Ever since urban studies first turned its attention to the Maghrib more than a century ago, scholars have speculated about the North African city and what makes it different from the city of the West. Historians, sociologists, anthropologists, urban planners, geographers, architects, art historians, and even literary critics have searched for the paradigmatic Islamic city, debated about its essential character, and lamented how it has been transformed by modernity. The tentacles of this discussion are far-reaching and have thoroughly penetrated scholarship on urbanism in the region. A good example is the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who used the topic of housing in Sefrou as the departure point for contemplating the evolution of the town from self-contained village to exploding mini-metropolis. While his writing about Sefrou could hardly be accused of being essentialist, Geertz’s idea of Moroccan urbanity rests solidly on the notion that there existed in the past a classic medina that was qualitatively and quantitatively different from the urban pastiche we see today. The premodern Moroccan town in general seemed to possess attributes of tranquility, stability, and legibility of form that are missing from the contemporary cityscape. Implicit in his argument is the notion that an earlier, purer urban form exists as a normative ideal within the shell of the present town, or at least in the minds of its inhabitants, hidden from view by the ugliness spawned by modernity.

The purpose of this discussion is not to revisit the concept of the Islamic city with the aim of either contesting or asserting its validity. It is assumed that modernity has had its way with the Moroccan medina, altering its putative protean form beyond recognition. A more compelling question, to my mind, concerns the actual process of urban transformation and the mechanisms that propelled it. Presented with the vista of an exploded urban landscape, can one look backward in time and make change itself the object of inquiry? Clearly not an easy operation, it is one that requires the architect’s critical eye as well as the historian’s well-tuned ear. Along with looking at the city as it exists, it demands a large measure of historical imagination, aided by those texts (chronological, literary, and religious) that speak about the evolution of the built environment in its social and political context. Maps and photographs are also important, providing a visual record of sedimentary space. Using various kinds of documentation, our overarching aim is to try to reconstruct some of the complex processes that produced the Moroccan cityscape as we see it today.

Asa Briggs noted in his classic study of the Victorian city that cities are interesting not for their sameness but for the “historical divergences” that emerge out of the “provincial cultures” that fell victim to the rise of the nation-state. During the twentieth century, forces of centralization erased the local institutions that once provided the city with structure, continuity, and individuality. We may ask a similar question about the Moroccan city. How did the integrity of the Moroccan city become eroded as it was drawn into the framework of the modern nation-state? What processes brought about the situation that we see today, so deftly described by Geertz in the case of Sefrou?

To begin, it is important to take note of the social structures that once organized Moroccan urban life. Once they come into focus, it is easier to dispel the notion, long held by European scholars, that the premodern Islamic city was a “mere agglomeration” lacking the institutions and self-awareness of “true urban entities like those of classical antiquity or medieval Europe.”4 Tangier is a site that challenges this hypothesis. Located on Morocco’s northern coast, it became a point of contention in the nineteenth century, as colonial designs collided with native sensibilities, causing a rupture in both the built and the social environments. This rupture began with the “penetration” of the country by European commerce at mid-century and culminated in foreign occupation by France and Spain in 1912. In the course of the colonial take-
over, local institutions that provided the framework for civic life were gradually discredited, diminishing their value as levers of social action. The vacuum left by their removal allowed a more powerful state mechanism to emerge that set aside older patterns of local autonomy in favor of a system marked by a highly centralized rule.

How the Moroccan and North African city lost its autonomy, eventually becoming subsumed within the framework of the modern nation-state, forms the larger context of this study. Our interest here is a narrower but closely related one, concerning the transformation of one distinct urban institution: the hubus, or public endowment (known in the eastern Islamic world as the waqf) of the Great Mosque of Tangier. First published in 1914 by French sociologist Edouard Michaux-Bellaire, the records of the Tangier hubus provide detailed information about three centuries of Tangier’s history, from the end of the seventeenth century until the early twentieth. Three related topics will concern us here: first, examining how the hubus was used to create, organize, and maintain the Great Mosque and its surrounding urban fabric as the principal node of city life; second, locating the hubus in its late-nineteenth-century setting, in order to understand how it became a locus of controversy during Tangier’s transition to participating in a more global economy; and third, looking at how the hubus was dismantled after the coming of the Protectorate, as colonial interests came to dominate the mechanisms of municipal control.

THE HUBUS AS A VEHICLE OF URBAN GROWTH

In a society in which sacred and social were intertwined, the network of religious buildings in the Moroccan city formed the skeleton of the urban body. The most important means of maintaining this sacred infrastructure was the hubus, or public pious endowment. The hubus consisted of endowments of a permanent nature—usually real estate—that produced rents for the benefit of the institution for which they were designated. Individuals would donate property to a hubus in perpetuity, on the understanding that the rents derived from it would be used to support charity and good works. The supervisor (māzūr) of the hubus would take charge of the property, whether it was a house, a workshop, or a plot of land, and rent it at a reasonable rate. The revenues collected would provide a panoply of municipal services, such as religious instruction, caring for the sick, and even lighting the lamps of the mosques. The activities of the hubus permeated urban space, and, over time, a considerable amount of customary law developed in relation to the institution, making it the subject of lengthy discussions in the nawāzil, or collections of legal precedents that guided jurists in their deliberations.

One of the practices that grew up around the hubus, softening the rigid proscription against selling property placed in permanent trust, was the practice of istībāl (exchange) whereby a property given to the hubus might be exchanged for another privately owned piece of real estate in another part of the city. It was often used as a means of overcoming the “immobility” of the hubus by allowing entrepreneurs to amass contingent parcels and so increase their value. Another practice was called jalsa, or galsa (in the dialect), the “right of occupancy.” This right was seen as separate from the property itself, creating a distance between the charitable aspects of the hubus property and its commercial potential. The right of usufruct (manfa‘a) was retained by the holder of the galsa even if the property were sublet to a third party, often at many times the rent paid to the hubus. Through these various devices, hubus property became subject to market forces, even though the profit did not return to the hubus. The practice of exploiting hubus property for the advantage of a private individual instead of as a communal trust was widespread. It became a serious issue at the end of the nineteenth century, when Tangier was in full expansion and hubus property, regarded as “the least expensive and the most mobile of native properties,” became the target of foreign investors.

Malikite law was very strict about the separation between hubus revenues and the revenues belonging to the state treasury (bayt al-māl), emphasizing the local nature of the trust and the need for local control over spending its revenues. For example, the hubus of the Great Mosque, Tangier’s richest endowment, was considered by the people of Tangier as a communal fund designed to serve their interests, just as the treasury of the sultan was intended to serve the interests of the state. Nevertheless, from time to time sultans succeeded in seizing hubus funds for their own purposes, even though such interventions were regarded as intrusive. More acceptable in the popular mind was the sultan’s use of the hubus revenues to benefit local institutions, such as their use by Sultan Sulayman (r. 1793–1822) to make extensive repairs to the Great Mosque.
The state apparatus (or makhzan, as it is known in Morocco) also tried to insert itself into the administration of the hubus but met with only limited success. While in theory the nāzir of the hubus was an appointee of the qadi, or judge, who was in turn an appointee of the sultan, in reality other local interests had the main say in choosing this key officeholder. During the period between 1748 and 1914, of the nineteen men who held the position, thirteen had surnames of a distinctly local origin. Moreover, the ability of the nāzir to influence the dispensing of hubus funds was considerable. In Tangier, the documents creating a hubus were not very specific, giving the nāzir latitude in deciding how to spend its revenues.

Because of his wide decision-making powers, the nāzir became a primary actor in the shaping of urban space. The health of the hubus depended to a large extent on his adroitness in handling funds and in making shrewd investments that would allow the assets of the hubus to grow. Often the nāzir used hubus funds to buy additional property at low prices, or to combine properties and use them for new purposes, such as converting several adjoining residences into a single commercial property that would yield a higher rent. Moreover, his salary was tied to the revenues of the hubus, providing an incentive to show good results. Personal, familial, and class interests came into play in choosing the nāzir, and through association with him, the urban elite was able to exert its influence in deciding how the resources of the hubus would be used. The hubus conformed in many ways to Weber’s notion of a “solidary social relationship,” in which members of a corporate group engage in a kind of joint investment in the community, sharing the benefits and status that membership confers. In contrast to other local associations that were exclusivist or contentious, the hubus introduced an element of cohesiveness into the urban scene. Through it, city-dwellers not necessarily related by blood formed new solidarities, acquired a voice in urban affairs, provided for the collective future, and earned public praise for their good works.

Finally, we should take note of the relative importance of hubus property in terms of the total expanse of the Moroccan city. Geographer Georg Ströber estimates that at the turn of the century, the total amount of hubus-owned space in the Moroccan city averaged about forty to forty-five per cent of all urban properties, and included workshops, storerooms, and funduqs (hostelries). In Tangier, the hubus of the Great Mosque was the most important single property holder, managing scores of parcels, many of them located in the central business district. How this real estate was acquired, the purposes for which it was deployed, and who benefited from it are questions that we shall consider next.

THE BUILDING OF TANGIER: PHYSICAL AND SPIRITUAL DIMENSIONS

The circumstances of Tangier’s development promoted the development of a well-endowed public trust. The town itself is very ancient and the name Tangier—Tanja in Arabic—is probably Berber, from the word tan’ga, or “high place.” Under Rome and Byzantium, Tangier was a garrison town, protected from the hinterland by a wall penetrated by two gates, one leading to the countryside, the other to the port. The main street, the Decumanus, began at the port, bisected the town, and led to the gates opening to the hinterland. Today this street, now called the Siyaghin, or Street of the Goldsmiths, still forms the spine of old Tangier, demonstrating a remarkable continuity of urban form. At its halfway point, the street widened into a Forum (the Inner Market), where excavations have revealed a morass of Roman building materials. It is worth noting that the present city walls follow almost exactly the outlines of the Roman town, extending about 2200 meters in length and enclosing a surface area of about twenty-three hectares (fig. 1).

Early in the eighth century Tangier became an extension of the Umayyad Caliphate of Spain, and it remained within the Andalusian orbit throughout the late medieval period. Arab geographers al-Bakri (d. 1094) and al-Idrisi (d. 1165) both mentioned the city in their writings: al-Bakri called it Tanja al-baydâ’, or “Tangier the White,” and noted that it was littered with “ancient monuments,” including vaults, crypts, a bath, an aqueduct, and many large pieces of cut stone. Al-Idrisi was also impressed by its antiquity but remarked more on its current condition, saying that its markets and port were a hive of activity. As the Reconquista moved southward in the following centuries, Tangier along with other Mediterranean coastal towns felt the shock waves of the European advance. In the fifteenth century, Tangier was besieged over twenty-five times by the Portuguese, until it finally fell in 1471. Following this debacle, the local Muslim merchant class fled, commercial exchanges with the interior dried up, and cultural life faltered. Tangier,
Fig. 1. Street plan of Tangier ca. 1900, showing the location of the Great Mosque. (Drawn by Susan Gilson Miller)
like other coastal towns captured by the Portuguese, lost almost all of its Moroccan population and became a European military outpost. Similarly, nearby Ceuta (Sibta) had been an illustrious center of Islamic learning during the medieval period, but after its seizure by the Portuguese in 1415 it too underwent a precipitous decline from which it never fully recovered. Cut off from the interior, for the next two centuries Tangier and its neighboring towns were drawn into a European-dominated imperial system that stretched in the East as far as India, and in the West to the New World.21

The permanent implantation of Europeans on Moroccan soil unleashed an indigenous response that had deep roots in a cultural antipathy to non-Muslim invaders. The more the Portuguese entrenched themselves in the coastal towns like Tangier, the more Moroccan warriors (mujahidin), mostly from the nearby Rif mountains, acted like antibodies that coagulated around the nodes of European intrusion, sealing them off from the interior. The port towns of Tangier, Arzila, and Azzemour were known thereafter as thughūr, or outposts of the jihad, elevating their status in the popular mind to points of ideological confrontation. The mujahidin who gathered on the frontier were highly regarded for their bravery, zeal, and close association with Sufi shaykhs, who provided them with spiritual inspiration. In the sixteenth century, they posed a moral challenge to the ruling Sa’di sultans, who were regarded as lax in their responsibility to carry out the jihad.22 In the struggle over the liberation of Tangier, we see a prefiguring of what would become a long-standing tradition of tension between periphery and center, based not only on distance, but also on the differing viewpoint of a toughened and militant border people and that of a more compliant population in the heartland of the country.

Tangier passed to the English in 1662 as part of the dowry of Catherine de Braganza to Charles II; the Crown intended it to be a vital link in the naval empire of England, a point of resupply for its Mediterranean fleet. However, because of the town’s strategic vulnerability and the seemingly endless supply of Muslim warriors drawn to it, life in the garrison became the picture of hell—“an excrescence of the Earth,” according to diarist Samuel Pepys, who was present at its evacuation in 1684.23 Troubled by mounting expenses and the relentless pressure of the mujahidin, the English decided to “abandon the place to the Moors” after blowing up the extensive fortifications, built at great cost in both lives and money (fig. 2).24

The manner in which Tangier was rebuilt by its Moroccan conquerors determined its future character. Although not present at the retaking, the prestige-conscious Sultan Mawlay Isma’il (r. 1672–1727) claimed the victory for himself and immediately put his stamp on the town. The Arabic sources tell us that he wrote the governor, ‘Ali b. ‘Abd Allah al-Himlati, ordering him to place in trust all the lands surrounding the town. The revenues from these lands were to be used for the upkeep of the Great Mosque and for maintaining the city walls.25 Within the town itself, the governor was ordered to take over the citadel and rehabilitate it for the makhzan. Remaining parcels inside the town were to be sold “in accordance with the Shari‘a” to buyers who would retain full rights of ownership, creating a category of privately held land (mulk iyya) alongside the property of the makhzan and the hubus.26

The mujahidin found the town almost completely destroyed. They began by rebuilding the citadel (qusba), converting it into the centerpiece of a system of urban defense.27 Completely enclosed by a wall penetrated on three of its four sides by gates, the qusba was the seat of power and a city unto itself, prevailing over the town both physically and figuratively. It had its own water source, its own mosque and oratories (zawiya), and a residential quarter for soldiers. In addition, it contained two prisons for men and a third for women, a courtroom where the governor dispensed justice, a treasury house (bayt al-mal), the palace of the sultan, the house of the governor and his deputy, stables, and a parade ground (mishwahr).28 The qusba was the symbol of the makhzan’s presence in the town, and during royal visits to Tangier, the sultan made it his headquarters. Once a week, after the Friday prayer, the governor would appear on the parade ground to be greeted by his troops in a formal display of power. The parade ground was also the setting for the public manifestations of violence, such as canings and even the occasional execution, that reinforced respect for rule.29

Religious sites also sprang up, emblematic of the spiritual fervor that accompanied the retaking of the town. Foremost among them was the shrine of Sidi Muhammad al-Hajj al-Baqqal, known as Bu ‘Araqiyya, a sharif, Sufi, and mujahid from the tribe of Ghazawa in the Jbala, who took part in the final battles for Tangier. His qubba (shrine-tomb) just outside the medina
Fig 2. English Tangier (1661–84), from a series of etchings by Bohemian engraver Wenceslaus Hollar in 1669. (Courtesy of the Tangier American Legation Museum, Tangier, Morocco)

The wall is still the most venerated saintly site in Tangier, and he is commonly referred to as Tangier’s patron saint. According to popular belief, his family, the shūrafā’ of the Baqqalin, had for generations taken a prominent role fighting the Christians in northern Morocco, thereby burnishing their saintly credentials with qualities of militancy, piety, and sacrifice. Sidi Muhammad was recognized by his small knitted cap, called the ‘araqīyya. His modesty and humility endeared him to the people of Tangier as well as to strangers, and his tomb was a ḥurūm, or sanctuary for fugitives from authority.

Sidi Muhammad was also known as musāyafat al-huǧjaj, the “dispatcher of pilgrims,” and for outsiders, his shrine was a point of orientation in the strange city. It was marked by a sacred grove of trees and became a gathering place for pilgrims from all parts of the country preparing to make the hajj. In the late nineteenth century Tangier was the principal Moroccan port for departure to the East, and in the pilgrimage season the town was filled with strangers camping out and awaiting passage. On their return, their first steps on Moroccan soil took them to the tomb of Sidi Muhammad, where they would rest for a night before removing the special clothing of the pilgrim and starting their journey homeward.

As Jacques Berque has noted, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Maghribi cities emerged out of the presence of saintly types who, like Sidi Muhammad al-Hajj, were associated with a given locale. Nearly every major urban center had a foundation myth in which a holy man played a part. In Tangier, the spirit of the mujāhidīn prevailed, and Sidi Muhammad al-Hajj represented to the popular mind the qualities that signified what it meant to be Tanjawi: piety, simplicity, religious fervor, and, above all, hospitality to strangers. The character of Tangier, bridge to the outside and funnel to the interior, began to fill out in the years
immediately following the reconquest through stories implanted in popular memory and through personalities such as Sidi Muhammad’s. The oldest document in the hibus register of Tangier, dating from 1714, is the charter (waqfiyya) establishing the shrine that would become the center of his cult. Extensive gardens surrounding his tomb were also set aside as hibus, and this sacred ground eventually became the most prestigious cemetery in Tangier. Fees collected from the families of those buried there helped support the saint’s numerous descendants.34

The basic organization of urban space into categories of sacred, official, and profane was established within a generation of the reconquest. The foremost concern of the new rulers of Tangier was to restore the Muslim character of the town and provide for its defense. Once this was accomplished, civil society took over, filling up the rest of the urban landscape. Commercial streets developed around the old qaysariyya, or shopping area, near the central forum and the mosque; a marketplace receiving goods from the countryside grew up outside the main gate; Tanneries were built near the shore; cemeteries were established on top of the old Roman necropolis; caravansaries appeared. The Roman Decumanus became the main street, now called the Siyaghin after the many goldsmiths and moneychangers whose shops lined its edges. This was the commercial axis of Tangier, the trunk from which the residential neighborhoods radiated.35 The Riffian mountaineers who had participated in the retaking of the city moved into the residential quarters and rebuilt them to suit their needs. Usually organized around a local zawiyah or mosque, the quarters eventually took on the typical inward-looking, random quality of the Moroccan neighborhood.36

However, Tangier was frequently ravaged by devastating epidemics, and its population grew very slowly; inside the walls there were still open spaces until late in the nineteenth century.37

Although Tangier at the end of the nineteenth century was decidedly different from Tangier of the late seventeenth, its underlying character still referred back to the religious enthusiasm with which it was refounded. Its elite were descendents of warriors and shuara’ who had engaged in its recapture, and its principal institutions were those established in the fervor of re-Islamization. Tangier was a Muslim city, in the sense that religious considerations formed the matrix out of which a civic identity was composed. Most basic services were dependent in some way or another on the hibus, itself a projection of religiously informed values. To elaborate on this point, we shall follow the story of the Great Mosque, located at the center of the city and the richest endowment in Tangier, tracing its function as a pole of attraction where various components of the urban infrastructure converged.

THE GREAT MOSQUE AS SYMBOLIC CENTER

Its Monumentality

The story is told that one of the first acts of the Riffian soldiers who entered Tangier was to reclaim the former site of the mosque. According to historian Muhammad Skirij, they found a church where the mosque had been and were eager to pray in it once again. The reappropriation of the building after its long interlude in foreign hands created the conditions for a revived spiritual center toward which the rest of the city reoriented itself over time.38 This passage not only announced the return of lost space to the Islamic ecumene; it also demonstrated the triumph of Islamic cultural values over alien ones at the very margins of the state, where they were most vulnerable to European influence. The reclaiming of the mosque became emblematic of the recapture of the city as a whole—that is, a major moral and psychological victory after centuries of foreign rule. Yet despite its symbolic importance, the structure itself remained a simple prayer hall for more than a century. The Spanish traveler Ali Bey visited Tangier early in the nineteenth century and described the mosque as follows:

…it is rude and plain...composed of a yard surrounded by arcades, and opposite its gate are several rows of parallel arches. The front is entirely plain, and the minaret is placed at the left corner. The arches and the roof are very low; the timberwork, which is very clumsy, is open, and the construction in general...very indifferent. Having observed that the mosque had no water for drinking, I caused a large jar to be fastened by masons to the side of the gate, with a vessel to drink with attached to it; I endowed this establishment with sufficient means to keep it supplied with water....39

Shortly after Ali Bey’s visit, the edifice was totally rebuilt by Sultan Sulayman, who visited Tangier in 1815 and was shocked by the rude appearance of the first mosque to be seen when landing on Moroccan soil. Reconstruction was completed two years later, according to the inscription carved over the door opposite the mihrab. Sultan Sulayman had the outer
walls and minaret completely rebuilt, bringing artisans from other towns, for the working population of Tangier—made up largely of tradesmen, port workers, and makhzan personnel—lacked the skilled craftsmen needed to complete the job (fig. 3). 40

The sultans of Morocco usually resided in the distant cities of the interior and rarely visited the town. But when they did, they often left behind reminders of their passing by reshaping the mosque complex.41 Sultan Sulayman’s renovations were the first of several remakings intended not only to enhance the monumental qualities of the place but also to send an explicit message about the nature of makhzan power. This sultan was the champion of orthodoxy as opposed to the popular and heterodox tradition of the Sufi brotherhoods that posed a permanent challenge to royal authority. While other mosques and oratories in Tangier represented parochial interests of the brotherhoods, the Great Mosque stood as the symbol of “official” Islam. 42 Its renovation affirmed its status as the religious epicenter of Tangier by associating it with the ruling ‘Alawi dynasty and by establishing its primacy over other mosques of the khitba.43 The conjuncture of sultanic authority with local tradition through the process of renovation was the means used by the central power to reinforce its symbolic dominance over urban space.

Its Administration

The administration of the mosque was dependent on the revenues of the hubus, which grew through the generosity of Tangier’s richest families. While lesser endowments came and went over the centuries to benefit other causes, the hubus established to maintain the Great Mosque and its appendages endured as the most important and wealthiest in the town. Gifts of land, houses, shops, gardens, and even salt pits and astrolabes enriched its holdings.44 When the hubus was appropriated in the middle of the eighteenth century by the reigning sultan, Tanjawis quickly responded with an outpouring of fresh donations. 45 Careful manage-
ment also added to its wealth. Sometimes the näzir’s of the hubus acted as entrepreneurs, using the revenues of the trust to acquire new property. At other times, they exchanged hubus property for other property of equal value, so that houses could be enlarged, shops extended, and even, in one case, a synagogue built. A 1788 list of hubus property shows that parcels often clustered together, especially near the city center, suggesting a deliberate pattern of acquisition. Twenty parcels in all are mentioned: six are on the periphery of the Great Mosque, three are attached to al-funduq al-jadid (the new hostel) found on the Siyaghin, and five are located in the suq of the tailors near the Inner Market, all prime commercial locations. In 1811, the näzir used hubus funds to construct three shops in a funduq located next to the Great Mosque. These shops were built in two stories to increase their profitability. In addition, the hubus maintained the municipal water system, at least one large funduq and several smaller ones, butcher shops, private residences, workrooms, and storerooms. The water system alone was a considerable undertaking, requiring constant upkeep, technicians who knew the layout of the pipes and could manage their repair, and a fleet of human water carriers who were the principal means of water distribution throughout the city.

How decisions were made about investments, projects to be undertaken, and goals to be achieved with hubus assets is not known exactly, but some general ideas can be inferred from the sources. Kinship and social ties played a significant part and certain family names recur in the list of known näzirs from the eighteenth century through the early twentieth (see Appendix). Those responsible for managing the hubus shared a single worldview, a common education, a shared set of interests and values, and a sense of duty toward serving the public good. In this small town of frequent face-to-face encounters, where the Muslim elite intermarried extensively, engaged in joint business ventures, and came from similar rural origins, the forces favoring consensus were strong. Dishonesty and breaches of conduct from administrators of the hubus elicited sharp and collective retribution. When one näzir left unexplained debts in the accounts after his death in 1829, his family house was seized by the hubus as compensation; when another näzir died leaving a huge debt of 627 mithqāls, his property was confiscated and his inheritors thrown in jail. Oversight operated through informal networks of social obliga-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Salary (1809)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Imam of the Qasba Mosque</td>
<td>60 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(and if he teaches law and grammar, an additional 40)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher (of religious sciences)</td>
<td>30 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher (of the students, or tanba)</td>
<td>30 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam of the zeitiyah</td>
<td>40 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam of the zeitiyah Nasiriyya</td>
<td>25 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher of the liyā’ of al-Ghazzali</td>
<td>30 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To a pensioner</td>
<td>20 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 muezzins (prayer callers) at 15 üqiyyas each</td>
<td>90 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 muezzins of the Qasba Mosque at 25 each</td>
<td>50 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muezzin of the zeitiyah Nasiriyya</td>
<td>30 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 secretaries</td>
<td>30 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The näzir of the hubus and his deputy</td>
<td>60 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The collector of rents</td>
<td>20 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>720 üqiyyas</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One hundred years later, in 1907, the expenditures of the hubus had grown considerably. The annual budget was now over 20,000 pesetas, much of it used to support the personnel of the Great Mosque, including three imams, fifty-five students, twelve muezzins, four notaries who assisted the qadi, and an official clockkeeper (muwaqqit). In addition to teachers, qadis, and imams, the hubus paid for students to recite the prayers. It also served as the depository for a large collection of manuscripts and books that were stored in a separate room of the mosque, including Qur’ans, commentaries, books on Hadith, Islamic law, grammar, rhetoric, poetry, and belles-lettres, travel accounts, chronicles, and lives of saints. In an age when books were manuscripts, so costly that they were gifts worthy of a sultan, the library lent prestige to the mosque and served as a magnet for the educated elite of the town.

**Its Surroundings**

The Great Mosque was a pole in another sense. Due to its location in the heart of the medina close by the
Inner Market, swarms of people passed by its doors at all hours of the day. Like the Umayyad mosque in Damascus, the Great Mosque of Tangier was the only large covered space within the walls of the old city.

The mosque was a place of meeting, with people lounging under its arches and convening in small study circles around a respected teacher. Public ceremonies were held there, and the Friday sermon, or khutba, was an opportunity for the gathering of the male population of Tangier. The khutba was pronounced in other mosques of the city, but even people who ordinarily prayed elsewhere would make the effort to come to the Great Mosque to hear the final sermon of the day, according to Skirij. The oath of allegiance (bay‘a) to a new sultan was read there, as were letters and proclamations from the court. For the poorer classes, it was a place to have a drink or take a nap. For the large Jewish population of Tangier, it was an especially sensitive spot that had to be passed several times daily as they moved from their houses in the Jewish quarter to the customs house and the port. Before the nineteenth century, Jews were compelled to remove their garb to the customs house and the port. Before the nineteenth century, Jews were compelled to remove their garb to the customs house and the port.

Extensions of the mosque enhanced the nodal qualities of the site, drawing people into its orbit through the services it provided. In Skirij’s day, the qadi’s court was across the street in a small house with a raised step on which the official sat. In front of the house was a porch for hearing cases, where the disputants or their agents (when women were involved) and the court ushers gathered. A wire screen separated this porch from the street to protect litigants from the stares of the curious. The qadi handled cases involving family law, while the pasha or his deputy judged criminal cases. Next to the house of the qadi, and an extension of it, was the house of the muwaqqit (clockkeeper) of the mosque. Originally built for a sharif who held the position in the eighteenth century, this house was connected to the mosque by an overhead passage, so that the muwaqqit could conveniently check the clocks in the mosque without having to go into the street below. This property also belonged to the hubus, as did a house on the other side of the qadi’s inhabited by the distinguished shura‘a‘ of Jabal ‘Alam, whose influence extended throughout the entire North.

Next to the house of the shura‘a‘ was the māristān, a hospital for the mentally ill that was one of the principal charities supported by the hubus. Then came a small house for washing the dead, usually those who had the misfortune of dying far from home. The presence of this service suggests that the number of strangers in Tangier was considerable. Finally, opposite the qibla wall of the mosque on the main street was a school (madrasa) built in the eighteenth century under orders of Sultan Muhammad b. ‘Abd Allah, using funds from the hubus. In addition to sheltering students from the countryside who came to Tangier to study, it also housed the main water supply of the mosque (fig. 4).

This concentration of buildings and social functions at the lower end of the medina created a dense node of activity that was the nucleus of town life. Here the physical and the social environments reinforced each other with a clarity that was inescapable. The mosque area was a place where Tanjawis mingled, regardless of their class or religious orientation. It was also a place of contact with strangers and the world beyond Tangier. With its court, school, hospital, and water system, it was a product of the agency of the hubus. Responding to the rhythms of the ritual clock and physically bounded on all sides, premodern Tangier was the arena for a total life where secular and religious strands were so tightly interwoven as to become indistinguishable. There was little to intrude on the widely held belief that Tangier was a universe in which all things existed. But in the early twentieth century, as new ideas, architectures, and technologies from Europe entered the town, that sense of wholeness began to break down. Continuing to view Tangier through the prism of the hubus, let us examine the processes that began to undermine the civic coherence engendered by the public trust.

**DISMEMBERING THE HUBUS**

The assault on the hubus of Tangier as an organizing mechanism of urban life began sometime in the middle of the nineteenth century, when its rich assets were sequestered by the state to cover debts incurred during Morocco’s first unsuccessful colonial war with Spain in 1859–60. Used to help pay the huge indemnity Spain imposed on the Moroccan government, these funds were never returned to the hubus of Tangier. With no funds held in reserve for the upkeep of property, and the real value of rents dropping because of severe inflation, the treasury was emptied and property began to fall into disrepair. The former vigor with which endowments were administered disappeared, no new
The HUBUS of the Great Mosque of Tangier as an agent of urban change

Fig. 4. A ground plan of the Great Mosque and its surroundings about 1917, after the manuscript of M. Skirij. (Drawn by Susan Gilson Miller)
gifts were made, and even the quality of administrators seemed to diminish amid accusations of incompetence and dishonesty. However, the decrease in revenue does not fully explain the decline of the hubus and its subsequent restructuring after the onset of colonial rule. The confrontation between stricter European concepts of municipal order and the less formal intimacy of the Moroccan city had profound repercussions, both on the people of Tangier and on traditional institutions such as the hubus. The negative results of this encounter were not felt at once but rather accumulated slowly over time, working their way into all aspects of daily life, until the face of the city was changed beyond recognition.

The Aftermath of War

In Tangier, the Spanish war paradoxically introduced a boom in which a handful of entrepreneurs profited greatly from increased trade, giving rise for the first time to a small but energetic middle class. Treaty relations with the European powers stimulated commerce with the exterior, bringing a flood of manufactured goods into the city, while raw materials were exported through the harbor of Tangier, which for a short time became Morocco’s chief port. These changes were felt in streets that filled with foreigners bent on getting rich, merchants from the interior looking for quick gain, and hordes of country folk seeking relief from persistent crop failures. Meanwhile tourism grew, and with it the need for hotels to accommodate visitors of every social class, from penniless fortune hunters to the wealthy patricians who came to hunt, ride, or simply find relief from Europe’s sooty winter in the crystalline air of Tangier. Property became the object of intense speculation, as Europeans and wealthy Moroccans competed for building space. A drawing from the early nineteenth century shows areas of still-open space within the walls; in an image from late in the century, those spaces have disappeared, swallowed up by new construction (figs. 5 and 6). Along with mortgages and credit, property became part of an energetic capitalism, changing hands frequently until it was concentrated in the hands of a small group of wealthy individuals.

These transformations were also apparent in the cityscape, as the medina became increasingly invaded not only by Europeans but also by European architectural styles, in a madness to build. Cafés dansants, restaurants, bars, casinos, banks, post offices, and travel agencies grew up around the commercial center in the shadow of the Great Mosque. Residences built by Europeans and nouveau riche Moroccans had little in common with the sobriety of the traditional Arab house, whose restrained embellishments were always confined to the interior. In these newer structures, ostentation was the rule: gargoyles and baroque ornamentation sprouted from the rooftops, cohabiting with the plaster trimmings of the Belle Époque style, in a chaotic mix that matched the heterogeneity of the streets below. Multistoried dwellings vied for superiority with the minaret of the Great Mosque, the profane challenging the sacred for mastery of the skyline. Hotels boasted overhanging balconies that peered insolently into the private parts of nearby houses in a clear violation of Islamic building codes, while everywhere new construction demonstrated a flamboyance that was the inverse of the traditional. Meanwhile, sharp tradesmen bought up strings of tiny shops on the main street in order to convert them into department stores with names like Galeries Lafayette and La Belle de Paris, where the latest products of European ingenuity were sold. The transformation of the city center was in full swing, and the pressure on land was great. Once the small supply of privately held property was exhausted, demands for space were forwarded by politically influential entrepreneurs to the makhzan, which responded by looking to the rich holdings of the hubus for relief.

Although in theory the hubus was a local fund and not part of the state treasury, it was not entirely beyond the sultan’s reach. In addition to raiding its cash reserves from time to time, the ruler could exercise the right of tanfidha, or the granting of a hubus property to a former official in return for service, or to a sharif in order to improve relations with the religious elite. These grants helped shore up the social hierarchies that gave stability to the urban order. But when hubus property became the object of foreign cupidity, that was another matter. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, an indebted makhzan increasingly intervened in the management of the hubus by authorizing transactions that involved unequal exchanges of property or outright sales from the public trust. Apologetically at first, and later more aggressively, successive sultans beginning with Mawlay Hassan I (r. 1873–94) ordered the sale of hubus properties to members of religiously subordinate but economically powerful interest groups, such as local Jewish bankers or Christian diplomats. Although such transac-
THE HUBUS OF THE GREAT MOSQUE OF TANGIER AS AN AGENT OF URBAN CHANGE

Fig 5. View of Tangier from the Field of Sacrifices. Anonymous drawing, 1826. (Tangier American Legation Museum, Tangier, Morocco)

Fig. 6. View of Tangier from the south. Anonymous drawing, late nineteenth century. (Tangier American Legation Museum, Tangier, Morocco)
tions were supposedly legal if carried out in conformity with the law, they were not viewed that way by popular opinion. This interference angered many Tanjaws, who saw the mingling of hubus funds with those of the state treasury as a misuse of the pious trust. In retrospect, it is clear that this development was a response to fiscal crisis and part of the larger movement of capital that preceded the colonial takeover, in which ever-widening sectors of the economy were wrested from native control and diverted to European hands. The slipping away of the hubus properties was simply one more indicator of the extent to which capitalism had penetrated “into every pore” of the local economy, in a process aptly described by historian Mohammed Ennaji.69

In spite of these infringements, the hubus of Tangier continued to function as an independent corporate entity well into the second decade of the twentieth century. Registers were maintained and improvements were regularly carried out, according to Michaux-Bel laire, who noted in 1921 that the hubus of Tangier, although “much diminished,” still controlled “a great number of properties.”70 The vitality of the institution was under siege but by no means exhausted.

Under the Protectorate

The demise of the hubus as an independent agent of urban change came in the second decade of the twentieth century, when Tangier was more fully integrated into a system of colonial rule. Following the division of Morocco into French and Spanish protectorates in 1912, Tangier was given a de facto separate status because of its strategic importance to the competing European powers. Surrounded by territory awarded to Spain, it eventually became an international city in 1925, governed by a commission composed of representatives from Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and, later, the United States.71 As colonial administrators became better informed about the institutions regulating native life, they recognized the pivotal centrality of the hubus, and launched an attack aimed at curtailing its role in shaping urban space. Accusations that the hubus was corrupt, mismanaged, badly in need of reform, and a “caisse noire” used by “enemies of the state” to undermine authority began to appear in the colonial press as early as 1907.72 A complete reorganization was called for and actually took place after 1912 in the French Zone. It involved centralizing the control of hubus assets, bureaucratizing its personnel, reorganizing the system of collecting rents, and “liquidating” properties that stood in the way of urban expansion. The activities of the hubus were confined to the support of religious instruction, good works, and relief for the “misery” of the masses.73

The institution of the international regime in 1925 also had important consequences for the municipal administration of Tangier. Most aspects of local governance were subsumed under the authority of the international committee of control, but at French insistence, certain sectors remained under the sultan’s sovereignty through his local representative, the Mendoub. Included in this portfolio was the hubus, now reorganized along lines conforming to the changes made in the French Zone a few years earlier. Although not exactly “dismembered,” its importance was reduced and many of its former functions were redistributed to other municipal services.74 Hubus properties that stood in the way of urban development were seized and sold, and the nāzīr became an employee of the municipality.

Parallel with these changes came major alterations in the disposition of urban space. By 1920, a ville nouvelle was under construction, laid out by French architect Henri Prost, who also planned the new quarters of Casablanca, Rabat, Meknes, and Fez.75 With this expansion outside the old walls, the Great Mosque and its appendages ceased to be the pole of the city, and the medina became a museum of decaying buildings and crumbling infrastructure, admired by tourists and historians but not to be lived in. It was not merely coincidental that the decline in the physical integrity of the medina took place concurrently with the dilapidation of those civic institutions that had once kept the old city alive.

IN CONCLUSION

A close examination of the visual and historical record shows that traditional urban institutions such as the hubus provided a framework for civic order premised on the principle of safeguarding the welfare of the community. In this respect, the Moroccan city had much in common with the premodern European city, even though the two grew out of different cultural matrices. As Jacques Le Goff points out, the essential quality of the reborn European polis of the twelfth century was “restraint, punctuality, order, a use of each day’s time which regulated both work and leisure,”
and the sense that the town was “an island of serenity and peace.” These elements were also the goals of urban culture in the Maghrib, where towns like Tangier grew up around a core of disciplined civility that stood in sharp contrast to what city dwellers believed to be the wild and unpredictable condition of the countryside. The knot of commercial, juridical, and spiritual activities concentrated at the city center was the hallmark of urban life, creating an aura of austerity and moral restraint that acted as a barrier against the excesses of an unbridled nature.

How such a clear and unambiguous framework of civic life went unnoticed until recently is something of a mystery. Perhaps the sources of authority in the Moroccan city, with their spiritual and saintly origins, were occulted from eyes more accustomed to seeing power inscribed in tangible structures such as mayoralities, governing councils, police forces, and systems of taxation. It was easy for critics to misread the intentions of a social organization founded on religious values, to confuse spirituality with fanaticism, and to misunderstand the connection between civic pride and the performance of sacred duty. Motivated by an ideology of possession barely masked behind a rhetoric of reform, colonial policymakers (and the scholars who put their science in the service of empire) sought to redistribute traditional urban functions to more manageable units of control. A handful of thoughtful observers among them had reservations about the process of dismemberment, and cautioned in vain against dissipating the spiritual capital of the city. Despite their warning, the operation went ahead largely unopposed, leading ultimately to the creation at the state level of a denatured religious institution that was the captive of secular authority. Among the victims of this radical surgery was the hubus, which lost its ability to serve as a vehicle for expressing complex attitudes relating to civic pride and local identity. As a result, the Moroccan city was deprived of a critical element in its spiritual and social life.

The story of Tangier is offered here as a case study in the transition from a premodern to a modern urbanism. The small size of the town, its situation on the “frontier” of Islam, and the conditions of conquest and reconquest that so deeply marked its character are a few of the principal components of the specificity of this narrative. Nevertheless, there are general themes that link it with wider discourses relative to Muslim cities. For example, our main source, the Riyāḍ al-Baḥja of Muhammad Skirij, is biased toward privileging the centralizing role of the state and its dominance over urban space. In so doing, it makes the case for a certain idea of urban form, namely, the primacy of the Great Mosque with the city centripetally organized around it. Coincidentally, this idea of the centrality of the mosque was also a key element in the discussion of Orientalist scholars, who made it a sine qua non of the paradigmatic Islamic city. But this centralized focus, as we have seen, was a more nuanced and complex phenomenon than an earlier generation of Western scholarship would allow. Indeed, as a close reading of the local sources shows, the institution of the hubus that maintained the mosque and provided for its continuity over time was a major repository of social capital, offering the people of Tangier a sturdy web of relatedness that tied the community together.

Whether similar conditions existed in other cities of the Maghrib, or in the greater Muslim world, is still an open question. Further study of the waqf and its fiscal and normative underpinnings is needed before we can make sweeping statements about the relationship between pious endowments, urban morphology, and the tenor of urban life. Yet the decisive influence of the hubus in figuring the face of Tangier is a clear and unequivocal demonstration of the agency of deeply rooted Islamic social institutions in shaping the urban form. Through its story, we are reminded of the power of cultural practices and their ability to lend meaning to the material world.

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APPENDIX

NĀZRĪS OF THE HUBUS OF THE GREAT MOSQUE OF TANGIER, 1748–1914

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NAME</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1748</td>
<td>'Abd al-'Azīz b. 'Umar b. Yusuf al-Amarti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750</td>
<td>'Umar b. Muhammad u Sidhum al-'Abd Razzaqi</td>
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<tr>
<td>1755</td>
<td>Bu 'Azza b. Ahmad al-Zaydi</td>
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<td>1757</td>
<td>Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Susi</td>
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<tr>
<td>1788</td>
<td>Taher b. Muhammad Laghmish</td>
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<tr>
<td>1790</td>
<td>'Abd Salam Bu 'Azza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1791</td>
<td>Muhammad b. Dinar al-Tamsamani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1811</td>
<td>Tayyib b. Hajj al-Ayashi al-Zaydi</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
1836 Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Tamsamani
Ahmad Shashun
1849 'Abd Salam Ahrudi
1858 'Abd al-Karim Ahradan
1867 Ahmad al-Mufarraj
1879 Hajj Qaddur Ahradan
1884 'Abd al-Qadir Ahradan
1901 Muhammad b. Ahmad Mufarraj 'Allal b.
Hajj al-Arbi al-Mufarraj
1914 M'hammad b. M'hammad al-Rakina


NOTES


5. Two distinct categories of waqf are permissible under Islamic law. The family endowment (waqf aghi) protects an inheritance against fragmentation by regulating its transfer within the family; the public endowment (waqf khawar) provides for the upkeep of a mosque, zawiyā, hospital, school, or other public institution. This second type is the subject of our concern.


8. Sometimes only four or five percent of the total rent actually returned to the hubus, according to H. Gaillard, La réorganisation du gouvernement marocain (Paris: Comité de l’Afrique Française, 1916), 38. See also L. Milliot, Démembrements du hubus: mensa’a, gēs, gœuls, zinā, istihqār (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1918), 38–45; E. Michaux-Bellaire, “La Guelsa et le Gza,” RMM 13, 2 (1911): 197–248.


11. This was in 1815, according to Muhammad Skirij, author of Riyyād al-bahja fº akhb¸r Þanja (henceforth Riyyād), vol. 2, 10). All subsequent page references are to vol. 2 of this extensive work, which includes a topographical history of Tangier. Skirij is the chief chronicler of Tangier, although his compendium has never been published and exists only in manuscript form. He was a fuqā’i (teacher) and an ‘alim (scholar) in government employ, which perhaps explains his interest in emphasizing the role of the state in local affairs. He died in 1965.

12. See Appendix, above. Al-Moutabassir, “Les habous,” says there were two nāzīrs of the hubus, both appointed by the qadi, but also “invested” by the sultan.


18. The width of Tangier’s main street was striking in comparison with the principal streets of other Middle Eastern cities, such as Jerusalem and Aleppo, where over time the thoroughfares were narrowed by encroaching shop fronts. See H. Kennedy, “From Polis to Medina: Urban Change in Late Antique and Early Islamic Syria,” Past and Present 106 (1985): 3–27.
23. Pepys went to Tangier as an official of the Admiralty. The quote is from Budgett Meakin, The Land of the Moors (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1901), 129.
25. The original proclamation was dated 10/5 (1684), according to Skirji (`Riâd, 9). It exempted a few “men of the makhzaw” from payment, most likely muḥādhīn who were being compensated for their role in the reconquest. Michaux-Bellaire, Les hubs de Tangier, 120–22.
29. Skirji, `Riâd, 6.
31. The tomb was also a sanctuary, or hûrûm. On the role of the hûrûm in Moroccan history, see M. El Mansour, “The Sanctuary (Hûrûm) in Precolonial Morocco,” in Rahma Bourqia and Susan G. Miller, In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power, and Politics in Morocco (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 49–73.
34. Michaux-Bellaire, Les hubs de Tanger, 89.
37. Tangier was frequently swept by epidemics that usually arrived with pilgrims returning from the hajj. After 1850, the population increased dramatically, quadrupling between the years 1858 (10,000) and 1904 (40,000). The 1858 figure comes from L. N. Godard, Description et histoire du Maroc (Paris: C. Tanera, 1860), 57; the 1904 figure from A. René-Leclerc, Le Maroc septentrional: Souvenirs et impressions (été 1904) (Algiers: Imp. Algérienne, 1905), 63.
40. The Skirji ms. and Ali Bey seem to differ on the extent to which the mosque was rebuilt. Skirji says that Sultan Sulayman actually “built” the minaret and minbar; Ali Bey said that the mosque already had both elements, and his sketch shows a small minaret: Atlas des voyages d’Ali Bey El Abassi (Barcelona: L’Avenc, 1892), 5. The most plausible explanation is that Sultan Sulayman’s renovation entailed a complete remaking of the mosque. The inscription over the door says that the sultan amara bi-binâ`, “ordered [the mosque] to be built.” See El Mghari-Baïda, “Les Mosquées à khotba,” 139, and Skirji, `Riâd, 10.
41. Sultan Sîdî Muhammad b. ‘Abd Allah (r. 1757–90) built the madrass, or mosque school, adjacent to the main prayer hall, according to Skirji (`Riâd, 22); Muhammad V (r. 1927–53, 1955–62) rebuilt the mid’d’a, a room for performing ritual ablutions, according to ‘A. Ibn Zaydân, al-Durar al-fîkhira bi-ma‘ṭâr al-mulîk al-‘Alawîyîn bi-Fûs al-zâhirî (Rabat: al-Math’â al-‘Itqîsâdiyya, 1937), 196; King Hassan II (r. 1962–99) redesigned the mihrab and extended the mosque to make room for a women’s section. See M. Métalsy, “La grande mos-
The fact that there were several mosques in the town ranged in a hierarchical order, including several mosques of the **khutba**, reinforced the importance of the city, according to Islamic jurists. The relationship between the Friday mosque and the status of a town as a **misr al-jami'** (an “all-embracing town”) in Hanafite law is discussed in Baber Johansen, “The All-Embracing Town and Its Mosques: al-Misr al-Gâmi’,” in idem, *Contingency in a Sacred Law: Legal and Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 77–106. Johansen argues that according to Hanafite law a town is distinguished from the countryside in several ways, among them being the hierarchical classification of its places of worship, a notion that seems to be echoed in Skirij’s discussion. Furthermore, there was a close tie between religion and politics in the choice of a Friday mosque. Hanafite jurists argued that the Friday mosque was associated with the political authority, and the representatives of the regime were obliged to attend the Friday prayer as a “moral duty.” Having one mosque meant there was one “politic-religious center” in the town, which jurists preferred to a situation of proliferation. But their view did not predominate in reality, for in the great cities of the East such as Cairo and Istanbul, more than one Friday mosque was the norm from a very early date. (“The All-Embracing Town,” 99–100.) Even in the case of Tangier, according to Skirij, it seems that there were several options of where to perform the Friday prayer, and it was up to the individual worshipper to make a choice. In fact, Skirij’s vision of a unified town with all the people praying together in a single mosque on Friday may well have been more a normative wish than a statement of fact.

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[282] Susan Gilson Miller
70. Michaux-Bellaire, _Tanger et sa zone_, 298.
71. Tangier remained an international zone (except for a short period during World War II when Spain took control) until 1956, when it was integrated into the newly independent Kingdom of Morocco.
72. See, for example, al-Moutabassir, “Les habous,” 332. Michaux-Bellaire goes so far as to say that the _hubus_ funds “constituted independent treasuries that allowed for insurrections and for pretenders to struggle against the established power...” (“Les biens,” 443). Other critics were A. Le Chatelier (see his “Introduction” to Michaux-Bellaire’s _Les habous de Tanger_, 1–3), Milliot, _Démembrements_, and Gaillard, _La réorganisation_, cited above. The context of these attacks was the frenzied environment surrounding the early days of colonial scientific exploration, which in itself was an initial stage of political domination. See E. Burke, _III, “The First Crisis of Orientalism,”_ in _Connaissances du Maghreb_, ed. J.-C. Vatin (Paris: CNRS, 1984): 213–26.
75. Prost supposedly sketched the plan for Tangier while flying over the city in an airplane. Unpublished autobiography (typescript) by Ernest Waller, former head of “Rentistica,” in my possession.
78. On the question of political authority in Morocco, see Bourqia and Miller, _In the Shadow of the Sultan_, introduction, and, in the same work, Abdellah Hammoudi, “The Reinvention of Dîr al-mulk: The Moroccan Political System and Its Legitimation,” 129–75.
79. See especially Michaux-Bellaire, “Les biens,” 457. While not necessarily an advocate of native control, Michaux-Bellaire understood better than others the importance of institutions such as the _hubus_ to the workings of the urban system.