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Security for Peace: *Setting the Conditions for a Palestinian State*

Edited by Andrew Exum

Contributing Authors: Andrew Exum, Scott Brady, Richard Weitz,
Kyle Flynn, Bob Killebrew, James Dobbins and Marc Lynch



Center for a
New American
Security

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Cover Image

Palestinian police troops parade on November 15, 2009 in Bethlehem's manger square during a rally marking the symbolic declaration of independence.

(MUSA AL-SHAER/AFP/Getty Images)

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INTRODUCTION

By Andrew Exum

M A R C H 2 0 1 0

Security for Peace:
Setting the Conditions for a Palestinian State



INTRODUCTION

By Andrew Exum

When President Barack Obama took office in January 2009, the international community hoped he would have more success than his two predecessors in brokering a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Although peace in the Middle East is hardly the exclusive responsibility of the United States, it is a goal long sought by its political leaders and one inextricably linked to U.S. interests. As the Administration continues its quest for a Mideast peace agreement, U.S. policy-makers should ask how they can get both sides to think past the issues of the day and instead, begin focusing on the kind of strategic outcome they wish to achieve. This report takes an “end-around” approach to the problems of the Levant, imagining the goal – the establishment of a future Palestinian state – and asking what kind of security regime would be necessary to serve as midwife to such a state.

This research project examines three international peace operations in an effort to identify what lessons might be applied to a potential peace mission in the Middle East. It begins with case studies of East Timor, Kosovo and South Lebanon – all historically recent instances of international peace operations in highly complex environments. These case studies are followed by an essay on general military lessons learned from past peace operations and another on political lessons learned. Each chapter is preceded by a brief summary of how these past experiences might inform any future effort to provide the security necessary to implement a Middle East peace agreement and create a new Palestinian state. A concluding chapter examines likely future scenarios in Israel and the Palestinian territories that would make an international peace keeping force more or less likely and more or less successful.

No individual case study can replicate the challenges and environment of the Middle East – peace operations, like wars, are *sui generis* – but general lessons emerge from the international community’s experience with peacekeeping. At the very least, these papers will highlight these lessons. At best,

though, thinking sooner rather than later about the mechanics of keeping peace between Israel and a Palestinian state might encourage leaders and publics on both sides and in the rest of the international community to embrace the idea that, despite all the frustrations of the past two decades in Israeli-Palestinian affairs, the two-state solution remains a viable and necessary option. Through a study of comparative models, this volume illustrates both the daunting challenges and potential promise of a peace operation in the Middle East.

The Promise and Perils of International Peacekeeping

Mention the idea of an international peacekeeping or peace-enforcing force in the Palestinian Territories and the anxiety in the room is palpable. Israel and the Palestinian Territories comprise perhaps the most politically and religiously sensitive parcel of real estate in the world. The composition and activities of an external force in the West Bank and Gaza, to say nothing of Jerusalem, would be subject to near constant examination under the world's microscope. Essentially, though, given the multitudes of international security forces and nongovernmental organizations, the Palestinian Territories have already played host to external engagements. Capacity-building missions in the Palestinian Territories administered and executed by the European Union, the United Nations and individual donor countries abound. And the greater Middle East, including Israel's own borders, is no stranger to international peacekeeping forces. So the idea of a third party guaranteeing a peace agreement between Israel and a Palestinian state is not so controversial at second glance. Indeed, the Multinational Force and Observers [MFO] in the Sinai has enforced a peace agreement between Israel and the state of Egypt since 1981.

Palestinians have long been open to the possibility of international security forces supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state. On the Israeli side, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's June

The greater Middle East, including Israel's own borders, is no stranger to international peacekeeping forces.

2009 speech could be interpreted as conditional approval for the creation of a Palestinian state, with the provision that the international community must guarantee such a state would not morph into a staging area from which Palestinian rejectionists could lob mortars and rockets into Israel.¹

As John Paul Vann once said, "Security may be ten percent of the problem, or it may be ninety percent, but whichever it is, it's the first ten percent or the first ninety percent. Without security, nothing else we do will last."² From a foundation of security, the provision of social services and the construction of enduring state institutions can proceed. Security for Israel from Palestinian terror is the *sine qua non* for Israeli policymakers taking steps necessary for the establishment of a Palestinian state. An international force could address legitimate Israeli security concerns while enabling decisions on more controversial issues – such as Israeli settlements. If Israelis and the rest of the international community could be assured that a future Palestinian state would contribute to the stability of the Levant, and not further instability, the establishment of a Palestinian state would become easier to support openly in word and in deed.

Israel and Palestine Today: Progress and Perils

Upon his inauguration in January 2009, President Obama clearly signaled his intention to aggressively pursue a peace settlement in the Middle East through the creation of a viable Palestinian

state. Somewhere along the way, though, the Administration's plans went off the rails. Whereas the Administration intended to move quickly to resolve final status issues with respect to Israel and the Palestinians, it instead became ensnared in a long and ultimately fruitless argument with the Israelis over settlement construction. And although the Administration intended to strengthen Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas, it instead weakened him.

The records of President Obama's two predecessors illustrate that peacemaking in the Middle East is not an exercise that comes easily or naturally to U.S. presidents.³ Nonetheless, President Obama's administration began with great energy and seemed determined to do things differently than had preceding administrations. Implicit in the appointment of Senator George Mitchell as presidential envoy to the region, and explicit in the President's rhetoric, was the intent to resolve, once and for all, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. This effort, combined with the excitement of a new U.S. administration, led the international community to hope events might proceed differently this time around. The stalemate encountered by the President, then, has been doubly disillusioning.

For all the disillusionment and lack of trust on each side, a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians might not be the stuff of fantasy. Most significantly, both sides appear to favor – at least in theory – the establishment of a Palestinian state. Prime Minister Netanyahu's June 14, 2009 speech declaring his conditional support for the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state was a landmark given the prime minister's prior suspicion of efforts leading to such an outcome.⁴ Palestinians, too, back the idea of a two-state solution, with two thirds supporting the Arab Peace Initiative.⁵ Over time, polling suggests that Palestinians have slowly begun to accept more of the prerequisites Israel sees as

necessary for the establishment of a Palestinian state on its borders.⁶

It is not just developments at the political level that suggest the conditions for progress are in place. A number of encouraging initiatives are taking place on the ground, in both Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Freedom of movement in the Palestinian Territories, for one, has been improving of late, thanks to both new operational philosophies among Israeli commanders on the ground as well as the establishment of credible Palestinian security forces who have earned the trust of many Israelis.

The United States deserves significant credit for the establishment of these more credible security forces. The mission of U.S. Army Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, for example, got off to a rocky start in the region, with Dayton unfairly blamed for the Hamas take-over of Gaza in 2007.⁷ But since then Dayton's efforts have earned plaudits from Israelis and Palestinians alike. The United States Security Coordinators (USSC) Team, established in 2005, started gaining traction in 2007 when the Congress allotted 86 million dollars to train Palestinian security forces in the West Bank. An additional 75 million dollars were provided to the USSC in 2008.⁸

The USSC has trained over 2,000 Palestinian security personnel in Jordan while building infrastructure in the West Bank.⁹ Additionally, the USSC has worked to reform the Ministry of Interior and to train senior leaders within the Palestinian security forces. Israelis marvel at the transformation of previously restive areas of the West Bank into models of stability.¹⁰ And Palestinians living in the West Bank not only believe in the ability of Palestinian Authority police forces to provide security, but also strongly favor the expansion of the Jenin-Nablus police training project.¹¹

Yet as Dayton himself admits, the Palestinian security forces he is training can either be the backbone of a new Palestinian state or another engine for instability if those being trained lose hope that a Palestinian state is indeed on the horizon. In a May 2009 speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Dayton warned that his Palestinian officers “believe that their mission is to build a Palestinian state.”¹² If these officers do not see political progress, they risk becoming more vulnerable to claims lobbed by Palestinian rejectionists that the security forces are tools of Israeli occupation.

Thinking Ahead

The successes of LTG Dayton’s initiatives suggest both an opportunity and a warning. Success on the ground is possible, but it must be accompanied by a political process for resolving disputes as well as a sense of urgency. At the same time, the lessons of the first year of the Obama Presidency, as well as the two administrations that preceded it, suggest that a key to avoiding failure in the Middle East is to remain engaged, staying focused on the end goal rather than the tactical efforts necessary to get there.

Thus, if the Obama Administration wishes to be successful in the Middle East, it must refocus the vision of stakeholders on the desired end state. What does the future look like? What steps will be necessary *after* the peace process? This volume attempts to start a conversation by asking these very questions.

As with any thought exercise, this collection of papers starts with several assumptions that make the exercise possible. First, and most importantly, this project assumes Israelis and Palestinians can agree on a two-state solution that outlines an acceptable path forward on “final status” issues, such as the right of return for Palestinian refugees and the future of Jerusalem. Second, this project assumes that any peace agreement between Israel

and the Palestinians will contain security guarantees for each side as well as efforts to build up key institutions within a Palestinian state that allow it to provide services for its people. Based on those assumptions, the mechanisms that allow for such guarantees and capacity building should be considered now rather than the morning after a peace deal is signed. In fact, the likelihood of a peace deal being completed actually increases if the international community – and especially the United States – can demonstrate to all parties that it has a plan for winning the peace.

About this Project

This project began in the summer of 2009 with a series of discussions designed to solicit analysis from retired and active-duty U.S. military officers, security analysts and regional experts on the feasibility of peace operations in a future Palestinian state. Those discussions, together with an already considerable body of literature on peace operations, provided the research questions and assumptions for this project.¹³

The participants in this project recognize that an international force in what are now the Palestinian Territories would operate in an extremely sensitive environment. At the same time, though, such a force would not be so unique that lessons learned elsewhere would not apply. Accordingly, this report examines three potentially relevant case studies – East Timor, South Lebanon and Kosovo – in order to answer three basic questions: (1) what was the mission of the international force; (2) what actually happened upon deployment; and (3) what lessons can be drawn from each engagement? The selection of these three past examples of peace operations offers diversity in geography as well as outcomes.

These case studies are followed by two chapters on general lessons learned from peace operations elsewhere and a final concluding chapter that applies these lessons to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Of note, this report is not intended to

provide prescriptive recommendations regarding whether the United States or other actors should create an international force to guarantee a peace settlement between Israel and a future Palestinian state or to dictate what such a force should look like. The details of such an arrangement would need to be negotiated by military and police commanders on both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides and ratified by political leaders. Rather, this report offers general political and military lessons learned that could be used by these negotiators if and when they begin to examine the use of an international force. Lastly, this report provides the kind of food for thought that might allow parties to shift their focus away from the tactical concerns of today and toward a strategic vision for tomorrow.

Briefly, the observations compiled by the contributors to this project fall into two categories: operational and strategic. Operationally, Scott Brady's chapter on East Timor highlights the need to focus on building institutions quickly – especially police forces – as part of peacekeeping operations. In Timor-Leste, the weakness or nonexistence of institutions able to oversee the police and security forces, coupled with the failure to demobilize an armed group that had been part of the struggle for independence, exacerbated the conflict. Similarly, Richard Weitz notes that in Kosovo, a veritable “alphabet soup” of national, international and nongovernmental organizations compromised such basic military principles as unity of command and unity of effort. Any mission in a Palestinian state, an area that already hosts more than 150 international, national and nongovernmental organizations, would confront similar challenges

Strategically, Kyle Flynn and I point out, peacekeeping forces need a clear mandate – as the experience of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has amply taught. The acquiescence of belligerents, a factor missing in southern Lebanon, would also be absolutely necessary for success in any future peacekeeping effort in the

Middle East. On the surface, these lessons learned might seem obvious enough. But as the historical record demonstrates, and as Bob Killebrew's chapter on military lessons learned reminds us, all too many peacekeeping missions have proceeded with principles of war ignored and with weak mandates that have placed the forces themselves at the mercy of the belligerents. To minimize these risks, peacekeeping operations must, among other things, include confidence-building measures to build trust between the peacekeeping force and local parties.

This project concludes with a chapter by Marc Lynch that explores various scenarios under which a peacekeeping force might deploy to a Palestinian state. Lynch, like Ambassador James Dobbins in the preceding chapter on political lessons learned, describes the difficult conditions under which a peacekeeping force would operate in the political minefield of Israel and the Palestinian territories. Under almost any conceivable scenario, Lynch concludes, a peacekeeping force would need to navigate a potentially toxic political and media environment, the near constant potential for violence from spoilers, and a high risk of attacks on its members.

There should be no doubt that peacekeeping in a future Palestinian state would be fraught with difficulties, not simply because of the unique history and circumstances of the region but also because the international record of such operations is mixed. The potential to resolve such a bitter and divisive conflict could entice policymakers to do whatever they can to support a peace agreement. Yet, as difficult as past peace operations have been, the terrain of the Middle East could prove rockier still. As this project makes clear, policymakers should tread cautiously when considering such an option. Any initiative to broker peace in the Middle East carries risk, but the more risks policymakers and leaders understand beforehand, the better prepared they will be to mitigate and manage them.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER 1:
EAST TIMOR

By Scott Brady

In this chapter, Scott Brady explores a series of international peace operations in Timor-Leste since 1999. The author draws upon both primary and secondary sources as well as his own experiences serving two operational tours in Timor-Leste with the Australian Army, including one tour as the J-2 (Principal Staff Officer- Intelligence) for the Australian-led International Stabilisation Force in 2006-07. The editor chose Timor-Leste as a case study due to the way in which the international community has served, over the course of the past decade, as midwife to the birth of a new state. The lessons of Timor-Leste have much relevance for any potential international intervention in the Middle East. Among those lessons are the need to emphasize training effective police forces, to devise and implement a strategy for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of non-state actors, and to rapidly develop institutions. – Editor

EAST TIMOR

By Scott Brady

The international community has engaged in some form of intervention operation in Timor-Leste since mid-1999 when U.N. staff arrived to supervise the Popular Consultation vote that led to Timor-Leste's independence from the Republic of Indonesia. The Timor-Leste intervention is significant because it represents one of the first times the United Nations authorized an Executive Mandate for an intervention mission. This mandate obliged the international mission to take responsibility for all aspects of governance in the formerly occupied province and restore, or in most cases establish, local institutions capable of taking over governance upon the transition to independence after May 2002. In terms of the scale of the international commitment, its metamorphosis over time and the lessons that can be drawn from the successes and failures in institution building, Timor-Leste provides a valuable case study in the conduct of a third-party intervention.

Background

The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, formerly known as Portuguese Timor during the period of colonial rule and as East Timor during its history as an Indonesian province and whilst under U.N. administration, occupies the eastern half of the island of Timor (as well as an enclave in the western half and several smaller islands) in the Indonesian archipelago. It has a population of approximately one million people. Dili, located on the northern coast, serves as the nation's capital and largest city.¹

Prior to the granting of independence by the United Nations in 2002, the people of Timor-Leste had little experience with self-rule. Their territory had been the colony of Portuguese Timor until its declaration of independence on November 28, 1975. An Indonesian invasion nine days later, though, resulted in the incorporation of Timor-Leste as the Indonesian province of East Timor. The next 24 years saw the Indonesians deal with a two-front resistance in its efforts to control the

province. Within the territory, an internal insurgency based largely on the FALINTIL (*Forças Armadas de Libertacao Nacional de Timor-Leste* – National Liberation Forces of East Timor) guerrilla group arose. Outside Timor-Leste, former members of the Timorese political elite living in exile (mostly in other former Portuguese colonies) conducted a campaign to draw international attention to the Timorese plight. The conduct of the Indonesian counterinsurgency was particularly brutal, with fatality estimates as high as 200,000.² This campaign was unable to destroy FALINTIL, but it did manage to limit the extent of its activities. In the process of incorporation of the new province, Indonesia invested in the physical infrastructure of this most under-developed part of the archipelago, but Timorese involvement in local political activity and employment in the bureaucracy was limited.³

The question of East Timor's future as a province of Indonesia was eventually resolved in 1999. The Indonesian government was, at that time, dealing with effects of the Asian financial crisis, sectarian unrest in other parts of the country, the resignation of long-serving President Suharto, and increasing international pressure over the issue of East Timor. As a result of diplomatic negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia, the new Indonesian President B.J. Habibie announced in May 1999 that the Timorese people would be given the choice between independence or special autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia.⁴ The choice would be made in the U.N.-sponsored East Timor Popular Consultation.⁵

The first international intervention in East Timor arose to manage this referendum. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1246 established The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) on June 11, 1999.⁶ UNAMET was charged with registering eligible voters, educating the electorate about the nature of their choice, conducting the election and overseeing its fairness.⁷



Source: www.cia.gov

This mandate was authorized under Chapter Six of the U.N. Charter; hence, UNAMET was to deploy with the consent of Indonesia and the Indonesian government retained all responsibility for governance and peace and security of the province.⁸ The United Nations Mission in East Timor had no institution-building responsibilities, though it was recognized that a follow-up U.N. mission would be required in the event that the electorate voted for independence.⁹ The United Nations Mission in East Timor included 50 Military Liaison Officers and 270 international police,¹⁰ but their roles were to maintain liaison with the Indonesian security forces and to provide advice to the Indonesian police.¹¹

The United Nations Mission in East Timor conducted its tasks under severe time pressure and in the midst of a deteriorating security situation. After being authorized in June 1999, the mission had to complete the voter registration, education and election process in a period of less than three months. Despite the timeframe, and incidents of intimidation of both U.N. workers and the

ACRONYM DEFINITIONS

CNRT – National Council of the Timorese Resistance

DDR – disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

ETPS – East Timorese Police Service

FALINTIL – Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (National Liberation Forces of East Timor)

FDTL – Timor-Leste Defense Force

F-FDTL – FALINTIL-FDTL

FRAP – FALINTIL Reintegration Assistance Program

ICITAP – International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program

INTERFET – International Force East Timor

ISF – International Stabilisation Force

PNTL – Timor-Leste National Police

TLPDP – Timor-Leste Police Development Program

UNAMET – United Nations Mission in East Timor

UNMISSET – United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor

UNMIT – United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

UNOTIL – United Nations Office in Timor-Leste

UNPKF – United Nations Peacekeeping Force

UNPOL – United Nations Police

UNSCR – United Nations Security Council Resolution

UNTAET – United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

Timorese population by pro-autonomy militias, the election was conducted on August 30, 1999 with an estimated turnout of 98 percent of registered voters. The result was overwhelmingly (78.5 percent) in favor of independence.¹²

This result sparked an outbreak of violence, which UNAMET, lacking its own security forces or a U.N. Chapter Seven mandate, was powerless to stop. In what became known as “Operation Clean Sweep”, pro-autonomy militias (unhindered, if not abetted, by elements of the Indonesian security forces)¹³ attempted to forcibly relocate large numbers of the population into Indonesian West Timor, destroying infrastructure and property as they went. It is estimated that by September 13, 1999, between six and seven thousand Timorese were killed with some

300,000 displaced from their homes.¹⁴ The United Nations Mission in East Timor’s lack of security capability and mandate left the mission, and the Timorese people, at the mercy of armed elements that sought to dispute the election result.¹⁵

INTERFET AND UNTAET

This outbreak of violence prompted a more robust response from the international community. The first element of this response was the establishment of a military task force, known as International Force East Timor (INTERFET). As a result of diplomatic pressure – particularly from the United States, the European Union, and the International Monetary Fund – the Indonesian Government accepted the presence of an Australian-led (rather than U.N.-led) intervention force and invited

INTERFET into East Timor. The United Nations authorized this deployment in UNSCR 1264 on September 15.¹⁶ This was a Chapter Seven mandate, under which INTERFET was given three broad tasks: restore peace and security to East Timor, protect and support UNAMET and facilitate humanitarian assistance within force capabilities.¹⁷ This was a purely military mission; INTERFET was given no mission or authority to conduct institution building of Timorese military or civilian institutions.

In addition to maintaining law and order, disarming and demobilizing armed groups and taking over INTERFET's responsibility for external defense, UNTAET also needed to develop a defense framework for the new nation and establish an East Timorese police service.

The other part of the international response was the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). This mission drew its authority from UNSCR 1272, which was one of the most extensive and comprehensive mandates in the history of U.N. interventions. Not only was the mission given complete legal, administrative and

executive control of East Timor, but as UNSCR 1272 was authorized, after the Indonesian government had informed the United Nations that it would accept the result of the vote for independence, UNTAET was also effectively granted sovereign status in East Timor. This was the first time in its history that the United Nations had exercised sovereign authority.¹⁹

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1272 included the task of fostering the capacity of the Timorese to govern their own affairs.²⁰ Given that Timor had very little experience in self-governance, this required building many institutions from scratch. Also explicit in the mandate were substantial institution-building responsibilities in the security sector. In addition to maintaining law and order, disarming and demobilizing armed groups and taking over INTERFET's responsibility for external defense, UNTAET also needed to develop a defense framework for the new nation and establish an East Timorese police service.²¹ Alongside the first foray into sovereign responsibility, this was also the United Nations' first attempt at building a military defense force.²²

The magnitude of the task facing INTERFET and UNTAET was immense. Most of the population had been displaced from their homes, with up to 25 percent having fled (or been forced) into Indonesian West Timor. An estimated 70 percent of public buildings and private housing and much of the infrastructure was destroyed. Public administration had collapsed²³ and according to at least one observer, East Timor effectively did not have a functioning economy.²⁴ This was the starting point from which UNTAET and INTERFET were to both restore stability and build a nation.

The first INTERFET forces arrived on September 20 and quickly established control of Dili. At this time, the military task was complicated by the potential need to deal with the presence of three armed groups in East Timor: the FALINTIL guerrillas, the

pro-autonomy militias, and the Indonesian military (the Indonesian government did not announce its acceptance of the vote until after the deployment of INTERFET). In the event, apart from some minor skirmishes in the border areas and acts of reprisal against the civilian population in areas prior to the arrival of INTERFET, the militia did not provide any major resistance to international forces. Many militia personnel, however, were able to retreat into West Timor, where they were not disarmed by Indonesian military and were able to intimidate displaced persons in camps there and remain a latent threat to East Timorese living in the border areas.²⁵ INTERFET relations with the withdrawing Indonesian military were tense, but ultimately not marked by any major outbreaks of hostility. This meant that the only organized armed force remaining in Timor was FALINTIL, whose leadership had kept its fighters in cantonment throughout the election period (so as to deny the opportunity for pro-autonomy groups to accuse them of influencing the outcome of the vote) and did not interfere with the military operations of INTERFET. INTERFET negotiated an arrangement with FALINTIL that allowed FALINTIL to retain their weapons as long as they confined themselves in their cantonments while INTERFET and UNTAET took responsibility for the security of the Timorese people.²⁶ Even though INTERFET had no specified institution-building responsibilities, this arrangement, which saw the main force of resistance fighters maintain their weapons and their organization, became an important factor in the eventual establishment of a Timorese military. Within three weeks of their arrival, INTERFET was in complete occupation of all of East Timor.²⁷ INTERFET's military strength peaked at about 11,000 troops from 22 nations and the force remained in East Timor until it transferred peacekeeping responsibilities to UNTAET on February 23, 2000.²⁸

By the time UNTAET assumed authority for governance on October 25, 1999, the mission enjoyed

favorable circumstances. The Indonesians had relinquished their claim to the province and withdrawn their military and bureaucracy, the militias had fled to West Timor, the National Council of the Timorese Resistance (CNRT) provided a solitary and unified local political actor for UNTAET to work with, and the international community provided substantial levels of cooperation and commitment.²⁹ Despite these favorable circumstances, the build-up of UNTAET capability was slow; by the end of January 2000, only 351 international civilian staff had arrived and the consequent inability to establish complete, effective governance undermined the mission's credibility during its initial months.³⁰ The pace of "Timorization" in preparation for independence was also slow, with very few locals in the UNTAET bureaucracy even after six months; most of these staff were in very junior positions.³¹ This scenario depicts the limits to what the international mission was able and willing to achieve.

One area of the security sector that did get substantial early attention from UNTAET was policing. The slow build-up of UNTAET capacity meant that the focus of effort was largely on training police officers, with relatively little attention paid to building the institutional framework and oversight for the force. Despite UNTAET authority to deploy 1,640 international police to maintain executive authority for law and order and to commence capacity-building tasks,³² by December 1999, only four police trainers had arrived.³³ Training of Timorese police commenced in March 2000 with an initial class of 1,700 recruits, most of which undertook a three-month basic academy course and six-month tutelage under United Nations Police (UNPOL) instruction.³⁴ The East Timorese Police Service (ETPS, renamed PNTL after independence) was established in August 2001 but only assumed full responsibility for law enforcement in May 2004.³⁵ The PNTL came under the control of the Interior Ministry in the fledgling Timorese government.

The UNTAET approach to building a host nation military was much more ambivalent. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1272 did not define the status of FALINTIL, leaving some uncertainty as to UNTAET's relationship with the group.³⁶ Was it to be disarmed like other "armed groups," or was it the nucleus of a new defense force? In any event, it was unified, armed and to some extent, the only intact Timorese institution.³⁷ The United Nations' initial reluctance to recognize the status of FALINTIL directly led to increasing resentment within the group, due to the perception that heroes of the resistance were being ignored and left in cantonment, while Timorese who had previously served with the Indonesian police were being reintegrated into the higher echelons of the ETPS.³⁸ The UNTAET position on the future of FALINTIL was finally resolved in late 2000, when UNTAET, in consultation with CNRT, accepted an option for raising the new Defense Force based on a nucleus of FALINTIL personnel. Under this plan, the Timor-Leste Defense Force (FDTL) was officially raised in February 2001, selecting 650 FALINTIL personnel in its regular component with the rest of the 1,500 regulars to be recruited from the general population.³⁹ The remaining 1,300 ex-FALINTIL personnel were demobilized under the FALINTIL Reintegration Assistance Program (FRAP); but both the selection process for FDTL and the inability of the FRAP to satisfy the economic needs of those demobilized was the basis for substantial discontent and led to a number of security incidents over the following years.⁴⁰ UNTAET reluctance to work with FDTL persisted and the mission had little involvement in training and equipping the new force. As a result, FDTL sought this assistance directly from international donors.⁴¹

In summary, by the time the UNTAET mission came to a close, the international intervention had created the two main security agencies for the new nation as well as the ministries responsible for

controlling each (the Interior Ministry responsible for the police and the Defense Ministry responsible for the military). Yet UNTAET had little direct role in the development of the FDTL, with its initial focus primarily on building a police force. Even in the approach to building the ETPS, the UNTAET's initial efforts were mainly in recruitment and training of individual officers.⁴³ By contrast, little attention was given to the mechanisms necessary for building a comprehensive security sector: The establishment of legislative and regulatory frameworks for defining respective police and military roles; development of senior management; the establishment of safeguards for protecting human rights and ensuring effective civilian oversight; funding for acquisitions, maintenance and administration; and consideration of national infrastructure.⁴⁴ The failure to resolve these issues adequately, together with the handling of the FALINTIL demobilization, was to have serious consequences for the new nation.

UNMISSET, UNOTIL AND BILATERAL ASSISTANCE

After East Timor (now known as Timor-Leste) was granted independence on May 20, 2002, the U.N. presence in the country was adjusted to reflect that reality. The two successive U.N. missions, between independence and the events of 2006, witnessed a rapid decrease in the international presence and transfer of control to local authority. At its outset, the U.N. Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET, authorized under UNSCR 1410) retained many of the responsibilities of UNTAET, but it was a smaller presence and no longer the sovereign authority in the country. Its mandate was threefold: to provide core administrative structures in areas critical to the viability and political stability of Timor-Leste; to provide interim law enforcement and assist in the development of the PNTL (as the Timorese police service was now known); and to contribute to the maintenance of internal and external security.⁴⁵ The Timorese leadership reluctantly agreed to this mandate, which

authorized UNPOL and the U.N. Peacekeeping Force (UNPKF) to retain primary security responsibilities in the independent nation,⁴⁶ but UNSCR 1410 specified the expectation that the mission would, without jeopardizing security, devolve all responsibilities to the Timorese government over the course of two years.⁴⁷ By the time the successor mission, the U.N. Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), was established by UNSCR 1599 in April 2005, the U.N. presence was purely in the form of an advisory mission. The PKF had been withdrawn and the PNTL now had executive authority for law enforcement and public security,⁴⁸ but UNOTIL retained police development (including border police) as one of the key elements of its mandate.⁴⁹

Upon its assumption of responsibility immediately after independence, UNMISSET inherited a peacekeeping force that numbered 5,000 troops (as well as 120 military observers) and 1,250 United Nations Police.⁵⁰ However, these numbers declined rapidly, due to changed global security circumstances and the overwhelming perception that U.N. involvement in Timor-Leste was “a success.”⁵¹ Furthermore, of the total UNPOL force, only two positions were dedicated to police development. The quality of some U.N. police personnel exacerbated this situation; the overwhelming majority of the international officers were recruited without any experience in police force development.⁵² Hence, police development remained focused on training police officers and capacity building rather than on institutional reform.

By May 2004, UNMISSET had handed all operational responsibilities over to PNTL and FALINTIL-FDTL (F-FDTL).⁵³ At this stage, the international presence was 157 police advisers and a total military strength of 477 (including a 125-person International Response Unit).⁵⁴ UNOTIL continued in a trend of rapid decline in personnel strength. From a modest initial total contingent of 130 personnel (including less than 70

police and few military),⁵⁵ by early 2006 UNOTIL was planning for an extension of its initial mandate in order to oversee the 2007 elections; but this would be accompanied by drawing down further to a total strength of 65 advisors (civilian, military and police).⁵⁶

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Throughout this period, there were increasing indications of structural problems in the development of the Timorese security sector. As early as November 2002, an internal U.N. report noted growing dissatisfaction within the ranks of the F-FDTL, including the domination of the force by former FALINTIL fighters from the eastern part of the country and perceived discrimination against soldiers from the western districts.⁵⁷ The outbreak of riots in Dili in

December 2002 both highlighted wider discontent among elements of the population (including demobilized FALINTIL fighters) and revealed incidents of excessive use of force by the police.⁵⁸ During 2003 and 2004 there were several incidents, including armed stand-offs and illegal detentions, that showed the extent of hostility between the PNTL and the F-FDTL.⁵⁹ The security sector, driven by rivalries among the political elite, was becoming increasingly politicized during this time. Some of the most important developments in this regard involved the Interior Minister's cultivation of a segment of the police leadership that owed its political allegiance to himself and his creation of special police units that were better paid and equipped than the F-FDTL.⁶⁰ Conversely, the F-FDTL Military Police were assuming some crowd control and traditional policing responsibilities.⁶¹ The result was an ambiguous division of labor in the security sector as both the police and the military assumed responsibilities and developed capabilities for elements of internal security.

The UNMISSET leadership, and later the smaller UNOTIL mission, was eager to promote progress toward full local control and to avoid conflict that undermined that progress. There was thus an inability (or unwillingness) to recognize and address these dangerous developments and resolve the underlying structural deficiencies.⁶² Police training was still considered a critical part of the UNOTIL mission (which did identify the need to develop sustainability in the service),⁶³ but the political climate and decreasing resources led to a narrowing focus on assistance in specialized areas, such as border security and the allocation of ten human rights officers to provide democratic governance and human rights training.⁶⁴

In parallel with the U.N. missions, Timor-Leste was also obtaining important support through its bilateral relationships. This arrangement added another dynamic to the development of the security sector. On the one hand, apart from some specialized training in management and

investigative skills by the U.S. International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP),⁶⁵ the Anglo-Australian initiated Timor-Leste Police Development Program (TLPDP),⁶⁶ and other smaller programs, the PNTL has received most of its international training and development support from the successive U.N. missions. By contrast, the Timorese military – due to the early unwillingness of the U.N. missions to engage with FALINTIL and F-FDTL directly – needed to look to bilateral donors for its primary means of assistance. The main international support for development of the F-FDTL was provided by the Office for Defence Force Development, which was staffed by military officers seconded from donor nations. This was separate from the U.N. PKF and not under UNMISSET or UNOTIL control.⁶⁷ In terms of training and other capacity-building support, Portugal and Australia have been the most enduring partners, with New Zealand, the United States, China, Malaysia and Brazil as other significant donors. The range of donors involved – often with divergent interests and priorities for F-FDTL – has resulted in a somewhat ad hoc approach to development, including some overlap in programs, which has not forced the F-FDTL to prioritize its support requirements or to synchronize these efforts in support of a comprehensive strategy.⁶⁸ Another effect on security sector development has been that, especially since the commencement of UNOTIL in 2006 (which had no formal mandate to deal with military capacity or institution building),⁶⁹ integration of the police and military development efforts have grown increasingly complicated.

2006 CRISIS

Somewhat against the grain of international perceptions that the Timor-Leste intervention succeeded, the events of 2006 prompted a renewed international response and highlighted some of the problems inherent in security sector development in the new state. The catalyst for the crisis

came in January 2006 when 159 F-FDTL presented President Xanana Gusmao a petition by soldiers outlined a number of grievances regarding poor conditions and allegations of discrimination. The situation was allowed to fester over the following months. More soldiers supported the complaints, with the result that, by March 16, 593 soldiers – almost half of the F-FDTL regular strength – were dismissed from the service. By this stage, the issues had been politicized. What had started as a number of administrative grievances evolved into a series of political rivalries: between people from the eastern and western districts, between the PNTL and F-FDTL, and, most destructively, between members of the political elite.

The crisis came to a head in late April. When the police response to an outbreak of violence at a demonstration in Dili was found wanting, the government called in the F-FDTL, which led to a heavy-handed response by the military. This initiated an outbreak of violence in and around the capital, involving rival elements of the security forces as well as inter-communal violence. A series of incidents ensued over the following weeks, including high-profile desertions by armed F-FDTL personnel, attacks on the F-FDTL headquarters, and a skirmish between F-FDTL soldiers and the deserters. An estimated 120,000 Timorese were dislocated from their homes in this period.⁷⁰ The PNTL command structure broke down.⁷¹ By late May, it was clear that the Timorese government was unable to contain the cycle of violence. On May 24, it issued an official request for military support to the governments of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Portugal. Even as the new military intervention started to arrive the next day, the violence continued. One notable incident was the fatal shooting in Dili of 10 unarmed PNTL officers (under the protection of unarmed U.N. police) by members of the F-FDTL.

ISF AND UNMIT

As in 1999, the new international intervention had

military and civilian components under separate commands. The military response, known as the International Stabilisation Force (ISF), was again under Australian command, authorized by a series of agreements between the Australian and Timorese governments,⁷² and later recognized by the United Nations in UNSCR 1690. The task of the ISF was “to assist the Government of Timor-Leste and the United Nations bring stability, security and confidence to the Timorese people.”⁷³ The Australian government authorized the deployment of its forces to Timor-Leste on May 24, 2006.

The multinational successor mission to UNOTIL was the U.N. Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), which was authorized under UNSCR 1704 on August 25, 2006. This intervention represented another major commitment by the international community, as reflected in the size of the authorized mission and the breadth of its mandate. The new operation was essentially a greatly expanded capacity- and institution-building mission to assist the Timorese Government consolidate stability, enhance democratic governance and facilitate political dialogue. Unlike the situation in 1999, UNMIT did not have sovereign and administrative authority over Timor-Leste, but once again, the police component was given interim law enforcement responsibilities “until the PNTL is reconstituted.” The mandate also tasked UNMIT to “assist the Government...in conducting a comprehensive review of the future role and needs of the security sector... [and] in strengthening institutional capacity-building.”⁷⁴

After the initial arrival of forces on May 25, 2006 ISF eventually grew to 1,286 personnel, with military forces from Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia.⁷⁵ Portugal committed a Gendarme unit, which although cooperating with ISF, remained under independent command until it was later subsumed into the UNMIT police contingent. The ISF fulfilled its role in containing, but not completely stopping, outbreaks of unrest and stabilizing the situation to allow the Timorese government to

re-establish control and permit the deployment of UNMIT personnel in August. Unlike UNMIT, the ISF mission had no institution-building mandate, but because it was the major international military force in Timor-Leste and led by one of the principal military donor nations, the ISF was able to retain some influence with the F-FDTL. In another divergence from the 1999 model, this time the military force was not eventually subsumed under U.N. command and has remained in existence under Australian command.

UNOTIL formally dissolved on August 25, 2006 upon the establishment of UNMIT. Even with a mandate that recognized the need to resolve the structural problems in the security sector that had played such an important role in the 2006 crisis, UNMIT once again needed a substantial initial focus on law enforcement issues. An immediate priority for UNMIT was the re-establishment of law and order, with UNMIT police assuming executive authority on September 13, 2006⁷⁶ and eventually growing to peak strength of 1,635 during 2007.⁷⁷ In addition to this operational role, the international police also had the sizeable task of re-building the PNTL, part of which involved a process of vetting, re-training, mentoring, and certifying 3,110 PNTL personnel over the course of 16 months.⁷⁸ As well as being protracted, this process created a degree of resentment due to perceived inconsistencies in the vetting process, the uneven quality of UNPOL mentorship provided by the different national contingents, and the fact that F-FDTL personnel were not subjected to the same process.⁷⁹ UNMIT has also needed to deal with attempts by the PNTL hierarchy and the Timor-Leste Government to bypass UNPOL leadership out of frustration with UNMIT's executive authority for policing.⁸⁰

By contrast, UNMIT's mandate restricted it from subjecting the F-FDTL to the same level of attention as the PNTL. Somewhat reflective of the relative political power of the two services, the

F-FDTL (which has been able to claim that, unlike the PNTL, it maintained its command structure and organizational integrity throughout the crisis) was able to avoid any process of wholesale screening or mentoring of its personnel. While UNMIT has been able to report some progress on legislative and administrative matters, there continue to be reported incidents of ill discipline and disregard for the rule of law by F-FDTL personnel and indications that the F-FDTL leadership and some members of the government deny any need for institutional reform of the service.⁸¹ The lack of a specific mandate (for UNMIT or ISF) to deal directly with F-FDTL has made it difficult for the international intervention to assist in the resolution of the outstanding grievances related to the petition of January 2006 that catalyzed the crisis that year.⁸²

Both the UNMIT and ISF missions remain active in Timor-Leste. These missions have presided over some important progress since 2006, including the relatively peaceful transfer of power following presidential and parliamentary elections in 2007 and the promulgation of an organic law and a military justice system for F-FDTL in 2008. The PNTL organic law was completed and law enforcement responsibilities in three districts were reassumed by PNTL before the end of 2009.⁸³ Although the assassination attempts made on the President and the Prime Minister in February 2008 reflect continued volatility in the security environment, the establishment of a "Joint Command," including both F-FDTL and PNTL as a part of the response, is a positive sign of cooperation between the security services,⁸⁴ as are plans for integrated Border Management Joint Management that were expected to have taken effect before the end of 2009.⁸⁵ Despite reductions in personnel strength, neither the United Nations nor the major bilateral assistance partner nations have indicated any intent to withdraw their commitment to development and security missions in Timor-Leste.

Lessons Learned

Over the course of a decade of intervention in Timor-Leste, the international community has achieved some success. The transitional period between Indonesian rule and Timorese independence marks the only time in the history of the United Nations where it exercised sovereign authority over a territory and maintained responsibility for governance.⁸⁶ In addition to the scale of the peacekeeping and governance tasks, and the conduct of two sets of national elections, the interventions in Timor-Leste have also helped the new country establish the institutions of state administration, none of which remained intact following the Indonesian withdrawal. In the security sector, the international community established a police force and converted a resistance guerrilla group into the national defense force. The continuing instability in the country, though, and the need for a renewed international commitment after the events of 2006, show that the Timor-Leste example also bears lessons on what to avoid in the case of peace operations that have institution-building responsibilities.

International Unity of Purpose. One element that facilitated the initial achievements of the intervention in Timor-Leste was the degree of international agreement on the ultimate aim of the commitment. The cause of the Timorese was already the subject of much international attention and sympathy. Yet after Indonesian Parliament voted to accept the outcome of the Popular Consultation, virtually all international actors involved agreed that the purpose of the intervention was to work toward Timorese independence. This meant that, despite some tension and complications related to the Indonesian withdrawal and hostility from the pro-integrationist elements, INTERFET was essentially unopposed and UNTAET had a comprehensive, cohesive mandate supported by a unity of purpose from the U.N. member states as well as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

The freedom of action of the Timor missions, then, has not been constrained by fundamental diplomatic contradictions and conflicts in the same way that has undermined unity of purpose in other missions, such as Kosovo, where the international community continues to dispute the territory's appropriate status.

Continuity and Unity of Effort. Notwithstanding the unity of purpose, the Timor intervention has been marked by discontinuity and a lack of unity of effort by the international community. The "Timor intervention" actually refers to a sequence of five U.N. missions, two multinational military deployments, and important bilateral support programs. Although these interventions have seen very high levels of international commitment and support in 1999 and 2006, the period between those two years was marked by a rapid contraction in both the resources available to and the mandate of the U.N. missions. This shrinkage, together with the provision of support from a range of multinational and bilateral actors, has complicated prospects for a comprehensive and consistent approach to institution building. Local political actors exploited this divergence of agendas and their respective priorities to support parochial rather than national interests. This competition adversely affected the security sector. In particular, the development of capabilities in the F-FDTL and PNTL were not adequately integrated into a coherent national security framework.

Understanding Local Political Dynamics.

Institution building should be conducted in a manner cognizant of local political dynamics, particularly in post-resistance situations. The existence of a single political front organization (CNRT) committed to the cause of independence obscured the presence of substantially different ideas on post-independence governance among the local political elites. Independence also brought to the fore personal rivalries among these elites, some of which pre-date the Indonesian invasion.⁸⁷ These political

and personal rivalries drove the politicization of the security sector. The example of FALINTIL is also important in this regard. This group played an important part in the resistance to Indonesian rule and thus its members expected (possibly influenced by the example of the Indonesian military) that their responsibilities and political status in post-independence Timor-Leste should reflect their role in winning independence. An international intervention in these circumstances needs to have a plan for understanding and dealing with these political dynamics and for reconciling the various political agendas within the elements of the resistance.⁸⁸

Comprehensive Approach to Building Security Sector Institutions. A comprehensive approach to institution building needs a consistent and coherent plan that accounts for all elements of the security sector and the relationships among them. All armed elements in the environment need to be engaged early and managed through a sustainable disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process or a transition into legitimate security forces within the new political entity. The reluctance of the U.N. missions to deal directly with FALINTIL caused much resentment amongst the force and fostered rivalry with the police service. This rivalry became increasingly problematic because the establishment, training and equipping of the two services commenced before the respective roles of each agency had been articulated, demarcated and institutionalized.⁸⁹ This process needs to occur as early as possible, as it determines the personnel requirements for the security forces and in turn drives the DDR process. The intervention mission also needs to maintain a mandate and sufficient resources (including the commitment of appropriately qualified and experienced personnel) to oversee the development of the security forces as well as to detect and address tensions and institutional shortcomings as they become apparent.⁹⁰

Effective Oversight of the Security Sector. Building security forces in the context of a

developing democracy requires effective institutional control mechanisms in order to minimize abuses. Legislation, policies and regulations must be established to ensure effective civilian oversight of the security forces and that reinforce respect for human rights and the rule of law. In turn, these policies and regulations must be developed concurrently with capacity-building efforts. They also need to be supported by local political will and the establishment of structures – such as a cabinet-level national security council – that have responsibility over all security agencies. Each agency needs internal regulations for dealing with disciplinary issues and resolution of disputes.

Establishing Effective Military and Civil Infrastructure. The level of development and sustainment of support facilities and national infrastructure (such as transportation) may also have implications for the administration and discipline of the security forces. In the case of Timor-Leste, complaints about shortcomings in remuneration, living, and service conditions within the F-FDTL led to allegations of discrimination that ultimately became politicized and contributed to the 2006 crisis.

Long-Term Commitment. Finally, the successful conduct of an institution-building endeavor of the extent attempted in Timor-Leste requires a long-term commitment. In the period from independence until the outbreak of violence in 2006, growing impatience with the foreign presence by the Timor-Leste government and decreasing international interest in Timor-Leste (which was prematurely considered a success) led to a rapid draw down in the size and scope of the U.N. mission. On the one hand, this left the Timorese government dependent on support from diverse and somewhat divergent bilateral partnerships. On the other hand, it meant that the U.N. missions suffered from both a lack of resources to provide effective oversight and willingness to deal with the developing rivalries among the political elites and some of the irresponsible governance that resulted.

Conclusion

Over the course of more than 10 years, the international community has had a continuous – albeit inconsistent – commitment to maintaining security and building institutions in Timor-Leste. The course of that commitment, with its sequence of multinational military and civilian missions, as well as numerous bilateral programs, represents an increasingly common pattern of international involvement in intervention operations. The intervention involved building a sovereign state from scratch, including a period in which the United Nations was the effective sovereign authority. The international commitment to Timor-Leste has been a substantial undertaking – one that continues to this day. As a case study, it shows not only the protracted and complex nature of international commitments to major nation-building efforts, but also highlights the breadth of responsibilities that need to be assumed by the intervening mission as well as the need to deal with local political dynamics that may not be conducive to achieving the international objectives of the intervention. Many of these characteristics are likely to be evident in future efforts to maintain the peace during delicate political transitions.

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84. ICG, "Timor-Leste: No Time for Complacency": 4-5.
85. TL Sec'y of State, "Security Sector Development."
86. This is contrasted with the United Nations commitment in Kosovo (see Chapter Three). As initially conceived, the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) also had executive authority for governance in Kosovo, but the Republic of Yugoslavia retained sovereignty over the province.
87. ICG, "Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis": 1.
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CHAPTER II:
SOUTHERN LEBANON

By Andrew Exum and Kyle Flynn



In this case study, Andrew Exum and Kyle Flynn examine the troubled history of U.N. peacekeepers in southern Lebanon. Based on field research as well as documentary evidence, Exum and Flynn conclude that poorly constructed mandates and military units of varying degrees of competence limited whatever the United Nations hoped to achieve in southern Lebanon. While the opportunity for success was greater after the 2006 July War due to a more highly trained peacekeeping force and more robust rules of engagement, the fact that the new United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mission ultimately still failed to achieve its objectives should be a cautionary tale for any future peacekeepers in the Middle East. The need to maintain security and build confidence in a weakly governed territory sharing borders with a nervous Israel makes the experience in southern Lebanon an interesting parallel to any potential peacekeeping operation in a newly created Palestinian state. — Editor

SOUTHERN LEBANON

By Andrew Exum and Kyle Flynn

Introduction

For over three decades, the United Nations has led an international effort, albeit at varying levels of intensity, to manage conflict and bring stability to southern Lebanon. Yet despite some isolated tactical and operational successes, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is viewed as having failed to accomplish its military and political objectives – ending conflict along Lebanon’s border with Israel principal among them. Israeli policy-makers have derided UNIFIL as “useless” and “a joke,” while people living along the border between Israel and Lebanon have suffered through intermittent conflict lasting three decades.¹ UNIFIL’s failure is due primarily to a near impossible mandate, a lack of cooperation by both state and non-state actors in the region and a weak central government in Lebanon that is unable to compete with Hezbollah’s provision of necessary services to the people of southern Lebanon. UNIFIL has, however, played a limited role in improving the lives of the Lebanese people and furthering regional stability by serving as a go-between for belligerents and a partner with the Lebanese Armed Forces. As such, the UNIFIL experience in southern Lebanon is one worth studying as both a positive example of “Blue Helmets” finding limited successes in difficult circumstances and a peace mission ultimately failing to accomplish its mission due to both internal and external factors.

Drawing on lessons learned from over 30 years of continuous U.N.-led involvement in southern Lebanon, this case study presents evidence illustrating why realistic mandates and attainable goals are essential to the success of peacekeeping missions. The repeated extensions – usually in six-month blocks – of the “interim” mission illustrate the lack of a long-term commitment or strategy that has plagued the UNIFIL mission. Without an achievable mandate, the experience in southern Lebanon presents a regrettable example

of a peacekeeping operation that has risked becoming an end in itself. With enmity between Israel and Hezbollah showing no sign of abatement, the political and security conditions surrounding UNIFIL are today more combustible than ever. For this reason, southern Lebanon offers a uniquely difficult and telling stage for the deployment of traditional peacekeeping forces.²

Background

Since the establishment of the state of Lebanon in 1944, southern Lebanon has suffered from official neglect, watching its resources divided up in Beirut and diverted to more prosperous and politically important areas. In 1974, for example, a year before the start of the Lebanese Civil War, the heavily-Shia region of southern Lebanon received less than 0.7 percent of the Lebanese state budget despite holding 20 percent of the population.³ In 1978, the year Israel first invaded southern Lebanon, not a single village enjoyed running water and the state provided just four secondary schools for the region's 400,000 residents.⁴ The presence of violent non-state actors has plagued southern Lebanon since Palestinian groups first began to operate from the region in the 1960s.⁵ During the later years of the Lebanese Civil War, rival Shia groups Amal and Hezbollah fought for the loyalty of the population while Palestinian groups remained strong until 1982 and later in the refugee camps outside Tyre and Saidon.

The Lebanese Civil War started in 1975. While the war began with attacks between Palestinian and Lebanese Christian militant groups – a horrific cycle of tit-for-tat violence that culminated in the massacre of several thousand Palestinians in refugee camps in 1982 – many Lebanese viewed the country's fragile, confessional system of government as untenable because the Christian minority enjoyed disproportionate political rights over the Muslim majority.⁶ No sect in Lebanon was as “under-franchised” as the Shia. By the time of the civil war, Palestinian artillery and rocket attacks



Source: www.cia.gov

on Israel from southern Lebanon merely worsened the lives of those living in the Shia-majority south.

On March 11, 1978, Palestinian guerrillas infiltrated Israeli territory by sea and hijacked a tourist bus, resulting in the death of 37 Israeli civilians and leaving twice as many wounded.⁷ Four nights later, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched Operation Litani, moving into southern Lebanon and seizing control of a six-mile deep area south of the Litani River. Unofficial reports suggest as many as 2,000 Lebanese were killed during the operation.⁸ With the Camp David Peace Conference scheduled to start on March 21, the international community, led by the United States, shifted its attention towards the situation in Lebanon, anxious to deal quickly with the crisis lest it endanger ongoing Israeli-Egyptian negotiations. Any U.N. reservations about intervening in the Lebanese Civil War were cast aside under immense U.S. pressure.

The United States almost certainly underestimated the difficulty of the environment in southern

Lebanon. Rather than set the conditions for the establishment of a robust peacekeeping force, the United States pressed the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to act with haste rather than deliberation. United Nations official Brian Urquhart went on to reflect that even with more attention from the United States, "The hard facts of the situation militated against deploying such a force." Government authority, an important condition for successful peacekeeping, did not exist in southern Lebanon, where a tribal, inter-confessional guerrilla war was raging...A force of the size and with the mandate necessary for the job was unlikely to be agreed upon by the Security Council. Southern Lebanon would almost certainly be a peacekeeper's nightmare.⁹

UNSC Resolutions 425 and 426: The Original UNIFIL Mandate

Urquhart's words proved prophetic. Peacekeepers arrived in southern Lebanon, but never with the strength in numbers or with the mandate to manage the conflict effectively. After an urgent meeting on March 17, 1978, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolutions 425 and 426, under which UNIFIL was established. The former resolution demanded that Israel cease its military action, respect Lebanese territorial integrity and immediately withdraw its forces. The latter, meanwhile, established UNIFIL's initial six-month mandate.¹⁰ A multi-national contingent of peacekeepers arrived in southern Lebanon within weeks of the Security Council's decision. By this time, however, Israel controlled the territory up to the Litani River, save for a Palestinian stronghold surrounding the city of Tyre. Once on the ground, it became clear to UNIFIL representatives that none of the relevant local actors – the Palestinian groups, Christian militias under the command of Saad Haddad (later known as the South Lebanon Army, or SLA) or the IDF – would cooperate with the force.

Deployed primarily along the border dividing

Israel and southern Lebanon, UNIFIL was established to:

- Confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces
- Restore international peace and security
- Assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area¹¹

The mandate did not, unfortunately, reflect the Lebanese government's inability to administer southern Lebanon. (At the time, the government of Lebanon could barely claim the ability to administer Beirut. From 1975 until 1990, the city was divided into Muslim and Christian halves with militias garrisoning both.) Nor did it account for the presence of hostile and heavily armed non-state actors operating freely in the ungoverned territory. As such, the Security Council, while adopting the mandates, ignored a key ingredient to any successful peacekeeping mission – the explicit cooperation of the involved parties.¹² The lack of consent from both Palestinian groups and the SLA, along with an unrealistic Chapter Six mandate limiting the force to observing, monitoring and patrolling activities and self-defense, prevented UNIFIL from carrying out its mission. During the civil war, the environment in southern Lebanon required a peace *enforcement* mission, with correspondingly robust rules of engagement, rather than a peacekeeping mission. With an earlier peacekeeping disaster in the Congo still fresh in the minds of U.N. policy-makers, though, the organization was unable to muster support for a more proactive Chapter Seven mandate.¹³

The idea that UNIFIL, through the use of passive force and traditional peacekeeping methods, could coerce the PLO and Israel's SLA proxy into a settlement was unrealistic. With no standing army or other competent law enforcement organization operating in the south, U.N. decision-makers should have realized early on that realities on the ground in southern Lebanon rendered the third

stipulation of the mandate nearly impossible to carry out in practice.¹⁴ The writ of the Lebanese government would have to be first established before it could be restored. This hard truth, along with uncooperative factions on both sides, led to early and intractable complications from which the mission never fully recovered.

When peacekeepers entered into inhospitable terrain in which thousands of PLO guerrillas, 25,000 Israeli soldiers and thousands of SLA fighters operated, the mission counted on the full backing of the Security Council as well as individual troop-contributing nations. This support never materialized, though, as the council's most influential member – the United States – soon became distracted by foreign policy crises in both Iran and Afghanistan. Had the member states of the Security Council better understood southern Lebanon and been more committed to the mission, they would have insisted upon establishing UNIFIL under a more robust Chapter Seven mandate rather than a weaker Chapter Six mandate – which does not even allow peacekeeping forces to deploy with organic intelligence gathering capabilities. This lack of full support resulted in an inadequate force structure that was never fully reconciled with the mission and environment of southern Lebanon. Given the reluctance of any regional or extra-regional players – including Israel and the Soviet Union – to accept a larger force, the United Nations maintained a minimalist presence of no more than 7,000 lightly-armed peacekeepers until Israel's withdrawal in May 2000.¹⁵

With impartial geographic representation an established practice in traditional peacekeeping missions, UNIFIL was originally comprised of a diverse mix of small, medium and large powers. By the end of 1982, the force included representatives from fourteen nations – including Canada, Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal and Sweden.¹⁶ Despite the benefits of a multi-national

Chapter Six or Chapter Seven?

Chapters Six and Seven of the U.N. Charter lay the groundwork for two different types of operations. Chapter Six describes the procedures and mechanisms to bring about the pacific settlement of disputes. Peacekeeping operations – with their presumption that there already exists a peace to keep – fall under Chapter Six of the charter. Chapter Seven of the charter, meanwhile, describes procedures and mechanisms to forcibly counter aggression and breaches of peace. Peace enforcement operations and other forms of war are addressed in Chapter Seven, and U.N. missions that deploy with a mandate under Chapter Seven normally do so with more robust capabilities and rules of engagement than do missions carried out with a mandate under Chapter Six of the charter. Peacekeeping operations, for example, cannot have an intelligence-gathering apparatus as part of their capability. It has traditionally been easier for the U.N. Security Council to reach consensus on operations under Chapter Six than for operations under Chapter Seven.

force acting as honest power brokers in south Lebanon, the costs to mission effectiveness of such an unwieldy coalition were greater. Many of the troop-contributing nations provided willing, tough soldiers – but units whose training and equipment fell far below NATO standards.

Given the disparity in capabilities of the participating countries, transforming UNIFIL into a coherent and unified force was challenging from the outset. Considerable differences emerged in the efficiency, political orientation, equipment and training of the participating nations. While not insurmountable or unique to UNIFIL, these conditions ultimately prevented the mission from achieving unity of command. Furthermore, units of many troop-contributing countries arrived lacking a basic

understanding of either Israeli interests or Lebanese culture and politics. According to Timur Göksel, a 24-year veteran of UNIFIL:

[W]hen UNIFIL came in 1978 they had no ideas about the local dynamics, who the Palestinians were, what the Israelis were all about. They thought relations with the Israelis would be easy because they thought they were Europeans...¹⁷

Such disregard for the operational environment as well as an unrealistic mandate presented severe challenges to the mission.

Despite the inadequacies of the force, Israel accepted the terms of a U.N.-brokered ceasefire on March 21 in response to U.S. pressure. Seven days later, the PLO officially accepted both the ceasefire and the UNIFIL presence, and by June 1978, Israel had withdrawn the majority of its forces. Rather than transfer authority of all key border positions to the United Nations – which, it must be said, did not have the human infrastructure to take over all IDF positions – the IDF turned over several of the most strategically positioned sites to its Lebanese proxy forces. This hand off created an IDF- and Haddad-controlled “enclave” along the border region, within which UNIFIL chose to locate its headquarters.

With the PLO in control of Trye and the SLA maneuvering freely in southern Lebanon, the UNIFIL mission never achieved its initial military or political objectives. Taking orders from its Israeli patron rather than the United Nations, the SLA sought to undermine the mission’s effectiveness. Not only did Haddad’s presence along the border preclude UNIFIL from creating a buffer zone that could prevent the PLO from attacking Israel, it also created gaps in its area of operations.¹⁸ This, in turn, led the PLO and SLA to challenge U.N. authority while conducting regular attacks against each other and against the mission. As the months passed, it became clear that the United

Nations and the various belligerents agreed on little and understood each other less.

The troubled mission entered a new phase on June 6, 1982 when Israel, in response to an assassination attempt on its ambassador in London by, ironically, an anti-PLO commando led by Abu Nidal, again invaded southern Lebanon.¹⁹ This time, the Israeli reaction – Operation Peace for Galilee – amounted to a full-scale invasion of Lebanon. According to Göksel, “[T]hey [the Israelis] sent in more than 4,000 tanks and armored vehicles, the whole Air Force, Navy, about 90,000 soldiers – against 3,000 or 4,000 Palestinians.”²⁰ The sheer size of the force stressed Israel’s resolve to crush the PLO. Though UNIFIL’s second Commander, General William Callaghan, ordered his force to maintain its position, even the most ambitious battalions could do little more than observe the advance of the Israeli column. Despite some creative attempts by a few national contingents to slow down the invasion, the majority simply stood by and watched the IDF march on Beirut.²¹ The peacekeepers were no match for the IDF. To be fair, no one expected UNIFIL to check the IDF at the border. UNIFIL’s ambiguous mandate vis-a-vis ROE and its poorly equipped force crippled its effectiveness from the start.

When the fighting ceased, the IDF reported 368 deaths and another 2,383 wounded.²² The numbers claimed on the Lebanese side, meanwhile, were 19,000 dead and another 30,000 wounded.²³ Despite the IDF’s pullback from Beirut in the fall, its stranglehold on southern Lebanon up to the Awwali River forced UNIFIL to operate behind Israeli lines for three years. This displacement obviated the military component of the mission.

As Israel withdrew its forces, it relinquished control for the whole of southern Lebanon to the SLA rather than the United Nations. With the PLO gone, UNIFIL now operated in SLA-owned territory. Israel’s decision to entrust the SLA with

its security reduced UNIFIL to a less proactive humanitarian and population protection role. As a result, the rest of the decade witnessed continual fighting and the emergence of Hezbollah, an indigenous if Iranian-supported Lebanese resistance force. The Saudi- and Arab League-sponsored Ta'if Accords ended officially the Lebanese civil war in 1991, but also indirectly increased Hezbollah's recruiting base.

The Saudi- and Arab League-sponsored Ta'if Accords ended officially the Lebanese civil war in 1991 but also indirectly increased Hezbollah's recruiting base.

Throughout the next decade, UNIFIL's humanitarian role increased considerably, as the population in southern Lebanon suffered the effects of near-constant conflict. Often in competition with other non-government actors like Hezbollah, UNIFIL frequently assumed functions of the Lebanese government concerning the welfare and security of the population. While ethnic and religious tensions weakened Hezbollah's support at times, though, its ascendancy in southern Lebanon during the 1990s especially continued to outpace that of Israel, rival groups, the Lebanese government or UNIFIL.

In response to cross-border assaults by Hezbollah, the IDF launched several major incursions into southern Lebanon during the time leading up to its 2000 withdrawal. Major operations included Operation Accountability in 1993 and Operation

Grapes of Wrath in 1996, both of which were launched to deter future attacks and provoke the Lebanese population to turn against Hezbollah.²⁴ Instead, Israel's relentless pursuit to destroy Hezbollah served to both undermine Israeli objectives and galvanize the organization's popular support within Lebanon. At the same time, the Israeli public began to question the utility of their presence in southern Lebanon and urged their leadership for a change in policy.²⁵ The U.S.-brokered accords that ended the conflict in 1996, meanwhile, undermined UNIFIL's mandate by establishing "red lines" within which the conflict in southern Lebanon could be fought by both Israelis and Lebanese.

Despite objections from key Israeli military leaders, the IDF withdrew from southern Lebanon on May 24, 2000. This sudden departure created a political and security vacuum that Hezbollah, rather than the rapidly collapsing SLA or the weak Lebanese government, quickly filled. Unfortunately, a lack of coordination between Israel and UNIFIL concerning the withdrawal, coupled with the dissolution of the SLA, set the conditions for Hezbollah's further ascendancy in the border region. Nevertheless, General Kofi Annan closed the books on Resolution 425 when he reported to the Security Council that Israel had withdrawn its forces in compliance with the 1978 resolution.

Background: The July War

After the IDF withdrawal, Hezbollah seized upon the highly disputed Shebaa Farms enclave, located near the Lebanese-Syrian-Israeli tri-border area, as an excuse to maintain its arms and continued military activity against Israel. Although the United Nations certified the Israeli withdrawal, Lebanese officials supported Hezbollah's claims that Lebanese territory remained under occupation. With logistical, financial and military support from Syria and Iran, Hezbollah began preparing the battlefield in southern Lebanon for future conflict.²⁶ By January 2001, however, the Secretary

General determined that UNIFIL had completed two parts of its original mandate: to oversee the withdrawal of IDF forces and to assist in restoring power to the Lebanese authorities in southern Lebanon.²⁷ UNIFIL thus reconfigured into an observation force focused on restoring regional security. During this period, the mission also provided medical care and school services to the Lebanese and assisted in clean water projects.

In 2004, the United States and France co-sponsored UNSC Resolution 1559, which, among other things, called for the withdrawal of all remaining foreign forces from Lebanon and the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias (i.e. the removal of Syrian troops and the dissolution of Hezbollah's military wing).²⁸ The motion challenged the legitimacy of Syria's nearly thirty-year presence in Lebanon as well as Hezbollah's military arsenal and activities. Meanwhile, in February 2005, former Prime Minister Rafiq Harir was killed by a car bomb for which Syrian intelligence was blamed. A month of street protests led to the withdrawal of Syrian forces. The instability that followed created a split between Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's ruling coalition and the opposition group that included Hezbollah, its allies in the Amal Movement and Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement. This fissure further weakened the ability of the Lebanese government to exercise authority in the south.

Even with Hezbollah establishing an intricate network of bunkers along the U.N.-established "Blue Line" during this period, cross-border incursions, as well as mortar and rocket attacks by both parties, were surprisingly limited. The root causes of the conflict, though, and the security concerns of both parties persisted. Due to the relative quiet, UNIFIL reduced its presence to roughly 2,000 soldiers – its lowest level since 1978.²⁹ Yet even with the withdrawal of the IDF and the dissolution of the SLA (commanded in its later years by the much-reviled Antoine Lahad), the size and capability of the mission was insufficient to effectively monitor the

border – much less form a credible deterrent against Hezbollah. Moreover, such a skeleton force afforded Hezbollah a permissive environment in which to bolster its defenses and prepare for cross-border operations. As a result, the number and scope of cease-fire violations increased along the border – including one failed abduction attempt by Hezbollah at an Israeli border post in the divided town of Ghajjar immediately prior to the war in 2006.

Perhaps encouraged by Hamas' seizure of an IDF soldier during a cross-border raid near the Gaza Strip in June 2006, Hezbollah acted on a similar plan designed to secure the release of fighters being held in Israeli prisons in a prisoner swap. On July 12, 2006, two IDF soldiers were kidnapped and three others killed during a well-coordinated operation whereby Hezbollah fighters attacked an Israeli patrol along the Blue Line.³⁰ Following the attack, outrage in Israel combined with strong international condemnation, provided Israel's leaders with a strong base of support for an armed response to the Hezbollah raid.

Initial enthusiasm for the Israeli offensive – in not only Jerusalem but also the capitals of many Western and Arab states – turned to horror when the vaunted IDF was stymied at Hezbollah strongholds such as Bint Jbeil and images of dead Lebanese women and children began to be broadcast on al-Jazeera as well as the BBC, CNN and France's TF1. In the biblical village of Qana, which suffered particularly cruel casualties in the 1996 offensive, 28 people – including 16 children – were dragged from the rubble caused by an airstrike on July 30, 2006.

UNSC Resolution 1701: August 11, 2006

By the time the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1701, which, called "for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hezbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations," the war had killed nearly 1,200 Lebanese

In contrast to some of the poor-quality military units that contributed to UNIFIL in the years prior to 2006, the first reinforcements consisted of well-trained infantry battalions from France, Italy and Spain.

and 200 Israelis in the 34 days following the July kidnapping.³¹ The new resolution raised the UNIFIL troop ceiling to an unprecedented 15,000 soldiers – of which 7,000 would come from European NATO countries whose fighting units were better trained and equipped than many of the units that garrisoned southern Lebanon prior to 2006.³² In the face of severe devastation in Lebanon following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, UNIFIL's decision to increase its presence was initially welcomed on all fronts.

Charged with additional tasks, UNIFIL's mandate now included:

- Monitoring the cessation of hostilities
- Deploying with and supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) throughout the south, as Israel withdrew its armed forces from Lebanon
- Coordinating all activities with the Governments of Lebanon and Israel
- Ensuring humanitarian access to civilian populations and the safe return of displaced persons
- Assisting the LAF in exercising its authority between the Blue Line and the Litani river, thereby removing assets and weapons other than those of

the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL

- Assisting the Government of Lebanon in securing its borders³³

Backed by a more muscular mandate, UNIFIL now had the authority to, in theory at least, “take all the necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces, and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind.”³⁴

In contrast to some of the poor-quality military units that contributed to UNIFIL in the years prior to 2006, the first reinforcements consisted of well-trained infantry battalions from France, Italy and Spain.³⁵ UNIFIL now had the ability to patrol in a way it could not prior to 2006. While Israel welcomed the presence of heavily armed forces along the border region, both Hezbollah and some within the Lebanese population disapproved of UNIFIL's more robust posture. Some units within UNIFIL had begun to patrol in an aggressive manner to which the people of southern Lebanon were unaccustomed. The discovery of what were suspected to be Hezbollah arms caches merely heightened tensions.

Southern Lebanon is hardly expansive, though, and the sheer numbers of U.N. peacekeepers and Lebanese soldiers who flooded the region would surely have an effect on military planners in both Hezbollah and the IDF. By the end of 2006, an expanded mission included around 10,500 peacekeepers with countries such as Malaysia, Qatar, Indonesia, Italy, China, India and Nepal contributing resources and soldiers. Today, hundreds of international and local civilian staff join more than 12,000 international troops from 29 countries in southern Lebanon.³⁷ Unlike prior resolutions, the 2006 mandate also expanded the authority of the Lebanese Army in southern Lebanon.

Resolution 1701's enhanced mandate to promote regional stability had two effects. Foremost, it

strengthened the sovereignty of the Lebanese government by deploying the army to the south. Second, the larger contingent of peacekeepers allowed Israel to withdraw its forces without overtly ceding territory to Hezbollah.

The expanded mission also included the deployment of an 800-person Maritime Task Force (MTF) off the Lebanese coast and helicopter reconnaissance patrols above the Blue Line. This combination reduced the flow of illegal seaborne armed-shipments into Lebanese ports and the violation of Lebanese airspace by the Israeli Air Force, respectively. The resolution also encouraged UNIFIL to coordinate its activities with both Lebanon and Israel, something possible to only a limited degree prior to the deployment of the Lebanese Army to the south or the Lebanese Navy off the coast. In an effort to assuage the international community – including the United States – Israel lifted its coastal and land-based siege of Lebanon.

Yet despite less ambiguous rules of engagement and a more robust mandate, the military objective of disarming Hezbollah south of the Lifani remained out of touch with reality. Between 1982 and 2006, Hezbollah grew from a small group of Iranian-trained fighters based in Lebanon's Bīqā'a Valley to a popular movement supported by over a million Shia in Beirut's populous southern suburbs, the Bīqā'a and southern Lebanon. In southern Lebanon alone, Hezbollah ran hospitals, schools and provided other services to citizens of all sects. Moreover, Hassan Nasrallah pledged that Israel would not be allowed to accomplish politically what they could not achieve on the battlefield. Neither Hezbollah nor the government of Lebanon would have allowed a U.N. peacekeeping mission to attempt to forcibly disarm Hezbollah. Even with an expanded mandate lying somewhere between traditional Chapter Six peacekeeping and Chapter Seven peace enforcement – sometimes referred to as "Chapter Six-and-a-Half" – as well as an increased role for the Lebanese Armed Forces

(LAF), Hezbollah and its political allies continued to dominate the security and socioeconomic landscape in southern Lebanon.

Also, while the force authorization and mandate included in UNSC 1701 ostensibly provided UNIFIL the capabilities needed to carry out its mission, neither UNIFIL nor the Lebanese Army possessed the will to confront Hezbollah. Ironically, both groups relied increasingly on Hezbollah for protection as al Qaeda and other transnational groups increased their presence and activities in Lebanon.³⁸ This development cemented the reservations from Israeli policymakers concerning UNIFIL's effectiveness and willingness to carry out its mandate. While the Israelis might have been grateful for the way in which the expanded UNIFIL allowed the IDF to retreat from southern Lebanon, any such gratitude was quickly overwhelmed by cynicism.

Thus, despite the initial hype created by the adoption of Resolution 1701, the new UNIFIL found itself unable to accomplish its core objectives: the removal of Israel from Lebanon; the cessation of Lebanese airspace violations by the Israeli Air Force (IAF); and the disarmament of Hezbollah. To truly deny Hezbollah access to new armaments, UNIFIL would have had to deploy its forces along the Syrian-Lebanese border – an idea against which Syria adamantly protested and an area uncovered by the new mandate. Furthermore, international support for this requirement never manifested, and UNIFIL was therefore never able to disrupt Hezbollah's primary smuggling route for arms shipments. Barely a month after the ceasefire, Hassan Nasrallah claimed that Hezbollah had rearmed to a level beyond that of July 12.

By early 2007, further weaknesses in the mandate began to appear. The participation of too many countries, for example, was originally perceived as a strength because it diluted the perception that the force was dominated by any one nation. However,

this diverse force led to inevitable command and control and interoperability challenges. With some national contingents conducting peacekeeping operations and others assuming a more offensive posture, UNIFIL failed to implement a consistent approach to its operations. With differences in training, motivation, equipment and national caveats, the new multi-national body resembled less an improved U.N. peacekeeping force than a continuation of the original mission. Not only has Hezbollah remained in control of the border region south of the Litani River, the IDF continues to occupy the heavily disputed Shebaa Farms and territory within the Golan Heights. To a large degree, the unwillingness of both UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army to confront Hezbollah's military activities has again restricted the mission to an observation and humanitarian role. When a massive roadside bomb destroyed an armored vehicle carrying three Spaniards and three Colombians (all of whom died) during a routine reconnaissance patrol in June 2007, the Spanish units ceased to aggressively patrol. A message had been sent to UNIFIL – by whom it was never determined – and any hopes that the post-2006 UNIFIL would carry out operations more forcefully than the UNIFIL that preceded it quickly faded.

Lessons Learned

At the end of 2009, there were three U.N. peacekeeping missions in the Middle East: the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Today, UNIFIL operates under the same two mandates: Resolutions 425 and 1701. Despite thirty years of trial and error, these mandates remain unattainable. U.N. administrators have failed to recognize that UNIFIL's success or failure depends more on the political will of the Security Council and troop-contributing nations than it does on operational choices made by commanders on the ground. UNIFIL, while providing critical assistance to the Lebanese people,

remains unable to carry out its intended military and political goals. To its credit, though, UNIFIL was able to adapt to the realities on the ground by assuming a broader humanitarian role. And UNIFIL soldiers have made nontrivial sacrifices in southern Lebanon. Since March 1978, for example, UNIFIL has suffered 282 fatalities – including 268 troops, two military observers, and 12 international and local civilians.³⁹

What lessons can the international community learn from that service and sacrifice?

BEWARE UNREALISTIC MANDATES

UNIFIL was initially conceived (and reconstituted in 2006) hastily and in response to ongoing crises. Thrown into the middle of a civil war in 1978, the mission's survival is testimony to the professionalism of troop-contributing nations rather than to the appropriateness of the mandate itself.⁴⁰ Ultimately, a lack of international political will – reflected in weak, unrealistic mandates – has precluded UNIFIL from accomplishing its objectives. UNIFIL's shortcomings, in other words, have been less operational than political. Cursed with weak mandates, and operating in a broken or weak state, UNIFIL competed for legitimacy with numerous armed sub-state entities – including the PLO, the SLA and Hezbollah – that have all refused to cooperate with its operations. While some improvements resulted from the adoption of Resolution 1701 after the 2006 war, UNIFIL remains charged with an impossible task. It is also both unable and unwilling to disarm Hezbollah. Without a more robust Chapter Seven mandate, the mission cannot even operate with an organic intelligence-gathering capability, the absence of which has frustrated commanders and left the force vulnerable to attacks. And absent the cooperation of Israel, the authority of a powerless Lebanese government, and a buffer zone that all parties acknowledge, even the most carefully devised mission would have failed to satisfy its creators. From day one, UNIFIL's reach has sadly exceeded its grasp.

INSTITUTION-BUILDING GOES HAND-IN-HAND WITH PEACE-MAKING

The weakness of the Lebanese government stubbornly frustrates UNIFIL's efforts in southern Lebanon. Yet for 30 years, the international community directed its efforts towards accomplishing military objectives rather than building strong state institutions that could one day obviate the need for the mission. Even today, UNIFIL resembles more a Cold War era inter-positional peacekeeping mission than the more comprehensive "nation-building" efforts that have become the international norm for peace operations over the last twenty years. Not until national reconciliation in the early 1990s did the international community approach security sector reform in Lebanon – and even then, its efforts remained symbolic at best.⁴¹ Given the degree to which the Syrian military and intelligence services were involved in the Lebanese government's most delicate matters until 2005, the reasoning behind this decision is obvious. Following the immense destruction of Lebanon's civilian infrastructure during the 2006 war and the withdrawal of both Syrian and Israeli forces, however, international efforts to build partner capacity in Lebanon should have been increased.

CONFIDENCE MUST BE BUILT THROUGH ACTIONS

UNIFIL can take pride in the fact that many proud military units have served in a peacekeeping capacity in southern Lebanon. These units have, for the most part, carried out their mandate with competence and honor. But on both sides of the Blue Line, UNIFIL is still viewed with distrust. In Lebanon, Hezbollah fought a series of battles with UNIFIL peacekeepers in the 1980s and 1990s and only began to trust its intentions toward the end of the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. After 2006, Hezbollah again warned that UNIFIL should not attempt to halt Hezbollah's "resistance" activities, and six peacekeepers were killed following a more aggressive UNIFIL posture. On the Israeli side of the border, meanwhile, military

officers and policy-makers speak of UNIFIL with open disdain despite the fact that UNIFIL provided political cover for withdrawals from ill-fated Israeli interventions in southern Lebanon in 1978 and 2006. The lesson from the UNIFIL experience is that trust must be built between peacekeepers and the belligerents through confidence-building measures. Each side must see the benefit it receives from the peacekeeping force. In southern Lebanon, by contrast, the belligerents have usually viewed UNIFIL as little more than a roadblock to be negotiated when hostilities resume.

Conclusion

Thirty-two years later, UNIFIL is still charged with keeping peace below the Litani River. Despite impossible mandates, the mission continues to play a modest role in maintaining regional stability and providing humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people. While the mission has helped to prevent the inadvertent renewal of conflict, at times separating the various factions, UNIFIL has been unable to prevent the escalation of hostilities when one side or the other seeks to gain something by doing so. Today, due in part to a weak mandate from the United Nations, the mission remains only as effective as Israel and Hezbollah allow it. Having neither the mandate nor the instruments with which to address the source of conflict, UNIFIL's success or failure depends on factors and actors beyond its control. Entering into the conflict ignorant of the local dynamics, UNIFIL has worked hard to gain the trust of the local population, which continues to depend on the mission and on Hezbollah and its allies for services the government cannot or will not provide. The fundamental weaknesses that have plagued UNIFIL for the better part of the past three decades offer many cautionary tales for policy-makers contemplating other peace operations in the region.

ENDNOTES

1. See remarks made by Ehud Olmert in a *Times* interview ("The Times interview with Ehud Olmert: full transcript," *TimesOnline* [2 August 2006], http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article698343.ece). See also, remarks by Itamar Rabinovich during the 2006 "July War" (20 July 2006).
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6. Michael Hudson's *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon* (New York: Harper Collins, 1968) remains the most cogent pre-war diagnosis of Lebanon's troubled government and the impending storm it would face in the 1970s and 1980s.
7. Ray Murphy, *UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia, and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues in Practice* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 10. Many of the Israelis were killed in an attempted rescue by Israeli Defense Forces.
8. Scott Macleod, "What Makes Lebanon Skeptical about the Peace," *TIME* (13 August 2006), <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1226108,00.html>.
9. Brian Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War* (London: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1987): 288.
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11. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), "UNIFIL Mandate" (2009), <http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1500>.
12. Alan James, "Painful peacekeeping: the United Nations in Lebanon 1978-1982," *International Journal*, 38 (Autumn 1983, The Middle East After Lebanon): 614-615.
13. The United Nations Operation in Congo was established under a Chapter VI mandate but gradually experienced mission creep towards more ambitious Chapter VII peace enforcement provisions. Abandoning its impartial position in the midst of a civil war, the 20,000-person force quickly found itself unable to impose its will on the belligerents through force of arms. By 1964, the mission had suffered 250 fatalities, including then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, who lost his life in a plane crash on September 17, 1961. The political fallout among members of the United Nations over the debacle in Congo significantly affected the organization's policy-making process for decades.
14. From 1978-1982, UNIFIL had operational control over 500-1350 Lebanese army soldiers.
15. Hillen, *Blue Helmets*: 115.
16. James, "Painful peacekeeping": 620.
17. Timur Göksel, "'Mr. UNIFIL' Reflects on a Quarter Century of Peacekeeping in South Lebanon," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 36 (Spring 2007): 56.
18. Hillen, *Blue Helmets*: 130-131.
19. Göksel, "'Mr. UNIFIL'": 65-67.
20. Ibid: 66.
21. Hillen, *Blue Helmets*: 132.
22. Yezid Sayigh, "Israel's Military Performance in Lebanon, June 1982," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13 (Autumn 1983): 62. Casualties due to accidents such as weapons mishandlings, vehicle accidents and fratricide are included in this figure.
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32. UNSC, "Resolution 1701."

33. UNSC, "Resolution 1701"; UNIFIL, "UNIFIL Mandate."

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37. UNIFIL, "Facts and Figures" (2009), <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/facts.shtml>.

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CHAPTER III:
KOSOVO

By Richard Weitz



Richard Weitz explores the international community's involvement in Kosovo, a tiny country that has nonetheless hosted virtually every international organization in the Western world during its quest to establish an independent nation. One lesson that can be drawn from the Kosovo experience is the desirability of simplicity. Contemporary peace operations are, like all military operations, necessarily complex. As a principle of war, however, the need for simplicity refers to the necessity to both organize the mission with a clear chain of command and division of labor as well as to explain its objectives with as much clarity as possible. "Multinational operations," as U.S. Army doctrine notes, "put a premium on simplicity." In Kosovo, an abundance of actors made it difficult to communicate effectively, implement a coherent strategy, or approach anything resembling unity of command. Considering the fact that the West Bank and Gaza already host over 150 disparate international, national, and non-governmental institutions, any peace operation would struggle to coordinate all such actors in a coherent manner. — Editor

KOSOVO

By Richard Weitz

The Kosovo peace operations have involved many of the world's most important international and regional security institutions: the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Even though the majority ethnic Albanian community in Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in February 2008, through the local political infrastructure developed by these institutions, most U.N. members have declined to recognize this status. The United Nations, NATO and the OSCE have decreased their presence in Kosovo over time, but they remain heavily involved in the region due to the risk of renewed ethnic violence, Kosovo's severe economic problems and continuing disputes among the great powers over how to manage this troubled region. Despite a decade of intense efforts, a durable peace in Kosovo remains elusive.

Background

The ethnic Serbs and Albanians located in the province of Kosovo have clashed repeatedly since the rise of local nationalism in the 19th century. This clash contributed to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, in which the Muslim Albanians held privileged status. The Orthodox Serbs consider Kosovo their cultural heartland, but migration patterns in Europe resulted in the region becoming predominately Albanian. Although the province has been a part of Serbia, historically and politically, Serbs today account for only 7 percent of the population, while ethnic Albanians comprise 88 percent.²

In 1974, Kosovo became a fully-fledged autonomous province within Serbia, one of the republics that comprised the socialist Federation of Yugoslavia. In 1989, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, seeking to enhance his nationalist credentials, amended the Serbian constitution to revoke Kosovo's political autonomy. After several years of failed peaceful protests, paramilitary groups began attacking Serbian targets such as the local official appointed by Belgrade. By the

late 1990s, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged as the dominant paramilitary group. Serbian military and police forces responded brutally to these attacks. Civilian and military losses on both sides grew, accompanied by massive population displacement as hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians fled their homes.³

Starting in 1992, a six-nation Balkans Contact Group sought to manage the conflicts emerging from the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation. Its members included Russia, the United States and four major European countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy), which had a strong stake in the Balkans due to their geographic proximity as well as their economic ties to the region. Unfortunately, the Contact Group experienced the same paralyzing divisions regarding Kosovo that had hobbled its handling of Bosnia. While the United States and the United Kingdom argued that deploying international military and civil monitors in Kosovo would help stop interethnic atrocities, the Russian government characterized the Kosovo conflict as a domestic matter for Serbia – an approach that excluded foreign military intervention. The Russian government also blocked efforts to sanction Serbia within the United Nations. Russian diplomats consented only to adopt United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1160, which called for an end to the escalating violence, and UNSCR 1199 (September 23, 1998), which demanded that all parties cease fighting and enter a dialogue seeking a negotiated political settlement. The European Union and the United States adopted unilateral sanctions, such as a moratorium on export credits, a ban on oil sales and denial of travel visas for senior Serbian officials, but the Serbian leadership remained adamant about denying Kosovo's independence.

After several failed peace initiatives, including one involving an OSCE-led Kosovo Verification Mission, NATO governments concluded that Serb authorities,



Source: www.cia.gov

led by President Milosevic and his Serbian nationalist allies, were largely responsible for the escalating fighting within the province. Starting on March 24, 1999, NATO launched a 78-day air campaign, Operation Allied Force, against the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), then almost entirely under Serbian control. Although allied pilots did not suffer a single casualty from enemy action, the bombing campaign – which involved more than 38,000 sorties – encountered many difficulties. Some critics claim the air campaign actually worsened the situation for the Kosovo Albanians on the ground by encouraging Serbian retaliation against the local population, leading hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians to flee to neighboring Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro in order to escape the violence. NATO's reliance on high-level bombing also inflicted substantial collateral damage on the province's civilian property. Nevertheless, Milosevic eventually accepted a June 5, 1999 cease-fire agreement that mandated the withdrawal of all FRY police, military and paramilitary forces from

Kosovo and permitted a NATO-led military force, joined by Russian peacekeepers, to administer the territory while formally preserving Yugoslavia's territorial integrity.

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244

After the conflict ended, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 (June 10, 1999) under Chapter Seven of the U.N. Charter, which authorized the use of force to enforce the peace agreement. Its key provisions:

- Placed Kosovo under interim U.N. administration
- Authorized a NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo
- Allowed for the presence of a limited number of FRY and Serbian personnel at Serbian patrimonial sites and key border crossings
- Identified a path toward the development of provisional institutions of local self-government in Kosovo
- Reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (essentially Serbia)
- Assured the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo
- Required the demilitarization of the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups
- Authorized the United Nations to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status⁴

UNSCR 1244 included two annexes that further expanded and outlined the parameters of the mission. Specifically, Annex One reproduced the statement of the G-8 Foreign Ministers meeting of May 6, 1999. It called for:

- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences

- Establishment of an interim administration
- The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework
- A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis regions

Annex Two authorized "substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation ...under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees." The second annex also authorized the people of the Kosovo region to establish an interim administration to provide stability until the population created more durable self-governing democratic institutions.

The notes provided at the end of the second annex outlined a seven-day timetable for the complete withdrawal of military forces and a 48-hour timeframe for the removal of all air and ground defenses in the established 25-kilometer safe zone around the Kosovo autonomous region. One of the compromises in the security field was the inclusion in Annex Two of language allowing a limited number ("hundreds, not thousands") of Serbian personnel to return to Kosovo to conduct such tasks as:

- Liaison[ing] with the international civil mission and the international security presence
- Marking/clearing minefields
- Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
- Maintaining a presence at key border crossings

This compromise sought to reassure Kosovo's Serbs about their security, while fulfilling the United Nations' goals of making the region safer for civilians, by removing such threats as landmines. Despite these provisions, the ethnic animosity

stirred up by the years of fighting resulted in over 100,000 Kosovo Serbs fleeing into Serbia. Most still remain there.

United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo

UNSCR 1244 effectively postponed the divisive question of Kosovo's independence until tempers had cooled. It adopted what has become known as a "status-neutral framework." On the one hand, it defined Kosovo as a U.N. protectorate under the administration of a newly established United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). On the other hand, its mandate was to provide Kosovo with a "transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo." UNSCR 1244 also foresaw the development of new locally based provisional institutions of self-government while affirming that Kosovo was an autonomous political entity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, legally succeeded by the Republic of Serbia. This ambiguity was apparent in Annex One, which supported:

A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA.

When it began operations, UNMIK enjoyed substantial powers to correspond to its extensive mandate.⁵ UNMIK then spent the next decade surrendering many of these powers, first by creating a Constitutional Framework and encouraging the establishment of Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG). Then UNMIK gradually relinquished its "reserved" powers and transferred more responsibilities to the PISG, based on a "Standards before Status" policy, in which Kosovo's

UNSCR 1244 effectively postponed the divisive question of Kosovo's independence until tempers had cooled.

attainment of key benchmarks would result in UNMIK upgrading its status. Through this process, UNMIK progressively changed its role from that of managing and deciding to that of monitoring and supporting local institutions.⁶

The UNSC authorized the U.N. Secretary General to designate an official to oversee the peace operation as his representative. This Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), who formally heads UNMIK and reports at regular intervals to the U.N. Secretary General on its progress, supervises the international civilian presence in Kosovo.

Restoring Security with KFOR

NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) provides an international security presence in support of UNMIK, but is not subordinate to the United Nations. Its role was defined by the Military-Technical Agreement, which ended the war when it was signed on June 9, 1999, between NATO and Serbia (FRY). Its main provisions included:

- Deployment of an international civil and security force under U.N. auspices
- Withdrawal of all Serbian military forces from Kosovo territory within 11 days
- Release of detailed information on the location of mines and unexploded ordinance
- KFOR would be charged with interpreting and enforcing the terms of the agreement⁷

KFOR entered Kosovo on June 12, 1999, with an initial mandate to:

- Deter renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces
- Establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety and civil order
- Demilitarise the Kosovo Liberation Army
- Support the international humanitarian effort
- Coordinate with and support the international civil presence⁸

KFOR established storage depots across the country and began collecting munitions on June 20, 1999 from the KLA, which had pledged to disarm fully.⁹ In an effort to prevent former KLA veterans from turning to organized crime, fighting amongst themselves for power, or engaging in other disruptive activities following the end of the war, UNMIK sought to create civilian employment opportunities for them by establishing a Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) on September 20, 1999, under the chain of command of the KFOR Commander.¹⁰ The KPC's mandate included providing disaster response services (major fires, industrial accidents or spills), performing search and rescue, developing a capacity to render humanitarian assistance in isolated areas, assisting in de-mining and other ordnance disposal efforts and contributing to rebuilding Kosovo's infrastructure.¹¹ The KPC performed its last operational activities on January 21, 2009. It formally dissolved on June 14, 2009, when the new Kosovo Security Force (KSF) assumed many of its responsibilities, leaving the U.N. Development Programme and NATO to fund retirement and retraining programs for KPC members who did not enter the KSF.¹²

KFOR enjoyed some flexibility in responding to changes in its operational environment. In a joint statement issued in Kosovo's capital, Pristina, SRSG Bernard Kouchner and KFOR Commander Lieutenant General Mike Jackson said "The

primary aim of the international presence in Kosovo is to provide a secure environment for all Kosovars, whatever their ethnic origin." They added that they would respond appropriately to the changing situation by "continually reviewing the security situation and improving our response."¹³ KFOR specific tasks have included assisting with:

- Displaced persons and refugees
- Reconstruction
- Demining
- Medical needs
- Security
- Law and order
- Protection of ethnic minorities
- Guarding religious or historic sites
- Border security
- Interdicting cross-border weapons smuggling
- Collecting, securing, and destroying weapons
- Establishment of other civilian institutions¹⁴

KFOR divided Kosovo into five zones (four zones before June 2006), each under the command of separate multinational brigades (MNB) in which five lead nations commanded peace keeping and police- and nation-building operations (similar to post-WWII Berlin). Effectively, KFOR was directed by the NATO nations with the largest contingent of soldiers in each multinational task force:

- Britain (MNB Centre based in Lipijan)
- France (MNB North based in Novo Selo)
- Italy (MNB West based in Pec)
- Germany (MNB South) in Prizren
- United States (MNB East based in Urosevac)¹⁵

In theory, NATO had a single chain of command extending from the individual MNBs, which were formally under the authority of the Commander KFOR, who reported directly to the Commander

of Joint Force Command Naples (COM JFCN).¹⁶ In practice, each of the MNBs enjoyed considerable autonomy. This decentralization allowed for policies tailored to the needs of the particular region and allowed the KFOR troops to cooperate more effectively (especially in the gathering of intelligence) with the local police and population. But it also detracted from the unity of the mission.

One drawback of the national autonomy enjoyed by KFOR members was that the governments of the respective national contingents could more easily curtail their military commitments unilaterally. When KFOR began its mission in June 1999, it had an authorized strength of 50,000 troops. By February 2000, when ethnic riots occurred at Mitrovica, it still had only 37,000 soldiers, 13,000 fewer peacekeepers than planned.¹⁷ Many KFOR soldiers came from non-NATO countries, but these were primarily members of NATO's Partnership for Peace program, which helped train former Soviet bloc states in Western military tactics. They all served under unified command and control with the exception of Russian troops, which exercised joint responsibility with NATO forces for running the Pristina airport and provided medical services in Kosovo Polje until they withdrew in 2003. By then, KFOR's strength had dwindled to fewer than 20,000. In March 2004, when renewed violence broke out between Albanians and Serbs, and KFOR troops came under attack, NATO rapidly deployed an additional 2,500 soldiers to the region. After Kosovo's declaration of independence on February 17, 2008, NATO resolved to continue KFOR on the basis of UNSCR 1244, unless the UNSC directed its withdrawal.¹⁸ KFOR's current troop strength is now around 14,000, but this number is expected to fall further – providing the security situation remains stable – to perhaps 10,000 in 2010.¹⁹ The NATO governments want KFOR to transition into a so-called “deterrent presence,” with fewer troops

overall and a larger proportion of the remainder constituting rapidly deployable “over the horizon reserves.”²⁰

OSCE Mission in Kosovo

UNSCR 1244 established the four main pillars of the UNMIK effort, divided among the major international security institutions that were involved:

Pillar I: Police and Justice (UNMIK-led)²¹

Pillar II: Civil Administration (UNMIK-led)

Pillar III: Democratization and institution building (OSCE-led)

Pillar IV: Reconstruction and economic development (E.U.-led)

According to UNSCR 1244, UNMIK was to:

- Perform basic civilian administrative functions
- Promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo
- Facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status
- Coordinate the humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies
- Support the reconstruction of key infrastructure
- Maintain civil law and order
- Promote human rights
- Assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo

As authorized in UNSCR 1244 and OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 305 (July 1, 1999), a restructured OSCE Mission in Kosovo assumed the lead role in supporting democratic institutions and good governance, advancing human and community rights, and improving public safety and security. Its specific mandate focused on:

- Protecting community rights such as education,

language, culture, non-discrimination and property rights

- Promoting municipal governance reform to raise the quality of services and increase public participation in decision-making
- Working with the municipalities, courts and the police to improve their rule of law and human rights monitoring
- Supporting further development of independent nongovernmental institutions that promote human rights, rule of law and democratic elections
- Coordinating efforts to oppose illicit trafficking
- Enhancing legislative and executive branch procedures to include promoting community participation in their activities
- Strengthening security and public safety bodies such as the police, customs, correctional services and fire and rescue brigades
- Promoting a free, responsible, unbiased and professional media
- Assisting the human rights units in Kosovo's ministries and municipalities²²

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo represented an unprecedented step for OSCE-U.N. cooperation, since the OSCE had not previously been such an integral component of an U.N.-led operation.²³ Upon their arrival in 1999, the OSCE staff quickly began planning for municipal elections in 2000 and 2002 and national elections in 2001 and 2004, all designed to re-establish a legitimate governing body in Kosovo. The OSCE also assisted in establishing Kosovo's Central Election Commission (CEC) and CEC Secretariat, independent bodies charged with organizing the elections.²⁴ With over 200 international and over 600 local staff members, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo is the OSCE's largest field presence, with a budget of almost 27 million Euros in 2009.²⁵ By May 2001, after both a municipal and a national election, UNMIK created

the PISG, which would serve as Kosovo's interim government. The intention, defined by UNSCR 1244, was that, as the mission progressed, more responsibilities would be transferred from UNMIK to the Kosovar-run PISG. Yet, it was not until the late November 2009 ballot – the first election since Kosovo declared independence in February 2008 – that Kosovo's electoral institutions achieved full self-sufficiency, when the OCSE relinquished executive responsibility for supervising the elections and the CEC and its Secretariat oversaw 38 mayoral elections.²⁶ Even then, U.N. and other observers have complained that the CEC suffered from persistent political infighting and capability shortfalls.²⁷ The OSCE continues to provide some election-related assistance but has focused its efforts on monitoring the protection of rights and interests of Kosovo's minority communities.²⁸

The European Union in Kosovo

UNSCR 1244 gave the European Union a mandate to stabilize and reconstruct Kosovo's economy. It began its reconstruction and economic development mission understaffed (it represented the smallest of UNMIK's four pillars) and somewhat uncoordinated in June 1999. The fiscal and monetary reforms in the early stages of the E.U. mission helped reverse some of the economic damage that had been done by decades of socialist economic practices, discrimination and war. The reforms soon created the core institutions of a free market, including the Kosovo Central Fiscal Authority, the Central Banking Authority, the Kosovo Trust Agency and the UNMIK Customs Service. The introduction of the Euro as Kosovo's currency helped to arrest the high rates of inflation, which had reached double digits by 1999. The increase in tax collection was a significant boost to the interim government budget, though the heavy reliance on border taxes reflected the government's inclination to collect where it was easier to do so. The European Union and UNMIK have been criticized for moving too slowly on economic privatization,

though a Kosovo Trust Agency was created to oversee the development and allocation of Kosovo's real estate, social housing, and socially-owned assets, which under the socialist Milosevic regime, had failed to derive any real value. The E.U. pillar was also less successful at aiding the development of private industry.²⁹

Post-Independence

When the Kosovo Assembly declared Kosovo's independence on February 17, 2008, Kosovo authorities pledged to implement U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari's Comprehensive Status Proposal (CSP) unilaterally, including its provisions for protecting minority Serb rights and for a period of international supervision. They invited the European Union to deploy a rule of law mission and create an International Civilian Office (ICO) to supervise the CSP's implementation. The Assembly has adopted a number of laws to implement various features of the Ahtisaari Plan, including articles in the "Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo" that entered into force in June 2008.³⁰ The question is whether Printina will be any more successful at applying the principles of decentralization and local autonomy to Kosovo's Serb minority than earlier ethnic Albanians rejected Belgrade's offers of considerable self-government if they had foregone independence.

Managing this transition to independence within the UNMIK-led framework established by UNSCR 1244 has proved difficult. The Ahtisaari plan foresaw a clear transition period during which UNMIK would relinquish its authority gradually to a representative government structure within Kosovo. With the UNSC unable to reach a consensus on behalf of Ahtisaari's plan or any alternative status arrangement, the Kosovo Serbs and the Government of Serbia insisting on dealing directly with UNMIK rather than the Republic of Kosovo institutions in Pristina, and the Pristina authorities insisting on dealing with Serbian government officials on an equal basis, the U.N. Secretariat has

declined to transfer major powers to Kosovo bodies and has instead devolved responsibilities to the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), the OSCE, and other groups.

In this context, UNMIK has struggled to maintain its utility and "status neutral" positions despite a decline in its budgets and size. UNMIK reduced its authorized personnel strength from approximately 5,000 to only 510 by July 1, 2009.³¹ The remaining personnel concentrate on working with Kosovo's minority communities, protecting cultural heritage sites and helping refugees and displaced people to return, as well as dealing with foreign governments that do not recognize the new Kosovo republic. For example, Kosovo's Serb-majority communities as well as the Serbian government interact with the authorities in Pristina as well as EULEX primarily through UNMIK. Perhaps for this reason, the U.N. Secretary General has stated, "UNMIK has moved into a new phase, characterized by a focus on facilitating practical cooperation between [Kosovo] communities, as well as between the authorities in Pristina and Belgrade."³² Yet, the representatives of the Kosovo republic, eager to end the constraints of international dependency, have called on UNMIK to conclude its mission and have avoided contact with the U.N. Secretary General, even while they cooperate with UNMIK staff in some limited areas.³³

From June 12, 2008, to June 14, 2009, NATO's KFOR assisted in the transition from the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) – a transitional local security service – to the new Kosovo Security Force (KSF), as well as in constructing a civilian structure to oversee the KSF in the newly declared independent state of Kosovo. The KSF is a small, 3,300-person professional force that includes 2,500 active duty personnel and 800 reservists. While it does not possess heavy weapons, it would be able to respond to local security emergencies, help eliminate explosive ordnance and provide limited civic protection and crisis response activities.³⁴ Serbian

Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic denounced the KSF as “an illegal paramilitary group” and a threat to regional security.³⁵ The Kosovo Serbs also refuse to recognize the KSF’s legitimacy and have rejected its recruitment efforts (the KSF has a 10 percent quota reserved for Kosovo’s ethnic minorities), though economic imperatives have compelled some Serbs to join its ranks.³⁶ In general, KFOR has preferred a narrow interpretation of its mandate, staying out of policing and avoiding being drawn into guarding static objects such as courthouses, heritage sites and the two main U.N.-run border checkpoints between Kosovo and Serbia (which are now run by EULEX). Nonetheless, after small detachments stood by as Serbs destroyed the Brnjak and Jarinje border posts, KFOR has reestablished a more visible presence to counter renewed ethnic violence.

European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX)

On February 16, 2008, anticipating Kosovo’s independence declaration the following day, E.U. governments endorsed deployment of a 2,000-member police and administration mission – the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, or EULEX – to replace the current U.N.-led justice mission. The European Union proceeded to organize its International Civilian Office (ICO) to oversee implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, which the ethnic Albanian Kosovo authorities agreed to follow unilaterally when they declared independence on February 17, 2008. Ahtisaari’s CSP had proposed establishing an EULEX-like structure due to continuing rule of law problems in Kosovo, including corruption, an insufficient number of judges and prosecutors, and overlapping and conflicting laws adopted by ethnic Albanians, ethnic Serbs, the Serbian government in Belgrade and by the former Republic of Yugoslavia.³⁷ EULEX represents the largest civilian operation under the European Union’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). After months of preparation and training, the mission became operational in December 2008

and achieved full operational capability on April 6, 2009.³⁸ EULEX’s mandate is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities to enhance the rule of law, specifically by developing Kosovo’s police, judiciary and customs, however, following best European practices.³⁹ EULEX has found it difficult to manage the continuing tensions between the Kosovo government in Pristina and the Serbian authorities in Kosovo and Belgrade because nationalists on all sides distrust the European Union’s intent.

Assessment

Whatever its effects on the mission, the decision of KFOR to allow each MNB to enjoy considerable autonomy in managing its peace operation within each area of operations allows the analyst to compare and contrast the results of their diverging techniques and tactics.

BY REGION

The British military commanded a multinational contingent that controlled the area around Pristina, known as MNB Center. Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, Russia and Sweden also provided troops to help manage a MNB area that, while the smallest in physical size, had the largest population. The British commanders of MNB Center, believing that civil-military cooperation is every soldier’s job, focused on winning the support of the local population in order to prevent popular disturbances and gain information about potential troublemakers as well as dedicated terrorists. The tactics included improving local conditions by restoring critical infrastructure and local self-government, combined with an effective “hearts and minds” campaign and a policy that emphasized minimal use of force. The practice of having British soldiers shed their imposing personal protective equipment and meet in the homes of community leaders for tea and pastries also helped promote force protection, win local confidence and gain intelligence from local sources. More generally, the troops serving

under British command benefited from the long experience possessed by the British military in conducting military police and counterinsurgency operations throughout the world.⁴⁰

By leaving their flak jackets, helmets and automatic rifles at their bases when patrolling in low-threat environments, French and Italian troops were able communicate more easily with Kosovar Albanians and ethnic Serbians.

MNB Center also made considerable progress in achieving economic reconstruction in their zone. As of March 2007, the MNB had directly assisted in the reconstruction of approximately 200 kilometers of roads, six major bridges and a number of schools.⁴¹ The British also aided local medical authorities in providing ambulance services for Serbian hospitals that were still intact after the air war.⁴² Furthermore, British doctrine held that civil-military cooperation was naturally a responsibility of the military commander given its importance for fulfilling post-conflict reconstruction. This made the U.K.-led forces strive to keep open channels with their civilian and non-governmental organization (NGO) counterparts in order to facilitate better relations, information exchanges, material sharing and a more coherent approach to

reconstruction. This collaboration helped ensure that local projects would be well funded, supplied and constructed.

The experiences of MNB North and MNB West were similar. MNB North, under Italy's overall command, at various points included troops from Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Russia and the United Arab Emirates. MNB West, headed by France, included military contingents from Bulgaria, Finland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. Both areas had to deal with threatened ethnic reprisals following the end of the war, since their regions were hit hardest by Milosevic's ethnic cleansing and the three-month NATO bombardment. MNB North also contained the largest concentration of Serbs remaining in Kosovo after the war and was further constrained by the short (4-month) duration deployments of most of the French contingents. This rapid rotation made it difficult for the in-country military personnel to develop a good understanding of their mission and of local conditions.⁴³

Despite these challenges, the French and Italian forces achieved some success with the more personal approach to peacekeeping they adopted in their regions, which often helped them develop close relations with their civilian counterparts. For example, both the MNBs allowed junior officers and NCOs considerable discretion in pursuing local civic reconstruction projects that would optimize community needs. They then received the resources and professional expertise to implement these projects. For example, some French soldiers could use bulldozers and engineers to build a school playground, while others could establish a food and clothing distribution center from items donated by charities in their home countries and unused food items from brigade members.⁴⁴ This discretion also extended to patrol tactics. When appropriate, the French and Italians adopted the same approach to force protection that proved so successful for the British. By leaving their flak

jackets, helmets and automatic rifles at their bases when patrolling in low-threat environments, French and Italian troops were able to communicate more easily with Kosovar Albanians and ethnic Serbians.

The U.S. and German militaries, in contrast to the troops of the lead countries in the other three zones, were much more risk averse, imposing stringent force protection requirements and refusing to allow soldiers to socialize with the local population. Both MNB East – under overall U.S. command and including troops from Greece, Poland and Russia – and MNB South – led by Germany, with troops from Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia and Turkey – were guided by strict force protection rules. Troops were obliged to wear flak jackets and helmets as well as to carry semi-automatic rifles, even when conducting routine civil operations. For example, when U.S. troops left their compounds on routine or information-gathering patrols, they were required to travel in vehicles mounted with .50-caliber machine guns.⁴⁵ These weapons were often unnecessary for their mission and may have intimidated the local citizens, especially any Serbs concerned about the level of safety in a region that required such heavily armed American troops. The force protection rules also contributed to the U.S. sense of being over-extended since so many soldiers were assigned to protect their comrades. In one example, a two-vehicle convoy was required to escort a single individual for a one-on-one meeting.⁴⁶ The U.S. soldiers chafed at their inability to rely on their own discretion in choosing appropriate force protection tactics, whereas non-Americans saw the U.S.-led KFOR contingent as defining force protection as the mission rather than simply a way to achieve it.⁴⁷

Critics also disliked how U.S. commanders interpreted their security mandate as narrowly as possible to limit “nation-building” activities.⁴⁸

They left the task of reconstructing infrastructure primarily to civilian government agencies, NGOs and international organizations. In some cases, U.S. civil affairs personnel could offer their expertise, but rarely resources.⁴⁹ Another complaint was that U.S. troops, who typically rotated out after short six-month deployments, were often housed in large, walled compounds that placed physical and psychological distance between the soldiers and the local citizens. In contrast to other MNBs that located their brigade headquarters in major urban areas, or to the U.S. experience in Bosnia where peacekeepers often slept in tents, the Department of Defense constructed Camp Bondsteel (a remote 700,000 cubic foot compound replete with many private food and other services) and Camp Montheith to house troops. While Camp Bondsteel was seen as a marvel in that it was erected in three months and employed more than 7,000 Albanian Kosovars during its construction, these large compounds, which operated as self-contained communities, effectively walled off troops from the people they were trying to protect – a tactic that also proved counterproductive in Iraq and Afghanistan during the first years of counterinsurgency operations in both countries.⁵⁰

Like their U.S. counterparts, the Germans have been criticized for allowing an excessive concern about force protection to impede MNB North’s mission of promoting Kosovo’s political and economic reconstruction. German soldiers also had strained relations with some of the NGOs working in their region. For example, they refused to assist NGOs seeking to facilitate the return of Serbs, fearing it would provoke the Albanian majority and thereby increase the likelihood of violence. In fact, the Germans initially supported the return of Kosovar Albanian exiles, helping to build and reconstruct their homes and also discouraging them from exploiting Germany’s lax asylum laws to reside there.⁵¹

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The KFOR mission did ensure that Serbian military and police forces withdrew from all of Kosovo's territory within the 11-day timeline that had been established in the Military Technical Agreement. It also succeeded in disarming KLA fighters or incorporating them within the KPC, preventing further clashes between Kosovo paramilitary units and Serbian regular forces, as well as among the Kosovo factions themselves. Overall, violence has remained at low levels, despite a few occasional outbursts in which the peacekeepers have sometimes been faulted for their inability or unwillingness to intervene. Although the provisional government of Kosovo has been able to declare independence without further violence, the Serbs remain unreconciled to the result, raising the specter that this newly frozen conflict will thaw at any moment.

Some assessments criticized UNMIK and KFOR for being too understaffed to prevent ethnic tensions from escalating, while other observers fault the peacekeepers for either being overly neutral or for being overly committed to the principle of neutrality. Yet, the deeper problem remains – centuries of ethnic tensions cannot be dissolved overnight by an international force – no matter its effectiveness. It could take generations to overcome the deep hostility between the ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs in Kosovo. The various U.N. missions and other interventions have also failed to overcome the impasse in the diplomatic talks between Belgrade and Pristina, though their actions – such as the European Union's dangling before the parties the prospects of tighter ties and eventually possible membership – continue to dampen conflict, even if indirectly.

Security Sector Considerations**UNITY OF COMMAND**

KFOR's decentralized structure proved simultaneously a major strength and a significant weakness. Managing security and reconstruction operations

at the local level allowed policymakers to understand and respond better to their constituents' specific needs. Despite these benefits, however, the dual command structure under which each national military contingent operated worsened the confusion of an already difficult mission. For instance, each of the five MNBs developed its own information operations strategy rather than following the KFOR plan.⁵² In addition, military commanders received orders and informal guidance from both NATO headquarters and their own governments. This dual hierarchy led to contradictory orders and, when followed, occasionally contradictory policies.

When the field commanders followed the demands of their national governments, which was often the case, the ally's distinct domestic concerns (usually related to shielding their troops from combat) took priority over mission-wide needs. In KFOR, as in Afghanistan, it proved difficult to order soldiers from one MNB to assist soldiers in another MNB because of the Allies' reluctance to send their troops outside of a region. The system of caveats that has so disrupted NATO operations in Afghanistan has also impeded KFOR operations in Kosovo. Both NATO and non-NATO governments often required their military contingents to secure approval from their national capitals before implementing a KFOR directive. Similarly, governments sometimes withdrew their troops without coordinating force reductions with KFOR. These conditions caused friction and weakened the force's unity of action. The KFOR commander from October 1999 until April 2000, German General Klaus Reinhardt, later complained that the KFOR commander "has nothing to command" despite his lofty title.⁵³ In some cases, NATO allies were reluctant to cooperate among themselves, even in an emergency. Much to its chagrin, France discovered this problem early on in its mission when few allies offered troops to help quell an uprising that broke out in the northern city of Mitrovica.

Besides helping to overcome these weaknesses, a more centralized command structure would have helped KFOR identify best practices and apply them as standard operating procedures for the entire mission.

STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY

Compounding the fissiparous effects of KFOR's decentralized structure was the involvement of so many disparate international institutions (the United Nations, NATO, the European Union and their field missions in Kosovo) and non-governmental organizations in the operation. Combined with the absence of a dominant command and control center, the presence of so many international institutions – with differing mandates, players, and visions – has made it difficult for policymakers to follow a coherent overall strategy by creating problems of coordination, overlapping jurisdictions among them and gaps in their authority.⁵⁴

It also encouraged foreign and domestic actors to go forum shopping. For example, the Russian government used its veto power in the U.N. Security Council to bloc actions by NATO and the European Union, institutions in which Moscow enjoyed little influence. Conversely, on several occasions, the Western governments bypassed the United Nations to act unilaterally through NATO and the European Union. In addition, there was an awkward sharing of responsibilities regarding the construction of the new Kosovo Police Service. The OSCE had the task of recruiting and training, while UNMIK was to mentor, monitor and assist in its development. Since December 2008, EULEX has assumed UNMIK's responsibilities for monitoring, mentoring and assisting the Kosovo Police (KP) – however, capacity-building programs for the KP have occurred through bilateral arrangements.⁵⁵

Still, a more distinct division of labor among the various institutions might have made better use of Europe's uniquely rich institutional architecture.

For example, the Council of Europe has led a useful Reconstruction Implementation Commission that has concentrated on restoring the 34 cultural and religious heritage sites that had been damaged during the March 2004 riots against the Serbs. The profusion of European and Eurasian security institutions involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan might also be needlessly complicating the operation there. In contrast, the hierarchy of international institutions involved in the peace operations in Timor-Leste and Lebanon has been much clearer, perhaps because Southeast Asia and the Middle East are less well-endowed with security institutions that Europe.

In one respect, the complexity issue resembles the centralization issue. In the latter case, the major troops' contributors were reluctant to allow foreign commanders to control their forces, so they carved out their own "kingdoms." The complexity of the international presence in the Kosovo case likewise seems hard to avoid. Neither NATO nor the United Nations would serve under the other's military command. The architects of the Kosovo mission learned from the problems in Bosnia, where both the E.U. and the OSCE operated independently, and placed them under loose U.N. oversight. The United Nations might have assumed these functions directly, but at some probable loss of capacity. In the Kosovo case, the mission planners made a conscious choice to favor broad participation over unity of command.⁵⁶

POOR COMMUNICATION

A lack of effective communication among the parties compounded the complexity and incoherence problems.⁵⁷ This insufficient coordination among the military and civilian players was evident even before the mission began.⁵⁸ Within KFOR itself, insufficient communication and coordination occurred between the multinational brigades. The short duration of some troop rotations, such as France's four-month field deployment policy, limited its troops' ability to develop ties with the

The rigorous force protection methods practiced by the American and German forces distanced them from the people they were trying to aid.

civilian staff working in the region as well as the local population.⁵⁹ Some analysts believe that the rigorous force protection methods practiced by the American and German forces distanced them from the people they were trying to aid. They argue that the British practice of shedding unneeded protective equipment not only instilled a sense of trust between soldier and citizen, but dressing with only a sidearm reinforced the belief that combat operations had ended and that the peacekeepers were there to help maintain public order and safety and assist with post-conflict reconstruction and other civic tasks. The trust fostered by the British also allowed the peacekeepers to collect valuable intelligence about possible threats to their mission and themselves.

LIMITED CIVILIAN SURGE CAPACITY

The lack of readily available and deployable resources to conduct essential civilian missions such as local governance, street-level policing, and community liaisoning, especially those that could be employed rapidly in the early phase of the operation, disrupted the UNMIK mission. The limited UNMIK capabilities, especially at the beginning of its mission, compelled KFOR to assume civil responsibilities beyond its mandate when UNMIK needed more time to commence public services.

According to one source, “By June 2000, only 40 percent of the UNMIK regional and municipal positions were filled within the MNB(E) sector [and] MNB(E) only had three of the seven municipal boards functioning within its sector.”⁶⁰ The UNMIK support provided to the field commanders beyond Pristina was often underfunded, understaffed, and lacked the materials and knowledge (i.e., the ability to speak English) necessary to be an effective KFOR partner.⁶¹

It took the United Nations a year to reach its authorized strength of 5,000 police officers following the end of hostilities. The Security Council had sought to compensate for the United Nation’s limited police surge capacity by authorizing NATO (in UNSC 1244) to assume responsibility for public safety until adequate numbers of U.N. police could be deployed. Although the mandate for KFOR, unlike for the Stabilization Force in Bosnia, included “law and order,” KFOR was unprepared to assume such extensive civilian policing functions. As a result, law and order deteriorated during the power vacuum that emerged between the withdrawal of Serbian military administration and its replacement by KFOR and UNMIK. By June 1999, one account placed the murder rate in Kosovo at some 50 each week, most of which were directed at the Serbian minority.⁶² This rise of ethnic reprisals was especially worrisome given that more than 135,000 Serbs remained in Kosovo following the war, mostly in various enclaves in the north.⁶³ KFOR and UNMIK would eventually establish order, including the protection of Serbian minority enclaves. By mid-2000, the murder rate had fallen to around five per week.⁶⁴ Nonetheless, the initial wave of violence led many Kosovo Serbs to flee to neighboring Serbia, where most remain.

When the UNMIK police force was finally established, it was beset by the same problems that have hindered past U.N. police missions. The largest troop contributors to U.N. peacekeeping missions come from developing countries. Their police units

are often less well-trained in community policing methods, which decreases their ability to train the host nation's police units. Furthermore, the need to retrain most U.N. officers in law enforcement methods and crowd control, combined with the small stipends offered to them (approximately 71 dollars per day), contributed to the difficulties that UNMIK faced throughout its mission.⁶⁵ Along with a weakened police force, initially, UNMIK's operation was hindered by an inadequate judiciary and the lack of corrections facilities. As a result of Milosevic's ethnic cleansing and racist policies throughout the 1990s, few Kosovo Albanians were qualified to preside over Kosovo's courtrooms. The E.U. eventually had to organize a separate mission, EULEX, to address this deficiency by providing supplementary teaching and training. One hopeful sign is that almost all the Kosovo Serb police officers who abandoned their jobs after Kosovo's independence declaration had returned to work by the June 30, 2009 date set by Pristina when they would be considered to have resigned from their jobs.⁶⁶

Conclusion

In the end, the international community's experience in Kosovo illustrates both the promise and the operational challenges of peacekeeping operations. Students of the operation would do well to remember the lessons learned – and the fact that years after the commencement of conflict, the outcome still very much remains in doubt.

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CHAPTER IV:
MILITARY LESSONS LEARNED

By Bob Killebrew



In this chapter, Colonel Bob Killebrew USA (Ret.) draws on 30 years of military experience, including time spent planning peacekeeping missions in Rwanda and Haiti, to illuminate key lessons learned in the field of peace operations since 1945. In order for peacekeeping operations to be successful strategically, Killebrew highlights the necessity of consensus among the relevant international and national actors as well as the willingness of belligerents to accept the peace agreement. Operationally, Killebrew notes the need for the peacekeeping force to maintain discipline and a degree of impartiality, and the need for constant cooperation between all layers of command. Peacekeeping, Killebrew emphasizes, relies on confidence-building measures to prevent any side from misinterpreting the actions and objectives of the peacekeeping force. Given the level of suspicion that would likely greet a peacekeeping force in a Palestinian state, this last lesson is particularly worth remembering. — Editor

MILITARY LESSONS LEARNED

By Bob Killebrew

Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease fires and the separation of forces after interstate wars to incorporate an array of elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.¹

It is not just the United Nations that mounts peacekeeping operations today. Major world powers such as the United States, as well as virtually every major international nongovernmental organization (NGO), have also sponsored peacekeeping operations of their own, usually, but not always under a U.N. mandate. Thus, a considerable body of experience and doctrine from all over the world has emerged concerning planning, conducting and training for peacekeeping. Many nations, including the United States, maintain peacekeeping institutes and training academies. Particularly for smaller countries, peacekeeping has become a mainline mission for military forces, some of which have troops and personnel specifically trained for such operations.²

The aim of this chapter is to highlight the practical lessons military organizations have learned while conducting peace operations. After a brief overview, I will discuss peace operations in their strategic contexts and address critical operational factors militaries and their commanders should consider prior to commencing a peacekeeping operation.

Peace Operations

The whiskered man at the table, dressed in dirty khakis and worn work boots, was actually a U.S. Foreign Service Officer seconded to an NGO. The day before, he and some U.N. aid workers had been rescued from a lynch mob on the Rwandan-Burundi border by the last-minute arrival of Ethiopian peacekeeping forces. “I’ll tell you what,”

he said, “If those Blue Helmets hadn’t shown up when they did, I wouldn’t be here today.”³

Not all peacekeeping operations are as successful as the timely arrival of those U. N. peacekeepers, but for decades now, the arrival of “Blue Helmets” has meant at least the prospect of peace, however temporary, and the chance for better lives for millions of people around the world.

To military professionals, “peacekeeping” is an operational mission that can be frustratingly inexact. But it is not new. Throughout history, maintaining the internal security of one’s own society – or someone else’s – has been a fundamental military mission and it remains a primary mission of most armies today.⁴ For centuries, British forces performed missions in far corners of the Empire similar to those performed today by peacekeeping forces. The occupation of Germany and Japan by U.S. and allied forces after the Second World War kept the peace and supported civil government, although occupation is not “peacekeeping” as the term is currently understood. The current use of the term originated in the late 1950s, as the United Nations began to interpose neutral forces between two combatants, most famously in the Greek-Turkish division of Cyprus. Originally, peacekeeping forces were tasked only to keep two warring sides apart, maintain strict impartiality and report to U.N. authorities any violations of cease-fire agreements. Originally, U.N. peacekeepers were so strictly enjoined to maintain “neutrality” that the use of force was permitted only as a self-defense last resort, a practice that, after tragic U.N. impotence in Bosnia and Rwanda, recently has begun to change to permit more proactive practices.

As the United Nations and other authorities gained experience, they have modified the operational aspects of peacekeeping nearly constantly since the mid-1950s. In a major shift beginning in 1992, the United Nations moved from peacekeeping to “peace enforcement” in unsettled conditions. This shift allowed the use of force – if necessary

– to maintain the peace and to protect the peacekeeping force, as spelled out in Chapters Six and Seven of the U.N. charter.⁵ In addition to operational failures on the ground, the changes became possible when the end of the Cold War created new conditions and opportunities for peacekeeping around the world, and, more importantly, U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations increased. Expanded interest in peacekeeping by the world’s “superpower,” with its vast resources, added impetus to peacekeeping generally and to the development of peacekeeping doctrines.⁶

For the United States, increased emphasis on peacekeeping-type operations during the post Cold War years of the “peace dividend” resulted in rich debates over the nature of military operations in non-conflict scenarios. Beginning with an early attempt to doctrinally address “military operations other than war,” expanded U.S. participation in peacekeeping missions and U.N. operations from Kurdistan through Rwanda, Bosnia and Haiti gave U.S. force planners and trainers valuable experience in various theaters and under varying conditions. Because of lessons learned in the field, both the United Nations and the United States have published doctrinal guidance for the execution of peacekeeping missions under a variety of titles. Current U.N. doctrine rests in the 1000- through 6000-series publications, which provide a capstone overview, guidance on management, command arrangements and field operations support, as well as an overview of “multi-dimensional support” for operations under the U.N. flag.⁷

The development of United Nations doctrinal guidance represents a major step forward in the operational execution of peacekeeping operations; in the years prior to the publication of the doctrinal series, U.N. missions tended to be organized “on the fly,” and relationships and responsibilities between donor countries, U.N. staff in the field and peacekeeping forces were sometimes not well understood. I once had the experience, in the early

stages of planning the peacekeeping operation in Haiti, of being unpopular at both the U.N. command in New York as well as within the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington for trying to bridge the doctrinal and organizational gaps between the U.S. military and the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) – an experience which could have been avoided had doctrine existed at the time.

Fortunately, relationships among United Nations peacekeepers and the forces of participating countries are now evolving into more tested and pragmatic practices and doctrines. In U.S. doctrine, the publication of FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, provides general guidance for U.S. forces assigned to peacekeeping operations.⁸ U.S. executive branch departments now generally lump “peacekeeping” and “peace enforcement” categories together under the category of “peace operations” or, since the early 2000s, “stability operations,” as a general catchall for U.S. operations that can include peace operations as defined under U.N. authority.⁹ U.S. military doctrine currently describes peacekeeping as:

Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.¹⁰

The U.S. definition accurately highlights the first rule of peacemaking – that there must be a peace to keep before a peacekeeping force can be deployed. Prior to deployment, a hard-eyed assessment is required to determine whether all sides in a dispute are willing to stop fighting and to maintain a cease fire on their side. “Willing” does not necessarily mean the parties are happy about it – the Serbs were physically coerced into agreeing in 1999, and Hezbollah did not stop military operations against Israel between 2000 and

2006, despite the presence of a U.N. peacekeeping force – but there must be at least a basic agreement on which a more stable peace can be built. There was eventually peace in the Balkans, and conflict on Israel’s northern border is currently much reduced. If one side or other then breaks the peace, the operational conduct of the mission may change from “keeping the peace” to peace making, which presents a different operational problem and risks transforming the peacemaking force a co-belligerent.

Peacekeeping in Strategic Context

Effective peacekeeping operations require the consent of belligerents, major relevant powers, impartiality on the part of the peacekeepers and the non-use of force except in extreme cases. Peacekeeping is not a strategy, but peacekeeping operations are often closely connected with the strategic interests of participating nations. Major powers, such as the United States, may have strategic interests at stake in specific peacekeeping operations, as was the case of the NATO (North American Treaty Organization) states and Russia during peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. Successful “peacekeeping” at the highest levels, therefore, should reflect agreements between allies and differences with opponents, a fact that plays out operationally in the rules by which the peacekeeping force operates, also known as rules of engagement (ROE) – relations with belligerents and other factors that may add complexity to the peacekeeping task. As a rule, ROE become the battleground upon which the security interests of the participants are adjudicated, and the development of ROE may reflect the agreements and roadblocks between participating states as a peacekeeping operation is planned. (In the United Nations, the Security Council is often the place where disagreements are hashed out; for non-U.N. operations, they should be settled by the major participants and the chief of mission of whatever political authority is sponsoring the mission.)

Peacekeeping does not take place in a geopolitical vacuum, and the achievement of stability or the establishment of peace should ideally benefit parties other than the belligerents themselves.

Rules of Engagement are critical because peacekeeping missions will most likely – and perhaps *should*, if states are to remain interested in the outcome – touch directly or indirectly on the vital interests of one or more major powers. The former Soviet Union, for example, supported U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Sinai and the Golan Heights in the interests of its Arab client states after they faced a catastrophic defeat at the hands of Israeli forces. The United States supported U. N. peacekeeping operations in Haiti to forestall additional undocumented Haitian immigration to the United States. The United States and NATO supported peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in Bosnia and Kosovo when it became apparent that ethnic cleansing might upset the peace in Europe. The Russians grudgingly came in when they became alarmed about NATO inroads into what had been traditional a Russian sphere of interest, illustrating the fact that states often enter into international peace operations with national interests at the forefront of their considerations.

But to ensure the success of a peacekeeping operation, one must be realistic about these interests. The proposed mission should advance the strategic objectives of one or several of the interested states. Peacekeeping does not take place in a geopolitical

vacuum, and the achievement of stability or the establishment of peace should ideally benefit parties other than the belligerents themselves. As an example, the difficulty of coming to consensus to intervene against the murderous regime of Charles Taylor in Liberia illustrated the conflicting motives of the peacekeepers (who rapidly became peace enforcers when Taylor supporters attacked the peacekeepers):

Some states participating in ECOMOG (the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) had additional motivations to the ones listed above. Nigeria was not only concerned about regional stability and alleviating civilian suffering, it also sought to project its power abroad to maintain its regional hegemony. Nigerian leaders directly opposed Charles Taylor and the latter, in turn, denounced Nigerian participation in the ECOMOG force. Sierra Leone supported the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) force because a rebel group backed by Charles Taylor was undermining its government. Thus, Sierra Leone also opposed Charles Taylor's faction in the conflict. Other ECOWAS states, such as the Ivory Coast, supported Taylor's position, causing disagreements within the organization concerning the operation.¹¹

It may seem like an obvious conclusion to draw, but while troop-contributing nations having a stake in the outcome of a peace operation is beneficial, the interests of each state will not always align with those of the others. Thus, consultations between participating states are not only necessary but also have an immediate operational impact on the peacekeeping force – the nature of which depends on the kind of ROE framework necessary to provide operational success. Having a neutral platform for pre-deployment negotiations is enormously beneficial because one must assume, going into the operation, that troop-contributing nations will sometimes be at odds over ends and means.

For U.N. operations, the Security Council serves as the sphere in which debates are conducted and the ROE are shaped. Other deliberations have taken place within the European Union, NATO, the African Union or some other regional body.

A final consideration is that for peacekeeping operations to be successful, either the belligerents involved must be willing to settle for an end state that falls below their original objectives or the peacekeeping force must have sufficient clout to force them to do so – as the United States did when it forced the Israelis to stop their offensive against Egyptian forces in 1973. Normally, though, negotiations that lead to the insertion of a peacekeeping force result in each side settling for less than originally desired but more than they would have achieved without an agreement. The desired effect of a cease fire or agreement by co-belligerents to a U.N. peacekeeping force is almost always a return to the *status quo ante*, a condition that may not exist if one or the other is enjoying battlefield success. In such cases, external pressure is a prerequisite, as strategic concerns may require the sponsor of a belligerent to force compliance with cease-fire proposals and agree to the insertion of a peacekeeping force.

Peacekeeping at the Operational Level

I. ORGANIZING PEACE OPERATIONS

Once agreement has been reached to deploy a peacekeeping force, contributing states are asked to ante up resources, usually in the form of troops, leadership, logistical support or financing. Often, U.N. peacekeeping missions – and sometimes missions headed by regional organizations like NATO, the European Union, the Organization of American States (OAS), ECOWAS and others – will include other non-military activities, such as reconstruction of civil government, reconstitution of police forces, civil support in various forms and aid programs administered by various U.N. agencies – the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for example, the World Food Program

(WFP) or NGOs accredited to the United Nations, such as Doctors Without Borders or Oxfam.

Like any military operation, a peacekeeping mission requires clear lines of authority. If the operation is conducted by the United Nations, its “country team” will be headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), who will head all U.N. activities in the country, including military peacekeeping forces. Although a civilian, the SRSG heads the U.N. military chain of command, with day-by-day operation often delegated to a Deputy Special Representative, typically a military officer from a key contributing state.¹² When other international organizations, such as NATO, have mounted peacekeeping operations, they have also appointed a civilian chief of mission, which reflects the highly political and diplomatic nature of peacekeeping and the necessity for military peacekeepers to be led and supported at their highest levels by the civilians who sent them on the mission.

With the increasing number of fragile or failed states around the world, the scope of United Nations and other peacekeeping operations has expanded in recent years, not only toward more aggressive military operations, but also to include rebuilding some or most governmental functions in fragile states, reconciliation measures, polling and other non-military functions required to put failing states on life support.¹³

These “hybrid” peacekeeping operations require far more complex organizational designs than the mostly-military operations characteristically staged before 1990. Consequently, the composition of the peacekeeping force requires integration of a number of civilian components with the military force, which in turn requires the identification of complex requirements to meet the peacekeeping mission, itself often difficult to define. The recruitment of prospective donor states to fill non-military as well as military requirements – experts

and assets in public health or banking reform – are two such examples. Military requirements, either for peacekeeping itself or for retraining local security forces or police, must be integrated into the overall peacekeeping structure. In the United Nations, the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, head of the DPKO, which has a standing staff, provides such support. Other alliances like NATO or the European Union have made similar arrangements.¹⁴

Military command and control in peacekeeping operations remains a complex issue, even after 50 years of practice. In general, peacekeeping forces operate under both national and treaty authority. The U.N. procedure is to place military forces under operational control of the U.N. commander, while they remain under national command:

In the case of military personnel provided by Member States, these personnel are placed under the operational control of the United Nations Force Commander or head of military component, but not under United Nations command. However, once assigned under United Nations operational control, contingent commanders and their personnel report to the Force Commander and they *should not act on national direction*, particularly if those actions might adversely affect implementation of the mission mandate or run contrary to United Nations policies applicable to the mission. Member States may withdraw their contributed personnel from the mission through advice to United Nations Headquarters.

In fact, though, national contingents often do “act on national direction,” particularly that of major powers – including the United States – and the same is true of non-U.N. operations as well. National command authorities worldwide always reserve command authority over their own national forces, ceding only “operational control” (OPCON) to forces assigned under another authority; under U.S. doctrine, OPCON grants

full authority to employ the force in question, but reserves to national authority internal matters of discipline, organization and pay. Additionally, national command lines maintain veto authority over the operational instructions a peacekeeping force commander may issue. In fact, national authorities may, and often do, impose restrictions on units that can significantly affect their employment during the peacekeeping mission. The restrictions placed on German troops in Afghanistan, for example, illustrate this point. Peacekeeping forces come with many strings attached to their employment and support, and the organizing authority, whether the United Nations or some other institution, should sort out these conditions prior to employment. As analysts Jean-Marie Guéhenno and Jake Serman point out:

In times of crisis and danger, the authority of the Force Commander is often challenged, implicitly or explicitly, as national chains of command tend to assert themselves. When the senior commanders are nationals from one of the major contingents, the possible tension between their authority and the national chain of command may be minimized, but tensions may then develop with the civilian leadership of the mission or with UN Headquarters in New York, as different understandings of the implementation of the mandate clash. Too much decentralization may then lead to a breakdown of effective communications between headquarters and the mission.¹⁶

II. COMMAND CONSIDERATIONS

“Sorting out” conditions once an operation begins falls on the shoulders of the commander of the U.N. force, hopefully a seasoned general officer from one of the contributing countries. My experience in Haiti in 1995 confirms that “seasoned” officers are very important. The U.N. commander, U.S. Major General “Smokin’ Joe” Kinzer, was a tough, no-nonsense soldier who could relate to other peacekeeping forces in the

rough freemasonry of soldiers everywhere, and whose obvious professionalism generally overcame language barriers and national differences. A less experienced or more tentative officer would have been less effective. Depending on the size and focus of the peacekeeping mission, he or she may command only one of several components of the total U.N. commitment, but the military force is liable to be the largest and will have security requirements that cover the entire U.N. (or other) contingent. In a contested scenario, where the mission and its personnel are at risk due to conflict or lawlessness, the peacekeeping force will likely be “first among equals” in developing plans and executing peacekeeping, peace enforcement, the reestablishment of civil government and protection of the entire force.

Although a commander will likely have participated in the development of the mission at the DPKO prior to deployment, each he or she will make his or her own “mission assessment” once on the ground and deploy forces in accordance with a personal vision for executing the mission. Because he or she is commanding a multi-national force, each coming from a different culture with its own rules of engagement and requirements, the commander’s concept of execution must take into account each contingent’s capability, its unique national employment conditions and support requirements as well as the commander’s own view of what is to be done. Some national forces arrive already experienced in U.N. operations and prepared to begin operations immediately; British, Australian or French troops are highly professional and autonomous. India and Pakistan often have officers and other ranks experienced in U.N. operations. National contingents from smaller, cash-strapped states, require more logistical support than those from larger states and are sometimes wholly dependent on U.N. support. In at least one case, troops arrived with virtually no equipment at all, and required equipping at U.N. expense.¹⁷

The commander’s tasks break roughly into three

areas. First, he or she must execute the peacekeeping mission using the troops available and the relevant conditions of employment. Execution requires establishing the mission and concept of operations, allocating operational areas and setting responsibilities and channels of communication – including intelligence, relaying or establishing rules of engagement and arranging for support for the force. All of these are important, but three are especially ticklish. First, a commander must be especially sensitive to relations with subordinate commanders, most of whom also receive instructions from their respective national authorities, to ensure that U.N. and national missions remain congruent. In most cases, good relations and reliance on the professional bonds of soldiering – including a shared professional culture – will enable commanders and subordinates to negotiate potential conflict. For this reason, the personality and professional qualifications of the commander should be the first consideration in selection.

Second, the receipt, analysis and distribution of intelligence within the multinational force require the commander’s closest attention. Intelligence will be generated within the U.N. mission area by the usual activities of any combat force – patrolling, interrogation, checkpoints and so forth – and efficient channels must be established to collect, analyze and distribute it. The commander will have available a multinational intelligence staff, headed by a senior intelligence officer, to ensure that all components provide inputs per the commander’s guidance and that all parties receive equitably command-produced products.

National intelligence may be provided through restricted channels to the commander or to other various national contingents without availability to the total force. This requires the most perceptive and sensitive handling. No official representation can go against this practice, but suggestions can be made, through military channels available to the commander or through the DPKO, for an arrangement

to pool intelligence – either through command channels, e.g., commander to commander, or by having national intelligence representatives on the U.S. force staff. National restrictions on sharing intelligence (and in my perception and experience, the United States is often the most reluctant to share) are a fact of life in U.N. operations, and from the commander’s point of view, finding “work-arounds” is simply part of the job.

Finally, if the mission is under the U.N. flag, the commander must ensure that communications and a constructive relationship are maintained between the commander, his or her headquarters, the SRSG and the commander’s own national chain of command – particularly if the commander is from the United States or any major power with a stake in the outcome. The SRSG will almost certainly be a civilian diplomat from a different country than the commander, quite possibly unversed in military issues and selected for the job by the Secretary-General for reasons that may or may not have anything to do with proven leadership abilities. If the mission is under another organization, the commander must sort out the organization’s chain of command and act under that particular flag. The force commander is the vital linchpin between the mission and its execution on the ground, and the personal ability to develop guidance, supervise the mission and keep the higher echelons of the mission in agreement and synchronized with his operations is key to the successful accomplishment of the mission.

For these reasons, as well as others peculiar to peacekeeping coalitions, finding the right commander is a fundamental step in the evolution of a peacekeeping mission, second only to determining the mission of the force. The first, and overwhelmingly most important, criteria is that the commander be a soldier of proven ability and expertise; the mission depends on his or her professional abilities to lead and manage an unwieldy arrangement of national interests and often conflicting objectives and to draw loyalty and respect from other professional soldiers in the force. Second,

he or she must have a personality of great force and be a “people person,” skilled at establishing and maintaining open channels of communication within the command headquarters and among the commanders of various subordinate units. Finally, the commander should have experience operating with soldiers and armies of other nations – the more diverse the better. In the case of the United States, for instance, officers can rise to high rank without experience with other armies; as a rule, this is not true in the armies of other states, particularly smaller ones and even more true in the senior ranks of states that regularly provide contingents to U.N. missions. Peacekeeping is obviously no job for an officer who, regardless of other credentials, is uneasy with soldiers of other nationalities or has an overly nationalistic view. As mentioned above, “Smokin’ Joe” Kinzer turned out to be perfectly suited for the task, possibly because, nickname aside, he was professionally attuned to being an experienced field soldier, not a diplomat. Soldiers from other nations sensed a fellow professional, whether he was presiding over a commanders’ meeting or walking patrol with Pakistani troops on the Haiti U.N. force – which he did regularly – and his actions greatly enhanced his authority over the force as a whole.

A Chief of Staff, often appointed from a different country, will assist the commander and a staff composed of officers from the participating countries. The smooth functioning of this staff is critical if the mission is to succeed, and making it work is the responsibility of the chief of staff, who speaks for the commander and ensures that the commander’s directives are carried out. Different armies have different concepts for the roles and responsibilities of a chief of staff. In U.S. staff organizations, the “Chief” is the head of the staff only and confines his or her duties to insuring that the staff carries out the commander’s intentions. A second view – more prevalent in European or European-trained armies – involves a chief of staff who also acts as the deputy commander, sometimes on a par with the

commander. Clearly, the commander and the chief should meet early, swap expectations and settle on the rules and norms guiding their working relationship. A deputy commander, if appointed, should also be part of that conversation. Unity of effort at the head of the mission is imperative, particularly since the two or three dominant leaders will be from different military cultures and acting in their respective national interests as well as those of the peacekeeping mission itself.

III. TRAINING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

Training troops for peacekeeping missions involves an amalgam of tasks common to all military operations – tasks directed especially at peacekeeping and those specific to the area of operations. Because training is a national responsibility, military contingents will usually arrive in the mission area trained to whatever standards their national force maintains.¹⁸ One consideration for the peacekeeping commander is to encourage additional training within the limits of authority and resources granted to the mission, both prior to deployment and after troops have arrived in the theater.

A clear grasp of fundamental soldiering skills and good discipline is the foremost requirement for successful peacekeeping duties. Competence in basic individual tasks, such as land navigation, marksmanship, drill, maintenance and a high state of discipline on the part of the individual soldier, are the basic building blocks for operations of any nature – peacekeeping or otherwise. Solid small-unit leadership and competent noncommissioned officers will ensure that orders are executed and that the rules and procedures common to peacekeeping are carried out.¹⁹ The two fundamental small-unit activities of peacekeeping duties are patrolling and operation of checkpoints. While higher headquarters will be occupied with larger scale concerns, the venue in which the peacekeeping force comes face to face with the populace or the forces of the belligerents will be primarily an arena of small-unit activities; accordingly, a pre-

deployment focus on small-unit leadership and operations should be a first priority. In the final analysis, the success of a peacekeeping operation rests in large part on relationships between the peacekeeping force and the population.

In the final analysis, the success of a peacekeeping operation rests in large part on relationships between the peacekeeping force and the population.

With regard to peacekeeping duties, training soldiers, especially leaders, in the ROE specific to the mission is the first, and perhaps most important significant, of general peacekeeping skills. Impartiality and evenhandedness, the fundamental rules for a peacekeeping force, must be stressed, and procedures for de-escalating confrontations and working harmoniously with local law enforcement organizations should be part of the training program. This is a fine line for soldiers to walk, but the appearance of being seen as partial to one side or the other can jeopardize the mission. A high state of discipline, competent leadership and rigorous training to maintain impartiality will be necessary. The identification and protection of certain channels of communication and standard procedures to use in case of emergency should be emphasized.

Mission-specific training should include an orientation on the mission, the geographical area in which the unit will be deployed and the specific character of the unit's tasks and the environment in which they will be performed. Familiarity with the region and its language and customs, especially

local authorities and legal restraints, is vitally important to a peacekeeping force. The difficulty of execution of military plans can vary widely based on geography alone; the existence of good road networks, towns and public utilities can make a considerable difference in the force's operations. The operations of the non-military parts of the overall mission, and even the influence that outside powers or media can bring to focus on the mission, also affect mission outcomes. For example, road nets, supporting partners, availability of contractors and local labor and the characteristics of the population and local cultural norms would make execution of logistics support to a peacekeeping force on the West Bank much different from the same coverage in Haiti.

IV. INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIA

The peacekeeping force's approach to information and media operations deserves special mention. As a rule, peacekeeping operations take place under scrutiny of the world's press; not only will the peacekeeping force itself want to get its version of events before the world, but so too will the former belligerent powers. Peacekeeping authorities – beginning at the highest levels, but especially including the force commander – must prepare and implement an “information strategy” that narrates the peacekeepers' story and reinforces the mission of the force; otherwise, opponents will use the media to discredit the force and the peacekeeping mission itself. Equally important, the population within the conflict area will be affected by the perception of the peacekeeping force's impartiality and effectiveness. Done correctly, an effective media strategy can be a major factor in the successful execution of a peacekeeping mission.²⁰

Visiting VIPs in the disaster area is a contingency that requires careful handling. In Rwanda, for example, even as the full scale of the Hutu massacres was being appreciated, the U.S. task force was required to host an outdoor luncheon for a presidential-level observer group. White tablecloths

were improvised from hospital sheets and Army rations were converted to hors d'oeuvres on a hillside overlooking Kigali – while daily deaths in the Goma refugee camp a few hundred miles distant approached a thousand a day. Disasters and peacekeeping operations are full of contradictions that require constant readjustment and nimble command arrangements.

V. NEUTRALITY, IMPARTIALITY AND THE NEED TO TALK TO BOTH SIDES – AND TO EACH OTHER

Once the peacekeeping force is organized, trained and deployed, operations in theater are much like operations in any military mission, with units and soldiers executing the tasks to which they have been assigned and leaders supervising activities at the appropriate levels. Two areas, though, deserve special mention.

The first is the maintenance and execution of impartiality in relation to dealing with the target population and with the belligerent parties. In the “execution” of peace operations – whether “making,” “keeping” or “enforcing” – the appearance and fact of operational impartiality is the basis for the mission's legitimacy. When a peacekeeping force takes sides, or appears to take sides, the force risks becoming a belligerent itself and the overall mission is placed in jeopardy: (After the massacres in Rwanda and Bosnia, peacekeepers, led by the United Nations, began drawing a distinction between “impartiality,” which permits peacekeepers to react to breaches of the peace, and “neutrality,” which had been previously interpreted as standing aside when breaches occurred.²¹)

A key lesson drawn from the mid-1990s was that for U.N. peacekeepers impartiality should not be confused with neutrality and that clear violations of the peace by any party must be dealt with accordingly. Nevertheless, recent experience suggests that managers and staff in the field still find it difficult to distinguish between impartiality and neutrality and have, in some cases, been

reluctant to denounce spoiler behavior, particularly when it involves one of the main parties, for fear being seen as partial to one side.²²

Deciding on appropriate responses to breaches of the peace are among the most critical decisions the commander of a peacekeeping mission may have to make. Depending on the ROE, minor infractions may be dealt with on site by local commanders – an inadvertent crossing of a security line, for example, or a missing identification card. Others, such as an armed belligerent detachment attempting to force itself into a neutral zone or an open attack, may require measured responses from lower echelons through the civilian authority. In any case, the commander of the peacekeeping force must have firm control of the escalation ladder and deal with infractions in a consistent, professional manner. In such cases, solid and well-practiced standard operating procedures are critical to ensure that the force speaks and acts with one voice. Common sense has to guide the commander, though. In one case, the U.S. leadership had orders to avoid “mission creep” and to circumvent entanglements with NGOs, many of whom were working and living in exceptionally dangerous circumstances. In fact, however, contingency plans were quietly prepared to assist the most vulnerable aid workers if necessary, based not only on humanitarian concerns but also on a realistic understanding of the consequences to U.S. policy had U.S. troops stood idle while U.N. personnel were attacked.

The second critical area specific to peacekeeping is the need for constant liaison with higher headquarters, supporting partners in the peacekeeping efforts and with the former belligerents themselves. Peacekeeping relies on confidence-building measures to ensure that neither the belligerents nor any other entities in the peacekeeping theater might misinterpret actions in any of the theater or lose sight of the peacekeeping objective. Commanders of peacekeeping forces at all levels will spend more time than in normal military operations making

certain that their various audiences – higher headquarters, target populations, belligerents and others – are kept abreast of the situation. They must dispel rumors, intentionally-sown disinformation or inaccurate reporting of a given issue. Commanders should use their own communications staffs and systems to boost their credibility as the best source of factual news in their area of operations. In peacekeeping, truth is a powerful weapon. Effective peacekeeping, perhaps more than any other form of military endeavor, is intensely personal; in the absence of common professional bonds, the commander must use personal impact, tact, open communications and cultural awareness to ensure he or she maintains his or her authority.

Conclusion

Peacekeeping is one of the great advances in the use of military forces in history. But peacemaking, peacekeeping and “peace operations” have changed enormously since 1945 and even since the end of the Cold War in 1991. Fundamentally, though, the execution of peacekeeping missions relies still on well-disciplined and skillful soldiers and perceptive and dedicated leaders. When those factors come together, peacekeeping can become an effective way to head off or prevent the spread of destructive conflicts. In so doing, peacekeeping can lay the groundwork for and reinforce the political reconciliation necessary for a real and lasting peace.


ENDNOTES

1. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations; Principles and Guidelines*, Capstone Doctrine Document (March 2008): 18, http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf.
2. Others include Canada, Ghana, China, Malaya and Togo. The body of scholarly and policy literature on has increased by orders of magnitude over the past three decades, and much of the best literature can be found on the websites hosted by the U.S. Institute of Peace (<http://www.usip.org/resources-tools>) and the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/reports.shtml>). Readers searching for an accessible single-volume study of peacekeeping can seek out John Hillen's *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Peacekeeping Operations* (Washington: Brassey's, 2000). This chapter is intended to reflect the author's own experiences rather than the larger body of secondary sources.
3. From the author's personal experience.
4. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations* (6 October 2008): 6-2.
5. DPKO, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*: 13-14.
6. The U.N. peacekeeping mission to Haiti, for example, responded to U.S. pressure and replaced a U.S. operation. At the time the Haiti operation was mounted, there was not yet any U.N. peacekeeping doctrine.
7. See DPKO, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*.
8. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*.
9. Nina Serafino, *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations; Issues of U.S. Military Involvement* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2004): 2
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11. Carolyn M. Shaw, "Regional Peacekeeping; An Alternative to United Nations Operations," *Conflict Quarterly* 15 (Fall 1995): 5, <http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/Fall95/shaw.pdf>.
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CHAPTER V:
POLITICAL LESSONS LEARNED

By James Dobbins



In this chapter, Ambassador James Dobbins draws on personal experience overseeing U.S. post conflict reconstruction operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan and research on peacekeeping since the Second World War. Amb. Dobbins imagines a situation in which a peacekeeping mission could succeed in helping build a future Palestinian state as well as providing the requisites for such an operation – a robust force, the ability to support local efforts to ensure public security, engagement with regional actors and broad support among troop-contributing nations for state building. He reflects on lessons from U.S. and U.N. peacekeeping experiences that would be particularly relevant to peacekeeping in a Palestinian state. — Editor

POLITICAL LESSONS LEARNED

By James Dobbins

There are generally two types of peacekeeping missions: those designed to separate adversary forces and those designed to either rebuild a failed state or build an entirely new one. Inter-positional peacekeeping forces patrol ceasefire lines, maintain demilitarized zones and mediate incipient disputes between the adversaries. These operations have few if any political or governance functions. Nation-building missions have a much more comprehensive set of responsibilities. They promote economic and political reforms and build or rebuild institutions of government with the objective of eventually leaving behind societies at peace with themselves and their neighbors.

The Middle East has seen numerous peacekeeping operations of the first type. Several continue to this day. For over three decades, a U.S.-led force in the Sinai has helped separate Israeli and Egyptian forces and maintain peace between these two states. On Israel's northern border, a U.N. force in Lebanon seeks to prevent renewed fighting between Hezbollah militants and Israel. Helpful as these missions have been, they have done nothing to advance resolution of the core dispute between Israel and its Arab neighbors. They have not resolved the fate of the Palestinian population displaced when Israel was created in 1947 or determined the final status of the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel in 1967 but never incorporated into it.

Something more than inter-positional peacekeeping is likely to be needed as part of any accord designed to resolve these issues. Simply separating the Israeli and Palestinian populations will not be enough, because it is difficult to imagine a Palestinian state that could govern its side of the divide and guarantee faithful execution of any peace accord in the near future. The absence of such a state presents a classic chicken versus egg dilemma. There can be no Middle East peace without a Palestinian party capable of governing the territory under its control, yet no such Palestinian party can be created without a peace agreement. Experience has also shown

the challenges of establishing these two conditions sequentially. Israel will not end the occupation until it has a reliable negotiating partner, one capable of fulfilling whatever obligations it accepts, but such a Palestinian partner cannot be created under Israeli occupation. Thus, these two prerequisites for peace must be put in place more or less concurrently. Doing so will probably require some third party to help the emerging Palestinian state establish itself and assure Israelis that the peace accord will be faithfully implemented.

Theoretically, peacekeepers have two modes of operation, consensual or coercive. They can rely on the consent of the parties or they can engage in some level of coercion to enforce the peace. In practice, this is a spectrum rather than a clear-cut dichotomy. The very deployment of foreign, armed soldiers implies some level of coercion, while any peacekeeping force would prefer circumstances in which parties willingly cooperate. As Marc Lynch makes clear in his concluding chapter, there are a variety of circumstances in which an international force might be deployed in Palestine, and these circumstances will determine where on the consensual/coercive scale this force's mandate and activities would lie.

Historically, U.N.-led peacekeeping operations have tended to operate closer to the consensual end of the spectrum, while most U.S.-led efforts have relied more heavily on the use or threat of force to secure cooperation. In speculating about the nature of a new Middle East peacekeeping effort, it makes sense to reflect upon the international community's experiences over the past 20 years with both approaches to conflict resolution.

Lessons from the U.N. Experience

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has launched a new peacekeeping operation on the average of once every six months. Fifteen are underway at this writing, engaging 100,000 blue-helmeted soldiers and police.¹ The United Nations has suffered some spectacular failures – Somalia,

Rwanda and Bosnia in the early 1990s – and it is these experiences that linger in the popular imagination. But there have been an even larger number of successes. Tens of millions of people are living at peace today, and mostly under democratically elected governments, in places like Mozambique, Cambodia, El Salvador, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Liberia because U.N. troops came in, separated combatants, disarmed and demobilized contending factions, secured economic development, organized elections and stayed around long enough to make sure that the resultant governments could take hold.

Many Americans tend to generalize from the U.S. military's current engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan and perceive a world in growing disorder. In fact, the incidence of armed conflict has declined dramatically around the globe over the past 20 years, in no small measure due to international peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts.² Thus, we should be able to draw a number of useful lessons from the U.N. experience.

Maintain Impartiality. The United Nations has been able to secure positive results with relatively low levels of commitment, in terms of both military personnel and economic assistance, largely because its entry has been permissive, at the invitation of the formerly warring parties, and it has therefore been seen by those parties as impartial. Sustaining an evenhanded approach in the face of occasional provocations from one side or the other has not always been easy. But when the peacekeepers have been forced to take sides, the risks and costs of the operation went up sharply, as occurred in Somalia in the early 1990s, when the United Nations declared the clan leader and warlord General Farah Aideed an outlaw.

Match Resources to Objectives. The United States has tended to define the purpose of its interventions in fairly sweeping terms, setting ambitious objectives for itself in terms of promoting political

reform and economic growth. The United Nations, whose military and economic resources are usually much more limited than those of the United States, has learned to be careful about promising too much. In general, U.N. peacekeeping missions have enjoyed about one tenth the military personnel and economic assistance committed to large U.S.-led peace enforcement operations.³ Successful U.N. peacekeeping missions do promote both democratization and economic growth, but conflict prevention remains their defining purpose and overall objective.

Deploy Civilian Assets. The deployment of international military forces can open a window of opportunity for peace, but soldiers alone cannot facilitate the underlying changes that give their intervention lasting value. It is civilians who know how to stimulate economic growth, promote the development of political parties, encourage a free press, foster civil society and organize free elections that will set in train the political and economic reforms necessary to ensure enduring peace. Cold War peacekeeping was a uniquely military enterprise, but two decades later, the United Nations has learned the necessity of conducting integrated civil/military missions with participation from across the spectrum of its specialized agencies.

Don't Leave Prematurely. In the early 1990s, U.N. missions were intended to go from peace settlement to the first election, after which the international forces were to leave. Experience – in Cambodia and East Timor most especially – has taught that one election does not make a stable democracy and that peace settlements can easily unravel if international troops are withdrawn too early. By the end of that decade, the average post-conflict U.N. mission lasted five to seven years, and more recently, many are lasting eight to 10 years.⁴

Lessons from the U.S. Experience

The United Nations does not conduct invasions. Where a forced entry operation is needed as a

prelude to peace operations, the international community has turned to “coalitions of the willing” or formal alliances, particularly involving NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Over the past 20 years, the United Nations has mandated – and the United States has led – multinational forces into Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. In the case of Iraq, such a mandate came only after the invasion.

Somalia, the first of these operations, was an unqualified failure. Haiti, the second, was better executed but terminated before enduring results could be achieved. The U.S.-led, NATO-manned operations in Bosnia and Kosovo lasted longer – indeed, operations in Kosovo continue to this day – and achieved more substantial results. Neither of these Balkan societies is yet self-sufficient, but both have been at peace since the day NATO troops arrived.

We can derive three large lessons from these types of interventions: First, peace enforcers should be prepared to employ decisive force. Second, peace enforcers must accept responsibility for the provision of public security. Third, and finally, the mission's success depends on bilateral or multi-lateral engagement with neighboring and other regional states, particularly with those countries behaving most irresponsibly.

Decisive Force. In Somalia, President George H.W. Bush originally sent a large U.S. force to perform a very limited task: protecting humanitarian food and medicine shipments. President Bill Clinton then reduced that U.S. presence from 20,000 soldiers and Marines to 2,000 and gave this residual force the mission of supporting a U.N.-led, grassroots democratization campaign that antagonized the country's warlords. Nation-building ambitions soared just as reduced troop strength led actual peace-enforcing capabilities to plummet. The reduced U.S. force was – predictably – soon challenged. This encounter, chronicled in

Peaceful political processes cannot take place unless security forces provide the time and space for them to do so.

the book and movie, “Black Hawk Down,” resulted in a firestorm of domestic criticism in the United States and caused the administration to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia, which in turn, led the United Nations to do the same a year later. From then on, the Clinton administration embraced the “Powell Doctrine,” a set of guidelines outlining the importance of employing decisive force, and chose to super-size each of its subsequent interventions, going in heavy and then scaling back once a secure environment had been established and potential adversaries had been deterred from mounting violent resistance.

Public Security. Peaceful political processes cannot take place unless security forces provide the time and space for them to do so. In Somalia, Haiti and Kosovo, the United States arrived to find local security forces incompetent, abusive or non-existent. Building new institutions and reforming existing ones took several years. In the interim, responsibility for public security fell upon the United States and its coalition partners. The U.S. military resisted this mission but to no avail. By 1999, when the United States and its allies deployed into Kosovo, U.S. and NATO military authorities accepted that responsibility for public safety would be the military's responsibility until international and local police could be mobilized in sufficient numbers.

Engage Neighbors. Adjoining states played a major role in fomenting the conflicts in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. The international community avoided

dealing effectively with Somalia's neighbors, but was forced to deal with those of Bosnia, where the conflict had begun as one of several interstate and intrastate conflicts to follow the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The United States invited the presidents of Serbia and Croatia – both of whom bore heavy responsibility for the ethnic cleansing that NATO was trying to stop – to the peace conference in Dayton, Ohio. Both men were given privileged places in that process and continued to be engaged in the subsequent peace implementation. Both men won subsequent elections in their own countries, their domestic stature enhanced by their elevated international role. Had Washington treated them as pariahs, the war in Bosnia might be underway still.

From the Balkans to the Middle East

Whether an international force for Palestine would more nearly resemble U.N.-style peacekeeping or U.S.-style peace enforcement would depend on the nature of the peace it is designed to maintain. In his concluding chapter, Marc Lynch cites four hypothetical alternatives under which an international forces role could range from the highly consensual to the highly coercive.

Though the nature of a hypothetical peacekeeping force in the Palestine is fraught with uncertainty, it is possible to make well informed predictions about what circumstances would be more or less likely to result in the deployment of such a force. For instance, it seems unlikely that the United States or the rest of the international community would be willing to deploy troops into the Palestinian territories in order to garrison an Israeli occupation or to substitute for it. So a precondition for the deployment of such a force would be an end to that occupation. On the other hand, Israel appears unlikely to agree to a full transfer of sovereignty to a Palestinian state – particularly for functions potentially affecting the safety of the Israeli population, such as security and border control. Thus, an international mission designed to help keep an

Israeli-Palestinian peace would need to combine both inter-positional and state-building functions. Certainly one of its responsibilities would be to help prevent incursions and other attacks by Palestinian extremists into Israel, thereby also obviating the need for Israeli military incursions into the Palestinian state. But the mission would also have to help that state develop the capacity to secure and effectively govern its own territory.

This is not to suggest that the military component of an international presence should necessarily be given these state-building responsibilities. Rather, any international force would need to be embedded within a larger multilateral framework, the role of which would be to support and help build effective, competent, honest and representative Palestinian state institutions. For the most part, these functions would likely be performed by civilians, rather than soldiers, but the military and civil aspects of the peacekeeping mission would need to function in tandem even if they were managed separately.

Building a Functioning Palestinian State

Many non-military elements of an international nation-building mission are already in place and assisting the current Palestinian Authority. U.S., European and U.N. personnel have been working for some time to improve the quality of Palestinian governance. But these efforts are taking place in the midst of an ongoing military occupation run by an Israeli government that is unsure about whether it truly wants the emergence of a competent Palestinian state – particularly one capable of securing its own territory and population. The international community's state-building programs are also being conducted in the midst of an ongoing conflict among the Palestinians themselves regarding the nature of their state and control over their institutions. External efforts to build more effective Palestinian institutions are unlikely to make adequate progress until both these impediments – Israeli ambivalence and Palestinian in-fighting

– are removed or at least mitigated in a manner conducive to success.

Palestinian authorities are unlikely to be enthusiastic about trading an Israeli occupation for an international one, so international authority would need to be carefully delineated and substantially less sweeping than the current Israeli writ. External assistance in the field of state building, on the other hand, is likely to be considerably more extensive than what is currently provided – both because the conditions will be more favorable and because contributing nations with their troops on the ground will have a strong incentive to improve Palestinian institutional capacity to serve the Palestinian population and allow Palestine to control its own territory.

To facilitate mission success, there should be only limited areas in which the peacekeeping mission would have independent authority and the capacity to direct Palestinian institutions, and these areas should be largely focused on border security. This is also the sector in which the military component of the mission would most likely be active. It is conceivable that the peacekeeping force might also help train and equip Palestinian security forces, but this seems more likely to remain a national responsibility, coordinated to some degree among contributing governments, but not run multinationally. Support to other Palestinian institutions would also likely be provided largely on a national basis, but with some degree of multinational coordination and even oversight. Ultimately, the success of the international military operation would depend on the success of these civilian-led efforts, for no international force will be able to secure the Israeli-Palestinian border without the cooperation of a much more effective Palestinian government than the one that currently exists. It would be important, therefore, to establish institutional arrangements that link the military and civil components of the international engagement – even if the two remain largely autonomous.

In Kosovo, the United Nations had the lead in civil administration and public safety while NATO assumed responsibility for external security and for backing up U.N.-led police forces.

The responsibilities of any international mission would necessarily extend beyond keeping the peace between Israel and the new Palestinian state to helping keep the peace within that state. In many ways, this might turn out to be the more demanding task. There would be few volunteers for any peacekeeping mission to Palestine unless it is based upon prior agreement, not just between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, but also between the two major contenders for power in the new state, Fatah and Hamas – as well as a clear invitation from all these parties to help oversee implementation of these accords. Thus, any Israeli/Palestinian peace would need to be accompanied, if not preceded, by a Fatah/Hamas peace if it is to have any prospect of sticking, and if any multinational force is to be recruited to help oversee its implementation.

The state-building functions likely to be undertaken involve assistance in the delivery of most essential public services – including finance, health, education, transportation, economic development and of course, public safety. The Palestinian Authority's budget is already largely financed by foreign donors, and this is likely to remain the case well after a peace settlement. International assistance should focus heavily on capacity building, which is to say that it should focus on helping Palestinian officials develop the ability to perform these functions unassisted, rather than on using donor funding to pay nongovernmental organizations to substitute for the local government in certain areas.

The return of refugees and internally displaced persons is one facet of most peace settlements and a good measure of their success or failure. This would be particularly true of an Israeli/Palestinian

settlement. Thus, one essential component of any such peace agreement would be arrangements for the return of refugees to the new Palestinian state. The accord would also likely be accompanied by a commitment from donor governments to a very large package of support for the process of refugee return. The United Nations has handled refugee assistance for Palestinians for over 40 years and would likely be the lead agency in actually supporting such repatriation, but there would have to be many ancillary elements of international support, including the construction of housing, the provision of jobs and arrangements for the security for the returnees.

Structuring the International Presence

There are obviously strong arguments in favor of a unified peacekeeping mission that groups the military and civilian components under a single head. However, this model is unlikely to be achieved in any peacekeeping mission in Palestine. Though the United Nations routinely fields such integrated missions, in which the military commander is directly subordinate to the civilian representative of the Secretary General, the Israelis are unlikely to accept a chief of mission from the United Nations. To garner the support of both of the key parties, it is more likely that the military side of the mission would need to be either a U.S.-led “coalition of the willing” or, more likely, a NATO-commanded force. To date, all NATO and U.S.-led peace implementation missions have had a bifurcated structure, with separate civil and military components. Should such a peacekeeping force ever become a reality, it seems unlikely that either the United States or NATO would be willing to put military units under local civilian control, or to do the reverse and subordinate their civilian officials to military command.

NATO itself has no capacity for civilian reconstruction or development. In Kosovo, and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan, leadership in these non-military areas has been assigned to the United

Nations. In the case of Palestine, it is unlikely that Israel would permit U.N. leadership, even solely in the civil aspect of the mission, due to longstanding Israeli perceptions that the United Nations is biased against Israel. The alternative and more likely model is offered by Bosnia, where an ad hoc coalition of the willing was formed on the civilian side, in parallel to a NATO-led military operation.

In Bosnia, a civilian leader charged with overseeing non-military tasks was appointed, funded and directed by a self-selected group of interested governments assembled in a Peace Implementation Council. This Council meets only annually and delegates its ongoing responsibilities to a smaller Steering Board, which in turn oversees the activities of the civilian leader, or High Representative, and his staff. This individual enjoys broad powers, including the possibility of dismissing any local official and imposing any given piece of legislation. Enforcement of these edicts has depended ultimately on NATO's willingness to compel compliance, although the mere threat of so doing has generally been sufficient, in part because many Bosnian leaders have been relieved to have the High Representative assume responsibility for necessary but unpopular measures.⁵

A plausible construct for an Israeli/Palestinian peace implementation mission would thus be a NATO-led military component with a civilian-led parallel organization to handle political, governance and development matters. Both components would require the explicit consent of all the parties to the conflict, and their mandates would likely be embedded in the peace settlement. The governments involved would also likely seek and receive a parallel U.N. Security Council mandate. The international civilian leader would be appointed by a select group of interested countries, to include those contributing significantly to the NATO-led military force as well as those prepared to provide substantial economic assistance. These governments would also need to provide funding to

allow the civilian leader to assemble a staff and to conduct a variety of advisory and assistance activities. This civilian leader would probably need some extraordinary powers – although not likely as extensive as those granted to the Bosnian High Representative. These powers would derive from the peace agreement and the accompanying Security Council resolution. Enforcement would largely depend upon voluntary compliance but would have to be backed by a willingness to employ NATO military force, or ultimately the threat to withdraw that force and risk an Israeli reoccupation.

A plausible construct for an Israeli/Palestinian peace implementation mission would thus be a NATO-led military component with a civilian-led parallel organization to handle political, governance and development matters.

The exact division of labor between the NATO force commander and the civilian implementation chief would need to be worked out carefully. In 1995, as the Bosnian mission was being designed, the U.S. military took a restrictive view of its proper functions in peace implementation missions. As a result, the NATO mission in Bosnia was defined quite narrowly, while the parallel civilian operation was given much broader responsibilities.

If such a mission ever arises, the resultant effort is more likely to resemble the U.N.-led peacekeeping operations of the past two decades than the more robust U.S.- and NATO-led peace enforcement efforts in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo.

This led to an anomalous situation, in which the civilian High Representative had plenary authority and wide responsibilities, but few resources and no coercive power, while the NATO commander had a limited mandate but commanded overwhelming force. A satisfactory *modus vivendi* between the two was eventually achieved, but only after several years of pushing and pulling during which a number of important matters fell between the large cracks between the two organizational mandates. NATO, for example, throughout that period refused to detain or arrest indicted war criminals, while the High Representative had no means by which to do so.

Four years after the initiation of the Bosnian intervention, this division of labor was reworked in Kosovo. Public safety was managed by a joint civil-military task, with NATO responsible for policing in the early months until the United Nations could field an adequate number of international civilian police (ultimately almost 5,000) to take over these duties, allowing NATO to recede to acting as an emergency force. In designing arrangements

for the implementation for an Israeli/Palestinian peace, it would be wise to profit from this experience and adopt a structure of modestly overlapping authorities and powers rather than establishing a rigid division between the civil and military missions. Thus, the military component of the mission should be charged with supporting the civilian component – and vice versa – in areas in which each leads, rather than seeking an absolute separation of powers.

Keeping the peace among Palestinians might prove even more demanding than maintaining peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Any peace settlement would fall apart if Israel was exposed to continued attacks from Palestinian territory, and these will occur unless the overwhelming majority of Palestinians support the settlement. It is in the context of intra-Palestinian competition that the international mission's state-building functions would have to be conducted. This is also the domain in which the division of labor between the military and civilian components of the international mission would be most difficult to work out. Western militaries are unlikely to want responsibility for policing, crowd control or the suppression of violent extremist groups, yet the civilian element of the mission would probably lack the capacity to perform such functions. Hammering out the exact nature of the international community's responsibilities in this regard, and allocating the resultant responsibilities between the military and civilian components of the peace implementation mission, would likely be among the more difficult aspects of any peace negotiation.

Conclusion

Whether an international force is deployed as part of a comprehensive or a partial peace settlement, or even in the wake of a unilateral Israeli withdrawal, considerable buy-in would be necessary from both the Israeli and Palestinian sides before the United States or any other government would likely be willing to support such a mission. There is no strong

constituency in the United States for coercing Israel to make peace. Nor is there likely to be any stomach among potential troop-contributing nations to forcefully coerce the Palestinians to make peace. Thus, if such a mission ever arises, the resultant effort is more likely to resemble the U.N.-led peacekeeping operations of the past two decades than the more robust U.S.- and NATO-led peace enforcement efforts in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo – not to speak of the even more intense counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Since the mid-1990s, when U.S. troops last donned blue helmets and served under U.N. command in Macedonia and Haiti, the United States has displayed little appetite for participation in U.N. led peacekeeping. Should NATO or the United States ever commit to lead an international operation to support a Middle East peace agreement and the creation of a Palestinian state, planners should study the record of the United Nations and its emerging best practices carefully. Lessons drawn by the Clinton Administration's experience in peace enforcement would also be instructive. The force deployed would need to be large enough and sufficiently empowered to fulfill its mission – limited as that may be. Public safety would be a necessary condition for effective state building, which would be the prime task of any international presence in the Palestinian territories. Finally, success would depend, above all, on securing the collaborative engagement of all the parties, including neighboring and near neighboring states. Any Israeli/Palestinian settlement that leaves Hamas out, Syria and Iran unreconciled and Saudi Arabia and Egypt unenthusiastic would be unlikely to stick. It might be possible to proceed without one of these parties, but without the consent of two or more, any peace agreement would probably result in a costly failure.

ENDNOTES

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3. James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane and Beth Cole DeGrasse, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation Building* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007): 255-259, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG557.pdf.
4. A full list of U.N. peacekeeping operations and their dates of activity can be found at United Nations Peacekeeping, "List of Operations: 1948-2009" (n.d.), <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/list.shtml>.
5. In 2005, an E.U. peacekeeping force replaced NATO in Bosnia, but otherwise the structure remains as described.



CONCLUSION

By Marc Lynch

M A R C H 2 0 1 0

Security for Peace:
Setting the Conditions for a Palestinian State



CONCLUSION

By Marc Lynch

What role could an International Force (IF) play in securing an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement? The case studies in this volume offer useful comparative experiences from other instances of international peacekeeping. In light of these comparative lessons, this final chapter explores four plausible scenarios in which an IF might be welcomed into the West Bank and Gaza. It concludes that the potential contributions of such an IF, under certain conditions, make it a worthwhile option to explore. However, the logistical and political challenges would be daunting.

Multiple studies over the last several years have floated the idea of a NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)-type or other international peacekeeping force in the West Bank and Gaza. Such studies attempted to flesh out the likely size, composition and mandate of such a force.¹ In April 2002, *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman suggested that a NATO peacekeeping force be placed between the Israelis and Palestinians as part of an overall peace settlement.² In 2005, then-NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said, “We would not shy away from already starting to think about a potential role for NATO in supporting a Middle East peace agreement. This is not a revolutionary idea.”³ Current National Security Adviser, General James Jones, floated the concept of an international NATO force to facilitate the transitional period from Israeli control of the territory that will comprise of a Palestinian state to Palestinian control numerous times during his time as former President George W. Bush’s envoy to the Israelis and Palestinians.⁴ Tellingly, at the time, the proposal sparked intense criticism among Israelis and Palestinians but generated little enthusiasm among Europeans or Americans.⁵

Coming from President Barack Obama rather than President George W. Bush such a proposal may receive a more positive reception, at least among Palestinians and in the Arab world. In Israel, there

are also signs of a greater willingness to consider the idea. A recent public opinion survey, for example, shows changing views among Israelis. In what the director of the survey called a “sea change,” “Israeli Jews supported the presence of NATO peacekeepers in Palestinian areas by (a margin of) 62 percent to 34%.”⁶ Late last year, Quartet Envoy Tony Blair noted, “A principle that appeared to be out of bounds I think is now in bounds.”⁷ And, as noted earlier, the current U.S. National Security Adviser, General James Jones, has raised the idea in the past.

The logic behind an international peacekeeping force of some kind during the transition to Palestinian sovereignty in a negotiated two-state peace agreement with Israel depends on the parameters of such a peace agreement. And indeed, the logic is stronger under some conditions than others. In any scenario, implementing an agreement will produce an unstable, transitional situation in which there would likely be a security vacuum that Palestinian forces will struggle to fill. Spoilers would have strong incentives to launch attacks to derail implementation. An international force could provide reassurance and stability at an extremely tenuous moment and could provide the essential bridge between Israeli occupation and Palestinian sovereignty. But the risks and political sensitivities should not be underestimated.

I. Scenarios

This project began with the assumption that the arrival of an IF would only follow the completion of a broadly acceptable peace agreement. James Dobbins is surely correct that few states would be keen to contribute to an international deployment without a prior peace agreement and the buy-in of all parties. But that is not a sufficient reason to only consider scenarios based on fully negotiated peace agreements. It is conceivable that an IF could also be called upon to manage a unilateral Israeli withdrawal, similar to its disengagement from Gaza in 2005. This chapter therefore considers scenarios

that could arise from either a negotiated agreement or a unilateral Israeli disengagement.

A second differentiating factor among potential scenarios is the nature of the Palestinian state in which the IF would deploy. The most optimistic scenario is that the IF would support a Palestinian national unity government, including both Hamas and Fatah as well as other relevant factions, and that this government would have effective control over both Gaza and the West Bank. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that the IF would in fact deploy only to the West Bank, and that it could support a Fatah-dominated Palestinian government that has not reconciled with Hamas or other opposition groups.

I therefore examine four primary scenarios (see Table 1), based on whether a negotiated Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement precedes the entrance of the IF and whether the Palestinian Authority (PA) remains in roughly its current form:

Full Negotiated Peace. In this scenario, the Israeli government, with the acquiescence of mainstream West Bank settlers, reaches agreement with a unified Palestinian government, including both Hamas and Fatah in both the West Bank and Gaza. The IF enters with the full cooperation of all parties with the primary functions of reassurance and facilitation.

Partial Negotiated Agreement. In this scenario, the Israeli government reaches agreement with the PA, but Hamas and Gaza remain outside the agreement. The IF enters to support the implementation of an agreement, which includes a counterinsurgency-type strategy in the West Bank to neutralize Hamas and other rejectionist groups. Alternatively, though highly unlikely, major portions of the Israeli settler movement reject the agreement and challenge the relocation plans. The IF would then play some role in trying to prevent

Table 1: Scenarios

FOUR SCENARIOS		
	NEGOTIATED	UNILATERAL
Without the Palestinian Authority	Full negotiated peace	Unilateral Israeli withdrawal/ PA survives
With the Palestinian Authority	Partial agreement	Unilateral Israeli withdrawal/ PA collapses

violence between religious-nationalist settlers and Palestinians.

Unilateral Israeli Withdrawal/PA Survives: In this scenario, Israel disengages from the West Bank unilaterally without a negotiated final status agreement, along the lines of its departure from Gaza in 2005. The IF enters to bolster and work with the existing PA.

Unilateral Israeli Withdrawal/PA Collapse. In this scenario, an IF enters to rebuild a Palestinian state in the chaotic aftermath of a PA collapse and unilateral Israeli disengagement from the West Bank.

Each scenario involves a dizzying array of complicating variables. The timing of an IF entry (i.e., whether it enters early on or later in the process), the surrounding political context, and the composition and mandate of the intervening forces obviously matter a great deal. It matters whether or not potential spoilers, such as religious-nationalist settlers or Hamas, support the agreement. The extent of settlement relocation is also a key factor: The withdrawal of Israelis from the West Bank could be exceptionally tortuous, with hundreds

of thousands of settlers relocated and a massive infrastructure left behind or moved, or it could be relatively uneventful, leaving large portions of the existing settlements under Israeli control. Returning Palestinian refugees in any significant number would introduce considerable societal and economic stress on an already overtaxed society. The IF may only play a transitional buffer role, facilitating the transition and then departing, or it could become a long-term, integral feature of the landscape. The IF may build non-partisan state institutions, or it may primarily support the Palestinian Authority against Hamas and other challengers.⁸ If Palestinians see the IF as a vital ingredient in achieving true sovereignty, they will respond very differently than if they view the force as simply a proxy for the Israeli occupation.

The task of any IF in Palestine would potentially involve a complicated hybrid of missions, including the separation of forces, managing a chaotic transition that may include substantial movements of people, enforcing agreements in a hyper-politicized and media-saturated environment, and facilitating state building as a transition to self sufficiency. Thinking through these scenarios now could help to avoid some of these risks. For all the challenges identified in this chapter, such an IF may be the only way to provide transitional security for Israel and for nascent Palestinian state institutions during the transition to statehood.

1. FULL NEGOTIATED PEACE

In the best case scenario, the IF would be charged with enforcing and monitoring a peace agreement reached between the Israeli government – with the acquiescence of the mainstream of West Bank settlers – and a unified Palestinian government that includes both Hamas and Fatah and both the West Bank and Gaza. The IF in this scenario would enter with the full cooperation of all parties and with the primary functions of reassurance and facilitation, ensuring the security of both Israel and the Palestinian state during the transition and monitoring compliance with

Even the best case scenario is not without pitfalls. A very small rump opposition could still be drawn to terrorist tactics in an attempt to sour Israeli and Palestinian views of the peace agreement, destroy trust and re-militarize the relationship.

the agreement. Its efforts to support a transition to a capable, independent Palestinian state would begin from a relatively strong foundation.

The simplest mission for the IF would be reassurance, offering security guarantees for each side during a delimited transitional period. Israelis would benefit from a transitional buffer force to prevent the Palestinian government from doing politically popular things such as rapidly deploying troops along the new border. A robust and effective IF could substitute the need for a continued Israeli presence, as recently demanded by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for retaining a presence in the West Bank in order to prevent a reoccurrence of the situations in Gaza and South Lebanon where armed groups stockpiled rockets across the border.⁹ It would also ensure that no security vacuum followed a withdrawal of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The IF would also, crucially, protect Palestinians from attacks, either from departing settlers or from radical fringe spoilers. Most likely, the IF would have a broader

mission, including the construction of an effective Palestinian security force to take over security responsibilities as the IF departs.

Such a peace agreement would likely command broad regional support – at least from Israel’s immediate neighbors. While history counsels against assuming significant material Arab assistance, this scenario makes it far more likely that Jordan and Egypt would play important support roles, while wealthy Arab states such as Saudi Arabia would assist with the financing of Palestinian state construction and refugee return. The incorporation of Hamas into the peace framework would be crucial to the regional reception: Iran and Syria may prefer to remain potential spoilers, but they cannot hope to represent Palestinian aspirations more than the Palestinians themselves. They could, in other words, hardly be more Palestinian than Hamas. Al Qaeda and affiliated movements would oppose such an agreement under any circumstances and would likely mount a fierce propaganda campaign against Hamas for selling out the jihad. But in this scenario, that effort would likely be only a fringe cause with little resonance outside a tiny jihadist milieu.

Yet, even the best case scenario is not without pitfalls. A very small rump opposition could still be drawn to terrorist tactics in an attempt to sour Israeli and Palestinian views of the peace agreement, destroy trust and re-militarize the relationship. International Forces deployed throughout the West Bank and/or Gaza would provide extremely tempting targets for such terrorist attacks, particularly if they were lightly armed, included Americans or other Westerners, and chose to have an active presence in the communities rather than to hunker down within bases. The Oslo experience suggests that ensuring compliance on the ground with agreements and deterring or co-opting potential spoilers would be key to maintaining positive momentum – which would require such a more active presence. Should an IF

establish such a presence in the West Bank and/or Gaza, prevailing perceptions of the IF should not be left to chance. An extensive strategic communications campaign should be maintained to shape the narrative surrounding its deployment, emphasizing that the IF is assisting in the realization of a consensual two-state solution, rather than backing one side against the other in an ongoing conflict.

2. PARTIAL AGREEMENT

In this scenario, the Israeli government reaches agreement with the PA as currently constituted, but Hamas and Gaza remain outside the agreement and/or significant portions of the Israeli right wing and settler movement are actively hostile. The two key elements of this scenario are mutually independent. The settlers could oppose an agreement that includes Hamas and Gaza, while Hamas could oppose an agreement broadly acceptable to settlers. Indeed, given the concessions that would be necessary to satisfy both constituencies, it is probable that one of the groups would be in and the other out (i.e. if settlers are happy with a relatively small amount of displacement from existing settlements, Hamas is much less likely to agree; if the agreement calls for a near-complete return to the 1967 lines, as Hamas has demanded, then settlers are more likely to be opposed).

While both options are logically possible, it is extremely difficult to conceive of a plausible scenario in which the IF would be actively involved in the relocation of Israeli settlers. Politically, this would be a deal-breaker in the United States and most other Western countries. While an Israeli government may sign an agreement that does not satisfy religious-nationalist factions of the Israeli settler movement, a situation in which the IF forcibly relocates settlers or uses significant military force in self-defense against them, is so unlikely that I do not spend significant time on it.

By contrast, the former scenario – a West Bank-only agreement signed by the Palestinian Authority

without either Hamas or Gaza – is arguably the most likely of all the negotiated scenarios, and so worth considering at length. While Dobbins is likely correct that few external actors would want to enter under such conditions, in practice they may feel great pressure to do what they can to support even a partial peace agreement. A successful IF in this scenario would require an extremely high level of consensus on the mandate, agreement on the rules of engagement and political unity among the contributing powers.

The West Bank/PA scenario would pose distinctive opportunities and challenges to an IF. The IF could potentially play a vital role in bolstering the capacity of the new Palestinian state in the West Bank and give it the time to establish legitimacy and to demonstrate significant improvements in Palestinian quality of life. This would almost certainly involve a significant training and security capacity-building component. There should be a primary focus on ensuring that the institutions of the rule of law and civil police develop alongside the security forces. Success in this mission could give Israelis the confidence they need to relax Israel's grip on security arrangements in the West Bank. If the Israeli withdrawal put an end to the internal roadblocks and checkpoints, and removed enough settlements to guarantee a contiguous and viable Palestinian state, then Palestinian quality of life could rapidly improve – a key part of the current platforms of both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Prime Minister Salam al-Fayyad.

The risks are also significant. The lessons of past operations considered in this report suggest that failure to incorporate or to disarm all armed factions would weigh heavily. Even if initially tasked only with preventing the outbreak of violence and ensuring a secure transition, the IF would likely be forced in short order to engage in counterinsurgency-style operations against Hamas in the West Bank to support the new Palestinian government against internal opposition. The prospects of

violent attacks on peacekeepers will be dramatically higher and the local and regional political environment far more toxic.

From a political standpoint, domestic and regional actors are likely to be much less supportive in this scenario and unlikely to accept it as a final status end of conflict. The agreement would presumably still command the support of the PA's allies such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. But Iran, Syria, and popular forces across the region, such as Hezbollah or Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, would have ample opportunity to mobilize against it. Significant portions of the Palestinian public would also be dubious. Arab public opinion would likely view a partial deal with extreme skepticism, creating a new front in an ever more intense regional "cold war." The IF in this scenario would almost certainly come to be perceived as a new variety of occupation and become a political and military target; a major strategic communications campaign would be essential, but less likely to succeed.

3. UNILATERAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL/PA SURVIVES

This scenario would resemble the 2005 Israeli disengagement from Gaza, with a retreat to a unilaterally drawn line (presumably along something resembling the existing security fence) and the removal of settlements outside that line. The PA would become responsible, *de facto*, for administering the West Bank. The IF, in this scenario, would work to bolster the PA during the transitional period and to facilitate its consolidation of effective sovereignty while preventing the emergence of threats to Israeli territory. This scenario is less far-fetched than it may appear, since the international community may fear that the PA could collapse without such international assistance. It is most likely to occur if the IF enters as part of an agreement between Israel and outside powers, in the absence of a negotiated agreement with the Palestinians.

The mandate of an IF in this scenario would be to provide security in the interim period between Israeli withdrawal and the building of capable Palestinian security forces. Many of the IF's specific responsibilities and challenges would resemble those in Scenario 2. The primary difference is the absence of a negotiated agreement. This is not a minor difference, since the Palestinians would likely find the terms of the Israeli disengagement considerably less favorable than under a negotiated agreement. As a result, the PA would likely face a severe legitimacy crisis and may receive considerably less support from regional actors.

In such a scenario, the urgency of bringing all armed factions into the emerging state would be particularly intense. The IF could be a significant deterrent to any efforts spoilers such as Hamas to attempt to overthrow the PA and could help to ensure an orderly and relatively peaceful Israeli disengagement. The great risk in this scenario is that the IF could be drawn into an even more intense counterinsurgency role against Hamas in the West Bank and captured by the existing leadership of the Palestinian Authority as its own militia. The IF would be more likely to establish the conditions for Palestinian reconciliation if it establishes neutrality, incorporates all relevant actors and guarantees general security and stability during the probable shaky transition.

4. UNILATERAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL/PA COLLAPSES

A final plausible scenario for the entry of an IF also begins with a unilateral Israeli disengagement from the West Bank along the lines of its 2005 withdrawal from Gaza. In this scenario, however, the PA does not survive the disengagement in its existing form, requiring the IF to enter after its collapse in order to establish basic security in a relatively anarchic environment. Israel may welcome such an IF to the extent that it prevents a replay of the Gaza experience in which Hamas seized power and used the territory to launch rockets against southern Israel. International actors undoubtedly would be

leery of such a mission, but may see little alternative in a rapidly deteriorating situation.

An IF in this scenario would require very robust rules of engagement and would have little choice but to engage in a parallel process of institution building and security provision. It would face pressing Israeli demands to prove its worth by preventing terrorist or rocket attacks over the new border. At the same time, it would have to demonstrate to Palestinians that it would protect them from Israeli reprisals or from settler provocations. It could also find itself caught in the midst of intense intra-Palestinian power struggles, with no legitimate central authority upon which to rely.

While this in many ways appears to be a nightmare scenario, the IF could have several unexpected advantages compared to the “partial agreement” scenario, all rooted in operating with a relatively blank slate. Since the deployment would not be specifically tied to the political fortunes of the PA, it could reach out to Hamas and other spoilers and seek to incorporate all armed groups into new institutions. It could also promote institutional change across the whole of government, including the re-launching of a parliament, new presidential elections and a broadening of political participation. Establishing neutrality would be crucial, as would an effective communications campaign and the ability to quickly establish order and to demonstrate improvement in quality of life.

II. Comparative Lessons

Several common themes, with particular relevance for a hypothetical peacekeeping operation, emerge from the cases reviewed in this volume. Bob Killebrew concludes in his chapter, “Effective peacekeeping operations require the consent of major powers [and] belligerents, impartiality on the part of the peacekeepers, and the non-use of force except in extreme cases.” The scenarios discussed above also help to illuminate common factors critical to the success of an International Force:

Disarmament and incorporation of all factions.

The comparative lessons of this volume strongly suggest, “[A]ll armed elements in the environment need to be engaged early and managed through a sustainable process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or transition into legitimate security forces within the new political entity.”¹⁰ The IF must avoid being captured by any one faction and resist the pressure (or temptation) to take on a counterinsurgency role against Hamas in the West Bank. Ideally, its entry into Palestinian areas would be preceded by a prior Palestinian political agreement that allows for at least the tacit acceptance by Hamas and most preferably, its incorporation into security forces. The disarmament of Hamas may be too much to ask. The chances of it voluntarily surrendering its military capabilities in the context of an Israeli-Palestinian Authority peace agreement enforced by international forces are close to nil. But steps can be taken to give Hamas incentives to stand down and to avoid playing a spoiler role, as well as to build credibility by scrupulously demonstrating neutrality. Should the IF supplement efforts to combat Hamas, then it risks becoming a combatant in counterinsurgency operations rather than a peacekeeper – and is far less likely to succeed.

Unity of command and appropriate mandate.

The cases examined in this volume demonstrate that the composition and mandate of a peacekeeping force are vital to its success. Should an IF ever enter the hyper-politicized Palestinian environment, it will face intense media scrutiny and the winds of domestic politics in IF member states. Under these circumstances, great care should be taken at the outset to establish the appropriate mandate and chain of command. Whether the IF enters as part of a negotiated agreement or through a unilateral Israeli disengagement, there must be no ambiguity about the IF’s role and function.

Composition of the force. The most likely candidate for an IF is a NATO force, not an U.S.- or

Bold steps and significant international commitments would be needed to achieve the two-state solution that United States and world leaders have so often proclaimed to be essential for regional stability, Israel's security, and international justice.

Arab-led force. (A U.N. force would likely be vetoed by the Israelis.) However, the experience of raising troops for Afghanistan demonstrates the limited prospects for mustering a sizable NATO force in such an intensely controversial mission. A NATO force may also pose a major test to alliance unity. But NATO's experience in Bosnia and Kosovo peacekeeping missions gives it considerable operational experience to bring to bear. It would also allow for the division of labor among various functional specializations and competencies, as well as a way to overcome political obstacles. For example, the United States is legally barred by Congress from dealing with Hamas in any way, and this may not change, even if Hamas were a partner to a peace agreement. Other NATO member states would therefore be better situated to take the lead in Gaza.

Strategic communications and perception management. How the IF is perceived by the multiple stakeholders would be critical to any mission's success, and significant strategic communications

activities should be planned in advance of the mission. As Killebrew notes in his chapter, the IF "must prepare and implement an 'information strategy' that tells the peacekeepers' story and reinforces the mission of the force; otherwise, opponents will use the media to discredit the force and the peacekeeping mission itself."¹¹ If the IF came to be seen as simply an Israeli proxy force, it would lose legitimacy and quickly become a target for Palestinian violence. It must constantly communicate in word and deed to Palestinians that it is not another occupation and that it is working to assist the transition to full Palestinian independence. It must simultaneously communicate to Israelis that its efforts effectively provide for Israeli security.

Comprehensive security-sector building. The provision of security must be undertaken in the context of a simultaneous development of the rule of law and civil institutions to avoid the emergence of a politicized security force or an authoritarian polity. Scott Brady notes that in Timor, "little attention was given to the mechanisms for building a comprehensive security sector: establishment of legislative and regulatory frameworks for defining respective police and military roles; development of senior management; establishing safeguards for protecting human rights and ensuring effective civilian oversight; funding for acquisitions, maintenance and administration; and consideration of national infrastructure."¹² Institutional development must extend to a whole-of-government approach to institution-building with great care taken to develop the rule of law and civilian institutions commensurate with the level of military and security forces. The prioritization, in mission and in budget, of the military and policing side without adequate legal protections or civilian institutions has been a persistent problem with security sector reform. The heavy involvement of the international community in the West Bank to date should be leveraged to help guard against an imbalanced security sector development.

Transition timeline. The IF must have a mandate sufficient to be effective, but it should not commit to an open-ended presence upon which the new Palestinian government would come to depend. A clear timetable and strategy for the eventual departure of the IF would be important. Peacekeeping missions have a tendency to make themselves indispensable, or at least to create the appearance of indispensability. As political and security institutions evolve under their protective auspices, their presence and role comes to be taken for granted and any discussion of their removal can seem deeply alarming. An open-ended commitment creates dependencies and gives local actors no reason to make painful compromises or tough choices. Nor does a conditions-based withdrawal strategy really solve the problem, since it is the presence of the international forces that create the conditions of stability, with no way to know for certain whether that stability will survive their removal. Judging by the lessons of other peacekeeping operations, such as the relatively successful mission in Bosnia, once forces are in, there should be no expectation of them leaving in less than a decade. The focus must be on acting as a transitional force with a heavy training component to build the capacity and legitimacy of Palestinian security forces. The IF should pay special attention to preventing its “capture” by any faction – and to preventing the politicization of the new security forces being trained.

III. Conclusion

The comparative cases explored in this report do not offer a great deal of optimism for the prospects of an IF in a Palestinian state. Many of the key preconditions identified as necessary for successful operations are not likely to exist, whereas many of the most dangerous political conditions probably will exist. The political and media environment may well be toxic, the potential for spoiler violence and attacks on available Western targets high and the political underpinnings of the Palestinian state

shaky. Creating and leading such an IF will not be for the faint of heart. But the faint of heart are not likely to deliver a viable two-state solution. Bold steps and significant international commitments would be needed to achieve the two-state solution that the United States and world leaders have so often proclaimed to be essential for regional stability, Israel’s security and international justice. There should be no illusions. Peacekeeping in a newly created Palestinian state would be both difficult and perilous. For all the very real obstacles and risks, an International Force is one of the few viable routes to providing for security for both Israelis and Palestinians in a transitional environment and to establishing the space for the evolution of competent Palestinian security forces fully embedded within civilian institutions and the rule of law.

ENDNOTES

1. For instance, see Robert E. Hunter and Seth G. Jones, *Building a Successful Palestinian State: Security* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), especially chapter 3.
2. Thomas Friedman, "The Hard Truth," *The New York Times* (3 April 2002); also Friedman, "A Way Out of the Middle East Impasse" *The New York Times* (24 August 2001); Friedman, "Israel, Palestine and NATO" *The New York Times* (12 December 2002); Robert Kagan, "Can NATO Patrol Palestine?" *The Washington Post* (20 April 2002).
3. Quoted in Hunter and Jones, *Building a Successful Palestinian State*: 16.
4. "Israel, US discuss W. Bank NATO troops," *Jerusalem Post* (20 February 2008), <http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=92584>; "IDF opposes plan for NATO in W. Bank," *Jerusalem Post* (2 December 2008), <http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=122765>.
5. For a sampling of hostile commentary, see: Ted Galen Carpenter, "NATO's West Bank Nightmare" *National Interest* (20 February 2008), http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9228; former Jordanian Minister of Information Salah al-Qullab, "The Palestinian situation: between al-wisaya and international forces," *Asharq Al-Awsat* (5 July 2007), <http://www.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&issueno=10446&article=426695>; "Khaled Meshaal rejects international forces" (15 June 2007), <http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ArtID=29135&SecID=212>.
6. Haviv Rettig Gur, "Jewish Israelis favor NATO peacekeepers," *Jerusalem Post* (22 April 2009), http://zionism-israel.com/israel_news/2009/04/jewish-israelis-favor-nato-peacekeepers.html.
7. Quoted in Kevin Peraino, "NATO in the West Bank," *Newsweek* (6 December 2008), <http://www.newsweek.com/id/172638>.
8. I do not even consider here the possibility of the IF entering Gaza to forcibly remove Hamas from power.
9. *The Associated Press*, "Netanyahu: Israel must have West Bank presence after peace deal," *Haaretz* (21 January 2010), <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1143957.html>.
10. Scott Brady, "East Timor," this volume: 11.
11. Bob Killebrew, "Military Lessons Learned," this volume: 65.
12. Brady, "East Timor," this volume: 11.

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