THE NEW YORK CIVIL APPELLATE CITATOR 2022 REVISION

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The Appellate Division may not disregard a jury verdict as against the weight of the evidence unless "the evidence so preponderated in favor of the [moving party] that [it] could not

| have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence"; remittal for a new trial is the remedy when a determination has been made that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence; | |
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| by contrast, for the Appellate Division to hold that a jury verdict is insufficient as a matter of law "it must first determine that the verdict is utterly irrational; to conclude that a verdict is utterly irrational [which requires vacatur of the verdict] the Court must determine that 'there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead [a] rational [person] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial'; when it can be said that 'it would not be utterly irrational for a jury to reach the result it determined the court may not conclude that the verdict is as a matter of law not supported by the evidence'" | |
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| - "In conducting a sufficiency of the evidence review, the Appellate Division is required to consider all of the evidence placed before the jury, ('the evidence admitted at trial) and determine whether 'a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences could lead rational persons to find' in the way the jury did" | 6-13 |
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| An appellate court does not have the power to make factual findings in a weight of the evidence analysis in a jury case | 6-15 |
| Verdict after a nonjury trial should not be set aside as against the weight of the evidence unless it is clear that the court's conclusions could not have been reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence | |
| The Appellate Division may render the judgment warranted by th facts, although in a close case the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses | |

| 7. | The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine in Civil Cases, the |
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| | "Unavailable to Obey" Ground Application, and the Principles |
| | Behind the Doctrine |

| - | s inequitable to permit a party to benefit from an order or gment when it has deliberately frustrated appellate review of | |
|-------------------------------------|--|------|
| that | t determination | 7-2 |
| | Appeal not dismissed pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine "as there was no 'nexus' connecting the father's fugitive status and the pending proceedings where father continued to appear virtually, consented to relief sought by mother and complied with terms of probation | 7-10 |
| obj | gitive disentitlement applies to family court as to the filing of ections because objections have the status of an appeal in nily court | 7-12 |
| | e appeal remains pending if no application is brought to miss the appeal during the fugitive's flight | 7-13 |
| | e fugitive disentitlement doctrine is inapplicable to an ividual who was deported | 7-15 |
| | | |
| 8. | CPLR 5511, Aggrievement, Defaults, the Three Jurisdiction Predicates to an Appeal | onal |
| | | |
| [a] An Ap _j Agg | Predicates to an Appeal | 8-2 |

| Aggrievement is jurisdictional; the Appellate Division may sua sponte confirm presence of an aggrieved party | 8-4 |
|--|------|
| Aggrievement involves a "two-pronged" definition to be aggrieved a party must have requested or opposed the relief no appeal lies if an application for the specific relief was not made | 8-6 |
| Aggrievement requires an existing right, a direct interest in the controversy a remote or contingent interest does not give right to appeal; disappointment or even having been deprived of a financial benefit does not without more make that party "aggrieved" | 8-8 |
| Only the party directly affected by the order or judgment may appeal | 8-15 |
| - Receivers and aggrievement | 8-24 |
| No relief is available to a nonappealing party; there are exceptions to this rule: the Court of Appeals declined to enumerate the situations where this may occur | 8-25 |
| The successful party is not aggrieved and has no right to appeal unless he was not granted complete relief | 8-32 |
| A successful party may appeal when an important legal right is affected or where a specific finding may be prejudicial in a future proceeding through collateral estoppel | 8-34 |
| No aggrievement just because the underlying holding regarding a statute's applicability can have collateral estoppel effect in other proceedings; the interpretation of a statute presents a pure question of law and, as a result, collateral estoppel would not apply to Supreme Court's determination of that question here | 8-38 |
| A party is not aggrieved from the dismissal of a cause of action with leave to replead or to refile a motion | 8-39 |
| "Aggrievement does not hinge upon a court's words or reasons underpinning why relief was granted or denied" but rather on "the action taken by the court"; nor does it matter if the | |
| successful party did not prevail on all the issues raised | 8-41 |

| than proper form" | 8-42 |
|--|------|
| A party is not aggrieved and may not appeal from an order imposing sanctions on their attorney | 8-42 |
| Aggrievement does not apply where the order appealed from "merely found issues of fact" | 8-43 |
| A party is not aggrieved where no harm arises from an order | 8-44 |
| An intervenor seeking appellate resolution must be aggrieved | 8-44 |
| No appeal lies when a party prevails but disagrees with the court's reasoning, rationale or opinion or where the order or judgment contains language that a prevailing party deems adverse to its interests. | 8-44 |
| Public defender held not aggrieved where Supreme Court declined to appoint the defender as assigned counsel and defender disliked the Supreme Court's reasoning | 8-52 |
| Where multiple grounds for relief are asserted a favorable judgment or order on one ground does not render the prevailing party aggrieved as to the other grounds | 8-54 |
| A judicial vacatur of default must be absolute, a court may not impose any conditions except as set forth in the statute | 8-57 |
| [b] Consent Orders and Aggrievement | 8-59 |
| No appeal lies from a consent order; the remedy is a motion to set aside the stipulation; | |
| a judgment on consent is conclusive and has the same preclusive effect as a judgment after trial | 8-59 |
| The remedy for a party who maintains that consent was not knowingly or voluntarily given is to move to vacate or resettle the order in Family Court. | 8-61 |

| consent is not controlling when the record shows that a party objected to the order | 8-61 |
|--|------|
| No appeal lies from a consent order except where it differs from the consent | 8-63 |
| A claim that an admission, which is incorporated in a consent order, was involuntary must be raised and addressed in the context of a motion to vacate the underlying consent order | 8-64 |
| A party who consents to a court's reduction of a damages award is not aggrieved by the resulting judgment and may not appeal from that judgment but may seek relief pursuant to CPLR 5501(a)(5) | 8-65 |
| - "It is unfair" to bar a party from challenging on appeal a finding of liability only because that party stipulated to an additur | 8-66 |
| Neither CPLR 5501(c) nor CPLR 5522 requires the Appellate Division to expressly compare the damages award in the judgment appealed from with damages awards in other cases in its written decision | 8-66 |
| Alternative grounds for affirmance, lack of aggrievement and CPLR 5501(a) | 8-68 |
| - Generally | 8-68 |
| Handwritten language on an order not part of any decretal paragraph does not result in aggrievement | 8-75 |
| Where an opposing party did not submit opposition papers to a motion, the truth of the allegations in the moving papers will be assumed for only that motion | 8-76 |
| A stipulation that an order resolved a party's pending motion does not constitute a stipulation as to the propriety of the order | 8-77 |
| No appeal may be had from a consent to a divorce | 8-79 |

| [c] Aggrievement and Default | 8-80 |
|---|------|
| A default admits all factual and traversable conclusions of the complaint and all reasonable inferences including the basic allegation of liability but does not admit legal conclusions or plaintiff's conclusion as to damages as they are reserved for the court's determination | 8-80 |
| Uncontroverted facts may be deemed admitted; an unopposed matter advanced in motion papers for summary judgment is deemed admitted | 8-81 |
| An order made on default is not reviewable; the defaulting party must first move to vacate the default | 8-82 |
| When a default is entered against a party before the scheduled return date of the motion the aggrieved party must move to vacate the default once the court has granted the motion at which time this argument can be included | 8-83 |
| - Following a default a party should move for vacatur and reargument | 8-83 |
| Failure to retain counsel while sufficient time was available to do so does not establish a reasonable excuse for default; A pattern of willful default or neglect should not be | 8-83 |
| excused as law office failure | 8-84 |
| A decision vacating a default judgment is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion | 8-85 |
| The Appellate Division may disregard a technical defect and deem a motion to vacate a default order as one to also vacate the ensuing judgment | 8-88 |
| No showing of a reasonable excuse for the failure to appear and a meritorious defense are required to vacate a default where a party's fundamental due process rights have been denied | 8-90 |

| and complete excuse for a default on the motion, and deprives the court of jurisdiction to entertain the motion | 8-91 |
|---|-------|
| Vacatur of a default on the grounds of CPLR 317 that the summons was not personally delivered does not require the defendant to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default | |
| Failure to appear at a certification conference or trial calendar call constitutes a default; the procedure to challenge the dismissal is a motion to vacate the default | 8-93 |
| No default where a party had no notice of a scheduled court conference, including where counsel failed to inform the client; the default is a nullity and vacatur is required as a matter of law and due process; no showing of a potentially meritorious defense is required | 8-93 |
| Various discretionary courses of action available to a trial court when a party fails to appear or is unable to proceed at a call of the trial calendar and the various consequences to the defaulting party | 8-95 |
| Disruptive behavior in the courtroom or leaving the courtroom is sufficient to constitute a default | 8-97 |
| Defaults affirmed where a party had a pattern of being late to and missing court sessions causing numerous delays | 8-98 |
| A remittal is required when it is unclear if the order was granted on default | 8-100 |
| A party's default does not automatically entitle the other party to relief; the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing where the other party must satisfy his burden of proof | 8-101 |
| An order entered upon an uncontested inquest after a default is not reviewable on appeal | 8-103 |
| A default order entered pursuant to CPLR 3126 is directly appealable because it is made on notice enabling the defaulter to contest the motion; appeal is the sole remedy, the defaulter may not proceed by way of CPLR 5015 | 8-104 |

| The CPLR 3126 exception is not applicable where there was no prior application made on notice that would have enabled the defaulting party to contest the facts in the motion | 8-106 |
|---|-------|
| Relief granted after a court refuses to consider opposition papers is deemed to have been on default | 8-107 |
| CPLR 5511 does not apply where a noncompliant party has defaulted on a motion seeking a conditional order to strike its pleading or consented to the conditional order before noncompliance; an appeal is not the appropriate method of relief from conditional orders, the proper method is a motion to vacate the order under CPLR 5015(a)(1) | 8-108 |
| A default notwithstanding appellate review may be had pursuant to the court's inherent power to prevent excessive damage awards not to do so "would be tantamount to granting plaintiffs an open season" | 8-111 |
| Joining or supporting petitions of others; a party is not aggrieved from the denial of an order and lacks standing to appeal when it did not formally join in the motion | 8-114 |
| Nominal parties are those whose presence in the litigation is necessary only to bind them to the eventual judgment and to ensure full relief between the real parties in interest. | 8-117 |
| A party is not aggrieved from a stipulation after accepting reduced damages | 8-119 |
| A party dissatisfied with the amount of a judgment may be aggrieved even after accepting the benefit of the judgment when the outcome of the appeal could have no effect on the appellant's right to the benefit he or she accepted | 8-120 |
| No appeal lies from an assignment of a judgment or rights; no standing and no nunc pro tunc jurisdiction | 8-123 |
| Individual rights regarding aggrievement are not the same as corporate rights | 8-124 |
| Organizational standing, associational standing | 8-126 |

| "A motion for summary judgment, irrespective of by whom it is made, empowers a court, even on appeal, to search the record and award judgment where appropriate" | 8-127 |
|--|-------|
| The Appellate Division's power to search the record and afford a nonmoving party summary relief is not boundless | 8-127 |
| A defendant was held not aggrieved by Supreme Court's cautionary footnote directed at defendant's counsel | 8-128 |
| [d] Nonparties: Standing and Aggrievement | 8-129 |
| "Although CPLR 5511 refers to aggrieved parties the statute has not been so narrowly construed as to be limited to parties" where the appellant is adversely affected, bound by the judgment or | |
| order | 8-141 |
| Standing as to relief between third parties | 8-142 |
| [e] Collateral Estoppel and Default | 8-144 |
| An issue must have been "actually litigated and determined" for identity of issues to apply between the present action and the prior determination; an issue is not actually litigated if, for example, there has been a default, a confession of liability, a failure to place a matter in issue by proper pleading or because of stipulation | 8-144 |
| A limited exception exists "where the party against whom collateral estoppel is sought to be invoked appeared in the prior action or proceeding and, by deliberate action, refused to defend or litigate the charge or allegation that is the subject of the preclusion request" | |
| Collateral estoppel ceases to apply once overturned on appeal and remanded for a new trial | |
| [f] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.7 and 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.27 | 8-149 |
| Compliance with 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.7 is not required where effort would be "futile" | 8-150 |

| dismiss the action without providing notice to the parties of such intent | 8-153 |
|--|-------|
| The argument that a motion was defective for noncompliance with 22 NYCRR 202.7(c) may not be raised first time on appeal | 8-156 |
| Absence of an order of dismissal under 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.27(b) does not mean that there is no default | 8-157 |
| [g] "Genuine Default" | 8-158 |
| An order is appealable where a party is not guilty of a "genuine default" | 8-158 |
| An order entered upon default is appealable where counsel withdrew without giving the client proper notice | 8-162 |
| [h] Nonappearance and Default | 8-163 |
| Nonappearance by a party does not necessarily result in a default particularly where counsel appeared upon the absent party's behal and offered an explanation for the client's failure to attend | |
| A default results when a party does not appear and counsel neither offers an explanation about the absence nor participates in the proceedings thus precluding the right to appeal | |
| - Judgment on default vacated where the court was aware that the reason for a pro se party's nonappearance was likely attributable to mental health issues; before entering judgment upon the default there should have been an inquiry into whether a guardian ad litem was necessary | 8-168 |
| No default where a party has consistently appeared, declared an intent to testify and is briefly delayed on arrival to court while counsel presents another witness; this does not constitute "a | |
| convincing showing of waiver" | 8-174 |
| Absent unusual circumstances, an attorney's failure to appear for oral argument on a fully briefed motion does not constitute a | 0.45- |
| default and the order is appealable | 8-175 |

| A court may not grant counsel's oral motion to withdraw without notice to the client and thereafter find the client in default simply because the client failed to appear in court | 8-176 |
|---|-------|
| Family Court is not required to hold a second hearing before issuing the order of incarceration where the father had a full and fair opportunity at the hearing to defend the claim of willfulness; upon the father's failure to appear for a scheduled court date Family Court properly confirmed the recommendation; Family Court was not required to wait until the father's time to file objections had expired to confirm the Magistrate's recommendation of incarceration | 8-177 |
| A party's deliberate refusal to appear: "A litigation strategy cannot be a reasonable excuse for a default" | 8-179 |
| Plaintiff's attorney's nonappearance at a preliminary conference does not remove the order out of the realm of a default | 8-182 |
| Failure to appear at a conference combined with counsel's inability to explain the absence along with counsel's failure to seek an adjournment amounts to a default | 8-183 |
| A party's absence and counsel's failure to participate sustains a finding of default | 8-185 |
| No default lies where a party gave substantial testimony and was cross examined but failed to appear one time or where counsel appeared and participated or sought an adjournment | 8-188 |
| A parent who did not attend a hearing may not argue first time on appeal that she was denied a fair hearing | 8-189 |
| [i] Defaults and Subject of Contest, Instances of Subject of Contest | 8-190 |
| Defaults and subject of contest | 8-190 |
| Where a party contests the application for entry of a default judgment CPLR 5511 does not apply, the judgment predicated on the default is appealable | |

| Subject matter jurisdiction as the subject of contest | 8-195 |
|---|-------|
| Motion regarding lack of personal jurisdiction as the subject of contest | 8-196 |
| Appellant defaulted in answering complaint but had moved to dismiss the complaint | 8-197 |
| Nonfinal orders to amend answers to a complaint as the subject of contest | 8-198 |
| Request for an adjournment as the subject of contest | 8-199 |
| Whether a party's lack of readiness to proceed was excusable as the subject of contest | 8-202 |
| Failure to state a cause of action as the subject of contest | 8-203 |
| Lack of standing as the subject of contest | 8-204 |
| Denial of a motion to appear by either mail or telephone as the subject of contest | 8-205 |
| Motion for summary judgment as the subject of contest | 8-206 |
| Disputed motion for counsel fees as the subject of contest | 8-207 |
| Motion to withdraw as counsel as the subject of contest | 8-208 |
| Motion for recusal as the subject of contest | 8-209 |
| Failure to challenge a motion to confirm a referee's report as the subject of contest | 8-210 |
| Parties enter into a stipulation to expand plaintiff's visitation, plaintiff does not appear at the hearing for maintenance; court denies plaintiff expanded visitation and grants defendant maintenance; the expanded visitation and the maintenance were the subject of contest | 8-211 |
| A judgment was held appealable where after the inquest, but prior to judgment, the defendant contested the proposed judgment by letter, review was limited to matters that were the subject of contest | |

| Waiver of the right to counsel as the subject of contest | 8-213 |
|---|-------|
| Request for assignment of new counsel as the subject of contest | 8-214 |
| Although an issue may have been the subject of contest, a party may nevertheless forfeit the right to appeal it by failing to have raised the objections before the Supreme Court | 8-215 |
| [j] Aggrievement of Children in Custody Matters | 8-216 |
| A child can be aggrieved for appellate purposes by an order determining custody; the Attorney-for-the-Child has standing to take an appeal on behalf of the child | 8-216 |
| Children are not aggrieved from orders not involving custody such as financial disputes, matters of contempt or allegations of violations of custody orders between the parents. | 8-222 |
| It is unsettled whether a child can be aggrieved as a full party or whether the attorney for the child has standing to appeal | 8-225 |
| A child has standing to initiate a paternity proceeding | 8-227 |
| The law favors resolution on the merits in child custody proceedings; defaults are disfavored in child custody and child support cases and the general rule regarding opening defaults in civil actions is not to be rigorously applied | 8-229 |
| 9. CPLR 5512: Appealable Paper | |
| [a] In General | 9-2 |
| An appeal may be had from orders and judgments only; CPLR 5512 is jurisdictional; no appeal lies from a decision on which an order or judgment has not been entered | 9-2 |
| - "A so-ordered stipulation may be considered a court order" | 9-3 |
| No appeal lies from a decision; the difference between a ruling, a decision, and an order | 9-4 |

| – No appeal lies from a memorandum decision | 9-5 |
|--|------|
| No appeal lies from an order denying renewal of a decision | 9-6 |
| Where Supreme Court sua sponte modifies the judgment by a subsequent decision after the notice of appeal has been filed which decision sets forth more detailed findings and reasons, appeal dismissed as no appeal lies from a decision | 9-7 |
| An order without an underlying action does not constitute an appealable paper | 9-8 |
| No appeal lies from a decision directing "submit order," "settle order"; decisions and orders which direct the prevailing party to "submit order" are decisions from which no appeal lies | 9-9 |
| No appeal lies from findings of fact and conclusions of law | 9-10 |
| No appeal lies from an order finding probable cause under the Mental Hygiene Law Article 10 | 9-11 |
| No appeal lies from a verdict | 9-12 |
| No appeal lies from a referee's report | 9-13 |
| No appeal lies from a notice that a foreign order of support was registered | 9-14 |
| No appeal lies from an extract of the clerk's minutes of trial or from a mere notation in the court's file | 9-15 |
| No appeal lies from an unsigned paper | 9-16 |
| No appeal from an order made on the phone | 9-17 |
| No appeal lies from a letter decision, such decision must first be reduced to an order | 9-18 |
| Supreme Court granted leave to appeal without a hearing from an interim decision, which decision was not the product of a motion for relief; appeal dismissed as the paper was not appealable and the court lacked jurisdiction | |

| Decision treated as an order because it included "the standard language advising that any appeal from the 'order' | |
|---|------|
| must be taken within 30 days" | 9-23 |
| - "Essential requirements of an order" | 9-23 |
| - Letter "treated as an order" as it had the effect of an order | 9-23 |
| A "Stipulation and Order" is not an appealable paper | 9-26 |
| A matrimonial judgment granting a divorce without awarding equitable distribution is not appealable where it only states the court's intent to divorce the parties in the future | 9-27 |
| "An order awarding summary judgment, establishing that a party is entitled to a divorce, is nonfinal and not itself appealable, given Supreme Court's failure, as statutorily required, to also render a final award of equitable distribution as part of the final | |
| judgment" | 9-28 |
| No appeal lies from an order denying a motion to vacate a decision | 9-29 |
| No appeal lies from a court's rejection of a motion pursuant to Family Court Act § 1035(f) to intervene in proceedings for the purpose of seeking custody of a child | 9-30 |
| A bill of costs is not an appealable paper | 9-31 |
| An appeal from an order rather than from a judgment is treated as an appeal from a judgment where the order does not differ materially from the judgment | 9-32 |
| An appeal from a decision rather than from an order is treated as an appeal from the order where the decision does not differ materially from the order | 9-33 |
| No appeal lies from an order that has been superseded by a later order | 9-34 |
| No appeal lies from an order denying a motion to vacate an unsigned transcript of an oral decision | 9-35 |

| No appeal lies from an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, CPLR 4401 | 9-36 |
|--|------|
| A "decision and order" that does not order "anything" is not appealable because no appeal lies from a mere decision | 9-37 |
| Where the order of the Appellate Division is final, the appeal to the Court of Appeals lies only from that paper and not from the judgment subsequently entered thereon | 9-38 |
| [b] Resettlement of Orders; Court's Continuing Jurisdiction to Reconsider Its Prior Interlocutory Orders During the Pendency of the Action; the Trial Court Has Discretion to Correct an Order or Judgment Containing a Mistake, Defect, or Irregularity Not Affecting a Substantial Right; a Trial Court Has No Revisory or Appellate Jurisdiction to Sua Sponte Vacate Its Own Order or Judgment | 9-39 |
| Resettlement of orders and judgments | 9-39 |
| Definition of resettlement | 9-40 |
| Regardless of statutory time limits concerning motions to reargue, every court retains continuing jurisdiction to reconsider its prior interlocutory orders during the pendency of the action; a court has the inherent power, even sua sponte, to reconsider and vacate its prior interlocutory order and issue a new order | 9-43 |
| Once an order finally determines an action the matter is no longer pending and a court lacks the authority to consider an untimely request for reargument | 9-46 |
| - "The pendency of an appeal from an order continues to be a time period available for a motion to reargue, which is indeed the preferable construction" of CPLR 2221(d)(3) | 9-48 |
| In a case of default Supreme Court has the inherent authority to vacate a judgment in the interest of justice even after the statutory one-year period has lapsed | 9-50 |
| The "pendency of the appeal is no bar to a motion in the court below for a new trial" | |

| "A court of original jurisdiction may entertain a motion to renew or vacate a prior order or judgment even after an appellate court has rendered a decision on that order or judgment"; | |
|--|------|
| "on a post-appeal motion for leave to renew or to vacate, the movant bears a heavy burden of showing due diligence in presenting the new evidence to the court of original jurisdiction"; | |
| a court may not however grant leave to reargue | 9-53 |
| A trial court has no revisory or appellate jurisdiction to sua sponte vacate its own final judgment or order | 9-55 |
| A trial court has no revisory or appellate jurisdiction to sua sponte vacate its own final order or judgment | 9-59 |
| Substantive changes to an order or judgment are pursued by direct appeal or by motion to vacate under CPLR 5015(a); CPLR 5019(a) is only intended for clerical errors | 9-61 |
| Courts possess inherent power to correct their records relating to clerical mistakes or errors, the clarification of orders, or to conform the record to the truth; | |
| A trial court may unilaterally and affirmatively correct minor mistakes, defects, or irregularities in its orders or judgments, after the fact, so long as the correction does "not affect[] a substantial right of a party | 9-65 |
| A "written order or judgment must conform strictly to the court's decision"; "in the event of an inconsistency between a judgment and a decision or order upon which it is based, the decision or order controls" | 9-66 |
| - CPLR 5019 "cannot be used to sua sponte correct errors that involve new exercises of discretion or fact-finding, vacating prior orders or judgments reconsidering the merits of summary judgment or adding the words that a judgment is 'with prejudice' " | 9-67 |
| A clerk's mistake in assessing interest may be corrected by the court of original jurisdiction even after the appellate process is over where the interest rate was not disputed | 9-69 |

| No appeal lies from an order denying a motion to resettle or to clarify a substantive portion of an order or the decretal paragraphs of a judgment | 9-71 |
|--|------|
| A later order issued in response to a request for clarification of an earlier order is akin to a resettlement of the earlier order | 9-73 |
| An order resettling a prior order is appealable provided it makes material changes to render a new determination thereby creating a corresponding new right to appeal | |
| "The granting of a motion to resettle an order has no affect on the original appeal yet the change can be substantial" | 9-75 |
| The timeliness of an appeal of resettled orders or judgments | 9-76 |
| A defect or irregularity in a judgment or order that affects no substantial right of a party may also be corrected at the appellate level | 9-78 |
| The preferred remedy when a judgment does not accurately incorporate the terms of a stipulation or where the judgment contains an inaccurate insertion is by motion in the trial court for resettlement or vacatur of the judgment rather than by appeal | 9-79 |
| The decision controls when the judgment and the underlying decision differ | 9-81 |
| An application for resettlement is not required to be brought pursuant to notice of motion or by order to show cause | 9-82 |
| CPLR 5019(a) permits a Court to cure any "mistake, defect or irregularity" in a judgment, including mathematical errors in calculation | 9-83 |
| [c] Amended Orders and Judgments | 9-85 |
| No appeal lies from an order or judgment that has been amended, first judgment is superseded by the amended order or judgment | 9-85 |
| Where an order on appeal was superseded by an amended order the appeal need not be dismissed where the amendment is immaterial to the appeal | 9-87 |
| | |

| While an appeal is pending only from the original judgment an amended order or judgment that only clarifies the decision does not require a new notice of appeal | 9-88 |
|---|----------|
| The Supreme Court retains "inherent discretionary power to relieve a party from a judgment or order for sufficient reason and in the interest of substantial justice" | 9-89 |
| The Appellate Division may deny relief on statutory grounds but nevertheless grant it on its inherent authority | 9-89 |
| - "Although the Supreme Court retains 'inherent discretionary power to relieve a party from a judgment or order for sufficient reason and in the interest of substantial justice,' " once the appellate process has been concluded errors of law which could have been reviewed may not be addressed except as to the grounds for relief in CPLR 5015 or if there has been some other compelling circumstance | |
| - "A motion to vacate is not another means by which to raise an issue of law that could have been raised had the party timely perfected [a direct] appeal" | 9-98 |
| 10. CPLR 5513, Timeliness of an Appeal, Notice of Appeal, No Entry, Cross-Appeal, Motion for Leave to Appeal | otice of |
| Statutes that regulate the right to appeal are to be strictly construed especially when a party is seeking to limit the time of another to take an appeal | 10-3 |
| - Timeliness of notice of appeal, time does not commence when the order was transmitted and entered into NYSCEF (22 NYCRR 202.5-b(h)(2)) | 10-4 |
| Generally appeals from orders that have not been entered are subject to dismissal | 10-4 |

| When there are multiple parties, whose service of the order or judgment with notice of entry starts the 30-day limitation period? <i>W. Rogowski Farm, LLC v. County of Orange</i> , 171 A.D.3d 79, 96 N.Y.S.3d 88 (2d Dep't 2019) held that service by any party starts the 30-day clock | ; |
|--|-------|
| CPLR 5513(a) was amended in 1996, (L.1996, c. 214, § 1), effective January 1, 1997, to provide, in pertinent part: "An appeal as of right must be taken within thirty days after service by a party upon the appellant of a copy of the judgment or order appealed from and written notice of its entry" | |
| Pre 1997 amendment language provided: "CPLR 5513(a) limits the time to appeal by requiring that an appeal as of right 'be taken within thirty days <i>after service upon the appellant</i> of a copy of the judgment or order appealed from and written notice of its entry." | |
| Pre 1977 amendment case law noted that then CPLR 5513 did not explicitly designate the person or the entity who must serve the order or judgment being appealed from for purposes of commencing the 30–day limitation period clock | 10-6 |
| Pre-amendment caselaw involving multiple parties | 10-8 |
| The Memorandum of the Bill Sponsor, Bill Number: A10407, Sponsor: Rules (Sidikman) | 10-12 |
| W. Rogowski Farm, LLC v. County of Orange holds that the 1997 Amendment means service by "any party to an action" | 10-15 |
| The power of an appellate court to review a judgment is subject to a timely appeal; the CPLR 5513 time for filing is jurisdictional and nonwaivable an appellant is held to strict compliance even for pro se litigants; even one day late is fatal to the appeal | 10-17 |
| Where the untimeliness was occasioned by an act of the other party the untimeliness will not be charged against the appellant | |
| The presumption that an affidavit of service creates a presumption that proper service was completed upon mailing may be rebutted | n |
| 1000000 | 10 44 |

| revive an expired right of appeal | 10-24 |
|--|-------|
| No extensions may be made nor may a notice of appeal be amended once the time to file the notice of appeal has expired | 10-25 |
| Notice of appeal may not be amended to add parties after the time to serve and file the notice has elapsed | 10-26 |
| Notice of filing with the clerk is not a notice of entry; entry does not occur until the clerk files the judgment after signing it | 10-27 |
| The judgment served upon the other party must be a true copy of the original judgment; statutes which regulate the right to appeal are to be strictly construed | 10-28 |
| Where there is no written notice of entry the 30-day period under CPLR 5513(a) does not begin to run; proper notice of entry | 10-29 |
| Motion papers accompanied by a proper copy of the order triggers the 30 time clock | 10-31 |
| Where service of a conformed copy of an order omitted the word "interest," but service of a later copy included "interest," the omission was held inconsequential; service of the first copy satisfied the CPLR 5513 time requirements | 10-33 |
| A cover letter can function as a notice of entry only when it includes the requisite information alerting the respondent that the enclosure is an appealable paper | 10-34 |
| An appeal from a short form order with notice of entry rather than from the so-ordered transcript with notice of entry starts the 30-day jurisdictional clock | 10-36 |
| Failure to file a preargument statement is not jurisdictional | 10-37 |
| An order which does not contain a recital of the papers used is an appealable order; no new right of appeal is created by a resettled order correcting such omission | 10-37 |

| A court's failure to recite the papers that were submitted in support of a motion may be remedied by way of resettlement even after appeal; | |
|--|--------|
| the time to appeal from an order that fails to recite the papers relied upon may not be circumvented by a motion to resettle and appealing from the resettled order as resettlement correcting such omission makes no material change in the original order | 10-39 |
| Amended notice of appeal that clarifies a timely filed notice of appeal; prejudice is a factor | 10-41 |
| CPLR 2001: clerical, typographical errors and the notice of appeal | 10-43 |
| Notice of appeal amended pursuant to CPLR 2001 to add or name a proper party | 10-46 |
| Where counsel for a party erroneously signs the notice of appeal as the appellant the CPLR authorizes the Appellate Division to disregard the error | 10-50 |
| | |
| 11. CPLR 5515, CPLR 2220, Taking an Appeal, the Notice of | Appeal |
| 11. CPLR 5515, CPLR 2220, Taking an Appeal, the Notice of The Appellate Division has discretion to construe a notice of appeal liberally subject to the prejudice of the other party | |
| The Appellate Division has discretion to construe a notice of | 11-3 |
| The Appellate Division has discretion to construe a notice of appeal liberally subject to the prejudice of the other party The Appellate Division may exercise its discretion "to reach beyond" the scope of a party's notice of appeal; prejudice to | 11-3 |
| The Appellate Division has discretion to construe a notice of appeal liberally subject to the prejudice of the other party The Appellate Division may exercise its discretion "to reach beyond" the scope of a party's notice of appeal; prejudice to another party is a factor | 11-3 |

| An instance of the latitude given to correct an omission | |
|---|-------|
| Petitioner served a notice of appeal on respondent's law guardian pursuant to statute; petitioner failed to serve respondent herself as of the time of oral argument; petitioner granted leave to correct the omission | |
| une omission | 11 / |
| The notice of appeal must designate the judgment or order, or specific part of the judgment or order, from which the appeal is taken, this requirement is jurisdictional; | |
| where an appeal is taken from only part of a judgment or order the right to appeal from the remainder thereof is deemed waived and abandoned | 11-10 |
| Failure to appeal from a sub silentio denial of a motion precludes the Appellate Division from granting the relief sought | 11-12 |
| The Appellate Division "may treat a notice of appeal which contains an inaccurate description of the judgment or order appealed from as valid, it may not amend a notice of appeal to insert therein an order from which no appeal has in fact ever been taken" | 11-13 |
| Where a portion of an order appealed from is "inextricably intertwined" with the balance of the unappealed order an appellate court may neither be circumscribed nor precluded from passing upon so much of the order as is necessarily affected by the portion from which an appeal has been taken | |
| | |
| Limiting language | 11-16 |
| Parties may ask the Appellate Division to limit the issues addressed | 11-16 |
| Whether the notice of appeal contains limiting language is not always clear to the Appellate Division | 11-16 |
| It is "a perfectly legitimate tactic" even at the appellate level for a corporation to assign its interests to an individual in order to circumvent the prohibition against corporate self-representation in CPLR 321 | 11-19 |

12. CPLR 5520: Omissions, Appeal by Improper Method

| Mistakes as to Form and Content of the Notice May Well Be Excused | 12-2 |
|--|-------|
| - CPLR 5520 and CPLR 5512(a) | 12-2 |
| - CPLR 5520(b) overlaps CPLR 5014(a) | 12-2 |
| A "notice of poor person requesting permission to proceed" cannot be treated as a notice of appeal when nothing in it suggests that it was intended to be one; | |
| although a "mistake, omission, defect or irregularity" in a notice of appeal may be disregarded (CPLR 2001), and a notice of appeal may be deemed valid where it "is premature or contains an inaccurate description of the judgment or order appealed from" (CPLR 5520(c)), a document may not be treated as a notice of appeal when nothing in it suggests that it was intended to be one | 12-3 |
| Where an order is subsumed within a judgment the appeal is from the judgment not the order; the Appellate Division may treat the notice of appeal as one taken from the judgment | 12-5 |
| Notice of appeal treated as a premature notice of appeal from the judgment | 12-8 |
| While an appeal should be taken from an amended order the notice of appeal may be treated as being from the amended order | 12-11 |
| The notice of appeal from a ruling from a motion for discovery only referenced the amended order which deferred determination of defendants' entitlement to the records. The final determination was issued in a letter order, entered the same day as the amended order; defendants challenged the scope of the ordered disclosure. On those facts, and the absence of any prejudice, the Appellate Division discretionarily overlooked the inaccurate description in the notice of appeal and treated the appeal as having been taken from both orders | 12-12 |
| Where the record does not indicate that a notice of appeal was timely filed in the absence of prejudice for the | |
| other party | 12-13 |

| reviewable only in the appeal from that judgment; the failure to appeal from the judgment may be excused where it resulted from an office failure provided it was not prejudicial to the other party | 12-13 |
|--|--------|
| - Omission of a docket number | 12-14 |
| - Inaccurate description of an order | 12-14 |
| - General inaccuracies | 12-15 |
| Mere inaccuracies and inconsequential errors in the notice of appeal which violate no rules of practice, such as the failure to include an address, and are in themselves immaterial | 12-18 |
| Misstatements in the notice of appeal that the appeal is taken from a judgment rather than an order or from a verdict rather than from the judgment may receive discretionary treatment by the Appellate Division | 12-21 |
| An incorrect date in a notice of appeal is not fatal | 12-23 |
| Filing the notice of appeal in the wrong county | 12-24 |
| A notice of appeal may not be amended to insert an order from which no appeal was ever taken | 12-25 |
| References | 12-26 |
| Defective mailings of notice of appeal and leave for proper service granted | 12-27 |
| Bifurcation of an appeal from the same order is disapproved | 12-28 |
| 13. CPLR 5514: Four Grounds for an Extension of the 30-Da to Appeal | y Time |
| CPLR 5514(a) does not authorize a motion for an extension of time to move for leave to appeal | 13-3 |
| The Court of Appeals referred to CPLR 5514(a) as an "unnecessary procedural trap for the unwary" | 13-4 |

| inconsistent applications of Park East Corp. v. whaten | 13-7 |
|---|-------|
| When an incorrect method is used, the court can deny or fix the time within which to properly file | 13-9 |
| - CPLR 5514(b) does not apply to voluntary discharge of counsel | 13-10 |
| CPLR 5514(b): "otherwise becomes disabled" "connotes a force majeure" | 13-12 |
| CPLR 5514(c), CPLR 1022: Substitution of Parties | 13-14 |
| If an appeal is taken to the wrong court, the wrong court may sua sponte transfer the appeal to the proper court | 13-15 |
| 14. CPLR 5513, CPLR 5015 and Finality of Judgments | |
| A final judgment or order represents a conclusive adjudication of the parties' substantive rights, unless it is overturned on appeal; absent the sort of circumstances in CPLR 5015 a judgment becomes final when a timely appeal has not been taken; CPLR 5015 is discretionary and applies to judgments that are still in the appellate process and to those in which appellate review has been exhausted | 14-2 |
| When the law remains what it was when the original order was issued, the predicate for a motion to renew is lacking, and the motion is one to reargue; | |
| an intervening ruling that merely clarifies existing law does not afford a basis for renewal attributed to a change in the law pursuant to CPLR 2221 | |
| - Fuentes v. Kwik Realty illustrates the appellate remedy of a renewal motion based on a change in the law | 14-9 |
| Motions for Reconsideration | 14-12 |
| - A motion "for reconsideration" is a motion for reargument which is not appealable | 14-12 |

| A motion for reconsideration based upon additional facts which petitioner could not have discovered until after the prior application is a motion for renewal | 14-12 |
|--|--------|
| Where a renewal motion is nothing more than a reprise of a prior, unsuccessful motion for the same relief, it will be deemed to be a motion to reargue | 14-13 |
| 15. CPLR 5501(a), Finality, "Necessarily Affects the Final Judgment," Implied Severance, Doctrine of "Implied Final Fina | ality" |
| [a] In General | 15-2 |
| Finality | 15-2 |
| "Reviewability is governed by CPLR 5501, entitled scope of review, which enumerates the issues of law, fact, or discretion, that are subject to appellate review once the aggrievement and appealability requirements have been satisfied" | 15-2 |
| Finality is based on the perception that litigants are best served by a system that prohibits piecemeal appellate review | 15-4 |
| "The concept of finality is complex and cannot be exhaustively defined in a single phrase, sentence or writing" | 15-5 |
| The Court of Appeals has rarely discussed the meaning of the expression "necessarily affects"; the Court of Appeals has declined to give "a generally applicable definition" | 15-6 |
| [b] The Issue of Whether a Nonfinal Order Affects the Judgment | 15-8 |
| "Inevitable and mechanical reversal or modification of the final determination"; a final order or judgment disposes of all of the causes of action between the parties and leaves nothing for | |
| further judicial determination | 15-8 |
| Read with caution | 15-12 |
| An appeal from a final judgment "brings up for review any non- final judgment or order which necessarily affects the final judgment" (CPLR 5501(a)(1)), irrespective of whether the order | |
| had been made on notice | 15-14 |

| CPLR 5501(a)(1) brings up a prior unappealed default order for review | 15-18 |
|---|-------|
| An order granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration is a final order | 15-19 |
| When an appeal from a nonfinal order is perfected together with an appeal from a final judgment, the appeal from the nonfinal order is dismissed and errors in the nonfinal order affecting the final judgment are reviewed upon the appeal from the final judgment | 15-20 |
| An appeal from an interlocutory order that is withdrawn before determination may be brought up for review from the final judgment provided it necessarily affects the judgment | 15-21 |
| Finality and ministerial acts | 15-22 |
| An appeal from an order does not bring up for review a prior order | 15-24 |
| An appeal from a nonfinal order or an intermediate order does not bring up for review prior nonfinal orders | 15-26 |
| The corollary of CPLR 5501(a)(1) is that a final order may not be reviewed on appeal from a later order or judgment | 15-28 |
| An order from a contempt proceeding in a pending action does not finally determine the causes of action | 15-29 |
| An appeal from a jurisdictionally valid contempt order does not bring up for review the prior order | 15-30 |
| A decision or verdict upon which no formal judgment has been entered has no conclusive character | 15-31 |
| The scope of the words "final judgment" should not be confined to a final judgment in an action; the essential element of a conclusive adjudication is finality of the proceedings; a judicial decision may be a conclusive adjudication of fact or law | 15-32 |

| The conclusive effect of a final disposition of a case is not to be disturbed by a subsequent change in decisional law; retroactivity analysis does not permit application of new law to cases already resolved; a change in law generally will be applied to all cases still in the normal litigation process | 15-34 |
|--|-------|
| A party may not reopen a voluntary settlement agreement to take advantage of a subsequent change in the law | 15-35 |
| Generally, the right of a direct appeal from an intermediate order terminates with the entry of judgment in the action (<i>Matter of Aho</i> , 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248, 383 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1976)) | 15-37 |
| - In 2020, in <i>Knapp v. Finger Lakes NY, Inc.</i> , the Fourth Department reversed its precedent authority to hold that "an order otherwise appealable as of right (CPLR 5701(a)) entered after the entry of a final judgment is not subsumed in the judgment but is independently appealable" | 15-41 |
| Where the order appealed from is a final order, the right of direct appeal does not terminate upon entry of the judgment | 15-43 |
| A posttrial order is subsumed in the judgment | 15-44 |
| The notice of appeal from a final order does not need to recite or identify that the appeal is also taken from the nonfinal orders | 15-45 |
| CPLR 5501(a)(5), stipulation on a motion to set aside a verdict as excessive or inadequate, additur and remittitur; a party challenging the amount of an additur or remittitur on appeal must do so before | |
| a new trial takes place and is not required to specify an amount | 15-46 |
| [c] Implied Severance, Doctrine of Implied Finality | 15-50 |
| Implied severance, doctrine of "implied finality" | 15-50 |
| - Party finality doctrine | 15-53 |
| The intent of the amendment to CPLR 5501(c) | 15-54 |

| 16. CPLR 603, CPLR 1010, Severance and Separate Trials | |
|--|-------|
| [a] In General | 16-2 |
| A severed cause of action does not impair the finality of the remaining judgment, it becomes a separate action which may be terminated in a separate judgment; review of the prior order may only be had by direct appeal therefrom or by appeal from a judgment entered thereon | 16-2 |
| Consolidation or joint trial hinges upon a finding of common issues of law or fact; severance generally depends upon an absence of such commonality | 16-4 |
| 17. Provisional Remedies | |
| [a] Provisional Remedies to Preserve the Status Quo, Injunctions and Finality | 17-2 |
| "Absent unusual or compelling circumstances, appellate courts are reluctant to disturb preliminary injunctions" | |
| A preliminary injunction even when issued after an evidentiary hearing depends upon probabilities which may be disproven at trial | 17-6 |
| When reviewing an order that denied a preliminary injunction the Appellate Division should review only whether the court abused its discretion | 17-7 |
| Injunctions, provisional remedies to preserve status quo do not necessarily affect the final judgment and are not subject to review. | 17-8 |
| On an appeal from a preliminary injunction an issuing court retains the power to decide motions on an order that has been appealed even where the outcome may impact the pending appeal | 17-9 |
| [b] Stays, Preliminary Injunctions, CPLR 5518, CPLR 5519(a)(1) | 17-10 |
| Stays, Preliminary Injunctions, CPLR 5518, CPLR 5519(a)(1) | 17-10 |

| A stay merely suspends further proceedings; it does not vitiate the effect of the order or judgment stayed; "filing a notice of appeal does not suspend the operation of the judgment as an | |
|---|-------|
| estoppel" | 17-11 |
| - The Appellate Division possesses the inherent power to stay a trial | 17-13 |
| CPLR 5519(a) | |
| "CPLR 5519(a) only provides a stay of proceedings to enforce the executory components of the judgment or order appealed from; it has the effect of temporarily depriving the prevailing party of the ability to use the methods specified by law – a motion decided by an order does not become undecided and the declaratory provisions of a judgment are not undeclared when a governmental party serves a notice of appeal therefrom"; | |
| "the automatic stay of CPLR 5519(a) is restricted to the executory directions of the judgment or order appealed from which command a person to do an act"; | |
| "the stay does not extend to matters which are not commanded but which are the sequelae of granting or denying relief"; | |
| "where an order merely denies a motion for summary judgment or to strike the case from the calendar, an appeal from that order will not stay a trial which is a consequence of the order but is not directed by it" | 17-14 |
| "A notice of appeal of an order denying a motion to dismiss does not trigger the automatic stay in CPLR 5519(a) with respect to affirmative directives in the CPLR regarding litigation obligations such as the obligation to answer and comply with discovery requests" | 17-19 |
| An automatic stay pursuant to CPLR 5519(a)(1) is not available by appealing as of right or by seeking permission to appeal from an order or judgment which prohibits certain conduct because it does not direct an executory act; | |
| prohibitory injunctions are self-executing and need no enforcement procedure to compel inaction on the part of the person or entity restrained | 17-21 |

| Order discharging patient "forthwith" from state psychiatric center does not trigger automatic stay pursuant to CPLR 5519(a) because it is self-executing rather than executory | 17-23 |
|--|-------|
| A "stay pursuant to CPLR 5519(a)(1) stays only proceedings to enforce an order, a trial is not a proceeding to enforce an order" | 17-25 |
| The interaction between CPLR 5519(c) and CPLR Article 65 (Notice of Pendency): the pendency of an appeal notwithstanding, the rights from a final judgment "are fully enforceable in the absence of a judicially issued stay pending disposition of the appeal" | |
| Motion for a stay pursuant to CPLR 5519(c) is unnecessary where the automatic stay provisions of CPLR 5519(a)(1) are available | 17-31 |
| Stays and Mootness in Construction Cases | 17-32 |
| "Chief among the factors bearing on mootness has been a challenger's failure to seek preliminary injunctive relief or otherwise preserve the status quo to prevent construction from commencing or continuing during the pendency of the litigation"; | |
| other factors include "whether work was undertaken without authority or in bad faith, and whether substantially completed work is "readily undone, without undue hardship"; relief is "theoretically available" in that a structure or project "can be destroyed"; | |
| The Appellate Division "may retain jurisdiction despite mootness if recurring novel or substantial issues are sufficiently evanescent to evade review otherwise" | 17-32 |
| Appeals dismissed as moot or academic due to appellant's failure to "seek injunctive relief or to make any other attempts to preserve the status quo during the pendency of [its] appeal"; absence of bad faith | 17-39 |
| Has petitioner moved for a preliminary injunction, or otherwise sought to preserve the status quo; construction not performed in bad faith or without authority | 17-43 |

| A petitioner seeking to halt a construction project must "move for injunctive relief at each stage of the proceeding" | 17-46 |
|--|-------|
| No mootness where construction had not proceeded beyond the point where it could not be "readily undone, without undue hardship"; petitioners sought an expedited hearing of the appeal and had moved expeditiously to perfect it | 17-50 |
| Petitioner never moved for a preliminary injunction, or otherwise sought to preserve the status quo; construction was not performed in bad faith or without authority; | |
| work could not readily be undone without substantial hardship and the residents of the facility would suffer substantial prejudice if petitioner prevailed | 17-51 |
| Failure to seek injunctive relief pursuant to CPLR 5518 due to financial constraints is unavailing | 17-51 |
| Appeal dismissed as moot for failure to make an attempt to stay a deposition in order to maintain the status quo prior to the appeal | 17-52 |
| Professional liability insurance: plaintiff's appeal became moot for not taking action (CPLR 5518, 5519), pending appeal, to maintain the status quo; defendant-insurer, in the interim, paid the third parties and received a release of their claims against plaintiff | 17-52 |
| [c] Appeals from Pendente Lite Orders in Matrimonial Cases | |
| Appeals from pendente lite support awards in matrimonial cases are disfavored during the pendency of the action except where the award renders the payor-spouse unable to meet his or her reasonable needs | 17-54 |
| Pendente lite orders in matrimonial cases cease to exist after the final judgment has been entered and are not reviewable on appeal because even if modified they would not affect the final | |
| iudgment | 17-55 |

| Prof. Siegel equates a pendente lite order of support to a provisional remedy like a temporary injunction during the pendency of an action intended to preserve the status quo | 17-58 |
|--|-------|
| When a temporary order of visitation functions like a permanent order the word temporary does not control and the order is appealable | 17-60 |
| Pendente lite awards: noncompliance with 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 202.16(g) does not result in the forfeiture of the right to appeal | 17-61 |
| 18. CPLR 5701: Appeals as of Right, Orders Not Appealable Right, Appeals by Permission | as of |
| [a] In General | 18-2 |
| CPLR 5701 | |
| Appeals to the Appellate Division from Supreme and County Courts | 18-2 |
| Trial courts should be cognizant of the consequences that may ensue from piecemeal interlocutory orders; "from an appellate perspective, it is highly undesirable to review separate decisions on the basis of separate records" | 18-5 |
| CPLR 5701(a)(1): an appeal lies as of right from any final or interlocutory judgment except one entered subsequent to an order of the Appellate Division which disposes of all the issues in the action | 18-6 |
| An order refusing to strike scandalous or prejudicial matter from a pleading is not appealable as of right, leave to appeal must be sought; the Appellate Division may consider a belated motion | 18-11 |
| Instances of nonappealable interlocutory orders | 18-12 |
| – Motion to accelerate the return date of a motion | 18-12 |
| Denial of a motion to designate a date for trial | 18-12 |

| CPLR 5701(b) subsequent order held appealable as an amendmen to a prior order because the later order contained the same motion sequence number as the prior order; also the "[motion] | t |
|---|-------|
| denied" box was checked in the later order indicating reference back to the earlier order | 18-13 |
| [b] CPLR 5701(a)(2), Motions Made on Notice are Appealable as of Right; the Intersection between CPLR 5701(a)(2) and CPLR 2215(a); Relief Allowed although No Formal Cross Motion Was Served When the Merits of the Application Were Briefed and Argued | 18-15 |
| CPLR 5701(a)(2), Motions on notice | 18-15 |
| The intersection between CPLR 5701(a)(2) and CPLR 2215(a) (Cross Motions): instances where relief has been allowed and considered on appeal even though no formal cross motion had been served because the merits of the application were briefed and argued | 18-16 |
| Decisions holding that the lower court "should have granted" the requested relief notwithstanding the movant's failure to file a cross motion | |
| The Appellate Division may sua sponte conform pleadings to the proof, which although not formally pled, were raised and addressed before the motion court | 18-25 |
| - Relief requested without notice of cross motion, the Appellate Division refused to hear the appeal | 18-26 |
| Instances where the Appellate Division has granted leave to appeal from an oral motion | 18-29 |
| [c] A Petition for Habeas Corpus Does Not Require Notice | 18-30 |
| No appeal lies from intermediate orders in habeas corpus proceedings | 18-30 |
| Purpose and appealability of habeas corpus orders intermediate orders are not appealable | 18-31 |
| A writ of habeas corpus is not the proper procedure for seeking review of a family court order of custody and visitation | 18-33 |

| [d] Orders Following Court Conferences Are Not Appea as of Right | |
|---|----------|
| [e] Dictum Is Not Appealable | 18-36 |
| Definitions of dictum: | 18-36 |
| No appeal lies from dictum | 18-37 |
| [f] Failure to Rule on a Motion or on a Branch Thereof; an Order Holding a Decision in Abeyance or Deferri the Motion to Trial | ng |
| A court's failure to decide or rule on a motion or on a branch thereof is deemed a denial of that aspect of the motion and is appealable | 8 |
| An order that does not decide a branch of a motion is not appealable where the issue remains pending | 18-40 |
| An order holding a decision in abeyance or deferring the disposition is not appealable as of right | 18-42 |
| An order referring a motion to the trial court may constitute denial rendering the order appealable as of right | |
| An order directing a trial in response to a motion for summa judgment is appealable because it constitutes a denial of the motion | |
| An order that adjourns or reserves a decision is not appealab | le 18-46 |
| [g] Appeals from Motions for Summary Judgment | 18-47 |
| Summary judgment presumes a litigated motion; ex parte submission of a motion for summary judgment precludes meaningful appellate review of Supreme Court's disposition absence of any opposition to a motion for summary judgmer means there is no theory of recovery for review | nt |
| Although the Court of Appeals may not grant summary judgm to a nonappealing party the Appellate Division may independ search the record to grant complete relief to the appealing part | ently |

| An appellate court may search the record to find an issue of fact to preclude summary judgment; it may not search the record to support a new theory of recovery that was never remotely put forth by the plaintiff | 18-52 |
|--|-------|
| The Court of Appeals slams "the sloppy practice" of a midtrial motion for summary judgment in contravention of CPLR 3212(a) | 18-53 |
| Repetitive motions for summary judgment are disfavored but courts are permitted to consider such motions; the court should examine whether the motion "furthers the ends of justice and eliminate[s] an unnecessary burden on the resources of the courts" | 18-55 |
| [h] CPLR 5701(b) | 18-56 |
| Scandalous matter in a pleading, the standard of review for the appellate court is whether the trial court's order to strike matter, or not strike matter, was an improvident exercise of its discretion | 18-56 |
| [i] CPLR 5701(c), Appeals by Permission, Appeals from Sua Sponte Orders | 18-57 |
| CPLR 5701(a)(3): Sua sponte orders | 18-57 |
| Distinction between sua sponte relief not requested by any party and sua sponte reasoning | 18-59 |
| No appeal lies as of right from a sua sponte order as it is not "on notice" and is only appealable by permission; a sua sponte order must be vacated by motion on notice to nisi prius a direct appeal may then be taken from a denial of that motion | 18-60 |
| Remedy for unrequested sua sponte relief granted in a motion | 18-60 |
| An order that is based on a letter to the court is treated like a sua sponte order, an appeal therefrom must comply with CPLR 5701(a)(3) | 18-62 |
| A sua sponte order is appealable if leave to appeal is granted | 18-64 |
| Where sua sponte relief is extraordinary the Appellate Division may deem a notice of appeal as a motion for leave to appeal | 18-65 |

| The power to dismiss a complaint, sua sponte, is to be used sparingly and only when extraordinary circumstances exist | 18-67 |
|---|-------|
| A sua sponte order in the final judgment is appealable as of right | 18-68 |
| Instances where trial courts may and may not grant sua sponte relief | 18-71 |
| Courts may not sua sponte appoint private referees to supervise disclosure | 18-74 |
| Instances of sua sponte order of protections upheld | 18-76 |
| The Appellate Division may not sua sponte dismiss an appeal without articulating the reason | 18-77 |
| [j] CPLR 5701(c), Permission for Leave to Appeal | 18-78 |
| Instances where the Appellate Division has treated a notice of appeal as a motion for leave to appeal | |
| CPLR 5701(c): Novel and significant issues | 18-78 |
| - The Appellate Division may grant a motion for leave to appeal in order to address a new area of law | 18-79 |
| Instances where the Appellate Division declined to treat a notice of appeal as a motion for leave to appeal | |
| Citing CPLR 5701(c), the Appellate Division is disinclined to grant leave to parties who took it upon themselves to perfect an appeal without leave | 18-80 |
| A denial of an application for leave to appeal is not equivalent to an affirmance and has no precedential value | 18-81 |
| [k] Appeals from Orders and Judgments during the Pendency of an Appeal | 18-82 |
| Pendency of an appeal does not affect the use of an order or judgment as an estoppel | 18-82 |

19. Instances of Issues Appealable as of Right

| – Issue of self incrimination affects a substantial right | 19-2 |
|--|----------|
| - Damages | 19-2 |
| Discovery, an order granting a protective order and precluding discovery of numerous documents affects a substantial right. | 19-2 |
| - The ability to pursue a theory of the case | 19-3 |
| - Denial of a motion to bar a party from calling his counsel as a witness is reviewable | 19-3 |
| - An order denying a motion "without prejudice to renew" is appealable as of right | 19-3 |
| 20. Instances of Issues Not Appealable as of Right | |
| Where a motion is denied with leave to renew upon proper papers the appropriate remedy is not to appeal but rather to remove at nisi prius supported by the proper papers | 20-2 |
| An order deferring determination of a motion to compel discover until the production of other documents or after an in camera inspection of certain materials is not an appealable paper | |
| - The denial of an application to quash a subpoena is a final and appealable order | 20-4 |
| No appeal lies as of right from a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) | 20-6 |
| A justice's recusal from a case is not an appealable order | 20-8 |
| 21. The Appealability of a "Decision and Order" Following a Uniquely Treated in the Second Department | Trial Is |
| The Second Department does not permit a direct appeal from a "decision and order" following a trial | 21-2 |
| The Court of Appeals and the Third Department permit a direct appeal from a "decision and order" | 21-3 |

| 22. Appeals From Orders of Reference Directing a Hearing | |
|--|-------|
| [a] Appellate Courts | 22-2 |
| Appeals from orders of reference directing a hearing; the appellate courts are not quite unanimous | 22-2 |
| - First Department: appealable | 22-2 |
| - Second and Fourth Departments: non-appealable, with exception | 22-2 |
| - Third Department: one decision holds it is not appealable, another decision holds it is not | 22-2 |
| - Fourth Department: not appealable as of right | 22-2 |
| First Department: orders of reference are appealable | 22-3 |
| Second Department: an order directing a reference or a conference is not appealable as of right | 22-4 |
| An appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss based upon lack of personal jurisdiction—issued after a hearing—also brings up for review the issue of whether a hearing was necessary to determine the motion; | |
| since an order directing a hearing to aid in the determination of a motion holds the determination of the motion in abeyance, the subsequent order made after the hearing is "the proper order to appeal from" | 22-6 |
| Exception in the Second Department, similar to First Department | 22-8 |
| The Third Department is divided | 22-9 |
| Fourth Department: a hearing is not appealable as of right | 22-10 |
| An order appointing a JHO to hear and report is not appealable as of right | 22-11 |
| An order transferring an action to another judge is not appealable where the order was not made upon notice | 22-12 |

| A party who did not object to a reference may not challenge the reference on appeal as illegal following an adverse ruling | 22-13 |
|--|-------|
| No direct appeal lies as of right from orders of attorney-referee in disclosure matters | 22-14 |
| [b] CPLR 5703, Appeals to the Appellate Division from Appellate Courts | 22-16 |
| No appeal lies as of right from an order of a county court which determines an appeal from an order of a lower court nor may such leave be granted | 22-17 |
| [c] CPLR 5704 | 22-20 |
| CPLR 5704. Review of ex parte orders | 22-20 |
| While no appeal lies as of right from an ex parte order, the Appellate Division may treat the appeal as anda application for review pursuant to CPLR 5704(a) | 22-21 |
| Objections to an ex parte order will not be heard after the merits of the claim have been litigated | 22-25 |
| By declining to sign an order to show cause, a court refuses to permit a party to bring on a motion; no order on the merits can result therefrom because there was no pending motion, relief is only available by way of CPLR 5704(a); | |
| where the supporting papers are the same, one Supreme Court Justice should not sign an order to show cause refused by a colleague, however, if signed by a different judge, the motion should proceed on the merits; | |
| a court which declines to sign an order to show cause should not proceed to act as if the motion had in fact been made | 22-26 |
| A purported order that refuses to sign an order to show cause is not an appealable paper; review of such refusal is available pursuant to CPLR 5704; the court may write its reasons for declining to sign | 22-27 |
| - The signing of an order to show cause does not connote approval of the substance of the motion | 22-29 |

| Direct appeal allowed from court's refusal to sign an order to show cause | 22-30 |
|--|-------|
| Supreme Court may give reasons for refusing to sign order to show cause | 22-32 |
| A court's refusal to sign an order to show cause has no res judicata or collateral estoppel value | 22-35 |
| A prior justice's refusal to sign an order to show cause is not a court order and does not create law of the case | 22-37 |
| The Appellate Division may review an order pursuant to CPLR 5704(a) when there is no adverse party such as in appeals where a petition for a name change has been denied and in applications for tax comprises | 22-38 |
| 23. Appeals from Rulings | |
| While judicial errors in trials are inevitable cumulative effect of trial errors may be appealable | 23-3 |
| An appeal does not lie as of right or by permission from evidentiary rulings, such rulings are appealable from the final judgment | 23-4 |
| - CPLR 5701(c), "Appeals by Permission," were not intended to permit intermediate appeals from evidentiary rulings during trial | 23-5 |
| Rulings prior to trial regarding a jury charge are generally not appealable as they are advisory opinions | 23-6 |
| An oral trial ruling which has been memorialized in writing is not appealable either as of right or by permission | 23-7 |
| Decisions made on a motion during trial are nonappealable trial rulings and are only appealable from the final judgment | 23-8 |

24. Appeals from Motions in Limine

| An order from a motion in limine which limits the admissibility of evidence is at best an advisory opinion which is neither appealable as of right nor by permission; an evidentiary ruling made before trial is generally reviewable only in the context of an appeal from the judgment rendered after trial except, for instance when the order also limits the issues to be tried | 24-2 |
|--|-------|
| Appealable and nonappealable orders from in-limine motions | 24-4 |
| An evidentiary ruling made before trial is ordinarily reviewable only on appeal from the posttrial judgment, except when the order also limits the issues to be tried | 24-4 |
| - An in-limine order is appealable where it dismisses a claim | 24-4 |
| - An in-limine ruling is appealable as of right if it affects the merits of the case | 24-5 |
| An order from an in-limine motion that limits the legal theories of liability to be tried or the scope of the issues at trial is appealable | 24-6 |
| An in-limine order that is the functional equivalent of a motion for partial summary judgment is appealable | 24-9 |
| An in-limine order that limits the scope of the issues or legal theories is the functional equivalent of summary judgment is appealable | 24-9 |
| - "Where a party misuses a motion in limine as the procedural equivalent of a motion for partial summary judgment resulting in an order that limits the issues to be tried, that order is appealable" as it "clearly involves the merits (CPLR 5701(a)(2)(iv)), affects a substantial right (CPLR 5701(a)(2)(v))" | 24-11 |
| Where a motion is erroneously titled a motion in limine when it was the functional equivalent of a summary judgment motion; an order deciding the merits of such a motion is appealable because it limits the scope of the | |
| issues at trial | 24-14 |

| A motion for summary judgment that in actuality seeks an evidentiary ruling | 24-15 |
|--|-------|
| No appeal lies from an order regarding a motion to permit or to preclude expert testimony; such an order is appealable when it limits the scope of the issues or the legal theories of liability | 24-16 |
| Orders denying an in-limine motion to preclude expert testimony based on insufficient disclosure | 24-18 |
| Where expert testimony sought to be precluded created an issue of fact that served as the basis of the court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment | 24-23 |
| An order denying a motion for a <i>Frye</i> hearing or denying a motion to direct an expert witness to submit to a <i>Frye</i> hearing is not appealable as of right | 24-25 |
| Orders to preclude expert testimony or denying a <i>Frye</i> hearing are appealable where they limit the scope of the issues, involve the merits <i>and</i> affect a substantial right | 24-26 |
| Where a court declines to rule on contentions in an in-limine motion the contentions are not preserved for appeal | 24-30 |
| Generally no appeal lies from an order denying a motion to preclude proposed expert testimony | 24-31 |
| Orders granting separate trials | 24-33 |
| 25. Appeals from Questions Related to Depositions | |
| The approved procedure to an appeal from orders or rulings at an examination before trial is outlined in <i>Tri-State Pipe Lines Corp. v. Sinclair Refining Co.</i> | 25-2 |
| No direct appeal or by permission from rulings made during depositions even if reduced to an order unless such order seeks leave upon a complete record to compel answers or to obtain a protective order | 25-5 |
| Appellate Division treated the notice of appeal as an application for leave to appeal | 25-7 |

| Appellate Division declined to treat the notice of appeal as an application for leave to appeal | 25-8 |
|--|-------|
| No appeal lies as of right from an order directing a party to answer questions propounded at a deposition | 25-9 |
| No direct appeal lies from an order directing a party to answer questions propounded at a deposition <i>except</i> where the order involves the merits affecting a substantial right or the novelty or significance of an issue | 25-10 |
| Denial of a protective order preventing further examination of a witness is not appealable as of right as it is in the nature of an order on an application to review objections raised at an examination before trial | 25-11 |
| Where the Supreme Court fails to rule on objections on a deposition the Appellate Division should make the rulings | 25-12 |
| Rulings affecting the scope of pretrial examinations are not appealable as of right even if reduced to an order | 25-14 |
| 26. Appeals from Motions to Reargue | |
| Generally, no appeal lies as of right from the denial of a motion to reargue | 26-2 |
| No appeal lies from an order made upon reargument that adheres to its prior decision | 26-3 |
| Two exceptions to the rule that the denial of a motion to reargue is not appealable | 26-4 |
| 1. Where partial relief is granted: | 26-4 |
| 2. Although an order states that it denied reargument, if it reviewed the merits and adhered to its determination the denial of reargument is appealable: | |
| Where the original order was not appealed but where reargument is granted and the court changed its disposition review is limited to whether discretion was providently exercised in granting the motion for leave to reargue and upon reargument making the appropriate disposition | 26-5 |

| the category of either renewal or reargument, the court's disposition was well within the exercise of its discretion" | 26-7 |
|---|--------|
| Designation by an attorney of a motion as combined for leave to renew and leave to reargue does not govern, renewal and reargument are distinct and each item of relief is to be identified and supported separately | 26-8 |
| [a] Appeals from Orders Directing a Party Not to Consult with Counsel | 26-11 |
| Court orders that direct a party not to consult with counsel; the duration of the order is central to its validity | |
| Generally | 26-11 |
| 27. A Court May Not Deprive a Party of the Right to Either M Written Motion or Make a Record | Make a |
| CPLR 2219: "Upon the request of any party, an order or ruling made by a judge, whether upon written or oral application or sua sponte, shall be reduced to writing or otherwise recorded" | 27-2 |
| The Appellate Division cautioned "courts to ensure that the fundamental rights to which a litigant is entitled are not ignored, "no matter how pressing the need for the expedition of cases"; | |
| a court may not deprive a party of the right to either make a written motion or make a record; | |
| conditioning the making of motions on prior judicial approval is generally inappropriate; "a judge shall accord to every person who is legally interested in a matter, or his or her lawyer, full right to be heard according to law" | |
| An oral order is not appealable unless the transcript is so-ordered | |
| An unsigned transcript of an oral decision is not appealable | 27-10 |
| No appeal lies from an order denying a motion to vacate an unsigned transcript of an oral decision | 27-11 |

28. Abandonment of an Appeal

| [a] Abandonment of an Appeal and then Later in the Litigation Filing a Second Appeal on the Same Issue, the Abandonment Is Deemed to Be on the Merits; the Appellate Division Has Discretion to Hear an Abandoned | |
|--|-------|
| Appeal | 28-2 |
| - Rubeo v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. and Bray v. Cox | 28-2 |
| Bray and Rubeo are inapplicable where an issue could not have been raised in prior appeal | 28-6 |
| The <i>Bray v. Cox</i> rule did not apply where the issue of whether the defendant should have been granted leave to renew was based upon an additional affidavit from the defendant and a purported change in law that would change the Supreme Court's prior | 20.7 |
| determination, it could not have been raised on the prior appeals | |
| Rubeo and Bray notwithstanding, courts have discretion to hear a abandoned appeal | |
| Perfected appeal from an order where the judgment was not appealed | 28-10 |
| [b] Acts that Result in the Abandonment or Waiver of an Issue on Appeal | 28-11 |
| Instances of acts that result in the abandonment or waiver of an issue on appeal: | 28-11 |
| A party who agreed not to take a certain position at trial will be held to have waived that position on appeal | 28-11 |
| Issues not addressed in the main brief on appeal are deemed abandoned; a cross appeal must be dismissed as abandoned where the brief does not seek reversal or modification of any portion of the judgment | 28-11 |

| - Argument raised first time in reply considered where it is determinative, does not allege new facts, and is a legal argument on the face of the record that would not have been avoidable if raised in defendants' moving brief below, and because the record is sufficient to resolve the issue | |
|--|-------|
| Argument held abandoned because it was not included in the table of contents or as a point heading in the main brief pursuant to the rules of the Appellate Division, First Department | 28-14 |
| A claim first raised after oral argument is deemed abandoned | 28-15 |
| Failure to raise issues in a posttrial brief does not constitute an abandonment of a claim | 28-16 |
| However, failure to assert a claim even as late as in a posttrial submission may constitute an abandonment of the claim | 28-17 |
| The memorandum of law and issue preservation: a memorandum of law has no evidentiary value but may be included in a record on appeal for the sole purpose of establishing preservation of an issue | 28-18 |
| - Relief sought in a memorandum of law | 28-21 |
| Where an order imposes costs or sanctions on a moving party as a condition of granting the relief sought, acceptance of payment waives the right to appeal even if deposited into escrow account | 28-22 |
| 29. CPLR 5517, Subsequent Orders | |
| - Parties may continue litigating the same issue during the pendency of the appeal | 29-2 |
| No appeal lies from an order or judgment that has been superseded by a subsequent order or judgment which renders them moot or from a vacated judgment or order | 29-3 |
| The granting of a motion to resettle an order has no affect on the original appeal yet the change can be substantial | 29-6 |

| A supplemental order which amends, resettles, clarifies or corrects a prior order but makes no substantive change does not revive the time to appeal from the prior order; the notice of appeal, to be timely, must be filed within 30 days from the first order | 29-7 |
|--|-------|
| An order denying a motion to renew is a subsequent order that is appealable as part of the original order | 29-10 |
| The denial of a motion to renew will be disturbed only where it constituted an abuse of discretion | 29-11 |
| Subsequent order appealable as a continuation of a prior order | 29-11 |
| VOLUME II | |
| 30. Preservation of Issues and Arguments; Issues Raised First on Appeal | Time |
| [a] Issues Raised | 30-2 |
| Justice is best served when decisions are made based on arguments considered below | 30-2 |
| The rule of preservation is neither "a mere formality" nor "a meaningless technical barrier to review" | 30-4 |
| An issue raised for the first time on appeal is generally not properly raised before the Appellate Division; "the very theory and constitution of a court of appellate jurisdiction only is the correction of errors which a court below may have committed" | 30-5 |
| An issue improperly raised first time on appeal but briefed by both sides considered first time on appeal | 30-6 |
| An issue raised for the first time on appeal is generally not properly raised before the Appellate Division because the other party did not have an opportunity to address it; preservation alerts the adverse party to develop a record for appeal | 30-11 |
| Objections raised in a pretrial motion, but not raised thereafter during trial, are preserved for appeal; "one exception upon the same ruling is as good as two" | 30-13 |

| Dummitt and Konstantin were improperly tried together because defendant did not specifically challenge the joint trial until its posttrial motion; the Appellate Division rejected defendant's contention that because it joined all defendants in opposing the plaintiffs' pretrial motion it was unnecessary to renew its objection after the five other cases settled | 30-14 |
|--|-------|
| An issue not based on new facts, such as questions of law and legal arguments, may be raised first time on appeal if it is conclusive and could not have been cured by factual showings or legal countersteps | 30-16 |
| Failure to seek relief under the proper theory constituted a new legal argument that appeared on the face of the record, involved no new facts and was determinative | 30-19 |
| That a judgment creditor's lien on property was invalid because the debtor's surname was misspelled may be raised first time on appeal because it is one of law and could not have been avoided | |
| Barring prejudice to the adverse party, an issue can be preserved for appellate review by bringing it to the attention of the nisi prius court at oral argument | 30-21 |
| An issue of law that may be raised for the first time on appeal must be supported by a record sufficient to make a determination | 30-22 |
| An argument made in the alternative preserves the issue for appeal | 30-23 |
| A single objection against an expert's testimony is insufficient to preserve the expert's entire testimony, each objectionable element of testimony must be objected to individually | |
| Objections made in the unrecorded sidebar or in a charge conference are insufficient to preserve the issue on appeal | 30-25 |
| A non specific generalized exception to a jury recharge does not preserve the issue | 30-27 |

| An argument raised for the first time by amicus curiae that was not raised below is not properly before the Appellate Division | 30-28 |
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| A defect is jurisdictional if a court lacks power to enter judgment whereby preservation does not matter | 30-29 |
| A question preserved in the court of first instance may be raised to the Court of Appeals even though not suggested in the Appellate Division | 30-30 |
| [b] Generally, Statutory Applicability, Statutory Intent and Interpretation, Legislative Intent and Statutory Construction, and Issues of Law and Legal Questions May Be Raised First Time on Appeal | 30-32 |
| Preservation of an issue for appellate review is completely distinct from the question of whether a party sustained its burden of proof | |
| Instances of issues that may generally be raised first time on appeal | 30-33 |
| Legislative intent, statutory construction, statutory interpretation, legal arguments and questions of law may be raised for the first time on appeal | 30-33 |
| – Legislative intent | 30-33 |
| - "Statutory applicability," which are, in fact, issues of law | 30-33 |
| - 12 N.Y.C.R.R. 23-1.21(b)(4)(iv) | 30-33 |
| – 12 N.Y.C.R.R. 23–1.7(e) | 30-34 |
| - Administrative codes | 30-34 |
| 302.3 of the 2007 Property Maintenance Code of the State of New York (19 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1226.1 and its impact on General Municipal Law § 205–e liability | 30-34 |
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| – Labor Law §§ 240(1), 241(6) | 30-35 |
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| - Statutory intent | 30-37 |
| - Statutory construction | 30-38 |
| - Statutory interpretation | 30-39 |
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| - 302.3 of the 2007 Property Maintenance Code of the State of New York (19 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1226.1 and its impact on General Municipal Law § 205–e liability) | 30-40 |
| An insurer's attempt to modify a judgment based on the near exhaustion of a policy's limits sought to change the judgment substantively rather than to correct a mere clerical error. | 30-41 |
| - CPLR 302 | 30-41 |
| - CPLR 321(c), Attorney's Disability | 30-41 |
| - Compliance with CPLR 3217, Voluntary Discontinuance | 30-42 |
| - General Construction Law § 25–a (1) When the time period within which to act ends on a Saturday | 30-42 |
| Compliance with the Notice of Claim requirements of General Municipal Law §§ 50–e, 50-h and 50–I and County Law § 52 | 30-43 |
| – General Obligations Law § 5–701(a)(1) | 30-45 |
| – General Obligations Law § 5–701(a)(10) | 30-45 |
| – Judiciary Law § 14 is jurisdictional | 30-45 |

| – Judiciary Law § 49, fee splitting with nonattorneys | 30-46 |
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| - Whether Military Law § 308 and its federal counterpart toll the six-month period during which to "claim parental rights" | 30-46 |
| – A precedent condition in a statute | 30-46 |
| - Subject matter jurisdiction | 30-47 |
| - Town codes and municipal rules | 30-48 |
| - Waiver of collateral estoppel is a question of law | 30-49 |
| - Other instances of matters held to be questions of law, such as when there are no new facts | 30-49 |
| Failure to prove compliance with statutory service requirements may be raised first time on appeal | 30-55 |
| That the city violated the Public Officers Law in terminating a party's employment based on residency may be raised first time on appeal | 30-57 |
| | |
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| – Civil Rights Law § 50–a | 30-60 |
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| The Appellate Division rejected issues of legislative intent and jurisdiction as first raised on appeal | 30-67 |
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| An order directing a spouse to "irrevocably designate" the other as beneficiary of pension preretirement death benefits | 30-70 |
| – ERISA issue is a question of law | 30-71 |
| Family Court Act requirement that an order incorporating an agreement that deviates from the basic child support obligation must contain the court's reasons for approving the deviation | 30-71 |
| Injury to an employee of the insured during the course of employment and the exclusion of coverage for third party claims for contribution and indemnity related to such injury | 30-72 |
| – Rules that are repugnant to the law | 30-72 |
| Precommencement filing of a notice of pendency pursuant to CPLR 6512 involves an issue of law | 30-72 |
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| - Lack of jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(4) | 30-74 |
| Damages in quantum meruit in face of an express contract is an issue of law which may be raised first time on appeal; however, a party cannot recover in quantum meruit where there is an express agreement that covers the same subject matter. | 30-75 |
| While it is impermissible to seek damages in an action in quasi contract where the suing party fully performed on a valid written agreement, the issue may be raised first time on appeal | 30-76 |
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| Issue regarding service of process held as properly raised first time on appeal | 30-78 |
| Failure to meet an initial burden is an issue of law that may be raised first time on appeal | 30-79 |
| Entitlement to injunctive relief may be raised first time on appeal as it is an issue of law | 30-80 |
| Argument considered first time on appeal based on judicial economy where the argument was fundamental to a party's recovery | 30-81 |
| Withdrawal of a waiver by commencement of litigation is an issue of law that may be raised first time on appeal | 30-82 |
| Whether a motion court lacked authority to extend a notice of pendency may be raised first time on appeal | 30-83 |
| The question whether a J.H.O. or a Referee has the authority to issue an order may be raised first time on appeal as it is a question of law | 30-84 |
| The timeliness of a motion for leave to renew a petition involves a question of law and may be raised first time on appeal | 30-85 |

| based on unsworn testimony of the jury foreperson involves question of whether the court exceeded its power which may be raised first time on appeal | 30-86 |
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| Appeal from an oral order granting a mistrial based on a violation of Judiciary Law § 510(1) was considered where the motion was made after the verdict had been rendered | 30-87 |
| Timeliness of the commencement of an action against the Metropolitan Transportation Authority may be raised first time on appeal | 30-88 |
| Retroactive cancellation of an insurance policy despite any misrepresentations of the policy's procurment may be raised first time on appeal | 30-89 |
| Whether a phone call to a municipal body that was reduced to a writing satisfies the prior written notice requirement is an issue of law | 30-90 |
| Ultra vires authority by local community boards may be raised first time on appeal | 30-91 |
| Stare decisis may be raised first time on appeal | 30-92 |
| The posting of an undertaking may be raised first time on appeal | 30-93 |
| Time of the essence is an issue of law which may be raised first time on appeal | 30-94 |
| An argument raised first time in a motion for leave to reargue, although not properly on appeal after reargument, was denied, and the appeal from the denial of reargument was dismissed; the argument may nevertheless be raised first time on appeal | 30-95 |
| Legal deficiencies in a nonparty judicial subpoena duces tecum may be heard first time on appeal | 30-96 |
| Whether there is a statutory or regulatory requirement that a transcript be reviewed by the commissioner or his designee before making a determination is a question of law | |

| Continued prosecution of an action despite the transfer of propert | У |
|---|--------|
| is a question of law that may be raised first time on appeal | |
| The economic loss rule may be reviewed first time on appeal | 30-99 |
| A subpoena facially defective and subject to being quashed as noncompliant with CPLR 3101(a)(4) may be reviewed first time on appeal | 30-100 |
| [e] Unpreserved Fundamental Errors in Jury Charges that Prevented the Jury from Fairly Considering "the | |
| Central Issues" of the Case | 30-101 |
| The Appellate Division has inherent authority to exercise its discretion and correct fundamental errors | 30-101 |
| - "Even in the absence of an objection," when an unpreserved error in a jury charge is so fundamental that it prevented the jury from fairly considering "the central issues upon which the [proceeding was] founded", the Appellate Division may order a new trial in the interests of justice | 30-101 |
| A challenge to an unlawful sentence is not subject to the preservation rule; the Appellate Division has inherent authority to correct an illegal sentence even if not challenged by the appellant | 30-106 |
| [f] Unpreserved Objections as to Mode of Procedure, Mode of Proceedings | 30-107 |
| No objection is necessary to preserve a point of law for appellate review when court procedure was at basic variance with statutory or constitutional law; | |
| the doctrine of mode of procedure, mode of proceedings constitutes a "very narrow exception" to the preservation rule which seeks to amend the "irreparable taint" to "the essential validity of the process" | 30-107 |

| - Delaying the immediate swearing-in of a juror from selection until the entire jury has been chosen must be preserved with a timely objection; such delay is not a mode of proceedings error, it is a "technical error" that does not "go to the essential validity of the proceedings such that the entire trial is irreparably tainted" | 30_111 |
|--|--------|
| Denial of a jury trial is a fundamental error | |
| It is incumbent upon a court to advise a party in a child custody or visitation proceeding about the fundamental right to counsel; deprivation of this right requires reversal, without regard to the merits of the unrepresented party's position; prejudice is irrelevant | nt |
| The request to waive the right to counsel and proceed pro se places in issue whether the court conducted a searching inquiry to ensure that the party did so knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily and aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel | 30-115 |
| The inability of the trial court to state any facts in support of its determination after the case was remitted for the purpose of formulating findings of fact constitutes fundamental error | 30-116 |
| 31. Issues Precluded First Time on Appeal | |
| [a] In General | 31-2 |
| That a motion was one to renew and not reargue may not be raised for the first time on appeal | 31-2 |
| An application to conform pleadings to the proof may not be made first time on appeal | 31-3 |
| Issues relating to the burden of proof require preservation and may not be raised first time on appeal | 31-4 |
| The argument that the motion court impermissibly decided an issue that was not before it may not be raised for the first time on appeal | 31-5 |

| The qualifications of a referee may not be challenged first time on appeal | 31-6 |
|---|-------|
| A challenge to the qualifications of an expert may not be raised first time on appeal | 31-8 |
| The time to raise objections to the qualifications of an expert is at the time of the appointment before the expert commences work | 31-8 |
| Where an expert is disclosed as to only one subject area the argument that the expert also qualified as an expert in other areas may not be raised first time on appeal | 31-10 |
| That the affidavit of a process server should be admitted into evidence pursuant to CPLR 4531 may not be raised first time on appeal | 31-11 |
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| The interpretation of a statute presents a pure question of law, and collateral estoppel thus does not apply to Supreme Court's determination | 31-20 |
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|--|-------|
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|--|--------|
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| extended periods | 31-120 |

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| con suri | replies containing new arguments "generally should not be sidered"; courts, however, have discretion to authorize replies when there is either no prejudice or there are | |
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| "Ordinarily, courts do not consider issues first mentioned in reply in support of a motion for summary judgment"; | |
|--|-------|
| a party "cannot [in a motion for summary judgment] meet its prima facie burden by submitting evidence for the first time in reply or [in] surreply [papers]" | |
| prejudice; | |
| "unusual circumstances, such as a recent change in decisional law may arise which justify further submissions on a motion for summary judgment, with leave of court" | |
| Reply affirmation held appropriate in support of summary judgment dismissal since "defendants" arguments could not have been submitted at an earlier juncture because of the indefiniteness of plaintiff's initial pleading" | |
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| 7503(c)) when the petition is filed rather than when it is served is purely legal may be raised first time on appeal | 32-128 |
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| [ac] Failure to Satisfy CPLR 3016(a) by Reciting the Slanderous or Libelous Words Considered and also Precluded First Time on Appeal | 32-141 |
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| [ad]Whether a Mortgage Loan Was a "Home Loan" pursuant to RPAPL § 1304 Considered and also Precluded First Time on Appeal | 32-143 |
| Whether a mortgage loan was not a "home loan" for purposes of RPAPL § 1304 may be raised first time on appeal as it involves a question of law | 32-143 |
| Whether a mortgage loan was not a "home loan" for purposes of RPAPL § 1304 may not be raised first time on appeal | 32-144 |
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| of re | prohibition against the indefinite suspension of the alienation eal property is a matter of state public policy which may be ed first time on appeal | 33-10 |
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| Is an Objection Necessary to Preserve a Protest to an Order Restricting a Party from Consulting with Counsel May Be Raised First Time on Appeal Considered and Precluded | 34-12 |
| Although the defendant failed to preserve the issue restricting his right to speak to counsel overnight for appellate review, the Appellate Division reached the issue in the exercise of the interest of justice jurisdiction | 34-13 |
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36. Legislative, Governmental, Sovereign and Qualified Immunity First Time On Appeal

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|--|-------|
| Governmental immunity may not be raised for the first time on appeal | |
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| 37. Contentions that May Not First Be Made in a Reply Brief Appeal | on |
| Generally | 37-2 |
| Statute of limitations may not be asserted in the reply brief | 37-3 |
| The relation back doctrine may not be asserted in reply brief | 37-4 |
| Issues regarding attorney's fees may not be asserted in the reply brief | 37-5 |
| Judicial estoppel may not be asserted in the reply brief | 37-6 |
| Presumption of payment may not be asserted in the reply brief | 37-7 |
| That a party is conclusively presumed to know the contents of an insurance policy may not be asserted in the reply brief | 37-8 |
| Unconscionability may not be asserted in the reply brief | 37-9 |
| Excessive interest rate may not be asserted in reply brief | 37-10 |
| That a party is not a natural person may not be raised for the first time on appeal | 37-11 |

| raised for the first time on appeal in the reply brief | 37-12 |
|---|-------|
| That a proceeding be converted into an Article 78 proceeding may not be raised for the first time in a reply brief | 37-13 |
| Quasi judicial immunity may not first be made in a reply brief | 37-14 |
| Recusal may not be raised in a reply brief first time on appeal | 37-15 |
| To the extent that a party seeks to challenge the denial of part of a motion may not first be made in a reply brief on appeal | 37-16 |
| A contention as to standard of proof may not first be made in a reply brief on appeal | 37-17 |
| Effective assistance of counsel may not first be made in a reply brief on appeal | 37-18 |
| The presence of a justiciable controversy may not first be made in a reply brief on appeal | 37-19 |
| The contention that the court improperly restricted the cross-examination of a witness may not first be raised in a reply brief | 37-20 |
| [a] Court's Excessive Examination and Acting as an Advocate; Court May Not Interject Its Opinion as to Plausibility of Testimony in the Jury's Presence; A Court May Not Create an Impression of Incredulity; These Issue Must Be Preserved | 37-21 |
| Claim that a party was denied a fair hearing due to the court's excessive examination and acting as an advocate must be preserved; "it is incumbent upon counsel at least to attempt to register some protest to preserve the matter for appellate review" | 37-21 |
| Although unpreserved for appellate review, the Appellate Divisio remanded a matter for a new trial where the trial court overstepped its role in clarifying confusing testimony by excessive questioning of the plaintiff's treating neurologist in a manner designed to cast doubt on the foundation of his opinions | |
| DESIGNED TO CASE COURSE OF THE TOTHCAHOU OF HIS ODITIONS | 21-23 |

| Although unpreserved for appellate review verdict was set aside and the matter remitted for a new trial in the interest of justice where improper comments by the Supreme Court and opposing counsel deprived a party of a fair trial and may have unduly | 27.25 |
|---|-------|
| - Court may not interject its opinion as to plausibility of testimony in the jury's presence | |
| A court may not create an impression of incredulity | |
| Although counsel did not object, new trial ordered before a different judge in the interests of justice because the court conducted excessive and prejudicial questioning of trial witnesses acting as an advocate | 37-29 |
| 38. Issues Relating to Children | |
| [a] Issues Relating to Children That May Not Be Raised First Time on Appeal | |
| Issues arising from neglect and abandonment proceedings may no be raised for the first time on appeal | |
| In re Darryl Clayton T., III, 95 A.D.3d 562, 562, 944 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1st Dep't 2012): | 38-3 |
| The contention that a court improvidently exercised its discretion in failing to appoint an attorney for the children at the hearing must be preserved for appellate review | 38-4 |
| Challenges to an attorney for the child, including but not limited to conflicts of interest, may not be raised first time on appeal; a motion must be made during trial to remove the attorney | 38-5 |
| The contention that children should not have been jointly represented by the same attorney because they had conflicting interests must be preserved | 38-5 |
| Constructive abandonment by a child may not be raised for the first time on appeal | 38-7 |
| The propriety of prejudgment interest on child support arrears may not be raised for the first time on appeal | 38-8 |

| [b] Issues Related to Custody and Visitation Precluded First Time on Appeal | 38-9 |
|--|-------|
| Issues related to custody and visitation may not be raised for the first time on appeal; a request for a psychological evaluation or drug testing may not be raised first time on appeal as it is discretionary with the court | 38-9 |
| Relief relating to parental visitation at correctional facilities may not be raised first time on appeal; the proper remedy is to present such relief in a new petition | 38-12 |
| The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 | 38-13 |
| [c] Issues Related to Custody and Visitation Considered First Time on Appeal | 38-14 |
| Issues related to custody and visitation considered first time on appeal | 38-14 |
| 39. Standing, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Waiver, Justiciabil | lity |
| CPLR 3211. Motion to dismiss | 39-2 |
| "A court has no inherent power to right a wrong unless thereby the civil, property or personal rights of the plaintiff in the action or the petitioner in the proceeding are affected" | 39-3 |
| Standing to sue is a threshold issue: if standing is denied, the pathway to the courthouse is blocked | 39-4 |
| The difference between standing and capacity to sue | 39-5 |
| The First Department notes that it uses the terms standing and capacity to sue interchangeably | 39-7 |
| The Court of Appeals has held that standing may be waived, making it unlike subject matter jurisdiction, which may never be waived | 39-8 |
| | |

| The defenses of standing and capacity to sue are both subject to the same waiver rule under CPLR 3211(e) | 39-9 |
|--|-------|
| First Department | |
| The First Department has held that standing does and does not go to subject matter jurisdiction and standing may be raised by the court sua sponte | 39-11 |
| Citing the US Supreme Court: "Standing goes to the jurisdictional basis of a court's authority to adjudicate a dispute" and may not be waived | 39-11 |
| - First Department decisions that standing is a question of law that may be raised first time on appeal | 39-12 |
| Subsequent decisions from the First Department hold that standin does not go to subject matter jurisdiction and may be waived and may not be raised first time on appeal | |
| The Second Department | |
| The Second Department's analysis of the "unsettled question" concludes that standing is not jurisdictional and may thus be waived and not timely raised first time on appeal | 39-15 |
| Within one week the Second Department issued inconsistent decisions regarding standing first time on appeal | |
| The Third Department | |
| Third Department decisions hold that standing may and may not be waived and may and may not be raised for the first time on appeal | 39-20 |
| Recent decisions hold that standing may be waived and does not go to subject matter jurisdiction | 39-20 |
| Prior Third Department cases cite the U.S. Supreme Court that standing is jurisdictional and may thus be raised first time on appeal | 39-21 |
| The Fourth Department | 39-23 |

| which implicates subject matter jurisdiction; whether a person seeking relief is a proper party to request an adjudication is an aspect of justiciability which must be considered at the outset of any litigation | 39-25 |
|--|-------|
| Justiciability and ripeness implicate subject matter jurisdiction | 39-29 |
| 40. CPLR 4401, 4404: Preservation and Motions for a Direct Verdict | ed |
| Preservation and motions for a directed verdict | 40-2 |
| A directed verdict grants judgment as a matter of law; a court may not weigh the evidence but must determine "that by no rational process could the trier of the facts base a finding in favor of the [nonmoving party] upon the evidence presented" | 40-4 |
| An order denying a motion for a directed verdict embodies determinations in the nature of midtrial rulings and is not appealable either as of right or by permission | 40-7 |
| No appeal lies from an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, CPLR 4401 | 40-8 |
| Whether the Supreme Court improperly entertained a motion for summary judgment midtrial must be preserved | 40-9 |
| The grant of a CPLR 4401 motion prior to the close of the opposing party's case generally will be reversed as premature even if the ultimate success of the opposing party in the action is improbable | 40-10 |
| 41. CPLR 4404, Post-trial Motion for Judgment and New Tri Jury Trials and in Nonjury Trials | al in |
| Setting aside a jury verdict or the judgment entered thereon | 41-2 |
| - CPLR 4404 motions are reserved for those parties who took part in the trial | 41-2 |
| – CPLR 2221 is not an appropriate vehicle to "challenge a judgment entered after trial" | 41-3 |

| issue formal decisions" | 41-8 |
|---|-------|
| A challenger to the sufficiency of pleadings must have first moved for a directed verdict under CPLR 4401 | 41-10 |
| Objecting only that a verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence without claiming that the evidence of damages was legally insufficient disqualifies the sufficiency contention from appellate review | 41-12 |
| The failure to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of evidence implicitly concedes that the issue is for the trier of fact to determine and is not preserved for appellate review | 41-13 |
| Objections to a verdict on the ground of inconsistency must be raised before the jury is discharged or it is not preserved for review | 41-15 |
| The argument that the jury verdict was inconsistent, while not raised before the jury was discharged, was deemed preserved and considered within the context of the posttrial motion to set aside the verdict | 41-17 |
| Notwithstanding the failure to assert that the verdict was inconsistent before the jury was discharged and thus unpreserved, the argument was considered because it was raised in a posttrial motion without objection | 41-18 |
| Plaintiff's failure to object to the jury's award of \$0 for both past and future pain and suffering as inconsistent with the jury's awards for past and future lost earnings and future medical expenses did not preclude the court from deciding whether "'the jury's failure to award damages for pain and suffering [wa]s contrary to a fair interpretation of the evidence and constitute[d] a material deviation from what would be reasonable compensation'" | |
| A party may not avoid the consequence of its failure to preserve the inconsistency argument by characterizing it as an argument | |
| addressed to the weight of the evidence | 41-20 |

| preserved the contention that a jury verdict was inconsistent was not preserved the contention that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence may nevertheless be heard if it was preserved | 41-21 |
|--|-------|
| Although a party did not preserve the contention that the verdict was inconsistent by raising it before the jury was discharged when Supreme Court could have taken corrective action the Appellate Division addressed it in the context of the challenge to the weight of the evidence which was preserved in a motion to set aside the verdict on that ground | 41-22 |
| That the number of jurors who agreed to the verdict as reported on the verdict sheet was inconsistent with the number of jurors who agreed to the verdict when polled must be preserved | 41-23 |
| Consent that alternate jurors deliberate with the regular jurors fail to preserve the argument that the court committed reversible error in submitting the case to a jury of eight persons rather than six | |
| That a verdict was rendered by less than five-sixths of the jurors must be preserved | 41-25 |
| A party's submission of posttrial affidavits on appeal from jurors to explore its deliberative process and impeach its verdict is patently improper | 41-26 |
| [a] CPLR 4404(a), the Interest of Justice | 41-27 |
| A motion for a new trial under CPLR 4404(a), on the ground of the interest of justice, encompasses errors in rulings on admissibility of evidence, mistakes in the charge, misconduct of judges, misconduct of attorneys or jurors, deprivation of a fair trial, newly discovered evidence and surprise; it is directed to the components of the trial, such as the testimony, charge and conduct of the participants; | |
| the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate errors therein and must look to his or her own common sense, experience and sense of fairness rather than to precedents in arriving at a decision; the trial judge must decide whether substantial justice has been done, i.e., whether it is likely that the verdict has been affected | 41-27 |

| opposing counsel the opportunity to argue his or her case to the jury without undue or repetitive interruptions; nevertheless, where counsel, in summing up, exceeds the bounds of legal propriety, it is the duty of the opposing counsel to make a specific objection and for the court to rule on the objection, to direct the jury to disregard any improper remarks, and to admonish counsel from repetition of improper remarks; | 1 |
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| although no objection is interposed to pervasive prejudicial or inflammatory comments to deprive a party of a fair trial, the Appellate Division may nevertheless order a new trial in the interest of justice pursuant to CPLR 4404 where it would cause gross injustice to uphold the verdict | 41-30 |
| The contention that opposing counsel put forth a theory on summation that was unsupported by the record must be preserved | 41-36 |
| A party's failure to seek curative instructions or failure to immediately move for a mistrial for improper comments during opening statements and summations leaves the challenge unpreserved for appellate review | 41-36 |
| Application for mistrial where counsel makes inquiries about insurance | 41-40 |
| - "No judgment should be permitted to stand where it is made following a trial or hearing where [a party] was subjected to unprofessional and despicable conduct by opposing counsel" | 41-41 |
| Comments by adverse counsel during the trial and on summation that diverted the jury's attention from the issues and deprived the moving party of a fair trial failed for nonpreservation | 41-45 |
| 42. Applications for Mistrials | |
| An untimely motion for a mistrial (before the jury returns its verdict) leaves the error unpreserved and "may limit appellate review" | 42-2 |

| The contention that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence requires a timely motion to set aside the verdict on that | |
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| ground | 42-4 |
| 43. Jurisdiction of the Family Court, Civil Court, and Housin of Civil Court | g Part |
| Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction | 43-2 |
| Civil Court is a court of limited jurisdiction | 43-4 |
| Civil court loses jurisdiction over an action upon its transfer to supreme court; however, any appeal before the appellate term prior to the transfer remains | 43-5 |
| Civil Court has no power to direct a landlord to legalize an apartment; provisional remedies are statutorily limited | 43-6 |
| Civil Court has jurisdiction over any counterclaim that falls within its jurisdiction if sued upon separately; it may not hear a counterclaim for loss of income | |
| The Housing Part of the Civil Court has broad authority to execute its constitutional mandate to enforce housing standards | 43-8 |
| 44. Subject Matter Jurisdiction | |
| Subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by any party or sua sponte by any court at any level; subject matter jurisdiction cannot be born of waiver, consent or estoppel | 44-2 |
| The initiation of a removal proceeding to federal court suspends the state court's jurisdiction over all subsequent state court proceedings; a party may not file a notice of appeal or even perfect an appeal in the state system during the removal proceeding. | 44-8 |
| The Appellate Division may decide whether a juvenile delinquency petition is jurisdictionally deficient | |

| not come into being through waiver or estoppel does not apply when the court had jurisdiction of the general subject matter, but a contention is made after judgment that the court did not have power to act in the particular case or as to a particular question | у |
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| in the case | 44-12 |
| A challenge to a court's exceeding its jurisdiction was precluded first time on appeal | 44-13 |
| Strict procedure to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the negligence of an officer or employee of the state goes to subject matter jurisdiction | 44-14 |
| 45. Advisory, Hypothetical, Moot, and Remote Opinions or Otherwise Abstract Questions | |
| - "Once the Appellate Division concluded that the challenged regulations were invalid because [the agency] lacked statutory authority to promulgate them, it was unnecessary 'under the circumstances here presented' to prospectively declare the regulations invalid on additional common-law, statutory, and constitutional grounds as that constitutes an inappropriate advisory opinion" | 45-3 |
| Advisory opinions, hypothetical questions, remote or abstract questions | 45-4 |
| - "Where changed circumstances prevent [the court] from rendering a decision which would effectually determine an actual controversy between the parties involved, [the court] will dismiss the appeal" | 45-6 |
| - "Once the Appellate Division concluded that the challenged regulations were invalid because [the agency] lacked statutory authority to promulgate them, it was unnecessary 'under the circumstances here presented' to prospectively declare the regulations invalid on additional common-law, statutory, and constitutional grounds as that constitutes an inappropriate advisory opinion" | 45-6 |

46. Mootness

| [a] In General | 46-2 |
|---|-------|
| Mootness is related to subject matter jurisdiction and thus mus be considered by the court sua sponte; the mootness doctrine enjoins appellate review of academic questions; | st |
| "it is incumbent upon counsel to inform the court of changed circumstances which render a matter moot" | 46-2 |
| The doctrine of mootness is invoked where a change in circumstances or passage of time prevents a court from render a decision that would effectively determine an actual controversy | |
| Instances of mootness | |
| An appeal is academic where it seeks review of only one of the bases upon which the court granted adverse relief and an independent alternative ground still exists | |
| Even though the hearing had concluded, the First Department reversed the order of the Family Court which denied the father's motion for an "expedited hearing" to determine whether the children who were removed through a failed trial discharge should be returned to him | ugh |
| An exception to the mootness doctrine where the issue continually occurs in Family Court due to violations of statutory time periods; petitioner held entitled to legal for from the State pursuant to the "catalyst" theory; this ruli is limited to the First Department | ing |
| A subsequent order renders an appeal moot | 46-30 |
| Mootness may not arise from interim orders because they are nonpermanent in nature and may be reversed | 46-31 |
| "A matter is moot where "the relief being sought is supplied during the pendency of litigation" | 46-32 |

| An amended pleading takes the place of the original pleading, rendering an appeal from an order based on the prior pleading academic | 46-33 |
|--|-------|
| An amended complaint which adds new causes of action but "does not substantively alter the existing causes of action" in the amended complaint does not render an appeal from the original complaint moot or academic since the rights of the parties will be directly affected by the outcome of the appeal | 46-36 |
| Exceptions to the mootness doctrine and advisory opinions include: likelihood of repetition/recurrence between the parties or among others a phenomenon typically evading review and significant or important questions not previously passed on | |
| Although the order appealed from was superseded by a final order, the order still implicated substantial and novel issues which may evade review where family court left a mother with no recourse to challenge the support magistrate's decision that delayed issuing a recommendation to incarcerate the father for his willful noncompliance with a support order | 3 |
| Recurring issues, likelihood of repetition, due process rights arising from Mental Hygiene Law § 9.60 (Kendra's Law) | 46-45 |
| The "spawning of legal consequences or precedent" exception in mootness | 46-47 |
| Although it is general policy to dismiss an appeal that has been rendered moot or academic, a court may, in appropriate circumstances, also vacate the order to prevent the spawning of any legal consequences or precedent | 46-47 |
| An appeal is not moot notwithstanding modification of a judgment when appellant has not relinquished the right to appeal the remaining unmodified branches of the judgment | 46-52 |
| Compliance with an order or a demand renders an appeal moot except where the order has potential continuing practical consequences to respondents and their appeal is not moot | 46-56 |
| Mootness of an order notwithstanding an appeal will be heard in matters of enduring consequences, the Court of Appeals offers instances of such consequences | 46-58 |

| - Because of the enduring consequences motion for adjournment held not moot even posttrial and thus appealable as of right where the trial court refused to issue a written decision on the motion until five months after the date of the trial | 46-63 |
|---|-------|
| An appeal from an order revoking a suspended sentence following commitment is moot for the court to consider any enduring consequences appellant must also appeal from the underlying order that was violated | er |
| Overpaid child support and mootness | 46-67 |
| Mootness where the injured party did not seek injunctive relief from the Appellate Division to protect their interests and relief is no longer possible due to subsequent events | 46-69 |
| An action against an adjoining property owner for creating a nuisance on the property does not become moot upon the transfer of that property to a third party; the request for a permanent injunction does, however, become moot | 46-69 |
| [b] Mootness May Be Raised Anytime Including in a Reply Brief Even if It Is Grounded in Documents Dehors the Record; Counsel Is "Obligated to Raise the Issue" | 46-71 |
| Mootness may be raised anytime, including in a reply brief, even if it is grounded in material dehors the record; counsel is "obligated to raise the issue" | 46-71 |
| Instances where the Appellate Division declined to address an issue notwithstanding that mootness may be raised at any time | 46-72 |
| 47. Ripeness | |
| Ripeness pertains to the subject matter jurisdiction of a court which may thus be raised at any time | 47-2 |
| A declaratory judgment requires an actual controversy involving a genuine nonacademic dispute | |
| Speculative issues, justiciability: harm sought to be enjoined which is contingent upon events beyond the control of the parties and may not come to pass is nonjusticiable as speculative and abstract | 47-4 |

48. CPLR 4511: Judicial Notice

| [a] In General | 48-2 |
|---|-------|
| Judicial notice may be taken by any court at any stage of the litigation, including on appeal | 48-4 |
| A court may take judicial notice of its records and files | 48-5 |
| Courts may take judicial notice of a record in the same court of either the pending matter or of some other action and "are vested with broad discretion in determining the parameters for proof to be accepted at the hearing" | 48-7 |
| The Appellate Division may take judicial notice of papers in another appeal to complete the record | 48-10 |
| A court may not take judicial notice of a 'fact' which is controverted by virtue of its mere presence in the court file | 48-11 |
| Categories of which the Appellate Division may take judicial notice | 48-12 |
| Judicial notice may be taken of all prior proceedings of a case although held in another court of the State | 48-12 |
| Judicial notice taken of court orders and judgments including those rendered subsequent to the preparation of the record on appeal | 48-13 |
| The Appellate Division may take judicial notice of an order or judgment that was omitted from the record on appeal | 48-15 |
| – Judicial notice taken of so-ordered stipulations | 48-16 |
| Judicial notice taken of a letter which was part of the proceedings | 48-16 |
| - Judicial notice taken of a trial transcript | 48-16 |

| order must include among other things "the transcript, if any"; the court may "disregard defendant's technical failure and take judicial notice of the electronically filed | |
|---|-------|
| transcript" | 48-18 |
| - Appeal dismissed, no judicial notice taken of transcript | 48-19 |
| - Judicial notice taken of a pleading | 48-19 |
| Parties may stipulate to matters of judicial notice | 48-21 |
| It is improper to seek discovery of documents where the documents were subject to judicial notice | 48-22 |
| CPLR 4511(c), the Appellate Division may take judicial notice of information published on official government websites | |
| "Data culled from public records is, of course, a proper subject of judicial notice"; an appellate court may, in general, take judicial notice of matters of public record | 48-25 |
| – Instances of what courts have held to be public records | 48-25 |
| The contents of a minute book of the clerk of the court are an appropriate subject of judicial notice | 48-29 |
| A court may not take judicial notice of a statute of limitations | 48-30 |
| [b] Judicial Notice of Self Authenticating Bank Records in the Ponzi Scheme Era | 48-31 |
| Domestic and international bank records are deemed "self authenticating" and "inherently trustworthy" thus not requiring foundation testimony such records should be challenged in the Ponzi scheme era | 48-31 |

49. Misrepresentations of Law

| [a] Courts "Will Not Tolerate Attempts to Mislead the Court through Inaccurate Renditions of Controlling Authorities or Facts" | 49-2 |
|--|-------|
| Courts "will not tolerate attempts to mislead the court through inaccurate renditions of controlling authorities or facts" | 49-2 |
| [b] Counsel's Obligation to Cite Adverse Authority | 49-3 |
| [c] Admonitions against Inappropriate Appellate Practice | 49-5 |
| Undue delay in perfecting an appeal | 49-5 |
| The function of the appellate brief is to present good faith arguments; counsel are strongly warned against misleading briefs | 49-7 |
| A party must alert the court if the same argument was unsuccessfully raised in a prior appeal or even before a trial court | 49-11 |
| Attorneys in an appellate court have an obligation to keep the court informed of all matters pertinent to the disposition of a pending appeal and cannot, by agreement between them predetermine the scope of its review | 49-12 |
| 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 1250, Unified Practice Rules of the Appellate Division, eff. Sept. 17, 2018 | 49-13 |
| [d] The Appellate Division May Seek to Impose Sanctions Sua Sponte | 49-14 |
| The Appellate Division may seek to impose sanctions sua sponte pursuant to 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 130-1.1 | 49-14 |
| Failure to personally sign a brief is not sanctionable | 49-18 |

50. CPLR 5526, CPLR 5528, Appellant's Obligation To Assemble a Proper Record

| Appellant is "obligated to assemble a proper record on appeal" to "enable an informed determination on the merits"; "the record on appeal must contain all of the relevant papers that were before" nisi prius; "the appeal must be dismissed where the record is incomplete"; The record on appeal "must include any relevant transcripts of proceedings before the [court]" | 50-2 |
|---|-------|
| The record on appeal from an interlocutory judgment or order must include among other things "the transcript, if any"; the court may "disregard defendant's technical failure and take judicial notice of the electronically filed transcript" | 50-7 |
| The record may be sufficient for intelligent appellate review where critical data may be gleaned from the record | 50-7 |
| Where the trial court proceeded with a full hearing the Appellate Division has an adequate record to proceed on the merits | 50-7 |
| Although the appellant omitted the prior order from the record on appeal the merits of the order were appealable because there was no dispute as to the contents of the order | 50-8 |
| CPLR 5528, Appendix, Inadequate Record | |
| Appellant ordered to submit proper record, appeal dismissed, order affirmed, argument not considered | 50-9 |
| Parties may not stipulate to submit a record that is inadequate | 50-12 |
| Appellant's failure to assemble a proper record is "highly unprofessional" and "can only be deplored" appellant must suffer the consequences | |
| Gaps in a trial transcript resulting from inaudible segments of the audio recording may be "so significant as to preclude meaningful review of the order on appeal"; where meaningful review is not possible, the matter must be remitted for a new hearing | 50-15 |

| Appeal dismissed for failure to serve the appendix and brief | 50-16 |
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| Reference to a supplemental record is improper and sanctionable where no motion for enlargement of the record has been | 50 17 |
| granted | 50-17 |
| An administrative form in the Appellate Division cannot be used by a party to unilaterally expand a record on appeal | 50-20 |
| Although all factual assertions in a brief should reference the record the failure to do so is not a ground for dismissal | 50-21 |
| The appendix must include material excerpts from papers involving a motion and material excerpts from transcripts of testimony | 50-22 |
| An appeal that necessarily involves questions of fact is not appropriate without a transcript | 50-24 |
| A respondent is not entitled to its costs for supplementing appellant's defective appendix where the supplement failed to cur the deficiencies in the appendix | |
| 51. Matters Dehors-the-Record | |
| [a] Matters Dehors the Record Are Generally Disregarded | 51-2 |
| "The acceptance of new evidence on appeal is generally contrary to appellate practice simply because it is unfair to allow a party, on appeal, to rewrite the factual record in the proceeding" | 51-4 |
| Courts "severely condemn" the inclusion of dehors-the-record documents in the record on appeal | 51-6 |
| [b] Exceptions to the General Rule that Documents Not Submitted to Nisi Prius May Not Be Considered on Appeal: Incontrovertible Dehors-the-Record Official Documents May Be Used to Affirm or Sustain Judgments; Undisputedly Accurate Reliable Documents May Be Used Even to Modify or Reverse an Order | |
| under Review | 51-7 |
| - Such documents may also be used to reverse a judgment | 51-10 |

| changed circumstances in child custody matters where the record has become no longer adequate and sufficient thereby necessitatin | g |
|--|---------|
| a new trial | _ |
| 52. Settlement of the Record | |
| [a] In General | 52-2 |
| Every appellant has a clear legal right to settlement of the record | 52-2 |
| "A party may not unilaterally withdraw its stipulation to the record on appeal; the proper practice is to move to vacate the stipulation and settle the record" | 52-4 |
| Law guardian is a party who must be served with transcript before motion to settle the transcript | 52-5 |
| [b] An Otherwise Appealable Judgment Is Dismissible if Appellant Does Not Order and Settle the Transcript; a Party Does Not Need a Court Order to Obtain a Copy of a Transcript | 52-6 |
| An otherwise appealable judgment is dismissible if appellant does not order and settle the transcript | |
| A party does not need a court order to obtain a copy of a transcript | 52-7 |
| 53. CPLR 5525: Reconstruction of a Transcript; Judiciary La | w § 7-a |
| The trial judge is the "final arbiter of the record" certified to the appellate courts even after out of office | 53-2 |
| Judiciary Law § 7-a, Vacancies or changes in judges; power of judge out of office | 53-3 |
| 54. Motion to Strike the Record | |
| Submissions after the filing of the record without leave, the untimely filing of a brief or that the brief does not comply with form and content must be pursued by motion to strike | 54-2 |

| Forfeiture of costs for improper briefs | 54-4 |
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| 55. Doctrine of Law of the Case | |
| The purpose of the doctrine of the law of the case; | |
| "The doctrine of the law of the case presents itself in two scenarios: (1) when a second court of the same hierarchical jurisdiction becomes involved in the same matter and (2) when a court, on remand, is presented with a ruling from a reviewing court" | 55-2 |
| The doctrine applies only to legal determinations; "a jury verdict is not a judicial determination of law" | |
| - The "application of [the doctrine of law of the case] is exclusively to questions of law"; "the doctrine does not apply to rulings, such as action management decisions, which are based on the discretion of the court"; law of the case is inapplicable to the prior discretionary, conditional preclusion orders | 55-5 |
| - The doctrine applies only to legal determinations; "a jury verdict is not a judicial determination of law" | 55-6 |
| Discretionary rulings do not fall under the doctrine of the law of the case, only questions of law do | 55-7 |
| - "A motion in limine speaks to an evidentiary ruling; the law of the case doctrine generally speaks to questions of law not discretionary rulings of the court" | 55-7 |
| "Law of the case does not contemplate that every trial ruling is binding on retrial"; "an 'evidentiary' type ruling will normally not be binding in a subsequent trial" | 55-8 |
| The doctrine of the law of the case, historical usage and evolution its relationship to res judicata and collateral estoppel | 55-9 |
| The doctrine of law of the case applies only to legal determinations that were necessarily resolved on the merits in a prior decision including a prior appeal and to the same questions presented in the same case; was the issue presently on appeal "specifically addressed in a prior appeal | ;" 55-14 |

| appeal notwithstanding that the prior appeal did not specifically address a specific claim | 55-15 |
|--|-------|
| Under the doctrine of law of the case, the second Justice may not overrule the first Justice notwithstanding that the second Justice has a different view of the merits | 55-19 |
| The doctrine of law of the case may be ignored to allow a party the benefit of an intervening change in the law to all cases still in the normal litigation process even though the court has passed on the same issue | 55-20 |
| Law of the case does not apply to prior determinations on procedural grounds but rather only to "legal determinations that were necessarily resolved on the merits in a prior decision" | 55-21 |
| Doctrine of the law of the case does not apply to ex parte orders such as an order to show cause | 55-22 |
| A vacated judgment has no preclusive force either as a matter of collateral, direct estoppel or as law of the case | 55-23 |
| The law of the case doctrine is not implicated where the court only altered its own ruling not the ruling of another court of coordinate jurisdiction | 55-24 |
| The Appellate Division is not bound by the doctrine of law of the case and may make its own determinations | 55-25 |
| Subsequent expert testimony is precluded by the doctrine of law of the case after an appellate court has already ruled on the issue | 55-27 |
| Law of the case and res judicata do not apply to nonfinal orders | 55-28 |
| Because the scope of review of the two motions differs, the motion to dismiss examines the sufficiency of the pleadings; summary judgment tests the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the pleadings | - |
| uic picaumgo | 33-49 |

| of a temporary injunction and does not bind a court of coordinate jurisdiction from subsequently reviewing its merits | 55-31 |
|--|-------|
| The Appellate Division may reverse an order made in violation of the law of the case for that reason alone without regard to the merits | 55-32 |
| An appellate court is not bound by a prior unappealed order and may affirm an order which is substantively correct even if the effect of a prior unappealed order will possibly be undermined | 55-33 |
| To ignore the doctrine of law of the case, not only must the circumstances be extraordinary, but the error to be corrected must be so plain that it would require the court to grant a reargument of a cause | 55-34 |
| [a] Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel on Appeal | 55-35 |
| The primary purposes of res judicata are grounded in public policy and are to ensure finality, prevent vexatious litigation and promote judicial economy | 55-35 |
| The differences between res judicata and collateral estoppel | |
| "Issue preclusion differs from claim preclusion in two ways. First issue preclusion does not bar entire causes of action. Instead, it prevents relitigation of previously decided issues; Second, unlike claim preclusion, issue preclusion can be raised by one who was not a party or in privity in the first suit. Only the party against whom the doctrine is invoked must be bound by the prior | |
| proceeding" | 55-36 |
| - "A pragmatic test" as to res judicata | 55-38 |
| "Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final adjudication of a claim on the merits precludes relitigation of that claim and all claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions by a party or those in privity with a party"; | ; |
| "as a general rule, a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action is not on the merits and, thus, will not be given res judicata effect" | 55-39 |
| J | |

| "Neither the verdict of a jury nor the findings of a court in a prior action upon the precise point involved in a subsequent action between the same parties constitutes a bar, unless followed by a judgment based thereon"; | |
|---|-------|
| "entry of a judgment is a prerequisite of res judicata"; | |
| "principles of res judicata are inapplicable when the two determinations arise in the same action" and there is no prior judgment | 55-40 |
| The meaning of "transaction" or "a series of transactions" for the purposes of res judicata | 55-41 |
| "A judgment of default which has not been vacated is conclusive for res judicata purposes, and encompasses the issues which were raised or could have been raised in the prior action" | |
| Collateral estoppel | 55-44 |
| "The equitable doctrine of collateral estoppel is grounded in the facts and realities of a particular litigation, rather than rigid rules"; | |
| "There must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling"; | |
| "The litigant seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel must demonstrate that the decisive issue was necessarily decided in the prior action against a party, or one in privity with a party; The party to be precluded from relitigating the issue bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination" | 55-44 |
| Collateral estoppel is not an evidentiary matter but rather determines an issue | 55-46 |
| "If an issue has not been litigated, there is no identity of issues between the present action and the prior determination. An issue is not actually litigated if, for example, there has been a default, a confession of liability, a failure to place a matter in issue by | |
| proper pleading or even because of a stipulation" | 55-47 |

| A party seeking to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel need not have been a party to the prior action | 55-47 |
|---|--------|
| "Collateral estoppel does not prevent relitigation of a ruling that was an alternative basis for a trial-level decision where an appellate court affirmed the decision without addressing that ruling"; | |
| "where an alternate holding by the trial court could support its judgment but such holding is not considered upon appeal there is no collateral estoppel as to the unreviewed ground"; | |
| "if an appeal is taken and the appellate court affirms on one ground and disregards the other, there is no collateral estoppel as to the unreviewed ground" | 55-48 |
| - Collateral estoppel of interlocutory judgments | 55-51 |
| The doctrine of collateral estoppel "does not apply to bar relitigation of a pure question of law" | 55-55 |
| A court's dicta is not subject to the preclusive effect of the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case | 55-59 |
| 56. Mountain View Coach Lines, Inc. v. Storms; Interdepartr Stare Decisis | nental |
| Stare Decisis | 56-2 |
| Stare decisis only addresses legal questions not those involving factual issues | 56-4 |
| A disagreement among the Judicial Departments on the interpretation of a statute is a matter which is for either the Court of Appeals or the Legislature to resolve | 56-6 |
| Mountain View Coach Lines, Inc. v. Storms, Interdepartmental Stare Decisis | 56-7 |
| The law of the originating intermediate appellate court governs when an appeal is transferred from one appellate court to another | 56-9 |
| | |

57. Remittitur

| [a] | In General | 57-2 |
|--------------|---|-------|
| | e lower court must strictly conform to the remittitur on and | 57-2 |
| | In a rare body of law, the Appellate Division reassigned no fewer than nine decisions from the same Justice for "continuing to flagrantly ignore this Court's precedent" | 57-5 |
| case exig | order to avoid an unjust result upon remittitur a court may in es of equity mold its procedure and adapt its relief to the gencies of any new facts or conditions that were not before appellate court that made and entered the remittitur | 57-8 |
| [b] | Reversal on Appeal Leaves the Parties Wholly Unaffected by any Previous Adjudication Unless the Appellate Court Limits the Scope of the Remand | 57-11 |
| pre | versal on appeal leaves the parties wholly unaffected by any vious adjudication unless the appellate court limits the scope he remand | 57-11 |
| | - "It is fundamental that the reversal of an order upon appellate review restores the party who prevailed on appeal to the position that he or she enjoyed prior to entry of the order appealed from" | 57-11 |
| gra | he absence of an express direction for a limited trial, the nting of a new trial should be construed to require a new trial erally | 57-13 |
| que | order of the Appellate Division that reverses a judgment upon stions of fact and law determines the scope of the new trial as granted | 57-15 |
| | e term "insofar as appealed from" in a reversal of a judgment of limiting language as to the issues to be heard on retrial | 57-17 |
| Def | inition of remand: "in accordance herewith" | 57-18 |
| | e appropriate remedy if the remittitur is erroneous or unclear n application to amend it | 57-19 |

| A remittitur to make detailed findings to supplement the trial court's determination does not expand the evidentiary basis to make more detailed findings | 57-21 |
|---|-------|
| Intelligent appellate review requires a concise, clear explanation from the Supreme Court for its determination; remittitur is necessary where one sentence merely references the factors to be considered without explanation or analysis | 57-22 |
| 58. CPLR 4017: The Reviewability of General Objections and Specific Objections | l |
| [a] In General | 58-2 |
| The obligation falls on the objecting party to state the ground for its objection | 58-3 |
| Just as failure to timely object or move to strike inadmissible evidence is fatal to and places such error beyond the scope of review on appeal an unchallenged charge becomes the applicable law of the determination of the case; a timely objection is a necessary predicate of preservation | 58-6 |
| Where a party has not had an opportunity to object | 58-9 |
| The contention that a court deprived a party of a fair hearing by concluding the hearing during a party's cross-examination must be preserved by an objection or an offer of proof at that time and not wait until after an adverse determination is issued | 58-10 |
| Evidence though not competent that is received without objection may be relied upon to establish a fact in controversy and may not be challenged on appeal | |
| A court is presumed to have considered only competent evidence | 58-13 |
| Objection must be clear to apprise the court of the nature of the objection; the requirement of a timely exception is not merely a technicality, its function "is to give the court and the opposing party the opportunity to correct an error in the conduct of the trial" | 58-14 |
| | |

| An objection is not necessary where the court could not have corrected its error | . 58-15 |
|---|---------|
| [b] General Objections: Sustained or Overruled; Specific Objections: Sustained or Overruled | . 58-18 |
| An objection must be specific to preserve a question of law; the word "objection" alone fails to preserve the question for appeal | . 58-19 |
| Specificity requirement of CPLR 4401 in a motion for a judgment as a matter of law | . 58-20 |
| Where a party objected to the admissibility of evidence on one ground no new grounds may be considered on appeal | . 58-22 |
| A general objection is good only if it is sustained; it will be upheld if any ground existed for its exclusion the ruling will be assumed to have been on the proper ground; subject to the exception of inherent incompetency of the proffered evidence, a general objection is to no avail when overruled if not followed by a specific objection directing the court and the adversary to the particular infirmity of the evidence | |
| If a specific objection is sustained, the ruling must be sustained upon that ground unless the evidence excluded was in no aspect of the case competent, or could not be made so; if the ground at trial was invalid, the objector will lose even if another valid ground existed | . 58-29 |
| If a specific objection on one ground is overruled and the evidence is admitted other possible grounds cannot be considered | |
| Once a general objection has been overruled and the evidence is received the objector cannot argue a specific ground on appeal | . 58-32 |
| An objection to the competency of a witness must raise the question in some way which makes the intention clear; the simple objection that the evidence is incompetent is not specific enough | |
| Continuing Objections | . 58-38 |
| Rebutting evidence does not constitute a waiver of the objection | . 58-40 |

| | [c] Offer of Proof | 58-41 |
|---|--|-------|
| | Failure to make an offer of proof leaves the issue not preserved for appeal | 58-41 |
| | An offer of proof must be clear and unambiguous when a court sustains an objection to exclude evidence | 58-43 |
| | When and how an offer of proof is made | 58-45 |
| | [d] Objections in Matters Involving Multiple Theories of Liability Submitted to a Jury which Is Instructed to Render a General Verdict Only | 58-46 |
| | In instances where multiple theories of liability were submitted to the jury which is charged with returning a general verdict only, a judgment entered on a verdict in favor of the plaintiff must be reversed when the proof was insufficient for submission as to one or more of those theories; | |
| | concern over the impossibility of determining whether the general verdict was predicated on a finding in plaintiff's favor on one of the claims which lacked supporting proof and should thus not have been submitted to the jury thereby "forcing appellate courts to engage in speculation to determine whether the error affected the jury's verdict"; | l |
| | "one exception upon the same ruling is as good as two" | 58-46 |
| | - While "reversal generally is required when a general verdict sheet has been used and there is an error affecting only one theory of liability reversal is not required where defendant, as the party asserting an error resulting from the use of the general verdict sheet, failed to request a special verdict sheet or to object to the use of the general verdict sheet" | 58-49 |
| 59. Decedents: Commencement of Actions and Appellate Review | | |
| | The dead cannot sue nor be sued, rendering such an action a nullity from its inception, an appellate court has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal | 59-2 |

| Death of a party divests a court of jurisdiction and stays proceedings pending the substitution of a representative for the decedent; any determination prior to substitution is generally a nullity; the decedent's attorney has no standing to bring an appeal | 59-3 |
|--|------|
| Death of a party renders academic his or her motion for a preference due to age | 59-6 |
| A motion for substitution pursuant to CPLR 1021 is the method by which the court acquires jurisdiction" over the deceased party's personal representative; an order issued before such substitution is a nullity and must be vacated, the Appellate Division has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the order | 59-7 |
| 60. An Article 78 Application which Is in the Nature of Prohib Unavailable where an Adequate Remedy Exists by Way o Appeal | |
| Nature of the Writ of Prohibition | 60-2 |
| An Article 78 application for relief in the nature of prohibition may not be had where an adequate remedy exists by way of an appeal; writs of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari do not lie to review an appealable order or to correct an alleged error of law, the proper remedy is to appeal the final order or judgment to the proper appellate court | 60-6 |
| 61. The Intervenor on Appeal | |
| An intervenor becomes a party to the action even after original appellant has discontinued the appeal but the intervenor acquires no rights greater than a party | 61-2 |
| 62. Appeals Involving Administrative Agencies | |
| Administrative regulations will be upheld so long as they "have a rational basis and are not unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or contrary to the statute under which [they were] promulgated"; "where an administrative determination is supported by a rational basis, it must be sustained even if a reviewing court would have reached a different result" | |

| The scope of judicial review of administrative sanctions tests whether the sanction shocks the judicial conscience, if it does it constitutes an "abuse of discretion"; the Appellate Division has no discretionary authority or interest of justice jurisdiction to review | o |
|--|-------|
| a penalty imposed in an Article 78 proceeding | 62-5 |
| Definition of substantial evidence, substantial evidence is "a minimal standard" | 62-9 |
| An administrative determination becomes "final and binding" when the petitioner seeking review has been aggrieved by it; that a determination is final for the purpose of its present execution does not mean it is final for judicial review purposes | 62-11 |
| Judicial review of the acts of an administrative agency under Article 78 is limited to questions expressly identified by statute | 62-13 |
| Where standing is claimed based upon administrative action a petitioner must show harm greater than that to public at large and that the injury falls within the zone of interest contemplated by the statute | 62-15 |
| Where an administrative board's decision denying an application for review did not address the merits of the Law Judge's decision but rather was limited to the petitioner's failure to follow the board's procedural rules and regulations, arguments in the appellate brief regarding the underlying merits of the decision are not properly | |
| before the Appellate Division | 62-16 |
| 63. Amicus Curiae | |
| Definition of amicus curiae; intervenor | 63-2 |
| An amicus has no status to present new issues in a case, it may however point out that a court lacks jurisdiction | 63-3 |
| Even when intervention is denied the intended intervenor may be permitted to appear as amicus curiae | 63-4 |

64. Appellate Practice and Family Court

| [a] Family Court Act §§ 365.1, 1111, 1112; Appeals to the Appellate Division from Family Court Proceedings | 64-2 |
|--|-------|
| FCA §§ 1111, 1112 | |
| Appeals to the Appellate Division from Family Court Proceedings | 64-2 |
| Family court fact finding orders are brought up for review in the dispositional orders under CPLR 5501(a) | 64-4 |
| [b] The Family Court Act § 1113, Time of Appeal; Family Court Act § 1118, Applicability of Civil Practice Law and Rules | 64-5 |
| The CPLR does not automatically apply to the Family Court act but rather only in appropriate situations where Family Court Act Article 11 (Appeals) is silent | 64-5 |
| Family Court Act § 1113 does not state that service of a notice of entry is necessary to start the appeal time to run | 64-6 |
| While Family Court orders that are not entered are subject to dismissal, the Third Department deems such orders entered when it has been a Family Court's practice not to enter orders | 64-9 |
| [c] Dispositional Orders and Nondispositional Orders | 64-11 |
| Definition and instances of dispositional orders and nondispositional orders | 64-11 |
| A nondispositional order is appealable as of right in abuse or neglect cases | 64-16 |
| No appeal lies as of right from fact finding nondispositional orders in permanent neglect proceedings | 64-18 |

| | - "Family Court Act § 1112(a) creates an exception and allows an appeal as of right 'from an intermediate or final order in a case involving abuse or neglect', which has been interpreted 'to apply to abuse and neglect cases brought pursuant to Family Ct. Act <i>article 10</i> , which may involve immediate risk to children [but not] to permanent neglect cases brought pursuant to <i>article 6</i> ' " | 64-19 |
|------|---|-------|
| | e Appellate Division may grant permission to appeal sua nte from a nondispositional order | 64-20 |
| dist | e denial of a motion for summary judgment or motion to miss is not an order of disposition that is appealable as of nt | 64-21 |
| An | order staying a petition is not appealable as of right | 64-22 |
| | eference to a hearing is not a final order of disposition that ppealable as of right | 64-23 |
| brir | appeal from the final dispositional order in Family Court ags up for review prior interlocutory orders issued in the ceeding (CPLR 5501(a)(1)) | 64-24 |
| [d] | Family Court's jurisdiction in family offense proceedings is statutorily limited to certain criminal acts "between spouses or former spouses, or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household"; | 64-25 |
| [e] | Instances of Orders that Are Not Appealable as of Right under FCA § 1112(a) because They Do Not Constitute "An Order of Disposition" | 64-27 |
| | - Orders relating to venue are not appealable as of right | 64-27 |
| | - An appeal does not lie as of right from a temporary order of support | 64-27 |
| | - "Objections from nonfinal orders made by a Support Magistrate are typically not reviewed unless they could lead to irreparable harm" | 64-28 |
| | – Harm found where a parent did not receive child support | 64-29 |

| | No appeal lies as of right from a nonfinal order in a family offense proceeding; an appeal as of right lies only from a final disposition | 64-29 |
|--|---|----------------|
| | - Intermediate orders of visitation in Family Court are not appealable as of right | 64-30 |
| | Family Court's order modifying visitation pending a hearing on all issues before the court is not a final order | 64-31 |
| | An order barring a party from filing future petitions without permission regarding custody and visitation is not appealable as of right | 64-31 |
| | A finding of contempt scheduled for "continued dispositional hearing" is not appealable as of right | 64-32 |
| | An order settling a transcript is a nonfinal order which is not appealable as of right in the Family Court | 64-32 |
| | | |
| [f] | Family Court Act § 1116 and CPLR 5525(a), Appeals from the Family Court Records Need Not Be Printed but Must Be Transcribed | 64-33 |
| | from the Family Court Records Need Not Be Printed | |
| [g] A re | from the Family Court Records Need Not Be Printed but Must Be Transcribed | 64-34 |
| [g] A rea a fin to a | from the Family Court Records Need Not Be Printed but Must Be Transcribed | 64-34 64-34 |
| [g] A rea a fin to a | from the Family Court Records Need Not Be Printed but Must Be Transcribed | 64-34 64-34 |

| [h] Orders by Support Magistrates that Do Not Require Confirmation by a Judge May Be Challenged by Objections; Such Orders Remain in Full Force during the Objections | 64-37 |
|--|-------|
| A support magistrate's failure to adequately articulate its discretionary reasons behind a child support award requires a remand | 64-38 |
| [i] Only Issues Objected to May Be Reviewed on Appeal, Matters Objected to Do Not Extend to Other Matters | 64-39 |
| Even though objections are untimely, the Appellate Division may exercise discretion to entertain appeal to the extent it implicated Family Court's subject matter jurisdiction to modify a stipulation of settlement agreement | |
| [j] A Party's Default before a Support Magistrate Precludes the Defaulting Party from Filing Objections | 64-41 |
| [k] A Support Magistrate Lacks Jurisdiction to Determine Certain Defenses to a Finding of Contempt Such as Lack of Ability to Pay, Such Issues May Only Be Determined by a Family Court Judge | 64-42 |
| [l] Other Nonappealable Orders from the Family Court | 64-43 |
| Family Court's order directing a psychiatric evaluation is not a final order and is not appealable as of right | 64-43 |
| The issue of the father's failure to establish paternity may not be raised for the first time on appeal | 64-44 |
| A filiation order that also seeks support in the petition is not appealable as of right | 64-45 |
| No appeal lies as of right from orders that either denied a | |

| [m] An Order from the Family Court that Joins Issues of Custody and Neglect or Abuse is Appealable as of | CA 40 |
|--|-------|
| Right | 64-48 |
| An order that joins issues of custody and neglect or abuse is appealable as of right | 64-48 |
| [n] Family Court Act § 439(e), Specific Written Objections | 64-49 |
| Family Court Act § 439(e) | |
| Time to file objections from the determination of a support magistrate; | |
| The determination of a support magistrate shall include findings of fact a final order; Legislative intent regarding timeliness | 64-49 |
| Objections to a support magistrate's determination under FCA § 439(e) are tantamount to appellate review requiring specific objections failure to raise the issues in the objections renders the issues unpreserved and weived for later appeal. | 64 50 |
| issues unpreserved and waived for later appeal | 04-32 |
| An order of a support magistrate is not appealable unless it was first reviewed by the Family Court | 64-54 |
| An order of a support magistrate is not appealable after the order is superceded by an order of the Family Court | 64-55 |
| The procedural predicate to filing objections under FCA § 439(e) differs from the steps necessary to start the appeal time running | 64-55 |
| [0] Appellate Decisions Are Inconsistent Regarding Defective and Late Filings of Proof of Service of Objections | |
| The First Department | 64-57 |
| The Second Department: Family Court Act § 439(e) requires the filing of objections together with proof of service as a condition precedent to appellate review failure to comply waives the right to appeal | 64-59 |
| Service of the notice of appeal, postmark date on the envelope did not establish date of mailing | 64-61 |

| | - The Second Department also examines the circumstances of the case | 64-62 |
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| juri | e Third Department: Family Court Act § 439(e) is not sdictional and does not require strict adherence Family Court discretion to overlook minor noncompliance | 64-64 |
| | • | |
| – T | he Third Department also strictly adheres to FCA § 439(e) | 64-66 |
| The | Fourth Department | 64-68 |
| [p] | Service upon a Party's Attorney and Family Court Act § 439(e) | 64-69 |
| | vice of objections upon a party's attorney rather than on the ty satisfies Family Court Act § 439(e) | 64-69 |
| [q] | Where Objections Are Mailed to an Incorrect Address the Objectant Has Failed to Fulfill a Condition Precedent Thereby Failing to Exhaust Family Court Procedure for Review of Objections | 64-71 |
| [r] | A Matter Referred to the Family Court by the Supreme Court Becomes a Family Court Proceeding Subject to Its Procedures | 64-72 |
| Cou | en the Supreme Court refers a support matter to the Family art it becomes a Family Court proceeding subject to its cedures | 64-72 |
| [s] | Family Court Is Not Bound by the Amount of Support Requested in the Petition; Family Court May Award an Amount Appropriate to the Proof Adduced | 64-73 |
| [t] | A Waiver of the Right to Appeal in the Family Court Requires an Explanation of Such Waiver or Its Consequences, that the Party Understood Their Appellate Rights and that the Waiver Was Not an Automatic Consequence of the Party's Admission | |
| 65. | Assignment of New Counsel, Anders v. California | |
| | en Assigned Counsel Does Not Demonstrate Having Acted | 65-2 |

| An Anders application to be relieved as appellate counsel | 65-3 |
|--|------|
| A Family Court order will not be allowed to stand where a proceeding was so affected by errors and representation was so deficient that it was prejudicial | 65-6 |
| 66. Cost Sharing of an Appeal | |
| 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 1250.9, Unified Practice Rules of the Appellate Division, eff. Sept. 17, 2018 | 66-2 |
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| – First Department | 66-3 |
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| 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 1000.4 (b)(1), Rules of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department | 66-5 |
| Cases Remitted Sua Sponte to Different Judges | DJ-1 |
| Summary of the Judicial Role | DJ-2 |
| "All litigants, regardless of the merits of their case, are entitled to a fair trial" with "a high degree of patience and forebearance" and free from: bias, impartiality, predetermination, "atmosphere cimpartiality," court's adversarial stance towards a party, a court may not appear as an advocate | |
| Action | DJ-5 |
| - Nonabandonment of action | DJ-5 |
| Adjournments, continuances | DJ-6 |
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| Adjournment for counsel with bona fide medical emergency denied, client deprived of a full and fair evidentiary hearing with the fundamental right to the assistance of counsel of his choice | DJ-9 |
|---|-------|
| Denial of a one-day continuance to allow expert witness to testify, sua sponte dismissal of the complaint | DJ-10 |
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| - Failure to receive evidence | DJ-11 |
| Article 10, neglect proceedings, sexual abuse | DJ-12 |
| Existence of extraordinary circumstances in custody disput between parent and grandparents | |
| Determining whether a parent failed to maintain contact with the child or participate in plans for the child's future for one year after the agency was charged with the child's care before determining whether an agency made diligent efforts to strengthen the parent-child relationship requires reversal. | DJ-22 |
| – Without a hearing | DJ-23 |
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| - The age-appropriate consultation requirement of Family Court Act § 1089(d) | DJ-25 |
| Bias, cumulative effect of open bias with improper interference with a party's presentation of the case, violation of a fundamental tenet of due process | DJ-28 |
| – Undue bias | DJ-32 |
| Counsel's misconduct and demeaning comments in interrogation and summation coupled with the court's errors. | DJ-33 |

| aside a interes Supre | and the matter remitted for a new trial in the st of justice where improper comments by the me Court and opposing counsel deprived a party of trial and may have unduly influenced the jury; | ī |
|--------------------------------|--|-------|
| | ve instruction may be insufficient | DJ-34 |
| – Persor | nal bias, draconian and drastic remedy | DJ-36 |
| – Appea | arance of impartiality, impropriety | DJ-39 |
| | s remarks regarding its predisposition to denying types of motions | DJ-39 |
| – Multip | ple sua sponte orders | DJ-40 |
| – Error i | in granting a motion for a directed verdict | DJ-41 |
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| | ature factual findings and credibility determinations to the conclusion of an ongoing proceeding | DJ-43 |
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| – Finding | of, without a hearing | DJ-47 |
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| abandonment of in which it cor | cate, court's excessive intervention, court's of its neutral judicial role, court's cavalier manner aducted a proceeding, court's summary approach to | |

| – Determination without a full hearing | DJ-65 |
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| Court Decided Issues in a Motion that Were Not Raised by the Parties | DJ-68 |
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| Hearing without a party's counsel, is a deprivation of a fundamental right in a custody or visitation proceeding and a denial of due process requiring reversal | |
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