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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 6/9/2005

**File Folder** BRIEFING MATERIAL FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN-  
GORBACHEV MEETING 11/27/85 (3/3)

**FOIA**

F06-114/14

**Box Number** 47

YARHI-MILO

4703

| ID    | Doc Type | Document Description                                                                                                              | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|----------|--------------|
| 14179 | MEMO     | ANNOTATED AGENDA REAGAN<br>GORBACHEV MEETING<br>[ 1 - 8 ]<br><b>R 2/28/2008 NLRRF06-114/14</b>                                    | 8           | ND       | B1           |
| 14173 | MEMO     | KEY EVENTS AND TASKINGS DRAFT<br>SEPTEMBER 20, 1985<br>[ 9 - 9 ]<br><b>PAR 1/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/14</b>                           | 1           | ND       | B1 B3        |
| 14180 | REPORT   | UNITED STATES-SOVIET SUMMITS, 1972-<br>1979: AN OVERVIEW<br>[ 14 - 18 ]<br><b>R 2/28/2008 NLRRF06-114/14</b>                      | 5           | ND       | B1           |
| 14174 | MEMO     | MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN<br>RE YOUR MEETINGS WITH<br>GORBACHEV IN GENEVA<br>[ 23 - 24 ]<br><b>R 2/28/2008 NLRRF06-114/14</b> | 2           | ND       | B1           |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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| ID    | Doc Type | Document Description                                                                                                                              | No of Pages | Doc Date   | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|------------|--------------|
| 14175 | MEMO     | TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S<br>NOVEMBER 19 AFTERNOON PLENARY<br>SESSION WITH GORBACHEV<br>[ 25 - 27 ]<br><b>R 2/28/2008 NLRRF06-114/14</b> | 3           | ND         | B1           |
| 14176 | MEMO     | TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S<br>NOVEMBER 20 MORNING PLENARY<br>SESSION WITH GORBACHEV<br>[ 28 - 30 ]<br><b>R 2/28/2008 NLRRF06-114/14</b>   | 3           | ND         | B1           |
| 14181 | MEMO     | SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE<br>WHAT TO EXPECT FROM GORBACHEV<br>IN GENEVA<br>[ 33 - 47 ]<br><b>R 2/28/2008 NLRRF06-114/14</b>                   | 15          | 11/12/1985 | B1           |
| 14182 | CABLE    | 111357Z NOV 85<br>[ 50 - 55 ]<br><b>R 2/28/2008 NLRRF06-114/14</b>                                                                                | 6           | 11/11/1985 | B1           |

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| ID    | Doc Type | Document Description                                                                                                           | No of Pages | Doc Date   | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|------------|--------------|
| 14177 | MEMO     | SAME TEXT AS DOC #14174<br>[ 56 - 57 ]<br><b>R 2/28/2008 NLRRF06-114/14</b>                                                    | 2           | 11/19/1985 | B1           |
| 14178 | MEMO     | SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE<br>YOUR MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV IN<br>GENEVA<br>[ 58 - 62 ]<br><b>R 2/28/2008 NLRRF06-114/14</b> | 5           | ND         | B1           |

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September 19, 1988  
2000/2nd Draft

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NLRR F06-114/14 #14179

BY C1 NARADATE 2/28/08

III. Annotated Agenda

Saturday, November 16

8:30 AM Departure from White House

8:45 AM Departure from Andrews  
Note: No departure remarks because Saturday morning not good news time. Could do pre-departure, scene-setting remarks to nation on Friday or earlier.

12:05 PM Presidential radio address (pre-taped).  
(noon)

10:25 PM Arrival Geneva. Met by Swiss President Furgler,  
(4:25 PM minimal arrival ceremony (formal arrival ceremony on  
EST) Monday, November 18).

Brief arrival remarks (approx. 5 minutes) by President. Begin to achieve objectives vis-a-vis Western solidarity. Two possible themes:  
(1) U.S.-Swiss shared Western values: democracy, free enterprise, home for political refugees,  
(2) President's constructive approach to meetings with Gorbachev, but takes two to make relationship work. Open press coverage by White House press corps and international press.

10:35 PM President and Mrs. Reagan proceed directly to their residence -- Chateau de Saussure. No press coverage. 15 minutes' drive time.

Sunday, November 17

AM Private time for President to read briefing materials and relax.

1:30 PM President travels to Fleur d'Eau (five minute drive)  
Purpose: familiarity with site for U.S.-hosted meetings with Soviets. Also to meet with his key advisors. Press coverage showing President and advisors engaged in substantive preparation for meetings with Gorbachev. Traveling press pool (13 people).

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2:30-

3:30 PM

Possible horseback ride. Good location 10 minutes drive from Fleur d'Eau. Riding partners could include Swiss Los Angeles Olympics medal winner Heidi Robranny and/or other Swiss champion riders. Three purposes: Swiss proud of riders so would be popular event in Switzerland. Would show to world a vigorous American President and offset press coverage of Gorbachev as "vigorous, younger" leader (Gorbachev likely to go for his usual 45 minute daily walk). Finally a ride would help President clear his head and refresh his system after plane trip.

3:30 PM

President returns to residence. Private time for reading briefing materials and relaxing.

(Another possibility in same time frame could be attendance at service in the American Church. Drive time from Fleur d'Eau 10 minutes).

Monday, November 18

Morning

Private time

12:00-

1:30 PM

Meeting and working lunch at staff house (next to residence) with senior advisors to prepare for Gorbachev meetings.

1:55 PM

Depart residence en route for Swiss arrival ceremony

2:00 PM

Formal arrival ceremony at Le Reposoir. Military honors. National anthem. No public remarks by President. Press pool coverage.

2:15 PM

Proceed inside Le Reposoir to meet with President Furgler. To dramatize special quality of U.S.-Swiss relations in contrast to Soviet-Swiss relations, President Reagan presents President Furgler with Joint Congressional Resolution\* (photo op) expressing U.S. appreciation to Switzerland for its contributions to United States and world (ICRC, political refugees, democracy, religion, center for negotiators). General discussion of U.S.-Swiss relations and upcoming meeting with Gorbachev.

Note: Mrs. Reagan will have tea with Mrs. Furgler in adjacent room. Secretary Shultz will have meeting with Swiss Foreign Minister Aubert in another room.

\* Need to coordinate WH/LA.

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3:00 PM

Return to residence.

A possible event to demonstrate dynamism, strength of U.S., Swiss, and Western values. One possibility would be a speech at Geneva University -- "shining city on the hill" type speech about our vision of the future; not U.S.-Soviet relations. Excellent hall (Aula). Students could be invited from Graduate Institute for International Relations (Bud McFarlane attended), Geneva's Management Institute and University itself. No Q&A's, but following speech President could mix with students in reception hall. Expanded press pool coverage.

Other possibilities for same timeframe being developed. For example, the President could visit a Swiss entrepreneur who started with nothing 20 years ago and now has thriving technology business.

4:00 PM

Return to residence.  
Private time to read and relax.

Tuesday, November 19

9:15 AM

Depart residence for Fleur d'Eau.

9:20 AM

Meet with senior advisors to prepare for Gorbachev.

10:00 AM

Gorbachev arrives. President descends front steps for first handshake and photo op (40 U.S./40 Soviet/40 International).

President escorts Gorbachev to petite salon for brief tete-a-tete. President could set the tone for two days' meetings, reiterate willingness to get down to concrete work, and reaffirm understanding on order in which issues will be addressed. Photo op by restricted press pool (13 U.S./13 Soviet) TBD. Consecutive interpretation.

Note: During this period remaining members of the two delegations will be together and getting to know one another in plenary room (next door).

10:15 AM

Two leaders move from petite salon to plenary room, each introduces the other to members of his delegation and get seated.

10:20 AM

Photo opportunity for somewhat expanded press pool (30 U.S./30 Soviet/30 International).

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10:30 AM

Plenary meeting of two delegations. Seven on each side including notetaker. Meeting participants for the U.S.: President, Secretary Shultz, Regan, McFarlane, Asst. Sec. Ridgeway or Paul Nitze, Jack Matlock. Simultaneous interpretations. As host, President will chair. We will want to discuss broad nature of relationship. Might begin with what each wants and is trying to accomplish at home. Then move to international conditions which will permit kind of domestic developments and overall future our peoples want. Need for greater Soviet restraint in arms buildup and use of force in Third World. In his initial presentation, Gorbachev also likely to begin to get into nuclear arms control issues, particularly attack on SDI.

12:15 PM

First plenary concludes, President sees off Gorbachev (no press coverage of departures from plenaries), and returns to residence.

12:20 PM

Departs for residence.

12:30 PM

Working lunch at staff house (Palmetta) with senior advisors at residence to prepare for afternoon plenary.

1:15 PM

Private time.

2:20 PM

Departs residence.

2:25 PM

Return to Fleur d'Eau.

2:30 PM

Gorbachev arrives and President greets him again. Outside press pool.

Second plenary begins (no press coverage inside). President and Gorbachev turn to arms control issues in detail for first time. Discussion of strategic offense and defense. Possibly other arms control issues as well. (It's quite possible that some of the lesser arms control and other issues will get very brief treatment by the leaders in plenary during these two days. For this and other reasons Shultz/McFarlane/others may want to have some side conversations over dinner or elsewhere with Shevardnadze or other Soviets if we are trying to shape up language for a communique or trying to reach some agreement.)

Note: At about 4:15 PM, if weather permits, the President might take Gorbachev for a walk down to the lake. Cabana on the shore with a large fireplace and splendid view; ideal for coffee/drinks. Restricted press pool coverage. This would be a good time to broach human rights and trade.

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4:35 PM President sees off Gorbachev. No press coverage.

4:40 PM President arrives at residence.

Note: Around 5:30 PM there would be press briefing at Hotel Intercontinental by Speakes and some participants in plenaries. If we want to sustain some confidentiality and/or some news for end of second day, we might want participants to be at Hartman/Ridgway/Matlock level. If we want to combat Soviets' propaganda and/or make more major news, Shultz/McFarlane level might be better. In any case, our themes would include President's leadership of talks, our constructive proposals, etc.

5:00-

7:55 PM Private time.

7:55 PM President and Mrs. Reagan depart for Soviet Mission.

8:00 PM Gorbachevs greet President and Mrs. Reagan and U.S. delegation at Soviet Mission. Photo op of arrival outside. Unclear what Soviets will permit inside. President and Mrs. Reagan could use this dinner, among other things, to press for our peace and people-to-people proposals, i.e., deep reductions in nuclear arms, greater exchange of young people, appearances on each other's television. This could be theme of our toast -- desire for next generation to move away from fear of nuclear war and closer together.

10:05 PM President and Mrs. Reagan depart Soviet Mission and return to residence.

10:15 PM Arrival at residence.

Note: No in-depth press briefing after dinner but USG officials return to Inter Continental to provide atmospherics like duration of dinner, food served and themes of President's toast.

Wednesday, November 20

9:10 AM Private breakfast. Meet with senior advisors at residence to prepare for talks with Gorbachev.

9:40 AM Complete meeting with advisors.

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9:45 AM Depart residence.

9:55 AM Arrival at Soviet Mission.

10:00 AM Arrive Soviet Mission. Gorbachev meets President at bottom of steps and escorts him up stairs to Soviet meeting facility. Outside photo op.

10:05 AM Delegations get seated and inside photo op takes place.

Note: Soviets raised possibility that they might want to begin this Soviet-hosted day also with a tete-a-tete.

10:15 AM Plenary session begin. President may want to use this plenary to review geopolitical issues. These could include both effort to reach agreement in some general standards and discussion of specific regions like Afghanistan, Central America, Middle East, Cambodia, etc. President can make the point that two can play at support for national peoples liberation struggles but that we are also ready for diplomatic/political solutions.

12:15 PM Plenary concludes, Gorbachev sees off President (no photo) and President returns to his residence.

12:20 PM Departure for residence.

12:30 PM President arrives at residence.

12:40 - Working lunch with senior advisors at staff to  
1:30 PM prepare for final plenary with Soviets.

1:20 - Private time.  
2:10 PM

2:15 PM Depart for Soviet Mission.

2:25 PM Arrive at Soviet Mission, met by Gorbachev. Outside press coverage.

2:30 PM Final plenary begins. Likely to be very brief discussion of bilateral issues (hopefully agreement already reached on cultural exchanges, consulates, civil air). Then turn back to major issues for the bulk of this meeting in effort to draw together elements of "Charter for future" of U.S.-Soviet

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relations. Among other things, this would cover overall relationship, guidance to arms control negotiations, non-proliferation statement, regularizing regional experts meetings, new bilateral agreements, something on human rights even if it is just a disagreed statement (U.S. believes..., Soviet Union believes...), and possible agreement on summits in 1986 and 1987 in Washington and Moscow. All of this could end incorporated in a communique or handled individually by each side. Alternatively quite possible that this last session will be primarily a listing by both sides of its dissatisfaction with the other's positions and an effort to do damage limitation while putting Soviets clearly on notice that we can protect our interests regardless of the outcome of these meetings.

4:30 PM Conclude plenary.  
4:35 PM Departs for residence.  
4:45 PM Arrives at residence.  
5:00 - Private Time.  
7:20 PM

Note: Around 5:30 pm press briefing by speakers and meeting participants: likely to require Shultz - McFarlane level as this may be our major briefing on substance of both days meetings.

7:25 PM President and Mrs. Reagan depart for Swiss-hosted reception at La Gondale.  
7:30 PM Arrive at La Gondale. Photo op outside and more restricted pool inside. Further opportunity to talk with Gorbachev and other members of the Soviet delegation, as well as showing to Soviets and Swiss whatever posture we want at this stage. If a bad outcome; quiet confidence and make our case. If a more positive outcome; care not to generate euphoria. (Suggested attendees 70 Swiss, 35 U.S., and 35 Soviets.)  
8:25 PM President and Mrs. Reagan depart La Gondale before Gorbachevs to be on hand at residence to greet them.  
8:30 PM Arrive at residence.

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8:45 PM President and Mrs. Reagan greet Gorbachevs. Reagans and Gorbachevs may be seated at one table together; this likely would be the first and only opportunity for the two couple to talk together (photo op of them at table after dessert). President's toast will depend in part on how talks have gone. Again if they have gone well, we should still be realistic about difficulties ahead but also outline our hopes. If talks have gone badly, the President in his toast should stress that this has been the norm for decades, we regret it but can manage and it will not stop both protecting our interests and seeking ways to reach balanced agreements. Total suggested attendees are 16.

10:45 PM President and Mrs. Reagan see off Gorbachevs.

Thursday, November 21

10:30 AM Suggested visit/coffee by Mr./Mrs. Palmetta.

11:40 AM Depart residence for airport.

11:55 AM Arrival at airport.

12:00 PM Depart Geneva for Washington (open press coverage).

Note: Current plans call for no activity this morning in Geneva. It may be that we will have completed all work November 20 and have nothing further to do. However, it is possible that we will need or want to do some sort of activity, possibly a joint activity with Gorbachev or other members of the Soviet delegation. For example, if there is work on a (possible) communique which has to be done overnight November 20-21, and/or we want to highlight something special like mutual agreement to reciprocal summits in 1986 and 1987, and/or modest agreements we decided to have signed in Geneva, this could be done on the morning of November 21. The President and Gorbachev could be present, or we could decide to have the two foreign ministers or others carry out these tasks. Or we could simply have press spokesmen release the news/documents.

3:00 PM Arrive Andrews.  
(est.)

3:15 PM Arrive South Lawn. Possible statement.

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KEY EVENTS AND TASKINGS  
DRAFT  
SEPTEMBER 20, 1985

9  
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NLRB F06714/14 F44A  
BY CN KARADATE 1/15/02

- September 24 - Le Figaro Interview - State
- September 25 - Shultz/Shevardnaze Meeting
  - Briefing package - State
  - Talking Points - State
- September 27 - President/Shevardnadze Meeting
  - Briefing Package - State
  - Talking Points - State
- September 28 - Allied Consultations -  
Presidential Letter to Allies
  - Draft Letter - State (done)
  - Special Letter/Emissary to Mitterand - State
- October 2-5 - Gorbachev Visit to France
  - Details of Schedule - Embassy Paris
- October 23 - President's U.N. Address
  - Draft - State
- October 23 - Presidential Meeting with Allies, UNGA  
(tentative)
  - Briefing papers - State
  - Talking Points - State
- November 5 - Briefing Lunch with Soviet Specialists
  - Background Paper - NSC
- November 11 - Letter to Allies - State
- November 12 - NSC Meeting - Pre-Gorbachev
  - Briefing Package - NSC
  - Talking Points for McFarlane - NSC
- Arrival Statement and Dinner Toasts - State

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

*Briefing notes  
for President*

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October 22, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Study on U.S. - Soviet Summits, 1972-1979

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding the "Overview" section (Tab A) of a study on U.S. - Soviet summits. The study was prepared by the State Department's Office of the Historian, and is attached at Tab II for your information. It appears to be a thorough piece of work, well worth reviewing as we approach Geneva.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President forwarding the "Overview" section of the summit study to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A "Overview" section of summit study

Tab II Complete summit study

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *LVJ* NARA, Date *8/29/02*

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Study on U.S. - Soviet summits, 1972-1979

Issue

Whether to review the attached overview of U.S. - Soviet summits.

Facts

The State Department's Office of the Historian has prepared an in-depth study of U.S.-Soviet summit meetings from 1972-1979.

Discussion

As we approach your November meeting with Gorbachev I think it would be useful to review the attached summary of the State Department's summit study.

Recommendation

OK

No

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

That you review the attached summary of summits since 1972.

Attachment

Tab A "Overview" section of State Department summit study.

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By CS NARA, Date 8/29/02

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UNITED STATES-SOVIET SUMMITS, 1972-1979:  
AN OVERVIEW

Between 1972 and 1979, United States and Soviet leaders held six summit meetings. President Nixon's three summits with Soviet General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev (Moscow, May 22-30, 1972; Washington, June 18-25, 1973; and Moscow, June 28-July 3, 1974) were of longer duration than the others and included extensive side trips, photo opportunities, and ceremonial aspects. A programmed informality characterized these meetings, with occasions for the two leaders to socialize in a relaxed setting.

President Ford's two summits with Brezhnev (Vladivostok, November 23-24, 1974; and Helsinki, July 30 and August 2, 1975) were arranged in response to specific circumstances--Ford's assumption of the presidency and the signing of the Helsinki Accords. Hence, they were shorter, less ceremonial, involved less socializing, and dealt with fewer issues than the previous three summits.

President Carter's summit with Brezhnev (Vienna, June 15-18, 1979) was more formal in tone than the other summits. There were opportunities for informal conversation between the two leaders at the introductory session, short luncheons and dinners, and an evening at the opera, but none in a casual setting. Most business was conducted in plenary session; Carter and Brezhnev met privately only once. The discussions were substantively wide-ranging, but Brezhnev's failing health limited the length of the sessions.

In all cases, U.S. officials anticipated constructive but limited achievements from the summits. Conscious efforts were made to insure there would be positive results from the meetings that would enhance the President's image as a world leader and build support for his policies. Extensive U.S.-Soviet negotiations preceded all six meetings, not only to set the agenda and negotiate a joint communique, but also to narrow and reconcile differences on substantive issues so that specific agreements could be announced at the summit.

Arms control was the dominant issue discussed at all the summits. Summit consideration supplemented and crystallized rather than replaced ongoing negotiations on this issue. Two SALT treaties and several other agreements and joint statements relating to arms control were completed at the meetings. A limited number of negotiating deadlocks on arms control were

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resolved at the summits. At the 1972 meeting, differences were resolved on several subsidiary issues; in June 1974 a threshold test ban treaty was concluded; and in November 1974 important Soviet concessions were obtained regarding SALT.

Geopolitical issues, particularly the Middle East, were also a central concern at the summits. Discussions served mainly to restate existing positions rather than break new ground. The Soviet Union raised the subject of the People's Republic of China at all of the meetings. This reflected Soviet concern over China's nuclear capability and over the resumption of Sino-American relations.

Summit discussions also focused on trade, cultural and scientific exchange, and other bilateral interests. Numerous agreements on these subjects were signed at the three summits held during the Nixon administration. Certain bilateral questions were raised at the Ford and Carter administration summits, but less emphasis was placed on them and no agreements were signed.

#### NIXON AND BREZHNEV AT MOSCOW, MAY 22-30, 1972

In 1970 the United States took initiatives which after substantial negotiations eventuated two years later in the first Moscow Summit of May 1972. Both countries had high expectations for this summit and these were largely fulfilled, at least in the short run.

The two principal achievements of the summit were the establishment of a personal relationship between President Richard Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev and the signature of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I). Some last-minute negotiation on these agreements took place at the summit. Also signed in Moscow were prenegotiated agreements on the Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations, Prevention of Incidents at Sea, Cooperation in Space, Medical Science and Public Health, Environmental Protection, and Science and Technology. Of these, the Agreement on Basic Principles was of great importance to the Soviets, who saw it as a U.S. recognition of their full equality as a superpower.

Discussions at the summit also affected significant developments in Europe and the Middle East, trade expansion, and a lend-lease settlement. In subsequent years some of the roughnesses in the negotiating process before, during, and

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after this summit, particularly as they affected the SALT I agreements and the international grain trade, provided an opening for opponents of detente to criticize its viability.

NIXON AND BREZHNEV AT WASHINGTON,  
CAMP DAVID, AND SAN CLEMENTE,  
JUNE 18-25, 1973

The Brezhnev visit to the United States (June 18-25), undertaken more at Soviet initiative than American, took place amidst much fanfare but under the cloud of the Watergate hearings. Preparations were conducted primarily by a special interagency committee under the National Security Council's Senior Review Group, although some details were smoothed out by National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger during a May visit to the Soviet Union. Like Khrushchev's visit in 1959, Brezhnev's was marked by public demonstrations, mainly by Jewish groups critical of restrictive Soviet emigration policies. During the visit ten agreements were signed, the most important of which was an understanding on the prevention of nuclear war. In several private talks with Nixon at Camp David and San Clemente, Brezhnev also emphasized his anxiety over improving U.S.-Chinese ties, and he tried unsuccessfully to draw Nixon and Kissinger into an implied alliance against the Chinese. In their final meeting at San Clemente, Brezhnev also tried to bully Nixon into a secret deal to end the Middle Eastern conflict.

FORD AND BREZHNEV AT VLADIVOSTOK, NOVEMBER 23-24, 1974

The Vladivostok meeting between President Gerald R. Ford and Soviet leader Brezhnev took place only five months after the Moscow summit, primarily because Brezhnev was eager to establish contact with the new U.S. President. The summit was more ad hoc than the three previous ones and focused almost entirely on the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT). The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Cyprus, and the Middle East were dealt with briefly but nothing of substance was achieved on any of these issues. Mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) was mentioned only in the prenegotiated joint communiqué. In part because of the groundwork laid by Secretary of State Kissinger during his October trip to Moscow and to Soviet hopes of establishing a constructive relationship with the new U.S. President, a breakthrough on SALT did take place at Vladivostok. The two

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sides reached agreement in principle and the resulting SALT accord provided the basis for the SALT II treaty later signed by President Jimmy Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna in June 1979. It met the demands of the U.S. Congress and the Defense Department for equal aggregates and involved significant Soviet concessions, including abandonment of their previous demand that Forward Based Systems (FBS), such as U.S. weapons based in Western Europe, had to be included in the U.S. total. Ford and Kissinger returned home feeling triumphant and claiming that they had put a cap on the arms race. Their hopes were dashed, however, by the subsequent inability of the two sides to agree upon whether such weapons as the Soviet Backfire bomber and U.S. cruise missiles were to be included in the totals agreed upon at Vladivostok.

#### **FORD AND BREZHNEV AT HELSINKI, JULY 30-AUGUST 2, 1975**

The 1975 Helsinki summit between President Ford and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev took place on July 30 and August 2, 1975, immediately prior to and following the ceremonies closing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The United States gave top priority to two issues:

- Strengthening cooperation between the great powers
- Concluding a SALT II agreement

The results of the Ford-Brezhnev meeting were unsatisfactory. No substantive progress was made on SALT although the atmosphere which surrounded meetings of the two leaders was frank and cooperative. Public reaction to the meeting was strongly negative and contributed to the subsequent deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations during the remainder of the Ford administration and weakened the President's political position.

#### **CARTER AND BREZHNEV AT VIENNA, JUNE 15-18, 1979**

The only U.S.-Soviet summit conference held during the Carter administration opened in Vienna on June 15, 1979, and continued through June 18, with five plenary meetings as well as a private meeting between President Carter and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev. Discussions focused on the following subjects:

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1. Strategic Arms Limitation treaty (SALT II)
2. SALT III and other arms control issues
3. International issues
4. Bilateral and trade issues.

The major achievement at Vienna was the signing of the SALT II Treaty on strategic arms. Other issues were discussed and positions clarified, but little movement toward specific agreements resulted. Subsequently, the Soviet Union reacted negatively to the NATO two-track decision in mid-December 1979 to deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Western Europe while simultaneously pursuing arms control talks with the Soviet Union. The invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet armed forces later that month removed all hopes for progress toward a rapprochement in U.S.-Soviet relations. President Carter asked the Senate to delay further consideration of the SALT II Treaty from further Senate consideration; it has still not been ratified.

Office of The Historian  
October 1985

~~SECRET~~



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: What to Expect from Gorbachev in Geneva

George Shultz has forwarded the memorandum at Tab A which analyzes Gorbachev's typical approach to a number of the questions which may arise during your meetings with him and suggests appropriate responses.

I believe that this is an excellent treatment of this subject and recommend that you read it. We will work the talking points into the material for your meetings.

Recommendation

OK

No

That you read the Memorandum from Secretary Shultz at Tab A.

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from Secretary George P. Shultz

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 20, 1997  
By CRS NARA, Date 8/29/02

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTONSECRET/SENSITIVE

November 12, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: What to Expect from Gorbachev in Geneva

My meeting last week in the Kremlin with Gorbachev provided us with our most detailed look yet at the new Soviet leader. I was struck in our conversation by the curious blend of new and old in Gorbachev. He displayed the intellectual quickness and articulate debating skill which have impressed other western leaders. At the same time he showed us the blunt, sometimes browbeating style characteristic of so many of the older generation of Soviet leaders.

Substantively, he trotted out many of the old Soviet negotiating ploys and fell back repeatedly on many of the old stereotypes about the United States which we heard so often from the older leaders. While some of this undoubtedly represented a tactical approach to put me on the defensive, there is no question that Gorbachev and his younger colleagues really share much of this old "collective wisdom." It is also clear that however much Gorbachev represents the "new Soviet man," he and his colleagues are not about to squander the legacy of Soviet power and influence bequeathed to them by Brezhnev, Andropov and the old guard. The question is whether they are ready to deal with us on the basis of real equality.

Since Gorbachev will undoubtedly put forward many of these same points in your conversations in Geneva, I have had my Soviet experts examine parts of our conversation to give you a flavor of what to expect. They have extracted key statements Gorbachev made to me and prepared points which you might draw on in responding to Gorbachev. In every case, I think the best response is to rebut his point forcefully and then reiterate our concrete proposals for addressing the problem in question. If Gorbachev rejects our ideas, you should press him to put forward a practical means of resolving our differences.

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NLRR F06-114/14 #14181BY CU NARA DATE 7/28/08SECRET/SENSITIVE  
DECL: OADR

NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS/OLD U.S. PROPOSALS

Gorbachev Statements

Our side has tried to signal a desire to improve relations and the only response we get from you is that you call this "propaganda." If we do something and make suggestions, you say it is propaganda and we are weak. If we don't, you say we are intransigent.

The Administration is sticking with old positions. This will not lead to an improvement in Soviet-American relations on the basic issues.... The U.S. should think of making new proposals and not sticking with old policies. You should understand that the Republican Administration can't leave office with only old proposals. You can't continue to wrap these up as if they were new.

Analysis

It is a standard Soviet negotiating tactic to disparage U.S. arms control ideas as nothing new. At the same time they will repeatedly call on the U.S. to explore the so-called "new ideas" embodied in their proposals when there is in fact little if anything novel. The approach is designed to put pressure on the U.S. to come forward with further concessions, before the Soviets reveal any further compromises. The best way to get beyond such a semantic debate is to call a spade a spade and agree to probe those elements in which both sides have some interest.

Response

-- There's some question about just how "new" your proposals are; for example, Soviet calls for a moratorium on nuclear testing have been around for years. Back in the 1960s, we accepted one of those proposals, and you took advantage of it to prepare the ground for the most concentrated nuclear test series in history.

-- I have to be candid. A lot of your proposals look pretty empty to us. We cannot accept declarations of benign intent or calls for freezes which give you unilateral advantages.

-- You and I should get beyond these declarations and secondary matters, and get to work on the heart of the problem -- deep reductions in real systems that are dangerous to stability.

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 3 -

-- When we have found positive elements in your proposals, we have said so. I stated in my UN speech last month that we found seeds worth nurturing in your Geneva counterproposal. We responded within a month. Have you said anything similar about our latest offer? When will we see a new move from you?

-- And as for new ideas, we're still waiting for a positive response from you on the many ideas we've put forward in arms control and other areas -- to name a few, confidence-building measures, people-to-people exchanges, resolution of regional conflicts, human rights.

-- We don't expect you to take all of these ideas as proposed, but we do expect a fair hearing and a constructive response.

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## SALT II AND THE DECLINE OF DETENTE

### Gorbachev Statement

We know full well that SALT II had been buried and was long dead before the events of Afghanistan. ... There was a process at work in U.S. society, a deep distrust. The SALT II Treaty was buried because scientific achievements had come along which required that the U.S. drop the restraints in the Treaty ... the invasion of Afghanistan was used as the excuse. ... The Administration should not be so tied to the military-industrial complex, which just chews up money and programs by the billions. ... The Soviet Union wishes to know the desires of the Reagan Administration: does it wish to improve relations ... or complete its eight years in office with no change and therefore not disappoint the military-industrial complex.

### Analysis

At several points in the meeting Gorbachev referred to the influence of the political right in the Republican party. He cited what he called the Administration's ties to the military-industrial complex and its support for American military superiority over the Soviet Union. Like other Soviet leaders he took pride in what he saw as his insight into our political life. To demonstrate his "knowledge" of the U.S. political scene, for example, Gorbachev cited the Hoover Institute study "America in the Eighties" whose conservative defense and social programs he alleged have been totally adopted by the Administration. In fact, Gorbachev's knowledge, undoubtedly based on material from Ambassador Dobrynin, reflected a shallow perception of the dynamic of American politics. You will want in your comments about your domestic agenda to give Gorbachev a more sophisticated appreciation of our political process.

### Response

-- As you acknowledged to Secretary Shultz, both our countries have sectors of society that are concerned with national defense. They push us in that direction. Within limits, I welcome their concern with our national security. In any case, that's a fact of life.

-- But to say these sectors are the arbiters of public views toward the Soviet Union is far off the mark. The American people have no animosity towards the Soviet people. They want nothing more than peaceful relations with your country, and relief from the defense burden. They have no desire for endless confrontation and competition.

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-- But they also have a deep-seated mistrust of the Soviet government's objectives and purposes -- and that's the result of Soviet actions, not plots by American defense contractors or political currents.

-- The fact is, we hoped detente would bring about a new period of restraint on your part. It did not.

-- Beginning in the mid-1970s, we saw a string of Soviet military interventions in the Third World. You kept building up your military forces against the U.S. and our Allies. It was these events, not defense contractors or American political factions, that damaged our relations.

-- Everything that caused so much harm to our relations in the 1970s is still happening. You are still building up your nuclear arms. You or your allies are still engaged in the conflicts of the 1970s.

-- You and I have an opportunity to make a new start. Frankly, that's going to require some very concrete steps on your part. We're willing to do our share.

-- I have made specific proposals to deal with all these problems. If you don't like them, I'd be glad to hear some fresh, concrete thinking from you.

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

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SOVIET RESPONSE TO SDI

Gorbachev Statement

If you want superiority through your SDI, we will not help you. We will let you bankrupt yourselves. But we also will not reduce our offensive missiles. We will engage in a build-up that will break your shield. We don't want war, but neither are we going to allow unilateral advantage. Therefore, we will increase nuclear arms. But we are patient and we still have hope.

Analysis

Stopping the SDI program was Gorbachev's primary theme in his conversation in Moscow. At several points during the conversation he attacked your recent decision on ABM reinterpretation. He and his colleagues are undoubtedly motivated by fear of U.S. technological capability and by the threat they perceive SDI eventually posing to the massive Soviet offensive strategic arsenal assembled at great cost during the 1970's and 1980's. Your meeting provides an opportunity to explain the potential benefits of SDI, if it proves feasible, and to determine where Gorbachev draws his bottom line on strategic defense.

Response

-- You are very aware of political developments in the U.S. and Europe, so you should know that SDI has strong public support, not just in my country but in others as well.

-- The reason it has this support is that people believe, as do I, that if there is a better way to preserve peace and maintain security than by making each other nuclear hostages, we have a duty to look into it.

-- It's hard to understand why you object so strenuously to our research program, when you know very well that you are doing the same kind of research, and when you have long placed a very high military premium on strategic defense.

-- There is nothing obscure about our research program and our objectives. Both have been well publicized. It's a different case with the Soviet strategic defense program. You have acknowledged that the Soviet Union is also engaged in fundamental research. But what are your objectives? What do you plan to do with the knowledge gained?

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- 7 -

-- We have made no secret of the potential difficulties of a transition to greater reliance on defenses. We have tried hard to engage you on this in Geneva. Let me ask you what you plan to do if your own research proves that you can develop and deploy an effective strategic defense. Are you planning to discuss a joint, cooperative transition with us?

-- In the last analysis, we have an historic opportunity here; a chance to get a grip on the technology at an early date and see if can turn it to the task of securing peace and stability. That's going to require hard thinking by both our countries. We're willing to engage in this process. What about you?

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## U.S. ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION

### Gorbachev Statement

Gorbachev said that the U.S. was full of illusions. First, that the U.S. believed the Soviet Union was less economically powerful and therefore would be weakened by an arms race. Second, that the U.S. had higher technology and, therefore, the SDI would give the U.S. superiority over the Soviet Union in weapons. Third, the Soviet Union was more interested in negotiations in Geneva than the U.S. These are all illusions ... the U.S. apparently fails to draw lessons from history.

### Analysis

It was ironic that Gorbachev lectured me on our illusions about the Soviet Union even as he reiterated many standard old Soviet misconceptions about the United States. His comments reflected a standard Soviet view that no one understands the security threat which is posed by adversaries on every side. As you have said, one of the benefits of your meeting with Gorbachev will be the opportunity to air the suspicions and misconceptions which have arisen between our two countries over the years. You will want to recognize legitimate Soviet security concerns, but insist that Gorbachev must take into account the concerns of the U.S. and our allies.

### Response

-- I have no doubts that you or any other Soviet leader will take the steps necessary to assure your security, whatever the cost. You can be assured that I, and my successors, will do what's necessary for the defense of America and its allies.

-- We're not trying to bankrupt you. I have never considered that an option.

-- We are proud of our technological prowess, but we know full well that the Soviet Union has a formidable ability to produce advanced arms. Indeed, that's one of the major causes of tension between us -- from our standpoint, you produce many powerful weapons that far exceed legitimate needs.

-- If all we wanted to do was bleed you in arms race, we wouldn't be negotiating in Geneva and elsewhere to lower force levels.

-- We're not seeking unilateral advantage in these talks, but rather equality. We see fair agreements as profiting both sides, not just one partner.

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THE SOVIETS AND THE THIRD WORLD

Gorbachev Statement

Because of our belief in our principles, we will continue to support national liberation movements. The U.S. wants us to give up but we cannot. It is a matter of principle with us. You on the other hand should give up your illusions and then we can move along together even on such questions as human rights.

Analysis

The Soviets make much of the clause in their constitution calling for support for national liberation movements. They use it to justify ideologically and pragmatically their activities in the Third World. While we do not deny the Soviets legitimate interests in the developing world -- we would like them to provide their share of economic aid -- they cannot use "their principled position" to justify intervention in the affairs of less developed countries or the use of force in unstable Third World regions. This issue goes to the heart of American disillusionment with the Soviet policy of detente, which attempted to exclude Soviet activities in the Third World from its legitimate place in our overall relationship.

Response

-- We don't accept your claim to a right either to intervene in the affairs of others or to use force to impose your system on others.

-- We don't have any obligation to accept or respect what you claim is a constitutional right to foist wars of national liberation on other peoples.

-- Your efforts to carry out your so-called principles have cost thousands of lives, driven millions of people into refugee camps, and wrecked the economies of the countries involved.

-- No other factor has done more to make the American people deeply suspicious of your ultimate objectives and worried about their own security. I can tell you that so long as you operationalize this "right" or "duty", there will never be "normal" relations between our two peoples in any meaningful sense.

-- We are not going to sit by idly. Our sympathies lie with peoples who are fighting for genuine self-determination. They are the real movements of national liberation. We are going to help them.

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- 10 -

-- But I want to stress this is not the way we prefer to go. It is not the way to reduce tensions between us.

-- The question is, how do the U.S. and Soviet Union go about correcting the situation?

-- I gave you my ideas about how we can clear up the five most pressing active conflicts. I've gotten no positive reaction from you, which is disappointing.

-- Perhaps you have your own ideas; if so, I'd be glad to hear them.

-- But if you don't have any fresh thoughts of your own, you should reconsider what I offered in New York.

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U.S. SEEKING MILITARY SUPERIORITY

Gorbachev Statement

Does the United States consider that its present policies of force -- exercising pressure, strength -- that these policies have brought the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table? If that is the type of thinking which seems to motivate people who surround the President, then no success is possible

Analysis

The Soviets continually attack us for seeking military superiority. At the same time they insist that our relationship must be based on the principles of "equality and equal security." It is wrong in their view for the U.S. to seek any form of military advantage, but they reserve the right to maintain military force equivalent to that of all their adversaries put together. The question of what constitutes genuine equality in military forces goes to the heart of your discussions with Gorbachev on the geopolitical balance. It affects not only the NST negotiations in Geneva but other arms control negotiations such as MBFR and CDE. You will want to put our views on this core issue on the record forcefully early in your meeting with Gorbachev.

Response

-- Whenever I hear these kinds of complaints, I'm reminded of the story told to me by an American who was once in your country.

-- The American was watching your annual military parade. As the missiles and tanks rolled by, a Soviet woman turned to her, after realizing there was an American present, and said, "There, you see how much we want peace!"

-- That woman recognized that strength is a necessary ingredient of peace. Anyone familiar with your media, or who followed your treatment of this year's 40th anniversary of the end of World War II, knows that in the Soviet Union this principle is axiomatic. That's no less true for the United States than it is for the Soviet Union.

-- We think you've been trying to establish nuclear superiority for years. Now you say we are trying to get the edge. The question is what you and I are going to do about this situation.

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- 12 -

-- I have said many times that we do not seek military superiority. We do want a stable balance of forces at radically lower levels. That's what we've been trying to negotiate with you for years.

-- Our experience is that negotiations work only when both sides have incentives to reach an agreement, and that means that one side cannot outweigh the other.

-- More important, the ultimate objective must be equality; anything less will be inherently unstable.

-- Look at our negotiating proposals and you'll see that when we propose limits on Soviet systems, we put our own comparable systems on the table as well. Can you say that about the Soviet negotiating positions at Geneva?

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LINKAGE

Gorbachev Statement

Gorbachev went on to say that it had been an idea of Nixon's to call for linkage. He said this was old hat and should be put in mothballs.

Analysis

The Soviets have repeatedly rejected the concept of linkage in principle, but have in fact practiced it to the present day. For example, they have linked the opening of new Consulates in Kiev and Moscow to our agreement to a resumption of Aeroflot air service to New York. While we should expect them to continue to criticize linkage, particularly in regard to making progress on human rights, we should have no illusions that linkage will remain a political fact of life in our relationship.

Response

-- My Administration has never dwelled on linkages, and you know that.

-- But you should also recognize that linkages are a fact of political life. It is naive to think that what happens in one area of our relationship won't have an impact, for better or worse, on the others.

-- Actions by the Soviet Union in violation of international agreements -- whether that means repression of the Helsinki monitors, or building of the Krasnoyarsk radar -- inevitably affect our relations.

-- When the Soviet Union invades Afghanistan, suppresses freedom in Poland or fuels conflicts in other regions of the world, Americans very naturally begin to worry about your purposes in the world, and about their own security.

-- I have never said that nothing will be solved until everything is solved. I am ready to make as much progress in all areas as possible, but I recognize that some matters will have to proceed at their own pace. The important thing is to get to work to start narrowing the differences between us. If we succeed, the linkage question will take care of itself.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Gorbachev Statement

[Although Gorbachev did not directly rebut our position on human rights in Moscow, he has in the past responded by attacking U.S. practices along the following lines:] You talk about human rights in the Soviet Union but you ignore the terrible injustices of American society -- poverty, hunger, unemployment, crime, racial discrimination, maltreatment of your Indians. We don't have these problems in the Soviet Union.

Analysis

While the older Soviet leadership responded to our human rights complaints by rejecting them as illegal intrusions on Soviet internal affairs, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze have responded by actively rebutting our points and trying to turn the tables on us. You should be ready in Geneva to respond to an aggressive attack on our human rights record and refocus the discussion on Soviet violations.

Response

-- The United States isn't perfect. We have never made any secret that many of our citizens haven't been able to share in the prosperity enjoyed by the majority of Americans.

-- But we're working hard to change that -- and I'm proud of the record of my Administration. We've created some eight million jobs since I came into office. Our health services are making stunning improvements in such things as higher life expectancies, lower infant mortality rates, and pioneering new techniques for curing diseases.

-- I could cite figures to demonstrate how much we are spending on social programs and the considerable progress we are making. Perhaps the best demonstration, however, of the attraction of the American dream of prosperity and freedom is to point to the thousands of immigrants who want to come to our shores, sometimes at great risk when they leave their native countries.

-- We are working hard to eradicate poverty, feed the hungry, house the homeless, to find jobs for the unemployed. We will never be satisfied that we've done enough.

-- Pointing to our shortcomings, though, doesn't relieve you of yours. Human rights is a central aspect of our relationship, a matter of deep concern to all Americans. You have international obligations which you've freely assumed. In the end, there can never be much trust and confidence between our peoples when the Soviet Union ignores fundamental humanitarian principles.

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 15 -

Geneva Meeting: Themes & Responses

Drafted by: EUR/SOV: B<sup>BB</sup>Burton/JF<sup>JS</sup>Tefft  
11/11/85 (1495P) ext. 20821

Cleared by: EUR: M<sup>D</sup>Palmer  
EUR/SOV: M<sup>P</sup>Parris

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



20  
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 17, 1985

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

~~(CONFIDENTIAL with Attachment)~~

TO: NSC - Ambassador Matlock  
FROM: PA - Bernard Kalb *BK67H*  
SUBJECT: Study on U.S.-Soviet Summits, 1972-1979

I am forwarding a classified study of U.S.-Soviet Summits, 1972-1979, prepared by the Office of the Historian. It takes into account comments on an earlier draft completed in July, as well as information developed in the course of personal interviews.

Attachment:

Study on U.S.-Soviet Summits, 1972-1979

*hrc*  
PA/HO: PClaussen:bj  
10-17-85 632-9477 0066h

*43*  
clrs - PA/HO - WZSlany  
PA - GBHigh

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By *ALS* NARA, Date *5/29/02*

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

21  
**Office  
of the  
Historian**

United States Department of State  
*Bureau of Public Affairs*

**Historical Research Project No. 1454**

UNITED STATES-SOVIET SUMMITS  
1972-1979

OCTOBER 1985



~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

As 8/29/12

*Matlock* JFM08  
SYSTEM II  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE

November 8, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: President's Briefing Book for Geneva Meetings

Attached is the briefing book which we received from State today, to which I have added an "Overview" paper for your signature at Tab I.1. The Defense Group has vetted the talking points dealing with arms control, and the regional senior directors those dealing with their areas.

I believe that the organization of the points in several sections could be improved, and also think we will need a more summary treatment of the main points to be covered before we get to Geneva. However, I believe that we have time next week to work this out, and the book as it stands should be useful preliminary reading for the President.

If you can obtain from the President a copy of the talking points he has already drafted, this will be of considerable assistance as we put the talking points in final form.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.1 of the Briefing Book and forward the book to the President for his weekend reading.

Approve \_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I.1                      Memorandum to the President

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By CAL NARA, Date 8/29/02

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
SUBJECT: Your Meetings with Gorbachev in Geneva

Your object in meeting Gorbachev will be to have a thorough and frank substantive discussion of the key issues in the U.S.-Soviet relationship and to use the occasion to initiate a process of dialogue which can be used, over time, to manage the relationship in a more stable and predictable manner than has been the case in the past.

Essentially, this means that you will be laying out for Gorbachev your views on the state of the current relationship and the formative influences in the past, then making clear what direction the relationship could take if the Gorbachev is willing to modify Soviet policy in the areas we find most threatening and destabilizing. Through your interchanges, you should be able to get a feel for Gorbachev's intentions. Specifically, you will be looking for indications as to whether Gorbachev is willing to adjust Soviet policies on concrete issues sufficiently to permit a lowering in overall tension. If he is, it might be possible to give specific impetus to some of the questions under negotiation. But in any event, the meeting should enable you to establish a framework for a continuing process of dialogue and negotiation in the future.

You can expect Gorbachev to defend Soviet policies vigorously and to place great stress on the necessity of dealing as equals (while complaining that the U.S. refuses to recognize the Soviet Union as an equal). In doing so, he will be probing to determine your overall intentions and to test possible soft spots in our current positions. He is likely to try to gain psychological advantage by making vigorous charges against American actions, statements and policies, though he will probably go about this in a more respectful manner than that he employed with George Shultz and me last Tuesday.

Basically, however, Gorbachev wants a "successful" summit. It is important to his political position and his image as an

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NLRR 606-714/14 #14174

BY CJ NARA DATE 7/28/08

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Declassify on: OADR

*mission*  
follow-up meetings, and these can provide the high points in the sustained dialogue we are seeking in the future.

It is typical of Soviet negotiating behavior that they withhold most of their concessions until the last minute. The run-up to your meeting has fit this pattern, with Soviet negotiators moving very slowly on the various negotiations. The result is that we cannot be sure whether we can agree on enough of substance to justify a joint communique. I would recommend that we agree to joint statements or a communique only if the substance of agreements reached justifies treatment in this form. Otherwise, we could just announce separately our own assessment of the meeting. Given the usual Soviet desire to end high-level meetings with signed pieces of paper, this stance may give us some leverage in pressing for closure on several of the bilateral matters still under negotiation. It would not surprise me if we see rapid movement on some of them by the Soviets next week.

Secretary Shultz's memorandum under Tab 2 sets forth a number of considerations which I consider valid. The talking points which follow are of a preliminary nature and should be read for the stimulation they provide as you think about the points to be covered in the various meetings. I will be providing further thoughts on the tack you might best take in each of the meetings as we go through the preparatory process next week.

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S NOVEMBER 19  
AFTERNOON PLENARY SESSION WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

Arms Control

NST  
NEGOTIATIONS

-- Opportunity now exists for immediate and real progress in the nuclear and space arms area.

-- We have put forward a comprehensive new proposal designed to build on the positive elements in your counterproposal and bridge our two positions. It deals with all three areas under discussion in Geneva.

-- One of the most concrete results of this meeting could be our agreement on a new set of guidelines for our negotiators in Geneva.

-- You have our ideas for such guidelines. They would commit us both to intensify the negotiations with the objective of early progress wherever possible.

-- They would call for significant reductions applying the general principle of 50% reductions to equal limits in specific, comparable categories in a manner that enhances stability. This concept builds on your counterproposal. Must insist, however, that the reductions be applied to the proper categories of systems. Cannot accept that systems should be limited on our side while not being limited on the Soviet side.

-- Ready to reach agreement on U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles of longer range, as an interim step toward their complete elimination. Our proposal would call for the right to equal global levels of LRINF missile warheads.

-- We propose that both sides conduct their strategic ballistic missile defense research programs as permitted by and in complete compliance with the ABM Treaty. We also propose to open laboratories and to inform one another about the progress our researchers are making in this field. Such steps would enhance mutual confidence in this area.

-- We must also conclude verification measures sufficient to verify compliance with all provisions of agreements. We must take steps to resolve current differences over compliance with existing arms control agreements.

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BY CL NARADATE 2/26/08

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-- This framework agreement would provide direction for the future efforts of our negotiators in Geneva.

NPT STATEMENT

-- Have had useful discussions on nuclear non-proliferation. Pleased we have agreed to joint statement.

CHEMICAL  
WEAPONS

-- We believe a verifiable, worldwide CW ban is the way to deal with the CW problem. We hope you will negotiate on our draft treaty at the CD.

-- At the same time, practical steps on CW nonproliferation could be consistent with our foremost objective. We have noted your expressions of interest in this subject. Let us agree to hold bilateral experts discussions.

-- These discussions should -- as we have proposed -- focus initially on CW use in the Iran-Iraq war, and if those discussions were successful move on to a broader discussion.

-- We are concerned over Soviet use of CW in Afghanistan, and in supplying CW to its Vietnamese allies, as well as about massive Soviet CW capability, which you developed while we unilaterally refrained from CW production. This has required us to take compensatory steps -- planning production.

SALT II  
RESTRAINTS

-- I think we agree that mutual restraint in strategic weaponry can add stability and improve the atmosphere for making progress in the Geneva negotiations. We will continue to refrain from undercutting existing arms agreements to the extent you exercise comparable restraint and provided you actively pursue arms reduction agreements in the NST talks.

-- This would include the SALT II Treaty's provisions. We recently dismantled an existing Poseidon submarine in order to remain in compliance with commitments. But we will review future milestones on a case by case basis.

-- We insist, that you take necessary steps to correct your non-compliance activities.

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CDE

-- My Dublin offer on CDE stands. If we can agree on general outline of an agreement consisting of genuine confidence and security building measures falling within the Madrid Mandate, excluding independent air and naval activities, combined with a reaffirmation of our non-use of force commitment, we should give our CDE delegations parallel instructions to commence drafting.

-- Hope informal exploratory phase which conference began just before end of last round will be fruitful in narrowing differences on specific content of confidence building measures we have proposed.

MBFR

-- We have studied your recent "Model" responding to our proposal of August 1984 and I believe a positive Western initiative will be forthcoming in the near future. Hope we can agree to make early progress in negotiations.

RISK  
REDUCTION  
CENTERS

-- We have a shared interest in reducing risks of armed conflict, especially risks resulting from accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Senators Nunn and Warner mentioned to you their ideas along this line. You indicated you would study their idea of risk reduction centers.

-- We are ready to explore this and other ideas, such as a high level dialogue on defense budgets or military exchanges. Suggest that we agree to hold experts meetings.

NAVAL VISITS

-- The incidents-at-Sea Agreement is an excellent mechanism for practical problem-solving. We're pleased that our representatives have recently held their annual review.

-- As Secretary Shultz told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow, we are interested in exploring the idea of reciprocal ship visits that were first initiated at an INCSEA review.

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TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S NOVEMBER 20  
MORNING PLENARY SESSION WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

Regional Security Issues

GENERAL

-- Yesterday, I spoke about my proposal at the UNGA. Today I would like to discuss some of these issues on a region-by-region basis.

-- Many of these issues are covered by the process outlined in my UNGA proposal, but others are of a different nature and require their own solutions.

AFGHANISTAN

-- Afghanistan remains one of the biggest obstacles to improvement in relations.

-- Practically speaking, any solution will require the creation of conditions which give the millions of Afghan refugees confidence that they can return to their homes and exercise genuine self-determination.

-- At the same time, we respect the USSR's desire for a secure southern border.

-- As I said yesterday, we continue to believe a negotiated solution which will allow this is feasible and I understand the Soviet Union may also be interested in such a solution.

-- What is missing is Soviet willingness to provide a reasonable timetable for withdrawal of its troops. That key step could provide impetus for the Cordovez Mission and facilitate rapid progress toward a negotiated settlement at the scheduled December round of talks.

-- Given a reasonable timetable for Soviet withdrawal and political conditions which permit the refugees to return home in safety, I can assure you that we would be willing to provide guarantees.

EAST ASIA

-- The problems of Vietnam and North Korea are caused by their present policies, including the Isolation they have inflicted on themselves. Their policies threaten the stability of the region.

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BY G1 NARA DATE 7/28/08

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- 2 -

-- We believe you should use your considerable influence with Hanoi to urge them to pursue a political settlement.

-- Military offensives by the Vietnamese have in the past caused widespread suffering and destruction among civilian refugees on the Thai-Cambodia border. Hope you will urge Vietnamese restraint.

-- Tensions on the Korean peninsula also represent an ongoing threat to stability in Northeast Asia. Both of us should do what we can to encourage dialogue between North and South. This ought to include bringing North and South Korea into the United Nations as members.

-- As you know, we also support Japan's position on the Northern Territories.

CENTRAL AMERICA  
CARIBBEAN

-- It is worth recalling that perhaps the most dangerous crisis between our two countries in the postwar era arose in this region. There is no need for this to happen again as long as you do not misunderstand the importance of this region to the U.S.

-- We wish to reiterate that the introduction of jet fighter aircraft or of Cuban combat units would be totally unacceptable to the United States. At the same time, it should be clearly understood that we are gravely concerned about the overall arms build up of Nicaragua by the Soviet Union and its allies. We reserve the right to take all necessary action in the region to safeguard the interests of our national security and that of friendly nations.

-- True peace in the region will require a change of direction by the Sandinistas, including national reconciliation with their armed and unarmed opposition. That would be the beginning of a positive process to which we could contribute.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

-- Your side has said on many occasions that southern Africa is not an area where either of us have vital interests.

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- 3 -

-- We remain committed to helping the nations of the region reach a peaceful resolution on Namibia.

-- The Soviet Union has considerable influence with key actors among the frontline states: You should use that influence to encourage the continued search for a negotiated solution.

MIDDLE EAST

-- This remains a crucial and volatile area of the world where our respective interests have brought us to the brink of conflict in the past.

-- The U.S. is committed to working with the parties in the region to achieve a lasting comprehensive settlement. The only realistic path is direct negotiations based on UNSC resolution 242, and we think present circumstances favor real progress.

-- In our view, your 1984 proposal for an international conference holds out the certain prospect of stalemate, which in turn seems sure to lead that region back to war within the foreseeable future.

-- In the nearer term, Syrian aloofness from the peace process and the military buildup they have pursued raise the question of whether they are considering a military solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute.

-- Israel would win a war with Syria, but the consequences would be incalculable. We hope you will use your influence with Damascus to discourage Syrian consideration of a military option.

IRAN-IRAQ WAR

-- The Iran-Iraq war is one conflict which clearly does not serve either your interests or ours.

-- In discussions between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Ministers Gromyko and Shevardnadze there has been agreement on that point and on the fact that Iran is the intransigent party.

-- We to believe it would be useful for the Soviet Union to restrict arms flows from its friends to Iran, as we will continue to do with our friends.

Briefing mail for Pres  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

November 13, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: What to Expect from Gorbachev in Geneva

Secretary Shultz has sent a Memorandum to the President which analyzes Gorbachev's typical approach to many of the general questions which may come up at the Geneva Meeting, and provides suggested talking points for countering them.

I think this is an excellent analysis and consider the suggested responses pertinent and effective.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the Memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Shultz Memorandum to the President

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Declassify on: OADR

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White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997  
By *CHS* NARA, Date *11/29/02*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET~~ACTION

November 13, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT:

Art Hartman's Comments on Geneva

In case it has not already come to your attention, I want to be sure you see Art Hartman's cable on Gorbachev and his likely approach to the Geneva meeting. It is an excellent assessment of the man and his style. I think it is well worth sharing with the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I forwarding Art Hartman's assessment of Gorbachev.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## attachments:

Tab I      Memorandum to the President  
Tab A      Cable from Art Hartman

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White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997  
By *CA* NARA, Date *8/29/01*



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~~~ACTION~~

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
SUBJECT: Art Hartman's Comments on Geneva

Issue

To review the attached cable from Art Hartman.

Facts

Art Hartman has sent in a personal assessment of Gorbachev and his likely approach to your Geneva meeting.

Discussion

Art has had extensive direct contact with Gorbachev. His assessment of the man and his style is excellent and well worth reviewing.

RecommendationOKNo

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

That you review the cable from Art Hartman at  
Tab A.

## Attachment:

Tab A Cable from Art Hartman

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White House Guidelines, August 20, 1997

By CH NARA, Date 8/29/02



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# Department of State

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~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 16035

BY CH NARADATE 7/28/08

## SPECIAL ENCRYPTION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, US

SU ~~REDACTED GENEVA MEETING~~

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SINCE YOU AND I HAVE SEEN MORE OF GORBACHEV THAN ANYONE ELSE ON OUR SIDE, I WANTED TO GIVE YOU MY THOUGHTS ON HIS PERSONALITY, HIS LIKELY BEHAVIOR WITH THE PRESIDENT IN GENEVA, AND THE TACTICS THE PRESIDENT MIGHT FOLLOW IN DEALING WITH THIS MAN.

GORBACHEV'S PERSONALITY

3. TO USE A FAMILIAR IDIOM, THE NEW GENERAL SECRETARY COULD BE PLAYED CONVINCINGLY BY GEORGE C. SCOTT BUT NOT BY JIMMY STEWART. HE IS INTENSE, SELF-ASSURED AND ASSERTIVE. IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE WHY:

-- HIS RISE IN THIS TOUGH, DEMANDING BUREAUCRACY HAS BEEN METEORIC, AND HE DIDN'T MAKE IT TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT AT THE TENDER (FOR THIS PLACE)



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# Department of State

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AGE OF 47 BY BEING A MARSHMALLOW.

-- IN ADDITION TO HIS INNATE QUALITIES, HE KNOWS HE PERSONIFIES THE SOVIET UNION, AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S IMAGE SUFFERED BADLY UNDER HIS DECREPIT PREDECESSORS.

-- WITH ONLY NINE MONTHS AS GENERAL SECRETARY, HE STILL FEELS UNDER PRESSURE TO PROVE HE IS UP TO THE AWESOME RESPONSIBILITIES HE HAS INHERITED.

-- IN PARTICULAR, HE WANTS HIS BEHAVIOR TO REFLECT HIS CONCEPT OF WHAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE: DYNAMIC, PROUD, CLEAR-EYED ABOUT TODAY'S PROBLEMS AND COMPETENT TO OVERCOME TOMORROW'S CHALLENGES.

--  
4. I THINK WE HAVE SEEN ENOUGH OF HIM TO CONCLUDE THAT HE HAS A RIGID CAST OF MIND AND CAN APPROACH ARROGANCE IN REJECTING IDEAS THAT CLASH WITH HIS PRECONCEPTIONS. HE HAS DONE THIS REPEATEDLY ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. HE DID IT IN OUR MOST RECENT MEETING WHEN YOU LINKED AFGHANISTAN TO THE DEMISE OF SALT II. IN SHORT, THIS IS A MAN WHO REFUSES TO BE CONFUSED OR EVEN CONFRONTED WITH UNPLEASANT FACTS. INSTEAD, HE IS MORE THE DEFENSIVE LAWYER WAITING (BUT NOT NECESSARILY LISTENING) FOR THE CHANCE TO GET HIS PUNCH IN.

--  
GORBACHEV'S LIKELY DEMEANOR AT GENEVA  
-----

5. HIS MEETING WITH YOU LAST TUESDAY, PLUS HIS EARLIER SESSIONS WITH THE O'NEILL AND BYRD GROUPS,

SHOW THAT GORBACHEV HAS ABSORBED A VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

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## Department of State

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THAT IMPEDES AND SOMETIMES TOTALLY FRUSTRATES SERIOUS  
DISCUSSION. IN HIS MIND, WE REPRESENT THE "REAL"  
EVIL EMPIRE, HINDERING AS BEST WE CAN THE USSR'S  
EFFORTS TO LEAD MANKIND TO ITS "BRIGHT FUTURE."

--  
6. HE IS NOT AN IDEOLOGUE, CONCERNED ABOUT  
DOCTRINAL SUBTLETIES (ALTHOUGH HIS WIFE, WHO HAS  
A DOCTORATE IN "PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES," MAY BE).  
GORBACHEV NONETHELESS IS A TRUE BELIEVER IN HIS  
SYSTEM AND HIS PARTY'S CAUSE. HE IS ZEALOUS,  
AS WELL AS TOUGH AND ABLE, AND THIS IS ANOTHER KEY  
TO HIS SUCCESS.

--  
7. DOBRYNIN MAY BE RIGHT IN TELLING YOU THAT  
GORBACHEV WILL NOT BE AS VITUPERATIVE WITH THE  
PRESIDENT AS HE WAS WITH US ON NOVEMBER 5. BUT  
THE GENERAL SECRETARY IS UNLIKELY TO CONCEDE  
ANY SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DETERIORATION  
OF OUR RELATIONS OVER THE PAST DECADE. ACCORDING  
TO HIS DISTORTED VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES, "SHAPED  
BY THE LIKES OF DOBRYNIN AND ARBATOV:

-- A SMALL CIRCLE OF ANTI-SOVIET HAWKS AROUND THE  
PRESIDENT IS DETERMINED TO FORCE THE USSR TO ITS  
KNEES.

-- THEY DELUDE THEMSELVES INTO BELIEVING THE  
SOVIET ECONOMY IS ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE AND  
THUS MOSCOW WILL IN THE END SWALLOW UNEQUAL ARMS  
CONTROL AGREEMENTS.

-- THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S WARPED VIEW OF THE  
SOVIET UNION IMPEDES IF NOT TOTALLY FRUSTRATES SERIOUS  
DISCUSSION (THE MIRROR IMAGE OF OUR ASSESSMENT OF  
HIS VIEW OF US).

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8. GORBACHEV HAS RESORTED TO A NUMBER OF TACTICAL  
DEVICES TO ENSURE THAT HIS VIEW OF REALITY IS NOT  
CHALLENGED. THESE INCLUDE:

-- A COMBATIVE INSISTENCE THAT THE USSR MUST, IN  
WORD AND DEED, BE ACCORDED EQUAL STATUS WITH THE  
UNITED STATES. AS GENERAL SECRETARY, GORBACHEV SEEMS  
DISINCLINED TO DEFER TO AMERICAN INTERLOCUTORS, IN  
CONTRAST TO THE ATTITUDE OF HIS AMIABLE FOREIGN  
MINISTER.

-- IN PARTICULAR, GORBACHEV IS INTOLERANT OF  
EFFORTS TO LAY OUT GENERAL PROPOSITIONS ABOUT THE U. S. -  
SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND THEN APPLY THEM TO THE CURRENT  
SITUATION. ON SUCH OCCASIONS, HE WILL INTERRUPT  
(AT TIMES IN MID-TRANSLATION) TO CHALLENGE WHAT HE  
CONSIDERS TO BE A FALSE PREMISE.

-- HE IS ALSO ADEPT AT BRINGING AN ISOLATED FACT FROM  
LEFT FIELD TO THROW HIS INTERLOCUTOR ON THE  
DEFENSIVE (E. G., THAT YOU AND CAP WERE BUSINESS  
COLLEAGUES, THAT WE CHOSE A NEW YORK CRIMINAL  
LAWYER TO ANALYZE THE ABM TREATY, THE PRESIDENT'S  
MISQUOTATION OF LENIN).

--  
IMPLICATIONS FOR GENEVA  
-----

9. THIS VIEW OF GORBACHEV HAS SEVERAL IMPLICATIONS  
FOR OUR APPROACH TO GENEVA. FIRST, WE NEED TO BE  
COLDLY REALISTIC BOTH WITH OURSELVES AND WITH

THE PUBLIC ABOUT WHAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED AT  
AN INITIAL REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING. THE SOBER  
TONE OF YOUR MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE WAS A STEP IN  
THE RIGHT DIRECTION. I AM HAPPY THAT THE VARIOUS VOICES  
IN WASHINGTON CONTINUE IN A SIMILARLY REALISTIC

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DIRECTION.

--  
10. SECOND, WE ARE NOW ON THE RIGHT TRACK TO  
TAKE EVERYONE'S EYE OFF A POSSIBLE IMPRECISE  
COMMUNIQUE OR VAGUELY-WORDED PSEUDO-AGREEMENT.  
THIS MEETING HAS TO CONCENTRATE ON HOW WE GET  
A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP STARTED. NOT MUCH  
MEAT FOR A JOINT STATEMENT THERE.

--  
11. THIRD, ON A TACTICAL LEVEL THE PRESIDENT  
SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR CONTENTIOUS DISCUSSIONS  
WITH GORBACHEV. IT WILL BE A TALL ORDER TO  
CHALLENGE HIS INTELLECTUAL AND IDEOLOGICAL  
PRECONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES AND U.S.-  
SOVIET RELATIONS. WHILE THE GENERAL SECRETARY  
WILL ATTEMPT TO GIVE AS GOOD AS HE GETS, SEVERAL  
TECHNIQUES SHOULD BE HELPFUL TO BLUNT HIS  
ASSERTIVENESS:

-- A FRANK, STRAIGHTFORWARD APPROACH IS ADVISABLE.  
HE IS A MAN WHO COMES DIRECTLY TO THE POINT. HE  
WILL BE LESS COMBATIVE IF HE SENSES THAT THE  
PRESIDENT IS SIMILARLY DIRECT.

-- GORBACHEV WILL NOT ADMIT BASIC MISTAKES ON  
THE SOVIET UNION'S PART. HE SHOULD BE QUIETLY  
REMINDED THAT THIS PRETENSE OF INFALLIBILITY IS NOT  
CREDIBLE, THAT ALL LEADERS ARE SUSCEPTIBLE  
TO MISCALCULATIONS AND WE FRANKLY REGARD THE  
SOVIET LEADERSHIP AS PARTICULARLY SO BECAUSE IT  
OPERATES ON THE BASIS OF AN UNREALISTIC CONCEPTION  
OF SOCIETY AND GLOBAL AFFAIRS.

-- WE SHOULD THROW HIS RIGIDITY INTO CONTRAST BY  
BEING CANDID ABOUT OUR OWN MISTAKES (E.G., THE  
FAULTY LENIN QUOTATION, THE MISSTATEMENT ABOUT THE

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RUSSIAN WORD FOR FREEDOM).

-- HE CAN BE MERCURIAL IN HIS MOOD CHANGES. PERIODIC  
INJECTIONS OF HUMOR WILL BE USEFUL IN DEFUSING HIS  
AGGRESSIVENESS.

-- IF HE TALKS TOO LONG OR TOO ASSERTIVELY, THE  
PRESIDENT SHOULD CALMLY HOLD UP HIS HAND AND WITH A  
SMILE SAY: "DON'T OUR PEOPLE EXPECT MORE OF US.  
WON'T WE GET FURTHER IF WE HAVE A SIMPLE CONVERSATION  
AND NOT A DEBATE." IN SUM, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD  
NOT HESITATE TO USE HIS SENIOR (IN AGE AND POSITION)  
PLACE TO CALM HIS INTERLOCUTOR AND GET HIM BACK  
ON THE TRACK.

--  
12. THE LAST IS THE MOST IMPORTANT BECAUSE  
THE IMPRESSION WE WANT TO LEAVE WITH MR. GORBACHEV  
IS THAT WE ARE LED BY A STRONG, CALM, SURE-FOOTED,  
UNCOMPLICATED AND HUMANE MAN WHO WITH PATIENCE SEEKS  
WAYS TOWARD MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS. THIS IS  
THE PRESIDENT. NO ACTING REQUIRED.  
HARTMAN

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*File*

~~SECRET~~

November 19, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *rem*  
SUBJECT: Your Meetings with Gorbachev in Geneva

Your object in meeting Gorbachev will be to have a thorough and frank substantive discussion of the key issues in the U.S.-Soviet relationship and to use the occasion to initiate a process of dialogue which can be used, over time, to manage the relationship in a more stable and predictable manner than has been the case in the past.

Essentially, this means that you will be laying out for Gorbachev your views on the state of the current relationship and the formative influences in the past, then making clear what direction the relationship could take if the Gorbachev is willing to modify Soviet policy in the areas we find most threatening and destabilizing. Through your interchanges, you should be able to get a feel for Gorbachev's intentions. Specifically, you will be looking for indications as to whether Gorbachev is willing to adjust Soviet policies on concrete issues sufficiently to permit a lowering in overall tension. If he is, it might be possible to give specific impetus to some of the questions under negotiation. But in any event, the meeting should enable you to establish a framework for a continuing process of dialogue and negotiation in the future.

You can expect Gorbachev to defend Soviet policies vigorously and to place great stress on the necessity of dealing as equals (while complaining that the U.S. refuses to recognize the Soviet Union as an equal). In doing so, he will be probing to determine your overall intentions and to test possible soft spots in our current positions. He is likely to try to gain psychological advantage by making vigorous charges against American actions, statements and policies, though he will probably go about this in a more respectful manner than that he employed with George Shultz and me last Tuesday.

Basically, however, Gorbachev wants a "successful" summit. It is important to his political position and his image as an

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BY GW NARA DATE 2/26/88



effective leader to demonstrate that he can deal as an equal with the President of the United States. He has a strong incentive, therefore, to make sure that he can emerge from the meeting and claim a positive result. He has already agreed in principle to follow-up meetings, and these can provide the high points in the sustained dialogue we are seeking in the future.

~~It is typical of Soviet negotiating behavior that they withhold most of their concessions until the last minute.~~ The run-up to your meeting has fit this pattern, with Soviet negotiators moving very slowly on the various negotiations. The result is that we cannot be sure whether we can agree on enough of substance to justify a joint communique. I would recommend that we agree to joint statements or a communique only if the substance of agreements reached justifies treatment in this form. Otherwise, we could just announce separately our own assessment of the meeting. Given the usual Soviet desire to end high-level meetings with signed pieces of paper, this stance may give us some leverage in pressing for closure on several of the bilateral matters still under negotiation. It would not surprise me if we see rapid movement on some of them by the Soviets next week.

Secretary Shultz's memorandum under Tab 2 sets forth a number of considerations which I consider valid. The talking points which follow are of a preliminary nature and should be read for the stimulation they provide as you think about the points to be covered in the various meetings. I will be providing further thoughts on the tack you might best take in each of the meetings as we go through the preparatory process next week.

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET/ SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President  
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*  
SUBJECT: Your Meetings with Gorbachev in Geneva

I. WHERE DOES OUR RELATIONSHIP STAND?

- o We are at an important juncture in U.S.-Soviet relations. After years of strain and misunderstanding, the possibility now exists to take a major step toward putting the relationship on a more realistic and stable foundation.
- o This will not be an easy task, as my meetings in Moscow showed. New Soviet leadership is skilled and determined to protect the legacy they inherited from Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko. They continue to hold serious misconceptions about our policies and purposes.
- o It is not clear that the Soviets are willing to take the tough decisions necessary to remove barriers to progress, particularly in this first meeting with you.
- o They will drive a hard bargain, whether it be in arms control, regional problems, human rights or bilateral issues.
- o Your meetings provide an opportunity to determine whether and how Gorbachev and his colleagues are ready to work with us in resolving problems.
- o Our discussions in Moscow were tough. We reached agreement in principle on such issues as regularizing our regional dialogue, and holding meetings between you and Gorbachev in "the nearest future." But differences on other major issues cloud the prospects for reaching agreement on a joint final document.

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DECL: OADR

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NLRR F06-719/14 #14178  
BY 61 NARA DATE 2/22/08

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- o The Soviets reacted skeptically to our new arms control proposal. We are still probing to see if points of convergence can be found for agreement at the Geneva meeting on new guidelines for our negotiators and on non-NST arms control items such as CDE, MBFR and chemical weapons.
- o Shevardnadze was tough on human rights, but held open possible resolution on case-by-case basis.
- o High-profile Soviet moves on human rights (Bonner, certain refusenik cases, reports of Israeli-Soviet contacts), first hints of response to our calls.
- o Soviets responded negatively to your UNGA regional initiative; but have agreed to our suggestion of regularizing regional experts talks.
- o On bilateral issues, Soviets have yet to make the key moves which would allow agreement on announcing establishment of consulates in Kiev and New York, a new exchanges agreement, your new people-to-people initiative and aviation issues.
- o But it was clear in Moscow that they are working seriously on all of these issues and that they have not ruled out agreement by November 19.

## II. WHAT DO WE WANT?

- o For you and Gorbachev to establish a relationship and to agree on process for resolution of problems; within that context, give substance to the meeting by reaching concrete agreements where possible.
- o To air fully suspicions and misconceptions on both sides; explore basic assumptions which motivate behavior.
- o A joint final document can be useful to record decisions, but we don't want the effort to hinder a good discussion of the issues. If we cannot achieve agreed joint language, we should be ready to work out separate statements on specific issues (i.e. nuclear non-proliferation). We do not need a joint document that records only differences.
- o On further meetings between you and Gorbachev: Soviets have agreed to further meetings "in nearest future to review progress and coordinate follow-up measures aimed at reaching our goals."

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- o On arms control and security issues in general, to impress on Gorbachev our unwillingness to accept commitments to vague rhetorical statements in the absence of real progress toward effective agreements.
- o On specific arms control issues, to make clear the rationale behind our positions, especially on SDI.
- o On NST: Obtain Soviet agreement to new guidelines for our negotiators.
- o On SDI: Explain to Gorbachev reasons why strategic defense could enhance stability and serve interests of both sides.
- o On CDE: Nail down agreement that both sides should begin drafting final document.
- o On Chemical Weapons (CW): Obtain Soviet agreement to expert discussions on chemical weapons use and proliferation.
- o On MBFR: Agree to provide new impetus to these negotiations in order to reach concrete agreement on conventional force reductions in Europe.
- o On human rights: Press for positive response to our concerns, including specific requests you and I have made on sensitive cases.
- o On bilateral issues: Review status of possible areas of agreement (i.e. exchanges, people-to-people initiative, North Pacific Air Safety and civil aviation).
- o On regional issues: Explain the rationale behind your UNGA initiative, and review regional problems. Express approval of agreement to regularize regional experts talks.
- o On terrorism: Explain our views on how to combat terrorism and review status of our proposal for cooperation in this field.

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### III. WHAT THE SOVIETS WANT

- o Above all, to stop the SDI program. Gorbachev made this clear in Moscow. He will press you hard on this issue. He may not have made up his mind on how to handle other questions -- bilateral, regional and human rights issues -- absent agreement on SDI. Gorbachev is, however, interested in talking about other issues.
- o U.S. acceptance of a joint concluding document which incorporates Soviet language on:
  - inadmissibility of nuclear war;
  - extension of SALT II restraints until December, 1986;
  - U.S. acceptance of nuclear testing moratorium and recommitment to comprehensive test ban negotiations;
  - language on regional issues similar to the 1972 Basic Principles Agreement.
- o U.S. acceptance of Soviet nuclear fusion pilot reactor proposal.
- o Avoid discussion of your regional conflict resolution initiative.
- o Emphasize Soviet views on unacceptability of U.S. involvement in Soviet human rights concerns. Take credit for issuing a visa to Yelena Bonner and other human rights developments, while resisting pressure for further concessions.

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IV. WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED FROM THIS MEETING?

- o We can take a substantial step forward in Geneva if you can develop a personal relationship with Gorbachev, fully discuss our differences, and agree on a process for negotiating and resolving problems in the future.
- o In addition, there is still the possibility that Gorbachev may be willing to achieve concrete progress in Geneva by agreeing:
  - to give new guidelines to our NST negotiators;
  - to provide new impetus to other arms control negotiations through separate or joint statements; and,
  - to wrap up agreements in a number of bilateral areas.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE

November 8, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

President's Briefing Book for Geneva Meetings

Attached is the briefing book which we received from State today, to which I have added an "Overview" paper for your signature at Tab I.1. The Defense Group has vetted the talking points dealing with arms control, and the regional senior directors those dealing with their areas.

I believe that the organization of the points in several sections could be improved, and also think we will need a more summary treatment of the main points to be covered before we get to Geneva. However, I believe that we have time next week to work this out, and the book as it stands should be useful preliminary reading for the President.

If you can obtain from the President a copy of the talking points he has already drafted, this will be of considerable assistance as we put the talking points in final form.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.1 of the Briefing Book and forward the book to the President for his weekend reading.

Approve *h*

Disapprove       

Attachment:

Tab I.1

Memorandum to the President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 26, 1997

By *CS* NARA, Date *8/9/02*