About Me

I am a PhD Candidate in Economics at Indiana University Bloomington.

My research fields lie in Transportation Economics, Network Economics, Behavioral Economics, and Applied Microeconomics Theory. My methodological tools are focusing on Optimization, Data-driven Inverse Optimization, and Algorithmic Game Theory. I am particularly interested in studying the network effects of policy interventions through behavioral traffic equilibrium models.

Research

The Transportation Network Efficiency Effects of Congestion Pricing (Job Market Paper)
Abstract: This paper develops a novel economic analysis framework by integrating an advanced Perturbed Utility Route Choice Model with Beckmann’s classical User Optimization and System Optimization formulations. ... show more Abstract: This paper develops a novel economic analysis framework by integrating an advanced Perturbed Utility Route Choice Model with Beckmann’s classical User Optimization and System Optimization formulations. To conduct quantitative analysis in a real-world numerical experiment, this paper employs a data-driven inverse optimization approach to “learn” the critical theoretical parameters. Taking New York City as the case study, this paper constructs an abstract monocentric city structure to evaluate the impacts of congestion pricing on traffic equilibrium outcomes and network efficiency. The results of comparative analysis show that congestion pricing does not eliminate the primary network bottleneck but reshapes the spatial distribution of mode-specific travel demand across origins and multimodal transfer dynamics at intermediate nodes. These results, moreover, uncover nuanced substitution and complementarity patterns between private vehicles and public transit that jointly mitigate congestion externalities. Specifically, vehicle travel times, travel costs, and gasoline consumption decline by 15.23%, 14.34%, and 30.74% across the entire network, compared to substantially larger reductions—38.65%, 37.90%, and 41.27%, respectively—along the main entry links. These heterogeneous responses indicate that congestion pricing is more effective at alleviating localized congestion than at resolving system-wide inefficiencies, resulting in a modest overall network efficiency gain of 0.4%. The results of sensitivity analysis further reveals that while economic revenues continue to exhibit substantial growth, the marginal efficiency gains diminish as congestion pricing intensifies. These findings provide practical insights for designing urban mobility markets and formulating effective transportation policies. show less
A Perturbed Quantitative Spatial Equilibrium Model with Optimal Location and Commuting Decisions (Working Paper)
Abstract: This paper consider a nonatomic, selfish spatial location and commuting choice game within multi-commodity and multi-class transportation networks, where rational agents balance agglomeration and dispersion forces to make their optimal spatial ... show more Abstract: This paper consider a nonatomic, selfish spatial location and commuting choice game within multi-commodity and multi-class transportation networks, where rational agents balance agglomeration and dispersion forces to make their optimal spatial location and commuting choices. To address the limitations of existing quantitative spatial models and bridge the gap between transportation literature and spatial economics, this paper utilizes a perturbed utility model within a general spatial equilibrium framework to account for unobservable heterogeneity. This paper establishes existence and uniqueness properties of the perturbed spatial equilibrium, and derives its closed-form expression. The results of a numerical experiment suggest that improvements in transportation infrastructure alter the spatial distribution of traffic flows and economic activity. Moreover, the simulated elasticities of spatial equilibrium outcomes highlight the critical role of carefully targeted policy interventions. show less
Stochastic Traffic Equilibria under Risk Aversion and Distributionally Robust Optimization (Working Paper)
Abstract: Moving beyond the standard risk-neutral framework, this paper first proposes a novel Risk-Averse Stochastic User Equilibrium (RA-SUE) model, where travelers minimize perceived risk (disutility) by considering both mean travel time and its variability. To further account for ambiguity aversion of policymakers ... show more Abstract: Moving beyond the standard risk-neutral framework, this paper first proposes a novel Risk-Averse Stochastic User Equilibrium (RA-SUE) model, where travelers minimize perceived risk (disutility) by considering both mean travel time and its variability. To further account for ambiguity aversion of policymakers, this paper introduces a novel Distributionally Robust RA-SUE (DRO-RA-SUE) model, formulated using a phi-divergence-based ambiguity set over perception errors. In this paper, we establish theoretical properties of existence and uniqueness, and apply efficient algorithms to compute equilibria. These models provide a richer behavioral foundation for analyzing travelers' path choices under uncertain travel times, and offer a practical tool for robust policy analysis. Simulated numerical experiments reveal key insights: under RA-SUE, both public transit and new link interventions consistently induce a Braess-like paradox, with system costs changing monotonically with risk aversion. Under DRO-RA-SUE, ambiguity aversion alleviates the paradox for public transit but not for the new link, where system performance deteriorates in a non-monotonic manner. These findings highlight how accounting for risk and ambiguity aversion is critical to accurately assessing transportation policies under uncertainty. show less

Selected Refereed Publications before PhD

Huahua Zhu, Huaqing Wang (2011). Game Analysis on Pollutant Discharge Behavior of Coal Enterprises under Low-carbon Economy. Ecological Economy, Vol.10: pp.304-306.
Huaqing Wang, Longfei Zhao, Huahua Zhu (2011). Game model of vertical cooperative advertising under asymmetric channel power. International Conference on E-Business and E-Government (ICEE).

Teaching Experience

Indiana University Bloomington

Associate Instructor

  • FUND OF ECON FOR BUSINESS I and II (B251 & B252)— Spring 2023, Fall 2023, Spring 2024, Summer 2024, Fall 2024
  • FUNDAMENTALS OF ECONOMICS I (E251)— Fall 2025
  • INTRO TO MACROECONOMICS (E202)— Spring 2022

Chongqing Technology and Business University

Counselor and Lecturer (July 2015 – November 2020)

  • Marketing Research and Analysis
  • Consumer Behavior
  • Business Model Design and Innovation
  • Game Theory