

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Blackwell, Morton: Files
Folder Title: Military Issues (1 of 9)
Box: 12

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

*file
Defense*

ARMS CONTROL & U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

FATAL FLAWS OF SALT II



Published by The Foreign Affairs Council, 325 Constitution Avenue, N.E., Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20002, (202) 543-5121. Additional copies of this publication are available for purchase from the Council at \$3.50 per copy.

The Foreign Affairs Council is a publicly supported, non-partisan educational institution dedicated to a better public understanding of the United States and its position in world affairs. The Council undertakes original research, conducts seminars and publishes articles and books based on its findings.

Arms Control and U.S. Foreign Policy

Fatal Flaws of SALT II

By David S. Sullivan

November 1980
Washington, D.C.

Arms Control and U.S. Foreign Policy JAMES H. DUFFY

James H. Duffy
Legislative Assistant
U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C.

Author's Note

This booklet was written in the Summer of 1980 and was prepared for publication in October 1980. Due to a backlog in publication commitments, its publication has been delayed. During this period the author was a legislative assistant to several conservative Senators. It is largely a critique of the Carter Administration's strategic and arms control policies, but remains relevant today in the reformulation of strategic and SALT policy now taking place under the new Reagan Administration.

The text of this publication has been thoroughly reviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency and contains no classified information.

Contents

Summary	i
Introduction: The Dawning Of The New Age Of Soviet Nuclear Blackmail	1
The Eight Fatal Flaws Of Salt II	3
Some Technical SALT II Flaws	9
SALT II In Balance	10
U.S. Strategic Posture Is Already Approaching Minimum Deterrence	11
SALT II Constrains The U.S. Much More Than The Soviets	14
Summary Of Carter's Strategic Cutbacks	20
Paradoxical SALT Intelligence Estimates	22
SALT II Codifies Soviet Superiority	24
U.S. Failure In Long-Term Strategic Planning	25
Predominance Of The Soviet Military	26
Declining U.S. Bargaining Leverage	26
The Opening Threat Window	27
Need For New U.S. Strategic Doctrine	27
Rapid Force Improvements	28
Footnotes	34
The Author	35

Summary

Soviet spokesmen now are openly admitting that the U.S.S.R. has exploited the 1969-1980 decade of detente and SALT to mislead the West into complacency, while using the Western credits, trade, technology and grain derived from detente to pursue a relentless strategic buildup. Key top American leaders have also publicly conceded recently that Kremlin oligarchs deceived them in Moscow in 1972 on all the key issues of the SALT I agreements. Since as early as 1971, Moscow has been steadily outpacing America in the accumulation of military power, despite SALT negotiations. It is clear that an historic shift in the balance of military power occurred during the 1970s, the decade of detente and SALT, and the shift continues.

By 1975, the Ford Administration finally realized the danger of the growing Soviet strategic buildup, and President Ford wisely planned an American strategic buildup sufficient to match the Soviet threat. He decided to fully fund the new MX Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the new Trident submarine, the new B-1 bomber, and the new air launched cruise missiles. These programs were all of top priority and were included in Ford's Fiscal Year 1976 Defense Budget, the first American defense budget to fund a real increase in defense spending since the mid-1960s (exclusive of Vietnam war spending). Had the Ford schedule been carried out, the U.S. might have regained strategic parity by their deployment before the early 1980s.

Due to the seriousness of the growing Soviet threat, in 1976 President Ford also ordered the CIA to conduct its first experiment in competitive intelligence estimating. He organized the famous "A Team—B Team" competitive analysis of the objectives and scope of the Soviet strategic buildup. The B Team was composed of outside experts on the Soviet threat. The CIA was the A Team. In late 1976, the B Team soundly concluded that U.S.-Soviet strategic parity was eroding in Soviet favor, and that growing Soviet strategic superiority was due to their accelerating deployment of multiple (MIRV) warheads on their new missiles, and also to their rapid improvement in the accuracy of their new missiles. In 1976, the B Team realistically projected that the rapidly growing Soviet counterforce capability threatening American strategic forces could cause the United States to be strategically inferior to the U.S.S.R. by as early as 1980. The A Team or CIA estimate was in contrast decidedly optimistic, reportedly projecting a delayed Soviet counterforce threat only *after* 1985.

In early 1977, the new Carter Administration rejected the ominous conclusions of the sound and realistic B Team estimate. Instead, President Carter believed the CIA and chose to ignore the compelling evidence of the seriously worsening strategic trends, asserting complacently that strategic parity was permanent and would not erode.

Carter's Presidential Review Memorandum 10 of early 1977 expressed the hope that arms control would somehow solve our strategic problems and preserve parity with the Soviets. One Carter national security advisor even openly advocated U.S. surrender of any remaining strategic advantages we possessed. Based upon these naive views, the Carter Administration unilaterally cutback both existing and planned U.S. strategic forces so drastically that we have now reached a posture of inferiority and minimum deterrence, while ignoring the relentless Soviet strategic build-up. Carter also ignored continued Soviet deception and duplicity in negotiating SALT II. The resulting Carter SALT II Treaty signed in June 1979 was therefore understandably unequal, destabilizing, and largely unverifiable. SALT II, like SALT I before it, merely codified a growing strategic imbalance in favor of the Soviets.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of the Strategic Air Command recently confirmed the validity of the B Team's realistic estimate of 1976. Our military leaders now publicly concede that since the Carter Administration came to power in 1977, the United States has become inferior to the Soviet Union in strategic forces. Our military also states that America may not be able to overcome this strategic inferiority during the next *decade*.

In sum, we must conclude that the Carter Administration bears the responsibility for the present dangerous American strategic inferiority to the Soviets, for the following reasons:

- Suppressing accurate intelligence estimates of the growing Soviet threat, while believing unrealistic optimistic intelligence assessments now proven wrong. Top Carter Administration defense officials have recently publicly confessed that in 1977 they grossly *underestimated* the rapidity of both Soviet MIRV missile deployments and accuracy improvements. They concede the grave consequences of their misjudgment.
- Pursuing vague hopes for arms control as the sole solution to the immediate and growing U.S. strategic deficiencies.
- Cutting back unilaterally U.S. strategic forces massively, to the extreme of inferiority and minimum deterrence, while asking for no *quids pro quo* in SALT negotiations with the Soviets.

- Allowing the United States to forfeit strategic "essential equivalence" to the Soviets in 1977, while deliberately creating the long term "window" of our strategic vulnerability lasting from 1980 to 1990.
- Negotiating a fatally flawed SALT II Treaty which would codify American inferiority and vulnerability beyond 1985, and dangerously constrain U.S. strategic options to redress the strategic balance.
- Tolerating large scale Soviet disinformation and hostile propaganda campaigns, Soviet negotiating deception in SALT II, and Soviet violations of SALT I, SALT II, and other arms control agreements.

In January 1980, unanticipated Soviet aggression in Afghanistan finally caused President Carter to ask for an indefinite delay in the U.S. Senate's ratification debate on his fatally flawed SALT II Treaty. President Carter also surprisingly admitted that he had at least learned about the dangers of Soviet diplomatic duplicity and aggressive intentions from the Afghan crisis. He nevertheless believed that the United States still has an international legal obligation to fully comply with all the provisions of SALT II. In effect, this policy decision has meant Presidential ratification of SALT II without the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. The Soviets, in contrast, have authoritatively announced that they will not comply with SALT II until the United States ratifies the Treaty, and their continuous violations of SALT I, SALT II, and the other arms control treaties are consistent with this posture. The Soviets thus have all the benefits of U.S. ratification of SALT II, while themselves accepting none of SALT II's obligations.

SALT II thus continues to impose *de facto* constraints on all U.S. strategic forces, despite the fact that this Presidential compliance policy lacks affirmative legislative support and is contrary to Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961. Unilateral U.S. compliance ordered by President Carter has inevitably caused the debate over the merits and flaws of SALT II to continue. SALT II is dead only as it applies to the Soviets, however, because necessary U.S. programs continue to be constrained by it. Since the election of President Reagan and a Republican Senate, it is now clear that the SALT II Treaty will be withdrawn since President Reagan favors complete renegotiation of SALT II in a new form.

The many important fatal flaws of SALT II need to be more fully analyzed since they form the basis for renewed negotiations with the Soviets. There are at least *eight* fatal flaws of SALT II, of which the four most important are:

- The longstanding Soviet monopoly in heavy ICBMs;

-
- The allowed growth in the already overwhelming Soviet counterforce threat;
 - The failure to limit stockpiled Soviet missiles capable of rapid refire; and
 - The exclusion of the intercontinental Backfire bomber.

Correction of all eight flaws (see below) must be achieved in SALT III.

Far more significant even than the fatally flawed provisions of SALT II are the harmful effects of the Treaty and the SALT negotiating process upon the sound planning of U.S. strategic forces. SALT II has severely damaged American security, but the scope of the damage is still not well known.

Due to the SALT II negotiating process and to Carter Administration unilateral strategic cutbacks, the United States has forfeited well over 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads previously planned by the Ford Administration, and Carter has also cutback 710 strategic delivery vehicles.


In contrast, the Soviets already have over 785 more strategic delivery vehicles than the United States, and have been adding over 1,000 new strategic warheads each year since 1974, an increase of over 6,000. They have almost equalled the United States in our one last remaining advantage, number of warheads. Further, they will be able to legally add over 6,000 *more* warheads to their forces by 1985 to achieve superiority even in warheads.

Before 1985, fully within the terms of SALT II, the Soviets can legally increase their already dangerous strategic counterforce capability and their strategic superiority. They can have over 14,500 mostly large counterforce warheads, compared to the presently planned U.S. total of only 11,900 mostly vulnerable small warheads. They will also have succeeded in excluding from SALT II second-line strategic forces *far more numerous* than their first-line forces, about 3,000 strategic delivery vehicles (some with multiple warheads) *unaccountable* in SALT II and unmatched by the United States.

The optimum time to improve U.S. strategic posture, 1976, has long ago passed, and the urgency of strategic force improvement is clear. We must rapidly improve our strategic forces while we attempt to negotiate an equitable and stabilizing SALT III Treaty with the Soviets. Due to the destabilizing geopolitical dangers inherent in present U.S. strategic inferiority and vulnerability, the Congress should also agree to urgently fund the following ten most reasonable, cost effective, and beneficial rapid strategic force improvements:

-
1. Rebasing part of our Minuteman ICBM force immediately in many new vertical multiple protective structure (MPS) silos. Further, also deploying some 100 extra Minuteman II ICBMs, replaced by 100 presently stockpiled MIRVed Minuteman III ICBMs, in a truck mobile, garrison-based mode. These launchers could be able to move out rapidly onto our interstate highway system within 12 hours of strategic warning;
 2. Acceleration of MX ICBM development for rapid replacement of the Minuteman force in new vertical MPS silos;
 3. Immediate deployment of a mobile and also hardsite ABM defense for both Minuteman and MX;
 4. Initiation of a massive, Manhattan-Project style program to develop and deploy as soon as possible a space-based chemical laser ABM defense;
 5. Immediate increased alert rates and immediate inland basing of our B-52 bomber force;
 6. Immediate mass production of a modified B-1A multi-purpose, stealthy bomber;
 7. Acceleration of Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) mass production and deployment on B-52s, B-1As, and fighter-bombers;
 8. Immediate construction of an operational Extremely Low Frequency communications system to improve Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) survivability;
 9. Retention of our ten Polaris submarines for rapid conversion into Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) platforms; and
 10. Acceleration of Trident submarine construction and rapid expansion of Trident I missile retrofit to all 31 of our Poseidon submarines.

The net effect of the above ten rapid strategic force improvements will be to quickly and significantly enhance the survivability of American strategic forces by as early as 1983. They will also add to the lethality and hence to the deterrent effect of our now dangerously weakened strategic posture.



Introduction: The Dawning Of The New Age Of Soviet Nuclear Blackmail

"In retrospect, the balance sheet of the ten year policy of detente is for us (i.e., the West) a simple negative. While contributing to a weakening of our military and defense readiness, detente has paralyzed us in the ideological dispute, and, not least, had an influence on the destabilization of our democratic social system."

This statement is now a commonplace assessment of detente and arms control in the West. It is a quotation from the West German centrist leader K. Biedenkopf. What is unusual is that such a statement can be quoted approvingly by the Soviets themselves. It appeared in *Kommunist* of July 1980 (pp. 70-81) as an example of the persistence of detente despite the increasingly realistic assessment of detente's dangers in the West. The Soviets believe that even though many Westerners now realize that detente has gravely weakened the West, it is so mortally weakened that there is now no alternative to detente and further appeasement.

As a Soviet writer stated as long ago as 1971: "In fact, a nation's diplomatic activity becomes a part of those non-military means of policy implementation which,...are contained within the concept of the content of war." (*Voenya Mysl*, No. 7, 1971, V. Dimetriyev, emphasis added.) To the Soviets, diplomacy is a facet of war.

Former President Nixon recently conceded that he was *deceived* in Moscow in 1972 on the key provisions of SALT. The Soviets must have conducted SALT I negotiations like war, to gain advantages. Nixon admitted this year: "First, they (the Soviets) try to deceive us, in order to disguise their intentions and make us relax our will...in some cases, such as substitution of the heavy SS-17 and SS-19 ICBMs for the light SS-11s, Soviet force modernization exploited loopholes in the SALT I agreement *contrary to our understanding of that agreement*." (*The Real War*, Richard Nixon, Warner, New York, 1980, pp. 48, 171.)

Soviet public statements indicate clearly that they believe that the world balance of power (the "correlation of forces") shifted decisively in Soviet favor as early as 1971, a whole year before SALT I was signed.

In early 1979, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff finally conceded ominously

that the strategic nuclear balance had long ago shifted against America, because of the unrelenting Soviet strategic buildup after SALT I. Because of President Carter's cutbacks and delays in all our strategic programs, the JCS also warned that the strategic balance could not be improved by our delayed MX, ALCM and Trident strategic modernization programs until the *mid-1980s*.

In February 1980, General Ellis, Commander of the Strategic Air Command, finally echoed the ominous JCS warning with an even more grim revelation. Ellis testified to the Senate that since 1977 we have lost strategic "essential equivalence" to the Soviet Union. But essential equivalence itself has long been recognized by most experts as a euphemism for the American strategic inferiority that has existed through the last 8 years under SALT I. So General Ellis, too, was conceding long-standing American military inferiority to the Soviets.

In January 1980, the JCS predicted more soberly that we will not be able to restore strategic parity until the *late 1980s*. More pessimistically, General Ellis believes that parity cannot be restored by as late as 1990, even *after* our planned MX, ALCM and Trident modernization programs are fully deployed.

American strategic inferiority thus has long been an unfortunate reality. It manifests itself in several forms, one of which is vulnerability.

Both the U.S. SALT I unilateral statement of May 9, 1972 and the Jackson Amendment to SALT I made it clear that enhancing the *survivability* of U.S. strategic forces was to be the fundamental, paramount U.S. goal in seeking a SALT II Treaty. As Senator Jackson precisely stated in regard to SALT I: "The intent of the (SALT I) agreements is to enhance our security by enhancing the survivability of our deterrent." Yet SALT I has allowed U.S. strategic vulnerability to become unprecedented. SALT II has again failed to solve the problem of maintaining survivable U.S. strategic forces.

Beyond American numerical inferiority, Soviet strategic forces of 1980 have already opened a "window of vulnerability" on all U.S. strategic forces, and this window will gape open all the wider throughout SALT II. The SALT process itself has contributed to U.S. strategic vulnerability by offering the false promise that somehow the Soviets would agree to limit their threat to American land-based missiles. Meanwhile, while vainly hoping that the SALT process would solve our ICBM vulnerability problem by encouraging Soviet restraint, we failed to unilaterally solve our own problem through either mobility, active defense, or proliferation of aim points. Now the adverse strategic and military trends against us are unmistakable, and will surely make the 1980s a perilous decade for Americans. The "window of vulnerability" once again leaves America open to Soviet nuclear blackmail, as in the period of Khrushchev's rocket rattling in the 1950s and early 1960s.

But before we analyze SALT II, we need to examine a simplified numerical comparison of United States and Soviet strategic forces. (See chart.)

U.S.-Soviet Strategic Force Numerical Comparisons, 1980-1985

Delivery Vehicles 1980

U.S.	1,865
Soviet	2,650 SALT II accountable (About 2,720 second-line, excluded from SALT II)

Warheads 1980

U.S.	9,000
Soviet	About 8,000

Delivery Vehicles under SALT II 1985

U.S.	2,009
Soviet	2,250 SALT II accountable (About 3,100 second-line forces excluded from SALT II)

Warheads under SALT II 1985

U.S.	11,900
Soviet	About 14,500 (About 4,400 excluded from SALT II)

Sources:

U.S.-Soviet Military Balance by John Collins, McGraw-Hill, 1980.

The Military Balance, 1980-81, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1980.

"Analysis and Compliance Enforcement in SALT Verification" by Senator Gordon Humphrey, *International Security Review*, Spring 1980.

The Eight Fatal Flaws Of SALT II

There are at least eight flaws in SALT II, each of which by itself was fatal to the Treaty's ratification. Each fatal flaw will be analyzed and explained in sequence in order of its importance.

The most serious flaw allows the Soviets to neutralize the credibility of the entire U.S. strategic deterrent posture by merely continuing to build the capability for *threatening* to destroy most U.S. strategic forces in a

counterforce first strike. It also entails failure to achieve the equal force levels, including throw-weight, called for by the Jackson Amendment to SALT I.

First, SALT II preserves the existing *gross inequalities* favoring the U.S.S.R. in both "very heavy" and "heavy" intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), as measured by their throw-weight (or payload). By exploiting MIRV (multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles) technology and equalling the United States in accuracy, the Soviets have dangerously translated their huge throw-weight advantage into massive *counterforce capability* for threatening the complete destruction of all our land-based missiles, bombers, and in-port submarines in a first strike.¹

SALT I already granted the Soviets superiority in number of missiles and throw-weight since 1972. SALT I also allowed the Soviets a monopoly in very heavy missiles. But the Soviets are granted the same exclusive right to have very heavy SS-18 ICBMs again under SALT II lasting through 1985. In SALT II the United States is again forbidden to have any very heavy ICBMs whatsoever. The Soviets have a permanent monopoly on very heavy ICBMs. We have thus conceded for the *second* time in eight years the principle that we can be legally inferior to our most dangerous adversary in a decisively significant military capability. The Soviets will also have a *de facto* monopoly on heavy SS-19 sized ICBMs until 1986, throughout SALT II. *These U.S. concessions are already being perceived world-wide as continued U.S. acquiescence in Soviet strategic superiority.*

The Soviet SS-18 force of super missiles *alone*, all by itself, carries more megatonnage or explosive power than the *combined total* of all U.S. land- and sea-based ballistic missiles. This is a measure of the enormous military significance, and therefore the geopolitical weight, of granting a monopoly on SS-18s to the Soviets.

The Soviet SS-19 force of heavy ICBMs is almost equally formidable. The SS-19 force too can destroy most U.S. strategic forces in a first strike all by itself.

It should be no comfort to Americans that under SALT II the Soviets now have *two*, independent, first strike forces, one composed of 308 SS-18s, and another made up of about 400 SS-19s. Thus the Soviet monopoly on very heavy SS-18 super missiles, together with their nearly as lethal monopoly on heavy SS-19 missiles, will neutralize the deterrent effect of U.S. strategic forces. These combined forces are simply a measure of the gravity of the Soviet threat endangering strategic stability. But the Carter Administration argued incredibly that since the SS-19 force is almost as deadly as the SS-18 force, we somehow need not worry about either.

The Carter Administration has also argued that the Soviet heavy ICBM monopoly does not matter, because the U.S. military has never desired to have heavy ICBMs. This argument is incorrect for four reasons. First,

heavy ICBMs are in fact militarily useful, because they can be used to threaten the other side's military forces. Second, from 1960 through 1963, the U.S. Air Force planned to deploy 250 Titan I and Titan II heavy ICBMs. This is a militarily significant number. But a *civilian*, Defense Secretary McNamara, cut these plans back to only 54 Titan IIs. Third, as late as 1970, even Dr. Henry Kissinger wanted to maintain the right for the United States to have 250 heavy ICBMs in the SALT I agreement then under negotiation. Of course, Kissinger later conceded on this point in May 1972 and the Russians were allowed over 300 heavy ICBMs in SALT I to none for the United States. Finally, the U.S. MX ICBM was designed in 1973 by the Air Force to be a very heavy throw-weight ICBM. All these facts contradict the Carter Administration claim that the U.S. military has never wanted heavy ICBMs.

These unpleasant facts mean that our strategic forces are now being "checkmated." Aggressive Soviet behavior all around the world demonstrates that our deterrent forces are already in the process of being neutralized politically and this will increasingly erode deterrence at intercontinental, theatre nuclear, and conventional levels. Our nuclear umbrella intended for extended deterrence, vital to the security of NATO, our allies in the Middle East, and Japan, is steadily losing credibility. Even Dr. Kissinger himself has recently conceded the geopolitical significance of Soviet counterforce superiority.

In effect, within the terms of SALT II, we are allowing the Soviets to build with impunity precisely the numbers and types of strategic weapons which will enable them to completely defeat our entire deterrent strategy. Thus, the Soviets can threaten nuclear blackmail in order to further their aggressive aims.

As if the *existing* Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 heavy ICBM forces were not bad enough, the second and even more dangerous fatal flaw of SALT II also deals with counterforce. SALT II allows the already overwhelming Soviet ICBM counterforce threat to *grow* even further. This counterforce growth is permitted by several loopholes in SALT II's provisions.

The Soviets can reasonably be expected to maximize their warhead capabilities by legally putting ten multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) warheads on *each* of their allowed 820 SS-18, SS-19, and SS-17 MIRVed ICBMs—giving them an allowed total of 8,200 highly accurate counterforce warheads. The Soviets can thus upgrade their heavy SS-19 force from six to ten MIRVs each, and their SS-17 force from four to ten MIRVs each.

Moreover, there is no agreement in the Treaty on the specific launch-weight and throw-weight data necessary to define a heavy ICBM, thereby allowing Soviet deployment of many more heavy ICBMs. (This point will be addressed in more detail below.)

Further, "new type" Soviet ICBMs are not really limited. Despite the

lessons of SALT I, there is also no agreement on the specific missile qualitative characteristic baseline data necessary to measure and verify the allowed increases in missile throw-weight, launch-weight, and volume, and also, silo volume. The SALT II constraints on "new type" ICBMs are too imprecise to be meaningful. These loopholes, together with the allowed encryption (or encoding) of Soviet missile telemetry signals, make it clear that there are no effective constraints on "new type" Soviet missiles. Thus, with one of their new missiles already legally exempted, the Soviets will be able to legitimately deploy *all five* of their new missiles known to be under development.

This "new type" deployment will provide even greater counterforce capabilities than the existing SS-18 and SS-19 forces, which are already devastating. Despite Carter Administration claims that the factionation (MIRVing) limits of SALT II comprise effective constraints, the Soviets will be able to greatly increase their ICBM warhead number under SALT II. They can add over 6,000 ICBM warheads legally under SALT II, which cannot be construed as restraint.

The third fatal flaw deals with the famous Backfire bomber. The intercontinental-ranged, refuelable Soviet Backfire bomber is not counted in the Soviet strategic delivery vehicle aggregate of 2250. But all U.S. intelligence agencies agree that Backfire has the unrefueled range to strike all of the United States on a one-way mission. Range is the key criterion for SALT purposes. Indeed, the Backfire has *better range* than the oldest variants of the U.S. B-52 and all Soviet Bison bombers, which are counted.

Range is the most important SALT criterion for bombers because all U.S. B-52 bombers are programmed for *one-way* (or range) missions against the U.S.S.R. Thus, Backfire's one-way mission, intercontinental *range* capability, should cause it to count in SALT II like all U.S. B-52s, which also have one-way, range missions.

But Backfire also has refueling capability and sufficient tankers are available for it. With refueling and Arctic basing, Backfire can even strike the United States and return to the U.S.S.R. on a round trip radius mission, which gives it *better* capabilities than most U.S. bombers.

Further, the upgrade of Backfire's already intercontinental range capabilities is totally unverifiable. The Soviets have spurned all of our attempts to limit Backfire range upgrade, and also constraints on basing and operations.

Additionally, even 220 unflyable, mothballed U.S. B-52s count in SALT II, but all 400 eventual Backfires, 220 Soviet bomber variants (and 1300 Soviet stockpiled missiles) do not count. These Soviet exemptions are totally inequitable.

Finally, due largely to Soviet insistence on excluding Backfire, there is no clear, equitable definition of a heavy bomber in SALT II. But there are *three* additional "new type" Soviet heavy bombers already known to

be under development, whose status, under SALT II, is recklessly left unclear. The status of these new Soviet bombers will require further negotiation in the Standing Consultative Commission for determination of whether or not they count. But our negotiating leverage will be greatly weakened by the precedent of Backfire's exclusion.

To add insult to injury, the Soviets have falsely told us that they will not give Backfire an intercontinental or refueling capability, but we know it already has both. Such blatant falsifications are an indication of Soviet duplicity.

The strategic significance of not counting Backfire in SALT II is that this force *alone* can deliver about 30 percent of the present huge Soviet megatonnage advantage, making Backfire a formidable second strike force. This inequity is compounded by the fact that the United States has no effective air defenses against Backfire. Hence all Soviet bombers would have a "free ride" against the United States.

The fourth flaw, which also will be analyzed in more detail below, relates to how SALT II hinders solution of our prime strategic problem. SALT II constrains all U.S. options to make our land-based missiles survivable. Such options as the "shell game" multiple protective structure (MPS) deceptive basing mode, and truck mobility for our ICBMs are either temporarily or permanently precluded, despite the allowed *growth* of the already alarming Soviet counterforce threat. SALT II bans both additional fixed ICBM launchers and mobile ICBMs. These restrictions are due to the Treaty's too restrictive definition of what constitutes a fixed ICBM launcher, combined with the constraints on mobile ICBM deployment in the Protocol. The U.S. conceptual designs for the canisterized MX missile do not sufficiently distinguish the moveable canister from its fixed, multiple protective structure. The MX is either a mobile ICBM, in which case the Protocol bans its deployment, or it is launched from multiple fixed positions, in which case the additional fixed positions are banned.

Further, Soviet leaders have already given us an arrogant ultimatum that the new U.S. MX ICBM is unverifiable and inconsistent with SALT II deployed in *any* basing mode. Despite their arrogance, the Soviet interpretation of SALT II is reasonable. Moreover the Soviets have already challenged our MX even though MX will not be deployed until 1986, well after the Treaty expires. These SALT II constraints on U.S. ICBM options are destabilizing, especially in view of the allowed growth in Soviet counterforce capability.

The fifth fatal flaw also relates to unequal constraints on U.S. options, and this too will be treated in more detail below. The SALT II Protocol contains unequal constraints on new U.S. long-range weapons for the NATO theatre. U.S. ground- and sea-launched, long-range cruise missiles—GLCMs and SLCMs—now under development are constrained and cannot be deployed until after 1981. But a huge Soviet buildup in SS-20

intermediate range ballistic missiles, and other medium- and short-range theatre nuclear missiles and fighter-bombers, is totally unconstrained.

This massive Soviet theatre strategic buildup against Europe began years ago and is still ongoing. There is no end of the Soviet buildup in sight. It is inequitable for U.S. theatre deployment options to be constrained, but not comparable ongoing Soviet deployment programs. Moreover, these constraints on U.S. cruise missiles are *still negotiable* in the proposed SALT III negotiations, and could well establish a permanent precedent, particularly in light of the fact that ratification of SALT II would put the United States in a grossly inferior position from which to bargain in all future arms control negotiations.

Sixth, it is significant that SALT II limits only launchers, but not missiles or nuclear warheads themselves. The Treaty fails to control the production of all types of missiles and their warheads. Further, the stockpiling of missiles is not banned. Hence stockpiled missiles and extra warheads are fully legal and could easily be used for refire. Moreover, rapid reload and rapid refire capabilities are inadequately defined and constrained. The recent Soviet testing of a rapid reload and rapid refire capability with their SS-18 reported in *Aviation Week* (22 September 1980, p.14) is not only a clearcut violation of the terms of SALT II, but it also illustrates well the danger of the huge Soviet missile stockpile (over 1300 ICBMs) allowed under SALT II. Moreover, even counting only launchers, the United States faces a huge disadvantage under SALT II. The Soviets have 785 more launchers now.

Seventh, there is still no definition of a heavy ICBM in SALT II. The most surprising and significant fatal flaw in SALT II is the continued Soviet refusal to agree to a definition of a heavy ICBM. This is a loophole of major proportion. Soviet refusal to agree to specific, precise provisions indicates that they are protecting dangerous new heavy ICBM programs. It is ironic that this failure to define a heavy ICBM is also widely recognized as the single most significant flaw of SALT I in 1972 and again of SALT II through Vladivostok in 1974. This SALT II failure to define a heavy ICBM is especially dangerous because it means that other "new type" Soviet ICBMs could be even larger and more deadly than their famous heavy SS-19. The Soviets could also increase the size of the SS-18 follow-on, and because there are no agreed SS-18 baselines, the burden would be on the U.S. to prove violations.

The Carter Administration claims that a U.S. unilateral statement not contradicted by the Soviets is somehow agreed. This is precisely the status of the heavy ICBM definition in SALT II. The United States on August 16, 1977 unilaterally provided U.S. data on the launch-weight and throw-weight of the Soviet SS-19 ICBM in an attempt to define the parameters of a U.S. heavy ICBM. This was also an attempt to define a heavy ICBM for both sides. The Soviets, however, did not agree. *They did not even*

respond. The Carter Administration evidently believed that this is another strange case in which Soviet "non-contradiction" constitutes agreement, because despite the facts the Administration nevertheless claimed that there is a "clear, agreed" definition of heavy ICBMs. But this non-agreed heavy ICBM definition must be deemed even weaker than the more explicit and positive U.S. SALT I unilateral heavy ICBM definition of 1972. In 1972, we at least told the Soviets that we would regard any new ICBM significantly larger than their SS-11 to be a violation of SALT I. We have said nothing similarly positive in SALT II. No good corporate lawyer negotiates key aspects of any commercial contract on this kind of "assent by silence" basis. It is obvious that Soviet silence can always be broken with impunity with grave consequences for the United States. Moreover, the Soviets have already told us *repeatedly* that they would not be bound by U.S. unilateral statements, emphasizing the unreality and danger of U.S. trust in the strange diplomatic device of "non-contradiction."

The eighth fatal flaw relates to the least important issue, verification. Like SALT I, SALT II fails to prevent the already massive, nationwide Soviet camouflage, concealment, and deception program from growing further, and from continuing to hinder U.S. intelligence monitoring and verification. This Soviet program reportedly grew in scope and scale under SALT I, despite the fact that it was deliberate and was, therefore, a violation. Soviet camouflage, concealment, and deception has clearly already hindered verification. The recent losses, compromises, funding reductions, and withholdings in U.S. intelligence collection capabilities, coupled with the more difficult to monitor qualitative constraints of SALT II and the allowed encryption of Soviet telemetry, altogether make SALT II largely unverifiable. For example, we cannot verify the "new type" ICBM provisions, the range of cruise missiles, the upgrade of Backfire, Soviet ICBM fractionation, rapid reload and refire capability, stockpiled missiles, with anywhere near "adequate" confidence.

Any *one* of these eight fatal flaws in SALT II impairs U.S. national security, and each was cause enough for the Treaty to be voted down in the Senate. Combined, they clearly have made the Treaty unequal, unbalanced, destabilizing, largely unverifiable, and harmful to our NATO, Middle East, and Asian allies.

Some Technical SALT II Flaws

But in addition, there are several almost equally significant but somewhat more esoteric technical fatal flaws. For example, about 250 *mobile*

Soviet SS-20 intermediate range missile launchers are capable of launching intercontinental missiles, and they have reportedly launched mobile SS-16 ICBMs.² The provisions of the Treaty state clearly that any launcher which has launched an ICBM is defined as an ICBM launcher. These Soviet mobile SS-20 launchers therefore explicitly should count. But inexplicably, none of the 250 SS-20 mobile launchers count, although they are capable of being quickly loaded with stockpiled SS-16 ICBMs and then launching them. And a large number—about 100—of SS-16 mobile ICBMs are known to have been already produced and stockpiled, making them readily available for rapid launch by SS-20 launchers.³

Secondly, there are inadequate verification rules for determining which old and new ICBM or SLBM launchers will house which types of new missiles in the future. The Treaty does not require "*functionally* related observable differences" for each launcher type, but these distinctions are necessary for verification.

Moreover, new Soviet SLBMs could easily, covertly circumvent *all* SALT II testing and deployment restrictions on new ICBMs. Merely by testing ICBMs in the guise of SLBMs, the Soviets could completely avoid all "new types" restrictions.

And finally, the Soviets are allowed to preserve and even increase their already huge advantage in so-called "test and training" missile launchers which do not count, even though these launchers are known to be part of their operational missile force. For example, the Soviets maintained 18 SS-9 Fractional Orbital launchers at a test range for years under SALT I, but these ICBMs did not count. The Soviets reportedly have over 100 test and training launchers which still do not count in SALT II, a significant number.

SALT II In Balance

In sum, before 1985, the Soviets can easily achieve a warhead superiority of *at least* 14,500 to the U.S. planned total of 11,900 warheads, and surpass U.S. missile accuracy, *fully within* the terms of the SALT II Treaty. Again, they will have overwhelming throw-weight, megatonnage, and counterforce advantages. But the Soviets have excluded significant forces from SALT II. The Soviets can still keep 400 Backfire bombers, about 350 old submarine launched ballistic and cruise missiles, about 220 intercontinental bomber variants, over 100 ICBM test and training launchers, over 350 mobile ICBM launchers, over 1,300 stockpiled old ICBMs *totally exempted*. Moreover, the Soviets are free to continue to produce excess ICBMs at their three very active ICBM factories for additional stockpiling.⁴

Treaty. It is clear that even a limited *two* site ABM system defending U.S. ICBMs would have hopelessly confounded Soviet counterforce strike planning, yet even this was prohibited by the terms of the SALT I ABM Treaty.

In 1972, the United States actually had a two site ABM system for ICBM defense under construction with two more planned, but the terms of the ABM Treaty required us to dismantle one of the sites under construction. Then in 1974, the Protocol amending the ABM Treaty limited the United States and the U.S.S.R. to only one site each.

After 1974, we were left with an allowed level of only 100 ABM launchers at our one site, a non-optimal number. And the terms of the ABM Treaty prevent us from deploying mobile ABMs capable of defending our new mobile MX ICBM. But in 1976, we unilaterally deactivated completely even our one allowed ABM complex.

The ABM Treaty in effect destroyed all political support for any American ABM capability whatsoever. Thus the ABM Treaty has ruled out both fixed and also even mobile ABM defenses of our ICBMs.

As noted above, the second best option to make our ICBMs survivable is to use deceptive basing or mobility. Yet *both* the "shell game," multiple protective structure, deceptive ICBM basing mode and the truck mobile basing mode are precluded under SALT II. The option of using existing Minuteman ICBMs in a "shell game" vertical protective structure deceptive basing mode in existing Minuteman deployment fields is:

- Technically most feasible;
- Most survivable;
- Least costly;
- Least disruptive environmentally and politically;
- Could be begun immediately and completed much more rapidly than MX as currently envisioned;
- And, was in December 1978 the first choice of the Air Force, especially because the new MX ICBM could also be made compatible to eventually replace Minuteman.

But SALT II prohibits new fixed ICBM launcher construction or their relocation, which is what the Soviets quite reasonably interpret MPS deployment to entail. This means that truck mobile ICBMs are the only option left.⁶ Yet all mobile ICBM deployment and even testing is prohibited by the Protocol until after 1981. But by then, the Soviet counterforce threat to our ICBMs will already have long been total, and it may well be *too late* to make our ICBMs survivable.

Thus we have allowed SALT II to paint us into a dead-end corner. SALT II allows the already dangerous Soviet counterforce threat to our forces to grow, but blocks all U.S. options for making our own forces

survivable. This is an absolutely absurd result for a negotiating process which was intended at its outset to ensure the survivability of U.S. forces.

We should also recognize that the MX mobile ICBM is not a panacea. It is important, but it is only a long-term solution to our ICBM survivability problem. But there are four caveats here even. MX will not become operational in even small numbers until 1986 at the earliest, well after SALT II's ostensible limits on Soviet ICBM fractionation expire, and will not be fully operational and thus fully effective and survivable until at least 1989. Thus MX should not really be considered a factor in our debate over the security risks of SALT II, because it will be deployed well outside SALT II's time-frame. Further, the SALT II Protocol's prohibition of mobile ICBMs and the Joint Principles for SALT III both indicated that MX is *still* a SALT "bargaining chip" which could easily be traded away before its initial deployment in 1986. Since vertical MPS, we have already seen the trench, race track, and now grid deployment modes. Moreover, there are severe environmental, political, survivability, and cost problems with deploying the MX, especially in the hastily devised hybrid horizontal shelter, grid mobile-deceptive mode currently in vogue. These problems could easily combine to eventually cause the United States to cancel the MX unilaterally anyway, just as the Carter Administration has unilaterally cancelled so many other strategic programs.

Finally, the Soviets have already issued several intimidating ultimatums that MX in *any* envisioned basing mode is unacceptable, on both verification and compliance grounds. Thus those who believe that MX could make SALT II acceptable are deluding themselves. With or without MX, the frightening reality is that the Carter Administration planned to somehow live with significant and unprecedented ICBM vulnerability through the late 1980s.

As noted, the Protocol constrains the two best U.S. theatre balance improvement options, SLCMs and GLCMs, while comparable Soviet theatre systems such as the SS-20 intermediate range mobile ballistic missiles are totally unconstrained. Moreover, it is simply not true that U.S. cruise missile programs could not have been ready for deployment before 1981, irrespective of SALT. Office of Management and Budget documents indicate that the SLCM program was unilaterally slowed for over three years by the Carter Administration, pending the negotiation of the Protocol constraints. The production of long-ranged SLCMs also was unilaterally cutback. The GLCM program has similarly been deliberately delayed over three years for reasons related to SALT II. Our ALCM programs too were delayed over three years in order to provide for an unnecessary fly-off competition. (The fly-off essentially competed fuel tanks, since all other elements of the competing designs were the same.) Thus having already slowed all our cruise missile programs for over three years in order to fit them into the Protocol, the Carter Administration argued that the

Protocol does not constrain our programs. But the SLCM, GLCM, and ALCM programs all could have been deployed three years ago if we had wanted to do so.

We should recall that in 1960, the United States deployed large numbers of our first generation SLBMs and ICBMs after only three years of crash development in the late 1950s. Yet our much cheaper and less complex cruise missile programs are *still* in development after over seven years. But America remains capable of launching high priority programs for developing new strategic weapons, if there is consensus on the threat and national leadership with the will to defend our country.

The MX ICBM, also begun in 1973, has likewise been delayed and purposely constrained unilaterally by the Carter Administration to conform to the launch and throw-weight of what became the SS-19. In 1973, the MX was originally being designed by the Air Force to be a very heavy throw-weight ICBM carrying 14 warheads.⁷ It is restricted now to much lower throw-weight and to only ten warheads, despite the fact that even the Soviet press still reports that it was designed to carry 14. Moreover, well over 250 MX ICBMs were originally planned by the Defense Department for deployment. What has not been sufficiently realized is that in cutting back from 14 to ten warheads, we have already lost four warheads per missile. We have thus forfeited 1,000 MX warheads. Further, in cutting back from 250 to 200 MX missiles, we have lost another 500 warheads. We have thus lost a total of at least 1,500 warheads on MX. (This is a deliberately conservative estimate. The Air Force at one time planned 400 MX missiles each with 14 warheads, so the warheads forfeited could be calculated to be almost twice as high, or 2,100.)

We should also note that the MX underway since 1973 was planned for an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 1983 or even earlier by the Ford Administration. But the Carter Administration has delayed the IOC by *three years*, until 1986.

Moreover, it is not true that the U.S. military has never wanted heavy ICBMs. Over 250 Titan I and II ICBMs were planned by the Air Force in the early 1960s, until a civilian, Secretary McNamara cut them back to 54. Even Dr. Kissinger tried to preserve the U.S. right to 250 heavy ICBMs as late as 1970 in SALT I.

The 1200 ceiling on MIRV missiles will constrain presently planned U.S. Trident submarine deployment, despite the fact that this was a U.S. proposed limit. The 1200 ceiling will restrict us to deploying only *six* Trident submarines. Yet at the present Trident construction schedule, the United States will have at least seven Trident submarines completed by 1985, the year that SALT II expires. But the only way we can deploy more than six Trident submarines is to dismantle some of our most modern MIRVed ICBMs or SLBMs, which we should not be forced to do.

There are even further problems with the related 1320 ceiling on MIRVs

and ALCM carriers, another U.S. proposed ceiling. This problem involves the Carter Administration's concession that ALCM-equipped U.S. bombers would count within the 1320. Originally at Vladivostok, U.S. ALCM-equipped bombers were not going to be counted at all within the 1320. Despite the fact that the United States in 1975 originally planned 250 ALCM-equipped B-52s, and then later 150, we are now allowed only 120 within the 1320 ceiling. We have thus already lost a total of 130 ALCM-equipped B-52s under SALT II. Because each B-52 would carry 20 ALCMs, we have thus forfeited 2,600 ALCMs. The ultimate irony is that the Carter Administration is not even planning to have the allowed 120 ALCM-equipped B-52s by 1985, and moreover those that we will have will not even carry the 20 maximum allowed number of cruise missiles. Each ALCM-equipped B-52 will instead carry only 12 through 1985. Thus we have forfeited at least 960 more cruise missiles.

It is doubly ironic that the *United States proposed* on its own initiative both the 1200 and the 1320 SALT II ceilings which limit MIRVs and ALCM carriers. This is because further analysis of the combined effect of these ceilings shows that they have *already* impacted adversely upon long-term U.S. force plans.

Few analysts realize the magnitude of U.S. unilateral restraint already embodied in these two SALT II ceilings. In 1974, under the Ford Administration, the United States planned to build 11 Trident submarines by 1985. The 1320 MIRV launcher ceiling proposed by the United States was predicated in large part upon this U.S. plan for 11 Trident submarines by 1985. This plan would have given the United States a total of 1310 MIRVed launchers by 1985, including both ICBMs and SLBMs. The Soviets even realized this. As noted, at that time, the United States also proposed to completely exclude all our ALCM-equipped B-52s from the 1320 ceiling. Since 1974, however, because of our construction delays, funding cuts, and other U.S. SALT proposals, we have reduced our Trident plans to only seven submarines through 1985. We then proposed the overly restrictive 1200 MIRV launcher ceiling in May 1977. Further, later, in 1977, we strangely agreed to count all ALCM-equipped B-52 bombers within the 1320. These were major U.S. unilateral reductions and concessions, which seriously degrade our forces. But we neither even asked for nor received any *quid pro quo* in Soviet restraint.

Moreover, the Carter Administration was unilaterally deactivating all ten of our Polaris submarines beginning this year. These ten submarines carry a total of 160 missiles with 160 clustered warheads. So we are forfeiting *still more* of our strategic power at the very moment the Soviet strategic threat is at its gravest menace ever.

What are the combined results of these U.S. cutbacks and concessions? We have thus lost 5 Trident boat-loads of MIRVed SLBMs, or 120 SLBMs, 10 boat-loads of Polaris SLBMs, or 160 SLBMs, and 130 ALCM carriers.

Assuming that we should not have to deactivate any MIRVed ICBMs or MIRVed SLBMs, the combined effect of the 1320-1200 ceilings and unilateral U.S. constraints in force planning has therefore *already* deprived the United States of 120 MIRVed SLBMs, 160 un-MIRVed SLBMs, and 130 ALCM-equipped B-52s. Counting at least 50 more cancelled MX ICBMs, and 250 cancelled B-1 bombers, we have thus already lost a total of 710 delivery vehicles.

Here are our forfeited delivery vehicles:

120	SLBMs on 5 delayed Trident submarines
160	SLBMs on 10 deactivated Polaris submarines
130	ALCM carriers, B-52s for eventual deactivation
50	MX ICBMs cancelled
<u>250</u>	B-1 bombers cancelled
710	Forfeited delivery vehicles

U.S. MIRV and ALCM forces planned by the Ford Administration before Vladivostok in 1974 for 1985 have thus been vastly cutback by SALT II constraints and by U.S. unilateral restraint. Since 1974, the SALT process and U.S. unilateral restraint has cost us well over 6,000 warheads which we would otherwise have had by 1985.

Here is a summary of our already forfeited warhead total, which we would have had in 1985 under the Ford plan:

1,500	On down-loaded and fewer MX
960	On 5 delayed Trident submarines
2,600	On 130 dropped ALCM-equipped B-52s
960	By not maximizing planned B-52 ALCM loading
<u>160</u>	On deactivated Polaris
6,180	Forfeited warheads

The B-1 bomber force of 250 was planned to carry 5,000 more ALCMs, and be *additive* to B-52 ALCM carriers, so the forfeited warhead total could be almost twice as high, or 11,180. This is the high cost to U.S. national security of putting arms control negotiations at a higher priority than sound defense planning. We have unilaterally cutback over 710 strategic delivery vehicles and well over 6,000 warheads, in the vain hope of reciprocal Soviet restraint.

But, at the same time, the Carter Administration openly conceded that under the 1200 MIRV ceiling, the Soviets will be able *legally* to add *at least* 6,000 new warheads by 1985.⁸ Indeed, there is reason to believe that the 1320 ceiling actually *accelerated* Soviet plans for MIRVed SLBMs at the time of Vladivostok in November 1974. Further, the Soviets can be ex-

pected to add many *more* than 6,000 warheads by exploiting all their options. They will probably add at least about 8,000 warheads merely on SALT accountable launchers to reach over 14,500 by 1985.

Summary Of Carter's Strategic Cutbacks

Since 1974, the Soviets have reportedly been adding an average of about 1,000 new warheads to their strategic forces *each year*, a rate which will continue through 1985.

But under the strategic program of President Carter since 1977, *no* additional U.S. strategic warheads have been added. Indeed, our warhead level has been *frozen* until this year, when Carter began deactivating Polaris submarines. The strategic forces of the United States have been *cutback* by over 6,000 fewer warheads and 710 fewer delivery vehicles by 1985 than were planned by the Ford Administration. And those thousands of additional warheads under the Ford plan would have been carried by the most modern of our strategic delivery systems.

Here is a recapitulation of the Carter strategic cutbacks, which has entailed unilateral disarmament:

- President Carter killed the B-1 bomber, acknowledged by our military leaders as the best penetrating bomber in the world, while the Soviets are mass producing the intercontinental Backfire bomber and are reportedly developing three new bombers. Several squadrons of B-1s could have been operational by now.

- Carter cut funding and delayed development and deployment of the MX ICBM by over four years, and reduced the number of missiles and warheads, while the Soviets are developing five new lethal ICBMs with many warheads each.

- Carter delayed air, ground, and sea-launched cruise missile development and deployment by four years, while the Soviets are developing two new types of cruise missiles and have had many types operational for over 20 years. Carter cancelled the ALCM A deployment program entirely.

- Carter delayed Trident submarine construction for over four years and cut the building rate by one third, while the Soviets have had the equivalent to the Trident I missile operational since 1973.

- Carter refused timely development of the Trident II missile to maximize the capabilities of the expensive Trident sub, while the Soviets are producing two types of new SLBMs and developing two others.

- Carter terminated Minuteman III ICBM production, while the Soviets are currently mass producing eight types of ICBMs.

- Carter cancelled plans to deploy 50 additional MIRVed Minuteman III ICBMs, and has actively opposed plans to deploy 100 extra MIRVed Minuteman III missiles, while the Soviets have been deploying over 200 new MIRVed ICBMs each year.

- Carter actually destroyed or dispersed the tooling for the Minuteman III production line, the only ICBM production line in the Free World, requiring over four years to resume production.

- He ended Minuteman II ICBM modernization, while the Soviets are modernizing all of their single warhead ICBMs.

- He ended the production of the Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM), while the Soviets continue to produce similar missiles.

- Carter unilaterally deactivated 400 nuclear armed Hound Dog stand off bomber missiles used with the B-52 in 1979, while the Soviets have kept similar missiles in service.

- President Carter cancelled the neutron warhead (bowing to Soviet propaganda), cancelled the Lance I missile, negated Lance II, delayed GLCM and SLCM, while the Soviets have opened a two to one superiority in Theatre Nuclear Forces by deploying their SS-20, other short range missiles and new fighter-bombers.

- Carter unilaterally withdrew 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe, at a time when the Soviet theatre nuclear buildup was accelerating.

- Carter opposed ELF submarine communications to enhance SLBM survivability, when the Soviets may have such a capability themselves.

- Carter unilaterally deactivated 160 Polaris SLBMs, while the Soviets keep their own obsolete subs and missiles.

- He opposed for three and one half years even minimal U.S. nuclear testing and building minimal nuclear weapons production facilities, while the Soviets have been testing and building nuclear weapons at an unprecedented rate.

Under President Carter, our strategic posture has suffered severely. As even Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Jones conceded in June 1980, "Senator Tower, I don't think there is any question but that we are *worse off* today than we would have been had we had these programs." Thus President Carter is directly responsible for U.S. strategic inferiority and American loss of "essential equivalence" to the Soviets.

With these facts exposed, which side is engaged in an "arms race?" The United States has long exercised deliberate, unilateral restraint, but the Soviets have just kept right on building for over 17 years since 1963. There is in fact no "arms race," because the United States has been moving backwards.

The Carter Administration therefore acknowledged that the Soviets will be able to continue their massive MIRV buildup through 1985 completely within the 1200-1320 ceiling. But it is self-defeating that these

U.S. proposed 1200-1320 ceilings have already resulted in depriving the United States of about as much strategic capability as the Soviets are allowed to add.

To re-emphasize, under these SALT II 1320-1200 ceilings, we have already forfeited over 6,180 warheads and 710 delivery vehicles, while the Soviets can still add over 6,000 warheads.

But we will also still have to dismantle some MIRVed ICBMs or MIRVed SLBMs anyway if we want to deploy our 7th and 8th Tridents in 1985, or more than 120 B-52 ALCM carriers. Indeed, we may have to dismantle as many as 65 existing MIRVed missile launchers by 1985 in order to deploy our 7th and 8th Trident submarines. If these 65 launchers turn out to be Poseidon SLBM tubes, they would carry about 650 warheads. This could put the U.S. warhead forfeiture total at over 6,830. It is therefore shocking that both these 1320-1200 U.S. proposed ceilings actually significantly constrain previous and present U.S. force plans, but not Soviet plans. The Soviets are still building up to the 1200 MIRVed missile ceiling, which is fully consistent with their future MIRVed missile plans.

In contrast, by deactivating 160 Polaris tubes, under SALT II the United States will *never* even reach our allowed SALT II level of 2250 delivery vehicles, which the Soviets have long been well above. The Soviets now have well over 2650 SALT accountable delivery vehicles, compared to only 1,865 for the United States. Even if the Soviets come down to 2,250 by 1981, the United States will never go up to 2,250. Is this parity or equality in the aggregate ceiling, especially considering the fact that the Soviets have about 2720 non-SALT accountable, second line strategic delivery vehicles?

Paradoxical SALT Intelligence Estimates

There are two other important contradictions that relate to SALT II's constraints on U.S. programs in the arguments used by the Carter Administration in its defense of SALT II. First, the CIA has publicly estimated that SALT II will not result in any significant reduction in Soviet defense spending. SALT II will change Soviet defense spending only a miniscule 1.5 percent through 1985, according to the CIA.⁹ This clearly implies minimal additional strategic spending by the Soviets in the absence of SALT II. Nevertheless, despite this estimate, the Carter Administration continues to argue that SALT II will prevent the Soviets from adding about 1,000 additional missile launchers.¹⁰ This was the same fallacious overestimate argument used to justify SALT I by claiming an ostensible constraint on the Soviets. In 1972, the Nixon Administration claimed that there would be 1,000 more Soviet ICBMs without SALT I.

There is an obvious contradiction between the economic estimate that the Soviets will not spend much more on strategic forces in the absence of SALT II, and the concurrent deployment overestimate that they would build about 1,000 more missiles without SALT II. A thousand Minuteman ICBMs cost the United States over 30 billion dollars to procure, and would cost the Soviets at least that much. The Administration must believe that the many projected new missiles and launchers would be extraordinarily cheap. Either CIA's estimate of future Soviet defense spending is wrong, or SALT II's constraints on Soviet programs are illusory.

Moreover, we need to ask why the Soviets might want to build 1,000 more new missiles in the first place, when they are already allowed clearcut superiority fully within SALT II's terms and have major forces exempted. And the Soviets are already spending over 13 to 16 percent of their much smaller Gross National Product on military programs. Their economy is already on close to a wartime footing, and there is very little room for more Soviet spending to finance additional strategic forces. Having already programmed strategic superiority within SALT II, they do not need any more strategic forces in any case.

Secondly, Defense Secretary Brown has argued publicly that SALT II will *save* the United States about 30 to 100 billion dollars in strategic spending over the next ten years. But Secretary Brown also argues that no U.S. strategic programs are constrained by SALT II, and all can go forward as presently planned. How can SALT II save us money while allowing us to go forward with our programs? It is only because we have already unilaterally cutback our programs drastically to fit below the SALT II ceilings. This kind of paradoxical argument begs the question of whether the Carter Administration ever planned to do what is necessary to counter the Soviet strategic threat, irrespective of SALT II. We thus evidently hope to use SALT II to aid us in avoiding measures to offset the threat. But we have already allowed Soviet superiority within SALT II. And we have already shown the alarming degree to which we have unilaterally reduced our own programs since 1977 in anticipation of SALT II.

These two Carter Administration arguments are therefore mutually contradictory. The Administration has unwittingly put itself into the untenable position of arguing that SALT II constrains *Soviet programs* but not *Soviet spending*, while simultaneously arguing that SALT II does not constrain *U.S. programs* but does constrain *U.S. spending*. This is the height of illogic, and it is contrary to all the evidence and analysis above. The truth is that SALT II constrains both U.S. programs and U.S. spending, but neither Soviet programs nor spending. The Soviet negotiators were wise and stubborn enough to make certain that their pre-existing and ambitious long-term plans were either excluded from SALT II provisions or already consistent with all SALT II ceilings. The U.S. negotiators,

on the other hand, unilaterally constrained our forces and then cut them further to fit well beneath the SALT II ceilings.

SALT II Codifies Soviet Superiority

To sum up, SALT II's significant constraints on vital U.S. options and force levels alone made it intolerable. The facts that SALT II contains so many unilateral advantages for the Soviets, has so many ambiguities, loopholes, and exclusions, all favoring the Soviets, does not contain agreed qualitative missile baseline data, is largely unverifiable, does not constrain Soviet programs, and allows legal Soviet superiority by 1985, combine to make the Treaty anathema.

The fatal flaws of SALT II merely reflect and codify the shifting strategic balance. The strategic balance has already shifted against us long ago during the 1969-1979 SALT decade. Since 1969, the Soviets have added over 1,000 new operational missile launchers and over 250 Backfire bombers, while the United States has maintained a constant but lesser number of missile launchers and has deactivated over 250 B-52 bombers. The Soviets are now far ahead of us in missile launchers and bombers. By about 1981, the Soviets will also have added over 6,000 warheads, and will have overtaken the United States in warhead numbers and accuracy by 1985. Because most Soviet warheads are large and are on accurate ICBMs, they are much more lethal. Well before 1985, they will be ahead in *all* strategic measures. The shifting strategic balance makes SALT II unenforceable, even if it were verifiable, which it is not. The shifting balance also will reduce U.S. bargaining leverage in any SALT III negotiations.

This Soviet thrust to strategic superiority has been expensive. Since about 1969, the Soviets reportedly have also spent a total of over \$100 billion more than the United States on strategic forces, a yearly investment rate of 250 percent more than the United States. The Soviets have spent over \$250 billion more than the United States on defense since 1969. While the Soviets spend more than 16 percent of their much smaller Gross National Product on defense, the United States spends only 5 percent. Of this small fraction, the United States spends only a miniscule .005 percent of our GNP on strategic forces.

In sum, fully within the terms of both the SALT I and II agreements, the Soviets have managed first to *quadruple* and then even to quintuple their counterforce threat to U.S. ICBMs, while removing the best U.S. option to redress their counterforce threat—ABM defenses of ICBMs and mobile ICBMs. The SALT I agreements were not a good bargain. Resting upon this unsound foundation, the SALT II Treaty is likewise even more

dangerous to us, because it allows the Soviets to continue building precisely the types and numbers of strategic weapons capable of completely defeating our deterrent strategy.

In May 1972, a significant U.S. unilateral statement said that a permanent offensive limitation treaty would have to be reached in five years, by 1977. We went on to say that if a severe threat to the survivability of our strategic forces developed in the meantime, this could constitute grounds for abrogation of both the SALT I agreements—the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement—on the basis of jeopardy to our supreme national interests. Moreover, the Jackson amendment to SALT I of 1972 called for equal force *levels* in SALT II. This meant equality in throw-weight and heavy missiles in SALT II. The Jackson amendment re-emphasized that failure to constrain the Soviet threat to the *survivability* of our forces in SALT II would make such a treaty unacceptable.

SALT II clearly does not meet these fundamental U.S. SALT II objectives as established in 1972.

SALT II does not provide equality in either numbers of delivery vehicles, numbers of warheads, counterforce capability, heavy missiles, or in throw-weight. SALT II does not help our survivability problem. Indeed, it allows the Soviet counterforce threat to grow and it hinders the solution of our vulnerability problem. SALT II has thus further jeopardized our supreme national interests. Therefore, SALT II must be rejected. Further, the SALT I ABM Treaty must be modified to allow mobile ABMs or be abrogated, and U.S. compliance with the SALT I Interim Agreement should be abandoned.

U.S. Failure In Long-Term Strategic Planning

A fundamental U.S. problem has been our failure to accomplish effective long-term strategic planning. The unfavorable strategic trend has been well recognized for well over five years, but nothing was done to reverse it. This is partly because we have a "rolling" five year defense plan which is never fulfilled—a new long-term plan each year. In practice, due to the Congressional appropriations cycle, this becomes a one-year, short-term plan. Moreover, the difficulties of U.S. short-term planning are compounded by our documentable tendency noted above to accommodate our own defense plans to our own or to Soviet SALT proposals. This U.S. behavior can be termed "pre-emptive compliance." It is a form of unilateral disarmament, and it has exacerbated the already noble U.S. unilateral restraint in new strategic launcher deployments since 1967. Another prob-

lem is the tendency to assume that detente in general, and arms control in particular, will solve our strategic deficiencies. This has proven a wholly unrealistic basis for national security policy.

Predominance Of The Soviet Military

The Soviet military, in contrast, carefully controls all Soviet defense planning, which is long-term and rather rigid. The Soviet five year defense plan entails long-term commitments, and it is not readily altered. The Soviet military's dominance of defense planning also gives them the decisive role in Soviet SALT decision making. The practical effect of the political power of the Soviet military in both defense planning and SALT decision-making is that arms control takes second place to Soviet defense plans. Restated, the Soviet military formulates its defense plans many years in advance, and then carefully negotiates the terms of SALT agreements to protect from constraint the ongoing strategic programs to which they are committed.

Declining U.S. Bargaining Leverage

Another U.S. handicap is the fact that the U.S. has always been the diplomatic *demandeur* in the SALT process; we initiated the entire process and over the years we have made most of the concessions and accommodations. As the strategic balance has shifted against us, we have lost bargaining leverage in SALT negotiating, and enforcement leverage in SALT compliance. Our primary motivation for SALT has been to try to use the process to solve bilaterally what is rather really a unilateral strategic problem: The growing vulnerability of our ICBMs and other strategic forces in the face of the expanding Soviet counterforce threat. But it has proven futile to try to constrain the Soviets instead of building up our own strategic forces to maintain at least parity. SALT I did not constrain the Soviets, and SALT II will not either.

It is clear that arms control negotiations have not solved the U.S. vulnerability problem; only unilateral strategic programs will protect our national security. Indeed, even sound arms control arrangements will be dependent upon our doing for ourselves what is necessary. Otherwise there will be no Soviet incentive to negotiate. Experience shows that the Soviets will use the SALT process to improve and maximize their own strategic advantages. The violations of SALT I and the flaws of SALT II

show that they play SALT to win significant unilateral strategic advantages. They stubbornly seek to constrain or delay U.S. strategic programs, while advancing their own.

The Opening Threat Window

The danger of the impending unstable strategic balance is finally becoming well understood and of increasing concern in the United States. As noted above, most strategic experts agree that the U.S. land-based missile force is even now dangerously vulnerable to a Soviet counterforce first strike. Equally severe vulnerabilities also exist, however, in our bomber forces, warning systems, command and control systems, and even our submarine forces. The threat of the Soviet counterforce capability has opened a destabilizing "window of vulnerability" on the United States, and this Soviet capability has profound geopolitical significance. To make matters even worse, the Soviets will easily be able to gain overall strategic superiority before 1985, fully within the terms of SALT II. Moreover, the Soviets have already achieved clear theatre nuclear and conventional superiority against NATO, and are rapidly approaching naval supremacy as well.

Need For New U.S. Strategic Doctrine

U.S. foreign policy has always placed heavier reliance on strategic forces than Soviet foreign policy. Indeed, flexible response and extended deterrence, still our ostensible strategic doctrines, have always required U.S. strategic *superiority* in order to control escalation and be credible. But with U.S.-Soviet strategic parity having declined from parity to first sufficiency, then to strategic inferiority, then to essential equivalence, we must rethink our entire strategic and military doctrine.

One of the problems is that American defense planners have not realized that all U.S. military strategy is still predicated upon our original intercontinental strategic superiority. This superiority long deterred war not only at the intercontinental level, but also at the theatre nuclear and conventional levels. NATO's flexible response nuclear strategy, designed to offset the continuous Soviet conventional superiority through nuclear escalation dominance, is still based upon the presumption of both U.S. theatre nuclear and intercontinental strategic superiority. But U.S. superiority is gone at all three levels—intercontinental, theatre nuclear, and

conventional. The deterrent credibility of the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" over our NATO, Middle Eastern, and Japanese allies is now understandably being questioned. Because U.S. strategic doctrine is still essentially predicated upon the assumption of U.S. superiority, however, we can conclude that Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and "Flexible Response" are obsolete strategies. We can conclude that we have no military strategists worthy of the name. Formulation of new U.S. strategy is long overdue, but the FY 1980 Defense Department report's "countervailing strategy" is only a first and unsatisfactory step in this direction.

One concept for a new U.S. strategic doctrine might be "assured surviving counterforce." But such a strategic doctrine requires more survivable and more lethal strategic forces, which are not now even being programmed. It also requires a rethinking of the entire U.S. strategic posture.

The purposes of U.S. strategic doctrine should be reformulated to transcend mere deterrence. Mutual Assured Destruction is a long obsolete, unfounded, and totally inadequate objective. U.S. strategic forces should instead be designed for multiple purposes, such as:

- To pose a severe counterforce threat to the Soviets;
- To create uncertainty that possessing a counterforce capability, the United States might strike first;
- To be able to control escalation at each level in general nuclear war;
- To control escalation in limited nuclear war;
- To possess selective nuclear options for different geographical areas with different levels of intensity;
- To ease deterrence of theatre nuclear war and conventional war by re-establishing the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella; and,
- To be able to actively defend U.S. strategic forces from a Soviet first strike and assure their survivability.

Achievement of these purposes would in effect re-establish U.S. strategic superiority, thereby enabling the United States to tolerate imbalances at the theatre nuclear or conventional levels. "Assured surviving counterforce" would be a good way to describe such a new doctrine, but much work needs to be done in conceptualizing, formulating, and refining it.

Rapid Force Improvements

Some strategic experts believe that with or without ratification of the SALT II Treaty, there is little that the United States can do between now and 1985 to avoid the destabilizing dangers of strategic inferiority to the U.S.S.R. The Carter Administration created the 1980-1985 window of vulnerability, and then planned to accept it for the entire decade of the

1980s. The Strategic Alternatives Team's book, *Strategic Options for the Early Eighties: What Can Be Done?* edited by W. Scott Thompson and William Van Cleave, (National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1979), however, provides the analytical basis for a different view. The Strategic Alternatives Team believes that there is ample evidence to reject the notion that there is little that can be done in time to arrest the strategic pendulum and swing it back to equilibrium. The book sets forth several options for quickly correcting the deficiencies of our strategic nuclear forces.

As noted, the Soviet ten year investment advantage in strategic forces alone is over \$100 billion since 1969. If only a fraction of this were invested by the United States, it could easily restore equilibrium to the overall military balance by about 1983. The irony of the U.S. strategic decline is that the United States is still the world's leading technological, industrial, and economic power. As noted, in 1960, we deployed massive missile forces after only three years of R & D. If the American people understood the grave threat, and developed the national political consensus, we could again readily concentrate more resources upon strategic forces to capitalize on our national advantages, and simultaneously enhance deterrence of lower level conflicts. The funds required are very small, compared to the Soviet outlay, the danger, and the huge American Gross National Product.

In sum, the massive Soviet buildup of military forces has compelled us to find effective strategic solutions much more rapidly and vigorously than planned. We need both rapid force improvements and long-range programs. While the MX ICBM, ALCMs, and the Trident submarine and missiles are necessary for our future security, they are all nevertheless long-term programs for the mid and late 1980s not relevant to what has become a near-term period of grave national peril. Our past inadequacies in planning have created an immediate security gap. As the FY 1981 military posture statement recognizes, most of our strategic modernization programs now underway will not be completed until very *late* in the 1980s, if even by then, but meanwhile, our threat window of dangerous vulnerability is 1980 to at least 1986 and beyond. Already, each leg of the strategic triad is unacceptably vulnerable, the Soviets will have overall strategic supremacy, essential equivalence will have been absent since 1977, and we will have only a minimum deterrence posture relying on a few patrolling submarines. At a minimum, we must accelerate our MX, ALCM, and Trident long-term modernization programs.

But at the same time and without disrupting the acceleration of our long-term programs, it is on near-term, "quick fixes" that we must concentrate. Some criteria for evaluating our rapid force improvement options should be:

-
- Strategic and political soundness;
 - Crisis stability;
 - Improved survivability;
 - Countering a Soviet capability;
 - Allied support;
 - Relative cheapness;
 - Technical and operational feasibility;
 - Re-utilizability of previous R & D investment and existing industrial capability; and,
 - Achievable quickly, by 1982-83.

We can no longer continue to allow the better long-term options to drive out the merely good short-term options, because our strategic situation is growing desperate. Of the above criteria, *survivability* and *quick achievement* are the most crucial. The strategic triad is the core of our entire military posture of deterrence, and it provides redundancy by design. We must quickly provide for the short-term survivability of *each* element of our triad as a top priority, no matter what the cost. What we need are survivable strategic forces which are at least equal in number and capability to Soviet forces. If any of the most attractive "quick fix" options are in conflict with the SALT II Treaty or the SALT I ABM Treaty or the SALT I Interim Agreement, then the Soviets have forced us to seek a way to modify both Treaties to accommodate our vital national security requirements.

Our objective should be to thoroughly frustrate Soviet counterforce capabilities. Thus we need to proliferate launch points, increase mobility, increase C³ survivability, add active defense, and increase readiness.

But even before most of our quick fix or long-term options can be achieved, we need urgently to increase our capability to produce and test nuclear warheads. We simply must completely upgrade our nuclear weapons complex, at a cost of over 5 billion dollars.

The following listing assembles our most reasonable and attractive rapid force improvement options, which have been carefully selected because they meet most of the above criteria. They are listed in order of priority.

ICBM Rapid Improvement Options

1. Rebased part of our Minuteman III ICBM force immediately in new vertical multiple protective structure silos. Further, some extra Minuteman ICBMs could also be deployed in a truck mobile, garrison-based mode, able to scramble on our interstate highway system with 12 hours of strategic warning, Initial Operational Capability (IOC) by 1982.
2. Accelerate MX ICBM development, to deploy MX to replace Minuteman in *vertical* MPS, possibly with "split basing," IOC by 1983, Full Operational Capability with 400 missiles and 4600 MPS by 1986.

3. Develop zero CEPs for Minuteman and MX, IOC by 1983.
4. Accelerate air-borne launch control system and batteries, and add to entire force, IOC by 1982.
5. Accelerate mobile ABM R & D. Abrogate the SALT I ABM Treaty, and deploy mobile, hard site ABM defense of Minuteman and MX in vertical MPS or grid, IOC by 1983.
6. Start a massive, Manhattan-project style program to deploy a space-based chemical laser ABM system, IOC by 1985.

Bomber Rapid Improvement

1. Accelerate production and deployment of ALCMs on B-52s, and increase total deployment, IOC 1981, full ALCM deployment by 1983.
2. Rebase B-52s and FB-111s inland, IOC by 1981.
3. Increase B-52 alert rates, especially for those equipped with ALCMs, IOC by 1981.
4. Start immediate production of a modified, multi-purpose B-1A, including adapting Stealth techniques, IOC by 1983.
5. Mass production of both competing ALCMs, for deployment on fighter-bombers and a modified 747 Cruise Missile Carrier, IOC by 1982.
6. Accelerate production of the KC-10 tanker and accelerate KC-135 re-engining, IOC by 1982.

SLBM Rapid Improvement Options

1. Proceed immediately with the austere ELF communications facility in either Wisconsin or Michigan, IOC by 1982.
2. Extend life of Polaris submarines and convert to SLCM platforms, IOC by 1981. This will increase sea-based nuclear firepower by about one third, target coverage by five-fold, at the cost of 1 Trident submarine.
3. Accelerate SLCM production for Polaris, 688 class SSNs, and deployment on all surface ships, IOC on 688 class 1982.
4. Accelerate C-4 Trident I missile production and expand retrofit to all 31 boats, full capability by 1984.
5. Accelerate Trident submarine construction.
6. Accelerate D-5 Trident II missile R & D to achieve increased accuracy capability, IOC by 1984.
7. Plan a Poseidon ship life extension program (SLEP), IOC 1984 to extend to 1995.
8. Restudy Hydra launch of ballistic missiles from surface warships.

Theatre Nuclear Rapid Improvement

1. Accelerate GLCM deployment, IOC by 1981.
2. Accelerate Pershing II, R & D and deployment, IOC by 1981.
3. Deploy ALCMs on NATO fighter-bombers, IOC by 1981.

-
4. Deploy SLCMs on NATO surface ships and attack submarines, IOC by 1981.

Strategic Defense Rapid Improvement

1. Counter Backfire by increased F-15 interceptor, AWACS, and new SAM production IOC 1981.
2. A massive civil defense program, IOC by 1981.
3. Improve strategic C³I, ASAT, and early warning capabilities, IOC by 1982.

Approximate Costs of Rapid Strategic Improvement Options

	FY 81
•ICBM	
1. Minuteman III vertical MPS Redeployment and truck mobile mode	\$4 B
2. Acceleration of MX R&D	\$.4 B
3. Airborne Launch Control System Acceleration	\$.5 B
5. Hard site ABM to defend MPS or grid MX	\$2 B
Reactivate Grand Forks ABM	\$.1 B
Accelerate mobile ABM R&D	\$.5 B
6. Space-based Laser ABM, Manhattan project priority	\$1 B
•Bomber	
1. ALCM production and deployment acceleration on B-52	\$1 B
2. Rebase B-52s, FB-111 inland	\$1 B
3. Increase B-52s alert rate	\$1 B
4. Immediate production of modified B-1A	\$2 B
5. CMC for ALCMs in mass production	\$1 B
6. Accelerated production of KC-10	\$.5 B
•SLBM	
1. Austere ELF	\$.1 B
2. SLEP Polaris and convert to SLCM	\$.3 B
3. SLCM production acceleration	\$1 B
4. Increase and accelerate Trident I C-4 retrofit	\$1 B
5. Accelerate Trident sub production	\$1 B

TOTAL \$18.4 B

increase above
FY 81 strategic
budget of \$12.5 B

Sum total
of \$30. B
in FY 81 for
strategic forces

Footnotes

1. See *Strategic Review*, Fall, 1979, "A SALT Debate: Continued Soviet Deception," by David S. Sullivan, pp.36,37; *Soviet SALT Deception*, by David S. Sullivan, Coalition For Peace Through Strength, November 1979, pp. 12, 13.
2. William T. Lee, *How CIA Estimates Went Astray* (National Strategy Information Center, 1976), p. 43.
3. *The New York Times*, 2 November 1977, "Pentagon Aides Say Moscow has Mobile Missiles Able to Reach US," by Bernard Weintraub.
4. *The Washington Post*, 9 December 1979, "How We Spy on the Russians and Monitor SALT," by Nicholas Daniloff.
5. See *Strategic Review*, Winter, 1979, "The Legacy of SALT I: Soviet Deception and US Retreat," by David S. Sullivan, p. 29.
6. Summit Statement of Soviet Defense Minister Dimitri Ustinov, June 1979, *Wall Street Journal*, June, 1979.
7. *Soviet SALT Deception op. cit.*, p. 10.
8. *SALT II Questions and Answers*, The White House, Spring, 1979.
9. CIA, *Estimated Soviet Defense Expenditures, 1978-1985*, unclassified, June 1978.
10. *Op. cit.* #8.

The Author

Mr. Sullivan is an honors graduate of Harvard and Columbia Universities. He was decorated for service as a Marine Captain in Vietnam, and for seven years served as a strategic and Soviet foreign policy analyst in the Central Intelligence Agency. He was Legislative Assistant for military affairs for a year to Senator Gordon J. Humphrey, R-N.H., a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In addition to his many classified writings, Mr. Sullivan has written extensively on international and military affairs. He edited *The Columbia University Journal of International Affairs*, *Revolutionary War: Western Response* (Columbia University Press, 1971) and *Change and the Future International System* (Columbia, 1972). He has written several widely publicized articles and monographs on Soviet SALT deception: *Strategic Review*, Winter, 1972, "The Legacy of SALT I: Soviet Deception and U.S. Retreat;" Fall, 1979, "A SALT Debate: Continued Soviet Deception;" *Soviet SALT Deception*, Coalition for Peace Through Strength, November, 1979; and *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Estimates and Analysis*, "Evaluating U.S. Intelligence Estimates," April, 1980, National Strategy Information Center, edited by Roy Godson.

STUDIES IN THIS SERIES

- ★ A Program for Military Independence
- ★ Arms Control and U.S. Foreign Policy
- ★ An Alternative Intelligence Policy
- ★ A Foreign Policy of National Independence
- ★ The Presidential Transition, 1980-1981

OFFICE OF PUBLIC LIAISON

Document Due By: 83/10/04 4⁰⁰
 Date: 83/10/04
 Subject: H.R. 3062 - Military Construction
 Appropriation Bill, 1984

	in	for	Remarks
1. WHITLESEY			
2. V. WIND			
3. ROUSSEY			
4. BLACKWELL	✓		
5. BRADLEY			
6. BLACKBURN			
7. CALT			
8. TALORS			
9. FISHER			
10. K. P. S.			
11. LLOYD			
12. HARRISON			
13. WAGG			
14. T. LEE			
15. T. L. PARRIS			
16. BANSCHOTRA			
17. BRIT			
18. MOXLEY			
19. SUNDSETH			
20.			
21.			

Remarks:

C. A. A. Smith
 C. A. A. Smith
 10/14/84

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

MB

DATE: 10/3/83 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 10/4/83

SUBJECT: ENROLLED BILL H.R. 3263 - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATION
BILL, 1984

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☐	HERRINGTON	☐	☐
MEESE	☐	☒	HICKEY	☐	☐
BAKER	☐	☒	JENKINS	☐	☐
DEAVER	☐	☒	McMANUS	☐	☐
STOCKMAN	☐	☐	MURPHY	☒	☐
CLARK	☒	☐	ROGERS	☐	☐
DARMAN	☐	☒	ROLLINS	☐	☐
DUBERSTEIN	☒	☐	SPEAKES	☐	☒
FELDSTEIN	☐	☐	SVAHN	☒	☐
FIELDING	☒	☐	VERSTANDIG	☒	☐
FULLER	☒	☐	WHITTLESEY	☒	☐
GERGEN	☒	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS:

May we have your comments on the attached bill by close of business tomorrow, October 4. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

Richard G. Darman
Assistant to the President
Ext. 2702



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

Received SS
1983 OCT -3 PM 3:54

OCT 3 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Enrolled Bill H.R. 3263 -- Military Construction
Appropriation Bill, 1984

Sponsor: Rep. Whitten (D), Mississippi

Last Day for Action

October 11, 1983

Purpose

Provides spending authority totaling \$7,104 million for Military Construction for the Department of Defense.

Highlights

- The bill is generally consistent with the Administration's request.
- The enrolled bill provides over seven billion dollars for Administration requested projects that increase military readiness and enhance military quality of life in the United States and throughout the world. Those projects include over four billion dollars for military construction projects and approximately two and one-half billion dollars for construction and operation of military family housing.
- The bill reduces your request for PEACEKEEPER missile construction from \$69.3 million to \$31.2 million. This action was taken because of lack of design presently available. The Department is to request either supplemental or fiscal year 1985 funding for the project once design has proceeded to the 35% level.
- Also, the bill reduces funding for the Turkish airbase upgrade program and other U.S. projects in support of NATO.

Agency Recommendations

Office of Management and Budget

Approval

Department of Defense

Approval (informally)Summary of Congressional Action

	(in millions of dollars)		
	<u>Administration Request</u>	<u>Enrolled Bill</u>	<u>Congressional Change</u>
Total, Spending Authority.....	8,167	7,104	-1,063

- This bill contains only annually funded programs.

Discussion

While the bill has reduced PEACEKEEPER missile facility construction for 1984, it leaves open the option of coming back in for supplemental or fiscal year 1985 funding for these facilities when they have reached a satisfactory state of design.

Congressional objections to fully funding our requests for the Turkish airbase upgrade and other U.S. projects in support of NATO were not based on the merits of the projects so much as on the traditional burden-sharing argument. The way has been left open to resolve these differences with the Congress so that some progress can be expected in the months ahead.

Recommendation

Despite reductions in the PEACEKEEPER, Turkish Air Base upgrade, and U.S. support of NATO programs, the bill is generally consistent with the Administration's request.

I recommend that you sign the enrolled bill.



David A. Stockman
Director

Presidential Defense Speech Plan of Action and Milestones

(Assumption: Speech date, Wednesday, March 23)

*Ale
Defense
Budget 1984*

Wednesday, March 23

-- Presidential events (current Presidential schedule attached)

o Finalize text and preparation for delivery

*6:00 McFarlane & Keyworth cocktails
6:45 press briefing gets text 6:00*

o Briefing for select list of former Secretaries of State and Defense + 15 scientists
East Room briefing (5:45 p.m.) for Senior White House staff, Cabinet, former Secretaries of State and Defense and military services, former members of JCS, and National Security Advisors, and scientists and other luminaries
*o Cabinet + JCS
o served dinner + watch speech*

o Speech

-- Brief key individuals on speech concepts and solicit their support in TV appearances or op-ed pieces--McFarlane/Keyworth *(see item on Tuesday schedule)

-- Notify former Presidents -- Clark

-- 6:15 p.m. - release embargoed text of speech and graphics at White House -- Speakes

-- 6:30 p.m. - backgrounder for White House press corps - Speakes/McFarlane/Keyworth

-- Provide frontchannel guidance to State Department for Posts -- Boverie

Note: Congressional notification to be determined

Thursday, March 24

- Morning TV shows and NPR Morning Edition interviews -- Vice President from Canada, Weinberger from Europe, Shultz, Keyworth, Meese, Baker, Congressionals like Tower, etc and former Secretaries of State and Defense -- Gergen
- 10:00 a.m. - Columnists, commentator, editorial writer briefing by Keyworth, Boverie, Shultz (?)
- *450* *Peace through strength people back here* 11:00 a.m. - Briefing(s) for conservatives, pro-defense, and veterans organizations; religious leaders, labor leaders, business and trade associations, especially Defense-related industries -- Whittlesley/Keyworth/Boverie
- 4:00 p.m. - TV anchor briefing -- Gergen
- ~~Briefing for scientists~~ -- Keyworth/McFarlane
- Mail speech to editors -- Gergen
- News magazine bureau chief briefing -- Gergen
- NPR "Dateline" and McNeil-Lehrer -- Gergen
- ~~Individual nighttime backgrounders for news magazines~~ -- Gergen/Sims
- Foreign Press Center briefing -- Robinson/Allin (Keyworth to brief?)
- MacNeill/Lehrer -- Gergen

Friday, March 25

-- Pentagon press conference by CJCS -- Vessey/Catto

Follow-up:

- Weinberger, Shultz, Vessey, Tower, Jackson and group of foreigners on weekend TV
- Kirkpatrick consider address at UN
- Blair House dinners and Family Theater briefings -- use speech themes

3:00
Wednesday

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 27, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: Dr. Jerry Falwell
Dr. Ron Godwin
Mr. Dick Dingman
Mr. Cal Thomas

FROM: Morton C. Blackwell 

Pursuant to your request for succinct, useable material, someone has drafted this for you.

Please let me know if this is helpful because more is available from that source.

MCB:jet

1 Enclosure a/s

"....and you shall clear out the old to make way for the new." (Leviticus: 26:10)

The old arguments against a strong defense no longer work. Once we heard that if the United States cut its own military spending, the Soviets would follow our example. They did not. Once we heard that detente would end Soviet aggression. It did not. Today critics of the defense budget cannot make the old argument that we need less defense; instead, they are trying a new argument that less really means more.

But a closer look at what defense critics are proposing reveals that they are not suggesting a new program of their own, but simply preserving the old by scrapping the President's modernization program. In other words, "less is better" really translates into "we can make do with what we have." We cannot.

As the President explained in his televised speech to the American people, America's weapons and equipment are simply suffering from old age. The newest B-52 bomber came off the production line in 1962. The Army's main battle tank originated in the early '60s. The Navy shrank from about 1,000 ships in the mid-sixties to 453 ships during the 1970s, as old ships were retired and new ships were not built. How many of us after all, are still driving our 1963 cars?

And this is looking only at the need to replace old equipment, without considering the new threats we must

be prepared to meet. The Soviet Union has a different kind of military force today. Its land-based nuclear missiles are larger, more modern, and more accurate than any we have deployed. The Soviet army is trained and equipped for sudden, surprise movements, while their air force can now fight even at night, and in bad weather. The Soviet navy today can take Soviet military power around the world.

As President Reagan has said, "the United States does not start fights." Our peaceful intentions, however, require not a weaker but a stronger defense. As defenders, we do not choose the time and place of attack. We give up the advantage of surprise. And for this reason we need modern military forces that can move quickly -- like the new M-1 tank -- aircraft that can meet an enemy even in bad weather or at night -- like the F-15 fighter -- and above all forces that are trained, equipped, and ready to respond to any emergency. Only by showing that we can meet -- and defeat -- aggression can we preserve the peace.

File: *Pro Nuclear
Power
Defense*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 27, 1983

The Most Reverend Anthony F. M. Clavier, D.D.
Primus
THE AMERICAN EPISCOPAL CHURCH
Post Office Box 373
1416 S.E. 2nd Terrace
Deerfield Beach, Florida 33441

Dear Bishop Clavier:


I am writing in response to your letter of May 18, to the President. Thank you very much for your letter and the copy of your article for A Christian Challenge.

Clearly, we are in a period of great crisis which will determine the course of mankind for many generations. With respect to defense and foreign policy, the central question is: "Will the West survive?" If we allow the debate to be whether totalitarian Marxism is to expand slowly or rapidly, we will surely lose.

We are always encouraged when thoughtful leaders, such as yourself, recognize that peace and the survival of freedom ultimately depend on strength and resolve.

Thank you for sharing your Christian approach to the issue of nuclear disarmament.

Sincerely,



MORTON C. BLACKWELL,
Special Assistant to the President
for Public Liaison

MCB:jet

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF PUBLIC LIAISONDATE: MAY 24 1978 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: _____SUBJECT: American Episcopal Church ltr to Pres
Nuclear Disarmament

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
WHITTLESEY	☐	☐	TILLER	☐	☐
VIPOND	☐	☐	VILA	☐	☐
ROUSSELOT	☐	☐	GRAF	☐	☐
✓ BLACKWELL	☒	☐	SUNDSETH	☐	☐
BUCKALEW	☐	☐	MORECI	☐	☐
GALE	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
JACOBI	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
JEPSEN	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐

REMARKS:

RESPONSE:

ID: 139552 CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET PAGE D01
INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE DATE 830518 RECEIVED DATE 830523
(PREFIX) (FIRST) (LAST) (SUFFIX)
THE MOST REV. ANTHONY F. M. CLAVIER D.D.
TITLE: PRIMUS

ORGANIZATION: THE AMERICAN EPISCOPAL CHURCH

STREET: POST OFFICE BOX 373

1416 SOUTHEAST SECOND TERRACE

CITY: DEERFIELD BEACH

STATE: FL ZIP: 33441

COUNTRY:

SUBJECT: VIEWS RE: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

AGY/OFF ACTION CODE TRACKING DATE
PL MORE ORG 830523

C 830524

STAFF NAME: PRESIDENT REAGAN
COMMENTS: ATTENTION JOAN MORECI

MEDIA: L OPID: LC TYPE: IBA

CODES: REPORT MI INDIV:

USER:

PL BLAC A 830524

See Id 139552



The American Episcopal Church

Office of the Primus

Bishop: The Most Rev. Anthony F. M. Clavier, D.D.
 P.O. Box 373, 1416 S.E. 2nd Terrace
 Deerfield Beach, Florida 33441
 (305) 421-3506 • 428-0774

May 18, 1983

John M. Moad

The Honorable Ronald W. Reagan
 President of the United States
 The White House
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Enclosed is an article for the Christian Challenge, a magazine for traditionalist Episcopalians and Anglicans, in which I write under the pen name of Bishop Hobeau.

As a Bishop of the Continuing Anglican Movement, I represent a tradition which hesitates to allow its bishops to make political statements. However, the recent pastoral letter of the Roman Catholic bishops in this country, and its approval by the National Council of Churches, does seem to indicate that Christians in the Catholic tradition of the Church are united in their approval of such opinions. I do not think this is the case and I just wanted to point out that there is another Christian approach to the problem of nuclear disarmament.

With all good wishes,

In Christ,

+ *Anthony M. Clavier*

The Most Rev. Anthony F.M. Clavier, D.D.
 Primus

Enclosure
 AFMC/11

NO EASY CHOICES

There they were assembled in a ballroom, hundreds of black-suited bishops eschewing even a touch of purple or an amethyst ring, labelled with Hibernic-sounding names. The TV news commentator excitedly summarized the contents of a pastoral letter, almost unanimously approved, calling on the governments of this world to abandon the use, if not the possession of nuclear weapons. Although the Catholic faithful of the Roman obedience are not obliged to agree with the contents of the letter, they are obliged, we are told, to weigh the thoughts of their fathers in God most carefully. They will be assisted in this endeavor by educational material, to be used in Sunday schools, parochial school curricula and, one assumes, in the pulpit.

The next day I saw a cartoon of a Russian missile aimed at a bishop who was retaliating by aiming a paper dart. The part of me which is a student of secular history filled my mind with the picture of the same bishops sitting in a similar ballroom being congratulated on their graduation by Neville Chamberlain, and each presented with an umbrella and a scrap of paper, after which they chanted enthusiastically, "Peace in our Time." But the part of me which is Christian heard our Lord's orders forbidding His disciples to resist evil, but rather to overcome evil with good. In short, I recognized once again the extraordinary problem of being a Christian in the world and envied old Simon Stylites, elevated on his pillar in the desert fifteen hundred years ago.

Once again I was brought face to face with the extraordinary condition of Christianity in America. Theologically speaking, most Roman Catholic bishops are conservative. Theological conservatives in the Protestant world are largely opposed to the nuclear freeze movement. Most liberal Protestants rejoice in the stand of the Roman Catholic bishops while gladly endorsing the "right" of a woman to exterminate the living being in her womb should she find its birth inconvenient, or judge that possible deformity invalidates the meaning and purpose of life. The bishops find such an endorsement to be perhaps more dreadful than Mr. Reagan's nuclear policy for, as yet, H bombs are not raining on our cities while the garbage bags in the clinics of the abortionists are daily filled with the dismembered limbs of little children. Surely one must approve of the logic of the Catholic bishops for its consistency even if one remains uncomfortable about the possible consequences of a government's conversion to Roman Catholic ideals.

Of course one could approve the conservative Protestant view that abortion is evil and to be opposed, while nuclear weapons are necessary and to be endorsed. Such a philosophy may be justified by the handgun ideal, that a Saturday-night special is neutral; the hand on the trigger is either good or evil. Yet one can no more imagine our Lord with a sword or a slingshot than one

can imagine Him with a handgun or pressing the button to unleash destruction upon millions of people.

But bishops are safe. They are not obliged to carry arms and it is unlikely that a future Pope or Archbishop of Canterbury will be recruited to press the panic button. Having informed the politician that it is immoral in all cases to use nuclear weapons, the bishops can go back to teaching Transubstantiation, leaving a future Roman Catholic president to agonize about the morality of resisting foes who care nothing for Christian morality or religious teachings of any kind. No guidance has been forthcoming for such a person and millions of Americans, who perhaps do not take lightly the prospect of this country turning the other cheek to the lethal slaps of perhaps a Soviet leadership, or even more likely some crazy dictator with the money to finance his megalomania, may think twice about electing a future president who is a Roman Catholic.

Here we address a distinct problem. Christian leaders have the freedom to influence public opinion in the Free World. They have no influence over the rulers of that greater part of the globe in which the population enjoys limited freedom of belief and action. Many pacifists cite Gandhi's success in India to prove that passive resistance can overcome military force. Two points

must here be made. Despite the obvious shortcomings and occasional brutality of the British Raj, the Empire claimed Christian principles - its leader was the Head of the English Church and Defender of the Faith - and had contributed enormously to India's emergence as a modern nation. Again, Gandhi's actions did not prevent the cruel dismemberment of the Indian continent, nor the slaughter of thousands of innocent peoples in communal strife which continues to this day. But would Mr. Gandhi as an English prime minister have fared as well with Adolph Hitler and his gang of thugs?

For centuries all but a few Christian communities accepted the doctrine of the just war. The advent of mass weapons of terrible destruction has called this doctrine into question. However we must address the question as to whether weaponry ever constituted the deciding factor about whether a war was just or unjust. Despite the numbing of our senses by the daily diet of carnage which accompanies dinner on television news, we must recognize that all violent death is unjust, whether the means is an arrow or a bomb. Nor is it entirely factual to picture wars in earlier days as gentlemanly sports engaged in by knights in shining armor. That is Hollywood history. War has always been accompanied by its sisters, plague, famine, rapine and plunder. War is dreadful, is evil and the scourge of mankind.

So many of our religious leaders really believe the 19th century liberal idea that education and culture with their product, reason, inevitably overcome wickedness. Now this is superstition. Our century has seen the rise of ruler after ruler, in both great and small countries, some Christian others not, who have slaughtered millions as a result of ambition, paranoia or fanaticism. Reason did not save millions of Russians, Chinese, Jews, Gypsies, Cambodians and Tibetans. Reason interests the rulers of Iran not one bit. And Reason is confused with Christian witness. Our Lord left no blueprint for political action. His forecast of the future was gloomy. He did not see the Kingdom arriving as a result of international cooperation, but in the face of wars and rumors of war. Education and reason are as powerful a force to prevent a Hitler as they are to prevent a mother's son becoming an ax murderer. And we are amazed because we have abandoned our Lord's teaching on the power of evil and the person of the Devil amidst burblings about dualism and superstition, while cleaving strongly to an idea of good untempered by His warnings on the climate in which good would survive as a tender plant.

If we take the New Testament seriously, we must recognize that our rulers have a different responsibility, sanctioned and or-

dained by God, than that exercised by the servants of the Church. The Church's task is to proclaim the Gospel. Nor is this a pietistic mission. We are called to witness to Christian morality and that involves denouncing evil and the tools of the Devil whether they be men or the inventions of men. However, bishops are not called to rule nations or to control the rulers of nations. That path has led the Church to error in all sorts of ways. It is not the task of the Church to call nations to heroic self-sacrifice. Its task is to call Christians to such a mission. It is sheer irresponsibility to call a nation's rulers to a policy which leaves its people naked to aggression and loss of freedom. "Better Red than dead" is not the actual choice. At the present time, it is probable that the bishops' philosophy, legislated as government policy, would far more likely expose both East and West to the irresponsible and crazy ploys of international adventurers than to war between Russia and the United States. A nuclear war bears not contemplation. But neither does the destabilization of peoples and nations, the conquest, enslavement and destruction of whole segments of populations which might well result from the most powerful nation in the world laying down its arms in a unilateral love-feast. A Christian may feel called to martyrdom. A whole community of Christians may embrace the same calling, but Christians have no moral right to invite non-Christians to join

in such an endeavor.

Only a blind partisan can reject the fact that Western materialism has bound people in an economic slavery in some cases and some areas. But despite the checkered record of colonialism and economic colonialism, a record not nearly as wretched as revisionist historians and sociologists would have us believe, ~~it is not the Western democracies which avow world domination. Both fascism and communism have actively pursued such an aim. Is the Christian solution to the nuclear dilemma the suggestion that the West abandon all deterrents, thus encouraging less cautious and perhaps more doctrinaire forces hostile to that freedom which is the direct result of Christian teaching to seize control of nations?~~

~~We are to seek to overcome evil with good. But is it really goodness to take an action which discounts the forces of evil and actually encourages evil to strike? The Early Church exalted martyrdom and actually believed that those who survived an attempt at execution were ordained by their sufferings. But the same Church taught that no man should actively seek martyrdom. In the light of the history of this century, is it not possible that the bishops are suggesting that the Western world actively seek collective martyrdom? Poor old Chamberlain was broken in spirit and health when he realized that he could not reason with Hitler; that, in fact,~~

~~he had been betrayed and had made war inevitable by his misguided idealism and refusal to believe in evil.~~ Are we now really to believe that Mr. Andropov is a splendid fellow, driven to preside over a military state and its members because of a misinformed view about the West and its intentions? There is no reason in such a view. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Afganistan, the Gulags and mental wards are all terrible symbols of a state undergirded by no system of morality known to Western man. Granted, such sentiments sound illiberal and reactionary. However, liberalism is not built on a philosophy which discounts evidence. The cemeteries of Eastern Europe are filled with liberal men and women who thought they would be allowed to work with Communists after their "liberation" in 1945.

Thus we are faced with the eternal dilemma of Christians. I return to my original thoughts, awed by the nobility of intent demonstrated by the Roman Catholic bishops, certain of the Christian nature which permeates their thoughts, but alarmed by their blinker vision and by their unwillingness to address the moral crisis within the context of the world in which we live. Certainly they should denounce a world gone mad, precariously perched on the edge of the nuclear abyss. Certainly they should graphically describe the essential dichotomy between such a reality and the aims and objectives of

the future in the Christian hope. Certainly they should call on all Christians to return to their task of converting the peoples of this world both theologically and morally, for such is the contribution of the Church. But thank God they were called to be Apostles and not Presidents.