Cairo, an Islamic Metropolis

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The seed from which the modern metropolis of Cairo sprang dates in reality from the time of the Arab conquest. The ancient historic significance of the site and the continuity of settlement there from earliest times indicate that some great city would have emerged in the general location. The point where the wide Delta, embraced by the two downstream branches of the river, meets the narrowing Nile upstream has always endowed Cairo’s site with enormous strategic advantages. There, and only there, could the soft underbelly of the Delta be defended against invaders, and there, and only there, could the source of the upstream floodwaters be protected.

The site, therefore, had been the choice of all successive rulers of the Nile Valley, who, since Pharaonic times, had built their cities in the vicinity. But modern Cairo is not just ‘any’ city; it is a unique city. The arrival of Islam in the seventh century, while it did not interrupt geographic continuity, created a marked break in cultural continuity. Contemporary Cairo stands pre-eminently as a Muslim city, bearing only slight traces of the physical and cultural imprint of its Pharaonic and Greco-Roman precursors.

The message of Islam was first brought to Egypt in AD 639 by Arab forces under ‘Amr ibn al-‘As, the commander who eventually conquered an Egypt much weakened by battles between contending Persian and Byzantine armies. By 641, his army had advanced to the northern edge of Babylon (in Egypt), a partially fortified port on the Nile. ‘Amr had received instructions from Caliph Umar to establish his headquarters in the country’s interior and to protect his land lifeline to Arabia. The strategic site of Cairo was his inevitable choice, both because of its central location and because it was on the firmer eastern bank of the Nile. This assured his access to Arabia by land and, later, by water as well, through the old Red Sea Canal (renamed Khalij Misri) which ‘Amr reopened in 643. This preference for the eastern bank sealed forever the fate of Memphis (on the western shore of the river) and, until the present century, led to greater and greater concentrations on that bank. To understand how the Nile formerly constituted the insurmountable barrier that it no longer presents, a brief description of the regional terrain and of the changes in the course of that river is essential. Given the narrow cone of alluvial land on the eastern shore, wedged between the old channel of the Nile and the high ridges that divide it from the desert, the only path for urban expansion from Babylon was to its north (see fig. 1).
During the seven months that 'Amr besieged Babylon, his army's tents were pitched on the dusty plain north of Babylon. Once capitulation was achieved, the troops were arranged formally in a more permanent settlement called al-Fustat. Here, in the southern part of today's Cairo known as Misl al-Qadima (Old Cairo), 'Amr built the first mosque on the African continent. Over the ensuing almost fourteen hundred years, Islam spread its roots in the region. Cairo, the largest (and most Islamic) city of Africa, now contains some sixteen million inhabitants who occupy hundreds of square kilometres on both shores of the Nile. This chapter summarises its development, focusing primarily on the premodern phase.

At first, Babylon continued to serve as the port and commercial centre for al-Fustat, housing the original population of Copts and Jews. Over time, most but not all had converted to Islam, and the town and the army camp grew together, both physically and socially. But new additions to these nuclei lay ahead that reflected changing patterns of leadership and schismatic forces occurring within the expanding Islamic empire.

The new towns of Islam were of two major types: army camps such as al-Fustat that eventually developed into permanent cities; and princely towns founded to celebrate the hegemonic power of new dynasties. (The next few settlements marked significant political changes.) The final scene of an internal struggle between the Umayyads and the Abbasids for imperial supremacy was played out on the site of Fustat in AD 750. The Umayyad caliph had fled to Fustat in

![Diagram of the Cairo area showing the location of major settlements and the land added through shifts in the channel of the Nile since AD 800.](image)
the hope of evading his pursuers but was apprehended there and killed. In the struggle, much of Fustat was burned. For the Islamic world outside Spain, this marked the end of Umayyad power and the removal of the seat of the Caliphate from Damascus to the new capital of Baghdad. For the smaller world of Egypt, it meant the displacement of local governing functions to a newly constructed suburb to the north of Fustat where Abbasid troops were quartered. This princely city, called al-Askar (the Cantonment), dominated rebuilt commercial Fustat and, as had its predecessor, eventually blended with it.

The next governor/builder was Ahmad ibn Tulun, who had come originally from Iraq in 868 as deputy for the Abbasid governor of Egypt. Aided temporarily by the autonomy granted from a fragmenting empire and presumably inspired by luxurious Samarra from which he hailed, he added his own princely city north and inland from the existing conurbation of Fustat. In this new settlement, called al-Qata'î (The Wards), Ibn Tulun assigned separate areas to each of the ethnic groups making up his army. Employing architects and builders who followed Byzantine/Coptic traditions, he had his mosque constructed (an acknowledged masterpiece completed in 878), with its ziggurat minaret patterned on that of Samarra. It stands today in the southern part of Cairo, now densely populated, marking the location of his long vanished town.

However, Cairo itself had not yet been built. It had to await a new set of rulers, followers of the Shi’ite branch of Islam, who arrived from Tunisia under the command of their talented general, Jawhar the Sicilian. In AD 969 Jawhar easily overcame the resistance of the previous ruling Ikhshids. He quartered his troops temporarily on the plain north of al-Qata’î until he could provide them with permanent quarters. He proceeded to lay out a new, rectangular, and even more glorious princely town on the flat land farther north, between the Khalij canal on the west and the beginning of the eastern desert, at first naming it al-Mansuriyya. This well-planned walled city was divided into four main quarters by its two intersecting thoroughfares. The north-south processional route, named after the Fatimid caliph, Muizz al-Din (but later to be known in medieval literature simply as the qasaba) stretched from the centre of the northern wall to the centre of the southern wall, along which were built the palaces of the ruler (Bayn al-Qasrayn, or “between the two palaces”). The east-west thoroughfare led from the Khalij to al-Azhar Mosque, which was destined to become the world’s first university. The remaining areas were assigned to various ethnic groups in his composite army. By 974 the city was ready (see fig. 2). Jawhar renamed it al-Qahira (the Victorious) to celebrate the ceremonial installation of Muizz al-Din as the caliph of the Fatimid dynasty under which the city would reach one of its historic and artistic high points. (The name Cairo was a later European-language distortion of the city’s Arabic name.)

Despite the increasing beauty, luxury, and intellectual vitality of the Fatimid princely city, for close to two hundred years it remained a royal refuge within whose secure enclosure successive rulers
and their entourages governed the region and pursued their lives. As a royal enclave, it was closed to the masses. Fustat and its extensions, already known by the alternative name of Misr, remained the dominant transport, productive, and commercial metropolis. Its population continued to inhabit the increasingly dense and prosperous conurbation, isolated from the artistic, architectural and intellectual achievements of the Fatimid capital.

During the eleventh century, then, we can reconstruct two thriving but symbiotic cities. Misr-Fustat, the larger of the two whose northern limit was the mosque of Ibn Tulun, was occupied by the indigenous population and devoted to commercial and industrial activities. Al-Qahira, instead, was a well-designed community serving the needs of a large and complex courtly society. Originally divided into ten separate quarters (harat) for the defending army and their dependents, it was liberally endowed with gardens, palatial residences and mosques, of which the new al-Hakim Mosque near the northern wall was one of its architectural treasures. The dual city was served by dual ports, the older one at Misr-Fustat, devoted to commercial shipping, and a newer one at al-Maqṣ (a revival of the pre-Islamic port of Tendunyas on the island of Bulaq, not yet joined to the mainland) where the powerful Fatimid navy was anchored. So secure did the Fatimids feel that apparently they neglected to maintain the defensive walls around al-Qahira, until they were repaired and strengthened by Badr al-Jamali towards the end of the eleventh century.
The thriving dual city, however, was to experience setbacks over the course of the next century. Some were natural events (a plague that began in 1063, an earthquake in 1138) but the final blow was administered in 1168 by larger-scale religious and political events. The Europeans had launched their first crusade in the final year of the eleventh century, but Cairo's peripheral position *vis-à-vis* the Holy Land kept it relatively insulated from the battles being fought in the Fertile Crescent. Two-thirds of a century later, however, the city was disastrously drawn into them. Between 1164 and 1169 it was at best a pawn in the complex and shifting alignments of the rival powers in Syria (under Nur al-Din) and the Christian forces of Amalric (Amaury) in Jerusalem, her young Fatimid caliph a figurehead at the mercy of changing viziers.

When the campaigns that had wracked Egypt for five bitter years ceased temporarily in 1169, the future of Cairo had been completely altered. Al-Qahira had been transformed from a princely city in symbiotic competition with commercial Misr-Fustat to an overflowing metropolis inhabited by masters and masses alike. Although still nominally ruled by Fatimid Shi'ites, it was actually controlled by the new Sunni vizier, Salah al-Din (Saladin), who had participated in the campaign (led by his uncle, Shirkuh, whom he succeeded after the latter's death in 1169) that had rescued Egypt from the attempted conquest by the crusaders. The next few years witnessed the final overthrow of the Fatimids in Cairo and the establishment of a new dynasty of Sunni Ayyubids under the leadership of Saladin.

How had this remarkable transformation taken place? Quite simply, through the virtual destruction of Misr-Fustat, not the only but certainly one of the major casualties of the war. The crusader forces, in an unusual tactic, were approaching Cairo from the south. Fearing that they might occupy indefensible Fustat and use it to launch a fatal attack on the walled enclave of Cairo, in 1168 the Fatimid vizier ordered the city of the masses to be burned down. Burn it did — for fifty-four days and nights. The smoke, borne southwards by the prevailing winds, drove the crusaders into retreat. The people of Misr-Fustat fled northwards in great confusion, seeking protection within the walls of Cairo. By the following year, when the Syrian forces had routed Amalric and Saladin had assumed the role of vizier, much of Fustat lay in ashes; her population crowded within the former princely city or huddled in temporary camps outside her walls.

While the disaster was not total, the changes were irreversible. In the next fifteen years, parts of Misr-Fustat along the shores of the Nile were rebuilt, but the greatly reduced population no longer needed the higher lands, which were abandoned. The city of Misr-Fustat, formerly almost contiguous with al-Qahira and of at least equal importance, had become a community separated from, and definitely subordinate to, its northern neighbour. In contrast, the city of al-Qahira, now infused with population, industry, and commerce, had become the true centre of the region in every sense of the term. Having little interest in preserving al-Qahira as a sacrosanct refuge for the court
and contemplating his own private domain in the citadel he was planning, Saladin had opened the city to the masses who, in their need for more space, constructed everywhere within the larger streets and mayadin (open spaces), gradually effacing the basic outlines of the original symmetrical design. The palaces were torn down and replaced by schools and mosques, and former Fatimid villas were converted to commercial uses.

Although Saladin was never to spend much time in Egypt because his campaigns against the crusaders demanded constant attention abroad, he invested efforts to strengthen and expand al-Qahira’s walls, extending the northern wall all the way to al-Maqs, which encouraged some construction west of the Khalij. He also ordered the building of a fortified Citadel on the spur of the Moqattam Hills overlooking the city, from which he planned to govern. Begun as early as 1174–1175, travellers’ accounts noted that it was still under construction in 1183 (by crusader prisoners) and it remained unfinished at his death in 1193. Its construction, however, served as a magnet that encouraged settlements in the area between the existing southern wall and the approaches to it.

During the next few centuries, Cairo expanded into a world capital, becoming the most populous city of the world outside China. The medieval cycle of Cairo’s growth and subsequent decline began essentially with the accession of Saladin to the leadership of Sunni Islam. It rose sharply within the next 175 years, reaching an apogee during the long reigns of the Mamluk sultan al-Nasir ibn Qalawun before the middle of the fourteenth century. The entire cycle was played out within the central section of contemporary Cairo (see fig. 3).

The expansion, begun towards the end of the twelfth century under Saladin, picked up speed after the middle of the thirteenth century when two events caused far-reaching changes in the shape of western Islam. The first was the rise to power in Egypt of the Mamluks, whose mounted cavalry, under their leader Baybars, routed Saint Louis’ forces when his crusaders invaded the Egyptian Delta in 1250, and also wrested control of Palestine from the Europeans, adding that territory to their expanding empire. Baybars was installed as sultan in 1260, and under his successors Egypt became the head of a large and flourishing empire. The second factor was the Mongol conquest of eastern Islam and the destruction of Baghdad, which resulted in the relocation of the Caliphate to the safety of Baybars’ capital, Cairo.

The shift to Mamluk rule was much more than a simple change in dynasty, however. It represented, rather, a social revolution of deep significance that, while it facilitated a flowering of medieval Cairo, contained within it the seeds of its own (and Cairo’s) eventual decline. Although from one point of view Egypt had rarely been ruled by indigenous elements, earlier conquerors had eventually been absorbed into or at least coalesced with the population they ruled. The Mamluks, on the other hand, remained a ‘foreign’ military caste, each generation recruited anew from abroad. Although inter-
Fig. 3. Cairo's expansion at the time of Sultan al-Nasir ibn Qalawun c. 1340.
marriage and common belief in Islam bridged some of the distance, not since the early days of the Arab conquest, when Muslims governed a predominantly Christian populace, had so great a cleavage existed. But whereas the former split had been bridged by the gradual conversion of Egyptians to Islam, such assimilation was impossible during the later era when the ranks of the Mamluks were, by definition, closed to local recruits. Their unique form of feudal control over the countryside and their virtual monopoly over the spice trade, however, yielded enormous prosperity to the rulers who, in addition to recruiting and training more slaves from the Caucasus, invested it in endowing mosques, schools, hospitals and palaces in Cairo. They also began to build funerary mosques in the Cities of the Dead outside the city, especially in the cemeteries just east of the capital.

The city’s fortunes closely reflected those of the empire, for as internal strife and external threats multiplied, the expansion of the city came to a temporary halt. The Black Death of 1353 onward, which spread along world trade routes from its point of origin in China all the way to north-west Europe, afflicted Egypt and Syria as well, causing Cairo’s population to drop by about a third. As elsewhere, it precipitated a change in the ruling regime — from the Bahri (or Nile-based) Mamluks to the Circassian Mamluks of the Burj (Citadel). By the opening decades of the fifteenth century, Cairo’s fortunes rose with the recovery of the larger world system, significantly enhanced by the虚拟 monopoly control her merchants, in league with their alien rulers, exercised over the trade between a rising Europe and a prosperous Far East. It was then that the expanded city reached its maximum dimensions of the pre-modern era. It completed laying down the precious heritage we now seek to restore and revive. By then, Cairo’s population may have reached half a million. This peak, however, was soon to pass.

The mirror image of the rise of Islam on the Anatolian plateau, signalled by the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 by the Ottoman Turks, represented a decline in Egypt’s imperial wealth and autonomy. After the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517, Cairo was reduced from its former status as centre of a vast empire to a mere provincial capital. Its talented cadre of architects and artisans were removed to Istanbul where they contributed to the transformation of that Byzantine Christian city into a magnificent Islamic capital. During the ensuing centuries, Egypt underwent a precipitous decline. Peasants fled the burdensome taxes imposed by a contracting economy, and peripheral lands went out of cultivation, the east-west spice trade found alternate routes, including those around the African continent, and Egypt and Cairo lost population. This was especially true in the ‘old city’, as developments west of the Khalij, including the zones around the interior lakes of Azbakiyya and Birkat al-Fil, began to be favoured by Mamluk aristocrats. These zones attracted some clients, residents, and businesses from the walled city’s two dominant quarters, al-Jamaliyya north of al-Azhar Street, and al-Darb al-Ahmar south of it.
The arrival in 1798 of the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt brought the cycle to a close, the intrusion forming a bridge between a medieval Cairo much decayed and a modern Cairo yet to be. The savants who accompanied the brief occupation mapped the city, estimating its population at less than three hundred thousand. Although the French did not remain as colonisers, the processes of ‘modernisation’ and ‘reform’ had begun.

The first ‘reformer’ was Muhammad Ali, the Albanian soldier appointed by the Porte to govern Egypt. He first ruthlessly dispatched his remaining Mamluk rivals by a ruse. Then he reorganised the feudal system and introduced new crops (in particular, long staple cotton), and tried to modernise education, administration, and his army. In the later years of his rule, he also made some important revisions to Cairo’s urban pattern. The rubbish mounds that had collected around the city walls were levelled and the residue used to fill in some of the disease-breeding interior lakes, including the one at Azbakiyya, which was drained. North of the city, in Shubra, he built a large palace, and Shubra Street was laid out to give access to it. Although not completed in his lifetime, he ordered two new thoroughfares to open the way for better circulation. The most striking was a broad diagonal thoroughfare that connected the Zuwayla Gate in the southern wall with the Citadel, to which he added new fortifications, a Turkish-style mosque, and additional barracks for his large army. He also ordered a new street (al-Sikka al-Jadida, later al-Muski Street) that cut laterally through the old city, parallel to the road that led to al-Azhar. Both these avenues required ruthless demolitions of existing houses and shops.

But all the same, these were minimal changes in comparison to those introduced by his successors, changes in the urban panorama increasingly influenced by European planning principles. Muhammad Ali was succeeded by his nephew Abbas who, during his brief reign, allowed the British to build railways to connect Alexandria with Cairo and Cairo with Suez, thus intensifying Cairo’s links with the outside world. The Cairo terminus was at Bab al-Hadid, the gate in Saladin’s wall extension that had been only recently demolished. In addition, Abbas set up a small military city in the desert outpost of Abbasiyya. Both developments tended to elongate the shape of the city to the north. After a brief interlude under the reign of Muhammad Ali’s youngest son, Said, most noteworthy because he invited his old tutor, De Lesseps, to begin executing the latter’s plan for the Suez Canal, Khedive Ismail, the ruler most committed to modernising Cairo along European lines, succeeded.

Ismail, assisted by his talented polymath chief engineer, Ali Mubarak, was responsible for setting in motion the most significant changes in the city during the latter third of the nineteenth century. Like many times before, the digging of a new canal (the Ismailiya Canal parallel to but much farther west than the old Khalij Misri, which was dry for much of the year) opened a further gift of dry land between the built-up city and the newly stabilising banks of the Nile.
Ali Mubarak, after visiting Paris where he much admired Hausmann's re-planning of that city, drew up his plans for a 'new' westernised addition to Cairo. On this tabula rasa, only sparsely occupied and newly rescued from flooding by the construction of the Ismailiya Canal, he used his ruler to create a rough checkerboard suited to carriage travel that was becoming more popular among the wealthy. The latter were drawn to the new area by Ismail's new palace there and the incentive of cheap land for those willing and able to build. Thus began the creation of the dual city (see fig. 4), which would be carried to its extreme after Ismail's bankruptcy and lead eventually to British colonial rule.

The impact on the older quarters of Cairo was dramatic, although the full force of the change was not really felt until after British colonial rule brought numerous Europeans who pre-empted the space designed by Ali Mubarak. As elsewhere in other Third World colonised cities, the dual-city pattern eventually denuded the older quarters of wealthy natives who flocked to ape the new consumption patterns associated with the colonisers. In the process, the older quarters became neglected and degraded, as new migrants from the countryside joined the poorer population left behind, subdividing the large homes of the departed rich into cubicles, unable to maintain them, and eventually spilling out to the cemeteries east and south-east of the city. All resources were devoted to paving the streets in the new quarters, to providing them with gaslights, piped water and even sewers. While the old quarters did not lose their important economic functions - handicrafts and the processing and distribution of foods - these products were increasingly purveyed to people of similar social standing. In the new city, which increasingly stretched back to the western border of medieval Cairo at the Khalij Misti, the consumption needs of the indigenous rich and the foreigners who increasingly dominated the new districts were provided for by upmarket grocery stores and glass-windowed shops selling imported goods and lux-
uries. Medieval Cairo was alive with production and people, but its architectural heritage was condemned to death by neglect, poverty, and overcrowding.

It seemed that in the rush to be 'modern', few placed any value on the old; the Aladdin scam of 'new lamps for old' was too compelling. At first, it seemed, only mavericks cared. K. A. C. Cresswell, who had come to Egypt at the end of the nineteenth century with the British occupying army, came to care a great deal. A tiny man with enormous self-confidence and a tendency to bully, he devoted his life to surveying and mapping the hundreds of Islamic buildings left in the old city, to carefully documenting each monument, and trying, often to little avail, to mobilise more than the cadre of well-meaning Westerners and to convince an economically-strapped government to preserve Cairo's breathtaking historic heritage. But he had little concern for, or interest in, the people who remained in the degraded urban setting and who he often seemed to blame for its destruction. One senses that his ideal solution would have been an urban landscape without people. Without his work, however, the present efforts to rescue the living heritage of Cairo, together with its people, would have been even more challenging than it is.

As it was, the western edges of the pre-modern core city had already been redeveloped into the Central Business District of the early twentieth century, especially after 1898 when the Khalij Misri was finally filled in and street cars were introduced along the broad thoroughfare of Port Said Street: the division between old and new became concretised. Port Said Street was as impassable a barrier as any wall had ever been, separating the remnants of the original walled city and its northern and southern extensions from the nucleus of the new city. The area east of that divider remained for the most part on the older pattern, replete with neglected mosques and monuments and crumbling buildings, but also with major streets and out-pockets (notably the qasaba and the fifteenth-century Khan al-Khalili) still thriving as commercial centres, albeit more geared towards tourists.

Current efforts, including those being assisted by the Aga Khan Foundation described in this publication, have built on the work of their non-Islamic predecessors, but with a real difference. More sensitive to the needs of living inhabitants, they have been trying to preserve not only the monuments and street patterns, but to upgrade housing while preserving much of the area's economic base in labour-intensive handicrafts. The Egyptian government, particularly the Ministry of Tourism, has been both supportive of these efforts and simultaneously pressing in an opposite direction as it seeks to enhance the exotic appeal of the areas in question.

Today, the historic city, while containing the largest remaining remnants of any Middle Eastern medieval-styled city, is dwarfed by the gigantic urban agglomeration that now surrounds it on all sides. The population has declined, not only because residences have crumbled from age, but also because they are being destroyed by natural events (the recent earthquake) and the works of man
(new highways and tunnels, new colonies of informal settlements, the clearance of parts of the Cities of the Dead, such as al-Darrasah). Time is of the essence. Increased commitments to preserving not only monuments, but also the 'living city', are needed. The world's heritage embodied in this Islamic 'medieval city' is too precious to squander.

This chapter draws heavily on Janet Abu-Lughod, *Cairo: 1000 Years of the City Victorious*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1971, from which the original maps have been taken. The author retains the copyrights to the original cartographic materials, which may not be reproduced without the prior written permission of the author.

Although some have suggested that the plan was based on that of Mahdiyya, it seems to me that it was modelled more generally on Roman-origin cities in the North African region, for example, Tunis, Tunisia; Lepsis Magna, Libya; Timgad, Algeria.

It was common for the capital of a province and its main city to bear the same name, for example: Dimashq, the name for the province of Syria and also of its capital city, Damascus. In the same fashion, the name Misr came to stand for the province of Egypt and its main city.

Syrian cities such as Aleppo, with their strong citadels, were undoubtedly the inspiration, but Cairo's Citadel was relatively unique because of its location on elevated terrain and its separation from the centres of population.

This effectively closed off the central trade route between Europe and Asia, forcing Italian merchants to deal with Egypt in pursuit of the increasingly profitable spice trade.

European lenders were eager to provide loans to fund his ambitious schemes for modernising Egypt, but the main cause of the fiscal crisis was the expense of constructing the Suez Canal, opened with lavish ceremonies in 1869. When the Egyptian government was unable to repay the loans called in by European bankers, Ismail was forced to sell the country's shares in the Canal to Great Britain, which opened the door to colonial rule in 1881 as part of the 'grand empire'.


The author was privileged to know Professor Cresswell a little (he was a difficult man) when we were both affiliated with the American University in Cairo. I have enormous respect for his scholarly devotion and erudition, and am eternally grateful for rare access to his library, his advice, and his offhand ability to answer the most obscure questions I could pose about Cairo's development.

See the proposals, for example, of the joint study project by the United Nations Development Programme and the Egyptian Supreme Council for Antiquities, *Rehabilitation of Historic Cairo Final Report*, Technical Cooperation Office, Cairo December 1997.