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STRAIGHT WIRE - JUNE 21, 1983

Major General Milnor Roberts, AUS, Ret.
Reserve Officers Association
Hotel Utah
Main and South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

I am delighted to send my warm greetings to the Reserve Officers Association on the occasion of your 1983 Convention in Salt Lake City.

The ROA's history of achievement and service by its citizen soldiers is well-recorded and deservedly acclaimed. The concern and continuing action of your organization and its ladies auxiliary toward the preservation of the peace and security of this nation have earned the esteem of all Americans.

Looking forward to the difficult challenges which lie ahead, I am confident that the ROA will continue to advance and support the principle of allegiance to our country. Your convention serves as an ideal time to recount with pride your accomplishments of the past and to build for the challenges of the future.

As Commander-in-Chief I look to your continuing leadership and dedicated service as I wish you a most enjoyable and memorable meeting.

RONALD REAGAN

RR: Livingston:pt
cc: K.Osborne/D.Livingston/E.Hickey?M.Blackwell/D.Jepsen/CF
EVENT: JUNE 23
Draft information provided by DOD.



Reserve Officers Association of the United States



National Headquarters • MINUTE MAN MEMORIAL BUILDING
1 CONSTITUTION AVENUE, N.E., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002
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ARMY ★ NAVY ★ AIR FORCE ★ MARINE CORPS ★ COAST GUARD ★ PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ★ NOAA

25 February 1983

file
NAE

Mr. Morton Blackwell
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Morton:

I have just received your letter of 16 February with regard to the proposed Conference on the Church and Peacemaking in the Nuclear Age. I agree that it seems to be heavily weighted to the left and has at least one member I know, Jim Wallis, who admits he would rather be red than dead. He favors unilateral disarmament -- by us.

The Eagle Forum will hold a seminar on our fifth floor on Monday morning, 7 March, from 9:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. They will feature highly qualified spokesmen from the major demonstrations who will discuss the morality of warfare, and I think you could recommend their names to the California Conference Group. You might also recommend the authors of Justice and War in the Nuclear Age, published by the American Catholic Committee, 127 East 35th Street, New York, New York 10016. Their names are Robert R. Reilly; Rev. James V. Schall, S.J.; Thomas F. Payne; Angelo Codevilla; Philip F. Lawler, editor. I think this would be a good meeting for you to avoid.

With best regards, I am

Cordially yours,

J. Milnor Roberts
Major General, AUS (Ret.)
Executive Director

JMR/gw



file ROA

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ARMY * NAVY * AIR FORCE * MARINE CORPS * COAST GUARD * PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE * NOAA

7 February 1983

Dear Editor:

Enclosed is a copy of the newly published pilot edition of the "ROA Washington Report," a new project of the Defense Education Fund of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States. A press release on this premiere edition also is enclosed.

Several years ago ROA considered a proposal that we establish a Defense Education Fund. This would be supported by contributions from the members with the objectives of informing the members about national security matters and passing ROA's positions on these issues to the policy makers on Capitol Hill, in the White House, and at the Pentagon.

The program will be in accordance with our Congressional charter "to support an adequate national security and the execution thereof." The orientation will be national security, not just the reserve aspects although obviously we consider them as important integral parts of it. Our first step will be this newsletter.

This pilot issue has just been published. This is merely a prototype. Everything, including the name, is only tentative.

We hope to start regular publication in the summer. Frequency initially will be bi-monthly with the plan to go to monthly as soon as funding permits.

It may be that you have a message that you think would be appropriate for publication in a future issue of the ROA Washington Report. If so, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Herbert M. Hart
Colonel, USMC (Ret.)
Director of Public Affairs

HMH/jbh

encls

roa



NEWS RELEASE

1 Constitution Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002 • (202) 479-2200

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
February 3, 1983

RESERVE OFFICERS UNVEIL NATIONAL SECURITY NEWSLETTER

WASHINGTON, Feb. 3. -- A new national security newsletter premiered here this week through the efforts of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States.

Tentatively named the "ROA Washington Report," the 8-page publication is a project of the new Defense Education Fund of the ROA.

The issue includes a response by President Reagan to ROA's stands on countering the Soviet buildup and on the POW/MIA issue.

Other articles are by Army General John W. Vessey, Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the Central Command, new U. S. joint headquarters and force for the Middle East; Air Force General James R. Allen, commander-in-chief of the Military Sealift Command, on the shortage of shipping to project U. S. influence overseas.

Rep. Stewart B. McKinney, R-Conn., writes on his bill to upgrade America's industrial base to meet mobilization needs and David J. Trachtenberg, defense analyst with the Committee on the Present Danger, discusses the dangers of a unilateral nuclear freeze.

The issue of the newsletter is bound within the February edition of ROA's monthly magazine, "The Officer." Bimonthly publication, separate from the magazine, is planned to start this summer with the publication to go to a monthly frequency ultimately.

The newsletter will be supported by contributions to the ROA Defense Education Fund. It will be distributed to ROA members and Capitol Hill and Pentagon leaders. Non-member subscription details have yet to be determined.

A sample copy of the pilot edition can be obtained by writing ROA, 1 Constitution Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C., 20002.

Capitol Hill-based ROA was founded in 1922 and chartered by Congress in 1950 to support an adequate national security. Its members include officers of all branches of service, reserve and regular.

ROA WASHINGTON REPORT



The National Security Newsletter of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States.

Pilot Issue, February 1983

A Cold Shoulder for the Freeze

By David J. Trachtenberg

The idea of a nuclear freeze leaves me cold.

The fundamental problem with a nuclear freeze is that it seeks to do what it can not (decrease the likelihood of nuclear war) by actually doing what it should not (reducing our ability to prevent nuclear war).

Preventing nuclear war is what deterrence is all about. And deterrence can only be effective if the United States is committed to the maintenance of a strong, secure and credible second-strike capability. However, two decades of Soviet action and relative American inaction have resulted in an erosion of the credibility of our strategic nuclear deterrent and a situation of rough nuclear equivalency has given way to one of clear-cut Soviet nuclear superiority.

The existence of enormous Soviet advantages in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces is a well-documented fact. One need only look at the trends in the nuclear balance over the last two decades to appreciate this fully. In virtually every significant category (missile throw-weight, equivalent megatonnage, prompt hard-target kill capability,

etc.) the Soviet Union commands a substantial advantage.

The implications of Soviet strategic superiority are ominous, yet they are commonly ignored by advocates of a



nuclear freeze. The strategic deterrent is the high ground which overshadows all other use of military force. If Soviet dominance of the strategic nuclear level is allowed to persist, Soviet policymakers may—and almost certainly will—feel freer to use force at lower levels, confident that the United States will shy away from the threat of escalation. A nuclear freeze would sanction the existing strategic nuclear imbalance, increasing the risk of Soviet aggression and undermining global stability. By doing so, it would violate the basic goals of arms control. After all, what kind of arms control is it that sanctions instability?

continued on page 8



David J. Trachtenberg is a defense analyst with the Committee on the Present Danger. He expresses his own views in this piece written for ROA.

TO EDUCATE, TO INFORM

This is the first edition of the ROA Washington Report, a newsletter designed to educate the 126,000 members of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States and to inform policy makers of ROA's position on national security.

ROA Washington Report is funded by the ROA Defense Education Fund which is supported by contributions from the members of ROA.

This is a preliminary edition. Its format, contents, and name all are tentative, and suggestions for improvement are invited.

Although this issue is being distributed as an insert in The Officer magazine, future issues will be sent separately, usually two weeks after The Officer. Bi-monthly publication is tentatively planned to begin in summer, 1983. □

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ROA Washington Report Wrap-up

The eight pages that you have just read are samples of what the Defense Education Fund Committee hopes to publish regularly in a few months. Readers are asked to consider them and to pass along their thoughts, especially constructive criticism, to the committee at the Minute Man Memorial Building, 1 Constitution Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002.

Publication of this issue is the culmination of at least four years of effort by many members of the Reserve Officers Association. The records fill several file folders as they recount discussions at a number of places and by many members. The final decision to establish the fund was delayed several years so that details could be worked out. The national convention at San Juan last June settled the matter and the ROA Defense Education Fund was born.

Working by committee often has its hazards and it is said that such an arrangement came up with a camel when a horse was the original objective. It is hoped that the Defense Education committee had better luck and that the readers will consider this product as a thoroughbred rather than a denizen of the desert.

The committee considered many formats and objectives in determining what would be the first product. The extremes ranged from a five-column newspaper to an annual single-topic oriented book. The final recommendation to the executive committee was the newsletter that now has been produced. The committee gave its approval in December and this pilot edition is the result.

This newsletter will have two objectives. The first will be to educate the members of ROA so that they will be able to keep abreast of the status of America's national security. The second will be to inform the decision makers in Washington, both on Capitol Hill and in the Pentagon, the positions that ROA is taking on these important issues.

These dual missions are in accordance with ROA's Congressional charter to "support an adequate national security and the execution
continued on page 8

President Reagan Responds to ROA Resolutions

Informed of ROA's resolutions on America's strategic capabilities, space exploration, and the POW/MIA issue, President Reagan sent these comments.

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

I regret the delay in responding to your letter of September 16, but I wanted to thank you personally for your kind words. You were good to



share with me the resolutions adopted by the National Convention of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States.

As I outlined in my Address to the Nation on November 22, rebuilding the defenses of this nation and improving our strategic capability are absolutely necessary if we are to counter the massive Soviet buildup. Unless we pursue this path, the parallel path of negotiations and arms reductions will elude us. I am pleased to know that the members of the Reserve Officers Association understand this issue so well.

My Administration is committed to a policy of space exploration in support of our national well-being. We retain as goals the use of space to strengthen the security of our nation and to support our right of self-defense. This approach includes the development of an anti-satellite capability and measures to enhance communications, navigation, envi-

ronmental monitoring, warning, surveillance and space defense. At the same time, we remain open to measures for verifiable and equitable arms control in space.

In addition to these matters, I am aware of the particular concern that so many have expressed regarding the situation of Americans still missing in Indochina and Korea. I can assure you that we are actively and consistently pursuing the fullest possible accounting of our missing servicemen. We are pleased that in September the Vietnamese government agreed to a long-standing U.S. proposal that both sides meet regularly to discuss resolution of the POW/MIA issue.

The Vietnamese and Lao governments have stated that they accept in principle the humanitarian obligation to account as fully as possible for missing Americans, and we are convinced that they have sufficient information to resolve the status of many cases. In addition to our diplomatic efforts, we are seeking information from Indochinese refugees and other sources that might shed light on the fate of Americans lost in connection with the Vietnam War. Although we have thus far been unable to substantiate any reports of Americans being held against their will in Indochina, we are proceeding on the assumption that at least some Americans are still held captive.

Achieving a full account, and securing the return of any Americans now being held, are matters of the highest national priority. Knowing of your deep concern helps strengthen our unity of resolve in this regard, and I am grateful for your encouragement. Please extend my best wishes and thanks to all of the members of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States.

May God bless you.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Reserve Components Critical to MAC

By General James R. Allen, USAF

Members of the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard make substantial contributions to the national defense. For example, in the Military Airlift Command (MAC), there are not enough active duty people to perform all of our many and varied missions. We rely on Reserve and Guard members to help, and they do a magnificent job. They are so thoroughly integrated into the command on a daily basis that they virtually are indistinguishable from their active duty counterparts. That is the way it should be because we truly are a total force in peacetime just as we would be in a national emergency.

During the early stages of a contingency, the President would have the authority to call up to 100,000 reserve personnel prior to a declaration of national emergency. Of that total, up to approximately 40,000 would join MAC, and I have com-



General James R. Allen, USAF, is the Commander-in-Chief of the Military Airlift Command.

plete confidence in their ability to make an immediate contribution to our overall airlift capability.

Last spring MAC took part in exercise Gallant Eagle in the California desert. A highlight of that exercise was one of the biggest airdrop opera-

"These Reservists are highly experienced and skilled, some even more so than those on active duty."

tions since World War II. Out of 90 planned MAC aircraft, 88 dropped on the drop zone, all within 30 seconds of the scheduled time over target. The Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard played essential roles in the success of that exercise.

Within MAC we have six active duty strategic airlift wings which are comprised of 77 C-5s and 268 C-141s, all of which have intercontinental range. In time of crisis, they would be used to deploy combat forces to overseas theaters. Each of those wings has an Air Force Reserve affiliated wing

which consists of flight crews and support personnel who operate and maintain those aircraft right along with the active duty people.

These Reservists are highly experienced and skilled, some even more so than those on active duty. Thus the Air Force Reserves provide almost one half of our inter-theater airlift capability.

Concurrently, almost 60 percent of our tactical, or intra-theater, airlift capability is in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. In peacetime, these components operate their own C-7s, C-123s and C-130s. They also provide augmentation for MAC's Air Weather Service, the aeromedical evacuation mission, the rescue and recovery forces, aerial port squadrons and medical service squadrons, as well as a hospital and three clinics.

Overall, MAC-gained Reserve Component personnel number 18,000 in the Air Force Reserve and 37,000 in the Air National Guard. The critical importance of those Reserve forces is recognized throughout the Military Airlift Command. We simply could not do our job without them. □



Sealift Lacking to Project U.S. Power Overseas

By Vice Admiral Kent J. Carroll, USN

It's no exaggeration to say our country's merchant marine is floundering in the worst shipping slump in 50 years. I am worried. The more I see our merchant fleet decline, the more I see a blueprint for chaos develop, especially if this country faces a national emergency which requires deployment of our combat power.

Does it really matter if the United States has no merchant marine? You bet it does. If the whistle blew today, our own sea lines of communication might have to be filled largely by foreign flag ships. That doesn't make sense to me. A strong merchant marine, just as much as a strong Navy, is the basis of any nation's seapower.

We needed our merchant ships in World War II. About 1,700 merchant ships were called into service to support the U.S. Navy; and more than 700 went to the bottom in that conflict. That's more, by the way, than the number of U.S. Navy warships sunk in that war—and more than the number of U.S. merchant ships in our entire U.S. flag fleet today.

Vice Admiral Kent J. Carroll, USN, Commander, Military Sealift Command, provided this material to ROA after a speech to the New Orleans chapter of the National Defense Transportation Association on Dec. 16, 1982.



We called again upon our merchant fleet to support us during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. U.S. flag ships brought almost all the fuel and supplies consumed by our fighting troops.

It wouldn't be any different today.

We will need every U.S. ship we can lay hands on if we ever face a major overseas conflict again on the magnitude of a Korea or Vietnam. U.S. flag merchant shipping is a keystone to our military conventional strategy.

All but two of our allies are located overseas, and to meet alliance commitments, the United States maintains 1/4 of our ground combat power outside the continental United States. In time of war, these allies and our own overseas troops are going to have to be reinforced and resupplied. In addition, the remaining 3/4's of our ground combat power is stationed within the continental United States. If these troops are to fight in time of war, they must be transported overseas. This means more than personnel, it

means transporting the combat support and combat service support they need which can weigh more than 100,000 tons per armored division.

That means the successful employment and sustainability of ground combat power is transportation dependent—and the transportation mode

that must convey more than 90 per cent of that lift is SEALIFT! To airlift one armored division would take the all out effort of the entire airlift fleet over a period of at least a month to deploy to the Persian Gulf.

To put it simply: sealift in merchant type vessels will bring about 95 per cent of all dry cargo and more than 99 per cent of fuel shipments. Fuel shipments will outweigh all categories of dry cargo combined, whether delivered by sea or air.

This reliance on merchant shipping to support combat operations isn't peculiar to this country. When Britain put together her naval task force which sailed to the Falkland Islands, the majority of participating ships were U.K. merchant ships.

Merchant shipping also supports combat operations in another way. We need at least 22 imported strategic materials to produce equipment for defense purposes—and these materials are so bulky they move in ship bottoms. If we have to rely on foreign flag vessels, there's a chance they might not reach our shores in times of heightened international tension.

We must restore our merchant ma-

“(Sealift) will play a vital part in deploying and sustaining our combat troops abroad and the very start of operations.”

rine to health. It's a sinking industry. Just consider that:

- Less than 4 per cent of this nation's oceanborne foreign commerce is carried by this country's merchant marine compared to nearly 35 per cent in 1952.
- Thirty years ago, we had more than 1,400 privately owned ocean-going ships employed. Today, we barely have 500. The National Defense Reserve Fleet has declined similarly. In 1952, we had 1,853 ships in the reserve fleet. Today, we have less than 200 and most of them are nearly 40 years old.
- The number of seagoing jobs in the U.S. private maritime industry continues to decline. There are now less than 18,000 deepsea billets compared to over 70,000 thirty years ago.

Despite these depressing words, there are some bright spots.

The Reagan Administration has made a firm commitment to stop the decline of the U.S. Merchant Marine and is acting with the support of maritime labor.

We are making some progress.

The President and the Department of Defense recognize the importance of sealift to this nation's strategic mobility. Not only is more emphasis being put on existing sealift programs than all the years since WWII, but a number of entirely new programs are underway.



our combat troops abroad from the very start of operations. I think this nation's concern over what would happen if we had to deploy troops to the Persian Gulf has played a larger part in this emphasis on sealift.

In a Persian Gulf scenario, we are very far from home—over 8,000 miles away, and

face fighting in an area where we can't be sure of allies. Prepositioning sealift is one answer. Ships can be in place already loaded with cargo.

Where political decisions are likely to be delayed, there is no real substitute for forces on station in or near a threatened region to make a rapid response feasible like our maritime prepositioned forces and Naval battle groups. Navy and the U.S. Merchant Marine are working together to make sure this country has the sealift it needs.

Various Navy sealift enhancement programs will pump more than \$15 billion into the maritime economy over the next five years. This includes money paid out directly to the industry by Navy which includes operation of MSC's controlled fleet and business generated by Navy programs such as ship building and charter programs.

Navy programs will help industry, but it must become commercially viable on its own again. If not, our declining American merchant marine might well turn out to be the “strategic missing link” rather than our “fourth arm of defense.” □

For example, we now have a Near Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF) in place in the Indian Ocean, ready to help out if we should ever have to deploy combat power to Southwest Asia. A little over two years ago, we had no ships positioned in the Indian Ocean; today we have 17 on station. All of these ships are chartered merchant ships manned by civilians and all of these ships carry cargo for our troops. By this program alone we have more than doubled our ability to deploy combat power to Southwest Asia in the first 30 days.

We will have more than tripled our ability to deploy combat power to that part of the world when our two new programs—the expanded maritime prepositioning and fast sealift programs—are complete. Contracts have been awarded to start these programs.

These three programs mark the start of a renaissance in military sealift. No longer is sealift relegated to playing a minor supporting role in the long-term reinforcement of troops deployed overseas. It now will play a vital part in deploying and sustaining

Upgraded Industrial Base Critical for Defense

By Stewart B. McKinney, M.C.

When the 97th Congress reconvened in November for a "lame duck" session, the pressing issue was the unacceptably high level of unemployment facing our nation. Sadly, this belatedly had become the overriding concern of the leadership of both chambers when there was the least possibility of drafting legislation to put people to work in a productive and cost-effective manner. However, in the best band-aid tradition, Congress developed a cosmetic, make-work solution.

The sudden enlightenment of my colleagues was disheartening.

The Economic Stabilization Subcommittee of the House Banking Committee, on which I am senior Republican, had explored the problems of unemployment for much of the past two years. But this subcommittee looked well beyond the mere unemployment statistics. What we found was a series of critical problems—a declining number of firms, a growing shortage of skilled personnel, obsolete equipment, little investment in research, and the resulting difficulties in meeting national defense.

Too many people fail to make the connection between the first four items and the vital fifth. But the reality is that currently the U.S. must buy many of its bullets, missiles and submarines abroad. Obviously, that doesn't help domestic unemployment. Just as worrisome, though, is what a deteriorated U.S. industrial base means to meeting national defense needs from domestic resources in time of emergency.



Congressman Stewart B. McKinney represents the 4th district of Connecticut in the U.S. House of Representatives. He prepared this article for ROA.



Greek tanker was last ship to be repaired in Bethlehem Steel Shipyard, Baltimore, Md. (USA Today photo by H. Darr Beiser.)

To be more specific, we are more than 50 percent dependent on foreign sources for 23 of the 40 materials considered critical by the defense industry. By contrast, the Soviet Union is self-sufficient on 35 of the 40 critical materials and meets half of its needs for the remaining five domestically. Or, looking at manpower, the Pentagon lists 73 skills as currently in short supply. The tooling and precision machine industry would hire 60,000 journeymen today if they were available. Schools, not able to afford new equipment, are training students with technology of the 1960's. Only two 50,000-ton presses, on which all large aircraft and M-1 tank parts are forged, exist in the United States and both are 30-years old. Probably most symptomatic, the "lead time" (the time it takes to fill an order) for many defense items has doubled and tripled since 1978.

The Defense Industrial Base Revitalization Act, drafted after the subcommittee took a long and detailed

look at these problems, provides a much more basic and meaningful way to put U.S. citizenry back to work than the broom pushing schemes debated (and rejected) by the lame duck Congress. The four-pronged proposal would provide financial assistance to small and medium-sized firms for modernizing projects; spur the expansion of domestic production and processing of strategic minerals, metal and materials; establish educational programs for needed technical jobs, and provide grants to higher education institutions for the modern equipment needed to train modern workers.

This approach has been endorsed by a unanimous vote of the National Executive Committee of the Reserve Officers Association. It is also supported by a coalition of military, business, labor and educational groups. However, the bill was lost in the last-minute look for easy answers. It is my hope that the 98th Congress will exercise more foresight when the bill is re-introduced in 1983. Prompt passage will move us towards a stronger America—economically and defensively. □

Newest Unified Command Watches U.S. Interests in the Middle East

By General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA

By law, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have the mission to establish unified and specified commands in strategic areas.


On Jan. 1, 1983, by order of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the United States Central Command — USCENTCOM — and Lieutenant General Robert C. Kingston was designated as Commander.

Forces were assigned and represented at the activation ceremony on Jan. 5, 1983. CENTCOM now joins eight other unified and specified commands worldwide helping the U.S. in maintaining the peace.

CENTCOM's area of responsibility is large geographically. It extends from Egypt west to Pakistan; from Jordan south to Kenya. It includes vast land areas on two continents.

The region has great historical significance. It is the birthplace of western civilization; the genesis of three of the world's great religions; it has been the historic land-bridge for trade between Europe and the East. It has been the scene of battles, conquests and empires whose numbers alone stagger the imagination.

Most important for the United States, the region has great contemporary importance. It is comprised of diverse, proud peoples who love freedom and share a common hope for peace. It continues to encompass important trade routes. The area contains mineral wealth that is absolutely vital to the world's economic well-being. It contains 19 independent nations with a variety of governmental forms and political leanings.



General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided these comments to ROA, drawing on his talk upon the commissioning of the U.S. Central Command on Jan. 5, 1983.

Unfortunately, at this moment the region is not totally at peace: there are wars and rumors of war. That's not unusual; that's part of that world. For the United States the region is truly a strategic area. It is indeed fitting that this command be established.

It is important for the world to know why it has been created. The command is to represent the United States militarily in the region. The command will be the U.S. vehicle for military cooperation with friendly governments in the region when the governments concerned, our own and those of our friends, agree that military cooperation is necessary.

The command will administer the U.S. security assistance program in the region. It will control U.S. military forces that may be in the region for exercises or peacetime operations. It will plan for other peacetime functions that our unified commands perform, such as noncombatant evacuation and emergency disaster assistance to nations in the region.

Most importantly, the command will make its contribution to that fundamental element of United States strategy, the prevention of war, and do it in the same way that the other unified and specified commands do. The command will be ready to carry out its directed wartime missions in the region as circumstances should require.

There are several things the command will not become. It is not a force built to meddle in the affairs of countries in the region. It is not a force built to acquire territory for the United States.

I have known and worked with General Kingston for some years. He is an officer with great talent as a planner and trainer, but it is his reputation for audacity and success on the battlefield for which he is most widely known. The Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen who will work for

continued on page 8

U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility



THE FREEZE*continued from page 1*

Furthermore, a freeze would reduce our ability to deter nuclear war by forcing the cancellation of necessary U.S. strategic systems which are crucial to securing a strong and credible second-strike capability. All of our long-overdue strategic modernization programs such as the MX, the B-1, the TRIDENT submarine and TRIDENT II missile, as well as cruise missiles, would be canceled. The accelerated production and deployment of these systems, and the implementation of various quick fixes to our current strategic nuclear forces, is essential if we are to enhance the survivability of our strategic nuclear deterrent and preserve credible options for retaliation should deterrence fail. The irony of the situation is that these systems have been designed partially to offset the vulnerabilities of our current strategic forces brought about by the very Soviet buildup which a nuclear freeze would legitimize. By allowing the Soviets to maintain their existing nuclear preponderance, a nuclear freeze would actually reward the Soviet Union for its successful effort to make our strategic forces vulnerable while penalizing the United States for its previous strategic restraint by prohibiting us from modernizing our systems and reducing their vulnerabilities caused by the Soviet buildup. The logic of allowing such a situation to persist is incomprehensible.

Further complicating our ability to maintain an effective deterrent is the fact that a nuclear freeze would leave unscathed a number of Soviet programs which could increasingly threaten the effectiveness of our current strategic arsenal. For example, while a freeze would force cancellation of our plans to deploy newer nuclear submarines less susceptible to detection and destruction, it would do nothing to impede development of the impressive Soviet anti-submarine warfare (ASW) program.

Likewise, a freeze would force us to rely on an aging fleet of B-52 bombers increasingly incapable of penetrating Soviet air defenses which could be extensively upgraded outside the constraints of a nuclear freeze.

Most disturbing, however, is the impact of a nuclear freeze on solving

our most pressing strategic problem—closing the window of vulnerability. The current vulnerability of our ICBM force has dangerous implications for global stability. The Soviet Union now has the ability to destroy virtually all our land-based missiles with only a fraction of their own. This capability radiates intimidating power throughout the Western world. It is a situation which the United States can not afford to accept.

The timely deployment of a survivability based ICBM would alleviate the problems associated with the window of vulnerability. A nuclear freeze would simply perpetuate them.

For all these reasons, the idea of a nuclear freeze is an idea which deserves to be put in cold storage. □

ROA WASHINGTON REPORT*continued from page 2*

thereof." And the positions taken in the newsletter will reflect the same guidance plus that provided by the resolutions passed by the national conventions.

The committee has provided some additional parameters. The contents of this newsletter will not be service parochial but instead will address issues which are significant elements of the national security picture. The newsletter will not look to the "give me" concerns which are important from the aspect of morale and personal security but which are not necessarily those affecting the future of the country. Finally, the product will not be an in-house newsletter with chit-chat about the members.

Here's what the committee decided, as reflected in the minutes of its fall meeting: "The objective of the publication will be as a forum of the vital issues that affect our national defense. It should avoid service and Reserve parochialism and be devoted as objectively as possible to broad national defense concerns."

It is hoped that this sample issue fulfills that description. Funding permitting, the plan is to start a regular publication schedule this summer, initially on a bi-monthly frequency and ultimately monthly. The issues will be completely separate from *The Officer* magazine and mailed to the membership in the middle of the month.

Meanwhile, your comments and suggestions would be appreciated. And, of course, your financial support.

—HMH

ROA WASHINGTON REPORT

A project of the Defense Education Fund of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States, 1 Constitution Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002. This is a pilot edition distributed as a supplement to *The Officer* magazine of the ROA.

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Defense Education Fund Committee

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Captain Philip A. Whitacre, USNR, *chairman*; Major General Richard Mulberry, Jr., USMCR; Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Droms, Jr., USAR; Major Edward T. Tait, USAR.

Publications Subcommittee

Rear Admiral Paul E. Rohrer, USNR (Ret), *chairman*; Lieutenant Colonel Roy B. Root, USA (Ret); Captain John P. Lynker, USCGR; Captain David L. Woods, USNR; Colonel Milton E. Mitler, USAFR (Ret); Colonel Norman Burzynski, USAFR.

COLONEL HERBERT M. HART,
USMC (Ret)
EDITOR

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UNIFIED COMMAND*continued from page 7*

him need to know that they have a top-notch commander in whom the President, the Secretary of Defense and the JCS have great confidence.

The command is a signal to everyone concerned, friends and possible foes, that the United States has a great interest in the region, that we stand ready to defend those interests and to help promote peace and stability in cooperation with our friends in the region. The command will be a force for peace by being ready for war. □



Reserve Officers Association of the United States



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ARMY ★ NAVY ★ AIR FORCE ★ MARINE CORPS ★ COAST GUARD ★ PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ★ NOAA

10 February 1983

Mr. Morton Blackwell
Special Assistant to the President
Office of Public Liaison
Old Executive Office Building
Room 191, The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. ~~Blackwell~~: *Morton*

Enclosed is a copy of the newly published pilot edition of the "ROA Washington Report," a new project of the Defense Education Fund of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States.

Several years ago ROA considered a proposal that we establish a Defense Education Fund. This would be supported by contributions from the members with the objectives of informing the members about national security matters and passing ROA's positions on these issues to the policy makers on Capitol Hill, in the White House, and at the Pentagon.

The program will be in accordance with our Congressional charter "to support an adequate national security and the execution thereof." The orientation will be national security, not just the reserve aspects although obviously we consider them as important integral parts of it. Our first step will be this newsletter.

This pilot issue has just been published. This is merely a prototype. Everything, including the name, is only tentative.

We hope to start regular publication in the summer. Frequency initially will be bi-monthly with the plan to go to monthly as soon as funding permits.

(It may be that you have a message that you think would be appropriate for publication in a future issue of the ROA Washington Report. If so, please let me know.

Sincerely,
J. Milnor Roberts
J. Milnor Roberts
Major General, AUS (Ret.)
Executive Director

JMR:ba

Enclosure

ROA WASHINGTON REPORT



The National Security Newsletter of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States. Pilot Issue, February 1983

A Cold Shoulder for the Freeze

By David J. Trachtenberg

The idea of a nuclear freeze leaves me cold.

The fundamental problem with a nuclear freeze is that it seeks to do what it can not (decrease the likelihood of nuclear war) by actually doing what it should not (reducing our ability to prevent nuclear war).

Preventing nuclear war is what deterrence is all about. And deterrence can only be effective if the United States is committed to the maintenance of a strong, secure and credible second-strike capability. However, two decades of Soviet action and relative American inaction have resulted in an erosion of the credibility of our strategic nuclear deterrent and a situation of rough nuclear equivalency has given way to one of clear-cut Soviet nuclear superiority.

The existence of enormous Soviet advantages in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces is a well-documented fact. One need only look at the trends in the nuclear balance over the last two decades to appreciate this fully. In virtually every significant category (missile throw-weight, equivalent megatonnage, prompt hard-target kill capability,

etc.) the Soviet Union commands a substantial advantage.

The implications of Soviet strategic superiority are ominous, yet they are commonly ignored by advocates of a



nuclear freeze. The strategic deterrent is the high ground which overshadows all other use of military force. If Soviet dominance of the strategic nuclear level is allowed to persist, Soviet policymakers may—and almost certainly will—feel freer to use force at lower levels, confident that the United States will shy away from the threat of escalation. A nuclear freeze would sanction the existing strategic nuclear imbalance, increasing the risk of Soviet aggression and undermining global stability. By doing so, it would violate the basic goals of arms control. After all, what kind of arms control is it that sanctions instability?

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David J. Trachtenberg is a defense analyst with the Committee on the Present Danger. He expresses his own views in this piece written for ROA.

TO EDUCATE, TO INFORM

This is the first edition of the ROA Washington Report, a newsletter designed to educate the 126,000 members of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States and to inform policy makers of ROA's position on national security.

ROA Washington Report is funded by the ROA Defense Education Fund which is supported by contributions from the members of ROA.

This is a preliminary edition. Its format, contents, and name all are tentative, and suggestions for improvement are invited.

Although this issue is being distributed as an insert in The Officer magazine, future issues will be sent separately, usually two weeks after The Officer. Bi-monthly publication is tentatively planned to begin in summer, 1983. □

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ROA Washington Report Wrap-up

The eight pages that you have just read are samples of what the Defense Education Fund Committee hopes to publish regularly in a few months. Readers are asked to consider them and to pass along their thoughts, especially constructive criticism, to the committee at the Minute Man Memorial Building, 1 Constitution Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002.

Publication of this issue is the culmination of at least four years of effort by many members of the Reserve Officers Association. The records fill several file folders as they recount discussions at a number of places and by many members. The final decision to establish the fund was delayed several years so that details could be worked out. The national convention at San Juan last June settled the matter and the ROA Defense Education Fund was born.

Working by committee often has its hazards and it is said that such an arrangement came up with a camel when a horse was the original objective. It is hoped that the Defense Education committee had better luck and that the readers will consider this product as a thoroughbred rather than a denizen of the desert.

The committee considered many formats and objectives in determining what would be the first product. The extremes ranged from a five-column newspaper to an annual single-topic oriented book. The final recommendation to the executive committee was the newsletter that now has been produced. The committee gave its approval in December and this pilot edition is the result.

This newsletter will have two objectives. The first will be to educate the members of ROA so that they will be able to keep abreast of the status of America's national security. The second will be to inform the decision makers in Washington, both on Capitol Hill and in the Pentagon, the positions that ROA is taking on these important issues.

These dual missions are in accordance with ROA's Congressional charter to "support an adequate national security" and the execution
continued on page 8

President Reagan Responds to ROA Resolutions

Informed of ROA's resolutions on America's strategic capabilities, space exploration, and the POW/MIA issue, President Reagan sent these comments.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

I regret the delay in responding to your letter of September 16, but I wanted to thank you personally for your kind words. You were good to



share with me the resolutions adopted by the National Convention of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States.

As I outlined in my Address to the Nation on November 22, rebuilding the defenses of this nation and improving our strategic capability are absolutely necessary if we are to counter the massive Soviet buildup. Unless we pursue this path, the parallel path of negotiations and arms reductions will elude us. I am pleased to know that the members of the Reserve Officers Association understand this issue so well.

My Administration is committed to a policy of space exploration in support of our national well-being. We retain as goals the use of space to strengthen the security of our nation and to support our right of self-defense. This approach includes the development of an anti-satellite capability and measures to enhance communications, navigation, envi-

ronmental monitoring, warning, surveillance and space defense. At the same time, we remain open to measures for verifiable and equitable arms control in space.

In addition to these matters, I am aware of the particular concern that so many have expressed regarding the situation of Americans still missing in Indochina and Korea. I can assure you that we are actively and consistently pursuing the fullest possible accounting of our missing servicemen. We are pleased that in September the Vietnamese government agreed to a long-standing U.S. proposal that both sides meet regularly to discuss resolution of the POW/MIA issue.

The Vietnamese and Lao governments have stated that they accept in principle the humanitarian obligation to account as fully as possible for missing Americans, and we are convinced that they have sufficient information to resolve the status of many cases. In addition to our diplomatic efforts, we are seeking information from Indochinese refugees and other sources that might shed light on the fate of Americans lost in connection with the Vietnam War. Although we have thus far been unable to substantiate any reports of Americans being held against their will in Indochina, we are proceeding on the assumption that at least some Americans are still held captive.

Achieving a full account, and securing the return of any Americans now being held, are matters of the highest national priority. Knowing of your deep concern helps strengthen our unity of resolve in this regard, and I am grateful for your encouragement. Please extend my best wishes and thanks to all of the members of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States.

May God bless you.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Reserve Components Critical to MAC

By General James R. Allen, USAF

Members of the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard make substantial contributions to the national defense. For example, in the Military Airlift Command (MAC), there are not enough active duty people to perform all of our many and varied missions. We rely on Reserve and Guard members to help, and they do a magnificent job. They are so thoroughly integrated into the command on a daily basis that they virtually are indistinguishable from their active duty counterparts. That is the way it should be because we truly are a total force in peacetime just as we would be in a national emergency.

During the early stages of a contingency, the President would have the authority to call up to 100,000 reserve personnel prior to a declaration of national emergency. Of that total, up to approximately 40,000 would join MAC, and I have com-



General James R. Allen, USAF, is the Commander-in-Chief of the Military Airlift Command.

plete confidence in their ability to make an immediate contribution to our overall airlift capability.

Last spring MAC took part in exercise Gallant Eagle in the California desert. A highlight of that exercise was one of the biggest airdrop opera-

"These Reservists are highly experienced and skilled, some even more so than those on active duty."

tions since World War II. Out of 90 planned MAC aircraft, 88 dropped on the drop zone, all within 30 seconds of the scheduled time over target. The Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard played essential roles in the success of that exercise.

Within MAC we have six active duty strategic airlift wings which are comprised of 77 C-5s and 268 C-141s, all of which have intercontinental range. In time of crisis, they would be used to deploy combat forces to overseas theaters. Each of those wings has an Air Force Reserve affiliated wing

which consists of flight crews and support personnel who operate and maintain those aircraft right along with the active duty people.

These Reservists are highly experienced and skilled, some even more so than those on active duty. Thus the Air Force Reserves provide almost one half of our inter-theater airlift capability.

Concurrently, almost 60 percent of our tactical, or intra-theater, airlift capability is in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. In peacetime, these components operate their own C-7s, C-123s and C-130s. They also provide augmentation for MAC's Air Weather Service, the aeromedical evacuation mission, the rescue and recovery forces, aerial port squadrons and medical service squadrons, as well as a hospital and three clinics.

Overall, MAC-gained Reserve Component personnel number 18,000 in the Air Force Reserve and 37,000 in the Air National Guard. The critical importance of those Reserve forces is recognized throughout the Military Airlift Command. We simply could not do our job without them. □



Sealift Lacking to Project U.S. Power Overseas

By Vice Admiral Kent J. Carroll, USN

It's no exaggeration to say our country's merchant marine is floundering in the worst shipping slump in 50 years. I am worried. The more I see our merchant fleet decline, the more I see a blueprint for chaos develop, especially if this country faces a national emergency which requires deployment of our combat power.

Does it really matter if the United States has no merchant marine? You bet it does. If the whistle blew today, our own sea lines of communication might have to be filled largely by foreign flag ships. That doesn't make sense to me. A strong merchant marine, just as much as a strong Navy, is the basis of any nation's seapower.

We needed our merchant ships in World War II. About 1,700 merchant ships were called into service to support the U.S. Navy; and more than 700 went to the bottom in that conflict. That's more, by the way, than the number of U.S. Navy warships sunk in that war—and more than the number of U.S. merchant ships in our entire U.S. flag fleet today.

Vice Admiral Kent J. Carroll, USN, Commander, Military Sealift Command, provided this material to ROA after a speech to the New Orleans chapter of the National Defense Transportation Association on Dec. 16, 1982.



We called again upon our merchant fleet to support us during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. U.S. flag ships brought almost all the fuel and supplies consumed by our fighting troops.

It wouldn't be any different today.

We will need every U.S. ship we can lay hands on if we ever face a major overseas conflict again on the magnitude of a Korea or Vietnam. U.S. flag merchant shipping is a keystone to our military conventional strategy.

All but two of our allies are located overseas, and to meet alliance commitments, the United States maintains 1/4 of our ground combat power outside the continental United States. In time of war, these allies and our own overseas troops are going to have to be reinforced and resupplied. In addition, the remaining 3/4's of our ground combat power is stationed within the continental United States. If these troops are to fight in time of war, they must be transported overseas. This means more than personnel, it

means transporting the combat support and combat service support they need which can weigh more than 100,000 tons per armored division.

That means the successful employment and sustainability of ground combat power is transportation dependent—and the transportation mode

that must convey more than 90 per cent of that lift is SEALIFT! To airlift one armored division would take the all out effort of the entire airlift fleet over a period of at least a month to deploy to the Persian Gulf.

To put it simply: sealift in merchant type vessels will bring about 95 per cent of all dry cargo and more than 99 per cent of fuel shipments. Fuel shipments will outweigh all categories of dry cargo combined, whether delivered by sea or air.

This reliance on merchant shipping to support combat operations isn't peculiar to this country. When Britain put together her naval task force which sailed to the Falkland Islands, the majority of participating ships were U.K. merchant ships.

Merchant shipping also supports combat operations in another way. We need at least 22 imported strategic materials to produce equipment for defense purposes—and these materials are so bulky they move in ship bottoms. If we have to rely on foreign flag vessels, there's a chance they might not reach our shores in times of heightened international tension.

We must restore our merchant ma-

“(Sealift) will play a vital part in deploying and sustaining our combat troops abroad and the very start of operations.”

rine to health. It's a sinking industry. Just consider that:

- Less than 4 percent of this nation's oceanborne foreign commerce is carried by this country's merchant marine compared to nearly 35 percent in 1952.
- Thirty years ago, we had more than 1,400 privately owned ocean-going ships employed. Today, we barely have 500. The National Defense Reserve Fleet has declined similarly. In 1952, we had 1,853 ships in the reserve fleet. Today, we have less than 200 and most of them are nearly 40 years old.
- The number of seagoing jobs in the U.S. private maritime industry continues to decline. There are now less than 18,000 deepsea billets compared to over 70,000 thirty years ago.

Despite these depressing words, there are some bright spots.

The Reagan Administration has made a firm commitment to stop the decline of the U.S. Merchant Marine and is acting with the support of maritime labor.

We are making some progress.

The President and the Department of Defense recognize the importance of sealift to this nation's strategic mobility. Not only is more emphasis being put on existing sealift programs than all the years since WWII, but a number of entirely new programs are underway.



For example, we now have a Near Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF) in place in the Indian Ocean, ready to help out if we should ever have to deploy combat power to Southwest Asia. A little over two years ago, we had no ships positioned in the Indian Ocean; today we have 17 on station. All of these ships are chartered merchant ships manned by civilians and all of these ships carry cargo for our troops. By this program alone we have more than doubled our ability to deploy combat power to Southwest Asia in the first 30 days.

We will have more than tripled our ability to deploy combat power to that part of the world when our two new programs—the expanded maritime prepositioning and fast sealift programs—are complete. Contracts have been awarded to start these programs.

These three programs mark the start of a renaissance in military sealift. No longer is sealift relegated to playing a minor supporting role in the long-term reinforcement of troops deployed overseas. It now will play a vital part in deploying and sustaining

our combat troops abroad from the very start of operations. I think this nation's concern over what would happen if we had to deploy troops to the Persian Gulf has played a larger part in this emphasis on sealift.

In a Persian Gulf scenario, we are very far from home—over 8,000 miles away, and

face fighting in an area where we can't be sure of allies. Prepositioning sealift is one answer. Ships can be in place already loaded with cargo.

Where political decisions are likely to be delayed, there is no real substitute for forces on station in or near a threatened region to make a rapid response feasible like our maritime prepositioned forces and Naval battle groups. Navy and the U.S. Merchant Marine are working together to make sure this country has the sealift it needs.

Various Navy sealift enhancement programs will pump more than \$15 billion into the maritime economy over the next five years. This includes money paid out directly to the industry by Navy which includes operation of MSC's controlled fleet and business generated by Navy programs such as ship building and charter programs.

Navy programs will help industry, but it must become commercially viable on its own again. If not, our declining American merchant marine might well turn out to be the “strategic missing link” rather than our “fourth arm of defense.” □

Upgraded Industrial Base Critical for Defense

By Stewart B. McKinney, M.C.

When the 97th Congress reconvened in November for a "lame duck" session, the pressing issue was the unacceptably high level of unemployment facing our nation. Sadly, this belatedly had become the overriding concern of the leadership of both chambers when there was the least possibility of drafting legislation to put people to work in a productive and cost-effective manner. However, in the best band-aid tradition, Congress developed a cosmetic, make-work solution.

The sudden enlightenment of my colleagues was disheartening.

The Economic Stabilization Subcommittee of the House Banking Committee, on which I am senior Republican, had explored the problems of unemployment for much of the past two years. But this subcommittee looked well beyond the mere unemployment statistics. What we found was a series of critical problems—a declining number of firms, a growing shortage of skilled personnel, obsolete equipment, little investment in research, and the resulting difficulties in meeting national defense.

Too many people fail to make the connection between the first four items and the vital fifth. But the reality is that currently the U.S. must buy many of its bullets, missiles and submarines abroad. Obviously, that doesn't help domestic unemployment. Just as worrisome, though, is what a deteriorated U.S. industrial base means to meeting national defense needs from domestic resources in time of emergency.



Congressman Stewart B. McKinney represents the 4th district of Connecticut in the U.S. House of Representatives. He prepared this article for ROA.



Greek tanker was last ship to be repaired in Bethlehem Steel Shipyard, Baltimore, Md. (USA Today photo by H. Darr Beiser.)

To be more specific, we are more than 50 percent dependent on foreign sources for 23 of the 40 materials considered critical by the defense industry. By contrast, the Soviet Union is self-sufficient on 35 of the 40 critical materials and meets half of its needs for the remaining five domestically. Or, looking at manpower, the Pentagon lists 73 skills as currently in short supply. The tooling and precision machine industry would hire 60,000 journeymen today if they were available. Schools, not able to afford new equipment, are training students with technology of the 1960's. Only two 50,000-ton presses, on which all large aircraft and M-1 tank parts are forged, exist in the United States and both are 30-years old. Probably most symptomatic, the "lead time" (the time it takes to fill an order) for many defense items has doubled and tripled since 1978.

The Defense Industrial Base Revitalization Act, drafted after the subcommittee took a long and detailed

look at these problems, provides a much more basic and meaningful way to put U.S. citizenry back to work than the broom pushing schemes debated (and rejected) by the lame duck Congress. The four-pronged proposal would provide financial assistance to small and medium-sized firms for modernizing projects; spur the expansion of domestic production and processing of strategic minerals, metal and materials; establish educational programs for needed technical jobs, and provide grants to higher education institutions for the modern equipment needed to train modern workers.

This approach has been endorsed by a unanimous vote of the National Executive Committee of the Reserve Officers Association. It is also supported by a coalition of military, business, labor and educational groups. However, the bill was lost in the last-minute look for easy answers. It is my hope that the 98th Congress will exercise more foresight when the bill is re-introduced in 1983. Prompt passage will move us towards a stronger America—economically and defensively. □

Newest Unified Command Watches U.S. Interests in the Middle East

By General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA

By law, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have the mission to establish unified and specified commands in strategic areas.

On Jan. 1, 1983, by order of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the United States Central Command — USCENTCOM — and Lieutenant General Robert C. Kingston was designated as Commander.

Forces were assigned and represented at the activation ceremony on Jan. 5, 1983. CENTCOM now joins eight other unified and specified commands worldwide helping the U.S. in maintaining the peace.

CENTCOM's area of responsibility is large geographically. It extends from Egypt west to Pakistan; from Jordan south to Kenya. It includes vast land areas on two continents.

The region has great historical significance. It is the birthplace of western civilization; the genesis of three of the world's great religions; it has been the historic land-bridge for trade between Europe and the East. It has been the scene of battles, conquests and empires whose numbers alone stagger the imagination.

Most important for the United States, the region has great contemporary importance. It is comprised of diverse, proud peoples who love freedom and share a common hope for peace. It continues to encompass important trade routes. The area contains mineral wealth that is absolutely vital to the world's economic well-being. It contains 19 independent nations with a variety of governmental forms and political leanings.



General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided these comments to ROA, drawing on his talk upon the commissioning of the U.S. Central Command on Jan. 5, 1983.

Unfortunately, at this moment the region is not totally at peace: there are wars and rumors of war. That's not unusual; that's part of that world. For the United States the region is truly a strategic area. It is indeed fitting that this command be established.

It is important for the world to know why it has been created. The command is to represent the United States militarily in the region. The command will be the U.S. vehicle for military cooperation with friendly governments in the region when the governments concerned, our own and those of our friends, agree that military cooperation is necessary.

The command will administer the U.S. security assistance program in the region. It will control U.S. military forces that may be in the region for exercises or peacetime operations. It will plan for other peacetime functions that our unified commands perform, such as noncombatant evacuation and emergency disaster assistance to nations in the region.

Most importantly, the command will make its contribution to that fundamental element of United States strategy, the prevention of war, and do it in the same way that the other unified and specified commands do. The command will be ready to carry out its directed wartime missions in the region as circumstances should require.

There are several things the command will not become. It is not a force built to meddle in the affairs of countries in the region. It is not a force built to acquire territory for the United States.

I have known and worked with General Kingston for some years. He is an officer with great talent as a planner and trainer, but it is his reputation for audacity and success on the battlefield for which he is most widely known. The Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen who will work for

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U.S. Central Command
Area of Responsibility



THE FREEZE

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Furthermore, a freeze would reduce our ability to deter nuclear war by forcing the cancellation of necessary U.S. strategic systems which are crucial to securing a strong and credible second-strike capability. All of our long-overdue strategic modernization programs such as the MX, the B-1, the TRIDENT submarine and TRIDENT II missile, as well as cruise missiles, would be canceled. The accelerated production and deployment of these systems, and the implementation of various quick fixes to our current strategic nuclear forces, is essential if we are to enhance the survivability of our strategic nuclear deterrent and preserve credible options for retaliation should deterrence fail. The irony of the situation is that these systems have been designed partially to offset the vulnerabilities of our current strategic forces brought about by the very Soviet buildup which a nuclear freeze would legitimize. By allowing the Soviets to maintain their existing nuclear preponderance, a nuclear freeze would actually reward the Soviet Union for its successful effort to make our strategic forces vulnerable while penalizing the United States for its previous strategic restraint by prohibiting us from modernizing our systems and reducing their vulnerabilities caused by the Soviet buildup. The logic of allowing such a situation to persist is incomprehensible.

Further complicating our ability to maintain an effective deterrent is the fact that a nuclear freeze would leave unscathed a number of Soviet programs which could increasingly threaten the effectiveness of our current strategic arsenal. For example, while a freeze would force cancellation of our plans to deploy newer nuclear submarines less susceptible to detection and destruction, it would do nothing to impede development of the impressive Soviet anti-submarine warfare (ASW) program.

Likewise, a freeze would force us to rely on an aging fleet of B-52 bombers increasingly incapable of penetrating Soviet air defenses which could be extensively upgraded outside the constraints of a nuclear freeze.

Most disturbing, however, is the impact of a nuclear freeze on solving

our most pressing strategic problem—closing the window of vulnerability. The current vulnerability of our ICBM force has dangerous implications for global stability. The Soviet Union now has the ability to destroy virtually all our land-based missiles with only a fraction of their own. This capability radiates intimidating power throughout the Western world. It is a situation which the United States can not afford to accept.

The timely deployment of a survivability based ICBM would alleviate the problems associated with the window of vulnerability. A nuclear freeze would simply perpetuate them.

For all these reasons, the idea of a nuclear freeze is an idea which deserves to be put in cold storage. □

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COLONEL HERBERT M. HART,
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EDITOR

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ROA WASHINGTON REPORT

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thereof." And the positions taken in the newsletter will reflect the same guidance plus that provided by the resolutions passed by the national conventions.

The committee has provided some additional parameters. The contents of this newsletter will not be service parochial but instead will address issues which are significant elements of the national security picture. The newsletter will not look to the "give me" concerns which are important from the aspect of morale and personal security but which are not necessarily those affecting the future of the country. Finally, the product will not be an in-house newsletter with chit-chat about the members.

Here's what the committee decided, as reflected in the minutes of its fall meeting: "The objective of the publication will be as a forum of the vital issues that affect our national defense. It should avoid service and Reserve parochialism and be devoted as objectively as possible to broad national defense concerns."

It is hoped that this sample issue fulfills that description. Funding permitting, the plan is to start a regular publication schedule this summer, initially on a bi-monthly frequency and ultimately monthly. The issues will be completely separate from *The Officer* magazine and mailed to the membership in the middle of the month.

Meanwhile, your comments and suggestions would be appreciated. And, of course, your financial support. —HMH

UNIFIED COMMAND

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him need to know that they have a top-notch commander in whom the President, the Secretary of Defense and the JCS have great confidence.

The command is a signal to everyone concerned, friends and possible foes, that the United States has a great interest in the region, that we stand ready to defend those interests and to help promote peace and stability in cooperation with our friends in the region. The command will be a force for peace by being ready for war. □



Reserve Officers Association of the United States



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ARMY * NAVY * AIR FORCE * MARINE CORPS * COAST GUARD * PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE * NOAA

14 January 1983

Mr. Morton C. Blackwell
Office of Public Liaison
Room 191, OE0B
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Blackwell:


Our Association's 1983 Mid-Winter Conference will be held on 21-23 February at the Washington Hilton Hotel, bringing together Regular and Reserve Officers of all Military Services from throughout the United States.

Our Annual Mid-Winter Banquet on Wednesday, 23 February, will be the climax of our Conference. At that time we will honor our Commander-in-Chief, President Ronald Reagan, who will be given ROA's Minute Man of the Year Award as "the citizen who has contributed most to National Security."

This is a most cordial invitation to you and your lady to join us in honoring President Reagan. The Banquet will be held in the Ballroom of the Washington Hilton Hotel, with a cocktail reception at 6:45 p.m. and dinner at 7:30 p.m.

We hope very much that you can be with us for this occasion.

Cordially yours,


J. Milnor Roberts
Major General, AUS(Ret.)
Executive Director

JMR/gw

Dress: Black Tie
Winter Mess Dress

R.S.V.P. 1 Constitution Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
Or: Grace White (202) 479-2200



Reserve Officers Association of the United States



National Headquarters • MINUTE MAN MEMORIAL BUILDING
1 CONSTITUTION AVENUE, N.E., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002
TELEPHONE 202/479-2200

ARMY * NAVY * AIR FORCE * MARINE CORPS * COAST GUARD * PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE * NOAA

5 July 1983

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

will send US 6.

Dear Mr. President:

Enclosed are a half dozen copies of the newly published "ROA National Security Report" with your piece on page 2.

Thank you for permitting ROA to use your work. It is a significant contribution to this issue and particularly important at this time in demonstrating to our members the nature of articles planned for future editions.

This issue has been distributed to the 126,000 members of ROA; U. S. general and flag officers of all seven uniformed services, reserve, guard, and regular; the members of the Congress and key staff members of appropriate committees; and our media list of more than 1,000 publications, including all service post, station, ship, and base newspapers.

Again, thank you for your support. Please keep ROA in mind if you have another message that we could use in our defense education newsletter.

Sincerely,

J. Milnor Roberts
Major General, AUS (Ret.)
Executive Director

JMR/jbh

bcc: Mr. Morton Blackwell
encls

«Advanced copy»

Col Minter L. Wilson, Jr., USA-Ret.
Editor



**The Retired Officer
Magazine**

201 N. Washington St.
Alexandria, VA 22314
(703) 549-2311

EDITORIAL

By Col Minter L. Wilson Jr., USA-Ret., Editor

A Word of Caution

As we go to press, TROA's president has dispatched an important letter to President Reagan. It is printed below in its entirety, changed only to insert subheads for ease of reading.

Anyone who has served in the military realizes that there is little comparison between military and civilian careers. Part and parcel of the military are the greatly misunderstood benefits. The need for superior weapons is appreciated by all. Less understood is the need for those things which make the military community unique: commissaries, post exchanges, medical care, clubs, athletic facilities, space available travel—all have a symbolic significance that overrides their dollar value many times. They help create an all-important sense of community without which it would be difficult to sustain the total faith and support of the military family.

Most importantly, retired pay is again under attack and "this is no drill." As noted below and in *Washington Scene* on pages 8-9, the assault this time comes from the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control. Every concerned citizen should care about the outcome. A vigorous, vital, quality military force may not be sustainable if the proposed slashes ignore the present and future impact on the military institution.

Dear Mr. President:

Our Association has applauded and supported your emphasis on military preparedness. A key TROA goal through the years has been "advocacy of military forces adequate to the defense of our country." We believe, as you do, that previous administrations during the decade of the 1970s, given the deadly purposes of our potential enemy, did not do enough for military preparedness.

As a result of your emphasis on re-

building our military forces, there is renewed esprit in our truly professional armed services. My recent visits with each of the service chiefs of staff were tremendously reassuring. I found a great upbeat feeling in terms of increasing capabilities to meet our responsibilities. In the words of one chief, "We were a country overexposed and underinsured. We were in a downward spiral toward inferiority." Presidential support is correcting that and it's being reflected by the sergeants in the field.

SCARE HEADLINES

At the same time, Mr. President, another of your initiatives has the potential of destroying the outstanding defense progress made to date. I refer to the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (PPSSCC). Reports of the various Task Forces are prominently displayed in this nation's press despite the fact that their recommendations are tentative and you have not endorsed them. Nevertheless, the scare headlines and tentative conclusions are causing considerable concern among the men and women of the Uniformed Services.

As you know, the military compensation system, to include retirement, has been developed over the past century, not to meet civilian-like pension and other objectives, but to fulfill the essential management requirement of shaping and sizing an effective and combat-ready military force.

From time to time, critics suggest that the military compensation system should be more in line with the Civil Service, Congressional or systems used by private industry. Such is the case with the PPSSCC. What they seem to forget is that the management requirements of the Armed Services are totally different, orienting as they do toward preparing for and engaging the enemy in combat, should deterrence fail.

NOT AGAINST CHANGE

We do not argue against changes. To the contrary, it is essential that the sys-


tem be kept abreast of the times and attuned to the key management function it must perform. But the signals coming from your PPSSCC are the wrong ones. Those signals say, in effect, "We're going to slash your compensation drastically by reducing retired pay and health benefits and eliminating the commissaries in the United States." Talk of cuts always creates concern among the troops and hurts morale. So, it is unfortunate that the PPSSCC focused primarily on cost reductions with too little study of the impact on the forces. Premature presidential endorsement would be even more counterproductive.

There is a statutory requirement for the Department of Defense to review the military compensation system and recommend appropriate changes to the President and Congress. The mechanism for this is the Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC). The fifth such review of all aspects of military compensation has been underway for many months. And, in fact, you have charged the Fifth QRMC to review the retirement system in relation to its contribution to our national defense. The results are expected by October 1983.

WITHHOLD ENDORSEMENT

We urge, Mr. President, that you withhold your endorsement of any changes to the military compensation system until the QRMC report has been considered. Since people are the most important component of military readiness, we must ensure that their compensation system remains one which supports dedicated, trained, military forces in a highly competitive environment.

Respectfully,



GEORGE S. BLANCHARD
General, USA, Retired
President