Planning a Sectarian Topography
Revisiting Michel Ecochard’s Master Plans for Beirut between 1941-1964

by

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Bachelor of Architecture (BArch.)
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3
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Ali Khodr

Submitted to the Department of Architecture on May 25, 2017 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Science in Architecture Studies

Abstract:

Scholarly discourse around the work of French architect and urban planner Michel Ecochard in the early days of the Lebanese nation state frames his master plans for the capital Beirut as modernist tools for an ailing urban agglomeration, without considering the possible ramifications these plans could have had on the social and sectarian structure of the city. Throughout the scope of this thesis, I will present a re-reading of Ecochard’s work, detailing how he introduces an urbanity of social integration in a sectarian city rife with sporadic acts of urban violence.

I will also argue that Ecochard’s planned interventions are based on a careful reading of Beirut’s socio-political and economic divisions following Lebanon’s independence in the 1940’s, and throughout the nation-building era in the 1960’s. By studying and analyzing Ecochard’s personal archives, notes and drawings; I will maintain that Ecochard’s plans for the city reflect his vision for the peaceful integration of communities by promoting access, functionality and the articulation of communal public spaces, rather than viewing the plans solely as the agents of urban modernization.

Reflecting upon the broader discourse of Ecochard’s planning initiatives across Lebanon, at the time, I seek to position the architect/planner within the shifting political contexts of post-independence Lebanon. I will also address the nuances experienced by Ecochard as he attempts to intervene on Beirut within two spatial and temporal moments. The first concerned with planning a colonially inherited city. And the second, occurring at a time when Beirut becomes an economically driven safe haven, coinciding with the presence of a nationalist political agency attempting to restructure the capital with the intention of strengthening social and urban integration. The similarities and discrepancies surrounding the shifting architectural and urban dynamics between the 1941 and 1963 Plans will be key to this study.

Advisor: Nasser Rabbat, MArch, PhD
Aga Khan Professor
Professor of the History of Architecture
to Beirut,
and all those who find in her
an irreplaceable shelter

لبيروت
و كل الذين يجدون في قلبها
ملجا لا يغني
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introducing Ecochard’s Master Plans for Beirut</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michel Ecochard, a Biography</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecochard Enters the Levant, His Work in Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology of Research</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature Review &amp; Sourcing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beirut’s Urban History</strong></td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut and its Hinterland Historically (pre-1830’s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resurrecting a Port in Beirut (1830’s-1888)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut, a Provincial Capital (1888-1920)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A French Mandate Affair (1920-1941)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Master Plan for the city of Beirut 1941-3</strong></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political &amp; Social Context During WWII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecochard’s Proposal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Advent of the Modernist Discourse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Directorate Plan of Beirut and it’s Suburbs 1961-4</strong></td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political &amp; Social Context Throughout 1950’s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Initiatives Before Ecochard’s Return</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal One - Cite de la Ministeres 1961</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal Two - Plan Directeur de Beyrouth et sa Banlieu 1962</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal Three - Plan d’Amenagement de Beyrouth et sa Banlieu 1963</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Greater Beirut Metropolitan Region 1963</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saifi Ghalghoul Plan 1964</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beyond Ecochard</strong></td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendix</strong></td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bibliography</strong></td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures

Figure 1. - Ecochard's Work in the Levant 20
Figure 2. - Beirut Urban History Maps 40
Figure 3. - Religious Distribution Map in 1941 53
Figure 4. - Community Tension Map in 1941 55
Figure 5. - 1943 Ecochard Plan 57
Figure 6. - 1943 Ecochard Plan, Circulatory Diagram 59
Figure 7. - 1943 Ecochard plan, Implemented Sections 61
Figure 8. - Religious Distribution Map in 1961 69
Figure 9. - Class Distribution Map in 1961 71
Figure 10. - Community Tension Map in 1961 73
Figure 11. - Jounieh 1958 Masterplan 81
Figure 12. - 1961 Ecochard Proposal - Cite de la Ministeres 85
Figure 13. - 1961 Ecochard Proposal
  Cite de la Ministeres - Implemented Sections 87
Figure 14. - 1962 Ecochard Proposal
  Plan Directeurde Beyrouth et sa Banlieu 89
Figure 15. - 1963 Ecochard Proposal 92
Figure 16. - 1963 Ecochard Proposal Overlaid on Class Map 93
Figure 17. - Boulevard de Fleuve Masterplan 95
Figure 18. - Boulevard de Fleuve Zoning 95
Figure 19. - Greater Beirut Metropolitan Region 99
Figure 20. - GMBA Sectarian Map 99
Figure 21. - Ecochard's Maximum Density Proposal 101
Figure 22. - IFA Proposal 103
Figure 23. - ISTED Proposal 103
Figure 24. - Beirut City Center 1964 108
Figure 25. - Beirut City Center, Saifi Ghalghoul Plan 108
Figure 26. - Saifi-Ghalghoul Demolition Plan 109
Figure 27. - Saifi-Ghalghoul Urban Spine 109
Appendix. - Decree 7110 116
Beirut presents a peculiar urban landscape. The amalgamation of various sectarian, ethnic and national entities within the space of one city has consistently redefined the notion of urban space as the city moves, sometimes quite dramatically, from prosperity to destruction and vice versa. This urban mosaic, is in most cases regarded as Beirut's source of cosmopolitan charm, as well as the city's ultimate tragedy. But to understand a city as an intricate web of mosaics leaves much work to be done in providing a proper planning infrastructure to ensure an integrated social and urban growth. Given the disastrous urban situation that surrounds contemporary Beirut and the city's dire need for a more inclusive and updated master-plan, it thus becomes vital to re-assess two key points in the city's planning history that could have radically changed its functionality and urban form. Those proposals would both come at a time of radical political change in Lebanon, the first as the nation transitions into independence from the French Mandate, and the other coming at a time when Beirut asserts its position as the financial capital of the Middle East. Both proposals were drafted and proposed by French Architect and Planner Michel Ecochard during his illustrious career in the Levant and North Africa.

1. Lebanon’s confessional religious system identifies 18 religious communities within its borders. These are divided into 12 Christian sects (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian Apostolic, Armenian Catholic, Syrian Orthodox, Syrian Catholic, Assyrian, Chaldean Catholic, Coptic, Protestant and Roman Catholic), 5 Islamic sects (Sunni, Shi’ite, Alawite, Isma’ili and Druze) and a singular Jewish identification. Since 1932, there has not been an official census in Lebanon to determine how the nation-state’s religious communities are divided for fear of any one group claiming absolute majority and hence absolute political power at the expense of the others, yet the CIA world Factbook maintains that the Christian/Muslim divide in Lebanon stands currently at around 41%:54% with the exclusion of the Druze (5%) from the Islamic sects. “The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency,” accessed May 22, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html.

2. Lebanon’s major internal problems revolve around an unanswered ethnic question pertaining to whether Lebanese should identify as Arab or not. The source of contestation is derived from various external affinities that have seen Lebanon’s Muslim population identify as Arab while its Christian population (most notably the Maronites) identify increasingly with neo-Phoenicianism (a claim that is built on a constructed history) or Levantinism. Officially Lebanon identifies 2 major ethnic groups within its population, the Arabs numbering 94% including the Christians, and Armenians who account for around 5% of the population. In terms of representation, however; foreign (mostly European based) representations of Lebanon’s ethnic communities often groups Lebanese Christians under the category Levantines to show them as clearly distinct from Lebanon’s Islamic communities which are represented as Arab. Ibid.
Introduction

Introducing Michel Ecochard’s Master Plans for Beirut

Beirut presents a peculiar urban landscape. The amalgamation of various sectarian¹, ethnic² and national entities within the space of one city has consistently redefined the notion of urban space as the city moves, sometimes quite dramatically, from prosperity to destruction and vice versa. This urban mosaic³, is in most cases regarded as Beirut’s source of cosmopolitan⁴ charm, as well as the city’s ultimate tragedy. But to understand a city as an intricate web of mosaics leaves much work to be done in providing a proper planning infrastructure to ensure an integrated social and urban growth. Given the disastrous urban situation that surrounds contemporary Beirut and the city’s dire need for a more inclusive and updated master-plan⁵, it thus becomes vital to re-assess two key points in the city’s planning history that could have radically changed its functionality and urban form. Those proposals would both come at a time of radical political change in Lebanon, the first as the nation transitions into independence from the French Mandate, and the other coming at a time when Beirut asserts its position as the financial capital of the Middle East. Both proposals were drafted and proposed by French Architect and Planner Michel Ecochard during his illustrious career in the Levant and North Africa.


4. Peter G. Rowe and Hashim Sarkis, Projecting Beirut: Episodes in the Construction and Reconstruction of a Modern City (Munich; New York: Prestel, c1998, 1998), 9. And here I refer to cosmopolitanism with caution. Certainly not the entirety of the city claimed a sense of cosmopolitanism as it is the immediate product of the creation of an elite societal class that begins a form of cultural and social patronage throughout the city.

5. The city’s current plan is a manifestation of the Egli plan approved in 1957, alongside the modified 1963 Ecochard plan, they are the plans in use for the city’s urban planning today.
However, scholarly discourse around the work of Michel Ecochard in the early days of the Lebanese nation state constantly frames his masterplans for Beirut as modernist tools for an ailing urban agglomeration, without considering the possible ramifications these plans could have had on the social and sectarian structure of the city. And while most scholars that reference Ecochard’s work tend to focus on the legal framework surrounding the plans, the failure of their implementation, as well as touching upon the humanist within Ecochard and his ideals; there is still a lack of scholarly analysis on the plans’ structure, placement and relation to greater urban context. In light of revisiting Ecochard’s plans, this thesis aims to pose and answer the following questions:

In a sectarian city rife with sporadic acts of urban violence, how does Michel Ecochard introduce an urbanity of social integration through his masterplans?

Moreover, how are Ecochard’s planned interventions based on a careful reading of Beirut’s socio-political and economic divisions post-independence and throughout the nation-building era?

Throughout the scope of this thesis, I will argue that Ecochard’s masterplans for the city of Beirut throughout the 1940’s and 1960’s are based on a meticulous reading of the city’s divided social and sectarian fabric. By studying and analyzing Ecochard’s personal archives, notes and drawings; I will maintain that Ecochard’s plans for the city reflected his vision for the peaceful integration of communities by promoting access, functionality and the articulation of communal public spaces, rather than viewing the
new urbanity as an agent of modernization.

Ecochard's first plan for the city was drafted and proposed between 1941 and 1943. It presented a continuation of the French Colonial Era's *mission civilisatrice*, and was commissioned and championed primarily by the head of the colonial administration at that time, General George Catroux. It aimed towards the restructuring of the Beirut city center, facilitating access and circulation throughout the city and its vicinity while proposing several nodes of urban expansion into the city's greater hinterland.

Following the independence from the French Mandate in 1943, Lebanon would be hit by successive waves of crises and natural disasters⁶ that would put great strain on the country's fragile political system, eventually plunging it into a civil war in 1958. Following the war and the advent of the Chehabist political regime, the second plan would be proposed through four separate but interlinked projects between 1961-1963. These proposals sought to transform Beirut's functionality based upon a re-definition of the city's metropolitan boundaries and a creation of state-sponsored urban area for the city's disenfranchised populations. Where Ecochard places his interventions upon the city's fabric and how that is governed within the city-hinterland migration rubric in the case of Beirut is a central point of contention to be studied within the scope of this thesis.

In a sense, the volatile nature of Beirut's urban condition is a result of large waves of migrating populations seeking refuge and safety, inadvertently exacerbating social and economic tensions between existing populations and newer ones and further

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⁶ Mainly characterized by a large refugee crisis following the Palestinian Exodus in 1948, a large flood in 1955, an earthquake in 1956 and a mini-civil-war of 1958.
fragmenting the city fabric into confessionally based islands surrounded by zones of sectarian mixity in between. The architect/planner here acts to mitigate between the various populations and spaces while planning the future of urban growth. And while the experience of planning Beirut, or attempting to plan Beirut’s sectarian topography, has been largely unsuccessful; it remains remarkable to study the social evolution of the city and how that reflects in its various urban transformations.

Ecochard’s mitigation between the sectarian topographies of pre-civil war Beirut in his master-plans thus becomes a direct reaction to the city’s fundamentally disregarded condition of urban disintegration. The fragmentation of Beirut’s social structure along feudal and sectarian lines is reflected in all attributes of public life in the city, made acutely obvious by the structuring (or the lack thereof) of the planning discourse in Lebanon. This in turn will be shown as the product of the rise of Lebanon’s elite land-owning class which owes its origin to the sectarian crises that unraveled in Ottoman Mount Lebanon throughout the 19th century.

However, when addressing Ecochard’s work, it is also imperative to mention his personal change between being a self-proclaimed social engineer to becoming an entrepreneurial architect frequently collaborating with Lebanon’s primer architects and the upper echelons of Lebanese society. These relationships benefited Ecochard greatly, granting him direct access at almost all planning instances7 to the key power structures governing Lebanon at either time; most notable of these was his relationship to the president of the Welfare State8 from 1958-1963, General Fouad Chehab9, a large benefactor of many of Ecochard’s later planning

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7. See Figure 1 on Ecochard’s work in Lebanon

8. Termed as such given it was the only instance in Lebanon’s modern history where the central government aimed for the social and economic development of the Lebanese periphery. Peter G. Rowe and Hashim Sarkis, Projecting Beirut: Episodes in the Construction and Reconstruction of a Modern City (Munich; New York: Prestel, c1998., 1998), 9.

9. Fouad Abdallah Chehab served as Lebanon’s president from 1958 until 1964, following his unanimous election to power to ‘restore peace and prosperity’ to Lebanon following the civil war of 1958. Prior to his ascension, he had served as the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces from 1946 to 1958, he refused to compromise the neutrality of Lebanon’s army during internal conflict, safeguarding it from internal fragmentation. “President Fouad Chehab - Official Website,” accessed December 19, 2016, http://www.fouadchehab.com/.
projects. Ecochard’s experience in Lebanon, clearly emulates how the social consciousness of a foreign public figure had to adapt to Lebanon’s feudal and sectarian political system.

Essentially, this thesis is an analytical study on how Ecochard’s planning dealt with many of Beirut’s recurring problems, notably those related to spaces of urban violence, demarcation, excessive centralization, slum organization and lack of contextual and geographic integration with the city’s peripheral regions. Ecochard here not only becomes the advocate of state-sponsored agency, but also becomes the Lebanese political establishment’s most rebellious and critical agent, proposing direct interventions on the city’s most disenfranchised neighborhoods in order to upgrade them and re-integrate their populations into the city's fabric. It is in essence, a continuation of the mission civilisatrice albeit with a more profound social responsibility.

Reflecting upon the broader discourse of Ecochard’s planning initiatives across Lebanon, at the time, I seek to position the architect/planner within the shifting political contexts of post-independence Lebanon. I will also address the nuances experienced by Ecochard as he attempts to intervene on Beirut within two spatial and temporal moments. The first concerned with planning a colonially inherited city, as is the case in 1943. And the second, occurring at a time when Beirut becomes an economically driven safe haven. The latter also coinciding with the presence of a nationalist political agency attempting to restructure the capital with the intention of strengthening social and urban integration. The similarities and discrepancies surrounding the shifting architectural and urban dynamics between the 1941 and 1963 Plans will be key
Figure 1. Map of Ecochard's Projects in the Levant

- Museum of Antioch 1931
- Lebanese National Highway 1963
- Study for 3 Schools for the Sisters of Charity in Tripoli 1961
- Master Plan for Jbeil 1959-60
- Master Plan for Jounieh 1958
- Master Plan for Beirut 1941-43
- Protestant College of Beirut 1954-61
- City of Ministers Plan 1959-61
- Directorate Plan of Beirut and its Suburbs 1960-63
- College of the Fathers of the Antonite Order 1960-68
  (In collaboration with Gabriel Talibet)
- Grand Lycee Franco-Libanais 1959
- Hospital for the Sisters of Charity in Baabda 1961
  (In collaboration with Henri Edde)
- Saifi - Ghaghoul Neighborhoods 1963-64
- Master Plan for Delhamyeh 1961-62
- Master Plan for Saida and its Region 1958
- College of the Marian Brothers in Saida 1959-67
  (In collaboration with Amin al-Biri)
to this study.

The need to understand the agency and ideals behind these master-plans is crucial to Beirut’s modern planning, especially given how the current Lebanese state constantly resurrects some of Ecochard’s planning proposals to a profoundly different urban fabric than the one to which they were originally drafted. And following Lebanon’s civil war from 1975-1990, which left Beirut in ruins and the state morbidly divided, how can we now re-interpret Ecochard’s plans for applicability on a much more segregated city vying for recovery through an inflated real-estate economy. Also within the wider Geo-political context, how can we begin to address the reconstruction of the destroyed multi-ethnic, multi-religious cities of the Levant, most notably Aleppo, Mosul and Homs through integrative urban planning? And how will the polarized societies within these cities be re-integrated? How Ecochard conceived of Beirut’s internal boundaries and aimed to pacify them through planning prior to both of the Lebanon’s civil wars is the central subject of this analysis.

Michel Ecochard, A Biography

Michel Ecochard was born in Paris, France on March 11th, 1905 and died on May 24th, 1985 in the French capital. Trained at the Beaux Arts, Ecochard received his Architecte Diplome par le Gouvernement Francaise in 1932 and immediately began his career with the Department of Antiquities in Syria. And while Ecochard’s early beginnings were centered mostly on the study

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of the archaeological ruins of Damascus and Aleppo, he quickly earned a well celebrated reputation as an urban planner in former French colonies, most notably North Africa and the Levant.

Ecochard’s career, spanning 5 decades, has earned him the celebrated title Architecte en Chef des Batiments Civils et Palais Nationaux (Chief Architect of Civil Buildings and National Palaces) as well as earning the Gold Medal of Creator from the Société d’Encouragement a l’Art et l’Industrie in 1967. In addition to being a Member of the High Council of Civil Buildings, Ecochard was also the premier delegate of CIAM\textsuperscript{11} in Morocco and earned the Grand Prix d’Architecture prize from the Circle of Architectural Studies in 1964. Overall, Ecochard has completed studies for 33 Architectural projects and 24 masterplans worldwide, as well as surveyed dozens of historical buildings and neighborhoods in Syria over a 4-year period\textsuperscript{12}.

Ecochard’s planning practice was mostly centered around playing the role of the social engineer in former French Colonies, his modernist interventions striving towards city beautification and the articulation of functional and sanitary corridors and interventions upon urban fabrics. Moreover, the importance of his work as a modernist vis-a-vis its locality meant that Ecochard was a vital agent towards the dissemination of the modernist aesthetic in the nations where he worked\textsuperscript{13}. Ecochard, for example, is still regarded as a primary figure behind the establishment of schools of planning in Lebanon, Syria and Morocco; drafting major masterplans for the organization and expansion of those nation’s largest cities. Ecochard was also a great admirer of Le Corbusier\textsuperscript{14}, an influence that can easily be read through Ecochard’s functional division of


\textsuperscript{12} Sourced from Michel Ecochard’s personal CV. Michel Ecochard, Curriculum Vitae, circa late 1970’s, The Aga Khan Trust for Culture, Geneva.


\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 255. Although the two would not meet before their simultaneous trip to the United States in 1954.
his plans following Corbusian principles.

Ecochard’s Enters the Levant, His Work in Lebanon

Ecochard arrived in the Levant in 1930 and was immediately delegated to the French Archaeological Service in Syria. He designs a Museum in Antioch in 1931 as well as undertakes several studies and restorations of Islamic monuments as well as other major archaeological ruins in the Levantine Basin such as the Baalbek Temple complex in Lebanon’s Beqaa valley, the late Temple of Bel in Palmyra as well as the Ayyubid monuments of Aleppo and Damascus alongside Jean Sauvaget. Ecochard would later be appointed as the Director of Antiquities in Syria and through his collaboration with the Danger Brothers between 1932 -1934, he would propose his first urban plan for Damascus in 1936. In 1938, Ecochard is commissioned to create, and head, the Planning Administration in Syria where he aided in the drafting of national planning laws and regulations.

In her detailed study on Ecochard’s early works, Marlene Ghorayeb maintains that it was this early experience with the evolution of the urban form in Syria’s ancient cities that pushed Ecochard’s imaginary towards urban planning. Ecochard’s attempts to reconstruct the earlier Hellenic and Roman plans of Damascus while integrating the more contemporary Islamic monuments within the city furthered his understanding of the Arab-Islamic urban form and its evolution, proving particularly useful later in his extensive

15. The Temple of Bel, along with its door way (renovated by Ecochard) were both destroyed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) after they took control of the city in mid-2014.


work in North Africa. Ecochard’s joint archaeologist-ethnologist training provided him with a critical yet subtle lens through which he meticulously read the urban compositions of Damascus, Casablanca, Beirut and many others\(^{19}\).  

With the advent of the 1940’s and the collapse of France under Nazi rule, Ecochard’s work in the Levant and North Africa would become increasingly leveraged towards large scale planning of colonial cities for purposes that would mostly address access, circulation and transportation upgrades; echoing (to a minuscule scale) the Haussmannisation of Paris and the need to introduce the military machine into the heart of the city as a form of urban control. Such was Ecochard’s first experience in Beirut in 1941-3, in direct and primary collaboration with General George Catroux of the French Colonial Mission. Further exemplifying this point would be Ecochard’s notable career in Morocco, where he would be appointed Head of the Department of Planning between 1946 and 1952.

The experience in North Africa would greatly advance Ecochard’s planning as he adapted his knowledge of Islamic Urban centers in Syria to the Kasbahs and Madinas of the Magreb. Ecochard would present masterplans of Casablanca, Rabat, Meknes, Fes and Agadir among others, constantly striving towards the implementation of functional planning. Ghorayeb maintains that this training would form the source of Ecochard’s theoretical strength based on his early work experience in the Levant\(^{20}\). He would become the main proponent of CIAM’s urban design theories while developing simultaneously into a Social Engineer. His methodology for planning was mostly centered around

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 108.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.
the clearance of slums and the development of a progressive
densification scheme centered around what he referred to as
‘trame sanitaire\(^{21}\)’ or sanitary corridors throughout urban spaces.
His plan for Casablanca, which included a comprehensive social
housing scheme, was approved in 1952. However, due to his
advocacy for the poor and disenfranchised against large pressure
from developers and real-estate agents, Ecochard would resign as
the Head of Planning that same year\(^{22}\).

Following his departure from Morocco, Ecochard would
return to his Beirut office where he is commissioned to design and
construct a series of schools in various Lebanese regions as well
as propose a second set of plans for the city of Beirut. In order to
navigate Lebanon’s intricate sectarian topography, most evident
in the capital, Ecochard had to rely on local sponsorship. This
was provided by Lebanon’s transitioning class of urban planners
and modernist architects; a composite selection of Lebanon’s
elite foreign-educated youth. These collaborations, which will be
discussed in detail in later segments of this thesis, would form the
backbone of Ecochard’s social relationships and the foundation
upon which the regularization of Lebanon’s planning would be
achieved. Ecochard’s relationship with Lebanon’s key academic
institutions and how that lead to the dissemination of the discourse
of urban planning will also be detailed.

It is also important to note that Ecochard’s return to Beirut
would come at time when the city asserted its position as the financial
capital of the Middle East while the rest of Lebanon would be ridden
with a string of social inequalities. And following the crises of the
1950’s, which he viewed first-hand, Ecochard’s understanding of


\(^{22}\) Ibid.
the inherent lack of equity between Lebanon’s communities would again foster his drive as a social engineer seeking to pacify Beirut’s problems. Although his earlier plan in 1941-1944 were rejected by Beirut’s elite land-owning families, a later series of plans in the early 1950’s would see the implementation of Ecochard’s ideas within their framework. And by the time Ecochard is commissioned again to re-plan the city in the early 1960’s, a municipal Ecochard-inspired plan was already in place and undergoing surgical implementation.

Ecochard’s re-arrival would also see the rise of General Fouad Chehab to power following the 1958 civil war. This would herald the first, and only, welfare-based political system in Lebanon that strove towards a higher degree of equality, distribution of services and decentralization. Chehab’s modernization of the Lebanese state through investment in infrastructure, education and rural development meant a large array of planning projects were undertaken by the newly developed Lebanese planning agencies, which Ecochard himself aided in their establishment.

One clear change in Ecochard’s work ethic presents itself when the Lebanese planning experience is taken into account. His master plans for the cities of Beirut (1941-4, 1961-3), Saida (1958), Jounieh (1958) and Jbeil (1959-60) demonstrate a unique shift in Ecochard’s attitude towards his planning and architectural projects. When handling mixed confessional cities, Ecochard employs the ethic of the social engineer to his greatest ability; however, when Ecochard proposes plans for cities with more homogeneous populations, his planning shifts dramatically towards Real-Estate development plans. This is most evident in the masterplans of
Jounieh and Jbeil, where the ultimate goal was to produce modern touristic towns by maximizing sea frontage and zoning; whereas, in the case of multi confessional Beirut and Saida, the ultimate urban intent was to reduce slums, construct functional micro cities with green belts and implementing proper zoning laws.

Methodology of Research

This thesis is structured chronologically, and is composed of an urban analysis of the master plans of Beirut during the 1940’s and 1960’s. The plans will be studied in terms of the proposed systems of urban integration, social and architectural interventions as well as their theoretical framework. Thus, the first segment of this thesis will be centered around an abridged history of Beirut’s urban planning since the early 19th century. Throughout the first segment, I will address how the various points of Beirut’s historical planning are centered on redefining the relationship between Beirut and its surrounding hinterland and how human migration and the development of the city’s new elite would begin to drive urban change in the city at the expense of the city’s poor, and the sectarian divisions created as a result.

The second segment will address the first plan for Beirut between 1941 and 1944, the immediate political and social context surrounding Lebanon and Beirut and how Ecochard envisioned the city, addressing its plan, structure and organization. This segment will also detail Ecochard’s studying and planning methodology towards some of Beirut’s persistent urban divisions and addressing its refugee camps. The third segment will be concerned with the
period of time leading up to the second Beirut plan in 1961-4 as well as the creation of the planning and development infrastructure within Lebanon in addition to the plan itself and its perspectives towards the city. Finally, the fourth and final segment will conclude the arguments presented as well as draw parallels between Ecochard’s work and that of his contemporaries within Lebanon.

Methodologically, this thesis presents an interpretive reading of Ecochard’s plans over Beirut’s sectarian topography and divisions. Ultimately, the planner’s original maps\(^{23}\) will be viewed as historical tools behind which the agency of the architect, and how that agency affects the city’s urban fabric will be studied. This entails a redrawing of Ecochard’s plans of the city and overlaying them with various other layers of analysis concerning the city’s urban condition, its sectarian divisions and the economic and social disparity between its neighborhoods. In addition, given how Ecochard’s plan consistently become subverted by the Lebanese state and partially implemented, the mapping exercise will also exhibit which portions of these plans become a reality and the surrounding socio-political context of their implementation.

Reflecting upon the wider chronological nature of this thesis, the maps presented will change scales and scope depending on the growth of Beirut and the extents of the Ecochard’s urban planning and interventions. The first scalar unit to be presented is centered around the development and successive redevelopments of the city center as part of the second chapter on Beirut’s Urban History. The second unit, concerned with Ecochard’s 1940’s and his early 1960’s plans, enlarges the mapping scope to the Beirut peninsula, tracking the city’s expansion and Ecochard’s proposals. The third

\(^{23}\) Sourced from the architect’s personal archives at the Aga Khan Trust for Culture in Geneva, website: http://www.akdn.org/our-agencies/aga-khan-trust-culture
unit, addressing Ecochard’s Greater Beirut Metropolitan Area (GMBA) plan in 1963, maps the region between the Northern and Southern boundaries of the city as per the plan, exhibiting Beirut’s dramatic enlargement and how that ties into the city’s hinterland. The fourth and final unit, concerned with the Saifi-Ghalghoul plan of 1964, zooms back into the scale of the city center and tracks the architect’s architectural intervention upon its last residential neighborhoods.

Moreover, by consulting Ecochard’s archives, articles and projects; this thesis also puts the shift of the architect’s ethic between projects into perspective. The objective is to understand how and when Ecochard reacts to the planning authority by employing the perspective of a social engineer, and when he designs from the perspective of a real-estate developer depending on the social context. This shift is emphasized quite dramatically when the master plan of Jounieh in 1958, as well as that of Saifi-Ghalghoul in 1964 are discussed. And while Ecochard’s planning was not limited to Beirut and Jounieh, there is a clear separation between the contexts where Ecochard chooses to intervene as well as his methodology of intervention. The fourth chapter of this document will further outline this shift in methodology, in addition to discussing the importance of the plans proposed by Ecochard when it comes to assessing their social and political impact; specifically, in relation to the city’s spatial polarization in the internal civil wars of 1958 and 1975. The advent of the laissez-faire economic policy and the commercialization of the city center will also be considered and addressed through a socio-political lens.

24. But also extended to Jbeil, Delhamiye and Saida.
Literature Review and Sourcing

Concerning literary sources surrounding Ecochard and his work, I rely primarily on the critical works of Eric Verdeil, *Beyrouth et ses Urbanites* (2010) as well as Marlene Ghorayeb’s articles, *The Work and Influence of Michel Ecochard in Lebanon*, *L’intervention de Michel Ecochard: projets et réalisations* and *L’Urbanisme de la Ville de Beyrouth sous le Mandat Français*. Verdeil and Ghorayeb have both produced multiple literary works concerning Michel Ecochard’s plans and interventions in Lebanon. Verdeil’s book, in addition to his many articles, focuses on the legal framework surrounding the plans and the agency of their commission, primarily studying the Chehabist Welfare state, its national developmental programs and its visions for Beirut’s growth and urbanization. Verdeil also addresses the period after Ecochard’s departure from Lebanon until the war in 1975. Although Verdeil alludes to the sectarian component in the planning discourse of Lebanon, he affirms that the claim is indecisive.

Ghorayeb work focuses more on the spatial qualities surrounding Ecochard’s architectural interventions while also addressing extensively his professional formation from a director of antiquities in Syria to the go-to architect of French Colonial North Africa and the Levant while noting his concern for social issues. Ghorayeb also draws upon Ecochard’s Moroccan experience and provides a detailed account of his projects and endeavors worldwide. Both sources do not conduct a social and urban analysis of what the plans could have entailed for Beirut’s urban mosaic, and how, if implemented fully, they could have impacted the urban landscape of the city from a socio-political and economic view, the
primary contribution presented by this thesis.

For Beirut’s Urban History, Jens Hanssen’s *Fin de Siecle Beirut* provides the primary source around the city’s late Ottoman growth throughout the 19th century. Hanssen’s book intricately traces the development of Beirut from town to port-city to provincial capital, and how the rise of a new Beiruti bourgeoisie impacts the social and urban structure of the city. Many parallels will be drawn with the content of *Fin de Siecle Beirut* throughout the thesis as a new bourgeois class of Lebanese architects and planners collaborates with Ecochard for his plans and interventions following Lebanon’s independence.

Nina Jidejian’s *Beirut through the Ages* provides a detailed account into the functionality and growth of pre-Islamic Beirut, while Robert Saliba’s *Beirut 1920-1940*, Jad Tabet’s *Beyrouth: Portrait de Ville* and Peter Rowe and Hashim Sarkis’ *Projecting Beirut: Episodes in the Construction and Reconstruction of a Modern City* will provide the primary and necessary backgrounds towards the growth of post-independence Beirut as well as overviews of the city’s urban planning throughout the 20th century. George Arbid’s unpublished thesis *Practicing Modernism in Beirut* provides key insight on Ecochard’s aides and local contemporaries, while concentrating on the dissemination of the modernist discourse in Lebanon as a whole with a specific focus on Beirut. Arbid’s dissertation also provides a highly detailed account of Lebanon’s rising class of foreign educated architects and planners.

Concerning the mapping included within the scope of this thesis; Ecochard’s personal maps, courtesy of the Aga Khan Trust
for Culture based in Geneva as well as Ecochard’s archives at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Aga Khan Documentation Center, form the key sources and will be reproduced and clarified. These will then be combined with textual information pertaining to Beirut’s social and sectarian condition from the aforementioned sources as well as others such as May Davie’s *Beyrouth et ses Faubourgs (1840-1940)*, Claude Boueiz-Kanaan’s *Lebanon 1860-1960* and Helmut Rupert’s *Beyrouth une Ville d’Orient Marquee par l’Occident.*
Beirut’s Urban History
Beirut and its Hinterland Historically (pre-1830’s)

In order to understand the modern condition of the city of Beirut, and hence be able to assess the impact of Ecochard’s plan on the city and its inhabitants, it is imperative to construct an abridged history of the city’s urban form since the early 19th century, when the city first begin to swell in size and religious complexity. According to Ecochard, and profoundly obvious in both his plans; a major part of reconciling the haphazard planning of Beirut would be to completely rethink the concept of Beirut as a municipal city; its area, borders, and its urban and spatial relationships with the municipalities that surround it. Hence it is imperative to study how Beirut’s neighborhoods were formed and the agency behind urban change. In addition to noting how the city’s relationship with its surrounding hinterland shifts dramatically within small periods of time leading up to the formation of the Lebanese nation-state in 1921.

To begin, we must first consider the meaning of the term *hinterland* and what it entails geographically, socially and politically for any city or city state. *Hinterland*, originally a German word that means ‘the land in back of’, and according to Encyclopedia Britannica, is used to refer to the rural areas surrounding a
port or a coastal city. In this sense, the concept of hinterland is directly applicable to the negation of urban space as hinterlands are primarily not cities. And with the importance of the emergence of cities on the scale of the production of culture and civilization; hinterlands have historically been associated with the unruly, the barbaric and the uncivilized. On the other hand, cities cannot exist without their hinterlands, to be seen here politically as the natural space surrounding the city from whence it derives its wealth in resources, trading material, and population. The city in this case serves the function of providing the hinterland with a space from which to attain wealth and resources in exchange for capital production.

To address antiquity, in the pre-Roman period, Beirut’s relationship with its hinterland was highly centered around the sanctity awarded to the Lebanese mountains and their Cedar forests by the Canaanites. The Canaanites built their temples on the mountain tops surrounding their coastal city-states due to the belief that their Gods resided there. Geographically, the highest mountain in Beirut’s immediate region along the Mount Lebanon chain was Mount Sannine, believed to be the abode of the high God of the Phoenician pantheon, El. The foot of the Sannine’s mountainous massif rises in Beit Mery, an ancient settlement located at the edge of the Beirut river gorge less than 15km from where ancient Beirut would have been located. Beit Mery, would serve as an outpost for Beirut, ideally located mid-way towards the ancient holy temples on the top of Sannine. Over time, and especially during the Roman era, Beit Mery itself would evolve into a large pilgrimage and festival center devoted to the pleasing and pacification of the God Baal Mardoc, the God of earthquakes.
With the centering of the Phoenician economy around the trade of Cedar wood, with which Sannine was once coated, meant the growth of Beirut was directly related to the sanctity of its surrounding region and its mythological importance. It is also worth noting that although the city glorified the Gods of the mountains, they perceived of the mountain-dwellers inhabiting the sheer gorges and steep cliff-faces as unruly, uncivilized barbarians. Ancient Beirut, however, would never develop into an important trade center prior to the designation of the city as a Colonia during the Roman period. And even after so, its importance would be short-lived; finally being extinguished for over a millennium following the destruction of the city in 551 AD by a cataclysmic earthquake and its ensuing tsunami.  

Following the Islamic conquest of Syria, Beirut would become the main port of the city of Damascus, a role it would serve intermittently until the early-17th century when Emir Fakhreddine II Maan, with the aim of protecting the city from an Ottoman naval invasion, would block the harbor of the city by blowing up the medieval fortifications surrounding its entrance. After the fall of Fakhreddine, the city lost its importance again, and remained a local fishing town until the reconstruction of the Port and the resumption of trade in 1830.

Resurrecting a Port in Beirut (1830’s - 1888)

By the early 19th century, Beirut was a growing commercial
city of around 8000 inhabitants. And although the city was part of the Sanjak of Acre and henceforth under Acre’s direct control, Hanssen asserts in his book *Fin de Siècle Beirut* that Beirut by then had begun a series of trade dealings with foreign European powers to export renown silk from Mount Lebanon to Italian and French ports\(^\text{32}\). Beirut’s commercial freedom from Acre awarded the city the status of an autonomous entity within the Ottoman Empire, although politically, Beirut would repeatedly come under the hegemonic rule of the feudal Emirs of Mount Lebanon\(^\text{33}\), which surrounds the city on all sides.

In 1830, and following its separation from the Ottoman Empire under self-proclaimed Khedive Muhammad Ali in 1805, Egypt would invade Beirut and occupy the city, ultimately curbing the control of Mount Lebanon Emir Bashir II al-Shehabi and placing it under Ibrahim Pasha, military general and son of Egypt’s ruler, Mehmed Ali Pasha. From the perspective of Ibrahim Pasha, Beirut’s position as the uncontested port of Damascus was critical, especially given the city already functioned in a state of autonomy from the Imperial power based in Acre. And after the formation of a local municipal council, represented by 12 members of large land-owning families\(^\text{34}\) in the city evenly divided between Muslims and Christians and headed by Mahmud Nami Bey, the agency behind large-scale urban change was set. One of the local council’s first projects would be the construction of a port jetty upon the ruins of the older port facilities, returning to Beirut a port after a separation of almost 200 years. The ensuing economic boom in the city under Egyptian rule meant the opening of multiple foreign consulates and businesses eager to carve profit out of the Lebanese silk trade\(^\text{35}\). This would to a large degree exacerbate European patronage and

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35. Mount Lebanon also become a centre of silk export to Europe. According to historian Akram Khater, silk comprised 82.5% of all exports from Mount Lebanon to Europe in 1873. Meir Zamir, *Lebanon’s Quest : The Road to Statehood, 1926-1939* (London ; New York : I.B. Tauris, 1997., 1997), 86.
protectionist interventionist agendas concerning the minority groups that inhabited the Lebanese mountains and plains. Primarily, France would emerge as the protector of the Maronites and other Catholic Christians, Britain and the Ottoman Empire would handle the protection of the Druze.

In 1840, the Ottoman Empire regains control of Beirut after the departure of the Egyptians; however, in the mountain, mounting tensions exploded in a peasant revolt lead by the Maronites to topple both their own feudal lords and those of the Druze emirs. The dual Qaimaqamat system collapsed and the Ottoman army occupied the mountain. The marginalization of the Christian inhabitants of the mountain under the new direct Ottoman rule and their favoritism and military assistance towards the Druze would prompt a rapid militarization of the Maronites by the French.

Intermittent sectarian violence throughout the 1840’s and early 1850’s would plague the mountain, causing frequent waves of migration towards Beirut. The city’s population would almost quadruple between 1840 and 1860, rising from around 10,000 to 50,000 people. In 1860, tensions between the Druze and Maronites would finally boil over, igniting a front line that stretched through the mountain side. The ensuing war throughout the summer of 1860 destroyed hundreds of villages and after the conflict spread to Damascus, claimed the lives of at least 25,000 people, the overwhelming majority of whom were Christian.

The war in the mountain pushed massive waves of refugees fleeing the conflict towards Beirut, overwhelming the city’s population and completely altering its demographic make-
up. Where the Maronites had once made up 10% of the city’s population, and the city’s Christian-Muslim balance was almost divided equally; by the mid-1890’s, Beirut’s Christian population would dominate its Muslim counterpart, accounting for two-thirds of the city’s population41.

In the aftermath of the war, a new political system would be established to control the mountain. The Mutasarrefiyah of Mount Lebanon fused the two portions of the mountain together into a singular political entity while abolishing the right of each of the warring communities to rule. Following the establishment of the Mutasarrefiyah and the return of stability to its the geographic but politically separate hinterland, Beirut would experience a bout of growth and would become one of the most prized cities on the Eastern Mediterranean Basin. And with the Imperial reformations of the Ottoman Empire in the latter half of the 19th century, the Tanzimat, Beirut would see a continuous stream of public and imperial projects42 that aimed to beautify and according to Hanssen, Ottomanize the city43.

Thus would come the construction of the Grand Serail in 1850-3, a supreme assertion of Ottoman power on top of a hill, looming over the city and forming the backbone of the city’s skyline. The Serail’s sheer mass was meant to house the center of Ottoman power in the city and was built on top of the former acropolis44 of ancient Beirut. Following the Serail would be the construction of the military hospital next to it in 1861, the first dedicated municipal building in the city in 1868, as well as the expansion of the port, furthering the normalization of the Ottoman aesthetic throughout the city. The central authority in Istanbul’s aim was to ingrain its

36. This agenda was due to their Monophysite definition of the nature of Christ, which is contrary to the religious belief of their clergy. The religion established itself immediately, after persecution against it started following its creation, in Mount Lebanon and Syria, it ceased to accept new converts as of 1043. Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

38. The Druze are a religious sect whose beginnings are founded on Fatimid Egypt around 1017AD, initiated by Hamzah Ibn-Ali and Mohammad Al-Darazi, from which the group defines its name. The religion is monotheistic and venerates saints from both Christianity and Islam as well as a long line of Greek philosophers such as Plato and Socrates, whose teachings are central to the religious belief of their clergy. The religion established itself immediately, after persecution against it started following its creation, in Mount Lebanon and Syria, it ceased to accept new converts as of 1043. Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica.


42. Primarily under the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876 - 1909)

43. Rowe and Sarkis, Projecting Beirut, 44.

44. The religious center of Canaanite and Roman Beirut, the site where the city worshiped Poseidon.
1830 - 1840
- Port of Beirut rebuilt
- Movement of city’s merchants to Port district
- Displacement of city’s poorest neighborhoods
- City begins to spill out of Medieval walls
- First peri-urban structures

1890 - 1900
- Re-Ottomanization of Beirut
- Beirut Municipal Council of feudal families formed
- Change upon urban fabric driven to streamline trade
- Consolidation of city’s main squares and monuments
- Processional circulation through city
- Medieval walls demolished
- City spills onto surrounding landscape
1910 - 1920

Demolition of large areas of central district
Need to introduce hygiene
Mass exodus towards city periphery
Swift urbanization of the periphery
Urban decision making driven by Ottoman agency

1920 - 1940

Imported Urbanity
Commercialization of demolished center
Imposing of truncated Place de l’Etoile
Streamlining Port-Center connection
Introduction of colonial planning
subjugated cities into the Ottoman cultural and trade network and assert the identity of their inhabitants as Ottoman citizens. Foreign-sponsored universities and institutions were also constructed and the city flourished and a new elite began to take root within the city’s urban structure. However, before Beirut becomes a provincial capital in 1888, interventions within the city were more localized with the insertion of monuments and structure, free from large scale urban restructuring.

Beirut’s exploding population would mean the expansion of the city outside its walls and along main thoroughfares connecting the city to the mountain and beyond, to Damascus. Although this expansion was centrifugal around the city center, clear lines of religious and class segregation begin to take root as early on as the late 19th century. As the city’s wealthy began to appropriate the port and its surrounding districts for the construction of khans and department stores; the displaced population (described as the poorest mix of Sunni and Greek Orthodox families in the city) from these neighborhoods were moved outside the city walls to the Musaytbeh area south of Zokak el Blat where each community formed a neighborhood for itself. The neighborhoods in the immediate vicinity of the center: Bachoura, Monot, and Ras el Nabaa, would develop into mixed working-class districts with no clear majority over their inhabitants.

Ras Beirut and Zokak el Blat would become the elite mixed districts in the city with the construction of the Syrian Protestant College (Later the American University of Beirut) among other French, Protestant, and Orthodox schools which attracted students from across Lebanon and the region. Ras Beirut also maintained a
small (very poor) Druze enclave along its northern coastline since the 18th Century. The Eastern neighborhoods would be almost exclusively Christian, the Achrafieh hill would become the home of the elite land and business owning Christian families, primarily the Greek Orthodox community concentrated in lavish villas and mansions around the Churches of St. Dimitri and St. Nicholas. The Gemmayze, Rmeil, Geitawi and Mar Maroun neighborhoods would contain the Maronite majority, mostly refugees from the war in the mountain.

In 1888, and following several public campaigns and petitions by the city’s elites, aided by their brethren in the mountain, Beirut would be designated as a provincial capital of its own Vilayet. The city would not only acquire an elevated status in itself, but would also control the entire Syrian coastline from Latakia to Tripoli and from Sidon to Nablus. And although it remained separated from this new hinterland by the Mutasarrefiyah; the increased relationship between the mountain and the city geographically, politically, socially and economically would mean exponential prosperity for Beirut.

Beirut, A Provincial Capital (1888-1920)

After the capitalization of Beirut, a new form of Ottoman driven change would take place involving much more urban projects aimed at transforming Beirut into a trade center; facilitating access and circulation throughout the dense city center. The Beirut Municipal Council formed in 1868 would be dominated by the Sunni families in 1889 with 17 out of a total of 52 members, followed closely by
the Maronites at 16 members and the Greek Orthodox families at 14 members. Key feudal families from each sect would have a consistent, if not necessary, presence on the municipal council. These included Sunni families such as Daouk, Beyhum, Qabbani, Sabbagh and Salam; Orthodox families such as Bustrus, Tuweini, Sursuq, Trad, Najjar and Fakhri as well as Maronite ones such as Malhama, Naqqache and Tabet. The importance of the presence of these families as well as how that relates to the dissemination of the discourse of planning through Ecochard will be detailed in later segments of this thesis. This form of elite representation sows some of the earlier seeds of the system of social inheritance that Lebanon still suffers from today.

Essentially, the role of the Beirut Municipal Council was to provide legal and municipal structure for the control of the city’s markets, health facilities and quarantines, public morality and welfare as well as providing the city with a structured urban planning. However, given the domination of the council by Lebanon’s feudal families, the structure of the city’s planning throughout the late 19th and early 20th century would mostly be concerned with the capitalization of these families of the urban fabric of the city, inducing urban reform as a function of increasing economic output and trade in specified localities of their interests. In addition, the new municipal council would begin a program referred to by Hanssen as ‘social cleansing’ as the city’s rich began a large-scale program to introduce cleanliness and order into the bustling streets of the Medieval town, systematically displacing the city’s poorer inhabitants towards its peripheries. Coupled with an increased influx of people from Beirut’s new hinterland as well as Mount Lebanon, this meant the expansion of the city’s

45. Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut*, 149, Figure 4.
46. Ibid., 146–7, Figure 3.
47. Where the sons of a feudal family inherit their father’s political positions in government, establishing a continuous line of hegemony along feudal-familial ties.
neighborhoods along the pre-established community zones from its earlier growth.

This en-masse population movement towards Beirut meant the creation of a new urban condition along the city’s borders with the Mutasarrefiyah. Intermediary settlements that acted as trading outposts while lying within the geographic control of Mount Lebanon were established. Villages such as Jnah, Furn el Chebbak, Chiyah and Sin el Fil would take form. The primary population of these villages composed of Maronite peasants now working in south Beirut’s vast Orange, Olive and Mulberry groves; benefited from the city’s prosperity while avoiding its hefty taxation policies. The movement of the mountain population towards the city would also import the Za’im social organization as communities congregated by class, village of origin and familial ties.

In terms of municipal organization, the city was divided into 12 electoral districts each centered around a police station and headed by two Mukhtars. In time, a vertically integrated political system would develop through the Mukhtar-Za’im partnership, effectively monopolizing sectarian politics and allegiances around the elite of each sect who advertised themselves as cosmopolitan citizens of the new Beirut Merchant Republic. The city’s poor and continuously displaced populations would become the pawns of this partnership with the Mukhtar functioning on a neighborhood level and the Za’im on the city-wide level.

Beirut would be due for its first large-scale restructuring under a new Wali, Kemal Bey in 1892. The Wali’s intervention would aim to consolidate the major squares and centers of political

49. Za’im references the feudal lords of the Lebanese mountains who maintained patron-client relationships with their subjects throughout the late Ottoman era. Rowe and Sarkis, Projecting Beirut, 12.

50. These are Minet El Hosn, Sayfi, Rumayl, Achrafieh, Ras El Nabaa, Mazra’a, Jumayzet El Yamin, Ras Beirut, Ayn Mreise, Zuqaq el Blat, Bashura and Museytbeh. Hanssen, Fin de Siècle Beirut, 153, Map 6.

51. Only Achrafieh and Rmayl/Gemmayze had one Mukhtar due homogeneous sectarian composition since the two mukhtar system was meant for sectarian representation.

52. Mukhtar, translated from Arabic as that who is chosen, denotes a neighborhood community representative.

53. Hanssen, Fin de Siècle Beirut, 27.
and economic power through the construction of two streets. The first of these streets named after Emir Bachir II linked the two most important squares in the city, Sahat al Burj and Sahat al Sur to the center of political power, the Grand Serail. The second street created a direct access line between the Port, the Bazaars on Bab Idriss, and connected Bab Idriss to the northern side of Sahat al Burj. The axes of [Public Squares - Serail] and [Port - Bazaar] were clearly meant to facilitate the movement of commodities within the city as well as creating a processional connection with the Imperial governing power. Even more interestingly, this primary pathway through the city carefully frames the Ottoman constructed monuments and elite constructed department stores while avoiding the city's inner neighborhoods, conveying to the viewer the image of a rich, Ottoman city. It is upon this new axis of grandeur that the Maronite community would erect their symbol of presence, the St. George Maronite Cathedral completed in 1896, dominating the skyline of the city center. Further intervention in the immediate aftermath of the 1892 plan would see the creation of Fakhreddine street, connecting Sahat al Sur and the Serail to the Souks as well as the opening of Rue Foch to connect the Khans and Wikalas of the Tuweini and Sursuq families to their respective bazaars.

This elite economic restructuring would lead to the demolition of hundreds of homes, displacing more of the city center’s inhabitants towards the peripheries of the city. Eventually, tensions would begin to simmer on the borders between community enclaves due to high density, dire urban conditions and a radial circulatory system that limited access to neighborhoods and communities. The most notable of these tensions would culminate in the 1903 riots in Musaytbeh, after the Wali of Beirut Rashid Bey accused
the Mutasarrif of Mount Lebanon, Muzaffar Pasha of harboring Christian outlaws. An end to the riots was brokered by a deal between the Sunni and Orthodox notables from the Sursuq and Beyhum families, exhibiting a direct system of political patronage of their sectarian communities58.

With the rise of the Young Turks to power in the early 20th century, Beirut’s fortunes would begin to worsen as the Ottoman Empire approached its inevitable implosion. The Final restructuring of this era would be perpetuated by Beirut’s Wali Azmi Bey in 1915 and would entail razing immense swaths of the medieval city to construct the Ma’arad and Allenby Streets, creating a third wave of displacement towards the city’s fringes. This large-scale demolition aimed at introducing cleanliness into the city as was part of a larger series of street constructions that were also imposed upon Aleppo, Damascus, Jerusalem and Jaffa59. The consistent marginalization of the city’s poor lead to a cross-confessional revolt in 1915 lead by the city’s scholars and notables that was ultimately crushed with their execution on May 6th, 1916.

Between 1916 and the final departure of the Ottomans in 1920, Beirut would become a haven for those who successfully fled the Ottoman siege of Mount Lebanon. Following the onset of the Great Famine in 1915-1916, the city’s inhabitants and those of the mountain would be decimated as Lebanon lost a third of its population to starvation and war60.

A French Mandate Affair (1920-1941)
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, an agreement was brokered between the British and French over the division of Levant named Sykes-Picot agreement. This would entail the carving up of the Levantine basin into spheres of direct and indirect French and British influence, Britain would become a mandate power over Trans-Jordan and Iraq, while France controlled Syria and Lebanon. Britain and France Conclude Sykes-Picot Agreement - May 19, 1916,” HISTORY.com, accessed May 22, 2017, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/britain-and-france-conclude-sykes-picot-agreement.ould mandate Syria and Lebanon.

The Maronites are the descendants of the ancient Phoenicians is also based on a false historical construction given the Maronites first arrived en-masse to Mount Lebanon from the 4th-7th centuries AD, a full 8 centuries after the last great Phoenician city, Tyre, was destroyed by the armies of Alexander the Great in 332BC.

With the formation of Le Grand Liban in 1922 and the advent of the French Mandate over Lebanon and Syria, Beirut’s relationship with its hinterland would once again be altered as the colonizing power divided the fertile crescent into nation-states. Greater Lebanon would thus include the areas of the Mutasarrefiyah of Mount Lebanon in addition to the Beqaa, the Akkar Plain in Northern Lebanon as well as Southern Lebanon which previously had been under the direct rule of the Sanjak of Acre.

The creation of the Lebanese nation-state in its current borders was the ultimate manifestation of what Carol Hakim discusses at length in her book, the Lebanese National Idea. The Lebanese National Idea, as argued by Hakim, was the manifestation of long-standing Maronite dream of autonomy within the Lebanon mountains, which is considered by the Maronite Church as being the Maronite homeland. This translates in the historic isolationist policies adopted by the Maronite feudal lords of the mountain throughout the Ottoman, and earlier Arab, Empires as well as a persistent will to dominate the coastal cities from the mountain. However, the movement from the Mutasarrefiyah to the nation-state meant the addition of 3 Muslim majority regions whose inhabitants did not identify immediately with the Lebanese nation-state, and had initially requested to remain adhered to their historic ties to large cities within their realms now located within British Mandated Palestine and Syria.

The Maronites, being favored by the French in the newly formed mandate as being the ‘most civilized and educated’ of the Lebanese, would become the primary power shareholders, systematically monopolizing Lebanon’s politics and economy;
securing and localizing the largest share of government and mandate sponsored development in their regions of Mount Lebanon and the capital. This in turn, would lead to the marginalization of the remainder of Lebanon’s communities who found themselves unwillingly in a national context that rejected their historical constructions of community identities in favor of the Neo-Phoenicianism\(^{63}\) advocated for primarily by the Maronites. It is also imperative to note the shift in community tensions from within Mount Lebanon, historically between the Druze and the Maronites, to the newly added Sunni-dominated cities of the coastline, now forming the bulk of the anti-separatist sentiment and locked in a perpetual cycle of political conflict with their Maronite counterparts.

The French mandate would inherit a Beirut with a demolished center and an incomplete Ottoman modernization scheme given the haste with which the Empire was dissolved. Atop the demolished fabric, the mandate authorities would construct a truncated\(^{64}\) Place de l’Etoile, importing from Haussmann’s Paris a rigid radial organization for Beirut’s new center. The buildings constructed throughout the 1930’s alongside the new avenues would exhibit a collage of architectural styles that aimed to introduce an aesthetic which Assem Salam\(^{65}\) laments as being closer to that of southern France rather than the Arab Oriental.

In terms of urban design, Freres Danger would be commissioned in May 1931 to provide a masterplan for Beirut. The plan aimed to extend the city southwards by defining a new edge along its coastline and agricultural plains, as well as providing a comprehensive embellishment scheme for the beautification of the city. Following the rejection of the plan, the city’s expansion

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\(^{63}\) The idea that the Maronites are the descendants of the ancient Phoenicians is also based on a false historical construction given the Maronites first arrived en-masse to Mount Lebanon from the 4th-7th centuries AD, a full 8 centuries after the last great Phoenician city, Tyre, was destroyed by the armies of Alexander the Great in 332BC.

\(^{64}\) The initial plan aimed at the integration of a complete star formation for the entirety of the demolished zone; however, the owners of the souks of Sursok, Hani, Raad and Abi Nasr families heavily resisted French attempts at introducing the radial plan through their markets; moreover, the presence of the St. George Greek Orthodox Cathedral as well as the St. Elias Melkite Catholic Cathedral further complicated the expropriation and demolition project. The united sectarian-economic front finally pressured the French authorities to concede, leaving the last two streets of the etoile unimplemented. Chantal El Hayek, *The Last Levantine City: Beirut, 1830-1930*, 2015, 56.

\(^{65}\) Assem Salam was a modernist architect trained at the University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom, he graduated with a degree in architecture in 1950. He has had an illustrious career in the design and realization of several modernist structures in Beirut, most notably the Khachogi Mosque bordering Horsh Beirut. He belongs to the Salam family of Beirut’s Sunni notables. Salam also held the title of head of the OEA from 1996-1999. Arbid, *Practicing Modernism in Beirut*, 192.
continued haphazardly until the second major attempt at providing it with a functional masterplan came about with the arrival of Ecochard in the 1940’s.

Conclusion

This chapter constructed a brief urban history of Beirut before Ecochard’s planning initiatives, detailing the relationship between the city’s urban change and the power and agency of its feudal families. Moreover, it provided a deconstruction of the ideological differences between Lebanon’s frequently embattled sectarian communities and how the creation of the nation-state seemed to come to the favor of one of those communities at the expense of the others, who by Ecochard’s coming in the 1940’s had already begun to exhibit various forms of public and communal distress in the face of the Maronite, French-endorsed, political and economic monopoly.
Master Plan for the City of Beirut 1941-4
Political and Social Context During World War II

Ecochard enters Beirut in 1941 following extensive work in Syria under the political patronage of the French Colonial Mission in the Levant. His close relationship to the high circles of French Mandate politics as well as his extensive work alongside Freres Danger for the Damascus master plan in 1936 meant Ecochard’s planning schemes would become a tool for French Colonial urban reformation. The primary goal behind these endeavors would mean the consolidation of major Levantine cities alongside French urban design ideals, allowing France’s military regiments based in the colonies to quickly access city centers, airport, ports and subsequently evacuate a city efficiently should the need arise. In addition, the dramatic collapse of France under Nazi rule in 1940 and the formation of an exiled Free French Army in resistance meant an increased reliance on colonial territories which were soon enough drawn into global conflict with the invasion of North Africa in June 1940.

General George Catroux would immediately be posted to head the French Mandate in the Levant by General Charles De Gaulle. Arriving in 1941, Catroux immediately declared the
independence of Syria and Lebanon pending France’s victory in the war, a bleak attempt at pacifying the increasingly resistant opposition to the French authorities within Syria and Lebanon. A strict food rationing system, inflated censorship and the cessation of trade and economic activity had put tremendous stress upon both population, riots and demonstrations were frequent in Damascus and Beirut (see figure 4), and the Second World War was at their doorstep. Recognizing the importance of Beirut’s position on the Eastern Mediterranean and its vitality within the Free French Army’s supply network, Catroux moved immediately to commission Ecochard to draw up a comprehensive master plan for the city in 1942. Catroux even confided in Ecochard his desire for the architect to act as a town-planning dictator concerning Beirut’s master plan.

Ecochard would begin his design by assessing the previously proposed Plan Danger in 1932-4, of which he was highly critical; regarding it as lacking an overall vision and sense of cohesion. Ecochard believed the Danger plan represented an Urbanisme d'Alignement and believed that the growth of the city had already consumed the many rights of way that were proposed by the project, calling for more demolitions of the built fabric. A few years later, Ecochard would collaborate directly with Freres Danger in the 1936 Damascus master plan, greatly advancing his experience as an urban planner. Following Ecochard’s arrival to Beirut in 1942, the greatly modified 1939 Danger plan presented by Joseph Najjar, would be used as a base draft for Ecochard’s expansion and organization of Beirut.

However, before delving into the specificities of Ecochard’s
plan for the city, it remains imperative to highlight the contextual differences between the cities of Beirut and Damascus at the time of Ecochard’s work. Firstly, Damascus’s urban fabric is profoundly more homogeneous that Beirut’s sectarian mosaic. One way or another, this meant that decisions made in Damascus were significantly more centralized than those made in Beirut, the diversity of the shareholders and their multiplicity being a key factor. Moreover, Damascus's position as the political center of the French Mandate authority with Beirut as its port under control of the French backing Maronites, meant that the city was afforded a greater degree of autonomy than its Syrian counterpart; an autonomy that would eventually translate to a lack of political consent among the diverse parties over a consistent planning strategy for the city. Further complicating his proposal, was the daunting task of planning around and integrating the city’s sectarian communities through the rigidity of French colonial planning.

Ecochard’s was briefed directly by General Catroux, and was immediately made aware of the most important points of focus for the new city’s master plan. The port and airport were to be enlarged, the latter to be relocated further South from its present location in Jnah. Beirut will acquire a ring road, a large avenue that bypasses the city completely but links it to Tripoli and Saida, and several large avenues that delineate the city’s center as well as pierce through the fabric to provide direct access between the port, airport, Grand Serail, the city’s largest public spaces, its railway station, and the road to Damascus. The intent was clear, in the event of an invasion or attack, the allies needed to move their armies as efficiently as possible along the mountainous coastline and along Lebanon’s coastal cities while creating clear axes that
Figure 4. Community Tension Map in 1941
connect the city’s peripheries to their central districts.

Concerning Beirut’s urban form at the eve of Ecochard’s plan, which constitutes the context upon which Ecochard reacted, the city center’s peripheral regions had experienced exponential growth since the creation of Le Grand Liban in 1921. The mass migration of some of Lebanon’s rural communities, mostly from Mount Lebanon, had driven the rapid urbanization in the city’s eastern and southern districts. Meanwhile, Beirut’s traditional Sunni and Greek Orthodox communities urbanized around their respective enclaves created from the exodus from the city center decades before (see figure 3). A series of large Maronite villages develop along the city’s southern periphery; replacing the settlements, farms and plantations that carefully straddled the border between the Mutasarrefiyah and the Vilayet while benefiting from the same spatio-territorial condition carried through from the late Ottoman period. The city’s North Western portion, strategically positioned between some of the city’s largest and most acclaimed universities, begins to develop into a middle to high class suburb, Hamra.

On the Eastern flank, straddling both sides of the Beirut river, a large Armenian refugee camp⁶⁹, Bourj Hammoud, is slowly undergoing regularization and urbanization. It is Beirut’s newest, and densest, neighborhood abound with temporary constructions that house several families at once. However, it’s strategic location on the main roads between Beirut’s port and Northern Lebanon meant that it needed to be rapidly reformed, a modification that would later be proposed by Ecochard and made central to his expansion plan for Beirut.

Figure 5. 1943 Ecochard Plan

Port to be Enlarged

Airport to be moved south to Khaldeh

Legend
- Yellow: Zone One
- Light Yellow: Zone Two
- Light Pink: Zone Three
- Bright Pink: Zone Four

Industrial Zones
Moreover, when the street network of early 1940’s Beirut is considered, it is immediately evident that the city’s radial growth around the center meant no direct axes between the city’s various neighborhoods. The exception of these being the city center, providing the sole direct connection between Beirut’s Eastern and Western districts. Damascus road\textsuperscript{70} at this point also seems to form the dividing line between the mixed, but overwhelmingly Muslim Western segment and it’s almost exclusively Christian Eastern counterpart. The lack of lateral connectivity between Beirut’s neighborhoods and the longitudinal expansion of the city Southward meant the extrusion of the city’s sectarian neighborhoods along pre-established community quarters with a lack of an overall comprehensive circulation pattern. Ecochard’s reaction to the city’s growth patterns would aim not only to reform intra-city circulation, but also to consolidate the new expansion of the city along newly created urban ‘health’ axes.

Ecochard’s proposal

Ecochard’s plan (see figure 5), presented in 1944 after two years of intensive studies that included a historical mapping of Beirut pre-mandate and as far back as the Roman era. In addition, Ecochard also mapped the city’s urban growth over time and conducted an extensive aerial photography campaign over the city and its surrounding hinterland. Firstly, Ecochard begins by re-defining what formally constitutes the city of Beirut in terms of land area and municipal control. The boundary of the provincial capital set during the 19th century is abolished, and the city’s boundaries

\textsuperscript{70} Infamous for its dramatic transformation into Beirut’s green line during the civil war of 1975-1990.
Figure 6. 1943 Ecochard Plan - Circulatory Diagram
are to be extended to Nahr el Mot in the North, forming the first point of expansion of the Beirut peninsula away from Mount Lebanon, and the Ghadir River in the South, running through the olives gloves of the neighboring town of Choueifat.

This new extension meant the addition of the Armenian refugee camp/settlement of Bourj Hammoud as well as South Beirut’s Maronite villages to the city’s fabric. The new border of the city would be marked by a peripheral boulevard that connects North and South Lebanon, linking Tripoli to Saida while bypassing Beirut’s dense neighborhoods. The city’s seafront to the East of the Port will be zoned for the Port’s expansion until the Beirut river, while the airport is to be relocated to Khaldeh. Linking the airport to the city center would be a direct line of access passing through Beirut’s pine forest, in addition to 3 lateral connections directly linking the Eastern and Western portions of the city (see figure 6). Beirut’s city center would be surrounded by a ring road to de-congest it from its daily traffic woes, branching out from either side of the new ring road would be the road to Damascus, the airport and the future urban areas of the city. This logical consolidation of airport-port-political center was meant to facilitate armored vehicular access to and from the city center as efficiently as possible while providing the French mandate authorities with clear routes of evacuation withdrawal should the city be attacked.

Beirut would then be divided into 12 administrative sections, each reporting to the municipal council based in the city center. In terms of zoning, Ecochard envisions the creation of two industrial zones, one along the Northern entrance to the city, and another along the Beirut river. The city is then imagined as expanding
Figure 7. 1943 Ecochard Plan - Implemented Sections as per 1950’s Municipal Plan
along 4 phases, the first of which starting in Bourj Hammoud, and moving clockwise towards the sea as the city continues growing. Interestingly enough, Ecochard imagines the beginning of Beirut’s growth as branching out from and regularizing the city’s newest, poorest and densest neighborhood, the Armenian refugee camp. Here we see Ecochard’s high concern towards the city’s newly forming slums, proposing an immediate urban reaction not only by integrating the neighborhood into Beirut’s newly expanded borders, but also starting the urban Amenagement or re-organization directly from Bourj Hammoud. The second phase of expansion aimed to urbanize the Southern portion of Achrafieh and extend the city towards the settlements of Furn el Chebbak and Hazmiah while planning a large road interchange where the third and fourth ring roads as well as the road to Damascus converge. The Third phase of Ecochard’s expansion plan is in itself divided into 3 segments progressing from that closest to the Ras Beirut (designated as 3A) and moving towards the airport (designated as 3C). The fourth and final urban expansion of the city would be the Bourj-Hammoud / Sin el Fil Axis on the Eastern waterline of the Beirut River.

While the Architect himself does not explicitly address Beirut’s sectarian divisions, Ecochard’s axes that cut into the fabric of the city seem to be carefully designed to bisect the city’s most disenfranchised, unruly and mixed neighborhoods; particularly those along its Southern axis such as Mazra’a, Mousaytbeh, Ras el Naba’a, Bachoura, Monot, Barbir, and Mar Elias. The urban form surrounding these communities meant that while commuting from one’s residence to their workplace, the commuter inevitably had to pass through other neighborhoods inhabited by other communities creating sectarian tensions over right of way. A historic example
of this are the residents of the Greek Orthodox neighborhood in Mousaytbeh, which when transiting between their locality and the city center, experienced various forms of sectarian violence while passing through their surrounding Sunni neighborhoods and vice versa. Ecochard’s new avenues that connect the city’s periphery to the center provided a large neutral axis that bisected several neighborhoods and communities at once, creating a direct link between the rapidly commercializing center and the neighborhoods that radiate from it.

It is important here to note that while the driving agency behind the master plan was profoundly French colonial and based on a militaristic modernization of colonial cities, it is also imperative to mention, or at least allude to the agency of the designing authority, Michel Ecochard himself. The fact that Ecochard clearly defines the scope of the city’s urban expansion as one starting with the regularization of a refugee camp and the introduction of a singular fabric for Beirut’s growth, further attests to Ecochard’s understanding that the future of Beirut lay in the integration of its communities within a singular space rather than proposing a series of island expansions that cater to the sectarian communities within.

However, not all sources agree on the militaristic nature of Ecochard’s 1940s plan. Gregoire Serof, a contemporary of Ecochard and one of his aides, maintains that Ecochard’s intent behind the 1940’s plan was more geared towards modernizing Beirut, with the application of a radial system of planning around the city center. This stance is further detailed in Chantal El Hayek’s thesis, The Last Levantine City, addressing how the Place de l’Etoile and the Plan Danger of the earlier decade act as agents
of urban modernization primarily concerned with easing traffic flow throughout the city. El Hayek argues that Ecochard’s plan, like that of Freres Dangers did not present an urban design comprehensive enough to be characterized as militaristic; however, like the Ottoman attempts half a century before it, it aimed to consolidate a unified circulation through the city; albeit on a much larger scale by connecting the Beirut’s economic and political nodes. At key moments in this unified circulation, come Ecochard’s points of direct intervention, the Serail, Martyr’s Square, the Port, Airport, and a new, regularized, integrated Eastern Neighborhood.

In addition to his urban plan, Ecochard would also provide a series of architectural and traffic design plans. His architectural plans included a new project for remodeling the Ottoman Serail that looms over the city center. Ecochard proposes the demolition of the Ottoman structure along with its acclaimed clock tower and the military hospital built adjacent to its Northern facade and their replacement with a large modernist compound of governmental and institutional structures. The intention behind this move is clear, the newly independent Lebanese nation-state will need a new symbol and structure of power that was to be profoundly modern. The crowning of the city’s ancient acropolis with this modern vestige, overlooking a remodeled French designed city center can be seen as representing both an abolishing of the Ottoman Islamic and a rejection of the new French-Levantine architectural collage surrounding Place de l’Etoile. The modernist vestige’s minimal approach and its abstraction of architectural identity could be further interpreted as an attempt to neutralize Lebanon’s urban fabric. The city under the gaze of its new modernist power structure in the post-independent era would no longer aim to resemble a faux-Paris or

71. El Hayek, The Last Levantine City, 58.
an Ottoman-Islamic city, but would seek a new globalized mode of self-identification, one that collapses the translation of cultural, religious and Lebanon’s already conflicted identitarian ideologies into a neutral architectural complex.

Ecochard’s planning also provided a comprehensive series of plans concerning Beirut’s social and communal spaces. He plans the creation of protected zones, divided into environmental zones as well as archaeological ones. The environmental zones, such as Horsh Beirut, a large pine forest bordering the city’s southern neighborhood, as well as the city’s beaches and natural landmarks, were to be zoned as in-develop-able with substantial green landscapes surrounding them for their protection while extending the scope and size of the pine forests. The archaeological zones aimed at conserving the city’s oldest buildings as well as some of the newly discovered archaeological sites courtesy of the French reconstruction of its city center. Ecochard also provided traffic plans for key intersections such as the Hazmieh interchange and the Martyr’s Square - Port axis, promoting ease of circulation between the city’s largest public space, the nucleus of its commercial activity, the souks; and the its largest freight outlet, the port.

Yet, like the plan of Freres Danger, Ecochard’s plan was also not to be implemented fully due to the power and agency of Lebanon’s land-owning bourgeois and Beirut’s nouveau-riche, rejecting Ecochard’s call for expropriation. According to Hayek, the power structure and division within the Lebanese political system, the Ottoman established sectarian-economic system, allowed these families significant agency over urban decisions, especially given their consistent dominance over the Beirut Municipality. In
fact, the plan never made it to Lebanon’s parliament for ratification, citing a lack of real-estate speculation at a time of global conflict.

The Advent of the Modernist Discourse

Ecochard’s role in the dissemination of modern planning in Syria and Lebanon is a crucial one. The architect’s heading of Syria’s planning in Syria meant the direct importation of French urban planning ideals into a context where decision making was highly structured and centralized. His experience in Lebanon, and Beirut specifically, meant the lack of this top-down decision making due to the numerous and diverse actors at play, each of whom meant to advance their own economic agenda at the expense of the city itself and its inhabitants.

This essentially meant that Ecochard’s methodology had to consistently adapt to the lack of consensus between the city’s planning authorities, its sectarian municipality. However, Ecochard would instead become a very active member of the formation of the educational apparatus for the teaching of architecture and planning in Lebanon. In 1943, he gives the inaugural speech for the first school of architecture in Lebanon and Syria, which he helped create, providing a nationalized platform for architectural education. However, Ecochard’s inability to advance his own agenda throughout the 1940s plan in favor of the city’s embellishment and restructuring would lead him to proclaim in 1945, that he had failed in planning Beirut. Nevertheless, following his return to Beirut in the late 1950’s, Ecochard’s role in establishing an autonomous planning authority would greatly expand under the patronage of Fouad Chehab.


73. Ibid., 259.

74. Given most Lebanese architects and planners at this point were still trained abroad in France, Great Britain and the United States.

Moreover, Ecochard’s large network of local architects, planners and collaborators, meant a constant professional exchange and propagation of modernist ideals; especially given most of these collaborators, such as Amine el Bizri and Henri Edde, were either engrained in Lebanon’s political-elite system or were figures of authority at the Order of Engineers and Architects (OEA). Essentially, Ecochard’s ties to Lebanon’s sectarian-political system through its architects and planners meant that his voice would constantly be heard as he positioned himself squarely against the liberal-capitalism advocated for by Lebanon’s politicians. Ecochard thus is not only an agent of the state, but also its primary critic. In later segments of this thesis, I will exhibit the shift in Ecochard’s planning methodology to cater to the Lebanese political system.

This chapter dealt with Ecochard’s first plan for the city of Beirut between 1940-1944, it discussed the plan’s impact upon Beirut’s sectarian topography at that time. Ecochard’s plan exhibits a sensitivity towards the city’s poorest neighborhood, its Armenian refugee camp and aims to launch the project for the restructuring of the entire city from there, while zoning ample space for greenery and protected areas. The project aimed to streamline circulation through and around the city while addressing the lack of cross-city accessibility that developed due to the city’s organic radial growth around its center. Moreover, this chapter dealt with the failure of the plan as well as Ecochard’s role in the propagation and establishment of modernist planning in Lebanon. The upcoming fourth chapter concerns Ecochard’s return to Beirut in the late 1950’s and his second set of proposals for the organization and planning of the city.
Following Lebanon’s independence from the French Mandate in 1943, the young and already-conflicted nation-state’s political and feudal families immediately moved to separate government and economy; furthering the freedom of trade system that first took hold during the early 19th century, and which in itself led to the rise of this same bourgeoisie. A Laissez-Faire economic policy was enacted, rendering Lebanon’s economy free from political governmental intervention. While it seemed like an incredibly avant-garde stance for a newly independent post-colonial state, this came at the cost of both providing equity within the Lebanese economy for all Lebanese communities, as well as providing balanced economic aid and development across the entirety of the nation. In essence, the Laissez-Faire economy would allow Lebanon’s mercantile class – the assortment of sectarian feudal families, led by Mount Lebanon’s Maronite transplants in the capital – to continue the political and economic monopoly allowed to them by the French authorities. Independent Lebanon, although 49% Muslim to 51% Christian in 1932 already, would still grant the Maronites exclusive rights to the presidency of the republic, the governing of its armed forces, the governing of the Central

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The first few years of Lebanon’s independence would be characterized by what Toufic Gaspard refers to as a period of ‘Growth Without Development’. In essence, reflecting the priorities of the post-colonial government headed by President Bechara el-Khoury. The 1948 free foreign exchange transaction law followed closely by the creation of the freely convertible Lebanese pound in 1950 as well as the Bank secrecy law of 1956, would lead to an explosion in Lebanon’s banking sector as foreign capital from the Arabian Gulf, where oil had just been discovered and was in the process of extraction, poured into the Lebanese capital generating a large amount of wealth for both the state and the heads of the financial sector and bank owners, mostly Maronite.

In addition to the above, the \textit{faux nation-building} program would see the localization of almost all publicly funded projects of that era within Beirut and Mount Lebanon. This new economic relationship between the city and its historic hinterland, built upon the marriage of sectarianism and economy, meant highly depleted funds and developmental programs were awarded to Lebanon’s peripheral regions, which were overwhelmingly non-Christian. This further exacerbated the existing sectarian tensions between the Lebanese communities. The centralization of the state around the capital and its immediate hinterland would also force large waves of rural migration towards a rapidly expanding Beirut, now one of the richest cities on the Eastern Mediterranean. These populations, seeking better economic conditions, education and health care, would begin settling the Southern and Eastern fringes of the
Figure 9. Class Distribution Map in 1961
city. First came the Maronite farmers, moving from the isolated mountain top villages of Jbeil and Batroun, who greatly expanded the suburbs of Furn el Chebbak, Chiah, Haret Hreik and Sin el Fil. These were followed by a large Shi'ite migration from South Lebanon and the Bekaa, where the Lebanese government had an almost negligible presence, further swelling the southern suburbs and establishing settlements alongside their disenfranchised Maronite counterparts.

The 1950’s would present independent Lebanon with its first set of large-scale natural and political disasters as a nation-state. Beginning with the Palestinian Exodus of 1948, where over 100,000 Palestinians [mostly Muslim and thus tipping the delicate power balance that kept Lebanon more or less stable] would seek refuge in Lebanon following the colonization of Palestine by Israel (see figures 8 & 9). The Palestinians would be given state-owned land in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut and other large Lebanese cities to settle in and form refugee camps, the presence of several camps around the capital, as well as the mixed Maronite & Shi’ite settlements of South Beirut, would popularize the term Belt of Misery in reference to the poor housing conditions, unavailability of utilities and services, as well as lack of access to hygiene and health care. In 1955, another crisis would strike Lebanon’s second largest city, Tripoli. Record breaking rainfall would cause the river that ran through the old town to spill its banks, inundating the city center and forcing thousands from their homes. One year later in 1956, a 6.0 magnitude earthquake destroyed scores of villages and towns in the Jezzine Caza, severely damaging Lebanon’s third largest city, Saida and creating another wave of displacement towards the capital, which by this time had begun cringe under the weight...
Figure 10. Community Tension Map in 1961
of sudden over-population with no comprehensive developmental or reactionary plan in sight. By 1950, Beirut’s population would surpass 500,000 people; a decade later, the agglomeration was home to over 700,000.\(^81\)

Throughout this period, and prior to 1952, there had been several attempts to plan Beirut; primarily under the leadership of Swiss planner Ernst Egli. These plans, as maintained by Verdeil, are neither well known nor detailed. Inspired by Ecochard’s 1943 plan, Egli and his aide Rolf Meyer sought to re-organize the city in order to further the development of business by connecting the touristic and commercial areas of the city. The Egli plan, which would later evolve into the Beirut municipal plan of 1954, maintained the creation of Ecochard’s East-West boulevards throughout the city, but was significantly less comprehensive than its earlier counterpart when it came to defining the scope of the city and its extensions (see figure 7). The municipal plan proposed and approved in 1954, was a perversion of Egli’s plan and its Ecochardian precedent. The road network previously proposed during Ecochard’s 1943 plan was imported without considering the city in its context at the time. The zoning proposals; however, were dropped, including those relating to the preservation of the city’s natural and archaeological sites and its architectural monuments.\(^82\) Alongside the plan, came a zoning law which dictated a significantly higher coefficient of exploitation than the Egli plan. In addition to no proper zoning division and an uncontrolled land cost as well as no designated open and green spaces, the law, and arguably the plan as a whole, awarded Beirut’s land-owning bourgeoisie a resounding victory as the city experienced a rapid growth.\(^83\)
Beirut’s accelerated commercialization would usher in a new kind of urban condition, the highly mixed residential and commercial district of Hamra, developing along a flat plateau in the city’s Western portion. Absorbing the affluent and educated of all of Lebanon’s sectarian communities, Hamra quickly emerged as the modern surrogate to Beirut’s highly congested and traffic ridden old town. Hamra provided the space and regularity the city center lacked, and given its location between some of the city’s most venerated educational institutes\(^4\), it proved an ideal expansion point from an economic perspective. Over a century of commercialization of the once mixed city center, driven by the city’s elites, had displaced almost all of the center’s inhabitants towards the city’s peripheries, creating an almost entirely economical social space bisected at several moments by the city’s ancient churches and mosques. Hamra mirrored that commercialization, but inherent in the neighborhood’s structure was a residential component that can only be described as also being profoundly post-sectarian. Thus the *Laissez-Faire* policy, that had generated an overwhelming degree of economic disparity within Lebanon had also driven the creation of the city’s most diverse urban area, mixing and intermingling even the most minute Lebanese communities within a regularized modern aesthetic.

**Ecochard’s Return to Lebanon and Beirut**

Following Ecochard’s departure from Morocco in 1952, he returned to Paris where he sets up a private consulting firm. Shortly after-wards, he reactivates his social network in Lebanon, and
begins to partner with local rising modernists for the realization of private projects. Following the 1956 Jezzine Earthquake, Ecochard would be asked to design an emergency urban for the city of Saida along with Greek architect and urban planner Constantinos Doxiadis. Doxiadis would be tasked to conduct a comprehensive survey of the destroyed villages of the Jezzine area, along with proposing an emergency housing plan for their inhabitants throughout the reconstruction period, while Ecochard would be assigned the planning of Saida and its immediate surroundings, including the newly founded Palestinian refugee camp of Ain El Helweh, Lebanon’s largest.

Through the Saida experience, Ecochard firmly asserted his criticism of the centralized *Laissez-Faire* policy. The fact that the architect first chose to consolidate and re-organize the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain el Helweh and make it the central node of Saida’s expansion not only affirms his social agenda towards the poor and disenfranchised as he did in the Beirut 1941-3 plan, but also sought the make Saida, and subsequently Ain el Helweh, a model integrated neighborhood straddling the border between the Sunni majority coastal city, protected as is along with its large surrounding orange tree orchards, and its overwhelmingly Christian, Maronite specifically, hinterland in the Jezzine highlands. Drafted in Paris in collaboration with Saida native Amine Bizri as well as French architects and planners Pierre Riboulet and Gerard Thurnauer, the Saida plan was also doomed from the beginning; however, the urgency behind the need for emergency housing would translate with the construction of the first social housing scheme in Lebanon. The complex housed a cross-section of Sidonian society before it was ultimately incorporated into the Ain El Helweh refugee camp as

85. Considering that the two key protagonist behind the collapse of Lebanon into its 1975 civil war were the Palestinians and the Maronite separatists, this forms a very interesting point of departure and poses another set of projective questions. How could have Ecochard’s integration of Palestinians and Maronites within the same fabric lessened the tensions brewing between both communities?
its population exploded following the expulsion of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from Jordan in 1970.

Politically, the rise of Pan-Arab nationalism in Egypt, spearheaded by Gamal Abdul Nasser would send a sweeping wave through the Lebanese communities that found themselves disenfranchised by the Maronite, French facilitated, political and economic monopoly. Abdul Nasser’s revolutionary rhetoric proved highly attractive especially to Lebanon’s Muslim community, which identified greatly with both Arab unity and the suffering of their Palestinians brethren to the south, began to rally to demand its fair share of power and economic reform in the early 1950’s.

The Suez Canal crisis of 1956 would prove a turning point in Lebanon’s internal politics. The Lebanese president at that time, Camille Chamoun, abstained from supporting Egypt through its nationalization of the Suez Canal and its subsequent war against a joint Israeli, British and French offensive. Chamoun’s pro-Western stance, very much aligned with the Eisenhower doctrine, would immediately come under heavy criticism from the Lebanese left, especially the Muslim communities who were outraged by the lack of support. In the summer of 1958, tensions that had been brewing since the Canal crisis would spark a wave of violence across the Lebanese capital when it became apparent to Lebanon’s Muslim communities that President Chamoun was planning on amending the constitution in order to extend his term in office\textsuperscript{86}.

Lebanon’s first civil war raged on from July until October 1958, prompting the first US intervention on Middle Eastern soil, the rise of the Lebanese left in this context was seen as inherently

\textsuperscript{86} It is according to these events that Claude Bouez Kanaan, in her book ‘Lebanon 1860-1960’, deconstructs the clashes between Lebanon’s various religious communities to wide historical differences on a cultural construction of Lebanese history by each of Lebanon’s largest religious sect. In essence, she views the development of the internal Lebanese struggle shifting directions from the initially feudal wars fueled by foreign powers and internal instability in the 19th century, to the outbreaks of the civil wars of 1958 and 1975, as a conflict between the Pan-Arab Nasserist supporting Sunni community and the Imperialist Rightist Maronite Elite class, which had managed during the French Mandate period to monopolize the Lebanese political and economic systems due to historic ties of pre-colonial protection put forth by France while the Maronites, and the rest of Lebanon, were under Ottoman Rule. To the French, in a blatant example of Orientalist thinking along the Saidian discourse, have referred to the Maronites as “the most civilized and educated” of the Lebanese communities. Kanaan, Lebanon 1860-1960.
linked to expansion of Soviet influence into the oil rich Middle East. Throughout the conflict, a united leftist front bastioned in Hamra and Ras Beirut rioted and clashed violently with the pro-Chamoun’s right-wing Maronite Militia, the Lebanese Phalanges. Spatially, like its 1975 counterpart, the battles were mostly localized in Beirut’s commercialized central district, targeting the city’s traditional space of unity and convergence. Violence also erupted sporadically along the traditional dividing lines since the Late Ottoman Period (see figure 10), particularly along the impoverished neighborhoods of Mazraa, Mar Elias, Ras El Naba’a, and Bachoura. Fouad Chehab, who during the war served as the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, refused repeated requests to allow the army to intervene on behalf any of the warring parties and used the army’s strength to secure major national and strategic structures such as the airport, port and governmental buildings. Following the stabilization of Lebanon via an American micro-invasion, Chamoun would leave office by the end of his term, and President Fouad Chehab would be unanimously elected to power in order to restore peace and prosperity.

Chehab’s term in office between 1958 and 1964 would herald what is commonly referred by scholar’s as being the Welfare State, characterizing the first, and only, time in Lebanon’s history when the government would actively seek the integration of Lebanon’s peripheral regions beyond Mount Lebanon into the nation’s economy and political life. Chehab’s extensive military service meant constant traveling to and from the nation’s peripheral regions, and thus to a large degree not seen before in Lebanon’s politicians to date, Chehab was acutely aware of the economic disparity between the Lebanese communities. Chehab
also recognized the need to implement wide-scale development of the periphery in order to maintain the peace and security of the Lebanese nation. At the same time, he understood the vitality of protecting the services-based economy while passing several key reforms that aimed to provide more equity greatly aiding the disenfranchised communities in South Lebanon, North Lebanon and the Beqaa Provinces in acquiring services, education, utilities and proper social attention.

To achieve this, Fouad Chehab would first contract Pere Louis Joseph Lebret to bring the IRFED mission into Lebanon. Having been introduced to Lebret through the Lebanese ambassador to UNESCO, Chehab would commission IRFED in 1959 to undertake the most extensive economic and social study in Lebanon’s history. Chehab’s main objective was to understand where the violent dissent that came about in the 1958 war was rooted. In 1961, IRFED’s study would produce a 20-volume work detailing each and every Lebanese region and where its deficiencies lie. On the side of the government, Chehab would initiate a large-scale decentralization project that would see investment and development reach the very peripheries of the Lebanese state. Schools, hospitals, universities, colleges and factories would be erected; a new large coastal highway would connect the North and Southern parts of the country together through Beirut, hydro-electric dams were constructed en-masse to power the new nation-building project which was for the first time in Lebanon’s history centered on the development of not only the Lebanese countryside but Lebanese society as well.

As per IRFED’s guidance, Chehab would also establish the

87. Father [Pere] Louis-Joseph Lebret was a Jesuit missionary who started the IRFED mission [Institut de Recherches et de Formation de vue de Developpement] in 1958. The IRFED mission was started in order to develop what Pere Lebret referred to as Human Economics through the development of large-scale mapping and planning projects in developing countries, most notably Senegal, Lebanon and Brazil. “Louis-Joseph Lebret - DCLI - Centre International Lebret-Irfed,” accessed December 19, 2016, http://www.lebret-irfed.org/spip.php?article86.
Council of Public Administration, the Directorate General of Urban Planning (DGU), as well as the Executive Council of Grand Projects (Conseil Executif des Grands Projects - CEGP) the branch of which concerns the capital Beirut would be headed by Michel Ecochard. The Conseil Executif des Grands Projects de la Ville de Beyrouth (CEGPVB) and its contribution to the planning of Beirut in the early 60’s will be discussed in greater detail in the upcoming segments.

Economically, Fouad Chehab founded the Lebanese Central Bank in its current form in 1964, consolidating the nation’s chief financial matters into its hand and making it the primary sponsor of the government-led projects in the Lebanese periphery. This not only strengthened the national economy as a whole, but also promoted the extension of financial services outside the capital Beirut and into the Lebanese hinterland. Coupled with an internal peace due to fairer development, Lebanon’s GDP would experience a sustained annual growth of up to 4.3% during the Chehabist presidency.

Ecochard forms a personal relationship with Chehab after the latter’s rise to the Lebanese presidency, according the Verdeil, the two had been introduced in Jounieh in early 1958 during Ecochard’s visit to the city. Following Chehab’s appointment as Lebanon’s president, Ecochard’s architectural and urban portfolio would see a sharp rise across Lebanon as he re-established his Beirut office along with Japanese planner Gyoji Banshoya. Having designed the College Protestant de Beyrouth in 1954 along with Claude Lacoeur, Ecochard partners once again with Amine el Bizri for the design and construction of the College of Marian Brothers in Saida in 1959, followed by a collaboration with Gabriel Tabet for the construction of the College of the Fathers of the Antonite Order in 1960 as well as working with Henri Edde on

90. Amine el Bizri is a modernist architect belonging to the notable el Bizri family from the city of Saida. El Bizri collaborated with Ecochard on all of the latter’s projects in and around the city of Saida, including the city’s 1956 masterplan. El Bizri was the head of the Order of Engineers and Architects from 1965-1966.

91. The Tabet family is a traditionally Maronite family that migrated to Beirut following the Mount Lebanon where it rose to prominence. Gabriel Tabet, alongside Antoine Tabet and his son Jad Tabet were all instrumental modernists who both practiced extensively as well as headed the Order of Engineers and Architects. Antoine Tabet (1955-1956); Jad Tabet (2017-onwards).

92. Henri Edde was a modernist architect and politician, and received his education at the Ecole Superieure d’Ingenieurs de Beyrouth graduating in 1950. Edde collaborated with Ecochard on the design and construction of the Sacre-Coeur Hospital in Ba’abda in the 1966 and was the head of the Order of Engineers and Architects from 1963-1964. The Edde family is a notable Maronite family that migrated to Beirut from Mount Lebanon.

Council of Public Administration, the Directorate General of Urban Planning (DGU), as well as the Executive Council of Grand Projects (Conseil Executif des Grands Projects - CEGP) the branch of which concerns the capital Beirut would be headed by Michel Ecochard. The Conseil Executif des Grands Projects de la Ville de Beyrouth (CEGPVB) and its contribution to the planning of Beirut in the early 60's will be discussed in greater detail in the upcoming segments.

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88.  This number excludes the annual growth rate of 1959 where the economy grew by 20% due to regained faith in the Lebanese government under Chehab and the cessation of hostilities in 1958. Gaspard, A Political Economy of Lebanon, 1948-2002, 144.

the design and construction of the Hospital of the Sacred Heart in Baabda in 1961. Essentially, Ecochard’s partnering with the new generation of foreign educated architects and planners, who belong by and large to Lebanon’s feudal families across sectarian lines, cemented his ties to the upper echelons of Lebanese society where he earned a well-respected position.

In terms of planning, Ecochard would be asked to draft plans for the organization of Jounieh (1958), Jbeil (1959-1960), Delhamiye (1961-2) and finally, Beirut (1960-1963). Jounieh’s master plan presents a most interesting case when compared to its Sidonian and Beiruti counterparts. Jounieh, by 1958 a small resort town straddling the southern end of a natural bay, had an almost homogeneous, entirely Christian population the majority of which was either Maronite or Syriac Catholic. Here, and as is evident in the city’s proposed plan, Ecochard’s concern no longer becomes one geared towards the peaceful integration of conflicted and disenfranchised communities, and rather becomes centered entirely towards maximizing the real-estate value of his created plots, further promoting the town’s development into a resort city.

The roads in Jounieh’s master plan (see figure 11) are thus oriented at a 45-degree angle from both the National Highway93 (which he also designed) and the seafront were intended to maximize sea views across all plots. At the plan’s center would be a large sports complex dedicated in honor of Fouad Chehab. Ecochard does not intervene on the congested old town, but suggests a circulatory system to bypass it. This dynamic shift between planning strategies proves that Ecochard had an acute awareness of the context upon which he was to intervene from

93. The National Highway proposal was drafted by Ecochard in 1961 based on earlier studies he conducted for the 1943 masterplan. The highway stretched from Tripoli to Saïda in both instances systematically excluding the entirety of South Lebanon. The highway stops 60km from Lebanon’s border with Israel, excluding the southern cities of Tyre, Nabatîeh, Manj’ouyoun and Bent Jbeil. This was perhaps intentional to lessen the massive waves of migration out of South Lebanon and into Beirut’s suburbs by South Lebanon’s Shi’ite population.
a sectarian and economic perspective, and in a context that did not require his sensitivity as a social engineer, Ecochard readily embraced the economically driven real-estate developer approach to planning. Jounieh is perhaps Ecochard’s only master plan in Lebanon to be fully implemented.

In Beirut, the second nation-building project would be manifested with a second series of Ecochard master plans for the city ranging from 1960 to 1964. Colloquially, these plans are often grouped into a singular project termed the Ecochard Plan, although Ecochard publicly renounced his agency in the plan approved in 1967, which was heavily modified by Lebanon’s politicians and planning authority. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity and continuity, I will explain them below chronologically. The following analysis will address each planning instance separately, highlighting how each endeavor aimed to solve Beirut’s rampant congestion and densification. How each of plans relates to the sectarian and economic condition within the city will be the key frame of analysis.

Proposal One - *Cite de la Ministeres 1961*

In 1958, Greek architect and planner Constantinos Doxiadis was commissioned by the Chamoun regime to plan the extension of Beirut in one of four possible sites. The new extension was to house a *Cite de la Gouvernement*, a large urban complex of ministries that immediately brings to mind Ecochard’s earlier 1943 plan for the demolition of the Grand Serail and the construction of a *Batiments des Ministeres* in its lieu. With the advent of Chehab’s presidency, Doxiadis’ proposal, now put on hold, would
be transferred to Ecochard following the choosing of Bir Hassan as the project’s location. In 1961, Ecochard was finally awarded the contact for the design and construction of the extension, a slight modification from the original Doxiadis proposal (see figure 12).

The *Cite de la Gouvernement* imagined a linear southward expansion along Beirut’s western coastline towards the airport, finally subduing and urbanizing the large sand dunes that lay to the city’s south. In essence, the aim was to void the city center of its political structures and transfer them to a new urban area with direct access to the nation’s only international airport. The three main axes into the city as part of the plan meant to disperse and ease traffic along the city’s southern entrance, now overwhelmed by refugee camps and informal settlements. However, given the Lebanese state’s inability, and unwillingness, to properly address the issue of the refugee camps and their organization⁹⁴; the *Cite de la Minsteres* plan had to be partially implemented, around them. Thus forming an incomplete modernist urbanity truncated at several moments with large hyper-dense and extremely run-down urban islands (see figure 13).

However, the plan carefully avoids the urbanized areas to Beirut’s south and makes no attempt to intervene within the larger infrastructural scope of the city aside from widening the existing boulevard that connects the airport to the city center. The aim is clear, the *cite de la ministeres* was not meant at any point to intervene on behalf of the state to regularize the city’s slums and integrate them. Instead, it was slated to become an exclusive urban area along the city’s beach front separated from its neighboring districts by a large green boulevard, obstructing access and views.

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⁹⁴. A decision that would later lead to the manifestation of militants within the camps, one of the key factors that triggers the second Lebanese civil war in 1975.
It is imperative to stress that Ecochard’s role in this design of this plan was minimal, and more catered towards its construction. The characteristics of this plan also reflect the agency behind it, asserting the Chamoun regime’s rejection of the underprivileged in favor of the Merchant Republic monopoly in the capital and it’s immediate surroundings at the expense of the nation-state.

Proposal Two - *Plan Directeur de Beyrouth et de sa Banlieu 1962*

In late 1961, Ecochard would again be contracted by the Lebanese Republic to provide a comprehensive plan for the city and its suburbs. In 1962, Ecochard presented the municipality with the *Plan Directeur de Beyrouth et de sa Banlieu* (The Directorate Plan of Beirut and its Suburbs). The plan aimed to provide the city with a complete infrastructural plan, streamlining the connection of the city to its suburbs and integrated into the National Highway System already under design by Ecochard himself. In addition to reforming the infrastructure, three new satellite cities are proposed in the city’s southern areas, housing up to 800,000 inhabitants. The spaces that lie at the intersection between the new cities and the old fabric are to be populated with public and administrative buildings.

To go into further detail, Ecochard’s plan imagined the widening of the Mazra’a boulevard into a large ring road, the creation of a second ring road along the southern suburbs, and a large interchange system that connects them to the National Highway, which bypasses the city completely. A series of perpendicular
roadways connect the city to its suburbs and the new proposed cities. In Figure 14, the three proposed cities, and how they interact with the mediating zones and public structures is illustrated. The first of these cities, located where the north and central areas Cite de la Ministere should be, is left un-designed, save for a few large roads that clearly contradict the rigor of the earlier plan. In terms of zoning, the proposal highlights a large central part of the city as the site of a new Parliament Complex.

The second city forms the southern end of the Airport Boulevard, at the center of which lies a zone designated for a new university. The third city, and perhaps the most interesting of the three, overlaps with one of Beirut’s most impoverished neighborhoods, the mixed Maronite and Shi‘ite districts of Chiyah, Ain el Remmaneh, Ghobeyri and Haret Hreik. Where the third city meets the Damascus highway, a district is zoned for the development of public offices, as well as financial, health care, social security and education centers, as well as proper sanitation. The dramatic introduction of these much needed services into the neighborhood clearly shows the architect’s social concern towards the disenfranchised populations of these neighborhood. On the other hand; however, Ecochard’s new cities seem to carefully avoid the Palestinian refugee camps with very little intervention. The camps, not even outlined in Ecochard’s original drawings, are almost entirely excluded from the planning initiative. Along the newly widened Corniche el Mazra‘a, three zones will be dedicated alongside the new highways leading into the city for the construction of the National Education Headquarters, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior.

95. The main agency over what the plan entailed rested with the architect himself according to Gregoire Serof. Serof, who drafted the plans himself, notes that Ecochard had full freedom in his planning decisions and was not subject to restrictions and impositions by the state under Chehab’s presidency. Gregoire Serof, Interview with Gregoire Serof, Voice Recording, January 9, 2017.
Figure 14. 1961 Ecochard Proposal - Plan Directeur de Beyrouth et de sa Banlieu

- National Education
- New Parliament Complex
- New University
- New Financial, Health, Social, Educational Quarter and Public Offices
- Ministries of Justice and Interior
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Arguably, one may assume that the exclusion of the Palestinian refugee camps came as a reaction to the failure of the first plan in 1961, when many concerns were raised concerning the relocation of the Palestinians and the temporality that the camp represents. This is especially important from the perspective of the Lebanese government, which denies Palestinian Muslims (the absolute majority of the inhabitants of the camps in question) from receiving the Lebanese nationality for fear of tipping the country’s sectarian balance. A political statement that considers the construction of purpose built neighborhoods meant regarding the Palestinian presence as being permanent; a notion which both the Palestinians and the Maronites overwhelmingly reject.

However, the imposition of the gigantic parliamentary complex between these camps raises multiple questions on how exactly the political power structures housed within were to interact with the camps, who by the early 60’s had developed into lawless and unruly neighborhoods run by armed militias. The camp here is very much a state of exception; in stark contrast to the imagined parliamentary complex. How did Ecochard imagine the dynamic existence of both of these entities within the same landscape, a mere stone’s throw from one another?

The proposal also clearly advocated for a Corbusian modernist separation of residence, work and leisure/public functions, clearly exhibiting Ecochard’s admiration of Le Corbusier, who he would meet during a trip to the United States in 1957. Also, while the scope of the plan does entail a major restructuring of Beirut’s southern suburbs, the generality of its composition still hearkens back to modernist planning methodology for post-

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97. By the 1960’s, Lebanon’s sectarian balance had already tipped in favor of Lebanon’s fast growing Muslim community by unofficial sources. This also stresses the final nature of the 1932 census as being the last to be conducted by the Lebanese government for fear of officially recognizing that Lebanon’s Christians had becoming a minority, defeating the purpose of the creation of the nation-state in the first-place as a ‘heaven for Middle Eastern Christians’. Maktabi, “The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who Are the Lebanese?”


100. See footnote 14.
colonial cities. Specifically, the method that entails the construction of a *new, healthy city* in order to aid the de-congest the *old, sick city*. A methodology that widely applied on the colonized cities of North Africa. In the following proposals, Ecochard’s focus would change, creating more integrated models that impacted the city’s neighborhoods directly rather than proposing a separated urban entity.

This Directorate Plan would also never make it to Lebanon’s parliament for discussion after the scale of expropriations to be conducted became clear to Lebanon’s feudal land-owning class. Ecochard was to provide other, more nuanced and limited scopes to his proposals.

**Proposal Three - Plan d’Amenagement de Beyrouth et sa Banlieu 1963**

One year onward from the second proposal, Ecochard would present a third set of plans in 1963, these would form one large project divided into three scopes and scales over two years. The first and earliest of these being the 1963 plan proposal, followed by the Greater Beirut Metropolitan Area which dealt with a redefinition of Beirut’s greater hinterland as well as the Saifi-Ghalghoul proposal in 1964, which was localized to the city center exclusively and was imagined as being integrated into the grander scope of the 1963 proposal. Although the scales associated with these projects is profoundly different, for the sake of simplicity and continuity, they are discussed below chronologically.


100. See footnote 14.
Figure 15. 1963 Proposal

Neighborhoods to be Demolished

New Settlements
Figure 16. 1963 Proposal Overlaid on Class Map
Saifi-Ghalghoul Intervention
Ecochard’s tailoring of his *Plan Directeur* would translate to the plan proposed in 1963. In the new plan, Ecochard rethinks his access and circulation network proposed for the older plans and designs a more nuanced road scheme. The new design entails creating a ring road around the congested city center, and connecting that ring road to two direct axes towards Khaldeh, on Beirut’s southern coast beyond the airport, on one hand and the Damascus highway on the other, the National Highway is retained as is and connected to the airport axis by a second ring road slicing through the southern suburbs (see figures 15 & 16). The scheme drops the previous proposal to widen and enhance the road to the airport, choosing instead to focus on connecting the city around the airport directly to the National Highway to the south, eliminating the need to pass through the large villages along the Old Saida Road, such as Choueifat and Kfarshima.

The new road network also proposes a large interchange at the foot of Mount Lebanon in the immediate vicinity of Baabda (the residence of the Lebanese President), Hazmieh (the final point on Damascus Road before entering the city of Beirut) and el-Fayyadiyeh further up the hill (the location of the newly constructed Ministry of Defense and the headquarters of the Lebanese Armed Forces). The convergence of all immediate access points into the city around the trio immediately brings to mind the consolidation of the city’s circulation around its primary structures of power and security in the earlier Ecochard plan of 1943, sponsored by General Catroux and the French Mandate Authority.

The new plan also proposes, for the first time in the Chehabist regime, the first wide-scale urban regeneration of some of Beirut's
most impoverished and ghettoized neighborhoods. Dubbed in his original plans as *Quartiers Insalubres* (unhealthy neighborhoods), Ecochard proposed the demolition of these neighborhoods and the integration of their inhabitants in four modernist settlements on the Eastern side of the Beirut river. Once Ecochard’s plan is juxtaposed upon a sectarian map of Beirut at that time (see figure), the findings presented are intriguing. The Greek Orthodox enclave in Mousaytbeh, the Sunni and Shiite neighborhoods to its North, as well as the very dense mixed neighborhoods of Mazra’a, Barbir, Basta and segments of Bachoura are zoned for demolition; in addition to the mixed Maronite and Armenian neighborhoods of Karm El Zeitoun, Geitawi and Mar Mkhayel, a large section of the now urbanized Armenian camp of Bourj Hammoud, the entirety of the Palestinian refugee camp of Tell el Zaatar and large portions of the camps of Sabra, Chatila and Bourj el Barajne. When the plan is then superimposed upon a social order map of Beirut, the impact zones become directly linked to the social status of the neighborhoods in question, targeting the city’s overpopulated, rundown neighborhoods.

Of the four neighborhoods specified by Ecochard as points of settlement, he proceeds to provide an overall master plan for the largest, a settlement of 60,000\(^{101}\) along the Beirut river (see figures 17 & 18). In his masterplan, Ecochard designs the settlement as two residential quarters populated by elongated residential buildings that surround a series of green corridors and open spaces along the river’s banks. The northern and southern portions of the new settlement are zoned for light industry, workshop and craftsmanship areas catering to the economy of the urban poor and replicating the spaces that exist within the neighborhoods to

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101. The inhabitants were to be relocated from the impoverished neighborhoods of Beirut as per IRFED’s instruction and results, the total number of urban poor inside the Beirut agglomeration was estimated by IRFED at 200,000 in 1961. Verdeil, *Beyrouth et Ses Urbanistes*, 133.
be demolished. Verdeil, who briefly discusses the plan in his book *Beyrouth et ses Urbanites, Une ville en plans (1946-1975)* citing the architect’s lamentation and social critique of the development of the city; Ecochard explains:

*Le seul mobile qui a conditionne ces installations humaines est le prix des terrains, de sorte que les habitations des classes moyennes et pauvres se sont developpees dans les zones cultivables, voire les zones les moins propres a la construction comme les vallons de Baouchriye-dekouane et jdaide, tandis que les sables plus proches de la ville restaient vierges afin de permettre a leur proprietaires de realiser par la suite ces terrains seraient construits, de substantiels benefices.*

102. Ibid.

*nous avons voulu souligner ici, ce qui est a nos yeux essentiels, la gravite de l’injustice social et de l’echec de toute solution qui ne cherche pas a transformer radicalement les rapports de groupe a group dans ce pays.*

103. Ibid.

Ecochard’s reference to the need to improve *group-to-group* relations between Lebanese communities is direct testimony to the architect’s awareness of the various conflicting topographies of Beirut complex social structure. Moreover, his assertion of the scale of the injustice practiced by successive Lebanese governments towards it’s underprivileged population further enhances our view of the key elements driving Ecochard’s planning philosophy.

To move even further into the analysis, Ecochard’s vision essentially entailed the integration of Sunnis, Shi’ites, Maronites, Armenians, Greek Orthodox, Syriac Orthodox and Palestinian into the same urban fabric, dominated by a clearly defined modern
aesthetic. Surrounding this mixity Ecochard places large green spaces, public amenities, and the opportunity of local commercial and light industrial development. This minimizes the often large commutes across the city between various communities, a key factor behind sporadic urban violence in Beirut. Instead, the communities will form a dynamic, integrated neighborhood that advocated the creation of a singular community from a wide range of Beirut’s sectarian topography, the overwhelming majority of whom share similar underprivileged backgrounds. Investment in local industry and commerce would foster a communal co-dependency, strengthening ties between religious groups. A post-sectarian fabric, reliant upon inter-community relations while embracing a modernism based on neo-liberal, economic and social development.

The Greater Beirut Metropolitan Region

On a far wider note, Ecochard’s third proposal developed the earlier creation of a new political entity in Lebanon, the Greater Beirut Metropolitan Area (GMBA). Essentially a critique of the centralized form of governance in Beirut, Ecochard draws new boundaries for a decentralized Beirut, abolishing the old Ottoman provincial line that had stayed almost intact since the late 19th century. The Damour river to the south and the Kalb river gorge to the north will become the new extents of Beirut including all villages in Mount Lebanon that lie below the 450m elevation line, an addition of 67 existing municipalities to the scope of Beirut (see figure 19).
Figure 19. The Greater Beirut Metropolitan Region

Figure 20. The Greater Beirut Metropolitan Region Sectarian Map

Legend:
- Greek Orthodox
- Maronite
- Greek Catholic
- Sunni
- Shi'ite
- Palestinian Camps
- Druze
- Armenian
- Mixed
The city’s size would expand by 480%, growing from 20km² to 96.5km², the proposal itself entailed the regularization, zoning and development of 1% of the Lebanese nation-state as part of the GMBA. Ecochard’s ultimate aim was to decentralize the city by developing its immediate hinterland, adding forests, rivers, and all the villages that form the coastal areas of the Maten, Ba’abda, Aley and Chouf Cazas. From the south towards the north, the villages of Damour and Na’ahmeh will form the southern tip having been segregated from the Chouf Caza. 15 municipalities will be added from the Aley caza, 10 of which belong to the agglomeration of the city of Choueifat, an overwhelmingly Druze village. From the Ba’abda Caza, 15 municipalities will be added, 7 of which form Beirut’s current southern suburbs of Chiyah, Ain el Remmaneh, Furn el Chebbak, Haret Hreik, Ghobeiri, Hadath and Jnah; in addition to Ba’abda itself and Hazmieh, Jamhour and Fayyadiyeh. The largest addition of municipalities comes from the Matn Caza with 35 municipalities added consolidating the entrance into the most urbanized mountainous area around Beirut, the Brummanah-Beit Mery summer resort area.

When a map of these villages is overlaid with Lebanon’s sectarian topography (see figure 20), it is immediately evident that the absolute majority of the villages are Maronite, a notion that rang the alarm bells in the Sunni powerhouses of Beirut. And although Ecochard planned to reconcile this through his density proposal (see figure 21), highly modified by Lebanon’s politicians before its approval in 1967. The contention produced by the plan in the political circles led to the identification of the area as a special municipal zone, rather an autonomous political entity as was its intention. Therefore, although the GMBA exists in terms of the

104. The city of Choueifat is also where the Beirut International Airport is located by land.

105. Where the Lebanese presidency is located.

106. A newly developing modernist middle class suburb.

107. Location of the Ministry of Defense and the Lebanese Armed Forces Headquarters.
Figure 21. Ecochard's Maximum Density Proposal

Legend
- Total GMBA: 1,356,700
- Municipal Beirut: 510,000
- 5 Habitants/Ha = 3,600
- Protected Beaches
- Industrial Zones
- 400 Habitants/Ha = 59,200
- 250 Habitants/Ha = 146,000
- 250 Habitants/Ha = 193,600
- 30 Habitants/Ha = 105,000
- 200 Habitants/Ha = 112,900
- 100 Habitants/Ha = 15,400
- 180 Habitants/Ha = 213,000
overall zoning scheme, when elections are held, each municipality will vote as part of its original Caza rather than as part of the new Beirut collectivity.

Ecochard’s decentralization of Beirut over a large territorial span comes as a reaction to the centrality awarded to the city as a product of French colonial development around Beirut and Mount Lebanon solely, when the city gained a new relationship to its mountainous hinterland after having been separated from it for over 300 years by the Mount Lebanon Emirate and the Mutasarrefiyah. The lower mountainous area would become part of Beirut, greatly increasing the city’s access to green zones and agricultural plains. When the economies of the municipalities are specialized and integrated into that of Beirut’s, the GMBA was expected to create a sustainable plan for growth and conservation. More importantly, it would integrate the entire agglomeration of the city and propose a unified circulation that consolidated the entrances into the Cazas and their integration into the National Highway system now under construction.

The GMBA proposal also meant the addition of the Palestinian refugee camps, Bourj Hammoud and the southern suburbs into the city’s scope, permitting direct intervention for their redevelopment by the city’s municipality and bypassing the need to consult the political powerhouses of the mountains for the development of the city’s peripheries as was the case with the Caza system. The new hinterland of the city would be a far larger area than the one in the days of the Mutasarrefiyah, propelling the new Merchant Republic with a wider area of influence on the scale of the nation-state.
104

Although the political collectivity proposed was not implemented, the GMBA was officially created in 1961 at the Ecochard’s request according to Decree 7110 from the Ministry of General Planning (وزارة التصميم العام), the first article of which states the creation of a new geographic entity from Beirut and its suburbs named Greater Beirut\textsuperscript{108}. The most interesting aspect of the article, the third article which dictates the creation of a Greater Beirut Organizational Committee (لجنة تنظيم بيروت الكبرى), does not mention Ecochard at all. In fact, Ecochard is completely excluded from mention in the entire 2-page document, signed by President Fouad Chehab, Prime Minister Sa’eb Salam\textsuperscript{109}, the Minister of General Planning Kamal Jumblatt\textsuperscript{110}, as well as the Minister of Interior Abdallah Machnouk\textsuperscript{111}.

The names that are mentioned as part of the third article are Engineer Joseph Najjar\textsuperscript{112} (Head of the committee), Assem Salam\textsuperscript{113}, Henri Edde\textsuperscript{114}, Amine el Bizri\textsuperscript{115}, and Fouad Abdel Baki\textsuperscript{116}. Each of these architects, aside from Abdel Baki being instrumental modernists of their time and each of whom is tied directly to the sectarian-political regime dominating Lebanon’s political class. Ecochard’s exclusion from mention seems to imply that the architect’s relationship to the state through these masterplans was not an official one, a notion which all primary sources on these plans reject. However, what is immediately apparent through the inclusion of the local collaborators at the expense of the foreign architect suggests that Ecochard relied on his network of local architects for the advancing of beaurucratic, state-related decrees that facilitated his work as a planner and designer, allowing the architect to devote more time and attention to the plans themselves.

108. Officially referred to as the Greater Beirut Metropolitan Area, translated from its original Arabic name بيروت الكبرى, the name becomes Greater Beirut.


110. At that time an acclaimed Lebanese politician belonging to the Progressive Socialist Party and father of current Lebanese politician and warlord Walid Jumblatt. The Jumblatt family is one of five leading Druze clans that saw their rise to wealth and power through the Lebanese silk industry of Mount Lebanon. Although the family is based in Moukhtara in the Chouf region south of Beirut, it has a consistent presence alongside the Druze inhabitants of the city of Beirut, its main hub formed around the Jumblatt villas of the Clemenceau neighborhood in West Beirut.

111. The Machnouks are a family of Sunni notables from the city of Beirut, the Minister of Interior in question is related to the contemporary ministers of Lebanon’s current, illegal government, ministers Nouhad and Mohammad Machnouk.

112. The Najjar family is a Greek Orthodox family of the Beirut elite, and has had a consistent presence in Beirut politics since the Beirut Municipal Council of the Ottoman Era. Joseph Najjar himself served as the head of the Order of Engineers and Architects over three terms (1951-1954, 1957-1958, 1961-1962) as well as providing the masterplan of Beirut modified from the Danger Plan in 1939.

When the zoning scheme of the plan is addressed, Ecochard’s mitigation of the sectarian topography in terms of zoning and maximum population density becomes apparent. The new added municipalities of the mountain would be zoned at 200 habitations per hectare, totaling a maximum population of 105,000, 7.7% out of the total planned population of 1,365,700 for the whole agglomeration. In retrospect, 739,300 (54.5%) was the maximum density allotted to the new neighborhoods of the city of Beirut\textsuperscript{117}, a resurrection of Ecochard’s previous 1962 satellite cities in the southern parts of the city in addition to the reorganization of Bourj Hammoud and the refugee camps. The remainder of the population is mostly composed of the current inhabitants of the municipal Beirut within its Ottoman borders, around 510,000 people.

Ecochard’s plan also included the extension of the city’s industrial zone along the Beirut port along the city’s northern coastline as well as the conservation of its coastal areas and beaches in addition to an urban agricultural zone between the city of Choueifat and the Beirut International Airport. Shortly after its proposal, Ecochard’s plan was revised twice, once by the \textit{Institute Francais d’Architecture} (IFA; see figure ..) and the another by the \textit{Institut des Sciences et Techniques de l’Equipement et de l’Environnement pour le Developpement} (ISTED; see figure...) both being presented in 1963.

The IFA proposal (see figure 22) modifies Ecochard’s boundaries greatly, reducing the scope of the city to the Beirut peninsula from Khaldeh to Antelias and removing the villages that do not lie immediately alongside its existing peripheral agglomeration of villages. The IFA proposal also entails the creation of protected

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107. The name becomes Greater Beirut Metropolitan Area, translated from its original Arabic name بروت الكبرى. For Decree 7110 See Appendix

111. See Footnote 66.
114. See Footnote 91.
115. See Footnote 89.
116. Fouad Abdel Baki is an obscure figure around whom not much information exists; however, given the document’s division of signatures between the main sectarian shareholders inheriting the new urban area: 2 Sunnis (Salam and el Bizri), a Greek Orthodox head of committee (Najjar), and a Maronite (Edde), Abdel Baki’s presence seemed to provide a form of legitimacy from the Druze community to whom he belongs given the inclusion of the Druze majority village of Choueifat within the scope of the GMBA. It is imperative to note as well that the Abdel Baki family traditionally hails from the village of Ain Bal in the Chouf mountains, across a small valley from Jumblatt’s headquarters in Moukhtara.

117. This figure includes the residents of the city’s already urbanized southern suburbs, with a population of 146,000 people; as well as the residents of Bourj Hammoud at 59,200 people.
environmental areas along all the valleys of the city’s immediate surroundings, in addition to providing further detail towards the zoning of the inner city region, creating economic zones, industrial and workshop areas and protected beaches.

The ISTED modification (the latter of the two, see figure 23) differs slightly from Ecochard’s earlier maximum density plan, it excludes the municipalities of Damour and Na’ahmeh that were added from the Chouf Caza as part of the city’s new scope. The plan also drops the maximum density allotted by Ecochard, choosing instead to remain at a formal description of the neighborhoods conditions, Bourj Hammoud thus becomes a slum, and the southern suburbs a medium density residential area.

The ISTED plan; however, zones designated areas for cemeteries and a protected valley zone along the Beirut river gorge.

Ecochard’s proposal, like its predecessors, would not be ratified before his ultimate departure from the city in 1964. Instead, his density proposal would be greatly modified by Lebanon’s political class, seeking to capitalize on real-estate development in the new cities. In two decrees passed in 1964 and not fully detailed until 1967, Ecochard’s proposed Coefficients of Exploitation (CE) were increased dramatically, defeating their purpose and allowing the haphazard and unchecked development of the mountainsides surrounding the city. Although colloquially referred to as Ecochard’s plan, the architect himself dismisses his agency over the proposal, citing its irreparable modification.

118. An eerie resurgence of this phenomenon still occurs in Beirut to this day; however, with the densification of the city, the center of interest shifts towards reclaiming land from the sea to be divided amongst Lebanese real-estate developers (tied with the political feudal class).

The Saifi - Ghalghoul Proposal

The last of Ecochard’s projects for the city of Beirut came about as a detailed proposal for the national renovation of the city center project in 1963. Undertaken by the Conseil Exécutif des Grands Projects de la Ville de Beyrouth (CEGPVB) which was coordinated by Ecochard himself, the Saifi-Ghalghoul proposal imagined the insertion of two commercial modernist complexes over the last two remaining residential districts in the old center, the neighborhoods of Saifi on the eastern side of Martyr’s Square, and that of Ghalghoul, on the southern side of the Riad el Solh Square. This effort would be a large collaborative project that divided the two neighborhoods of Saifi and Ghalghoul between Architects Nabil Tabbara (Sunni), Raymond Issa (Maronite) and Raymond Daoud (Maronite) for the first and Assem Salam (Sunni) and Pierre El Khoury (Maronite) for the second. The complexes are imagined as connecting directly to the main arteries Ecochard planned through the city.

The Saifi-Ghalghoul proposal, presented in early 1964, took into account the creation of the Beirut city center ring road from the circulation proposal of the G MBA, one year earlier. Ecochard justifies the creation of these complexes as such:

*S’il est nécessaire, pour donner à la ville sa véritable dimension, de créer de nouveaux centres à l’extérieur, ce centre traditionnel restera toujours le centre principal et le plus vivant de l’agglomération du Beyrouth de toujours. Il importe donc de l’agrandir à la dimension des activités actuelles et*
Here, the agency of the architect and his intentions are clear, the city center’s spectrum of activity was to be modernized and further commercialized in order to cater for the city’s rapid growth as a financial and economic capital as well as its newly gained reputation as one of the Mediterranean region’s newest resort towns. These two modernist interventions were to replace the last zones of residential mixity in the city center, continuing the long tradition of expropriation and expulsion of the city center’s inhabitants towards its peripheries that started with the reconstruction of the city’s port in the 1830’s.

When the Saifi-Ghalghoul plan is superimposed upon an aerial photograph of the Beirut city center from the late 1960’s (see figures 24 & 25) the scale of the urban change becomes evident. Ecochard imagines the cleaning of the brothels of the Mar Maroun neighborhood on the eastern side of Martyr’s square and the integration of the square into the modernist complex. When the ring road proposed in 1963 is juxtaposed, the vast areas zoned for demolition for the construction of the roads is apparent. The new highway system would encircle the city center completely pushing traffic around it instead of through it, as it gradually pedestrianizes. The areas to be demolished (see figure 26) include a swath of residential, commercial, and institutional buildings such as the Universite Saint Joseph (USJ) – Heuvlin campus in the Monot neighborhood.
Essentially, following the earlier failure of his masterplans where he employed the ethic of the social engineer, Ecochard finally submits to the laissez-faire and continues the trend of commercialized real-estate oriented development devoid of the social consideration of the inhabitants. On top of the residential districts of Saifi and Ghalghoul, Ecochard photomontages his modernist complexes citing the need to consolidate the two largest and most important squares of the city into a singular urban spine that was meant to form an international center for the city of Beirut. Ecochard notes:

_Il a semble que la réunion de ces deux places (celle des Martyrs et celle de Riad el Solh, limitrophe de Ghalghoul) pouvait alors créer un ensemble qui par sa dimension et sa noblesse, devenait tout naturellement le centre de la capitale internationale de la Méditerranée qui s'appelle Beyrouth_122.

As part of the consolidation of the city’s public squares into this plan, Ecochard also proposes a connective spine (see figure 27) between them that highlights and places at its center, the St. George Maronite Cathedral. Ecochard explains:

_Presenterait l’avantage de donner au lieu saint le plus important de Beyrouth, à sa cathédrale officielle, un dégagement digne des manifestations qui s’y déroulent avec toute la pompe que requièrent de semblables manifestations_123.

All structures surrounding the Cathedral are demolished, save the small Zawiya of Abu Nasr on the corner of Martyr’s Square.
Between them Ecochard imagined the integration of two plazas highlighting the dominance of the Cathedral and its monumentality as the city’s official house of Maronite worship. The squares were meant as accessory spaces to the church, for the hosting of public events and religious festivities. What message was Ecochard advocating for through the singling out of this Cathedral as the city’s most important religious structure, as opposed to the far older and well established Grand Omari mosque and the St. George Orthodox Cathedral both a mere stone’s throw away near the Place de l’Étoile. Surely Beirut’s Orthodox and Sunni communities far pre-date its Maronite one; however, the intentionality behind highlighting the symbol of the Maronite presence in the city by monumentalizing its copy of a Roman church is a profound one. Ecochard here not only embraces the laissez-faire, but also becomes an endorser of the Maronite political ethic, intent on dominating the city center architecturally and in terms of religious spatiality.

124. The St. George Maronite Cathedral was constructed in 1896 and modeled after the Basilica di Santa Maria Maggiore in Rome. The Cathedral represent a clear departure from Maronite traditional church construction, and came at a time where the Maronite community increasingly identified with foreign patronage and influence, specifically from the Holy See in Rome and France, its traditional protector. At the time of its construction, the Cathedral was the largest religious building in Beirut by size, dominating the skyline of the city center valley.
Beyond Ecochard
A Conclusion

As is presented by the analysis contained in this thesis, as well as the mapping exercise upon which it is based, it is profoundly apparent that Michel Ecochard’s work in Beirut was based on a detailed understanding of the city’s divided topography. Concerning the architect’s methodology, two main strands become apparent when his planning is taken into account. The first strand is that of the social engineer, a work ethic which he tries to employ tirelessly throughout his urban proposals for the city of Beirut as well as the city of Saida. And the second, being that of a capital-driven real-estate developer, used extensively in the design of the religiously homogeneous city of Jounieh and when he finally embraces the Lebanese exclusionary politics of rapid commercialization for economic profit as was the case with the Saifi-Ghalghoul project.

Essentially, Ecochard’s role and methodology in Lebanon’s (particularly Beirut’s) planning reflects his dynamic relationship with Lebanon’s key power nodes. Moreover, the duality of state agent vs. state critic awarded Ecochard the flexibility towards the advancement of his social agenda frequently in the face of a hostile political/developer establishment that consistently went to new length to subvert the architect’s agency for the purposes of making it more economically lucrative from their perspectives.
Following the rejection of Ecochard’s plans and their modification, the architect finally left Beirut in 1964 with a bitterness he would never reconcile. Meanwhile in Beirut the agency driving the city’s urban change would allow the unchecked urbanization of the city’s suburbs due to increasing rural to urban migration, creating more slums and impoverished neighborhoods along its peripheries. Internally, the economic disparity between communities would create deep tensions that frequently boiled over the city’s newly expanded tension lines surrounding its unplanned settlements and refugee camps. Following express militarization in the 1970’s, Lebanon would once again collapse into full scale civil war by 1975, a war that would leave Beirut and its commercialized center in ruins until its reconstruction commenced in 1992.

Although Beirut has done much to reconstruct its image from a war-torn capital to that of the Middle East’s newest party destination, there remains much to be done in terms of providing a proper, sustainable developmental plan for the city as it still cringes under the control of its redefined sectarian establishment, the one born out of the war lords and criminals of the Lebanon’s violent 15-year internal conflict and its unresolved end with the Taif agreement of 1989.

As a concluding note to this thesis, there remains a multitude of open-ended questions that we may never be able to answer; however, it is imperative that they are posed for reflection. How could the Lebanese state have avoided its eminent doom through the reorganization of its slums according to Ecochard’s principles? Could Ecochard’s integrative neighborhoods have had a long-
lasting impact upon the city's internal sectarian divisions? And if so, could the civil war in itself have been avoided through an integrative economic, politically inclusive and equitable social and urban development?
Appendix
Decree 7110 from the Ministry of General Planning; July 14, 1964

An important item is the creation of a new city in the province of Beirut. This decree, dated July 14, 1964, sets out the necessary steps and provisions for the establishment of a new city in the vicinity of Beirut.

The decree outlines the responsibilities of the Minister of General Planning and the procedures for the formation of a new city. It also details the powers of the new city council and the legal framework for its operation.

The decree is of great significance as it marks a new chapter in the development of Beirut, aiming to enhance the city's infrastructure and capabilities.

This document is part of a series of decrees and regulations aimed at promoting urban development and ensuring the provision of essential services to the growing population.

The decree is an essential tool for the implementation of the government's vision for the future of Beirut, highlighting the importance of planning and development in the country's overall progress.

The appendices to this document provide additional information, including maps and tables, which are crucial for understanding the broader context of city planning in Lebanon.
لا يمكنني قراءة النص العربي الذي يظهر في الصورة.
Bibliography


“Hashim Sarkis Looks Back at the Work of Assem Salam and His Influence on Urban


122