fringe of the central business district will find it beneficial to be within walking distance of central activities. A downtown location is also good for serving residents outside Bridgeport in the Sound corridor.

A Teamsters Union health facility is being considered as part of a downtown office building the Union may build. There already is a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) on Upper Park Avenue—the Connecticut Health Plan. It has fewer subscribers than experts feel are adequate to support such a facility. Relating the health services being considered by the Teamsters to the HMO might strengthen both and bring HMO services downtown.

A downtown-based health services cluster would draw a great deal of its attraction from the proximity of the City's three hospitals. But health experts warn that hospitals will be able to maintain high quality at affordable rates only by cooperative planning and sharing of specialized services. Bridgeport's hospitals have recognized this; they have formed a Joint Hospital Planning Council, and Park City and Bridgeport Hospital are exploring further

\* *Real Estate Report*, First Quarter, 1981, published by Real Estate Research Corporation, Chicago.

The Greater Bridgeport Transit District and the City are considering improving the pedestrian corridor from the Park City Plaza office tower to Main Street to Gimbel's and Lafayette Plaza, including making Wall Street a pedestrian mall feeding into the already refurbished People's Arcade.



The Transit District also is considering the feasibility of a waiting room-cafe in a never used portion of Lafayette Plaza for bus riders who now have to stand while waiting, blocking the Lafayette Plaza entrance.



Downtown retailers might consider building on University Square's discount sale success with related discounting downtown. Clustering of competitors strengthens them all.

ways to cooperate, leading toward consolidation. But still more coordination of services is needed, according to the Southwest Connecticut Health Systems Agency, which both the State and federal government look to for expert information on health services from Greenwich to Stratford.

Encourage more housing construction in the City and Greater Bridgeport Region by systematically facilitating housing construction as BEDCO facilitates factory construction. A 1977 survey of potential housing sites is available as a start. BEDCO has recognized this need and is building some relocation housing. Furthermore, housing should be built to tie bus service frequency in surrounding suburbs to appropriate transit-supporting densities.

### MOBILIZE THE COMMUNITY TO DEAL WITH REAL (NOT IMAGE) PROBLEMS

Though Bridgeport is not suffering from urban decline to the extent of most northeastern cities, it

every century, on the average. But even fear of crime lowers the enjoyment of life.

Mobilizing the neighborhood against crime appears to be the widely accepted first step against high urban crime rates. The State Urban Action Task Force, reporting December 19, 1978, called for a "community-based anti-crime program . . . to promote community involvement in the prevention of crime on a pro-active rather than reactive basis . . . . Without community support, police, even working at total efficiency, are stymied in their efforts to prevent crime." The Task Force found little involvement of neighborhood groups with city police departments.

A National Arson Prevention and Action Coalition (NAPAC) has been making progress in low- and middle-income neighborhoods around the country. The research agency behind NAPAC said: "The first lines of arson prevention and defense are local civic groups in the affected communities." Also, in Bridgeport, there is a Citywide citizen



In other cities, community groups meet regularly with police officials. Above, Newark's Captain Cullen meets monthly with the Roseville Coalition Public Safety Committee. Volunteer patrols often have radio contact with the police. The Connecticut State Urban Action Task Force has recommended "community-based anti-crime" programs.



In Bridgeport's East Side and East End, as throughout the country, tenants and home-owners are organizing into neighborhood associations to guarantee by their common efforts a mutual upgrading of the community—if you fix up and keep up your home, I'll do the same. At its first annual conference last fall, Bridgeport East Stands Together met with experts on such problems as housing and taxes, agreed on a long list of policies and programs and elected officers.



does have social and economic problems that deter downtown development.

Crime is substantially higher than in the suburbs, e.g., three to four times the rate per capita of Monroe, Seymour and Newtown—the kind of open countryside with which Bridgeport is competing for offices. There is even a wider disparity on violent crimes. Orange and Danbury, two fast-growing areas, have only a little lower crime rate than Bridgeport, however. Bridgeport's immediate suburbs have barely half the City's crime rate. Adding together Bridgeport residents and commuters to Bridgeport jobs, each person downtown during the day would be involved in a violent crime about once

motor patrol, but many neighborhood groups do not seem to be working with it or to have direct lines to the police.

The public should consider with their elected representatives whether they want to make a larger investment in police. The Police Superintendent asked for 48 more uniformed police than the budget gave him. The Superintendent also would like to shift more police to the high-crime time periods, but union rules prevent it. Negotiating the flexibility he wants could cost added funds.

Unemployment seems to stimulate crime, so economic development is a major anti-crime program. While this is mainly a national responsibility,

the City can help by facilitating training and hiring from all parts of the City so no one neighborhood becomes depressed and hopeless. Education quality also affects crime. More than half of Bridgeport's public school students drop out before finishing. Unemployed youth "hanging out" in public places seem threatening even if they are not.

**Education.** Prospective employers object to poor public school achievement in cities because their management personnel refuse to live in the city if they have children and the firms are confronted with work applicants who cannot read and write. As with crime, certain conditions for improving urban schools are widely accepted as essential, i.e., principals of high quality; teachers who believe in their students' ability to learn; and community attention on the schools.

There are many ways to integrate schools with other community activities; citizens observing what goes on and using the schools for adult functions—Bridgeport has some community schools; citizens providing services to the school, e.g., lecturing, assisting with administrative problems, parents as teacher aides—a school volunteer service is very active in tutoring Bridgeport school pupils; relating the working world to the schools to give students a sense that what they learn is relevant to future careers. Some corporations already participate in career guidance programs with the schools. As with crime, the public should consider with its elected officials whether more funds should be spent on education. Bridgeport's per pupil expenditure is below that of the State as a whole—despite its more serious educational problems—and even below that of comparable cities. Indeed, the City loses some State aid because of its low school expenditures.

**Sense of community.** Many people feel alienated by cities—i.e., there are too many people for them to belong or influence what happens. In cities around the country, associations of apartment tenants and homeowners on a block have organized to work together to improve their immediate area. These associations have joined to form neighborhood organizations and, here and there, citywide associations. This has enhanced the sense of community. It also can provide the city with eyes and ears in each community—alerting administrators to broken hydrants, deteriorating buildings, traffic problems as well as crime. And it can provide practical guidance on neighborhood priorities for scarce public dollars.

In Bridgeport, now, many of the newly-forming neighborhood groups do not feel the City listens to them. City officials have numerous grievances against some neighborhood groups as well. Prospectively in Bridgeport, more cooperative relations seem possible. BEST, one of the largest neighborhood coalitions, covering the East Side and East

End, now has elected leadership so there is official representation to meet with City spokesmen in small groups. Neighborhood Housing Services, which includes community participation, has been wonderfully successful on the East Side and, more recently, in the South End.

The City has recently improved its communication with the neighborhoods. The Community Council of the Neighborhood Strategy Areas—the federally-recognized low-income neighborhoods legally required to have a voice in spending federal Community Development grants—nearly came apart completely late last fall but is now meeting regularly with the City Development Administrator and staff and has joined the City Council hearings on Community Development. All over the U.S., all levels of government are acknowledging the importance of neighborhood associations for improving cities. The Ford and other foundations and major corporations are building a whole strategy of city revival on neighborhood organizations. On the State level, the Urban Action Task Force report said that the State should promote local neighborhood conservation groups and neighborhood-based community health partnerships as well as "community-based anti-crime" programs.

The City's Development Administration has demonstrated its recognition that neighborhoods as a whole, not just individual housing units, should be upgraded; they have packaged housing subsidies along with other public funds to do this. The City would do well to encourage community associations where they do not now exist, as a guarantee against the slipping back into decay of blocks into which the City and federal government have pumped considerable funds.


For Bridgeport, City-neighborhood cooperation is essential to downtown revival. Many residents oppose the City's emphasis on downtown revival because they do not see how it will benefit them, and they have many alternative preferences for using public funds. Unless neighborhood needs are considered in open discussion alongside Citywide needs, residents could turn against the City's downtown efforts. This has delayed downtown rebuilding in a number of cities. The condition of neighborhoods surrounding downtown affects the response of prospective downtown developers and tenants. It can scare them off or suggest a bonus possibility: walk-to-work convenience for prospective employees.

## **SUPPORT VIGOROUS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STATE'S URBAN POLICY**

**Present policy.** Both Executive Order XX and the Legislature-approved State plan declare the State's intention to revive city economies and pro-



tect the countryside from unnecessary urbanization; the Urban Act provides incentives for city job expansion; the Housing Finance Agency provides below-market mortgage money regardless of income within nine qualifying cities, including Bridgeport. The Economic Development Department administers several programs which give additional incentives for the 17 largest cities of the State. These incentives provide: (a) 80 percent reduction in local property taxes for new factory construction or substantial rehabilitation, of which the State repays 60 percent of the 80 to the locality, lasting five years; (b) 25 percent reduction in the State's corporate income tax for 10 years; (c) \$500 cash for each new job; (d) loans at below-market interest rates to small businesses up to \$75,000; when added funds are needed, State loans often are packaged with federal Small Business Administration loans; (e) loans to commercial businesses (offered only since October 1980); present conditions make the use of the program difficult for small businesses, but new guidelines are being considered; (f) 1 percent lower interest rate in the 17 cities on regular Connecticut Development Authority loans.



Despite a clear State policy favoring recentralization of jobs in cities and preservation of open countryside, backed by extra incentives to locate jobs in cities, offices continue to scatter in the suburbs and beyond, often with State aid. Added State incentives for city locations seem necessary to fulfill the State plan. The State should make clear to businesses that its capital funds will be going primarily to cities, not to areas that have become urban contrary to the State plan and are suffering from traffic congestion and water problems because of the unplanned development.

**Effects of State policies.** Bridgeport has taken advantage of these programs for almost all the many manufacturing firms now expanding, for Cilco Docks and the Ferryboat restaurant. State program administrators are persistently reminded of the pro-city policy through required reviews. Staff of the Economic Development Department and Board of Higher Education, as well as Office of Policy and

Management, demonstrated in our interviews clear recognition of the importance of recentralizing jobs and services in cities.

The principal demonstration of agency coordination in the service of cities is the packaging of joint projects in which funds are pooled and projects of several State and city agencies coordinated, under the Urban Act. Federal funds often are incorporated, too. Six cities have taken advantage of this. For example, New Britain is relating a transportation center to the rehabilitation of a building for sheltered employment for the handicapped. South Norwalk is rebuilding its business center by rehabilitating housing and stores, clearing and building a small downtown park, carrying out historic preservation, providing a short public transit mall and improved bus service, bus shelters, benches, sidewalk and street improvements in a concentrated area.

But inter-agency coordination in the service of the urban policy is not widespread, and major private offices continue to scatter through the countryside, often in places contrary to the State plan and frequently, even so, facilitated by the State's own agencies. For example, the State gave a low-interest loan to ACCO to move its headquarters out of Bridgeport. Indeed, every loan given for office development in fiscal 1979 helped to locate an office in a suburb or exurb of a city.

Despite an increase in State economic development aid to cities, the record shows that twice as much State money has gone to rural, small town and suburban communities in economic development grants as to major cities. More than three times as much money in State loans went to firms locating outside cities as in cities in fiscal 1979, the latest loan data available.

Bridgeport, the State's largest city, has received only 60 percent as much economic development grant money from the State as Waterbury and marginally less than Hartford and New Haven. Loans to Bridgeport-Stratford corporations in fiscal 1979 totalled \$8.6 million of a total \$221 million in the State, less than 4 percent, when Bridgeport-Stratford made up 6 percent of the State's population. This, despite the City's good reputation in the State Economic Development Department and with firms it has helped via BEDCO.

**Proposed policy changes.** No State funds should go to induce jobs to locate where they will create urban sprawl and draw services and population out of cities and existing suburbs. Cities apparently need a slightly greater advantage in economic development programs over places with extensive vacant land and low property taxes to achieve the goals of State policy.

With greatly restricted State and federal capital funds, priorities must be clear and followed to make

the best use of the money. The State should publicize its earnest intent to target public investment to its cities, warning prospective developers that the State will not come in after heavy urbanization in a now-rural area and provide the needed infrastructure. That warning might deter development in conflict with the State plan.

The State should keep and increase Urban Problems grants. There is no justification for city residents and businesses to be paying higher taxes for poorer public services just because cities have inherited most of the problems of poverty in the State and carry the costs of history. Equalizing local tax burdens and public service quality would save the State and its residents money in the net, plus precious land, energy, air and water quality, by helping to induce activities and population into urban centers. Saying the comparatively wealthy State cannot afford Urban Problems grants is saying that, therefore, we will leave the extra costs to the poorer people of the State—they can afford it.

Bridgeport should seek out joint projects eligible for multiple financing under the Urban Act, for example, near-downtown waterfront development, with housing, coastal zone, economic development and transportation funds.

The City should be wary of proposed transportation that might improve access to Bridgeport somewhat but improve it to competing office-campus and regional-shopping-center areas even more. Particularly, watch out for the proposal to build a huge airport in Oxford, which would draw offices away

from Bridgeport without greatly helping Bridgeport's access. Similarly, extending Route 25 to Route 84 might benefit manufacturers in Bridgeport, but improving rail freight service for Connecticut, New York and New Jersey may be a better investment for the State and City; that should be explored first. If the expressway goes ahead, location and design of the interchanges and local zoning around them should inhibit attraction of offices and shopping.

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### KEEPING DOWNTOWN SUITED TO BRIDGEPORT

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**Not like Stamford.** An almost universal comment about what people want from downtown revival is—bigger than it is, yes, but our own personality, different from Stamford. There is plenty of space for a well-designed downtown substantially more active than Bridgeport's today yet retaining a small city flavor and New England green.

**Connecting far-flung downtown elements.** From the theatres in the northeast to Lafayette Plaza is about three-quarters of a mile, more than most people are inclined to walk. However, they can be induced to walk that far (about 15 minutes) if there are interesting things to see along the way, like shop windows and a pleasant environment. Or perhaps some vehicle can link the downtown edges. Linkages are what make downtowns worth their trouble.



There is a lot of room for development in downtown Bridgeport; that is both asset and liability. From the theatres (on the upper right) to Lafayette Plaza (on the upper left) is about a 15-minute walk, more than most people take unless there is an interesting, pleasant en-

vironment along the way. Most people interviewed wanted downtown growth without a sense of bigness. To connect the edges pleasantly and build without overwhelming the New England small-city ambience will require careful design guidance.

**Shifting from cars to buses or trains as jobs increase.** One of the benefits of a strong downtown is that it induces a voluntary shift in travel to work from driving to riding with others, either in a car pool or on public transit. There usually are two inducements: congestion, if public transit is not affected as much as cars—the train on its own right-of-way, buses and carpools given priority at bottlenecks; and parking becoming costly.

Before Bridgeport becomes unpleasantly congested, a strategy for inducing a shift of drivers to riders should be developed. The Greater Bridgeport Transit District is aware of this need, recognizing that bus routes need to be clarified and better advertised to attract riders who have an automobile alternative; waiting conditions should be improved and transferring among bus routes made more convenient. Also, taxi availability should be more dependable.

**Providing for the auto as downtown activities increase.** While parking is more than ample in most of downtown today, it will still be necessary to adjust to increasing downtown trips, modified by an increased share of those trips on buses and trains. Parking design management as well as capacity must be planned. Traffic circulation for more cars and buses must be planned.

An urban design consultant should be hired quickly to suggest: priorities for use of downtown sites; ways to connect related activities; potential for attracting types of activities to various sites; possible uses of the near-downtown waterfront; strategic locations for new housing near downtown; design suggestions that could improve the aesthetics and convenience of downtown.

## INDUSTRIAL JOBS

**Present status.** The Bridgeport labor market has regained 7,000 manufacturing jobs in the last five years—after losing 20,000 in the previous 20 years.



**Prospects.** Even more factory jobs seem likely. But factory employment swings up and down rapidly because much of the output goes to one customer, the Department of Defense. Micro-electronics is a growth industry worth soliciting by northeastern cities. It can fit into multi-story factories and provide high-prestige employment for unskilled workers. Manufacturing's share of total jobs has been decreasing rapidly; there are now 56 percent more non-manufacturing than manufacturing jobs in the Bridgeport labor market, and that percentage seems almost certain to go up.

**Recommendations.** The conclusion must be to continue the City's energetic pursuit of manufacturing jobs while giving highest priority to downtown revival and the kind of jobs a downtown can attract, particularly offices.




**Bridgeport Area Employment\***

\* Labor Market Area Includes Bridgeport, Easton, Fairfield, Milford, Monroe, Shelton, Stratford, Trumbull and Derby after 1971



Greater Bridgeport has recovered 7,000 of the 20,000 factory jobs it lost between 1955 and 1975, but to keep up with the growth in job seekers, non-manufacturing jobs have had to double in the last 25 years. Office and service jobs, best recruited to a resurgent downtown, will have to be the basis for Greater Bridgeport's economic growth.



Bridgeport has one of the State's 17 vocational high schools, Bullard Havens, as well as a City public school vocational program and several other such programs. Still, manufacturers say more is needed. The Private Industry Council (PIC) appointed by the Mayor should coordinate the several programs and assure that skill needs are met.



Maintaining a flow of high-skilled manual workers is essential to keeping the industry Bridgeport has. Manufacturers are not now satisfied with training programs. There are numerous training programs in Bridgeport, but the need for highly-skilled machinists and the need to prepare unskilled young people for the working world are not being met, according to many manufacturing executives. The recruitment of business leaders to participate in planning and supervising the CETA-financed training for private enterprise employment in a Private Industry Council (PIC) has not resulted in a clear picture of the area's training needs with accompanying plans for meeting them. That should be done. Direct operation of many training programs by private firms probably would be most effective, but the firms must receive an adequate *quid pro quo*.

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### WHO SHOULD DO WHAT

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Reports like this could well have no effect addressed to the general public. To avoid this, we are going to suggest which individuals and organizations seem most appropriate to take responsibility for initiating the changes we are recommending. In dividing up responsibilities, we do not mean to de-emphasize the importance of cooperation and coordination, already existing through the Bridgeport Economic Coordinating Commission and other formal and informal means. But the coordinating mechanisms are not the initiating mechanisms. These suggestions deal with initiatives.

#### The Mayor (And His Top Aides) Should:

- Personally work with the Chamber of Commerce Downtown Council Development Board's Hotel Task Force on getting the new downtown hotel approved, including banquet and meeting rooms.
- Discuss with the Governor's Office of Policy and Management the selection of Bridgeport as the experimental Negotiated Investment Strategy city. If this seems too far in the future, initiate a public-private-civic partnership, working with the Chamber of Commerce Downtown Council to select City business institutions and civic leaders and with the Chamber and Regional Plan Association to recruit out-of-City corporate participants, State officials and Federal Regional Council representatives.
- Reorganize the Private Industry Council's program with the first priority to agree on meeting the labor market's high skill needs and the second priority surveying competence needs generally.
- Invite representatives of neighborhood organizations and Community Council of the Neighborhood Strategy Areas to meet with the Mayor in **small groups** to plan continuing cooperation, in-

cluding—with the Police Superintendent—neighborhood-based crime control.

- Use the Mayor's considerable political influence to strengthen the State's urban policy, particularly retaining Urban Problems grants or similar grants targeted to cities; promoting a clearer declaration of State investment policies to warn those considering office campuses in non-urban areas that the sewer, water, roadways, flood control, and appropriate housing they would need cannot be counted on.
- Push ahead on rehabilitation of the two theatres by stimulating organization of a nonprofit corporation and seeking public and/or foundation subsidy or asking BEDCO to assume the responsibility.
- Invite the real estate industry of the tri-state Region to go on one of the Mayor's impressive tours of Bridgeport's recent achievements, showing his faith in the City's potential.
- Use speeches, public statements and small meetings to inform City residents of their stake in a more dynamic downtown.
- Further stimulate housing construction in the City.
- Follow up the current waterfront survey with plans for reconstruction, particularly near downtown.
- Decide whether the Civic Center is to remain a high immediate priority or not. If it is, hire a big league manager; nothing less will make it work. Try to tie down as many of the uncertainties as possible in advance, e.g., the colleges' use for basketball, a professional indoor soccer franchise. In any case, **don't** let it delay a decision on a downtown hotel!

#### The Chamber Of Commerce And Its New Downtown Council Should:

- Assure with Regional Plan Association, the Mayor and the rest of the business community a speedy design study for downtown and take responsibility for committing the many participants in downtown development to make use of it.
- Work with the City and Transit District on the design concepts the District has been producing, in the light of the new design report to be commissioned.
- Sponsor with the City a paint-up parade along the Turnpike and railroad to turn Bridgeport into the bright spot between New York and Boston rather than the dreary stretch, as people now regard it.
- Work with the Greater Bridgeport Transit District, the City and Housatonic Community College to explore packages of State and City funds that might make remodelling of the Singer Build-

ing or a downtown site for Housatonic the best buy for the College and City as a whole.

- Assemble the downtown merchants and the most creative people in the City to think of attractions that might draw shoppers back downtown.
- Ride herd on all these suggestions; encourage everyone to do his assignment.

#### **The Public-Private-Civic Partnership Should:**

- Identify the conditions that out-of-Bridgeport corporations will require to invest in Bridgeport or put office jobs or retailing downtown.
- Relate the needs to the capacities of the participants and allocate responsibilities for meeting them.
- Among early projects, consider ways to mobilize the community against the principal objections office developers have had to Bridgeport, crime and school quality.

#### **The Greater Bridgeport Transit District Should:**

- Work with the Greater Bridgeport Regional Planning Agency to relate housing density to present and potential suburban bus routes, encouraging higher densities near places that could have good bus service into downtown Bridgeport.
- Prepare a strategy for shifting more downtown employees to public transit and walking when additional enterprises begin to threaten congestion. Let people know there is a strategy to improve public transit that will be applied as more and more people choose to leave their cars at home. Then, firms won't avoid locating in downtown Bridgeport because they expect it to become clogged up.
- Continue design work to improve pedestrian and public transit movement.
- Join with the Chamber, City and Housatonic Community College to consider a facility for Housatonic that best serves the College and the City.

#### **The Five Higher Education Institutions Should:**

- Consider together a joint downtown site for educational programs.
- Consider joint sponsorship—downtown—of arts, lectures and entertainment programs that college students are likely to attend.
- The University of Bridgeport, working with the South End Neighborhood Housing Services and the City, should improve the route between the University and downtown for pedestrians so students can be encouraged to walk between them rather than being discouraged from it.

#### **The Bridgeport Arts Council Should:**

- More energetically pursue the usual functions of an arts council, e.g., enlarging audiences for the

arts, and helping local arts institutions, amateur as well as professional. It could assist them in raising money, finding suitable facilities and operating more efficiently.

- Seek guidance from the Westchester Council on the Arts or some other successful Council.
- Seek out ways to tap into the New York Region's arts resources, e.g., follow the lead of Champion International, which will be opening a branch of the Whitney Museum in its new Stamford headquarters.
- Participate in planning the theatres' rehabilitation, exploring the possibility of making their structure a complete arts center. Planning and organizing the activities that will take place in the theatres should be the first step in the rehabilitation process.
- Follow the lead of the Allied Sculptors and Painters and assist artists seeking inexpensive studio space to find appropriate lofts.
- Participate with the Chamber of Commerce and City in the paint-up parade of the Turnpike-railroad corridor to assure a high standard of aesthetics.
- Work with the five higher education institutions to promote arts presentations that would attract students; 18,000 higher education students should be a good base on which to build audiences.

#### **The City's State Legislative Delegation Should:**

- Support the State plan in its current reassessment and insist that the Executive Branch concentrate on the plan's goals more determinedly—i.e., the revitalization of Connecticut cities and protection of its countryside.
- Support State redistribution of taxes toward the cities, whose high tax rates and low quality of services compared to the suburbs has no rationale. The argument that the "State can't afford it" is a *non sequitur*.
- Encourage the Executive Branch to put together packages of State and federal programs for Bridgeport—e.g., for waterfront development—similar to those recently put together for other cities under the State's urban policy.
- Lobby the Office of Policy and Management to choose Bridgeport as the try-out city for the Negotiated Investment Strategy.
- Shift the personal property tax on aircraft based in the State to a less costly tax so those planes now based at Westchester Airport that are owned by firms and residents closer to Bridgeport will no longer be discouraged from basing them at the Bridgeport airport.

#### **The State's Congressional Delegation Should:**

- Support continued targeting of federal aid, purchasing and employment to cities, particularly

Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG), Economic Development Administration assistance to urban economies, and counter-cyclical grants to cities.

- Make sure that the prospective fast depreciation provision allows extra incentives for locating or staying in cities and for rehabilitation.

#### **The Bridgeport City Council Should:**

- Publicly debate ways to improve anti-crime and public education programs, including the advisability of increasing their budget.
- Relate more to the neighborhood associations within their constituency.

#### **The Directors Of The Three Bridgeport Hospitals Should:**

- Extend their coordination to the issues of immediate concern to the Southwest Connecticut Health Systems Agency, e.g., heart surgery and pediatrics facilities.

- Consider how they can encourage more doctors and dentists to practice downtown.

#### **The Southwest Connecticut Health Systems Agency Should:**

- Consider with the Teamsters Union and the Connecticut Health Plan the possibility of joining forces in the new downtown building the Teamsters are proposing to build.
- Continue seeking cooperation of the Bridgeport hospitals to provide complementary services.

#### **The Manufacturers Association Should:**

- Make sure the training needs are taken care of; if the PIC is not reorganized to do it, the Manufacturers Association should bring together the many training agencies and assure that they meet the needs of business.
- Make every effort to keep in the City the office jobs related to the City's factories.

## **SOME ISSUES IN MORE DETAIL**

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### **WHY DOWNTOWN ENRICHMENT IS IMPORTANT TO THE WHOLE CITY**

Some in Bridgeport consider downtown unimportant. They say: We are a city of families; we don't need restaurants and fancy shops. But they also say: Why do our young people leave town when they finish school? They say: We're a blue collar town; concentrate on factory jobs; forget white collar jobs. But factory jobs are stable; non-manufacturing jobs have increased from 47 percent of this area's total in 1960 to 61 percent now. They say: All the City's Community Development money should go to making residential neighborhoods and housing better for moderate- and low-income households. But they also say: We need jobs and better bus service to them. They say: We who work downtown like it this way; there's plenty of parking and a low volume of traffic. It's a leisurely place, pleasantly small. But they also worry about stores closing, particularly in Lafayette Plaza, and a dwindling tax base.

Many of the problems for which downtowns are an antidote are not as severe in Bridgeport as in other cities—but still a stronger downtown would benefit the City.

**Jobs.** Bridgeport does have a larger manufacturing base than most American cities. **But,** factories

cannot meet the demand for jobs by themselves. The number of factory jobs in the Bridgeport labor area\* has bounced back to where it was in 1971 and where it was during an earlier low-point from 1958-62—and that is a remarkable achievement for a Northeast urban area. But at best, that's stability. Meanwhile, the number looking for work in the labor area has increased dramatically, and it took a doubling of non-manufacturing jobs in the last 25 years to fill the gap.

Throughout the United States, factory jobs are not increasing over the long run. Due to high energy costs, it is unlikely that the Northeast's share of the nation's stagnant manufacturing sector will increase. This Region will do well to hold the number it has now. Bridgeport's manufacturing economy is heavily based on one customer—the U.S. Defense Department. That is one reason demand has changed so rapidly: factory jobs dipped from 78,000 in 1955 to 65,000 in 1958, back up to 71,000 in 1970, then down again to 58,000 in 1975 and back up to 65,000 in 1980.

Some people object to focusing on non-manufacturing jobs: Bridgeport's residents, they say, are

\*Bridgeport, Stratford, Fairfield, Milford, Trumbull, Easton, Monroe, Shelton and Derby.



manual workers and those seeking jobs cannot do white collar work. But those are the jobs the economy needs, so if Bridgeport people want jobs, they will have to prepare themselves for the growing white collar and service economy. Many of the new jobs are not highly skilled. With offices come hotels and restaurants to operate, buses to drive, public places to maintain, stores to sell from, traffic to guide, typewriters to repair.

**Residents.** According to preliminary census figures, 24,000 persons migrated out of Bridgeport in the net during the 1970s, and the City population declined by 14,000, from 156,500 to 142,500. (There were 10,000 more births than deaths.) Of Connecticut's cities, only Hartford had greater out-migration.

Some of the population loss can be attributed to older couples liking their neighborhood so much that they remain alone in their homes after several children have moved out. Even Black Rock, with its extraordinary amenity, Long Island Sound, and high-quality homes, lost population in every single Census tract—though housing units increased in Black Rock by 7 percent. But Bridgeport also lost a large number of housing units—well over 3,000, over 5 percent of the 1970 total—and Bridgeport has a vacancy rate of 6½ percent compared to what the real estate industry considers normal, 4-5 percent.

Bridgeport's per capita income in 1974 (last figures available) was 143rd among the 169 cities, towns and boroughs in Connecticut, and nearly all the poorer municipalities were rural or small town. Bridgeport had the third largest percentage of school children on welfare—well behind Hartford but almost as high as New Haven.

So Bridgeport has not been immune to the out-movement of higher income residents, and it is not unreasonable to apply the general arguments for urban centers to this area. Stronger downtown magnetism drawing people to choose to live in Bridgeport could add to property values and the tax base, save some existing housing, and contribute to the City's dynamism.

**Image.** The initial meeting of this Project's Advisory Committee underscored the negative self-image of Bridgeport people. Our inquiries find a similar negative image of Bridgeport by outsiders. Downtown is the one place that City residents share in common—that is the locus of the City's community. Downtown is the only place outsiders usually know of a city, except what they see riding by on a train or expressway. The lack of dynamism in downtown Bridgeport and its death after dark could be one cause of the inferiority complex.

**In sum,** Bridgeport residents generally—factory workers and welfare recipients as well as business and professional people—seem likely to benefit from attracting more jobs downtown.

## CONCERNS ABOUT DOWNTOWN GROWTH

**Design.** It is not clear that all the Bridgeporters who want their downtown to be different from Stamford have the same vision for Bridgeport, but planners for Bridgeport certainly should find and consider the composite vision of Bridgeport residents in determining the design and density. To double the number of people downtown during the business day would require filling existing vacant office space, completing the second and third towers planned 10 years ago by Robert Rich and constructing five new buildings about the size of the largest office buildings already in the central business district. There is plenty of room in downtown Bridgeport for that and more without losing the green and the small city scale.

**Housing cost.** If demand for housing in and near Bridgeport is increased by more happening downtown, rents and home prices will rise, and some residents may be priced out of their neighborhoods. But Bridgeport has had a considerable loss of housing units and population over the past decade so there is space for added residents if the demand is there, and there is room in, or in place of, little used nonresidential buildings. It does not seem likely that anyone need be displaced when new residents are attracted. If a housing problem does occur, it will be one of simply not enough units in the **whole Greater Bridgeport Region**—the same problem that is plaguing the rest of the country. Attracting residents toward downtown would somewhat mitigate rather than worsen the regional housing shortage: (1) the loss of housing units such as occurred in the 1970s is less likely and, (2) by attracting residents to the City, to nonresidential buildings recycled for housing and new structures on vacant land, at least the cost of infrastructure, i.e., streets, sewers, water mains, schools, will be saved compared to building the same housing on vacant land on the urban fringe. So attracting people toward the center of Bridgeport seems likely to result in more housing for the Greater Bridgeport area as a whole. But some neighborhoods may attract so many new residents that programs may be needed to assure households of the right to stay in their neighborhoods if they wish. This problem is being addressed in Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS) areas.

## CAN BRIDGEPORT ENRICH ITS DOWNTOWN? HOW?

The value of a downtown is that it brings people together—to support common services and to interact with each other. The more that is there, the more advantage to being there—more opportunities and variety, more and stronger services. And fewer disadvantages, i.e., people on the streets deter crime;

businesses pay taxes, employ the unemployed, and contribute public services in other ways. So the city that attracts activities downtown is more likely to attract additional activities, with diminishing government inducements necessary.

**Start with office jobs.** Generally, cities like Bridgeport start with more office jobs. Office jobs will be expanding in western Connecticut; other key elements in downtown development probably will not—i.e., retail sales, higher education, hospitals. With more offices will come restaurants; if any are noteworthy, they will attract people after office hours, too. People who work downtown have reason to live near downtown; people who live near downtown are likely to shift their shopping downtown if appropriate goods are offered. People who work, shop and live downtown help support personal and business services there—doctors, barbers, photostat sales and service. And focusing Bridgeport area activities more in the downtown would strengthen support for the arts.

We might learn how Bridgeport should seek office development from both failure and success.

**Why Bridgeport failed to attract offices.** In 1970, Bridgeport seemed to be on its way to a downtown that would focus the major activities of the Greater Bridgeport region in a single center. Its downtown renewal program had quickly filled the cleared area with Lafayette Plaza, a United States Court House, a Holiday Inn, a State Court House. People's Bank had built a 95,000 square foot office building and Robert Rich, developer of Stamford's downtown and High Ridge office park, began a three-tower office complex at the new railroad station. But Rich's first tower, the State National Bank Building, still has a floor to rent after eight years. No other office building followed, and Lafayette Plaza never has been filled completely. The revival petered out.

Several firms looked at downtown Bridgeport as an office site and decided against it. Some even moved their headquarters from Bridgeport factories to suburban campuses and office parks—ACCO, Raybestos, Harvey Hubbell. According to some firms that looked and refused, Bridgeport is just not the first class place they want to identify with their company; they need to attract upwardly-mobile executives. It had a blue collar image. It offered few urban amenities in exchange for giving up a spacious green office campus. Concretely, they said they were put off by Bridgeport's crime and poor public schools.

Through much of the 1970s, small old cities around the country failed to attract office jobs. There was a presumption in favor of suburban office campuses. And Bridgeport was considered far from Manhattan, which still holds offices in its magnetic field.

**Why other downtowns are attracting offices.** Though crime seems the biggest factor in the refusal of office establishments to choose downtown Bridgeport, many downtowns with higher crime rates are getting substantial office development, including Hartford, Boston, Los Angeles, Manhattan. (A current yet incomplete survey of office space by Regional Plan shows recent substantial increases in Springfield, Boston and—very substantial—Wilmington.)

A poor public education product is a double deterrent—discouraging executives from wanting to live in the City and discouraging personnel directors from wanting to hire clerical-secretarial staff from City school graduates. But virtually all U.S. cities have the same problems.

Why, then, do other cities get offices? Each successful downtown apparently has something attractive enough to overcome the negatives of a high-crime, low-educational-quality image. Those that didn't have a strong attraction usually had a corporate sponsor or two that took the initiative to begin to build the magnet in downtown that would raise the benefits of being there and begin to decrease the liabilities. Hartford had insurance headquarters that ran risks to enrich that downtown. Kalamazoo had the Upjohn Company; New Brunswick, Johnson & Johnson.

Stamford, however, had no local establishment and had a bad urban image. Its revival dated from the decision of GTE to locate its headquarters downtown; six *Fortune* 500 corporations followed. Apparently firms recognized, once GTE located there, that downtown Stamford would soon provide the advantages of a dynamic downtown. One spokesman for a recent corporate recruit to Stamford expressed that recently: "If we'd known Stamford was going to be like it is becoming, we would have moved there sooner."

Bridgeport must convince outside firms that its downtown is going to become active enough to increase its benefits and decrease its liabilities. Indeed, this seems a make-or-break time for Bridgeport, with opportunities for downtown growth greater than before but a threat of retailing decline if office growth is not captured.

**Where should Bridgeport seek offices?** Manhattan remains the lodestar of the nation's economy. The drift away from Manhattan's central position in the national economy has been turned around in the past several years, in large measure by Manhattan's attraction for foreign business. But rents for Manhattan offices have tripled in the last few years so there will be a number of firms seeking office space elsewhere, probably not for their headquarters but for whatever segment of work can be separated for day-to-day operations. In addition, the many headquarters that already moved to Connec-

taut find too little housing near enough for their employees. Some intended to expand on their present sites but find they cannot; they need a location for additional office jobs where housing is available—if possible, within easy reach of headquarters.

Recent trends and the public pronouncements of Bridgeport area real estate spokesmen suggest that much of this spillover from Manhattan will be located by the side of the highway rather than in a downtown. But with petroleum prices and continued supply uncertain, downtowns offer unique advantages: They bring a lot of activities together (a) within walking distance of each other and (b) in the center of population. These qualities mean that:

- downtown employees are more likely to be able to get to work during times of energy shortage;
- those dependent on public transit can get to work without going out of their way or transferring, regardless of where in the metropolitan area they live—so a downtown firm can tap the whole metropolitan area for its labor force;
- those who drive are more likely to share rides because husbands and wives and neighbors are more likely to go to the same place. The saving to a household from not having to have a second car can be the difference between money to buy a house or not.

In this Region, a downtown usually has rail connections to Manhattan, which is growing increasingly inhospitable to cars.

Altogether, city downtowns surrounding Manhattan are ripe for office development. But why Bridgeport? The Westchester-Connecticut corridor has been most attractive to headquarters moving out of Manhattan, and downtowns in that corridor closer than Bridgeport to the center, i.e., White Plains and Stamford, are filling up. So it is timely to make Bridgeport's case for office development.



Originally conceived as three towers at the railroad and bus station, Park City Plaza's first and only tower still has one vacant floor after eight years.



But Bridgeport's energetic downtown enrichment efforts now seem likely to attract offices because: (1) the cost of office space in New York and Stamford has risen sharply, (2) there is continuing office growth spilling out from Manhattan, and (3) office locaters are beginning to recognize the benefits of city centers—witness White Plains', Stamford's and Hartford's downtown development—particularly in a time of energy uncertainty and high cost.



## THE CASE FOR BRIDGEPORT

Bridgeport should construct a set of reasonable arguments for its downtown, compared both to office campuses and other downtowns. Here are some arguments:

**Access.** Few places have as good a combination of auto, bus, train and corporate plane access. By auto, Bridgeport competes easily with rural and suburban sites, having good East-West and North-South expressways and little congestion on downtown streets. Bus service from suburbs as well as City neighborhoods is far better than present ridership merits. The railroad stops within walking distance of every corner of downtown, tying downtown to Manhattan, Stamford, New Haven, Waterbury, Hartford, Providence and Boston. Bridgeport should try to get direct Amtrak service beyond New York to Philadelphia, Wilmington, Baltimore and Washington. Corporate planes can be based just 10 minutes from downtown, and there is room for more. Small scheduled airlines also go from Bridgeport's airport to Washington and New England cities. So, to assemble people throughout the business day and for employees' trips to work, downtown Bridgeport has few peers.

**Housing.** Few old cities of this Region—perhaps none—have as good a housing stock as Bridgeport—a variety of well-kept homes in all price ranges from Sound-facing mansions to suburban-type large and small homes on various-sized lots to old Park Avenue and South End mansions, some transformed into apartments, to old fashioned but still sound (or potentially sound) six flats and cottages. While the percentage of households owning their own homes is not large compared to the suburbs, it is compared to other cities, and many people have told us that there are few absentee landlords. That helps to preserve neighborhoods. There has been little headlong white flight from an influx of black or Hispanic households. New townhouses and apartments are being encouraged, and several senior-citizen projects are being completed with the intent not only of providing appropriate living for older people but also to vacate their homes for younger

households needing more space than the older residents. Two-bedroom townhouses just completed are selling for \$55,000 without a subsidy, low compared to the rest of the Region and within the budget of middle managers or households with two clerical workers.

But the corporate middle manager, professional or executive is not confined to the City. Some of the most attractive suburban neighborhoods in the country are within a 15-minute drive of downtown, and bus and train from many parts of the suburbs are available when the car is in the shop. Schools in Bridgeport's suburbs, on the whole, have a good reputation.

**Outdoor amenity.** Bridgeport residents are within a few minutes of glorious countryside and have within the City some of the loveliest parks in urban America. Little of Long Island Sound is accessible to the public. By contrast, Bridgeport offers 2½ miles of Sound-front.

**In sum,** few downtowns in the nation have within a short trip as wide a choice of good housing, community types and outdoor amenities as Bridgeport's.

**The downtown itself** is convenient—still compact—less than a mile from one corner to the opposite—with nice amenities like McLevy Green and some graciously restored older buildings as well as a few significant pieces of architecture. While the impression in many places is uninspiring, even the “left-over” looking places offer a positive aspect—it is the vacant lots and partly vacant low buildings that are the main aesthetic offenders, and they constitute a resource, i.e., easily cleared and buildable land. It would be valuable for the City to buy up some of the best potential building sites it does not already own both to assure proper maintenance in their underused state and to assure an office prospect of quick clearance and ownership. The City could gain the increased value that its efforts with the other elements of the coalition will create downtown.

Downtown is not a hotbed of crime, nor is it closely surrounded by neighborhoods that are. Security may well be cheaper for a corporation



Parks are another outstanding Bridgeport asset: the 2½ mile L.I. Sound beach and Beardsley Park in particular.

downtown than on an isolated campus. But downtown Bridgeport will have to be sold to office entrepreneurs on the basis of what it will become more than what it is. While it has at least one good restaurant and the Algonquin Club and a few attractive buildings and outdoor spaces, it is clearly the weak point of the City, dull and, in many places, dreary. However, when more comes downtown, still more will come, and it will not take long to overcome its lack of magnetism.

**Public sector cooperation.** Many firms have avoided cities because city governments were alleged to be more difficult to deal with than suburban or rural governments. Bridgeport's government has demonstrated its interest in working with business to attract jobs. The Bridgeport Economic Development Corporation (BEDCO), a quasi-public corporation which has worked with the City and State to provide factory space for expanding firms, has won high praise from the firms it has worked with. For example, both Carpenter Technology and Bridgeport Machines stayed in Bridgeport and expanded in large part because BEDCO was helpful. The other public-private partnership is Neighborhood Housing Services, in which bankers, small business people and City officials work with neighborhood leaders to rehabilitate housing and the neighborhood around it. Most recently, the City has joined the Chamber of Commerce Downtown Council Development Board.

**Supporting services.** Bridgeport has 13 banks, the fourth largest banking center in New England; five higher education institutions in Fairfield and Bridgeport with about 18,000 students, New England's fourth largest college town. Fairfield University's Center for Financial Studies, established by the National Association of Mutual Savings Banks and run jointly with the University, trains corporate managers from all over the world. Fairfield University has just initiated a Master of Science degree program in Financial Management, and Sacred Heart offers a more general Master's in Business Administration. The University of Bridgeport sponsors meetings of the "Tower Fellows," a forum for top-level corporate executives in Fairfield County. In a recent reorganization, the University of Bridgeport has shifted its emphasis to Business Administration and opened a law school. Three institutions—Sacred Heart, Housatonic and University of Bridgeport—have "cooperative," i.e., work-study, programs, providing students with work experience linked to their studies and providing downtown Bridgeport with upwardly-mobile workers. The University of Bridgeport's is one of the largest cooperative programs in the nation. Bridgeport Engineering Institute's whole program is work-study; all of its students work and attend the Institute part-time.

**Local leadership.** The Chamber of Commerce's just-organized Downtown Council has business' top echelons for its leadership.

One important asset is unrecognized by the knowledgeable people who guided us as members of our Citizens Advisory Committee. Committee members identified as a City weakness that young people choose to leave the City after their schooling. We also have heard that doctors who intern or take residencies in Bridgeport seldom stay. This is a genuine problem to be pursued. But it masks the fact that there are many impressive young people, born and bred, who stayed and equally impressive young people who have newly come to work in behalf of Bridgeport. We shall resist the temptation to name some for fear of missing others, but we suggest you look around at some of the people the Mayor has at top City echelons, the staffs of the Transit District, Neighborhood Housing Services, BEDCO, the Chamber of Commerce, Greater Bridgeport Regional Planning Agency, the central kitchens for the schools and some private firms, plus the leadership of some neighborhood organizations. We count young upcoming leaders devoted to the City a distinct Bridgeport asset. Some should be included in the public-private-civic partnership.

#### **THE STEPS BRIDGEPORT SHOULD TAKE TO ATTRACT OFFICE JOBS**

Bridgeport needs to take two steps to attract offices: (1) publicize these assets and (2) attack the City's liabilities.

Mere publicity will not do the job, but it will help. For example, real estate people in the Bridgeport area have been quoted as skeptical that Bridgeport can attract prospective office jobs. The Mayor should take them on the tour he has been offering Bridgeport business leaders recently. Special effort should also be made to show Bridgeport to its own suburbanites who "never go into Bridgeport." The tour shows the City's ability to do things well—e.g., the remodelling of the Stratfield Hotel for senior citizens with nice touches of preservation, the central kitchens for the City schools and senior citizen meals—and in doing so, it takes visitors through the solid neighborhoods that distinguish Bridgeport.

Regional Plan, too, can help to change the negative image of Bridgeport outside the City by showing its slide report, possibly turning it into a videotape for use on UHF and cable as well as in individual cassettes. (The Association's videotape on New Jersey cities ran on New Jersey UHF and is run frequently on Manhattan cable TV.) Regional Plan, also, might organize tours of Bridgeport's historic architecture, showing other assets at the same time. Changing Bridgeport's image to the

passersby on Turnpike and railroad is discussed in the Summary.

But the principal proposal to attract offices to Bridgeport would combine publicity on the assets with an attack on the liabilities through the public-private-civic partnership.

**Organizing a partnership to recruit offices.** The business leaders of Bridgeport, with Mayor Mandanici and Connecticut Commissioner of Economic Development Stockton, should form the nucleus of the public-private partnership. This coalition should try to recruit to the coalition corporations not yet represented in Bridgeport or those that have industrial jobs in Bridgeport but no downtown office. These firms would not be expected to commit office jobs to downtown immediately. They would simply lay on the table the conditions they feel they need to put office jobs there. While it is conceivable that a major corporation would consider locating its national headquarters in Bridgeport, it is more likely that back-office functions or a division or regional headquarters would be located there.

The next recruit to the coalition should be the relevant federal officials in Region I, located in Boston and covering all of New England, and other State commissioners as issues come up affecting them. The area's higher education institutions also should be a part. The final element in the coalition should be selected civic leaders, to assure Bridgeport residents that plans will add up to their benefit. In short, all the key decision-makers who could make Bridgeport a good place to work will together focus on that question.

Because the agenda begins with the real concerns of business, there need be no waste motion. Once these problems are on the table, each participant can offer a contribution to solving them—including the business people themselves who, in many cities, have joined government to enrich schools and make their administration more efficient, build vestpocket parks, contribute to cultural life, and even participate in crime-fighting, particularly through youth employment programs.

Regional Plan Association proposed this kind of process in 1972. New Brunswick Tomorrow is a modification of it: The Board includes an executive of Johnson & Johnson, the City's principal business; a representative of a large public utility covering a major portion of the State; four local business people and two professional people; the Mayor, two councilmen and two appointed City officials; a school teacher; two representatives of Rutgers, the State University, whose main campus is in New Brunswick; an elected and an appointed County official; a labor representative; head of the County Urban League; a minister.

Johnson & Johnson was considering moving its headquarters out of the dying downtown rather

than building a new headquarters in the City. Two main conditions for staying in the City were put forward by J&J: better highway access to downtown by completing a long-delayed highway and the active attention of its New Brunswick Tomorrow partners to putting more activities downtown. The State quickly pushed through the highway. Rutgers put its Art School in an abandoned department store, providing visual interest at a central corner, attractions for downtowners and many more people coming downtown every day. Rutgers also put a major portion of its Medical School in a new building adjacent to a downtown hospital—another several hundred persons coming downtown daily. New Brunswick Tomorrow formed a BEDCO-type corporation, which built new office buildings, filled in large part but not entirely by J&J subsidiaries. Two near-downtown neighborhoods were rehabilitated in a Neighborhood Housing Services type of operation, with emphasis on recruiting young households when older households were vacating. J&J also contributed a small downtown park. Because Johnson & Johnson's contribution to the downtown revival has been dominant, it is something more than an equal partner. In Bridgeport, the existing banks and potential new corporate additions to downtown are likely to be contributing more equally, so there will be no question of first among equals.

In the past few years, The Netherlands and the United States have begun experimenting with an arrangement very much like our proposed coalition, called, in the United States, Negotiated Investment Strategy, and in The Netherlands, Agenda Consultation. Connecticut's Office of Policy and Management and the Region I Federal Regional Council (made up of the regional administrators of major federal agencies in New England) are planning to try Negotiated Investment Strategy in one Connecticut city. Bridgeport should campaign to be the city.

In St. Paul, Minnesota, Gary, Indiana, and Columbus, Ohio, coalitions using this strategy have agreed on priorities for capital investment and cooperatively moved against urban problems.

**Recruiting the corporations.** The City, Chamber and Regional Plan Association can seek out corporations together. The City and Chamber can talk with firms with Bridgeport connections while Regional Plan talks with firms with which the Association has connections. Attention should particularly focus on overspill jobs from firms in the Greenwich-Bridgeport corridor. Many of their employees already live east of their jobs, in or near Bridgeport. For meetings throughout the day, several large firms are within walking distance of the Greenwich and Stamford railroad stations just a half-hour away, with regular off-peak service. As more activities accumulate around the Connecticut



railroad stations, more frequent service can be expected. The Connecticut Department of Transportation is looking into the feasibility of a rail transit system with frequent trips between Connecticut and Westchester downtowns all day.

**State action.** Corporations are more likely to take interest in downtown Bridgeport if the State intensifies its implementation of Governor Grasso's Executive Order XX (March 1978): "The priority goals" of the State are "to revitalize the economic base of our urban areas by rebuilding older commercial and industrial areas, and encouraging new enterprises to locate in the central cities . . . . All commissioners are directed to encourage a strong business environment in our urban areas, seek the maintenance and expansion of business ventures by ensuring that financial incentives, physical facilities, necessary manpower needs and supportive services are available to maintain and attract employers and employees . . . (and by) locating future state facilities and personnel in potential of being rehabilitated and conserved."

This policy is justified, the order explains, because "the cities, urban areas and towncenters . . . have been historically the major focal point of our economic development and growth, have provided that sense of community for human well-being, have provided essential public services and have been the primary place of cultural enrichment." They have declined because of "aging physical facilities, Federal procurement policies . . . , a highly mobile upper-income population, footloose industries."

The cities should be revived to combat "urban sprawl, increased public service demands on the state and its local units of government, destruction of valuable farm land and other natural resources and widespread energy inefficiency." City decline and urban sprawl "impair the quality of life of all our citizens regardless of status or residence and need urgent, increased attention and a planned, coordinated effort of creating and implementing solutions . . ." Furthermore, "our cities and urban areas and their people are valuable resources and . . . these urban areas represent significant public and private investment that should not be abandoned and . . . our cities still remain the cultural centers of our society . . . .

"The city is the great conservator of land, energy and other resources."

There is also a Legislature-approved State plan (strengthening amendments are now being considered) which gives priority to development in cities and seeks to protect farmland.

Yet the places expected to attract office jobs ahead of downtown Bridgeport are rural places that will promote urban sprawl, invade farm and woodlands unnecessarily and weaken cities—the

opposite of State goals. So Bridgeport should seek the opportunity of a Negotiated Investment Strategy process to encourage the State to act within the policies outlined by Governor Grasso and the State Legislature. Equally important, all the cities of Connecticut should coalesce to argue that State investment in sewers, water lines, streets and highways be concentrated to make cities more accessible and pleasanter rather than opening up countryside to scattered development. If the State publicizes this policy and warns prospective developers not to expect needed infrastructure or much housing nearby while it facilitates housing in and near Bridgeport, the chance of inducing private office locaters to give Bridgeport a new look would be greatly enhanced. So a second step for Bridgeport, after organizing a coalition of all levels of government and prospective business investors, would be to press the State to more actively pursue its land-use policies.

**More housing** within, say, a 30-minute trip to downtown Bridgeport could be the strongest attraction in a housing-short Region. The Greater Bridgeport Regional Planning Agency did a survey of potential housing sites with the City in 1977. That should be updated and expanded in three ways: (1) to identify appropriate sites for market-rate as well as subsidized housing (the subject of the 1977 survey), (2) include appropriate sites regardless of existing zoning and (3) include suburban sites where public transit is available or could be available if density were appropriate. The Greater Bridgeport Transit District then should work with the Regional Planning Agency and its member municipalities to plan and offer improved bus service to municipalities which allow densities that provide enough residents to support better bus service. In and near suburban town centers are most likely candidates. With a large share of households now childless, the suburbs need not resist apartments and town houses to save their school tax rate.

**Appearance and design.** While downtown Bridgeport has many pleasant and even noble vistas, links among segments of downtown are haphazard, and there are several dismal patches. All around the downtown, too, are left over bits of land cut up by expressways and a sea of factories, gas tanks and chimneys. Some of the surrounding view can be decorated into a more aesthetic setting with landscaping, trees and imaginative painting. Mayor Mandanici has asked the State Economic Development organization for help on this. Downtown itself already is being transformed into a more unified and attractive place. "The Block"—a barrier of somewhat scary dreariness—clearly discouraged occupation of the State National Bank Building by separating it from the greener and more gracious part of downtown; it is now demolished, and those

who regretted the loss of the historic buildings at either end doubtless will acknowledge that the space can now be designed to link the riverfront and railroad station to the rest of downtown. People's Arcade is another contribution to linking downtown east to downtown west.

A downtown works only if people get out of their cars and proceed on foot. This has two design implications: (1) it must be compact because people typically don't walk far, but (2) if walking is pleasant and interesting, with lots happening or interesting shop windows, they will gladly walk farther than they will, say, through a parking lot. So it is especially important for Bridgeport to plan carefully where to put its next elements.

Every square foot of downtown must be used judiciously if Bridgeport is to have a dynamic center with small-city ambience and if two key elements are to get the support from the rest of downtown they very much need—Lafayette Plaza at one corner and the two grand theatres at the opposite corner. In the meantime, the Transit District has been working with the City on a concept for brightening and clarifying the path from State National Tower through the refurbished Arcade to Read's and Gimbel's and Lafayette Plaza.

Prompt attention to appearance and design improvements is imperative because image plays a very important part in location decisions. The attempt to attract new magnets downtown has to be accompanied by design and appearance improvements and a sense of where the downtown is going—as part of the sales approach. The Chamber of Commerce Downtown Development Board and Regional Plan Association have worked out a consultant program with a nationally known urban designer and they are together seeking funds for the study.

**Making downtown work smoothly.** The Transit District also has been discussing the idea of a People-Moving Company Cafe and Waiting Room in a long-vacant space in Lafayette Plaza where bus riders now often block the doors to the stores, a frequently mentioned problem. The important point here is that some downtown-oriented agency should take responsibility for dealing with such problems. A suburban shopping center has a single management. There is no question who is responsible for dealing with problems. A downtown's success depends equally on all the parts working well, but ownership and management are fragmented. Another example was relayed by the head of a small firm attracted to downtown Bridgeport by prompt and helpful service of the Chamber of Commerce. Shortly after, he was bad-mouthing the downtown because of alleged mismanagement of his building—and who is to deal with that? Some one agency has to think as a single downtown

“manager” about whether the parts are working well together. The Downtown Development Council of the Chamber of Commerce should take this “downtown manager” viewpoint, the suburban shopping center manager viewpoint for downtown, even if accomplishing proposed changes requires action by many individuals and agencies. As downtown activities grow, a plan for appropriate parking and parking management as well as traffic improvements will be necessary.

**Improved air service.** Proposals to lengthen the airport runways have been argued for many years. One runway cannot be lengthened because it would invade a protected wetland; the other runway would run into a less certain environmental prohibition, the airport manager feels, because its wetland is “questionable.” But the opposition from surrounding neighbors is not in question, and their objections would have to be met somehow.

A second need is more hangar space. With corporate planes costing more than a million dollars each, it is not surprising that protection for them is desirable. The airport manager feels that a private investor should build hangars. In Westchester, corporations are vying for the right to build hangars at the County-owned airport. The personal property tax burden on aircraft based in Connecticut seems to contribute to the excess demand for basing planes at Westchester airport and should be considered by the Legislature once more. Eventually, as Westchester fills up, more firms may be willing to pay the Connecticut tax, of course. Probably more important for business is lengthening one runway to allow somewhat larger planes at Bridgeport airport. Continuing negotiation with the State and Stratford would seem worth the effort, though it has been going on for years and years.

The airport manager also feels there is a market for more meeting rooms at or near the airport; however, the airport is very close to downtown Bridgeport. Hangars and facilities that must be near the aircraft would seem to deserve a higher priority at the airport site.

**Improved ferry service.** A study of increased ferry service from Long Island is underway. In a report dated February 25, 1981, the Bridgeport terminus was identified as most efficient from the viewpoint of the potential traveller (a shorter over-water trip than New Haven and serving more people than New London). However, it would require some truck movement for a few blocks along the waterfront downtown to get onto the Turnpike. This disturbance would be only two or three trucks every two hours or so, not very great. In return, downtown Bridgeport and the South End discount operations would get year-round and more pedestrian visitors off the boat, an estimated million

passengers a year, and Bridgeport would become a place on the New England map for many more people. On the whole, we suspect the traffic problems can be worked out and the benefits would outweigh the disruption; the big question is the cost/benefit calculations of the needed truck access. While it would be expected that the ferry would pay the debt service for other capital costs directly related to ferry service, a loan or loan guarantee would have to be arranged. The Connecticut Development Authority probably would do that if an increase in Connecticut employment could be demonstrated.

## **OTHER INGREDIENTS TO DOWNTOWN MAGNETISM**

Offices are only the first ingredient to seek in enriching downtown Bridgeport. Housing, higher education, hotels, more arts and entertainment, added medical services and, finally, more and better retailing also are important.

**Downtown housing.** Who might be attracted to near-downtown apartments? The best candidates are those who work downtown—so the more office jobs, the more candidates for downtown housing. Those who work in downtown Stamford also are candidates: housing is limited and expensive further west, train service to Stamford is fairly good and likely to get better, and large numbers of jobs are within walking distance or short bus ride of the Stamford station. Already we have heard that Stamford employees have found housing in Bridgeport. The third group of candidates are older people who don't drive any more; downtown offers them public transportation in every direction and a chance to walk many places.

These groups are likely to be attracted to housing in downtown Bridgeport if it becomes the place where the best movies, restaurants and shopping are available, along with jobs and public transportation. A fourth group might be attracted to live near downtown by water, e.g., town houses on a marina, as along the Sound further west.

Connecticut's Coastal Area Management program has small amounts of funds and technical assistance for replanning urban waterfronts and even some money to move facilities that time has made inappropriate for this valuable part of a city. Boston, Cincinnati, Baltimore, Seattle, San Francisco all have earned a reputation for revitalization in large measure based on waterfront redevelopment.

**Higher education** can provide strong downtown support by providing shoppers, restaurant goers, and audiences for the arts and other high-quality entertainment whether the university is in the downtown or not. Higher education right in downtown could be even more stimulating. The students

and faculty would keep the area lively in the evenings as well as daytimes and often add activities of interest to others downtown—e.g., the art school could display works where hundreds pass by, drama and music schools could offer brief lunch-time performances for office workers as well as full performances at night. The higher education institution offers valuable services to the enterprises operating downtown—continuing education for their employees, consulting expertise from the faculty, conference rooms. For the institution itself, a downtown site makes it easy to attract part-time students, the fastest growing segment of higher education; it leaves the administration free of parking problems that often preoccupy college presidents on their own campuses; it provides supplementary services like the Central Library and restaurants of all kinds.

The Computer Processing Institute (CPI) is an example of all these points. When the Institute outgrew its building in Stratford over a year ago, a relocation team selected the present downtown Bridgeport site which was available for fast occupancy and easily reached by train, bus and automobile. Assistance from the Chamber and the City Administration simplified the move, but the real attraction, CPI's director told us, was the downtown location with convenient access from all parts of the Region. The school brings several hundred people to the Lafayette Plaza area daily and could provide additional support for late-night eating places on nights when classes are held till 10:30 p.m. Besides the range of computer operation and programming courses offered, CPI teaches a special course in "small business systems" and can offer both its computer services and trained personnel to nearby businesses.

In today's world, higher education is one of the most important economic magnets. Bridgeport has it but does not have the image of a higher education center. A downtown higher education center, jointly operated by the five higher education institutions, could provide downtown strengthening and an important higher education image for Bridgeport. The University of Bridgeport and Fairfield University are involved in such a consortium in Stamford already. Increasingly, colleges have been going out to potential students with multiple campuses, so a downtown center could be equally beneficial to the institutions, the City and the region's economy. Without heavy investment, it could start in existing space to see if it works: perhaps in the space above the two theatres to tie the colleges into the Arts Center or vacant store space in Lafayette Plaza or the Algonquin Club or the second floor of the Arcade.

The near-downtown campus of the University of Bridgeport also could contribute more to down-



town dynamism. For many years, the University has been rather aloof from the City. For example, when the University built an Arts Center a decade ago, at a time when Bridgeport was making serious efforts to revive its downtown, no step was taken to relate it to the downtown or attract Bridgeport residents to attend its functions. The present University of Bridgeport administration has declared a strong interest in cooperating with the City. A shuttle bus does take students and faculty to Lafayette Plaza, but many students are said to be afraid of downtown Bridgeport—though they are also said to spend time in New Haven, with a higher crime rate but a livelier reputation. More ways should be found to link the University to downtown activities.

The current search for a site for Housatonic Community College raises similar issues. For a decade, the College has been in "temporary" inadequate quarters in the former Singer sewing machine plant on Barnum Avenue just off East Main Street. The Connecticut Board of Higher Education is considering alternatives, though it has approved a five-year extension of the College's lease in the Singer building until August 1986. The alternatives that have been seriously considered one time or another are: University of Bridgeport building(s) or a new building on a campus vacant site, a refurbished Singer building, downtown and the East Side Middle School.

Housatonic provides the first two years of college for students seeking a Baccalaureate Degree, two-year career and occupational programs, short courses for particular community needs like Emergency Medical Technicians and real estate agents, and remedial education and counseling for those who want higher education but are ill-prepared or unsure of their goals.

A location that fits this mission would—it seems—give high priority to (1) encouraging people into continuing education who might never consider it were it not in their neighborhood or near their work; (2) making it possible for everyone wishing to attend to do so, e.g., being easily reached by bus, train, or foot; (3) not discouraging attendance because the location seems frightening or just out of the world of potential students; (4) reaching out to the community so needed community services are asked of it and offered.

In addition to site considerations for the College's own mission, Housatonic could, just by its presence, contribute to other community goals. Its 2,600 students, many attending at night, plus its faculty could bring activity to an otherwise dead part of town. Its construction or reconstruction of a building could stimulate further renewal. Though these considerations may be outside the primary concerns of the State Board of Higher

Education, Housatonic's permanent location could be valuable for East Main Street or for downtown or for the University of Bridgeport—and so for the City of Bridgeport.

Of course, cost must be a high consideration—and it is the principal focus in the Board of Higher Education staff "Preliminary Review," just completed. But the full cost to the Board is not the full public cost and benefit. For example, the "Review" rejects a proposal to refurbish the Singer building to provide much better permanent facilities for the College because it would involve the State in putting together a "group of compatible users" for the majority of the building, not needed by the College, and those uses might require a subsidy. That, the "Review" says, makes "the purchase of the property by the State a difficult and unlikely solution . . ."

But East Main Street around the Singer building is being considered for substantial upgrading by the Transit District and City, stimulated by already-successful improvement of residential neighborhoods all around it. If the City, Transit District or BEDCO could put together a package—perhaps similar to the 1975 proposal put forward by Housatonic President Darnowski and others—and find the necessary subsidy to fit economic realities there—perhaps including State funds like the Housing Finance Agency adaptive reuse program—this might be the least-cost solution, compared to a gradual emptying of the Singer building. In other words, the cost of an abandoned building adjacent to an area targeted for upgrading or, alternatively, the cost of demolishing it and building something new really should be factored in. Those costs can be calculated; in addition there are more subjective costs. For example, the Board of Higher Education "Review" says: "There is unanimous agreement that in the 10 years the college has been located on Barnum Avenue, it has acted as a stabilizing element in the neighborhood. Clearly, the college serves more than the educational needs of the community." Yet this value has not been weighed sufficiently in the "Review" conclusions. Of Housatonic's 2,600 students, 185 live on the East Side, Housatonic's neighborhood. The fact that 2,400 students come from outside the East Side, many from outside Bridgeport, suggests that people are not generally deterred by its location.

Just as the Singer building may have a severe negative cost if **not** used, so the Middle School might have a negative community cost if it is used for Housatonic, i.e., it might have higher value if used for housing (complementary to the surrounding neighborhood), or for light industry (complementary to the adjacent vocational school).

Downtown Bridgeport probably would fit the site priorities for the College's mission, listed above,

better than any other location, with the Singer building second. In addition, it would add to the new downtown enrichment efforts by bringing more people into the City center, particularly in the evening, and would offer downtown business an educational resource. Downtown is the only place which faculty and students from all over the region can reach by public transit without a transfer. Of course, downtown space costs more than other space—precisely because it offers advantages of access and interchange which have a value. With downtown values depressed compared to their likely value in a few years and with great potential for stimulating a rise in downtown values and activities, now could be a strategic time for Housatonic to seek a downtown location. Housatonic's remarkable art collection also deserves a downtown location.



A permanent location for Housatonic Community College, with its magnificent art collection, now in the old Singer factory on the East Side, is being considered by the State. The decision is important not only for the College but for the East Side, where it could stay in a renovated Singer building for the University of Bridgeport (which has offered a site) and, potentially, for downtown, where it might logically go. Planned in a comprehensive development package, each of these locations could offer wide advantages to the College and community. Also, Housatonic's outstanding art collection deserves an easily accessible location.

The University of Bridgeport buildings offer several benefits from the viewpoint of Housatonic's mission, covered in the "Review," and Housatonic on the University of Bridgeport campus would strengthen the University, an important institution for the City and region—and so another valuable spillover effect that should be weighed.

The point is, the location of Housatonic College is an important decision for the East Side, for the University of Bridgeport, potentially for downtown. Making the decision on the basis of cost alone without considering these community costs and benefits is a mistake. It may be asking too much of the Board of Higher Education, the Community College Board Members, and the State Bureau of Public Works to consider all of these spillover effects, community costs and possibilities, but the people trying to stimulate downtown enrichment and the people trying to stimulate East Main Street upgrading should consider the possibilities—as the University of Bridgeport has done—and see if they can put together a package in which Housatonic College can perform its mission well and be part of the larger community plans as well. Since the current lease is being renewed, there is time for partisans of downtown and East Main Street to present a practical proposal to the Board of Higher Education. But a speedy decision on a permanent site would benefit the College and probably save the State money.

**The arts.** Bridgeport area people organize a lot of cultural and entertainment events, including the Barnum Festival that draws hundreds of thousands of viewers each year for its multiple events, the opera, symphony, ballet, numerous college-sponsored lectures, the Cabaret Theatre, the Museum of Art, Science and Industry, the Barnum Museum, Arts Alive last summer and Streets Are For People the summer before. But they haven't added up to making downtown Bridgeport a lively place on a continuing basis, nor do they reinforce each other. Despite strong support and solid financial backing for the opera, symphony and ballet, interviews revealed potential ticket buyers who didn't know about one or the other series. Scarcely any of the Barnum Festival takes place downtown; the Art Museum is on the edge of the City, miles from the center, with only a small outpost in a People's Arcade window. Many university activities are not widely advertised to townspeople and are not downtown. So this set of activities does not coalesce into a place which impresses the culturally inclined.

Since cultural attractions require a large population for adequate support, the whole Greater Bridgeport area needs to be mobilized for opera, theatre, concerts. This is best done in the metropolitan center, i.e., downtown. A rallying issue for those eager to increase artistic presentations in

Bridgeport probably should be the renovation of the two theatres. To make that economically feasible could well require wrapping many Bridgeport arts plans into that arts center. The space above the theatres as well as the auditorium should be planned with the theatre. So an early step should be toting up plans and prospects of all kinds of arts groups. Offerings planned by the five institutions of higher education also should be put in the calculation, including the possible use of the theatre complex as a downtown University Center until arts presentations can fill the whole space.


Bringing more museum showings downtown also would contribute. The Arcade owner is eager to bring more life to that building immediately; perhaps more space could be allotted at minimum cost for museum showings there; or a vacant store in Lafayette Plaza might be donated, with business benefit to the Plaza. The Art, Science and Industry Museum's rather isolated location probably limits attendance; it takes a deliberate trip to the Museum to end up there, whereas a downtown Museum draws people who are nearby for other reasons. For example, the downtown Newark Museum drew 267,000 in 1979 compared to only 76,000 for the Bridgeport Museum—3½ times as many. Newark's increase was 16 percent over 1978 compared to Bridgeport's 13 percent. Of course, Newark has about twice Bridgeport's population—about three times the population including nearby surrounding

cities and suburbs, but it also has a fiercer reputation for crime. Many of Newark's museum-goers come from adjacent offices.

Generally, museums suburban to New York City do not take full enough advantage of their location in the Region. There is enough art in the basement of the Metropolitan Museum, unseen by the public, to make truly great museums of the surrounding suburban institutions. Undoubtedly, there are many obstacles to its use, but if the suburban museums got together, perhaps cooperative showings could be arranged. That's just one example of a possible regional resource. Any such expansion of the Museum of Art, Science and Industry should be downtown. The Barnum Museum, well-located downtown but open brief hours, gives the impression of a dusty and neglected place not worth making the effort to find when it is open! It is, nevertheless, a base for adding to the attractions of downtown.

Should the Housatonic Community College move downtown, its remarkable art collection would contribute downtown magnetism.


Without trying to over-coordinate the many arts enterprises running efficiently and well—as most of Bridgeport's seem to be, the Arts Council might nevertheless contribute by helping to publicize them more broadly, bring as many of the University functions downtown as possible, perhaps link presentations where convenient, e.g., an art



Newark's museum, among the office towers of downtown (seen over this concert in the museum's "back yard") has higher per capita attendance than Bridgeport's, which is on the edge of the City.



Though many people say they are afraid to shop at Lafayette Plaza, the crime record suggests this fear is unjustified. Last year, the Plaza area had no murders and no rapes. It had one mugging, purse-snatching or pocket-picking every 12 days, one theft involving a car every nine days.



Newark's Project Pride, begun in order to enlist young people against vandalism, has expanded into a flourishing Citywide youth program and is being imitated by other New Jersey cities. A founder of Project Pride has offered to describe the program in Bridgeport.



exhibit with a musical performance or the Cabaret Theatre. But its greatest contribution right now would be (1) getting the several arts groups together to consider a center in the theater complex, (2) stimulating artists to live and work in Bridgeport by arranging artists' studios in unused loft buildings and perhaps seeking grants for them to work in schools or with neighborhood groups, and (3) working with the higher education institutions to see whether their faculty and students could not provide more support for downtown arts presentations.

Amateur and semi-professional arts groups contribute to the good life for many people and often strengthen neighborhoods, but these groups usually need outside help to organize effectively and to raise funds. Arts councils are providing that help in many places. The Bridgeport Arts Council is new and perhaps could benefit from the experience of somewhat older Arts Councils nearby. For example, the Council for the Arts in Westchester has progressed rapidly over recent years in raising money through a united fund for several dozen arts groups. It also provides (1) technical assistance, (2) training programs in arts management, (3) administrative services like address lists, (4) a CETA program for artists, (5) an arts in schools campaign, (6) arts for the handicapped and (7) promotion of Westchester artists in various ways. Top staff of the Westchester Arts Council would be available to advise the Bridgeport Council if requested (and probably other Arts Council staffs would be, too), and the Connecticut Commission on the Arts has small grants available for such purposes.

**Retailing.** "Something special" in downtown retailing has ignited downtown revival in many cities recently—Quincy market in Boston, the Inner Harbor development in Baltimore, Ghirardelli Square in San Francisco, downtown malls in Minneapolis and Kalamazoo, Michigan. As Paul Goldberger recently wrote in *The New York Times*: "Baltimore . . . has put great effort into changing its image. It has built office, apartment and hotel towers downtown, it has restored old town houses and it has turned the Inner Harbor, the portion of the skyline closest to downtown, into a mixture of shopping, entertainment and cultural facilities . . . . It wants to be thought of not as a harsh, crime-ridden city, but as a community of middle-class professionals, all in love with the idea of living in a vibrant downtown . . . . Harborplace, right beside the water at the Inner Harbor . . . is a mixture of restaurants, shops, boutiques, cafes and food markets, all put together by the Rouse Company . . . . The goal is . . . to provide a mixture of food, merchandise and social experiences that will seem 'urban' in a way that the mixture . . . in a shopping mall on the freeway does not . . . . It was Rouse's genius to realize that Baltimore . . . was . . . full of urbanites with no place to go. People come to

Harborplace not only to shop but also to promenade and to see one another . . . . It is no surprise that Harborplace had seven million visitors in the first three months . . . , reaching in that period the visitor totals projected by Rouse for the entire year . . . . Psychology is a large part of the battle to keep cities alive. Baltimore was never so bad as its detractors would have had us believe."

A similar view: "Merchandising is theater. Shopping is no longer just the need to clothe yourself or buy appliances for your home. It's a form of entertainment," Michael Rosenthal, a department store chain executive is quoted as saying in the March 1, 1981 *Downtown Idea Exchange* newsletter. Many people suggest that Bridgeport create a special attraction appropriate to itself—and what more appropriate than a Barnum theme? A mini continuing circus is a possibility, like Manhattan's "Big Apple" circus that performed throughout a summer, or expanding the Barnum Museum into a national phenomenon, or regular house tours of the historic houses with emphasis on Barnum's "new town" of 100 years ago, Washington Park, or a Barnum theme shopping area near the ferry boat and old railroad station, as planned for some time. The State has some funds to assist city tourist attractions if they draw people from out of State. Jai-Lai's success near the center of Bridgeport testifies that people will come for an activity they like. The trick is to relate the special event to continuing downtown activities.

In seeking a theatrical approach to retailing, the meat and potatoes of office jobs downtown should not be overlooked. Nationwide, a fifth of all retail store purchases are by other businesses, according to an Urban Institute study. A recent survey of retailing in a city of 53,000 persons found that 47 percent of shoppers who work downtown called downtown their preferred shopping area compared to only 34 percent of the shoppers who did not work downtown—and nearly two-thirds of the downtown workers surveyed while shopping lived outside the city, compared to one-third of total downtown shoppers (*Downtown Idea Exchange*, March 1, 1981).

Generally, the prospect for downtown retailing seems hopeful. *Chain Store Age* executive magazine said last December: "For a number of reasons, including the energy crisis, retailers are seeing an increase of business in their downtown stores after almost a decade of watching it slip away to suburban malls."

**Hotels.** A feasibility study for a downtown hotel projects plenty of demand for a first-class 250-room hotel with accompanying meeting rooms, bars and restaurants. While it ties the demand at least indirectly to the proposed Civic Center, its final sentence is: "Despite the presence of the proposed convention/civic center, the proposed hotel

is expected to rely heavily on commercial business . . . . In 1987, the commercial market is projected to account for approximately 75% of the total room-nights . . .". Although conferences are estimated to be responsible for less than 10 percent of the total 1987 room-nights, the study states that if Bridgeport cannot attract a reasonable share of state conferences and some little share of smaller national conferences, "there may be a material effect on the projections . . ." The study assumes the Civic Center will be built with meeting facilities but makes clear that the meeting facilities can be provided within the hotel instead. The Civic Center feasibility study projects very few events that will stimulate hotel-room use, except by performers a few nights a year. Primarily, restaurant-bar patronage and a general sense of downtown liveliness relate the Civic Center to the hotel's prospects.

There is talk of several hotel-site search teams looking in and around Bridgeport right now, and it is very important that downtown capture all or most of the new rooms being considered. It is important for three reasons: (1) to signal that downtown is where the action is going to be once more; (2) for the practical effect of more people downtown at night looking for something to do and, in the case of some conferences, providing activities that residents might take advantage of; (3) to bring business people downtown to show them its potential. Contrarily, losing a major hotel to the Merritt Parkway or the suburbs along the Turnpike would be a severe blow to the sense now being generated that downtown Bridgeport can become the action center.

Conference facilities and banquets are better located in the hotel itself both for the conferees and, according to the head of the Hartford Civic Center, for the Civic Center. Hartford's Center accommodates conferences reluctantly, at a loss, as a public service. Conferences in Bridgeport will not be national or international giants; there is not enough hotel space in the region nor is there a national airport. However, the City's consultant on the Civic Center said recently he is "bullish" on conferences for Bridgeport. A survey of New England organizations done for this report suggests the kind of groups Bridgeport could try to draw for conferences: The New England Council, New England Shippers Advisory Board, Portuguese Continental Union of USA, Connecticut Retail Merchants Association, Connecticut Association of School Administrators, Connecticut Society of Certified Public Accountants, Connecticut Association of Purchasing Management.

## OTHER BRIDGEPORT ISSUES

Crime and vandalism are serious liabilities to living and working in Bridgeport, though they are

less severe there than in many other cities, both in total and in pervasiveness. We have a strong impression from interviews that there are pockets of severe crime, e.g., in Father Panik Village, but that they don't spread widely. Even parts of Father Panik are considered safe, and Marianville, across the street, is flourishing while Housatonic College, not far away on the other side, also has had little crime problem.

In downtown Bridgeport, using last year's police crime figures, the 12,000 or so persons there on a typical working day can anticipate being mugged on the average of once every 165 years, raped on the average of every 1,000 years and murdered on the average of 1,500 years. These numbers are conservative because 24-hour crime figures have been applied to just the working day; certainly many of the crimes occur at night. As to murders, most are by people known to the victim, not random assaults on someone walking down the street. Last year, there were 69 purses snatched and pockets picked, 49 thefts or burglaries from a hotel, 29 robberies and 70 burglaries from a commercial establishment. Adding them all together, there was about one of these crimes per working day. In addition, there was about one theft of a car or from a car every day. Not a record one can be pleased with, but hardly a situation of terror.

Looking just at Lafayette Plaza, since it has the reputation of being unsafe for shoppers: no rapes in 1980, no murders, 10 muggings in and around it, 15 purse-snatchings or pocket-pickings, five motor vehicle thefts and 28 thefts from motor vehicles—58 of all these crimes during the whole year.

Crime is rising sharply all over the country, in suburbs as well as cities. New Jersey's Attorney-General just reported to the Governor: ". . . Urban Crime has reached such a level that . . . the State must be willing to dedicate a portion of its own resources to the war on street crime. We are compelled to balance our priorities and be prepared, if necessary, to make a choice between, for example, urban safety and highway patrols . . . . The assignment of State Police personnel to urban areas, after consultation with municipal authorities, is a logical next step in the ongoing evolution of that organization . . . . This action would provide a highly visible, effective and measurable State level response to an urban crime problem now approaching crisis proportions . . . . The objective would be limited to suppressing violent street crimes and armed robberies of certain commercial establishments." State patrols have done this in New Orleans and Atlanta, the New Jersey Attorney General observed. One experiment New Jersey has found successful is a Career Criminal program in five counties. It concentrates prosecution resources on speeding trials of repeated offenders and obtaining convictions on top charges rather than plea bargaining with lesser

charges. New Jersey also is seeking ways to speed trials generally and help victims and witnesses deal with the trauma of the event and the inconveniences of their trial roles. The Attorney General further recommended fixed jail terms for using firearms in a crime of violence and for crimes of violence generally.

New Jersey has been giving cities special grants for "walking policemen," in part for crime prevention, e.g., conducting security surveys of business and homes so they can recommend better practices to owners. "... The local police officer must be involved and trained in crime prevention" and must educate citizens in crime prevention.

Many experiments have been tried to cope with crime, but there are few success stories widely publicized and followed. There does seem to be general agreement though, that neighborhood organization tied to the police department is useful. In addition to teaching people how to secure their homes and businesses and mark their valuables, more and more neighborhoods are block watching: shut-ins keep an eye on the streets; others take turns patrolling on foot or in cars with radio contact to the police. Limited experiments in Newark and Elizabeth with "team policing" were judged successful by some (but not all) participants, i.e., keeping the same police in a neighborhood long enough to feel part of the community and generally making police work a community affair.

Vandalism and juvenile mischief have been addressed by Project Pride in Newark with enough success to stimulate Paterson and Trenton to adopt the same approach. Started by New Jersey Bell because the telephone company was losing a great deal of money from senseless destruction, Bell brought together other organizations suffering from vandalism, including the Board of Education and the bus company. They first shocked the public by toting up the cost to everyone of vandalism—\$30 million a year five years ago. The Chamber of Commerce took over the project, retaining close touch with the Mayor. An 85-person Task Force of the Chamber looked into causes of vandalism and the institutions that might or should deal with it, e.g., the criminal justice system, the schools, public housing management. In addition to a broad public education program, they began to make small changes that improved security, like putting school guards outside rather than in the buildings. The City Housing Authority and community organizations joined the project. They all focused on trying to instill in young people a sense of responsibility for their environment and pride in it and in themselves.

An early effort was creating summer anti-vandalism patrols; one youngster interviewed admitted he had been one of the vandals the summer

before just because he had nothing better to do. Very quickly, many schools reported considerable savings of damages. The growing part of the program involved the young people in planning and carrying out Citywide activities, including:

- An annual music program that fills Newark's Symphony Hall to overflowing, involving 750 young performers this year;
- Wholesome after-school activities like debate teams;
- Certificates to students with good school attendance records;
- Ten \$500 scholarships;
- A weekly radio program by and about students, which resulted in exchange visits with Harlem young people;
- An annual college football game to raise money for Project Pride, drawing 13,000 viewers; this connection to Project Pride inspired one of the colleges that fielded a team to provide . . .
- Tutoring by college students for public school students.

In the course of the program, young people mix with business executives, and a new program will team young people with senior citizens.

The specifics are not important; the process is: City public and private leaders working with public school pupils on positive projects, each one leading to others.

Robert Reynolds of New Jersey Bell, a founder and present Chairman of Project Pride, has offered to come to Bridgeport to further describe the program.

Mr. Reynolds also has been involved with the National Council on Crime and Delinquency's "Take a Bite Out of Crime" program, teaching crime prevention, i.e., home and business security, prudent personal behavior. In New Jersey, Mr. Reynolds reports, crime prevention has become one of the fastest-growing community efforts—with good reason: 80 percent of all cars stolen were unlocked; 80 percent of all rapists had no locked doors to get by.

Dealing with America's increasing crime probably requires more fundamental social change than one city can mobilize. In the meantime, under the aegis of the proposed public-private-civic coalition we have recommended, Bridgeport can at least fight back.

**Neighborhood organization and city government.** Two decades ago, Baltimore had the same kind of "inferiority complex" our Bridgeport Advisory Committee talked about at its first meeting last year, and an image among outsiders that the City deserved to feel that way. In the past half-dozen years, Baltimore has won a number of national awards for becoming a livable city and for its downtown and waterfront redevelopment. Meet-



ing with Regional Plan Association in May 1981, Baltimore's Mayor Schaefer emphasized the importance in their successes of "listening to the neighborhoods." The City, he said, enters into formal agreements with neighborhood organizations about what each will do, the City and the neighborhood organization in a complementary program to improve the neighborhood.

Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS) was begun in Baltimore; Bridgeport has two NHS areas that demonstrate the validity of the idea. In surveying conditions in Northern New Jersey and the South Bronx recently, Regional Plan found many dramatic examples of once-declining neighborhoods turning themselves around—rehabilitating abandoned apartments and improving one- and two-family homes. But nowhere have we seen a turnaround much more dramatic than the East Side of Bridgeport under the NHS.

The NHS is a public-private-civic partnership for neighborhood revitalization. All Bridgeport's banks participate. They subsidize the operation of the organization at \$110,000 a year, and about the same amount comes from industry and insurance companies. The banks also make loans for housing improvement at market rates. Some loans are subsidized with City Community Development block grant funds. Section 8 federal subsidies are used when available to allow low-income tenants to stay after their building has been renovated. The City provided Community Development funds, supplemented by local industry contributions, to start the NHS. The federal government initiated the idea for this program through the Congressionally chartered Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation. People's Bank started the process in Bridgeport. Neighborhoods chosen for NHS are those with clear potential for upgrading, not the worst places in town. The National Corporation provided the seed money to begin the new South End program. The City relates housing code enforcement and upgrading of City services to the program. Residents stimulate neighborhood organization where it does not exist and mobilize existing groups to work with NHS on housing improvement. Some fulltime staff organizers have been employed.

Residents, bankers, neighborhood business and institutional representatives and City officials are the directors of the two NHS', and directors make it a practice to attend meetings. The East Side NHS was chaired during the first five years by the Chairman of Mechanics and Farmers Bank, recently succeeded by a resident leader of the Washington Park Association. The South End Board of Directors is headed by a young man who is devoting his time to civic activities after a successful business career. The President of Mechanics and Farmers heads the joint Board of the two NHS'. The City is represented by

its Chief Housing Code Enforcement Officer and by the Chief Planner for the Office of Development Administration.

In addition to housing rehabilitation in the two NHS areas the City has subsidized rehabilitation in the West End and the formal representation structure of the NHS. The funds made available through the NHS are, of course, essential to the rehabilitation, but the neighborhood-business-City organization that begins the NHS operations is what changed the neighborhood from one where housing loans were seldom made to one where many are made and few are defaulted. The organization assures that the individual elements in the neighborhood will move up together—the rundown housing will be fixed up in patterns to reinforce each other, not a few here and there, and public spaces and services and code enforcement will keep in step.

Through much of the East Side and East End, blocks of homeowners and tenants of apartments have organized to preserve and improve their communities. Several have come together in Bridgeport East Stands Together (BEST): East Side Action Group, East End Concerned Citizens, Hilltop Citizens Action Group and 12 block clubs, working with the Washington Park Association and 10 churches, which are affiliates. Nearly 1,000 citizens are active.

BEST held its first annual Congress in September 1980 and elected officers, who can now represent the groups to policy makers at several levels of government and in business. In May, BEST held its first Corporate Awareness Day, taking on a tour of the East Side business, foundation and institutional leaders, who were shown both the accomplishments of an optimistic and dedicated organization and the still unmet goals—particularly arson prevention, more housing preservation and rehabilitation and organizing the unorganized areas. The Bridgeport Area Foundation and Housatonic Community College co-sponsored the tour.

BEST remains a grass roots organization. Small meetings preceded the fall Congress, and the BEST list of priority goals emanated from those meetings: (1) Keep taxes on homes from rising faster than taxes on nonresidential property by approaching the State Legislature. (2) Eliminate "blatant drug dealing" in five places on the East Side, initiating action with a meeting with the Police Superintendent and the State Narcotics Task Force together to ask for special officers in the targeted areas. (3) Take action against burglaries, muggings, trespassing, vandalism and stolen cars in specified places by expanding the police foot patrol and adding police in the targeted areas. (4) Provide a community center, a promised tot lot and renovation of Washington Park, to be initiated with a meeting with the Mayor and Development Ad-

ministrator. (5) Promptly demolish identified abandoned housing, to be initiated with a meeting with the Housing Code Enforcement Officer. (6) Clean up the streets and fix up curbs and then regularly maintain them, to be initiated with a meeting with the City Public Works Director.

Among accomplishments claimed recently by BEST:

- Foot patrols on Stratford Avenue to end drug trafficking and other anti-social behavior;
- Transformation of an unused school into a community center;
- A City ordinance mandating smoke alarms in Bridgeport apartments;
- Demolition of about 40 hazardous vacant structures;
- An anti-arson foot patrol;
- Four housing code inspectors assigned to the East End;
- Raids on houses of gambling and drug-selling.

City officials and BEST members have somewhat transcended the initial antagonism which is common between neighborhood groups and city elected officials. Antagonism is common because city officials must balance the interests of all neighborhoods and cannot always respond to the demands of one part of the city. Neighborhood leaders are seen as amateurs who don't understand the obstacles to solving problems—though, in fact, many are expert on some of the issues. Most important, neighborhood groups usually are formed when people feel their area is neglected, so they start with a negative feeling toward City Hall. Some have been organized by the kind of professional organizer for whom organization itself is more important than policy goals. Nevertheless, there seems to be growing mutuality in Bridgeport. The success of the Neighborhood Housing Services business-city-neighborhood collaboration and the wide respect for the Black Rock Association testify to the feasibility of neighborhood-City cooperation.

The growing mutuality is visible in relations of the Neighborhood Strategy Areas (NSA) Community Council and the City, also. These Areas are the certified low-income neighborhoods that must receive at least three-quarters of all federal Community Development block grants. The Community Council is required for citizen advice on how the block grants are spent, but the City need not accept that advice—and, for a time, Bridgeport did not seem to be paying much attention to its Community Council. The Council is made up of two members elected from each of the Strategy Areas.

Now, the Community Council has been better integrated into the policy process even to the point of holding joint hearings on neighborhood priorities with the Board of Aldermen.

**Vocational education.** Two danger signals were raised concerning vocational education in our survey

of Bridgeport: 1. Several manufacturers warned that Bridgeport's continued manufacturing prosperity would not continue unless vocational training assured a more adequate supply of highly-skilled workers. They did not feel that present vocational education was meeting the need. 2. Bridgeport's massive high school drop-out rate, over 50 percent, suggests that more vocational education might be appropriate. "The key to cutting the drop-out rate is the promise of employment after graduation," Superintendent Geraldine Johnson told us. But courses must be "hands on," not just out of books.

In Bridgeport, we found a great deal of vocational education going on, some highly regarded (e.g., the four-year machinist courses at Bullard Havens), some criticized as too limited to fit students for the intended job (e.g., the short courses for machinists at Bullard Havens). One federally-funded program regarded as successful was discontinued, i.e., the Skill Training Improvement Program (STIP) at Sikorsky. Several observers said the program was good for the students and society generally but more burden than benefit for the company, with no one picking up the administrative responsibilities that might have made it feasible for Sikorsky or other companies to continue it.

Generally, we have been impressed with how much Bridgeport leaders know about what goes on in their City. In vocational education, the opposite is true: we are impressed with how much misinformation is extant, despite three community advisory committees, each including important employers as well as others: (1) the Private Industry Council (PIC), appointed nearly three years ago by Mayor Mandanici, one of 400 in the country, required by the federal government where Comprehensive Employment and Training (CETA) programs were extended to private enterprise; (2) advisors to Bullard Havens, the largest of the State's 17 technical schools; (3) a parent-employer-student-faculty committee for public school vocational programs. Some people are on more than one of these committees, yet there appears to be little interchange.

Three needs: (1) identifying the jobs of the present and short-term future; (2) fitting training programs to them; (3) stimulating young people to train for the jobs likely to be available.

Surveying job needs is tricky because many employers cannot predict their needs or will not state them publicly with enough precision to shape vocational education, but surveys have been made. The public school vocational education staff has just surveyed prospective job needs, not just in Bridgeport but through much of Southwestern Connecticut. The Private Industry staff took a mail survey among Bridgeport employers but got inadequate response. The Connecticut Business and Industry

Association also found inadequate information about the kinds of jobs for which training is needed and took a membership survey which, according to the *Connecticut Business Journal* (February 3, 1981), "showed that employers all across the state are having difficulties hiring skilled people as metalworkers and machine tool operators, as well as electronics engineers and technicians. Additionally, computer personnel of all kinds are sorely needed, as are secretaries, word processors, bookkeepers, and accountants..." A public-private committee studied remedies, making 30 recommendations, "foremost... that the state commissioners involved in education, training and economic development meet on a regular basis with representatives from business and labor to work out the inevitable problems that arise from making major changes in a delivery system." A State Council on Education for Employment, made up of public, business and labor manpower experts, has been formed to do this. Regional Education-Training-Employment Councils also were recommended (i.e., a fourth advisory group for Bridgeport?).

For some training, a location where the jobs are is recommended: the machines are up-to-date and the work atmosphere in itself is instructive. The Board of Education operates some programs in factories, banks, hospitals and other work places.

Insofar as stimulating young people's interest, is a special effort needed or only more vocational training? Bullard Havens has many times the applicants that it can accept. Throughout Connecticut, two-thirds of the public school students do not go on to college, yet State vocational-technical schools educate only 7 percent of the high school population. There is room for public school vocational education. Bridgeport schools' parents-business-students-faculty committee is "relatively pleased" with achievements so far, according to Superintendent Johnson—just expand, they say.

Altogether, a lot of training is going on in Bridgeport. The public schools have numerous programs both in and out of the school buildings; Bullard Havens operates from 8 a.m. to 10 p.m. and graduates 1,500-2,000 students a year. There are literally dozens of CETA-financed training programs, run by more than 20 civic, labor, business, municipal and training institutions, in addition to on-the-job training in local governments. This may be effective, but no one seems to know whether job needs are being met as effectively as possible.

The Private Industry Council (PIC) was designed to promote and facilitate training and hiring of CETA-eligible people by private industry. The Council is supposed to be dominated by private employers but to include community and labor representatives. The Bridgeport PIC quickly initiated several small training programs—for computer programmers, welders, clerical workers, nurses'

assistants, dental technicians and others. But the basic function of coordinating the training activities of the whole Greater Bridgeport area has not been fulfilled—and some organization needs to do it. The coordinating role has been assigned to PICs around the country and, with the Mayor's leadership, Bridgeport's could assume that function. It could also make in-plant programs feasible by assuming the administrative burdens for the company. If the PIC does not, the Manufacturers' Association might take responsibility for assessing the training needs for factories, the Chamber's Downtown Development Council for white collar and service jobs—but a single training-manpower center would be better.

In somewhat similar cities to Bridgeport, Elizabeth and Paterson, New Jersey, the PICs began by assessing priority needs, then hosted a series of planning meetings with employers, testing their priorities and deciding how to address them. The next step was a series of meetings with community-based organizations to spread information on job availability and get them to do initial screening of job applicants.

In sum, the evidence of experts is that training for highly skilled jobs is inadequate in Bridgeport and in the State. The evidence of high school dropouts indicates that far more should be done to tie schooling to jobs. Hundreds of people in Bridgeport are doing something about training. No one person seems to know all that is being done or whether it is enough. That is the number one job for continued industrial prosperity and important for downtown development as well.

**Education.** A principal obstacle to fitting preparation to the present and prospective jobs in Bridgeport is more fundamental than technical training—it is competence in reading, writing and arithmetic. Skilled factory work as well as office work requires that. Yet Bridgeport students, in Statewide proficiency tests, scored lowest in the State in mathematics, writing and (tied with Hartford) reading.

Improving city public schools is the subject of great attention. Many specific achievements have resulted, but, overall, school success seems farther away than ever. Unlike law enforcement experimenters, educators have publicized numerous scientific evaluations of efforts to improve city schools and have come to some general agreement on certain elements of positive change. Not being education specialists, we turn to a recent review of effective schooling published by the Connecticut State Department of Education and Association of Boards of Education, "Critical Issues in Connecticut Education" (May 1980).

Lawrence W. Lezotte identified these characteristics of successful urban schools:

1. Acceptance by the staff of the "concept of accountability." Many school staffs have resisted



the idea that pupil performance should be the measure of the staff's work.

2. "Research shows that at effective schools, teachers expect students to learn. They assume all kids can learn." He adds: "It is important . . . that these beliefs characterize the whole staff, not one or two teachers or the principal."
3. "... The principal in the improving schools was much more likely to be an instructional leader . . . and . . . to assume responsibility for the frequent evaluation of the achievement of basic goals and objectives."
4. "... Actual time devoted to basic skills instruction . . . was higher in the improving schools," i.e., extra activities were not allowed to eat away as much teaching time on the basics as in the less achieving schools.
5. "... High levels of parent involvement and support make the instructional tasks easier," though some schools are effective without much parent involvement. And the literature on parent participation is not very instructive.

Professor Lezotte indicated that training could improve the effectiveness of **present** teachers and principals. In some places, however, public frustration has resulted in efforts to **replace** staff who either resist accountability, seem unable to feel confident that all students can learn the basics, or—in the case of principals—do not lead. For example, a new superintendent in Newark announced he would take the drastic step of continuing to pay inadequate principals because the rules required it, but he would replace them.

Bridgeport Superintendent Geraldine Johnson and other observers say that Bridgeport's three magnet schools with 900 elementary school pupils of the City's 15,000 appear to be having a positive effect on test scores, and in a recent poll parents gave these schools an almost unanimous vote of confidence. Magnet schools have extra federal funds for special services and programs. Each has an individual approach to education, most unusual being the Multi-Cultural school whose special aim is bilingualism—each of its 127 pupils in kindergarten, first and second grades will be taught to speak English and either Spanish or Portuguese, with curriculum emphasis on differences in cultures around the world. Since there are long waiting lists to get into the magnet schools, pupil conformance to the rules can be expected. Also, parent participation is unusually great.

Some 10 Bridgeport public schools are classed as "exemplary," with special teacher training the main distinction.

The City also is experimenting with "community schools," making the physical facilities available for community use and, in the process, bringing adults into closer touch with schools.

A second "Critical Issues" paper in the State publication, by Edythe L. Gaines, now a State official and formerly Superintendent of Hartford Schools, reported studies on school desegregation that "show positive long-term effects not merely in terms of acquiring skills, but also in terms of career decisions, lifetime earnings, and life changes in general" for the minority students; and "achievement scores for white students do not go down as a result of school desegregation." She reports that Hartford set up an alternative school and arts school which have attracted half their students from the suburbs. "Recognizing that the great arts organizations are located in the city," the Creative Arts Community school is especially appropriate, she suggested. Hartford has made a still-unsuccessful attempt to set up magnet schools sponsored by a group of city and suburban districts.

So, we do have some apparent successes to guide us. There are two questions. First, how much tax money are they worth? Compared to the devastation wrought on cities by school drop-outs who become long-term unemployed, programs with some evidence of effectiveness seem a bargain. The second question is more complicated: If special magnet schools and vocational programs are fit to the motivated students, what is to happen to those who don't fit? The remainder, the bored and disruptive, would become segregated, as in New York City's now-ended "600" schools. This is not an entirely bad idea. Having some place to get rid of the disrupters doubtless is an important reason parochial schools have greater achievement than public schools. Shape up or out you go is a strong motivator. The "600" school offers the public school equivalent, a place to put those who get in the way of other children's learning—and also a chance to concentrate whatever skills the school system has to motivate these hard-to-teach young people.

The disastrous test scores recently announced should be a call to all Bridgeport loyalists—City resident and suburbanite, with children and without—to join the School Board's search for solutions. As we suggested to New Jersey cities, faced with similar disastrous test results: If all of the varied civic organizations concerned with different aspects of city conditions put this one topic on the top of their agendas for, say, a two-year period, the movement might achieve enough momentum by then for them to go back to their regular priorities. It is an appropriate priority for specialized as well as general public-interest organizations because it is essential for good health, economic development, youth development, neighborhood preservation, the advance of cultural activities, crime control—just about any element of city life. Specifically, groups like the League of Women Voters, Rotary



and other fraternal organizations with civic programs, the YMCA and YWCA, churches, the Chamber of Commerce, the Arts Council, NAACP and Urban League should all focus on improving public school education as one of their high-priority programs. Together, they surely can make an impact.

**Taxes.** Most of the proposed solutions to these added City needs—job training, crime and vandalism, and education—require more public funds. All of these are needs that occur primarily in cities but are not caused by cities. The costs of meeting these needs should not fall on the cities alone. Nor is there justification or practicality in the existing real tax differential between cities and suburbs.

Because real estate tax rates are based on assessed valuations that vary among municipalities, comparing tax rates often raises objection. These figures are based on actual sales during the year, compiled by the Center for Local Tax Research in "Effective Real Property Tax Rates in the Metropolitan Area of New York," October 1980.

## Effective Real Estate Tax Rates, 1978-79

Bridgeport & Other Cities		Bridgeport & Its Suburbs	
Danbury	1.5%	Fairfield	1.2%
Norwalk	1.6	Easton	1.2
Stamford	1.7	Trumbull	1.2
BRIDGEPORT	2.1	Stratford	1.3
Bristol	2.1	Westport	1.3
New Haven	2.3	Monroe	1.5
New Britain	2.4	Weston	1.6
Waterbury	2.8	BRIDGEPORT	2.1
Hartford	2.8 (res.)		
	4.7 (non-res.)		

Programs dealing with problems that are state or national in scope should be financed by those levels, though administered locally within state or national guidelines and overseen by the public-private-civic coalition for administrative efficiency. Leaving cities unable to make inroads into their most pressing problems coupled with much higher taxes than other municipalities have can only bring about the opposite of the goals of Connecticut's clearly stated urban policy.

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 Mary Ellen Tatten, Citizens Union  
 Bertha Tickey, Barnum Festival  
 Deborah Zipf, Arts Alive

In addition to personal and telephone interviews, Regional Plan attended meetings of the following organizations:

Bridgeport Economic Coordinating Commission  
 BEST Congress and a preliminary block meeting  
 Chamber of Commerce Downtown Development Board  
 Chamber of Commerce Future Studies Task Force  
 Neighborhood Housing Services (East Side and South End)  
 People's Economic Development Committee



**Table 14.**  
**Total Civilian Labor Force by Employment Status by Sector**  
**of Residence in the New York Region, 1960-1974**

(figures for April of each year, in 000's)

	1960	1970	1974
<b>MANHATTAN</b>			
Civilian Labor Force	862.6	741.7	
Employed	805.3	706.8	(included with
Unemployed	57.3	34.9	Rest of NYC)
Unemployment Rate	6.6%	4.7%	
<b>REST OF NYC</b>			
Civilian Labor Force	2,625.5	2,589.0	3,200.9
Employed	2,502.5	2,484.6	2,993.9
Unemployed	123.0	104.4	207.0
Unemployment Rate	4.7%	4.0%	6.5%
<b>NY excl. NYC</b>			
Civilian Labor Force	1,308.5	1,722.9	1,852.5
Employed	1,263.4	1,670.9	1,763.6
Unemployed	45.1	52.0	88.9
Unemployment Rate	3.4%	3.0%	4.8%
<b>NEW JERSEY</b>			
Civilian Labor Force	2,038.7	2,448.1	2,707.9
Employed	1,946.3	2,357.8	2,510.8
Unemployed	92.4	90.3	197.1
Unemployment Rate	4.5%	3.7%	7.3%
<b>CONNECTICUT</b>			
Civilian Labor Force	601.6	724.0	768.0
Employed	574.6	697.8	720.6
Unemployed	27.0	26.2	47.4
Unemployment Rate	4.5%	3.6%	6.2%
<b>31-COUNTY REGION</b>			
Civilian Labor Force	7,436.9	8,225.7	8,529.3
Employed	7,092.1	7,917.9	7,988.9
Unemployed	344.8	307.8	540.4
Unemployment Rate	4.6%	3.7%	6.3%

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census and the various states' Departments of Labor.

\*Defined as persons employed or seeking employment in a civilian job from the noninstitutional population age 16 and over.

**Table 15.**  
**Unemployment in the New York-Northeastern New Jersey Standard**  
**Consolidated Area, 1969-1973**

(percent of the labor force)

	NEW YORK CITY		SCA		UNITED STATES	
	TOTAL	NON-WHITE	TOTAL	NON-WHITE	TOTAL	NON-WHITE
1969	3.6	4.7	3.2	4.7	3.5	6.4
1970	4.8	5.4	4.5	5.9	4.9	8.2
1971	6.7*	7.8*	6.0	8.0	5.9	9.9
1972	7.0*	7.6*	6.1	7.9	5.6	10.0
1973	6.0*	7.2*	5.3	6.9	4.9	8.9

\*Resident-based unemployment rates not strictly comparable to previous years affected New York City figures upward.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current population survey, quoted from: Tri-State Regional Planning Commission, ITR 4459-1202 Unemployment Rates... November, 1974.

**Table 16.**  
**Manufacturing Employment in the Region by County According to the Census of Manufactures 1958-1972**

	TOTAL EMPLOYMENT				PRODUCTION EMPLOYMENT			
	1958	1963	1967	1972	1958	1963	1967	1972
CONNECTICUT	221,279	232,700	264,600	231,100	158,729	162,787	185,200	144,800
Fairfield	104,540	114,400	129,800	113,100	71,355	74,491	84,100	64,600
Litchfield	16,063	15,800	20,000	17,000	12,651	12,291	15,300	12,800
New Haven	100,676	102,500	114,800	101,000	74,723	76,005	85,800	67,400
NEW JERSEY	683,381	713,000	759,600	726,400	480,937	486,971	513,700	459,300
Bergen	83,152	95,900	107,200	111,200	56,546	62,946	69,600	67,700
Essex	130,594	126,500	123,600	103,100	89,448	83,608	82,000	63,900
Hudson	124,348	109,500	107,200	96,300	89,645	82,857	81,200	72,000
Hunterdon	4,478	5,100	5,300	4,300	3,534	3,917	4,000	3,100
Mercer	36,232	37,800	38,100	35,000	25,933	26,286	25,900	22,600
Middlesex	66,206	76,400	81,600	82,000	48,540	53,330	56,600	53,600
Monmouth	14,705	20,800	24,900	25,900	11,188	13,626	15,900	16,000
Morris	26,544	31,300	38,400	42,400	15,812	16,064	20,200	20,100
Ocean	2,008	3,600	3,800	5,300	1,578	2,725	2,800	4,000
Passaic	75,393	80,600	82,800	76,900	58,522	59,726	60,900	55,100
Somerset	18,274	19,200	28,600	24,200	12,038	11,105	14,300	12,500
Sussex	2,563	3,200	3,300	3,600	2,071	2,536	2,500	2,300
Union	88,467	92,400	101,700	102,000	58,369	60,608	68,100	61,500
Warren	10,417	10,700	13,100	14,200	7,713	7,634	9,700	4,900
NEW YORK excl. N.Y.C.	238,600	273,400	312,000	283,300	157,458	173,091	192,100	170,700
Dutchess	23,243	23,300	26,300	22,000	12,198	12,100	12,200	11,000
Nassau	79,531	97,600	116,000	97,300	53,247	61,719	70,300	57,200
Orange	15,645	15,200	16,800	16,600	12,953	12,627	13,100	12,100
Putnam	940	900	1,200	700	423	706	900	600
Rockland	11,480	12,100	14,000	13,800	8,746	8,684	9,800	9,300
Suffolk	32,453	43,400	48,800	55,900	22,056	30,672	35,700	41,000
Sullivan	756	700	800	1,000	612	559	700	800
Ulster	12,659	13,700	14,800	12,400	7,909	8,110	8,700	6,200
Westchester	61,893	66,500	73,300	63,600	39,314	37,920	40,700	32,500
NEW YORK CITY	998,620	927,400	895,300	771,900	670,313	621,808	593,000	480,300
Bronx	52,546	56,400	52,700	40,900	41,391	44,477	42,200	31,500
Brooklyn	229,478	219,100	220,300	162,900	185,349	179,438	166,200	129,400
Manhattan	570,916	509,200	482,300	450,000	335,369	293,906	278,300	231,200
Queens	135,737	133,100	132,300	112,200	100,770	96,698	100,400	83,600
Richmond	9,943	9,600	7,700	5,900	7,434	7,289	5,900	4,600
REGION	2,141,880	2,146,500	2,231,500	2,012,700	1,467,437	1,444,657	1,484,000	1,255,100

**Table 17.**  
**Nonresidential Construction Starts in the Region, 1963-1973**

(000's square feet of building floorspace)						Percent of the Region's office building space started in Manhattan	Percent of the Region's non-office building space started in New York City
Year	Office	Other Comm'l	Institutional	Manufacturing	Total		
1963	12,397.8	22,983.7	29,982.8	18,470.1	83,834.4	39.5	26.5
1964	9,630.1	20,386.3	30,457.1	16,252.3	76,725.8	43.8	20.5
1965	14,702.4	22,009.6	31,489.0	18,859.0	87,060.0	39.5	22.4
1966	14,891.4	31,333.8	27,071.2	25,278.6	98,575.0	49.0	17.5
1967	18,314.2	22,255.7	29,960.1	20,891.5	91,421.5	42.7	16.5
1968	30,250.0	32,850.8	30,351.9	33,711.4	127,164.1	39.0	14.0
1969	45,876.2	26,948.1	36,499.8	29,651.3	138,975.4	70.6	20.7
1970	28,103.4	27,107.4	30,963.8	17,138.9	103,313.5	42.0	21.1
1971	9,315.6	14,710.5	16,780.1	7,380.5	48,186.7	33.6	22.7
1972	16,010.2	30,564.1	27,906.0	12,054.4	86,534.7	27.3	22.0
1973	12,866.7	31,610.5	24,818.0	12,704.8	82,000.0	20.5	22.9

Source: F. W. Dodge

**Table 18.**  
**Residential Construction Starts in the Region, 1960-1973**

Year	(Building Permit Authorizations) (000's of units)			Multi-Family Permits as Percent of all Permits in the Region	Multi-Family Permits as a Percent of Permits Outside New York City	Percent of all Multi- Family Permits Located in New York City
	Total	S.F.	M.F.			
1960	114.5	51.7	62.8	54.8	28.3	69.6
1961	144.6	52.3	92.3	63.8	34.1	72.6
1962	146.9	53.5	93.4	63.6	34.8	85.2
1963	129.6	51.2	78.4	60.4	40.3	59.2
1964	118.4	54.0	64.4	54.4	47.8	27.5
1965	126.7	57.2	69.5	54.9	46.6	32.4
1966	103.1	45.5	57.6	55.9	45.8	36.6
1967	91.5	43.3	48.2	52.7	39.8	42.9
1968	93.0	42.9	50.1	53.9	42.1	39.7
1969	80.5	38.0	42.5	52.8	42.6	36.5
1970	83.6	32.3	51.3	61.4	49.1	41.9
1971	105.0	43.6	61.4	58.5	49.2	33.2
1972	123.2	47.4	75.8	61.5	48.9	42.9
1973	93.3	41.9	51.4	55.1	44.5	36.8

Note: Includes public housing

**Table 19.**  
**Land Development in the New York Region, 1860-1970**

<u>22-County Region (6,919 square miles)</u>							
	<u>1860</u>	<u>1900</u>	<u>1925</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1970</u>
Population (000's)	1,933	5,514	10,391	12,518	14,826	16,678	17,935
Intensively developed land* (sq. mi.)	30	140	420	640	1,100	n.d.	n.d.
Total developed land (sq. mi.)	n.d.	n.d.	470	n.d.	1,330	1,842	2,190
Densities, persons/sq. mi. of developed land (rounded)	64,000	39,000	22,000	19,000	11,000	9,000	8,000
<u>31-County Region (12,788 square miles)</u>							
Population (000's)						18,264	19,756
Total developed land (sq. mi.)						2,351	2,830
Persons/sq. mi. of developed land (rounded)						7,800	7,000

\*Includes land with more than 10% building coverage.

Source: Regional Plan Association

**Table 20.**  
**Land Use Estimates for the New York Region, by County 1963-1970**  
(in square miles)

County or Planning Region	Total Land Area	1963	1970				Public open space*			Reservations**
		Developed	Res.	Non-Res.	Streets	Developed	1964	1970	1973	1970
Valley (Ansonia)	56.3	16.3	15.1	2.2	3.2	20.5	1.4	1.7	1.7	6.6
Central Naugatuck	308.0	36.4	28.2	4.3	12.1	44.6	13.9	13.9	14.8	5.0
Bridgeport	140.0	52.1	42.3	8.0	11.5	61.8	5.4	7.8	8.0	18.0
Housatonic	325.9	30.5	28.9	3.6	11.7	44.2	7.7	8.8	10.8	6.3
South Central	366.8	107.0	85.7	19.0	23.2	127.9	18.8	19.8	20.9	46.8
Southwestern	209.7	91.8	84.8	9.4	16.5	110.7	4.0	7.6	9.1	10.1
Rem. of Litchfield	774.3	(51.7)	(38.6)	(3.2)	(17.9)	(59.7)	(56.9)	n.d.	n.d.	(37.0)
CONNECTICUT	2,180.5	385.8	323.6	49.7	96.1	469.4	108.1	n.d.	n.d.	129.8
Bergen	234.0	124.6	91.6	24.6	26.8	143.0	13.6	15.5	16.7	6.4
Essex	129.5	76.3	48.0	18.5	16.6	83.1	10.5	13.0	13.2	6.0
Hudson	47.3	30.1	9.2	16.8	6.6	32.6	1.4	2.1	2.3	2.4
Hunterdon	433.6	(24.2)	(18.8)	(3.1)	(11.8)	(33.7)	2.7	n.d.	n.d.	(5.7)
Mercer	227.9	43.7	(29.2)	(10.2)	(49.7)	(4.7)	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	1.6
Middlesex	312.4	93.8	62.8	29.7	22.3	114.8	7.7	12.2	12.5	14.1
Monmouth	476.0	96.7	82.1	15.7	26.2	124.0	9.2	11.9	15.3	23.5
Morris	468.4	98.9	89.1	17.9	20.4	127.4	16.8	23.2	24.1	31.6
Ocean	642.2	(61.4)	62.7	(7.3)	(23.1)	(93.1)	(67.0)	n.d.	n.d.	(35.7)
Passaic	192.2	53.0	35.7	10.9	12.9	59.5	11.7	20.2	21.4	25.8
Somerset	306.7	54.3	50.3	11.2	13.4	74.9	5.9	8.2	9.8	5.2
Sussex	527.4	(31.7)	(38.2)	(2.0)	(13.7)	(53.9)	(59.4)	n.d.	n.d.	(17.1)
Union	102.7	71.2	44.2	18.7	13.3	76.2	9.7	9.7	10.1	2.7
Warren	361.5	(27.2)	(24.8)	(1.7)	(9.8)	(36.3)	(20.4)	n.d.	n.d.	(4.0)
NEW JERSEY	4,461.8	887.1	686.7	188.3	227.2	1,102.2	240.7	n.d.	n.d.	181.8
Dutchess	813.3	59.5	45.7	12.3	20.0	78.0	7.8	14.0	15.0	3.4
Nassau	288.5	183.1	123.5	28.1	42.0	193.6	32.5	46.3	47.8	6.5
Orange	832.6	57.6	41.8	11.3	24.6	77.7	44.0	49.8	51.0	28.7
Putnam	231.3	20.4	16.7	1.4	7.3	25.4	12.5	16.4	16.4	9.8
Rockland	176.3	45.8	38.5	9.5	10.5	58.5	47.9	56.1	56.7	5.7
Suffolk	328.9	259.0	202.8	56.8	63.3	322.9	45.0	65.4	76.5	14.7
Sullivan	986.0	(52.0)	(39.5)	(3.5)	(12.8)	(55.8)	(89.5)	(100.7)	n.d.	(3.0)
Ulster	1,142.8	(57.9)	(49.7)	(4.6)	(14.8)	(69.1)	(194.2)	(220.2)	n.d.	16.7
Westchester	442.9	133.3	102.8	23.2	32.5	158.5	25.7	28.6	29.6	34.0
NYS excl. NYC	5,842.6	868.6	661.0	150.7	227.8	1,039.5	499.1	597.5	n.d.	122.5
Bronx	43.2	28.2	11.6	7.7	10.0	29.3	8.1	8.8	8.8	0.8
Brooklyn	72.3	53.2	24.0	11.4	16.8	54.2	8.4	8.4	10.1	4.0
Manhattan	22.2	17.8	5.3	6.7	5.9	17.9	4.1	4.1	4.1	0.0
Queens	108.6	82.3	37.3	20.8	27.1	85.2	10.3	11.3	11.4	4.0
Richmond	57.2	28.0	12.6	10.8	8.9	32.3	6.1	7.6	8.3	1.2
NEW YORK CITY	303.5	209.5	90.8	57.4	70.7	218.9	37.0	40.2	42.7	10.0
31-county REGION	12,788.4	2,351.0	1,762.1	446.1	621.8	2,830.0	884.9	n.d.	n.d.	444.1
22-county REGION	6,919.4	1,841.5	1,331.6	385.0	469.1	2,185.7	356.0	457.0	489.0	264.9

\*As of December 31st of year shown: parks, state forests, and other publicly owned conservation and recreation areas.

\*\*Reservations: military, watershed, cemeteries, quarries

Source: Tri-State Regional Planning Commission; figures in parenthesis are Regional Plan estimates.

**Table 21.**  
**Public Open Space in the New York Region, 1921-1973**

(22-County Region) (in square miles)								
	<u>1921</u>	<u>1928</u>	<u>1936</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1973</u>
Connecticut	1.7	1.7	3.6	3.7	13.1	17.1	24.2	27.9
New Jersey	9.6	16.7	23.2	27.1	65.0	86.5	116.0	125.4
New York excl. N.Y.C.	57.8	110.6	140.9	144.5	158.8	215.4	276.6	293.0
New York City	13.9	18.1	27.0	34.5	38.6	38.6	40.2	42.7
22-County Region	82.9	147.1	194.7	209.8	275.5	357.6	457.0	489.0
Planned Targets:	First Regional Plan (1929) for 5,500 sq. mi. Region (Published by Regional Plan Association) 550							
	Race for Open Space (1960) for 6,900 sq. mi. Region (Published by Regional Plan Association) 1,150							
	Outdoor Recreation in a Crowded Region (1969) for 7,600 sq. mi. Region (Published by Tri-State Regional Planning Commission) 950							

Sources: 1921-1959 Regional Plan Association 1964-1973 Tri-State Regional Planning Commission



**Table 22.**  
**Motor Vehicle Registrations in the Region by County, 1960-1973**

	Total Motor Vehicles Registered (in 000's)						Total Passenger Cars Registered (in 000's)					
	1960	1965	1970	1971	1972	1973	1960	1965	1970	1971	1972	1973
CONNECTICUT	625.0	751.2	882.6	957.2	993.2	1,028.7	560.6	683.4	783.2	798.8	825.2	854.7 <sup>e</sup>
Fairfield	305.0 <sup>e</sup>	363.8	431.5	461.8	476.4	492.1	270.0 <sup>e</sup>	334.7	390.1	396.5	407.7	n.a.
Litchfield	60.0 <sup>e</sup>	71.9	82.8	93.5	98.1	103.8	54.0 <sup>e</sup>	64.7	69.5	69.8	73.6	n.a.
New Haven	260.0 <sup>e</sup>	315.5	368.3	401.9	418.7	432.8	236.6 <sup>e</sup>	284.0	323.6	332.5	343.9	n.a.
NEW JERSEY	1,872.1	2,358.3	2,799.0	2,802.6	2,873.6	2,973.7	1,687.0	2,136.8	2,493.7	2,581.6	2,634.1	2,729.1
Bergen	314.8	402.7	453.6	460.2	463.5	476.3	291.4	374.2	416.6	433.1	434.3	446.8
Essex	329.1	372.8	390.9	388.9	388.3	394.6	294.7	335.8	348.0	356.9	355.3	362.0
Hudson	169.6	191.1	217.9	210.1	212.3	216.0	152.2	169.2	189.3	191.8	193.7	197.1
Hunterdon	26.3	33.0	41.6	40.9	43.7	45.6	21.5	27.5	33.0	34.5	36.4	38.1
Mercer	101.4	130.0	148.7	149.2	154.1	159.8	90.4	116.3	131.1	136.2	140.2	145.5
Middlesex	164.6	218.4	281.7	283.6	292.2	304.3	148.6	198.3	250.6	260.9	266.7	277.9
Monmouth	136.3	180.2	228.0	228.4	239.0	248.8	121.3	162.6	203.2	210.6	219.6	229.3
Morris	113.1	154.2	203.3	206.6	214.6	223.9	102.5	140.2	181.8	190.4	196.5	205.0
Ocean	50.6	78.3	114.7	118.2	134.0	148.7	43.9	69.2	99.9	107.4	121.1	134.4
Passaic	152.6	192.7	230.6	229.2	235.2	240.9	137.4	175.5	206.7	212.3	217.1	222.7
Somerset	46.1	68.5	84.2	84.6	87.3	90.8	40.8	61.8	74.2	77.3	79.0	82.3
Sussex	23.5	33.1	44.7	44.4	48.5	52.1	19.4	28.1	36.4	38.4	41.4	44.9
Union	216.6	269.5	317.0	317.2	318.2	327.5	200.0	249.4	288.7	296.6	296.5	305.1
Warren	27.5	33.8	42.1	41.1	42.7	44.4	22.9	28.7	34.2	35.2	36.3	38.0
NY excl. NYC	1,482.4	1,905.3	2,258.7	2,451.8	2,404.4	2,532.8	1,305.8	1,664.1	2,010.8	2,098.9	2,145.9	2,255.6
Dutchess	70.7	94.1	109.2	121.4	117.8	125.1	59.3	79.1	94.6	98.7	101.9	107.7
Nassau	546.2	675.1	763.6	808.1	792.2	820.2	497.2	609.5	693.2	716.8	724.8	750.1
Orange	78.3	97.7	114.4	128.4	124.8	132.8	63.3	78.7	95.8	100.5	104.7	111.1
Putnam	19.1	25.1	33.1	36.6	36.1	38.6	16.4	21.5	29.2	30.9	32.0	34.2
Rockland	54.8	82.6	109.0	121.4	121.7	129.8	48.0	72.4	98.9	105.8	110.8	118.2
Suffolk	293.3	434.6	571.2	638.3	619.4	663.8	251.7	368.9	503.8	529.7	548.9	587.8
Sullivan	25.3	27.8	31.3	35.7	37.5	41.1	19.1	21.1	24.3	25.9	27.1	29.5
Ulster	53.0	64.1	73.7	83.4	86.8	92.1	42.8	51.6	60.9	64.7	66.9	70.3
Westchester	341.7	404.2	453.0	478.5	468.1	489.3	308.0	361.3	410.1	425.9	428.8	446.7
NEW YORK CITY	1,540.4	1,693.5	1,762.6	1,789.1	1,762.9	1,816.9	1,364.5	1,502.2	1,569.7	1,577.2	1,580.7	1,628.8
Bronx	239.0	260.2	265.2	265.4	261.3	268.5	219.7	240.4	242.6	241.0	240.9	245.9
Brooklyn	479.9	520.2	519.6	520.1	509.7	524.0	435.5	467.7	468.6	469.2	466.2	478.5
Manhattan	241.1	249.0	230.7	233.7	213.1	221.0	174.8	181.3	175.9	175.9	167.1	173.0
Queens	511.8	579.7	633.6	649.1	655.5	672.3	472.4	535.6	577.3	581.1	590.7	608.4
Richmond	68.6	84.4	113.5	120.8	123.3	131.1	62.0	77.3	105.3	110.0	115.8	122.7
Outside N.Y.C.	3,979.5	5,014.8	5,940.3	6,211.6	6,271.2	6,535.2	3,553.4	4,484.3	5,287.7	5,479.3	5,605.2	5,839.4
Core	1,752.9	1,926.9	1,962.5	1,973.9	1,947.4	1,997.3	1,549.7	1,708.0	1,738.8	1,744.1	1,743.7	1,788.3
Outside Core	3,767.0	4,781.4	5,740.4	6,026.8	6,086.7	6,354.8	3,368.2	4,278.5	5,118.6	5,312.4	5,442.2	5,679.9
REGION	5,519.9	6,708.3	7,702.9	8,000.7	8,034.1	8,352.1	4,917.9	5,986.5	6,857.4	7,056.5	7,185.9	7,468.2

Note: For 1920-1950 data and sources see: Automobile Ownership in the Region, RPA occasional paper, December 1973.  
For post-1970 data, this table supercedes Tables A-3 and A-4 in above publication.

e=estimated

**Table 23.**  
**Route-Miles of Limited-Access Highways in the New York Region, 1924-1975**  
 (31 counties, as of December of each year)

	New York State			Connecti- cut	New Jersey	Total Region	Annual Increment	Average Annual Increment
	N.Y.C.	North	L.I.					
1924	2.5	12.5	--	--	--	15.0	+5.0	
1925	2.5	12.5	--	--	--	15.0	0	
1926	2.5	12.5	--	--	--	15.0	0	
1927	3.0	12.5	1.0	--	1.0	17.5	+2.5	
1928	8.0	27.0	7.0	--	4.2	46.2	+28.7	
1929	8.0	27.0	21.5	--	4.2	60.7	+14.5	
1930	9.6	27.0	21.5	--	4.2	62.3	+1.6	10.5
1931	11.2	48.0	21.5	--	4.2	84.9	+22.6	
1932	12.0	48.0	27.5	--	14.1	101.6	+16.7	
1933	20.4	73.1	38.5	--	14.1	146.1	+44.5	
1934	20.4	79.1	46.0	--	14.1	159.6	+13.5	
1935	24.7	84.7	46.0	--	14.1	169.5	+9.9	
1936	36.8	84.7	46.0	--	14.1	181.6	+12.1	
1937	49.9	84.7	49.0	--	14.1	197.7	+16.1	
1938	49.9	110.2	57.2	17.0	14.1	248.4	+50.7	
1939	68.0	110.2	61.2	17.0	16.8	273.2	+24.8	
1940	89.8	123.2	61.2	40.0	25.5	339.7	+66.5	27.7
1941	103.7	123.2	61.2	45.0	25.5	358.6	+18.9	
1942	108.9	123.2	68.7	45.0	25.5	371.3	+12.7	
1943	108.9	123.2	68.7	45.0	25.5	371.3	0	
1944	108.9	123.2	68.7	45.0	25.5	371.3	0	
1945	108.9	123.2	68.7	45.0	25.5	371.3	0	
1946	108.9	123.2	68.7	45.0	31.2	377.0	+5.7	
1947	108.9	123.2	68.7	45.0	34.5	380.3	+3.3	
1948	110.3	123.2	68.7	61.0	35.0	398.2	+17.9	
1949	111.3	123.2	80.2	63.0	35.0	412.7	+14.5	
1950	119.8	148.2	85.3	69.0	45.0	467.3	+54.6	12.8
1951	124.3	160.7	85.3	71.0	49.0	490.3	+23.0	
1952	125.4	170.7	95.3	71.0	113.4	575.8	+85.5	
1953	126.7	181.2	100.3	72.0	200.6	680.8	+105.0	
1954	135.0	239.2	104.3	72.0	206.6	757.1	+76.3	
1955	146.5	287.7	104.3	72.0	215.8	826.3	+69.2	
1956	147.0	324.0	109.8	74.0	219.8	874.6	+48.3	
1957	147.3	333.8	116.8	74.0	241.8	913.7	+39.1	
1958	151.8	351.1	118.1	138.0	245.8	1,004.8	+91.1	
1959	150.3	358.9	131.5	148.0	253.0	1,041.7	+36.9	
1960	161.3	364.9	134.0	157.5	263.0	1,080.7	+39.0	61.3
1961	172.3	373.8	141.0	167.5	281.5	1,136.1	+55.4	
1962	178.9	380.0	160.4	187.0	289.0	1,195.3	+59.2	
1963	182.5	396.5	184.7	187.0	296.0	1,246.7	+51.4	
1964	199.7	415.3	194.0	198.0	315.7	1,322.7	+76.0	
1965	199.7	419.6	200.3	207.8	328.1	1,355.5	+32.8	
1966	200.4	429.9	200.3	230.8	341.6	1,403.0	+47.5	
1967	200.7	441.8	205.6	237.2	341.6	1,426.9	+23.9	
1968	203.2	452.6	213.9	238.7	342.6	1,451.0	+24.1	
1969	205.0	464.3	221.8	238.7	361.8	1,491.6	+40.6	
1970	206.0	502.8	241.8	247.5	400.0	1,598.1	+106.5	51.7
1971	209.5	512.3	241.8	253.3	407.4	1,624.3	+26.2	
1972	209.5	519.3	248.5	259.1	438.2	1,674.6	+50.3	
1973	214.4	519.3	257.0	259.1	479.1	1,728.9	+54.3	
1974	214.4	519.3	257.0	259.1	531.3	1,781.1	+52.2	
1975	216.9	525.3	257.0	264.4	542.0	1,805.6	+24.5	41.5

Note: Limited-access highway definition is that of the Tri-State Regional Planning Commission. It includes certain roads that have occasional grade-crossings, namely the original section of the Bronx River Parkway (10 mi.); an older section of the Saw Mill Parkway (4 mi.); Taconic Parkway sections not converted to full freeway standards (ca. 54 mi.); and the county-owned William Floyd Parkway on Long Island (16 mi.). It further includes certain two-lane limited-access highways, namely the Long Mountain Parkway (6 mi.) and the Bethpage Parkway (2.5 mi.). Source: Regional Plan Association, Tri-State Regional Planning Commission, and the Transportation Departments of the respective states.

**Table 24.**  
**Freeway Mileage Related to Motor Vehicles, 1973**

	Freeway route- miles	Freeway lane miles	Route-miles per 10,000 veh.	Lane-miles per 1,000 veh.	Average Daily Traffic per lane (vehicles)
Connecticut (3 counties)	259.1	1,207	2.52	1.17	7,781
New Jersey (14 counties)	479.1	2,870	1.61	0.97	8,176 *
New York State North (7 counties)	519.3	2,293	4.95	2.19	5,428 *
Long Island (Nassau-Suffolk)	257.0	1,338	1.73	0.90	10,046
New York City	214.4	1,284	1.18	0.71	15,762
REGION TOTAL	1,728.9	8,996	2.07	1.08	n.a.

\*Only within Tri-State Regional Planning Commission Region, 9 counties in New Jersey and 5 counties in Northern New York State

Source: Regional Plan Association and Tri-State Regional Planning Commission

**Table 25.**  
**Rapid Transit Patronage in the Region, 1969-1973**

(millions of fares)

System	Calendar Years				
	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
NYCTA	1,343.3	1,257.6	1,196.9	1,145.1	1,101.4
PATH	38.0	39.0	38.9	40.3	30.0
SIRT	5.2	4.8	4.7	4.1	4.0
Newark	4.3	4.3	3.5	2.0	3.0(e)
Region	1,390.8	1,305.6	1,244.0	1,191.5	1,138.4

Note: Columns may not add to totals due to rounding.

Sources: New York City Transit Authority; Port Authority of New York and New Jersey; Tri-State Regional Planning Commission.

**Table 26.**  
**Route-Miles of Rapid Transit in the New York Region, 1867-1974**

Year	Elevated	Open	Tunnel	Total
1867	0.1	--	--	0.1
1868	0.5	--	--	0.5
1869	0.5	--	--	0.5
1870	3.3	--	0.06	3.36
1881	3.3	--	--	3.3
1872	3.3	--	--	3.3
1873	3.6	--	--	3.6
1874	3.6	--	--	3.6
1875	4.0	--	--	4.0
1876	4.9	--	--	4.9
1877	5.1	--	--	5.1
1878	18.9	--	--	18.9
1879	24.7	--	--	24.7
1880	32.2	--	--	32.2
1881	32.2	--	--	32.2
1882	32.2	--	--	32.2
1883	33.4	--	--	33.4
1884	33.4	--	--	33.4
1885	40.2	--	--	40.2
1886	41.1	--	--	41.1
1887	41.1	--	--	41.1
1888	52.4	--	--	52.4
1889	57.6	--	--	57.6
1890	59.2	--	--	59.2
1891	59.3	--	--	59.3
1892	59.9	--	--	59.9
1893	63.9	--	--	63.9
1894	64.6	--	--	64.6
1895	64.6	--	--	64.6
1896	64.6	--	--	64.6
1897	64.6	--	--	64.6
1898	64.6	--	--	64.6
1899	64.6	--	--	64.6
1900	64.6	--	--	64.6
1901	65.8	--	--	65.8
1902	66.1	--	--	66.1
1903	66.1	--	--	66.1
1904	67.3	--	12.8	80.1
1905	67.3	2.5	15.4	85.2
1906	69.8	3.3	17.7	90.8
1907	70.3	8.0	17.7	96.0
1908	72.3	8.0	23.2	103.5
1909	72.3	8.0	25.6	105.9
1910	72.3	8.0	26.5	106.8
1911	72.3	15.1	27.2	114.6
1912	72.3	15.1	27.2	114.6
1913	72.3	15.1	28.4	115.8
1914	72.3	15.1	28.4	115.8
1915	76.0	20.2	37.0	133.2
1916	81.4	20.2	38.2	139.8
1917	102.4	20.2	40.2	162.8
1918	107.9	20.2	52.8	180.9
1919	112.5	20.2	59.7	192.4
1920	124.4	20.2	71.5	216.1
1921	124.4	20.2	71.5	216.1
1922	125.0	20.2	71.5	216.7
1923	124.8	20.2	71.5	216.5
1924	124.5	20.2	75.8	220.5
1925	125.3	41.9	76.2	243.4
1926	125.3	41.9	76.6	243.8
1927	125.8	41.9	76.9	244.6
1928	126.3	41.9	80.5	248.7
1929	126.3	41.9	80.5	248.7
1930	126.0	41.9	80.5	248.4
1931	126.0	41.9	81.6	249.5
1932	126.0	41.9	94.3	262.2
1933	126.9	41.9	116.4	285.2
1934	126.9	41.9	116.4	285.2
1935	126.9	44.7	117.2	288.8
1936	126.9	44.7	129.6	301.2
1937	126.9	44.7	136.6	308.2
1938	121.8	44.7	136.6	303.1
1939	121.8	44.7	136.6	303.1
1940	97.6	44.9	139.0	281.5
1941	97.9	47.9	139.0	284.8
1942	92.7	47.9	139.0	279.6
1943	92.7	47.9	139.0	279.6
1944	90.9	47.9	139.0	277.8
1945	90.9	47.9	139.0	277.8
1946	90.8	47.9	139.4	278.1
1947	90.8	47.9	139.4	278.1
1948	90.8	47.9	141.4	280.1
1949	90.8	47.9	141.4	280.1
1950	87.0	47.9	141.9	276.8
1951	86.7	47.9	141.9	276.5
1952	86.5	47.9	141.9	276.2
1953	86.1	40.5	141.9	268.5
1954	86.1	40.5	142.4	269.0
1955	77.5	40.5	142.9	260.9
1956	80.1	47.3	142.9	270.3
1957	79.8	47.3	142.9	270.0
1958	79.1	47.3	142.9	269.3
1959	79.1	47.3	142.9	269.3
1960	79.1	47.3	142.9	269.3
1961	79.1	47.3	142.9	269.3
1962	79.1	47.3	142.9	269.3
1963	79.1	47.3	142.9	269.3
1964	79.1	47.3	142.9	269.3
1965	79.1	47.3	142.9	269.3
1966	79.1	47.3	142.9	269.3
1967	80.0	47.3	144.4	271.7
1968	80.0	47.3	145.1	272.4
1969	77.3	47.3	145.1	269.7
1970	77.3	47.3	145.1	269.7
1971	77.3	47.3	145.1	269.7
1972	77.3	47.3	145.1	269.7
1973	71.8	47.3	145.1	264.2
1974	71.8	47.3	145.1	264.2

Note: Mileages shown after 1951 conform to Transit Authority totals; they refer to revenue route-miles (generally measured center-to-center of stations) with a minor amount of duplication at junctions, and exclude non-revenue routes such as spurs to yards. Staten Island Rapid Transit is included in the tabulation since its modernization in 1925, even though it developed a headway-type service as a steam railroad in prior years. Likewise, surface lines in Brooklyn are included since their grade-separation, not since they began operating as steam railroads. The data refer to all four existing transit systems, as broken down in Table 27.

Source: Regional Plan Association.

**Table 27.**  
**Rapid Transit Mileage in the New York Region by System in 1974 and the New Lines Program**

Operator	Route miles of line			
	Elevated	Open	Tunnel	Total
NYCTA	71.8	22.9	137.0	231.7
SIRTOA	--	14.3	--	14.3
PATH	--	7.1	6.8	13.9
Newark Subway	--	3.0	1.3	4.3
<u>Total</u>	71.8	47.3	145.1	264.2
MTA priority program	-1.8	+12.4	+15.8	+26.4

Source: Regional Plan Association.



**Table 28.**  
**MTA Subway Construction Progress, December 1974**

Route	Name	Total miles tunnel open		Miles under construction		Possible completion date with adequate funding	Cost Estimates million 1974\$ old	1974\$ new*	Cost of con- tracts now under const.	
131-D, 133	Archer Ave.	3.0	--	0.6	20%	1981**	265	437	35.2	
131-A	63d St Tun.	3.0	--	1.6	53%	1982**	289	505	157.7	
132-A	Second Ave N	4.7	--	0.8	17%	1982	282	921	55.0	
132-C	Second Ave S	3.6	--	0.5	14%	1986	222	658	32.6	
Subtotal		14.3	--	3.5	24%		1,058	2,521	280.5	
131-D	S-E Queens	--	2.4	--	--	1981**	included above		--	
131-B	Queens hi- speed	0.8	5.0	--	--	1983**	256	261	--	
132-B	Bronx hi- speed	0.7	5.0	--	--	1986	252	215	--	
Total all routes		15.8	12.4					1,566	2,997	
Yards, shops, cars...							254	490		
Total Priority Program		28.2 miles					1,820	3,487		
**Includes the cost of sections already under construction.										
*Routes proposed for continued construction by Mayor Beame.										
Construction progress:		1911-1925 (Dual contracts, subways)				3.5 miles annually				
		1925-1940 (IND subway)				3.8 miles annually				
		1969-1974 (MTA program)				0.7 miles annually				
Time lag from final plan approval to first operation:										
		1911-1915 (Dual contracts, BMT)				4 years				
		1924-1932 (IND)				8 years				
		1954-1967 (Chrystie St. project)				13 years				
		1968-1982 (MTA program)				14 years				

Source: Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Regional Plan Association

**Table 29.**  
**Comparison of Past RPA Population Projections with Actual Counts for the Region, 1920-1973 (000's)**

DATE*	PUBLICATION	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1973	1975	1980	1985	2000	2020
1922	Regional Survey of N.Y. & Env.												
	Nelson Lewis		10,870	13,253	15,923	19,295	22,840			26,788		34,698	
1923	Pearl and Reed**		11,460	14,070	16,840	19,650	22,340			24,810		28,760	
1924	Wilson and Luyten		10,370	11,840	13,110	14,130	14,890			15,460		16,160	
1925	Goodrich		9,670	11,000	12,300	13,820	15,430			16,850		19,780	
1932	RPA Bulletin 7			13,863	16,379	19,538							
1938	RPA Bulletin 40			13,426	15,355	16,379							
1941	RPA Bulletin 55				13,586	14,543	15,190						
	First Regional Plan Region (5,500 sq. miles)--actual count	<u>8,979</u>	<u>11,458</u>	<u>12,308</u>	<u>13,701</u>	<u>15,822</u>	<u>17,522</u>						
1954	RPA Bulletin 85					16,386	18,263		19,209				
1956	RPA Bulletin 87, People, Jobs & Land					16,400	18,250		19,100				
1959	NYMRS, Metropolis 1985, Vernon				(16,562)	(19,420)		20,810			23,712		
1962	RPA Bulletin 100, Spread City					18,420		19,700	20,950		22,170		
1966	Second Regional Plan, 22-Counties					18,325			20,775			24,197	
	<u>22-County Region-actual count</u>	<u>9,139</u>	<u>11,643</u>	<u>12,518</u>	<u>13,951</u>	<u>16,139</u>	<u>17,935</u>						
1966	Second Regional Plan, 31-Counties						20,226	(21,174)		23,385		30,186	
1970	Office Industry							(20,703)			23,546	27,968	35,000
1972	March 1973, Press release 1181 "likely"							(20,304)			22,515	24,583	27,000
1972	March 1973, Press release 1181 "low"							(20,100)			21,490		
	<u>31-County Region-actual count</u>	<u>10,024</u>	<u>12,637</u>	<u>13,566</u>	<u>15,147</u>	<u>17,624</u>	<u>19,755</u>	<u>19,823***</u>					

\* Date refers to the year a projection was made, not when it was published.

\*\* Most widely referred to, especially their 1965 figure of 21,000,000, which was First Regional Plan target

\*\*\* Census estimate.

Figures in parentheses ( ) are interpolated.

# APPENDIX

## Past Population Projections.

A view of the probable future is essential for making planning decisions, and over the past 53 years Regional Plan Association (and its predecessor Committee on the Regional Plan) published more than ten separate series of population projections. How have they fared in the light of events, and what can be learned from them? This brief overview is not intended to burrow into details, but focuses on the broad approach and the outcome of the projections as summarized in Table 29.

### 1. The First Regional Plan

The *Regional Survey* of 1929, Vol. 2, presented four different population projections spanning the period from 1920 to 2000 and beyond. Two of them were characterized as "high," two as "low"; each was prepared by a different method. The first, made by Nelson Lewis in 1922 was straight extrapolation of the growth trend, based on historic 1790 to 1920 data. It forecast 22.8 million people for 1970 and 34.7 million for 2000 within the boundaries of the Region, as then defined. The next year, Pearl and Reed of Johns Hopkins University refined the Lewis projections. They fitted a curve to the historical data mathematically, rather than by hand, and used a S-shaped growth line—not a straight line—recognizing the fact that growth will some day come to an end. That end was surmised to occur in 2220 at a level of nearly 35 million people; in the intervening years, 22.3 million were forecast for 1970 and 28.8 for 2000.

Wilson and Luyten of Harvard University in 1924 criticized Pearl and Reed's method of fitting an S-curve to historical data. Using the same equation, but a different criterion of best fit, they came up with an ultimate population of less than half: 16.8 million, to occur shortly after 2000, and 1970 and 2000 populations of 14.9 and 16.2 respectively. Similar in magnitude was the fourth projection of the 1920's by Goodrich, derived by two parallel methods. One was to assume an ultimate ceiling of 300 million for the national population (based on "available agricultural resources") and relate that to historic decrements in the growth rate, and to changes in the Region's share of the national population. Another had to do with the rank-size distribution of municipalities in the nation and their growth rates. The methods converged to yield a population of 15.4 million in 1970 and 19.8 in 2000.

To a great extent, all of these projections represented manipulations of numbers without much regard for their internal implications, i.e. the demographic composition of the population, or the economic base of the Region. Nevertheless, the four lines framed the actual performance quite closely. If one takes an average of the four projections for 1970, which is 18.9 million, the result is only 8 percent above the actual 1970 population within 1922 regional boundaries, 17.5 million.

Averaging four projections does seem legitimate in retrospect because all four were initially presented on an equal footing, and the Pearl and Reed figures were later favored with the explicit understanding that they are probably on the high side, "to allow for a safe margin of error in making plans for distant years." (*Regional Survey*, Vol. 2, p. 115).

### 2. Projections of the thirties and forties

While an 8 percent error over a 50-year period does appear respectable, the interesting fact is that the average of the four projections for 1930—the first Census checkpoint—was just as much off. The unusually high growth rate of the 1920's made all but the Pearl and Reed figures way too low, and the "tendency of the population to spread itself outward" (hailed as "most gratifying" by RPA *Bulletin* 7) made county projections obsolete. Accordingly, when the 1930 Census results were in, a new set of projections was published in March 1932 extrapolating recent growth trends by county for the three decades immediately ahead, but maintaining the Pearl and Reed 1965 control total of 21 million. This resulted in a regional population of 19.5 million in 1960.

In the meantime, however, the Depression was leaving its imprint on the demography of the Region, as birth rates continued to decline and in-migration fell. In January 1938, RPA *Bulletin* 40 predicted "a permanent slowing up of population growth" and revised the 1960 projection down to 16.4 million. The figure was presented as a temporary one, to be revised when the 1940 Census became available.

The 1940 Census did, in fact, reveal the full extent of the slowdown caused by the Depression, and in July 1941, RPA *Bulletin* 55 came out with a third set of revised projections, estimating only 14.5 million for 1960.

In actuality, because of the post-war baby boom, not predictable in 1941, the 1960 population within the 1922 Regional boundary reached 15.8 million, about half-way between the 1938 and the 1941 forecasts.

### 3. Projections of the fifties and early sixties

In 1947, the regional boundary was amended to include previously excluded portions of Orange, Dutchess, Fairfield and Monmouth Counties, taking in full counties for the ease of using Census figures. The population of the new Region was 1.8 percent greater than the old Region in 1950, and by 1970 the difference increased to 2.3 percent. Though the difference is small, it does preclude direct comparisons between pre- and post-1947 projections. One can argue that since the early projections underpredicted the degree of spread caused by automobile accessibility, the initially forecast population could be assigned to a wider area. To some extent this is no doubt the case, but to what extent, is a moot point. Therefore, projections based on three successive areal definitions of the Region are treated separately here.

The 1941 projection of 1950 population—13.586 million within the "old" Region came very close to the 1950 actual—13.701 million, but rising post-war birth rates and renewed in-migration made a reassessment of the longer term trend, based on the 1950 Census, necessary. Accordingly, RPA *Bulletin* 85 published in November 1954 carried a new set of population forecasts, derived, as a shortcut, directly from national Census projections by means of ratios. The 1970 forecast for the full 22-county Region was 18.263 million. It turned out to be 17.935 million.

The following year, the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission (MRTC) project got underway, to which RPA was

to supply planning forecasts, based on a detailed analysis of demographic and economic trends. With the volatile trends of the 1930's and 1940's behind them, the researchers, under the direction of Henry Cohen, tested several migration, birth and death rate assumptions, and considered an average between extremes to be "most probable." This, essentially, confirmed the shortcut 1954 forecasts; 1970 population as an example was merely rounded to 18.250 million. The 1954 and 1956 forecasts are, for practical purposes, identical. The 1956 forecasts were published in 1957 in the seminal report *People, Jobs and Land*, which presented a broad picture of land development and economic trends in the Region.

This work, in turn, was followed by a still more ambitious undertaking, the Harvard Study of the New York Metropolitan Region, conducted between 1956 and 1959 under the direction of Raymond Vernon, enlisting the expertise of top academicians in the field, and published in ten volumes from 1959 to 1961.

The principal innovation of the Harvard Study was to make population growth dependent on the forecast growth in economic activity, projecting the latter with the help of econometric models able to take into account relationships among variables, and not just separate trends. The study acknowledged, however: "It may be...that the refinement of the method is somewhat in excess of the refinement of the data." (*Projection of a Metropolis*, p.3).

To avoid direct comparisons with Census figures, the first of which for 1960 would become available shortly after publication, the Harvard Study showed projections only for intercensal years (1965, 1975, 1985); but by interpolation, its implicit 1970 forecast can be ascertained: 19.420 million people in the 22-county Region, 1.170 million more than the earlier RPA-MRTC forecast, and 1.485 million more than the actual Census count for the 22-county Region turned out to be. With respect to total employment, the Harvard Study (as interpolated, again, for 1970) came within 2 percent of reality, even though its figure for manufacturing employment turned out to be 35 percent too high. The rapid growth of the office and service work force, largely foreseen, made up the difference. Thus, the major reason for the Harvard Study's population overestimate was not migration (determined by the level of employment), but rather the high assumptions on fertility: these were made at a time (in 1957) when the birth rate hit the highest point in a half-century. Thus the Harvard Study remains, in retrospect, to symbolize the high point of growth optimism. The birth rate has been declining ever since--now for 17 consecutive years--and the projections have been declining accordingly. Every subsequent RPA projection represented a downward revision of the Harvard Study population forecasts.

The first such revision came in 1962, in RPA *Bulletin 100*, "Spread City." It reflected the findings of the 1960 Census, which were unavailable to the Harvard team. Their 1985 forecast of 23.7 million was scaled down somewhat to 22.2 million for the 22-county Region.

#### 4. The Second Regional Plan

In attempting to locate the projected population on the ground, taking account of the accelerated post-war tendency for dispersal, "Spread City" found that the 22-county bound-

ary was too narrow to accommodate the projected growth at foreseeable low densities; to capture the projected overspill within the boundaries of the Region, the latter were redefined in 1965 for a second time. To account for any conceivable future settlement pattern, to incorporate important region-related recreation areas, and the rail terminals in Trenton and New Haven, the new boundary was broadly drawn, adding nine counties in the three states. This increased the regional population by 9.2 percent in 1960 and 10.1 percent in 1970, while expanding the land area by 85 percent.

A new population forecast covering the expanded area was prepared under the supervision of Dick Netzer in 1966, and published in *The Region's Growth* (May 1967). It is perhaps best remembered for the new regional total--30 million people by the year 2000--but in fact, for the territory of the 22-county Region in 1985, it represented another downward revision compared to the Harvard Study or to "Spread City" to about 21.5 million.

The 1966 projection, the initial basis of the Second Regional Plan, was carefully constructed by the cohort-survival method and integrated with the employment projection (in terms of in-migration requirements) following the conceptual framework of the Harvard Study. But it soon became apparent that its fertility assumption--corresponding to the next-to-the-highest Census "B" series, and meaning that the birth rate would level off at the high level of the early 1960's--was too high.

In 1970, as the *Office Industry* study was being prepared for publication, the Census lower series "C" was substituted, leading to a year 2000 estimate of 28 million for the 31-county Region.

As the 1970 Census results became available, it turned out that the downward revision was not nearly enough. The birth rate continued plummeting, the Bureau of the Census revised all of its forecasting assumptions, and in 1972 Regional Plan prepared its fourth post-Harvard Study projection, (published in March 1973) forecasting 24.6 million for the 31-county Region in the year 2000 if the birth rate stabilizes at the then current level, and 21.5 million in 1985 with no growth thereafter if the decline in the birth rate continues. This range of forecasts was widely publicized in the CHOICES FOR '76 publications and television programs.

Providing an explicit range of forecasts was designed to take care of the extreme uncertainty attached to future child-bearing behavior, and to explain its effect on population growth. As evident from previous discussion, even this range turned out to be much too high only two years later. While the birth rate followed the assumptions of the low forecast quite closely, depressed economic conditions in the Region after 1970 put a sudden end to net in-migration, which was previously assumed to continue for another two decades albeit at a declining rate. The 1972 projections were overtaken by events and a major report on "Patterns of Growth in the New York Region," prepared to explain their implications in detail, was never published.

As further evident from the preceding discussion, this report avoids any numerical forecasts for the population as a whole. It focuses on the cohorts already born, and merely indicates the probability of a more-or-less stable total population for the immediate future, with the possibility of some increases or decreases. It emphasizes policy implications which appear to be relevant regardless of such shifts.



## 5. Appendix Summary

The projections of the 1920's can be considered good only if averaged. Individually, they were anywhere from 15 percent too low to 30 percent too high at a distance of 50 years, and 11 to 22 percent off at a distance of 30 years.

The 1938-41 projections fared better: at a distance of 30 years, they came within 3.5 to 15 percent of reality.

The 1954-56 projection prepared by Henry Cohen and Henry Fagin has been the best. At a distance of 15 years it predicted the actual population within 1.75 percent.

All subsequent projections starting with the Harvard Study and through 1972 had larger errors over a shorter time span, and all erred on the high side, unable to anticipate the continued decline in the birth rate, and the most recent decline in the growth of employment.

Several conclusions can be drawn from this review:

1. The perspective of any projection is strongly influenced by the events of the immediate past, as perceived through the data-reporting process, which has a time lag of 2 to 3 years.

2. No matter how rigorous the projection procedure itself, the choice of assumptions that go into it--intuitive by definition--is the largest variable affecting the magnitude of the projections. Projections are usually framed in "if-then" terms by their authors ("...if current trends continue"). Readers, however, typically pay little attention to the "if's."

More attention to these is clearly needed on the part of both authors and readers.

3. Projections are upset by powerful short-term events which are unpredictable in the perspective of the day. The four generations of forecasters whose work is referred to here did not foresee the following seven events:

- a. The economic upswing of the 1920's.
- b. The start of population dispersal in the 1920's (this was advocated, but not incorporated in the forecasts).
- c. The economic downturn of the 1930's.
- d. The post-war "baby boom."
- e. The decline in the growth of manufacturing employment in the Region beginning in the late 1950's.
- f. The extent of the "baby bust" which began in 1958 and still continues.
- g. The economic downturn in the Region after 1970.

4. In view of uncertainties of this nature, framing the forecast by reasonably possible extreme assumptions and taking their average as the "probable" seems to have considerable merit. This approach, as an example, prevented the 1954-56 forecasters from being carried away by the then rising birth rate. Of course, it in no way reduces the need for judgement that goes into formulating the range of assumptions. Moreover, projections do have to be reviewed continuously, in the changing perspective of time, as the unknowable future is approached.

### Publication Highlights 1974-75.

#### REGIONAL PLAN NEWS:

95. THE METROPOLIS SPEAKS. Extensively analyzed ballot results from Regional Plan's Mass Media Town Meetings, CHOICES FOR '76, and an explanation of the project and its results. August 1974. 34 pp. Members — \$1.40; non-members — \$2.00.

#### 96. CONNECTICUT TRANSPORTATION ISSUES.

A special report on several controversial highway issues in western Connecticut and the future of bus and rail service. February 1975. 16 pp. Members — \$1.40; non-members — \$2.00.

#### REGIONAL PLAN BULLETINS:

123. LISTENING TO THE METROPOLIS. An evaluation of the New York Region's CHOICES FOR '76 Television Town Meetings and a Handbook on Public Participation in Regional Planning. December 1974. 96 pp. Members — \$3.50; non-members — \$5.00.

124. GROWTH MANAGEMENT: A Background on Population and Settlement in the Nation. A summary of current demographic trends and an analysis of the spatial patterns of recent urban growth in the United States. Prepared as a background for dealing with land use and urban policy issues at the national level. 30 charts, 25 tables, 9 maps. Forthcoming May 1975.

#### REGIONAL PLAN REPORTS:

URBAN SPACE FOR PEDESTRIANS. The results of Regional Plan studies of pedestrian travel demand, pedestrian travel behavior, and design standards for pedestrian facilities, placed in a wider framework of urban space allocation. Scheduled for publication by MIT Press in Fall, 1975.



# Regional Plan Association

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
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