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JET 6/9/2005

File Folder E. 1 PRES/GORBACHEV CORRESPONDENCE

FOIA

F06-114/14

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
14211	LETTER	UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION GORBACHEV TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE US-USSR RELATIONS [16 - 14]	9	6/10/1985	B1
	R	2/28/2008	NLRRF06-114/14		
14214	LETTER	LETTER WRITTEN IN RUSSIAN [15 - 15]	1	ND	B1
	R	2/28/2008	NLRRF06-114/14		
14216	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV RE MEETING IN GENEVA [16 - 16]	1	8/6/1985	B1
	R	2/28/2008	NLRRF06-114/14		

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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Presidential Correspondence
with Gorbachev

~~Nov. 4 Pres. & Gorb.~~
Nov. 11 - President to Gorbachev
Oct. 31 - ..
Oct 22 - ..
Oct 12 - Gorbachev to Pres.
Sept 12 - ..
Aug. 6 - Pres. to Gorb
July 28 Gorb & Pres (Russian)
June 10 Gorb. & Pres
May 11 Pres. & Gorb
April 4 ..

1985/4/4 2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 4, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

The visit to Moscow of a congressional delegation headed by the distinguished Speaker of our House of Representatives provides an important, new opportunity for a high-level exchange of views between our two countries. I hope your meeting with the Speaker and his colleagues will result in a serious and useful discussion.

I believe meetings at the political level are vitally important if we are to build a more constructive relationship between our two countries. I believe my meetings in Washington with First Deputy Premier Gromyko and Mr. Shcherbitsky and your discussion in Moscow with Vice President Bush and Secretary Shultz both served this purpose. As you know, I look forward to meeting with you personally at a mutually convenient time. Together, I am confident that we can provide the important political impetus you mentioned in your last letter for moving toward a more constructive and stable relationship between our two countries.


I believe that new opportunities are now opening up in U.S.-Soviet relations. We must take advantage of them. You know my view that there are such opportunities in every area of our relations, including humanitarian, regional, bilateral and arms control issues. In improving stability there is no more important issue than the arms control talks we have jointly undertaken in Geneva. Our negotiators have very flexible instructions to work with your negotiators in drafting agreements which can lead to radical reductions, and toward our common goal, the elimination of nuclear weapons.

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BY CW NARA, Date 9/9/12

In seizing new opportunities, we must also take care to avoid situations which can seriously damage our relations. I and all Americans were appalled recently at the senseless killing of Major Nicholson in East Germany. In addition to the personal tragedy of this brave officer, this act seemed to many in our country to be only the latest example of a Soviet military action which threatens to undo our best efforts to fashion a sustainable, more constructive relationship for the long term. I want you to know it is also a matter of personal importance to me that we take steps to prevent the reoccurrence of this tragedy and I hope you will do all in your power to prevent such actions in the future.

Let me close by reaffirming the value I place in our correspondence. I will be replying in greater detail to your last letter. I hope we can continue to speak frankly in future letters, as we attempt to build stronger relations between ourselves and between our two countries.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "R".

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev,
General Secretary, Central Committee,
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 11, 1985

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

Secretary Baldrige's visit to Moscow provides me the opportunity to repeat to you my desire for a more constructive working relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. An expansion of peaceful trade can and should be an important part of an improved relationship between our countries.

I place great significance on the discussions between Secretary Baldrige and Minister Patolichev in Moscow. They are holding the first meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission in seven years, and their meeting reflects the judgment of both our governments that an expansion of our peaceful trade is now appropriate. It is my hope that their achievements will result not only in increased trade, but also in an increased desire to seek greater cooperation in areas other than trade.

I have asked Secretary Baldrige to have pragmatic discussions with Minister Patolichev, so that the meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission will result in concrete actions by both sides to expand trade where that is now possible. To leave no doubt that the United States favors the expansion of peaceful trade with the Soviet Union, I have also authorized Secretary Baldrige to join with Minister Patolichev in a public statement on the development of trade relations.

While I believe there are some actions we can take now to facilitate trade, I doubt that there can be a fundamental change in our trade relationship

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BY CJS, NARA, Date 9/9/02

without parallel improvements in other aspects of our relationship. I have mentioned in my previous letters some of the areas in which improvements would contribute greatly to a climate in which a more complete development of trade and economic cooperation would be possible.

It is my hope that upon his return from Moscow Secretary Baldrige will be able to report to me that there are areas in which both our countries can benefit from commercial cooperation and that there is Soviet interest in parallel improvements in other parts of our relationship. Given such progress, I believe that the development of our trade relationship is a question in which you and I could usefully take a continuing personal interest. I will welcome any suggestions you may have in this regard.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "R".

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

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NRPA FOLG-114/114 #14211

BY CN NARA DATE 2/28/08

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UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

His Excellency
Ronald W. Reagan
The President of the United
States of America
Washington, D.C.

June 10, 1985

Dear Mr. President,

I noted the intention expressed in your letter of April 30 to share thoughts in our correspondence with complete frankness. This is also my attitude. Only in this manner can we bring to each other the essence of our respective approaches to the problems of world politics and bilateral relations. In this regard I proceed from the assumption that in exchanging views we shall look to the need to move forward on key issues, otherwise one cannot count on a turn for the better in Soviet-American relations. I understand that you agree, too, that such a turn for the better is necessary.

To aim at a lesser goal, say, at simply containing tensions within certain bounds and trying somehow to manage from one crisis to another, is not, in my opinion, a prospect worthy of our two powers.

We noted the fact that you share our view on the need to give an impetus to the process of normalizing our relations. That, in and of itself, is not insignificant. But to be candid: a number of points in your letter perplex and puzzle, and those are the points on which a special stress is made.

What I mean is the generalizations about Soviet policy, contained in your letter, in connection with the deplorable incident with an American serviceman. As to the incident itself, we would like to hope that the explanations which were given by us were correctly understood by the American side.

Now turning to major problems. I also believe that agreement with regard to general principles alone is not sufficient. It is important that such agreement also be reflected in the practical actions of each side. I emphasize precisely each side, since it clearly follows from your letter that you see disparities between the principles and practice in the actions of the Soviet Union.

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Refute

That is very far from reality. There is nothing corresponding to the facts in the assertion that the USSR in its policy allegedly does not wish to conduct affairs with the U.S. on the basis of equality and reciprocity. No matter what area of our relations is taken, a really objective assessment indicates that it is precisely the Soviet Union that comes out consistently for equality and reciprocity and does not seek advantages for itself at the expense of the legitimate interests of the USA. And it was precisely when a similar approach was taken by the American side, too, that substantial agreements could be achieved.

US did not depart from the principle

It is not an accident that all agreements reached on the subject of arms limitation became possible only because both sides adhered in working them out to the principle of equality and equal security. At no point in time did the Soviet side demand more for itself. But as soon as the USA departed from that principle, the process of arms limitation and reduction was interrupted. Regrettably, this continues to be the case at present, too.

we will recognize and act as -

If, nevertheless, the question of equality and reciprocity is to be raised as a matter of principle, then it is the Soviet Union that is surrounded by American military bases, replete with nuclear weapons, rather than the USA by Soviet bases. Try to look at the situation through our eyes, then it will become clear who can have a real, substantiated concern.

Refute -

Take practically any issue from the sphere of our bilateral relations, whether trade or, for example, air or sea communication. Is it, in fact, the case that the actual state of affairs in those areas is determined by the Soviet Union's being against equality and reciprocity? Quite the contrary: the low level of those relations is a direct consequence of the American side's policy, which is not compatible either with conducting affairs as equals or with reciprocity in the generally recognized meanings of these concepts.

Or take the following aspect of the question of principles and adherence to them. With regard to third countries, we impose neither our ideology nor our social system on anybody. One should not ascribe to us that which does not exist. If the question is to be raised without diplomatic contrivances as to who contributes to international law and order and who acts in a different direction, then it appears that it is precisely the US that turns out to be on the side of groupings working against legitimate governments. And what about direct pressure on governments whose policy does not suit the USA? There are enough examples of both on various continents.

Afghanistan? Czech?

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I addressed these issues frankly and in a rather detailed manner not to embark upon the road of mutual recriminations, but, rather, in the hope that it will help you to understand correctly our approach to principles and their practical implementation, and to appreciate our willingness to build our relations with the USA on the basis of equality and reciprocity with a positive and common understanding of these concepts.

important I think a lot about the shape the affairs between our countries can take. And I ever more firmly believe in a point I made in my previous letter: an improvement in the relations between the USSR and USA is possible. There is objective ground for that.

Of course, our countries are different. This fact cannot be changed. There is also another fact, however: when the leaders of both countries, as the experience of the past shows, found in themselves enough wisdom and realism to overcome bias caused by the difference in social systems, in ideologies, we cooperated successfully and did quite a few useful things both for our peoples and for all other peoples. Of course, differences and different views remained, but it was our working together that was the determining factor. And it opened up confident, peaceful vistas.

I noted you also express yourself in favor of each social system's proving its advantages in peaceful competition. Yes, we proceed from the assumption that in this competition the USSR and USA will defend their ideals and moral values as each of our societies understands them. But it will result in nothing good if the ideological struggle should be carried over into the sphere of relations between states. I believe, you understand, what I mean.

grl
fine The main conclusion that naturally follows from the mutual recognition of the need for peaceful competition is the need to renounce attempts to substitute the dispute of ideas with the dispute of weapons. One can hardly count on serious shifts in the nature of our relations so long as one side tries to gain advantages over the other on the path of the arms race - to talk with the other side "from a position of strength".

Mr. President, for understandable reasons the political leadership of both our countries must judge in a competent manner both existing and prospective weapons systems. This is extremely important in order to avoid miscalculations whose irreversible consequences will manifest themselves, if not today, then at some point in the future.

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Yes, but provision to review periodically

In the past a rigid but at the same time quite fragile relationship was jointly defined between strategic nuclear weapons and anti-ballistic missile systems. The only correct conclusion was drawn - a treaty of indefinite duration to limit ABM systems was concluded. Only because of that did it become at all possible to tackle as a practical matter the problem of the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons.

Attempts to develop a large-scale ABM system inevitably set in train a radical destabilization of the situation. Just the factor of uncertainty in and of itself will not only block any limitation of nuclear weapons, but will lead to their build-up and improvement. Therefore, when we resolutely raise the question, and state that the militarization of space is impermissible, it is not propaganda and not a consequence of some misunderstanding or fear of "falling behind technologically." It is a result of a thorough analysis, of our deep concern for the future of relations between our countries, and for the future of peace.

quite seriously

There is also another aspect of the program of "strategic defense" which remains as it were in a shadow for the general public. But not for responsible leaders and military experts. They talk in Washington about the development of a large-scale ABM system, but in fact a new strategic offensive weapon is being developed to be deployed in space. And it is a weapon no less dangerous in its capabilities than nuclear weapons. What difference does it make what will be used in a disarming first strike--ballistic missiles or lasers? If there is a difference, it is that with the new systems it will be possible to carry out a first strike practically instantaneously.

Thus, from no matter what point of view you approach it, the mere beginning of efforts to realize this program has a destabilizing character, even regardless of its final results. And it is precisely for this reason that it cannot fail to serve as an impetus to a further upswing of the arms race.

I think you will agree that in matters affecting the heart of national security, neither side can or will rely on assurances of good intentions. Any weapons system is evaluated by its military capabilities, and not by public statements regarding its intended purpose.

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All facts unambiguously indicate that the USA is embarking on the path of developing attack space weapons capable of performing purely offensive missions. And we shall not ignore that. I must say this frankly. I must confess that what you have said about the USA's approach to the question of a

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moratorium on space and nuclear weapons enhances our concern. The persistent refusal of the American side to stop the arms race cannot but put in question the USA's intentions.

efute
And what is going on at the negotiations in Geneva? The American side is trying to substitute only a part of the agreed mandate of the negotiations for the whole of it. An integral element is being removed from the actually agreed upon formula for the negotiations - the obligation to prevent an arms race in space, to consider and resolve all issues in their interrelationship. The American side has so far done nothing to bring agreement closer. On the subject of preventing an arms race in space the U.S. delegation has not presented a single idea. I emphasize, not a single one. Why should one be surprised after that, why indeed, that there is no movement on nuclear arms reduction?

*rasnov
arsk*
I wish to mention in passing that the American representatives maintain - this point is also contained in your letter - that it is impossible to verify a ban on scientific research. However, a different thing is involved here: a federal program of research activities directly and specifically oriented towards the development of attack space weapons, a large-scale ABM system with space-based components. The very announcement of such a program is in clear contradiction to the ABM Treaty. (Incidentally, if one is to take the entire text of the "agreed statement" to the ABM Treaty, and not only the part which is quoted in your letter, it is easy to see that it is aimed not at weakening but at strengthening the central provision of the treaty on both sides' renunciation of the development of large-scale ABM systems).

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search
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areas?*
As to the assertions that the USSR is allegedly engaged in its own "large scale research program in the area of strategic defense", here, as Americans put it, apples are being confused with oranges. The Soviet Union is doing nothing that would contravene the ABM Treaty; it is not developing attack space weapons.

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Thus, the question of verification is in this case a far-fetched question, if one is clearly to proceed from the premise that nothing can be done - no matter what names one can come up with for it - that is unambiguously prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

Mr. President, I would like to hope that you will have another close look at the problem of non-militarization of space, at its interrelationship with solving the problem of nuclear weapons, and from that angle, at the prospects for the

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Geneva negotiations. It is in this objective linkage that there lies a resolution of the problems of the limitation of nuclear arms, a real possibility to get down to their radical reduction and thereby to proceed to the liquidation of nuclear weapons as such. In any case we shall not be able to avoid having precisely this complex of issues as a determining factor both for our relations and for the situation in the world as a whole. This follows from the special responsibility of our two countries.

I am convinced that we must and can rise to this responsibility. In this connection I note with satisfaction your words to the effect that our two countries have a common interest prevailing over other things - to avoid war. I fully agree with that.

Now, with regard to what other steps could be taken, including steps to stimulate progress in Geneva, we are convinced that of very important - and practical - significance would be the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests. In this area a lot can be done by our two countries. Specifically, we propose the following practical steps. To put into effect the hitherto unratified Soviet-American treaties of 1974 and 1976. To come to terms on the resumption of trilateral - with the participation of Britain - negotiations on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and, acting vigorously, to work towards their speedy and successful conclusion. Finally, we propose that the USSR and USA cooperate in carrying out such a specific and very substantial step on the part of all nuclear powers as a moratorium on any nuclear explosions would be. We are in favor of introducing such a moratorium as soon as possible.

The problem of prohibiting chemical weapons needs to be resolved. But its resolution should be sought realistically. I must say that the positions which the USA has so far had on a number of important aspects of this problem do not meet this criterion. We would like the American side to turn its attention to the proposals we have put forward. We agree that bilateral consultations between our representatives would be useful, for example, within the framework of the Geneva Conference on disarmament. It should be recognized, however, that the efforts which are being made in the USA for chemical rearmament, above all as concerns binary weapons, are not a favorable prerequisite at all for removing chemical weapons completely and forever from the military arsenals of states.

The state of things at the Stockholm Conference leaves one with an ambiguous impression. On the one hand, it would seem

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that there is common understanding regarding the need for an agreement on the basis of an optimal combination of major political obligations and military-technical confidence-building measures. On the other hand, the Western representatives, particularly the American representatives, clearly are not in a hurry to fill this understanding with specific, mutually acceptable - I emphasize, mutually acceptable - content. We favor a substantial understanding, genuinely facilitating enhanced confidence. Such are the instructions of our representatives. They are prepared to listen to constructive considerations which the American delegation may have. To put it briefly, we are for working towards a successful conclusion of the conference.

just understand by our proposals should be acceptable if principle of reciprocity is observed

I would like, Mr. President, to draw your attention to the negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Sometimes we hear from the American representatives that our proposals made last February "stimulate interest." But it does not show at all at the negotiations themselves. It would seem that reaching agreement on initial reductions of the Soviet and American forces in that area would be in your and in our interests, in the interests of a military relaxation in Europe. Could you look into it to see whether you might find it possible to advance things in this area?

no substantial advantage is observed

given statement

One of the sources of tension in the relations between the USSR and USA is a difference in the assessment of what is going on in the world. It seems that the American side frequently ignores the in-depth causes of events and does not take fully into account the fact that today a great number of states operate - and most actively, too - in world politics, each with its own face and interests. All this immeasurably complicates the general picture. A correct understanding of this would help avoid serious mistakes and miscalculations.

In the past we had a positive experience of joint action in lowering tensions in some areas and in preventing dangerous outbreaks. But it worked this way when a readiness was shown to take into account the legitimate interests of each other and the positions of all the sides involved in a certain situation.

We positively assess the agreement of the American side to have exchanges of views on some regional problems. We expect it to accept our proposal that a wider range of regional problems be the subject of such exchanges and that those exchanges look to seek specific ways of settling tense situations. In this connection I noted the readiness expressed in your letter to work together with the Soviet Union so that the situation around Afghanistan would move toward a peaceful settlement. I would

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like to have a more clear understanding of how the American side sees this. Such an opportunity is provided by the upcoming consultations of our experts.

refute
However, our opinions in this matter as well will be based upon practical deeds of the USA. From the point of view of achieving a political settlement, and not only from that point of view, we cannot accept what you say in your letter with respect to Pakistan. We perceive the behavior of that country not only as not corresponding to the goal of a political settlement around Afghanistan, but also as dangerous and provocative. We expect that the U.S., being closely linked with Pakistan and also taking into account its own interests, will exert a restraining influence on it. The curtailing of its direct support to antigovernment armed groups intruding into Afghanistan from Pakistan would be a positive signal from the American side. In other words the USA has the opportunities to confirm by its actions its declared readiness to achieve a political settlement around Afghanistan on the basis of a just solution of the questions connected with it and to eliminate tensions in this region as a whole. Such a mode of action would not be left unnoticed by our side and would clearly work toward straightening out Soviet-American relations.

there are also some negotiations, we have no doubt about the impact on relations.

Some kind of movement seems to be discernible in the area of strictly bilateral relations between our countries. You, obviously, have noticed that we support this trend. However, there should be no misunderstanding concerning the fact that we do not intend and will not conduct any negotiations relating to human rights in the Soviet Union. We, as any other sovereign state, have regarded and will regard these questions in accordance with our existing laws and regulations. Let us, Mr. President, proceed from this in order not to aggravate additionally our relations. The development of our ties can be based only on mutual interest, equality and mutual benefit, and respect for each other's rights and legitimate interests.

We consider it positive that in some instances the once diffuse structure of Soviet-American relations is beginning - although not very intensively, to be frank - to be restored and to be filled with content. In particular, we consider useful the talks between our ministers of trade which took place in Moscow recently. We intend to look for mutually acceptable solutions in other areas as well, which constitute the subject of discussion between us, and to expand the range of such areas.

It is encouraging that contacts, including those between parliaments of our two countries, have become more active recently. As I have already said to the representatives of the

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US Congress, we live in a time when people shaping the policy of the USSR and the USA must necessarily meet and have contacts with each other. To speak in broad terms, we stand for vigorously building a bridge to mutual understanding and cooperation and for developing trust.

In conclusion, I would like to confirm my positive attitude to a personal meeting with you. I understand that you feel the same way. Our point of view on this matter was outlined by Andrey A. Gromyko to Mr. Shultz during their stay recently in Vienna. As to the place for holding it, I understand there are reasons which make you prefer the meeting to be held in the USA. But I have reasons no less weighty which, taking into account the present state of Soviet-American relations, make this variant unrealistic.

free
Important international problems are involved and we should use the time to search for possible agreements which could be readied for the meeting. For our part, we entirely favor that such should be the case. .

Sincerely,

M. Gorbachev

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Уважаемый господин Президент,

Хотел бы проинформировать Вас о следующем.


В стремлении содействовать прекращению опасного соперничества в наращивании ядерных арсеналов и желая подать добрый пример другим ядерным странам, Советский Союз принял решение прекратить в одностороннем порядке, начиная с 6 августа 1985 г., любые ядерные взрывы. Наш мораторий объявляется до 1 января 1986 г. Но он будет действовать и дальше, если США со своей стороны будут воздерживаться от проведения ядерных взрывов. Обо всем этом будет сделано официальное заявление.

Мы рассчитываем, господин Президент, что Соединенные Штаты должным образом оценят этот миролюбивый шаг Советского Союза и последуют его примеру. Взаимный советско-американский мораторий явился бы важным вкладом в оздоровление международной обстановки, в уменьшение военной опасности.

Принимая это решение, мы исходили, в частности, из желания содействовать созданию более благоприятной атмосферы и в связи с предстоящей в ноябре нашей с Вами встречей.

Пользуюсь случаем, чтобы еще раз пожелать Вам скорейшего выздоровления.

С уважением



М. ГОРБАЧЕВ

28 июля 1985 года

Его Превосходительству
Рональду У. Рейгану,
Президенту Соединенных
Штатов Америки

г. Вашингтон

DECLASSIFIED / 21/07/00

MLRR F06-114/14 #14214

BY CU NARA DATE 7/28/08

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 6, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I am very pleased that Senator Robert Byrd, Minority Leader of the United States Senate, is leading a delegation of distinguished senators to your country.

As we prepare for our meeting in Geneva in November, it will be helpful to both of us if we can broaden and deepen the dialogue between our two countries. The visit by Senator Byrd's delegation will provide a good opportunity for you and your officials to exchange views with key members of the Legislative Branch of our government, and this exchange can assist us both in developing a deeper understanding of our respective points of view.

Let me assure you once again that I look forward to our meeting, which I hope can serve to put the relations between our countries on a more constructive course. I will be consulting with Senator Byrd and his colleagues upon their return in order to take account of their experience and advice as I make my preparations.

Sincerely yours,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

DECLASSIFIED/RE/ASEX

NLRR FOL-114/14 #14216

BY CU NARADATE 2/22/89

17
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

DECLASSIFIED/REMOVED
Authority NLSS97-001 #97 SMK 10/22/99
BY C/S, NARA, Date 9/19/02

LS NO. 117677

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to communicate some thoughts and considerations in continuation of the correspondence between us and specifically with a view to our forthcoming personal meeting.

I assume that both of us take this meeting very seriously and are thoroughly preparing for it. The range of problems which we are to discuss has already been fairly clearly delineated. They are all very important.

Of course, the differences between our two countries are not minor and our approaches to many fundamental issues are different. All this is true. But at the same time the reality is such that our nations have to coexist whether we like each other or not. If things ever come to a military confrontation, it would be catastrophic for our countries, and for the world as a whole. Judging by what you have said, Mr. President, you also regard a military conflict between the USSR and the USA as inadmissible.

Since that is so, in other words, if preventing nuclear war and removing the threat of war is our mutual and, for that matter, primary interest, it is imperative, we believe, to use

His Excellency
Ronald Reagan,
President of the
United States of America.

it as the main lever which can help to bring cardinal changes in the nature of the relationship between our nations, to make it constructive and stable and thus contribute to the improvement of the international climate in general. It is this central component of our relations that should be put to work in the period left before the November meeting, during the summit itself and afterwards.

We are convinced that there are considerable opportunities in this regard. My meeting with you may serve as a good catalyst for their realization. It seems that we could indeed reach a clear mutual understanding on the inadmissibility of nuclear war, on the fact that there could be no winners in such a war, and we could resolutely speak out against seeking military superiority and against attempts to infringe upon the legitimate security interests of the other side.

At the same time we are convinced that a mutual understanding of this kind should be organically complemented by a clearly expressed intention of the sides to take actions of a material nature in terms of the limitation and reduction of weapons, of terminating the arms race on Earth and preventing it in space.

It is such an understanding that would be an expression of the determination of the sides to move in the direction of removing the threat of war. Given an agreement on this central issue it would be easier for us, I think, to find mutual understanding and solutions of other problems.

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What specific measures should receive priority? Naturally, those relating to the solution of the complex of questions concerning nuclear and space arms. An agreement on non-militarization of space is the only road to the most radical reductions of nuclear arms. We favor following this road unswervingly and are determined to search for mutually acceptable solutions. I think that in this field both sides should act energetically and not postpone decisions. It would be good to be able to count on having obtained some positive results by the time of my meeting with you.

In connection with certain thoughts contained in your letter of July 27 of this year, I would note that on several occasions we have explicitly expressed our views on the American program of developing space attack weapons and a large-scale anti-ballistic missile system. It is based not on emotions or subjective views, but on facts and realistic assessments. I stress once again--the implementation of this program will not solve the problem of nuclear arms, it will only aggravate it and have the most negative consequences for the whole process of the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms.

On the other hand, quite a lot could be done through parallel or joint efforts of our countries to slow the arms race and bring it to a halt, above all in its main arena--the nuclear one. It is indeed for this and no other purpose that we have taken a number of unilateral, practical steps.

Mr. President, both you and I understand perfectly well the importance of conducting nuclear explosions from the standpoint of the effectiveness of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Consequently, the termination of nuclear tests would be a step in the opposite direction. This is what guided our decision to stop all nuclear explosions and appeal to the U.S. to join us in this. Please look at this issue without preconceived notions. It is quite clear that at the present level of nuclear arms our countries possess, a mutual termination of nuclear tests would not hurt the security of either of them.

Therefore, if there is a true desire to halt the nuclear arms race, then there can be no objections to a mutual moratorium, and the benefit it brings would be great. But the continuation of nuclear tests--albeit in the presence of somebody's observers--would be nothing else but the same arms race. The U.S. still has time to make the right decision. Imagine how much it would mean. And not only for Soviet-American relations.

But a moratorium on nuclear tests, of course, is still not a radical solution to the problem of preventing nuclear war.

In order to accomplish that, it is necessary to solve the whole complex of interrelated matters which are the subject of the talks between our delegations in Geneva.

It is quite obvious that in the final analysis the outcome of these talks will be decisive in determining whether we shall

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succeed in stopping the arms race and eliminating nuclear weapons in general. Regrettably, the state of affairs at the Geneva talks gives rise to serious concern.

We have very thoroughly and from every angle once again examined what could be done there. And I want to propose to you the following formula--the two sides agree to a complete ban on space attack weapons and a truly radical reduction, say by 50 percent, of their corresponding nuclear arms.

In other words, we propose a practical solution of the tasks which were agreed upon as objectives of the Geneva negotiations--not only would the nuclear arms race be terminated, but the level of nuclear confrontation would be drastically reduced, and at the same time an arms race in space would be prevented. As a result, strategic stability would be strengthened greatly and mutual trust would grow significantly. Such a step by the USSR and U.S. would, I believe, be an incentive for other powers possessing nuclear arms to participate in nuclear^a disarmament, which you pointed out as important in one of your letters.

We view things realistically and realize that such a radical solution would require time and effort. Nonetheless, we are convinced that this problem can be solved. The first thing that is needed is to have our political approaches coincide in their essence. Secondly, given such coincidence, it is important to agree on practical measures which facilitate

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the achievement of these goals, including a halt in the development of space attack weapons and a freeze of nuclear arsenals at their present quantitative levels, with a prohibition of the development of new kinds and types of nuclear weapons.

In addition, major practical measures could include the removal from alert status and dismantling of an agreed number of strategic weapons of the sides as well as mutually undertaking to refrain from the deployment of any nuclear weapons in countries which are now nuclear-free, and undertaking not to increase nuclear weapons stockpiles and not to replace nuclear weapons with new ones in the countries where such weapons are deployed.

Naturally, the issue of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe also requires resolution. I would like to emphasize once again: the Soviet Union favors a radical solution whereby, as we proposed in Geneva, the USSR would retain in the European zone no more weapons of this type, using warheads as the unit of count, than Britain and France possess.

Our delegation at the Geneva negotiations has appropriate instructions, and it intends to present our specific proposals on this whole range of issues and to give comprehensive clarifications in the near future. We count on the positive reaction of the U.S. side and hope that it will be possible to achieve certain results at the present round of talks.

Meaningful practical steps could and should be taken in the area of confidence-building measures and military measures aimed at easing tensions. I have in mind, in particular, that our two countries, together with other participants of the Stockholm Conference, should make a maximum effort to work towards successful completion of the conference. Such an opportunity, it seems, has now emerged. I would like to repeat what has already been said by our Minister of Foreign Affairs to the U.S. Secretary of State--we are in favor of making the subject matter of the Stockholm conference a positive element of my meeting with you.

Whether or not an impetus is given to the Vienna talks largely depends on our two countries. During the meeting in Helsinki the Secretary of State promised that the U.S. side would once again closely look at the possibility of first reducing Soviet and American troops in Central Europe as we have proposed. I am sure that such an agreement would make a favorable impact on the development of the all-European process as well. I see no reason why it should not be in the interest of the U.S.

In proposing practical measures concerning arms limitation and disarmament we, of course, have in mind that they should be accompanied by relevant agreed verification measures. In some cases it would be national technical means, and in other cases, when it is really necessary, the latter could be used in conjunction with bilateral and international procedures.

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I have not attempted to give an exhaustive list of measures to limit arms and relax military tensions. There could be other measures as well. We would listen with interest to the proposals of the U.S. side on this score. The main thing is for both sides to be ready to act in a constructive way in order to build up a useful foundation, which, if possible, might also be included in the summit meeting.

Mr. President, for obvious reasons I have paid particular attention to central issues facing our countries. But of course we do not belittle the importance of regional problems and bilateral matters. I assume that these questions will be thoroughly discussed by E.A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz with a view to bringing our positions closer and, better still, finding practical solutions wherever possible.

We hope that in the course of the meetings which our Minister of Foreign Affairs will have with you and the Secretary of State, as well as through active work at the Geneva talks, in Stockholm and in Vienna, and by means of exchanges through diplomatic channels, it will be possible in the time left before my meeting with you to create a situation making for a truly productive meeting.

We believe that the outcome of this preparatory work as well as the results of my discussions with you at the meeting itself could be reflected in an appropriate joint document. If you agree, it would be worthwhile, I think, to ask our

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Ministers to determine how work on such a final document could be best organized.

Sincerely yours,

M. GORBACHEV

September 12, 1985

Strictly confidential

Unofficial translation

October 12, 1985

Dear Mr. President,

Our Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze has informed me in detail about his conversation with you in Washington on September 27.

While there exist substantial differences in the positions of the two sides regarding concrete issues, which surfaced also in the course of that conversation and which I shall not touch upon in this letter, we deem it important that you, like us, proceed from the objective fact that we all live on the same planet and must learn to live together. It really is a fundamental judgement.

Here I would like to give you my answer only to one specific question you raised during the conversation with Eduard A. Shevardnadze, namely with regard to a confidential exchange of opinions between us bypassing, should it become necessary, the usual diplomatic channel. I am in favor of this. Indeed, there may arise the need to contact each other on matters on whose solution depend both the state of Soviet-American relations and the world situation as a whole.

On our side to maintain the confidential liason with a person who will be designated by you for this purpose is entrusted to Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin.

Sincerely yours,

M. GORBACHEV

His Excellency Ronald W. REAGAN
The President of the United States of America,
The White House

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BY: CJS, NASA, Date: 9/9/02

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Уважаемый господин президент,

Наш министр Э.А.Шеварднадзе обстоятельно информировал меня о своей беседе с Вами, состоявшейся 27 сентября в Вашингтоне.

При наличии существенных различий в позициях сторон по конкретным вопросам, которые обнаружились и в этой беседе и которых я в данном письме касаться не стану, нам представляется важным, что Вы, как и мы, исходите из того объективного факта, что мы живем в одном мире и должны научиться жить вместе. Это действительно основополагающее суждение.

Сейчас я хотел бы дать Вам ответ только по одному специфическому вопросу, поставленному Вами в беседе с Э.А.Шеварднадзе, - насчет конфиденциального обмена мнениями между нами в случае возникновения необходимости, минуя обычный дипломатический путь. Я за это. Действительно, может возникнуть потребность контактировать друг с другом по вопросам, от решения которых зависят состояние советско-американских отношений и положение дел в мире.

С нашей стороны поддерживать конфиденциальную связь с тем лицом, которое будет определено Вами для этой цели, поручается послу А.Ф.Добрынину.

С уважением,

М.Горбачев

12 октября 1985 года

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 22, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Thank you for your letter of September 12, which was delivered to me by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at the White House on September 27. The discussions that Secretary Shultz and I had with the Foreign Minister were frank and useful. In my view they demonstrated that we both are working seriously on the problems which divide us as we near our meeting in Geneva. As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, I look forward to the meeting and to the prospect of more constructive relations. I am considering carefully the arms control proposals contained in your letter and will be in touch with you on these questions in the near future.

This week I will address the UN General Assembly at the commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations. This anniversary is a valuable opportunity to reflect on the importance of the UN to world peace and security, as well as its unrealized potential. I think we both agree that the UN can and must be more effective in dealing with regional conflicts. In this connection, I noted Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's statement to the United Nations General Assembly that the Soviet Union viewed with alarm the fact that "it has not been possible to settle a single regional conflict or to extinguish a single hotbed of military tension."

We both recognize that the UN cannot by itself prevent such conflicts. All nations, particularly

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BY CK KARA, DOD 9/9/02

those directly involved, must devote their best efforts to reducing tensions and pursuing negotiated solutions to the most dangerous regional conflicts. Certainly our two nations have a major responsibility to encourage such efforts.

As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, we have found our regional experts' discussions useful and propose to hold them on a regular basis. It is also desirable to try to build on this start by moving beyond the clarification of viewpoints to the search for concrete solutions to real problems. I hope that you and I can discuss this larger question in detail when we meet at Geneva. Even before then, however, I will put before the UN General Assembly an initiative to deal with an important groups of conflicts in Asia, Africa and Central America. I want you to be aware in advance of the proposal I will make.

Through our regional exchanges we have made clear our views on the nature of these problems and their impact on our overall relationship. Although our views on many aspects of these problems vary greatly, we believe that these disputes require political, not military solutions, and we are prepared, if the Soviet Union is willing, to seek ways to help resolve conflicts through negotiation.

Because I believe in promoting a search for political solutions, I propose that we concentrate our efforts on those conflicts that did most to erode our relationship in the past. This would include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola and Ethiopia. Of course, each of these conflicts has its own character and requirements, and we approach them with this fact in mind; other conflicts will need separate treatment altogether.

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The peace program that I will put before the General Assembly seeks progress at three levels: internal reconciliation, superpower restraint, and economic reconstruction.

Because these conflicts are rooted in local disputes and problems, the starting point must be negotiations between the warring parties in each conflict; in the case of Afghanistan, this would obviously mean your own government. These talks may take different forms, but we believe that, together with improvement of internal political conditions, they are essential to achieving an end to violence, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and national reconciliation.

Once the parties to the conflicts make real progress, a second level of the process would be useful: separate U.S.-Soviet discussions, aimed at supporting the negotiating process between the warring parties. These talks would not be formal peace negotiations; needless to say, it is not for us to impose solutions. In some cases, however, it would be appropriate to consider guarantees for agreements reached. In every case the primary U.S.-Soviet role would be to support regional efforts to reduce and eliminate outside military involvement, including withdrawal of foreign troops and restraint on the flow of outside arms.


If the first two stages are successful, a third would then become possible: the reintegration of these countries into the world economy. The United State is prepared to contribute generously at this stage.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze noted in his remarks at the United Nations General Assembly that in many cases mechanisms for mediation were already in place. We want to strengthen these existing

mechanisms, and believe that this proposal will complement and reinforce them.

I feel that if we are unable to resolve these problems through negotiation among the real parties and through mutual restraint, they will only grow more difficult to resolve. This could lead to increased tensions - a situation that neither of us should welcome. I hope the Soviet Union is prepared to work constructively to help promote solutions to these conflicts, and will offer early support for my proposal. If so, you will find us willing to do our part, and to make the most of opportunities thereby opened for progress on other critical issues.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "R".

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 31, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in New York October 24, I have been giving careful consideration to your letter dated September 12. The issues you raise are important ones, the ideas you have put forward are in many ways interesting, and I have wanted to study them thoroughly before replying.

Many of the specific points you addressed in your letter have been or will be dealt with by our delegations in the Geneva arms control negotiations or by our Foreign Ministers. In this letter I will therefore focus on what I consider the most significant issues you have raised.

You suggested in your letter that we might reach an understanding on the inadmissibility of nuclear war and other general principles which should guide us. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has since proposed specific language for our consideration. As I have repeatedly made clear, it is indeed my view that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. I therefore have instructed Secretary Shultz to discuss this matter with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in their meetings next week.

As we address this and other elements which may figure in any document we may issue in Geneva, I believe it is important to give the most careful consideration to our words. The experience of the past has been that overly vague or rhetorical language has led to expectations which, given the competitive aspect of our relationship to which you referred in your letter, cannot be sustained.

If we are to avoid subsequent misunderstandings and disillusionment, our own statements should be clear and based on concrete achievements. I am convinced that there is substantial common ground on the range of areas we have been discussing in connection with our forthcoming meeting, and I would hope that this common ground can be expanded during our meeting in Geneva.

You raised several specific areas in the security field where this might be possible. Secretary Shultz will be prepared to discuss all your ideas in concrete terms while he is in Moscow. I believe you will find that we are indeed prepared to go our fair share of the way to ensure our meeting is a productive one.

I do, however, want to address your response to the proposals we had previously made in the Geneva arms control talks, which was foreshadowed in your letter and which your delegation subsequently tabled in Geneva.

We have been carefully assessing your counter-proposal over the last month. As I stated in my address to the United Nations on October 24, I believe that within it there are seeds which we should nurture and that in the coming weeks we should seek to establish a genuine process of give-and-take.

In order to foster such a process, I have approved a new and comprehensive proposal designed to build upon the positive elements of your counterproposal and bridge the positions of our two sides. I have asked our negotiators to extend the current round to permit your experts to achieve a full understanding of our approach. This new proposal deals with all three areas under discussion in the Geneva negotiations. Its essence is a proposal for radical and stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive arms and a separate agreement on intermediate-range nuclear missile systems, both of which bridge US and Soviet ideas. We also propose that both sides provide assurances that their strategic defense programs are and will remain in full accord with the ABM Treaty.

Such assurances assume a resolution of our current differences over compliance with the Treaty.


In the area of strategic arms, the United States agrees with the objective of a fifty percent reduction in strategic offensive forces. Our proposal builds on this, applying the fifty percent principle in a manner that is both equitable and can enhance stability. In the area of intermediate-range nuclear forces, we have also looked for elements we find in common. While I continue to firmly believe that the best outcome would be the complete elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles on both sides, in our new proposal, we have also moved in your direction. In defense and space we must begin now to establish a framework for a cooperative transition to more reliance on defenses and we would like to see a more developed dialogue on how such a transition could be jointly undertaken.

We have designed our approach to provide for a mutually acceptable resolution of the range of nuclear and space arms issues; to take account of the interrelationship between the offense and the defense; and to address those concerns that you and your negotiators have described as being of great importance to you. I am convinced that this new proposal can provide the basis for immediate and genuine progress on the numerous and complex issues facing us in the nuclear and space area, and I look forward to discussing it with you in Geneva later this month.

We will also have the opportunity in Geneva to discuss the other areas which make up our relationship. Much work remains to be done if we are to be able to announce specific progress on regional and bilateral issues. I hope that Secretary Shultz's Moscow visit will be a stimulus to rapid progress in the weeks ahead.

In conclusion, may I say once more that I am looking forward to our meeting and that I sincerely hope we will be able to set our countries on a less confrontational and more cooperative course in the years ahead. I will personally spare no effort to help bring this about.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "R".

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Moscow

MATLOCK

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 1, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

This is in reply to your letter of October 12, 1985, concerning the possibility of a confidential exchange of opinions on a non-official basis. My reasons for mentioning this possibility to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze were twofold.

First, it seemed that there could be some intrinsic value in exchanging opinions informally and privately without the constraints imposed by official formality. But I also wished to resolve certain ambiguities in how we communicate. From time to time in recent months Soviet officials have approached American officials or private citizens who are in touch with senior officials in our government and have offered comments which, they suggest, represent your views. Naturally, I have paid close attention to these comments since I take your opinions very seriously and wish to do the utmost to understand them with full clarity. However, the comments received in this manner have not always been consistent and thus I have difficulty determining to what degree they in fact represent your views. It therefore seemed worthwhile to seek a clarification.

I judge from your reply that you consider established channels adequate for communication between us. That is agreeable to me. Consequently Secretary Shultz will continue to look forward to receiving Ambassador Dobrynin at the State Department. Similarly, we will expect that Ambassador Hartmann will enjoy corresponding access to you in Moscow.

I hope that the meetings Secretary Shultz has in Moscow will lay the groundwork for a productive meeting between us in Geneva. I am very much looking forward to meeting you there and continue to hope that we will succeed in setting relations between our two countries on a more constructive course.

Sincerely yours,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow