

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Reagan-Shevardnadze
Meeting - 09/27/1985 (5)
Box: 45

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: Reagan-Shevardnadze Mtg - 9/27/85 (5)

Date: 1/4/01

Box ~~9122~~ 45

Skinner/F00-008/1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Minutes	National Security Council Meeting, re: Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's Visit, 8 p.	n.d.	B1
2. Memo	George Shultz to Reagan, re: Your September 27 Meeting iwth Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, 4 p.	9/21/85	B1
	<i>R 2/13/02 F00-008/1 #109</i>		
3. Talking Pts	President's Talking Points for Shevardnadze, 8 p.	n.d.	B1
4. Talking Pts	for Secretary's September 25 and 27 Meetings with Shevardnadze, 9 p.	n.d.	B1
	<i>#110</i>		
5. Talking Pts	re: Regional Issues, 8 p.	n.d.	B1
	<i>#111</i>		
6. Talking Pts	re: Bilateral Issues, 3 p.	n.d.	B1
	<i>#112</i>		
7. Talking Pts	re: Human Rights/Emigration, 2 p.	n.d.	B1
	<i>#113</i>		
8. Talking Pts	re: Structure for Follow-up, 2 p.	n.d.	B1
	<i>#114</i>		
9. Talking Pts	re: Geneva and Beyond, 2 p.	n.d.	B1
	<i>#115</i>		
	<i>#116</i>		

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

TAB

I

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90950

F. h

September 21, 1985

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TC*

SUBJECT: Minutes of NSC Meeting on Shevardnadze Visit --
September 20, 1985, 11:00 a.m., Cabinet Room

Attached at Tab I are the minutes from the NSC meeting on Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's upcoming visit.

Jack Matlock *JM* concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the minutes at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I - Minutes

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *clb* NARA, Date *12/26/00*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

9/21/85

Shevardnadze Visit: New York and Washington Schedule

Tuesday
September 17

5:00 PM
Shevardnadze Arrival
New York

Tuesday
September 24

11:00 AM
Shevardnadze Speech
UN

Wednesday
September 25

2:00 PM to 6:00 PM
Shultz-Shevardnadze Meeting
Soviet Mission in New York

US Participants

Amb. Hartman
Amb. Ridgway
Amb. Nitze
Amb. Matlock
DAS Palmer
Interpreter

Soviet Participants

Korniyenko
Dobrynin
Chernyshov
Sokolov
Tarasenko
Interpreter

Immediately following meeting, Secretary makes brief statement to press outside SMUN.

(Time to be determined: Hartman, Matlock and Ridgway to do backgrounder at USUN Press Center.)

Thursday
September 26

9:00 PM (Soviets to confirm -- might be 10:00 PM)
Shevardnadze arrives in Washington Andrews AFB
To be greeted by Ambassador Roosevelt, Ambassador Ridgway, and DAS Palmer

Friday
September 27

9:00 AM
President's Prebrief
The White House

State Participants
Secretary Shultz
Amb. Ridgway
Amb. Nitze
Amb. Hartman

10:00 AM - 12:00 PM
Meeting with the President
The White House

(State Participants: Same as pre-brief)

Soviet Participants
Shevardnadze
Korniyenko
Dobrynin
Chernyshov
Sokolov
Interpreter

12:15 - 1:15 PM
Lunch
The White House

State Participants
Secretary Shultz
Amb. Nitze
Amb. Ridgway
Amb. Hartman
Interpreter
(Note: Final list
to be determined
by White House)

Soviet Participants
Shevardnadze
Korniyenko
Dobrynin
Chernyshov
Sokolov
Isakov
Interpreter

At conclusion of WH events, the Secretary holds an on-the-record press briefing in the White House briefing room.

12:30 - 2:00 PM
Mrs. Shultz Lunch
(Coincident with White House lunch)
Secretary's Dining Room

<u>US Participants</u>	<u>Soviet Participants</u>
(Tentative, as of Sept. 21)	Mrs. Shevardnadze
Mrs. Shultz	Mrs. Dobrynin
Mrs. Hartman	Mrs. Sokolov
Mrs. McFarlane	Mrs. Isakov
Mrs. Matlock	Interpreter
Mrs. Armacost	(+2?)
Mrs. Suzanne Massie	
Interpreter	

4:00 - 6:00 PM
Shultz-Shevardnadze Meeting
Secretary's Dining Room

<u>US Participants</u>	<u>Soviet Participants</u>
Amb. Hartman	Shevardnadze
Amb. Ridgway	Korniyenko
Amb. Nitze	Dobrynin
Amb. Matlock	Chernyshov
DAS Palmer	Isakov
Interpreter	Interpreter

Following the meeting, the Secretary escorts Shevardnadze to diplomatic entrance for photo opportunity and brief statement to the press.

Friday
September 27

7:30 PM
Small informal dinner for Shevardnadzes
Shultz Residence

Guest List
Secretary and Mrs. Shultz
FM and Mrs. Shevardnadze
Amb. and Mrs. Hartman
Amb. and Mrs. Dobrynin
Mr. Korniyenko
One other American (tbd)
Two interpreters

Saturday
September 28

Morning
Open (Shevardnadze has requested early
morning private visit to National Air and
Space Museum)

4:00 PM
Shevardnadze Departure for Moscow

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

MATLOCK

John McArthur

SECRET

File System II
Eyes Only
Schultz, Myers & Neg

PRESERVATION COPY

National Security Council
The White House

85 SEP 26 4: 29

System # _____

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	_____	_____	_____
William Martin	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	1	<i>[Signature]</i>	advance per Martin
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	2	m	ADVANCE
William Martin	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
Matlock	3	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

85 SEP 26 4: 29

EYES ONLY

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 21, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: Your September 27 Meeting with Soviet
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

This memorandum provides some thoughts on how we can best exploit your meeting with Shevardnadze, along with my separate sessions September 25 and 27, with a view toward your Geneva meeting.

The Soviet Approach

The Soviet game plan is becoming increasingly clear. They are seeking to create the impression that they have left no stone unturned to achieve an arms control breakthrough in Geneva. Dobrynin confirmed to me September 16 that Shevardnadze will present concrete proposals to you next week on the nuclear and space talks. Our guess is that they will be an elaboration of Gorbachev's recent expressions of willingness to accept deep cuts in exchange for constraints on strategic defense beyond the "fundamental research" stage. Shevardnadze will presumably also be pushing previous Soviet initiatives (Gorbachev's July nuclear testing moratorium, the non-militarization of space proposal Shevardnadze will present to the UNGA, perhaps a new twist on the Soviet chemical weapon-free zone in Central Europe concept), while seeking to capitalize on our ASAT test.

Our Objectives

Our task will be three-fold. We will want to:

-- Probe to determine the seriousness of any new Soviet proposals;

-- Give Shevardnadze as much information as possible and appropriate to set the stage for a productive November meeting and progress at the Geneva talks;

-- Lay the basis for further steps in our regional dialogue and on the range of bilateral and human rights issues.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

FOO-008/1-#109

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

BY *GAJ* NARA, DATE *2/13/02*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-2-

Your Meeting, Friday, September 27

Given the constraints on your time, you might most usefully concentrate on laying the groundwork for an in-depth exchange with Gorbachev on the most pressing issues in the relationship. I recommend that you:

-- Respond to Shevardnadze's proposals with a strong statement of your own commitment to meaningful arms control, explaining to Shevardnadze your views on the need for deep reductions and the potential promise of SDI research. (As Shevardnadze will not be accompanied by his own arms control specialists, he will not expect a detailed reply to his message, which I hope he will preview with me in New York).

-- Outline your plans for a wide-ranging discussion of perceived intentions and motivations. (You might suggest to Shevardnadze that you and Gorbachev be prepared to describe your respective domestic agendas as a means of getting beyond stereotypes to the roots of policy).

-- Express your concerns about Soviet regional policies, focusing on Afghanistan, where we have recently seen some hints of a greater Soviet willingness to consider a negotiated withdrawal.

-- Reemphasize to Shevardnadze the importance you attach to movement on human rights and emigration (perhaps in your tete-a-tete at the conclusion of the meeting).

As with Gromyko last year, lunch could be given over to an elaboration of views on regional issues, providing an opportunity to rehearse points you will later make to Gorbachev on the impact of Soviet international behavior on our perceptions. You could also use the occasion to get some sense from Shevardnadze of current political dynamics in the Kremlin.

My Meetings: Wednesday and Friday afternoon, September 25 and 27

Dobrynin has indicated I may get a first look at Shevardnadze's arms control message during our initial session Wednesday. While I will press him to be as specific as possible, we may not have a complete picture of what Moscow has to offer until your meeting. I will also put some ideas of our own on the table.

-- On the Geneva talks, I will try to engage Shevardnadze in a comprehensive discussion of the offense/defense relationship. This will serve the purpose of smoking out details of his private message and giving him some direct exposure to our thinking on the subject.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-3-

-- On nuclear testing, I will stress the importance we attach to verification, reaffirming our willingness to ratify the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties if the Soviets will cooperate in satisfying our concerns. I will propose that special representatives from both sides explore this possibility this fall.

-- On ASAT, we are not in a position to take the initiative, but I will need to address any proposals Shevardnadze may make.

-- On chemical weapons, we are working interagency a proposal that we exchange lists of CW precursors as a first step toward collaboration in preventing the spread of CW possession and use; and

-- On nuclear nonproliferation, I will confirm our willingness to make a joint statement on cooperation at your Geneva meeting.

As arms control issues will dominate the New York session, regional and bilateral matters will probably slip to my Friday afternoon meeting. I will follow up in greater detail on regional points you make and formally propose that we regularize the expert-level talks we have had over the past year on the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southern Africa and Asia. (We are proposing Central American/Caribbean talks be held in October.)

I will raise human rights and emigration initially in a brief tete-a-tete on the margins of our New York meeting, broaching an idea discussed with Mac Baldrige: that concrete steps by the Soviets to meet our concerns might be met with some liberalization of our non-strategic trade controls. I will return to human rights and emigration in my final session, reinforcing the points you would make in your meeting, and presenting an up-dated list of cases in which we are interested.

There is a good chance that at some point in our meetings Shevardnadze will raise two additional issues: whether there should be a formal communiqué in Geneva and whether there should be follow-up meetings between you and Gorbachev. I will inform him that we remain open as to how the meeting should be documented, and that our final decision will depend on what substantive results can be expected. On follow-up meetings, I will indicate that we are willing in principle, but feel that future meetings should be in capitals. I will reiterate our view that it is the Soviets' turn to come to Washington.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-4-

Media Arrangements

As with Gromyko last year, I will plan to make two statements in connection with Shevardnadze's visit: the first, a short, informal comment following our New York meeting; the second, a longer review of where we stand following your meeting and lunch. We plan backgrounders by Roz Ridgway, Jack Matlock and Art Hartman after both my exchanges with Shevardnadze to shape public perceptions of the visit and of its implications for the Geneva meeting. You might want to consider a radio address focusing on US - Soviet relations, perhaps the following Saturday. We will also plan to do the usual talk shows after the meetings are over.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

PRESIDENT'S TALKING POINTS FOR SHEVARDNADZE

INTRODUCTION

-- IN PREPARING FOR THIS MEETING I HAD A CHANCE TO LOOK AT HOW THE US AND I PERSONALLY ARE ROUTINELY PORTRAYED IN THE SOVIET PRESS. AS YOU KNOW, THE PICTURE IS LESS THAN FLATTERING.

-- I RAISE THIS NOT TO MAKE YOU UNCOMFORTABLE, BUT TO MAKE A POINT. THIS MEETING, AND THE MEETING I WILL HAVE WITH MR. GORBACHEV IN NOVEMBER, ARE UNIQUE OPPORTUNITIES.

-- I WANT YOU TO BEGIN TO GET A TRUE PICTURE OF WHO RONALD REAGAN IS, WHAT HE STANDS FOR, WHAT HE WANTS TO ACCOMPLISH.

--I WOULD LIKE TO GET THE SAME FROM YOU AND MR. GORBACHEV.

--I WANT, IN A WORD, FOR US TO GET BEYOND STEREOTYPES; TO TALK FRANKLY ABOUT OUR DIFFERENCES; TO EXPLORE CONSTRUCTIVELY WHAT WE CAN ACHIEVE TOGETHER BETWEEN NOW AND NOVEMBER 19 -- AND AFTER THE GENEVA MEETING AS WELL.

-- WHEN I MET LAST YEAR WITH MR. GROMYKO, I DISCUSSED IN SOME DETAIL MY VIEW OF THE WORLD, AND OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES' PLACE IN IT. I KNOW YOU WILL HAVE READ THE RECORDS OF THAT CONVERSATION, SO I WILL NOT REPEAT MYSELF.

-- I DO WANT TO EMPHASIZE SOMETHING I SAID THEN, HOWEVER:

- o I BELIEVE OUR RELATIONSHIP IS AND WILL REMAIN AN ESSENTIALLY COMPETITIVE ONE. BUT WE LIVE IN ONE WORLD AND MUST HANDLE OUR COMPETITION IN PEACE.
- o NEITHER OF US WILL EVER ALLOW THE OTHER A MILITARY EDGE. BUT IF WE ARE EVER GOING TO CLEAR THE AIR, REDUCE SUSPICIONS, AND REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS, THERE WILL NEVER BE A BETTER TIME.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-008/1 #110
BY CH NARA, DATE 2/13/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY ISSUES

-- I KNOW YOU AND GEORGE HAD A FULL DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES ON WEDNESDAY.

-- I HOPE YOU CAME AWAY FROM THAT DISCUSSION WITH A SENSE OF THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE APPROACH THIS CRITICAL AREA.

-- OUR SUGGESTIONS HAVE BEEN CONCRETE AND DESIGNED TO ADDRESS REAL PROBLEMS. AS I HAVE STATED MANY TIMES, I HAVE GIVEN OUR NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA GREAT FLEXIBILITY TO EXPLORE POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS -- BUT YOU HAVE TO CONTRIBUTE YOUR OWN IDEAS.

-- WHAT WE WANT TO DO IS WORK WITH YOU TO RESTORE AND MAKE MORE EFFECTIVE THE REGIME FOR RELIABLE MUTUAL DETERRENCE WHICH, IN 1972, WAS THOUGHT BY BOTH SIDES TO BE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE.

-- THAT MEANS WE SHOULD BRING ABOUT THE DEEP REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS THAT THE 1972 ABM TREATY SAID WE BOTH WOULD SEEK. I KNOW MR. GORBACHEV HAS SAID THE SOVIET UNION, TOO, WOULD LIKE DEEP CUTS IN NUCLEAR ARMS. IT IS TIME TO GET DOWN TO WORK AND FIGURE OUT HOW WE ARE GOING TO ACHIEVE THEM, IN A WAY THAT ENHANCES STABILITY.

-- IT ALSO MEANS THAT WE SHOULD EXAMINE THE POTENTIAL OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS TO STRENGTHEN STABILITY BETWEEN US. WE THINK THERE ARE PROMISING NEW TECHNOLOGIES; SO, APPARENTLY, DOES THE SOVIET UNION, SINCE YOU HAVE A VIGOROUS RESEARCH PROGRAM ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE. I BELIEVE THAT IF THERE IS A BETTER WAY TO ASSURE THE PEACE BETWEEN US THAN THREATENING TO DESTROY EACH OTHER'S SOCIETIES, THE LEADERS OF OUR COUNTRIES HAVE NOT ONLY THE OPPORTUNITY BUT THE RESPONSIBILITY TO EXPLORE IT.

-- BUT I ALSO WANT TO EMPHASIZE TO YOU THAT OUR SDI PROGRAM IS ONLY FOR RESEARCH. I HAVE NOT MADE ANY DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS -- ONLY SOME FUTURE PRESIDENT COULD DO THAT. I HAVE ORDERED THAT ALL SDI RESEARCH COMPLY COMPLETELY WITH THE ABM AND OTHER RELEVANT TREATIES. AND I HAVE TOLD MY NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA TO EXPLORE WITH THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF ISSUES THAT WOULD ARISE IF IT DOES APPEAR POSSIBLE AND DESIRABLE TO MOVE TO GREATER RELIANCE ON DEFENSE.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

-- FINALLY, IF WE ARE TO MOVE AHEAD, WE HAVE TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS OF COMPLIANCE. YOU HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN AGREEMENTS; WE HAVE EITHER ANSWERED THEM IN DETAIL OR PROPOSED MUTUAL WAYS TO RESOLVE THEM. WE HAVEN'T SEEM THE SAME FORTHCOMINGNESS ON YOUR SIDE. CONTINUING QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS ARE VERY DAMAGING IN THEIR OWN RIGHT. THEY ARE DOUBLY SO WHEN WE GET NO SATISFACTION IN CLEARING THEM UP.

-- I ALSO HAVE TO SAY THAT WE HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED IN RECENT MONTHS OVER THE HANDLING OF SOVIET IDEAS. WE SEE THEM ADVANCED IN THE NEWSPAPERS BUT NOT THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MAKES US WONDER HOW SERIOUS YOU ARE.

-- IF WE ARE TO BE REALISTIC, WE HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THAT LITTLE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN GENEVA. THE TALKS HAVEN'T REALLY GONE BEYOND WHERE THEY ENDED IN 1983. WE DON'T NEED TODAY TO GET INTO THE REASONS FOR THAT: YOU HAVE YOUR ANALYSIS; WE HAVE OURS.

-- BUT WE HAVE ESTABLISHED SOME COMMON GROUND: THAT ANY AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY; THAT THEY SHOULD ENVISAGE DEEP REDUCTIONS IN WARHEADS; THAT THEY SHOULD ENHANCE STABILITY; THAT THEY SHOULD BE VERIFIABLE; THAT FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH ON DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY, WILL CONTINUE.

-- THE TIME HAS COME, IT SEEMS TO US, TO BUILD ON THESE GENERAL AREAS OF AGREEMENT TO SOMETHING MORE SPECIFIC -- SOMETHING WHICH WOULD GIVE OUR NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA THE STIMULUS AND DIRECTION THEY NEED TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE AGREEMENTS.

-- I UNDERSTAND YOU ARE BRINGING SPECIFIC IDEAS ON HOW TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING THEM AND WANT YOU TO EMPHASIZE TO MR. GORBACHEV THAT I WILL STUDY THEM VERY CLOSELY. I HOPE THEY WILL MARK THE OUTSET OF THE KIND OF SERIOUS GIVE-AND-TAKE THAT WILL LEAD TO PROGRESS AT GENEVA. WE MUST NOT LOSE THE OPPORTUNITY BEFORE US.

-- I ALSO HOPE YOU WILL GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE PROPOSALS GEORGE HAS MADE ON NUCLEAR TESTING AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

-- WE SEEM TO BE IN GOOD SHAPE ON A NONPROLIFERATION STATEMENT IN GENEVA, AND THERE APPEARS TO BE A BETTER CHANCE OF PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM. WE ARE ALSO CONSIDERING HOW TO MOVE THE VIENNA MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.

-- LET ME JUST EMPHASIZE HERE THAT WE ARE PREPARED FOR AS MUCH PROGRESS IN ANY OF THESE FORUMS AS YOUR SIDE WILL ALLOW. BUT YOU CAN NOT REASONABLY EXPECT THAT WE WILL MAKE ALL THE CONCESSIONS.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 4 -

PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

-- AS I SAID, I HOPE TO HAVE A WIDE-RANGING AND FRANK CONVERSATION WITH MR. GORBACHEV WHEN WE MEET IN NOVEMBER.

-- THERE WILL BE A NUMBER OF POINTS I INTEND TO RAISE WITH HIM.

o I WANT TO EXPLORE WITH HIM WHY THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD FEEL THREATENED BY US, WHEN WE HAVE NEVER STARTED A WAR, NEVER WILL, AND INDEED SOUGHT TO USE OUR PREPONDERANT STRENGTH AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

o I WANT TO EXPLAIN TO HIM HOW YOUR MILITARY BUILD-UP, YOUR SELF-PROCLAIMED DEDICATION TO REVOLUTION AND OUR DESTRUCTION, AND YOUR ATTEMPTS TO EXPAND YOUR INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AT OUR EXPENSE IS THREATENING TO US.

o I HOPE THAT THIS WILL GIVE YOU SOME UNDERSTANDING OF WHY WE ARE REBUILDING OUR OWN STRENGTH AND ABOUT SOME OF THE THINGS I HAVE SAID ABOUT RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I HOPE THAT THIS CAN CLEAR THE AIR BETWEEN US AND BEGIN THE PROCESS OF REDUCING SUSPICIONS.

-- BUT I HOPE WE CAN GO BEYOND A DISCUSSION OF OUR RIVALRY AND THE REASONS FOR IT TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR MOTIVATIONS.

-- ONE WAY TO DO THIS MIGHT BE FOR MR. GORBACHEV AND MYSELF TO SHARE WITH ONE ANOTHER SOME SENSE OF OUR DOMESTIC PRIORITIES AND CONCERNS.

-- IN OUR COUNTRY, WE HAVE MADE GREAT PROGRESS IN THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS IN GETTING OUR ECONOMY BACK ON TRACK. WE HAVE CREATED MILLIONS OF NEW JOBS; NEW TECHNOLOGIES WE ARE PIONEERING ARE OPENING UP NEW POSSIBILITIES THROUGHOUT THE ECONOMY; WE ARE SEEKING WAYS TO REDISTRIBUTE THE BURDEN OF TAXATION IN OUR COUNTRY TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF ALL AMERICANS.

-- I KNOW INTERESTING CHANGES ARE OCCURRING IN YOUR COUNTRY AS WELL. WE HAVE WATCHED WITH INTEREST THE STEPS TAKEN BY MR. GORBACHEV SINCE HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING FROM HIM -- AND FROM YOU IF TIME PERMITS -- WHAT YOU HOPE TO ACCOMPLISH IN THE MONTHS BETWEEN NOW AND THE FEBRUARY PARTY CONGRESS AND IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

-- I BELIEVE THAT SUCH A DISCUSSION COULD GO FAR TOWARD GETTING BEHIND THE STEREOTYPES WHICH INEVITABLY DEVELOP IN A RELATIONSHIP SUCH AS OURS. DO YOU THINK MR. GORBACHEV WOULD AGREE?

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 5 -

REGIONAL ISSUES

-- WHILE PUBLIC ATTENTION HAS OFTEN FOCUSED ON THE ARMS CONTROL ELEMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, REGIONAL QUESTIONS HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN THE CAUSE OF THE MOST SERIOUS STRAINS BETWEEN US.

-- WHAT HAS TRADITIONALLY CONCERNED US MOST HAS BEEN YOUR TENDENCY TO USE MILITARY FORCE AS A MEANS OF ADVANCING YOUR INTERESTS, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH SURROGATES.

-- EFFORTS DURING THE SEVENTIES TO DEVELOP UNDERSTANDINGS ON PERMISSIBLE ACTIONS IN THIRD AREAS CAME APART PRIMARILY, IN OUR VIEW, BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET UNION'S UNWILLINGNESS TO FORESWEAR PURSUIT OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

-- THE RESULT HAS BEEN THAT WE HAVE HAD TO LOOK TO OUR OWN STRENGTH AND TO CLOSER COOPERATION WITH OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE SUCH A POLICY FOR AS LONG AS IS NECESSARY -- WHETHER IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA OR ELSEWHERE.

-- NOR WILL WE FORESWEAR THE RIGHT TO LEND ASSISTANCE TO DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS WHEN THEY APPEAL TO US TO RESIST AGGRESSION.

-- IN ADDITION TO TEACHING US THAT WE HAVE TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS, HOWEVER, THE SEVENTIES ALSO TAUGHT US THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING CLEARLY THE REGIONAL MOTIVATIONS AND INTERESTS OF THE OTHER SIDE.

-- WE HAVE THUS SOUGHT TO EXPAND OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON REGIONAL ISSUES OVER THE YEARS. THIS YEAR, AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE HAD DISCUSSIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AFGHANISTAN AND ASIA. WE HAVE PROPOSED TALKS ON CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

-- WE HAVE FOUND THE EXCHANGES USEFUL AND WORTH CONTINUING. AND WE WILL HAVE A FORMAL PROPOSAL TO MAKE ON REGULARIZING THESE TYPES OF DISCUSSIONS.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 6 -

-- SUCH DISCUSSIONS, OF COURSE, ARE NOT DESIGNED TO REPLACE EXCHANGES AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER OR HIGHER LEVELS. IF I MAY TOUCH BRIEFLY ON SOME OF THE MORE SALIENT ISSUES:

o TENSIONS REMAIN HIGH IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AN AREA OF INTEREST TO BOTH OF US. YOUR LACK OF RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND SUPPORT FOR ELEMENTS OPPOSING DIRECT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED CONTINUES TO BLOCK THE MOST PROMISING AVENUES OF A SETTLEMENT AND CALLS INTO QUESTION YOUR WILLINGNESS TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE REGION. WE HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT THERE IS NO RENEWAL OF FIGHTING IN THE REGION.

o I WANT TO MAKE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. WE WANT STABLE, DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES IN THE REGION AND WE WILL NOT PERMIT THE FORCIBLE ALTERATION OF THE LOCAL BALANCE. SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE INTERVENTIONIST ACTIVITIES OF CUBA AND NICARAGUA IS AND WILL REMAIN A SERIOUS PROBLEM IN OUR RELATIONS AND RAISES THE POSSIBILITY OF A SERIOUS CONFRONTATION.

o SOUTHERN AFRICA IS IN THE PROCESS OF CATAclySMIC CHANGE. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF IS NOT AN EAST-WEST ISSUE AND IT IS IN NEITHER OF OUR INTERESTS THAT IT BECOME ONE. WE EXPECT MOSCOW TO SHOW THE NECESSARY RESTRAINT. WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO HELPING THE NATIONS OF THE REGION REACH A PEACEFUL ACCOMMODATION OF THEIR DIFFERENCES, INCLUDING ON THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA.

o IN ASIA, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO MORE TOGETHER TO HELP ALONG A SETTLEMENT OF THE KAMPUCHEA QUESTION. WE REGRET THAT MOSCOW HAS THUS FAR REFUSED TO USE ITS INFLUENCE IN HANOI TO ENCOURAGE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE FORCES FROM KAMPUCHEA. BOTH OF US SHOULD ALSO PLAY A ROLE IN LOWERING TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, BY ENCOURAGING AN EXPANSION OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE.

o WE ARE CONCERNED BY THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN POLAND, WHICH AS YOU KNOW HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF CONTROVERSY BETWEEN US MANY TIMES IN THE PAST. IN OUR VIEW, STABILITY IN POLAND CAN ONLY RESULT FROM A TRUE POLICY OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND DIALOGUE AMONG THE GOVERNMENT, THE CHURCH AND THE WORKERS.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 7 -

THE POLISH GOVERNMENT SEEMS HEADED IN A DIFFERENT DIRECTION. THIS IS SOMETHING OVER WHICH YOU HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE. WE HOPE YOU WILL USE YOUR INFLUENCE TO ENCOURAGE THE POLISH REGIME TO TURN TOWARD RECONCILIATION RATHER THAN INCREASED REPRESSION.

-- FINALLY, LET ME RAISE THE QUESTION OF AFGHANISTAN. THERE IS NO OTHER REGIONAL ISSUE ON WHICH PROGRESS COULD HAVE AS DRAMATIC AN IMPACT ON OUR OVERALL RELATIONS AS AFGHANISTAN.

- o I AM AWARE OF SOVIET ACCUSATIONS THAT WE ARE SEEKING TO "BLEED" THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN, AND THAT WE ARE OPPOSED TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

- o I WANT TO REASSURE YOU, AS I WILL REASSURE MR. GORBACHEV PERSONALLY, THAT THAT IS NOT THE CASE.

- o WE WANT THE WAR TO END. WE WANT THE AFGHAN REFUGEES TO BE ABLE TO RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY HONORABLY AND IN PEACE. WE WANT THE SOVIET FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN TO GO HOME SO THAT THE SUFFERING AND LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES CAN END. WE BELIEVE THAT ONLY A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT CAN LEAD TO SUCH A RESULT.

- o WE HAVE HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITIES TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE IN THE PAST. LET ME ADD ONE THING TODAY: IF THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED SERIOUSLY TO EXPLORE MEANS OF ENDING THE WAR ON TERMS WHICH ALLOW THE AFGHANS TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, THEY WOULD FIND IN US NO OBSTACLE. WE ACCEPT THAT SUCH A SOLUTION MUST ALSO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF YOUR SOUTHERN BORDER.

-- I HOPE YOU WILL CONVEY THAT MESSAGE FORCEFULLY FROM ME TO MR. GORBACHEV.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 8 -

BILATERAL ISSUES

-- I KNOW THAT YOU AND GEORGE WILL BE DISCUSSING IN DETAIL THE VARIOUS BILATERAL ISSUES ON THE AGENDA.

-- AS IN THE OTHER AREAS I HAVE TOUCHED ON, IT IS OUR HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO CLEAN UP AS MANY OF THESE AS POSSIBLE UP IN TIME FOR OUR NOVEMBER MEETING.

-- OBVIOUSLY, IF THIS IS GOING TO HAPPEN, BOTH SIDES WILL HAVE TO BE WILLING TO MEET THE OTHER HALF-WAY. WE ARE PREPARED TO DO OUR PART.

-- BUT IF IT PROVES IMPOSSIBLE TO WRAP THESE ISSUES UP BEFORE NOVEMBER 19, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO WORK ON THEM AFTER THE MEETING. THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO GET AGREEMENTS WHICH CAN STAND UP TO THE TEST OF TIME AND ARE FIRMLY GROUNDED IN EACH SIDE'S INTERESTS.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND EMIGRATION (for tete-a-tete)

-- I WANTED TO RAISE THIS IN PRIVATE BECAUSE I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE I ATTACH TO MOVEMENT ON THIS ISSUE. I HAVE IN MIND HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS, AN AREA I KNOW YOU DO NOT RECOGNIZE AS PART OF OUR AGENDA. THEY ARE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, HOWEVER.

-- THERE ARE PRINCIPLES INVOLVED HERE ON BOTH SIDES: YOU VIEW IT AS AN INTERNAL MATTER; AS A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS WE CAN NOT ACCEPT SUCH A VIEW.

-- BUT THERE SHOULD BE WAYS FOR US TO DEAL WITH THESE CONCERNS WITHOUT COMPROMISING OUR PRINCIPLES.

-- I KNOW GEORGE HAS SHARED WITH YOU SOME SPECIFIC IDEAS ON HOW WE MIGHT DO SO. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL CONSIDER THEM CAREFULLY AND THAT WE WILL SEE SOME PROGRESS BEFORE THE NOVEMBER MEETING.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

TALKING POINTS FOR SECRETARY'S

SEPTEMBER 25 AND 27 MEETINGS WITH SHEVARDNADZE

INTRODUCTION

[Note: Shevardnadze is your host in New York and should offer you the floor to begin the meeting].

-- WELCOME TO NEW YORK. UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE BEEN PRESSING YOUR STAFF HARD SINCE OUR LAST MEETING TO PREPARE FOR THE MEETINGS THIS WEEK AND FOR GENEVA. SO HAVE I.

-- AS I THINK YOU WILL SEE, WE HAVE COME PREPARED TO TALK IN VERY CONCRETE TERMS ABOUT WHAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE BY THE TIME OUR LEADERS MEET. MY HOPE IS THAT WE CAN USE THIS MEETING AND OUR MEETINGS ON SEPTEMBER 27 TO PIN DOWN AS CLEARLY AS POSSIBLE WHERE WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS BETWEEN NOW AND NOVEMBER 19.

-- BASED ON MY CONVERSATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT WE WILL START OFF THIS SESSION WITH SECURITY ISSUES, THEN MOVE ON TO REGIONAL ISSUES, AND THEN PROCEED TO BILATERAL QUESTIONS. WE ALSO WANT TO BE SURE YOU ARE CLEAR ABOUT OUR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS.

-- ON SECURITY QUESTIONS, IT WOULD SEEM TO MAKE MOST SENSE TO ADDRESS THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS FIRST. WE COULD THEN DEAL WITH THE STOCKHOLM AND VIENNA TALKS, AND CONCLUDE BY TOUCHING ON NPT, CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND NUCLEAR TESTING, WHERE WE HAVE SOME SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR YOU.

-- WE HAVE ALSO AGREED THAT WE WILL STOP THE MEETING IN TIME TO GIVE THE TWO OF US A CHANCE FOR A PRIVATE CONVERSATION OF, SAY FIFTEEN TO TWENTY MINUTES. [Note: we recommend that you use the private meeting to suggest that concrete Soviet steps on human rights might be met with a liberalization of our export controls on energy-related equipment and technology of interest to Moscow. Talking points below]

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 100-00871 #111

BY CK NARA, DATE 2/13/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

GENEVA NST TALKS

-- WHEN WE MET IN HELSINKI WE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO ACHIEVE WHAT YOU CALLED A "MAXIMUM" RESULT WHEN OUR LEADERS MET IN GENEVA. WE AGREED ON THE CENTRALITY TO SUCH A RESULT OF THE ISSUES OUR NEGOTIATORS ARE DISCUSSING IN THE GENEVA BILATERAL ARMS CONTROL TALKS.

-- WE HAVE BEEN GIVING A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT TO WHAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE BY THE NOVEMBER MEETING.

-- GIVEN THE TIME AVAILABLE, AND THE COMPLEXITY OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED, IT IS CLEAR THAT WE WILL BE UNABLE TO PULL TOGETHER A COMPREHENSIVE, DETAILED AGREEMENT BY NOVEMBER 19.

-- WE BELIEVE THE WAY TO APPROACH THESE ISSUES IS TO TRY FOR AGREEMENT ON UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH COULD GUIDE OUR NEGOTIATORS IN THE GENEVA TALKS IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS, AND WHICH MIGHT SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT WHICH MEETS BOTH SIDES' CONCERNS.

-- THIS WOULD REQUIRE, OF COURSE, THAT EXISTING PRECONDITIONS BE DROPPED, AND THAT THE SIDES AGREE TO ADDRESS BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE LIMITATIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY.

-- I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU TODAY SOME THOUGHTS ON THIS CRITICAL OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE RELATIONSHIP. IN DOING SO, I WOULD LIKE TO GO BACK BRIEFLY AND SEE HOW FAR WE HAVE COME AND WHERE WE ARE TODAY.

-- GROMYKO AND I HAD A LENGTHY EXCHANGE ON THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP LAST JANUARY. WE REACHED SOME BASIC CONCLUSIONS WHICH WE THEN CODIFIED IN A PUBLIC STATEMENT. OUR AGREEMENT ON A SET OF OBJECTIVES ALLOWED US TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS. I STILL BELIEVE THE JANUARY 8 AGREEMENT POINTS THE WAY TO FUTURE PROGRESS.

-- I STRESSED TO GROMYKO THEN AND WANT TO REEMPHASIZE TO YOU TODAY THAT WE HAVE NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS. NEITHER WE NOR OUR ALLIES INTEND TO ATTACK YOU OR YOUR ALLIES. WE HOPE YOU HAVE NO INTENTIONS OF INITIATING AN ATTACK ON US.

-- WE WILL MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT FORCES TO DEFEND OURSELVES AND OUR INTERESTS. WE WILL DO SO WITH OR WITHOUT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. BUT WE FAR PREFER TO RELY ON LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES, AND THIS CAN ONLY HAPPEN THROUGH ARMS CONTROL.

-- BECAUSE OF THE WAY EACH SIDE'S FORCES HAVE DEVELOPED, IF A CRISIS SITUATION SHOULD ARISE, BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE INCENTIVES TO ACT QUICKLY AND DECISIVELY WITH THEIR MILITARY POWER. THIS CREATES AN UNSTABLE SITUATION. WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH IT.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

-- IN THE LATE 1960s AND EARLY 1970s, WE NEGOTIATED MEASURES THAT WE HOPED WOULD HELP THE SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES. WE HAD THREE ASSUMPTIONS:

- o WITH DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS SEVERELY LIMITED, THE SIDES COULD PLACE COMPARABLE RESTRAINTS ON OFFENSIVE FORCES, AND CREATE A STABLE BALANCE AT SHARPLY LOWER LEVELS;
- o THE CONSTRAINTS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES WOULD PREVENT BREAK-OUT OR CIRCUMVENTION;
- o BOTH SIDES WOULD ADHERE TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENTS.

-- THESE PREMISES, HOWEVER, INCREASINGLY ARE BREAKING DOWN. WE BOTH HAVE HIGHER LEVELS OF SYSTEMS. YOU HAVE SYSTEMS WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF INFLECTING A DEVASTATING ATTACK ON OUR MISSILE SILOS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES.

-- YOU HAVE ALSO TAKEN FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE ABM TREATY, STEADILY MODERNIZING YOUR PERMITTED ABM SYSTEM AROUND MOSCOW AND DEVELOPING NEW FACILITIES SUCH AS THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR WHICH RAISE SERIOUS QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER YOU ARE BUILDING A TERRITORIAL DEFENSE.

-- WE ARE LIKELY TO SEE A CONTINUING EROSION OF INTERNATIONAL STABILITY UNLESS WE ACT TO RESTORE THE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS ON WHICH THE AGREEMENTS OF THE EARLY SEVENTIES WERE BASED.

-- THUS, AS I EMPHASIZED TO GROMYKO, WE HAVE TWO PRIORITY TASKS IN THE NEAR FUTURE:

- o TO NEGOTIATE DEEP CUTS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS.
- o TO REVERSE THE EROSION OF THE PREMISES ASSUMED WHEN WE ENTERED THE ABM TREATY.

-- CLEARLY, IF WE ARE TO ACCOMPLISH THESE OBJECTIVES, THE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT PROGRAMS OF BOTH SIDES MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE ABM TREATY.

-- THE PRESIDENT HAS SET AS A MAJOR OBJECTIVE FOR THE COMING DECADE THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER NEW DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES WILL MAKE IT FEASIBLE FOR OUR TWO COUNTRIES TO MOVE AWAY FROM A SITUATION WHERE OUR ONLY RECOURSE IF ATTACKED IS TO DESTROY THE OTHER'S SOCIETY.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT YOU SHOULD LOOK HARD AT WHETHER THIS POSSIBILITY IS NOT IN YOUR INTEREST AS WELL AS OUR OWN.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-- INDEED, THE SOVIET UNION HAS HISTORICALLY SHOWN GREATER INTEREST IN STRATEGIC DEFENSE THAN HAS THE U.S.

-- YOU HAVE CONTINUED AN ACTIVE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE RESEARCH PROGRAM THROUGHOUT THE SEVENTIES AND EIGHTIES.

-- THE SOVIET VIEW OF RESEARCH UNDER THE ABM TREATY WAS QUITE CLEARLY STATED BY THEN DEFENSE MINISTER GRECHKO IN A SEPTEMBER, 1972 SPEECH TO THE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION WHICH RATIFIED THE ABM TREATY WHEN HE SAID: "THE TREATY DOES NOT PLACE ANY LIMITATIONS ON CARRYING OUT RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTAL WORK DIRECTED TOWARDS SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY AGAINST MISSILE ATTACK."

-- WE AGREE AND THAT IS ALL WE ARE DOING TODAY.

-- LET ME ASSURE YOU -- AS I ASSURED GROMYKO -- NO DECISIONS ABOUT MOVING BEYOND RESEARCH IN OUR SDI PROGRAM HAVE BEEN MADE OR EVEN COULD BE MADE FOR SOME TIME.

-- WE HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY THAT THIS WHOLE ISSUE WOULD BE A MATTER OF DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIATION WITH YOU, AS IS REQUIRED BY THE ABM TREATY SHOULD NEW DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES PROVE FEASIBLE. NOW IS THE TIME TO BEGIN THINKING THROUGH BOTH THE RISKS AND POSSIBILITIES OF A TRANSITION TO DEFENSE.

-- THIS, IN FACT, IS ONE OF OUR DISAPPOINTMENTS IN THE COURSE OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS SO FAR. BY AND LARGE, ALL WE HAVE HEARD FROM YOU ARE PROPOSALS FOR MORATORIA AND ABANDONMENT OF OUR SDI RESEARCH PROGRAM.

-- WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING SPECIFIC FROM YOU ON OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS. WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING FROM YOU ON YOUR OWN STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS. WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING THAT SHOWS YOU HAVE GIVEN ANY SERIOUS THOUGHT TO THE BENEFITS OF, AS WELL AS THE POTENTIAL OBSTACLES TO, GREATER RELIANCE ON DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS.

-- AS I TOLD YOU IN HELSINKI, I THINK IT'S TIME WE PUT OUR NEGOTIATORS TO WORK. THIS MEANS BOTH DELEGATIONS HAVE TO BE READY TO TALK ABOUT CONCRETE WAYS OF DEALING WITH THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP, AND WITH REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS.

-- I UNDERSTAND YOU MAY HAVE SPECIFIC IDEAS FOR THE PRESIDENT. I HOPE THAT IS THE CASE: WE WANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS BETWEEN NOW AND NOVEMBER, BUT IT WILL REQUIRE SOME THOUGHT AND IDEAS ON YOUR PART, NOT JUST OUR OWN.

-- AND AS WE BOTH THINK OVER WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE, IT IS VITAL THAT WE KEEP IN MIND THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS: TO PUT US ON THE PATH TOWARDS ELIMINATING NUCLEAR ARMS.

-- IN OUR VIEW, THAT CAN ONLY COME ABOUT BY TAKING A DRAMATIC FIRST STEP IN REDUCING OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS; AND BY STEPPING BACK AND SEEING WHETHER WE CAN CAPITALIZE ON THE TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES OF THE LAST 15 YEARS TO BRING ABOUT A MORE STABLE SITUATION, ONE THAT OFFERS THE POSSIBILITY OF PRESERVING OUR SOCIETIES RATHER THAN THREATENING TO DESTROY THEM.

-- I KNOW THE PRESIDENT IS LOOKING FORWARD TO TALKING TO YOU ABOUT THIS SUBJECT SO I WON'T GO ANY FURTHER.

ASAT [If Shevardnadze raises our ASAT test]:

-- WE CANNOT ACCEPT SOVIET COMPLAINTS ABOUT OUR ASAT TEST. YOU HAVE HAD AN OPERATIONAL SYSTEM FOR YEARS, AND YOU HAVE INTEGRATED A TEST OF THIS SYSTEM INTO A STRATEGIC EXERCISE.

-- OUR SYSTEM IS A DETERRENT AGAINST AGAINST ATTACKS ON OUR SPACE ASSETS OR THOSE OF OUR ALLIES. OUR TESTING IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH ALL TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

STOCKHOLM CDE TALKS

-- THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS ARE ALSO ABOUT STABILITY.

-- WHEN THE ORIGINAL CBMS WERE NEGOTIATED IN THE CSCE FINAL ACT, IT WAS HOPED THEY WOULD HELP DECREASE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR MISCALCULATION AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS THAT COULD PROVOKE OR INTENSIFY A CRISIS.

-- BUT THOSE CBMS HAVEN'T MEASURED UP. WE HAVE STILL SEEN CASES OF FORCE BEING USED TO BULLY OTHER STATES IN EUROPE, EVEN IF THAT FORCE WASN'T DIRECTLY APPLIED. AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CBMS BY YOUR SIDE HASN'T BEEN ENCOURAGING.

-- YOUR ZAPAD-81 EXERCISE IN 1981 WAS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE PRE-NOTIFICATION AND INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE CBM ON MANEUVER NOTIFICATION -- AND IT TOOK PLACE AT A TIME WHEN THE SOVIET UNION WAS PUTTING GREAT PRESSURE ON POLAND.

-- MORE BROADLY, OUR EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT YOUR NOTIFICATIONS OF MANEUVERS ARE UNINFORMATIVE: YOU SELDOM INVITE WESTERN OBSERVERS; AND EVEN WHEN YOU DO INVITE THEM, THEY ARE DENIED THE ABILITY TO GET A GOOD PICTURE OF THE CONDUCT AND SCOPE OF THE MANEUVER. ALL THIS CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH THE WEST'S RECORD ON THE HELSINKI CBMS.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 6 -

-- SO WE AND OUR ALLIES ARE SEEKING A STRONGER REGIME OF MEASURES THAT COULD IN FACT GIVE A BETTER PICTURE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. WE ADVANCED STRINGENT CRITERIA FOR THESE NEW CBMS. WE HAVE RECOGNIZED ALL ALONG THAT THEY WOULD IMPOSE A BURDEN ON MILITARY FORCES AND COMMANDERS, BUT WE ARE CONVINCED THE END RESULT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL FOR ALL OF EUROPE.

-- SO FAR, PROGRESS AT STOCKHOLM HAS BEEN SLOW. YOU AND I AGREED AT HELSINKI THAT WE SHOULD SPEED UP THIS PROCESS, THAT THIS IS AN AREA WHERE PROGRESS SHOULD BE POSSIBLE.

-- AMBASSADOR GOODBY HAS REPORTED TO ME ON THE DISCUSSIONS HE HAD IN MOSCOW EARLIER THIS MONTH WITH AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKIY.

-- THE PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS THEY DISCUSSED PROVIDE A GOOD BASIS FOR STARTING THE DRAFTING PROCESS IN STOCKHOLM ON THE BASIS OF THE EXISTING STRUCTURE.

-- WE NEED TO LOOK BEYOND THE CURRENT WORK IN STOCKHOLM ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS TO WHAT SHOULD EMERGE WHEN DRAFTING BEGINS.

-- WHAT WE NEED NOW IS A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH ON BOTH SIDES AIMED AT RESOLVING THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES. AS THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID, WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER YOUR IDEA ON A STATEMENT REGARDING NON-USE OF FORCE. BUT AT THE SAME TIME, WE EXPECT YOU TO ACCEPT THE KIND OF DETAILED CBMS WHICH CAN IN FACT IMPROVE STABILITY IN EUROPE.

-- IF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON AN APPROACH TO DRAFTING IN STOCKHOLM, WE WOULD BE READY TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATE STATEMENT WHEN OUR LEADERS MEET IN GENEVA. THIS WOULD HAVE TO HAPPEN BEFORE THE CURRENT ROUND ENDS OCTOBER 18.

-- IN THAT CASE, WE WOULD WANT A GENEVA STATEMENT TO RECORD OUR MUTUAL AGREEMENT FOR A POSITIVE OUTCOME AT STOCKHOLM.

VIENNA MBFR TALKS [need to adjust depending on current inter-agency discussion of options in preparation for next round of negotiations beginning September 26]

-- WE CONTINUE TO CONSIDER MBFR AN IMPORTANT PART OF OUR ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS TO ENHANCE SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

-- MBFR AIMS AT MAINTAINING MILITARY STABILITY IN THE AREA WHICH HAS THE GREATEST CONCENTRATION OF MILITARY POWER ON THE GLOBE.

-- SOMEONE ONCE SAID THAT THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ARE ONE OF THE LONGEST-RUNNING DIPLOMATIC SHOWS IN HISTORY. I RECALL THAT YOU SUGGESTED IT WAS THE ARMS CONTROL STEPCHILD. WE SHOULD ASK OURSELVES, "WHY?"

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 7 -

-- ONE ANSWER, OF COURSE, IS THAT WE HAVE NOT EVEN BEEN ABLE TO AGREE ON THE SIZE OF FORCES IN THE AREA. HERE AGAIN, THE SOVIET APPROACH HAS BEEN UNHELPFUL.

-- BUT WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT EVEN IF AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON THE NUMBERS OF FORCES IN THE AREA, THERE ARE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS OF HOW WE GO ABOUT REDUCING FORCES, AND THEN ASSURING THAT AGREED LEVELS ARE OBSERVED.

-- WE HAVE ADVANCED IDEAS THAT WE BELIEVE WOULD SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. WE ARE STUDYING YOUR LAST PROPOSAL AND CONSULTING WITH OUR ALLIES ON HOW TO PROCEED TOWARD CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS.

-- WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE WAY OPENED FOR PROGRESS IN VIENNA.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

-- OUR DISCUSSIONS OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION HAVE OVER THE YEARS BEEN A MODEL FOR THE TYPE OF BILATERAL DISCUSSION WE WOULD LIKE ON A VARIETY OF ISSUES.

-- WE BELIEVE THE USEFULNESS OF THOSE CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE STATEMENT ISSUED AT THE NOVEMBER MEETING. I THINK YOU AGREE.

-- AMBASSADORS KENNEDY AND PETROVSKIY HAVE DISCUSSED THE TEXT OF A DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT WHICH OUR TWO LEADERS COULD ISSUE IN GENEVA. WE HAVE GIVEN YOU A TEXT AND NEED A RESPONSE.

-- WE HOPE THE TWO AMBASSADORS CAN WORK OUT APPROPRIATE, FINAL LANGUAGE WHEN THEY HOLD THEIR SEMI-ANNUAL BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS IN MID-OCTOBER.

-- BASED ON THEIR PROGRESS, WE CAN DECIDE CLOSER TO THE EVENT WHETHER THE STATEMENT SHOULD BE SELF-STANDING OR PART OF A LARGER DOCUMENT.

NUCLEAR TESTING

-- WHERE ARE WE TODAY ON THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR TESTING?

-- SADLY, WE CONTINUE TO BE CAUGHT IN THE SAME IMPASSE THAT HAS BLOCKED PROGRESS ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE FOR YEARS.

-- BOTH OF US HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE OTHER'S COMPLIANCE. WE TAKE YOUR CONCERNS SERIOUSLY AND WANT TO RESOLVE THEM. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A SIMILAR ATTITUDE ON YOUR PART.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 8 -

-- WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO RATIFY THE TTBT AND PNET UNLESS AND UNTIL IMPROVED VERIFICATION PROCEDURES GIVE US CONFIDENCE THAT THE TREATIES ARE BEING OBSERVED. YOU REFUSE TO EVEN DISCUSS VERIFICATION UNTIL WE RATIFY THE AGREEMENTS.

-- WE ARE CONVINCED THAT MEANINGFUL PROGRESS CAN BE MADE IN THIS AREA. WE BELIEVE VERIFICATION CAN BE IMPROVED BY EMPLOYING EXISTING TECHNOLOGIES TO INCREASE OUR CONFIDENCE. WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT BOTH OUR NATIONS WILL FOR YEARS TO COME HAVE TO RELY HEAVILY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR DETERRENCE, AND THUS REQUIRE SOME MEANS OF TESTING.

-- LAST JULY OUR TWO LEADERS MADE SUGGESTIONS FOR MOVING THIS ISSUE FORWARD. MR. GORBACHEV ANNOUNCED A NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM, BUT SAID NOTHING ABOUT OUR VERIFICATION CONCERNS.

-- THE PRESIDENT MADE A PRACTICAL PROPOSAL TO BREAK THE CURRENT IMPASSE: ON JULY 27 HE EXTENDED A UNILATERAL INVITATION FOR SOVIET EXPERTS TO VISIT THE US TO MEASURE THE YIELD OF ONE OF OUR TESTS, BRINGING THE EQUIPMENT THEY DEEM NECESSARY FOR SUCH MEASUREMENT. THIS WAS AN ATTEMPT TO SET IN MOTION A PROCESS THAT COULD LEAD TO IMPORTANT VERIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS AND TO INCREASED CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS.

-- I HAVE TO TELL YOU THAT YOUR HANDLING OF THIS ISSUE SEEMED TO US TO REFLECT A GREATER DESIRE TO PURSUE PROPAGANDA THAN TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.

-- WE TAKE THIS ISSUE TOO SERIOUSLY TO LEAVE IT IN ITS CURRENT IMPASSE. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THIS IS AN ISSUE WHERE PROGRESS CAN BE MADE.

-- IN ORDER TO EXPLORE THE FEASIBILITY OF MAKING PROGRESS ON THIS OFFER AND THESE VERIFICATION ISSUES, I WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE A PRIVATE, CONFIDENTIAL MEETING BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

-- AT SUCH A MEETING OUR REPRESENTATIVES COULD DISCUSS THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER IN GREATER DETAIL AND THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVES COULD PROVIDE INFORMATION HELPFUL TO YOUR GOVERNMENT TO CONSIDER POSITIVELY THE PRESIDENT'S INVITATION TO VISIT THE U.S. TEST SITE.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS [being worked in arms control support group]

-- EVER SINCE WORLD WAR I, WHERE POISON GAS WAS USED EXTENSIVELY BY BOTH SIDES, THERE HAS BEEN A WIDELY RECOGNIZED INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING AGAINST USE OF THESE WEAPONS. THERE HAVE BEEN PERIODIC BREACHES OF THIS COMMON UNDERSTANDING, BUT EVEN IN THE TOTAL WARFARE OF WORLD WAR II, THIS REGIME AGAINST CW USE HELD UP.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 9 -

-- IN THE LAST FEW YEARS, HOWEVER, WE HAVE SEEN THESE CONSTRAINTS BREAKING DOWN. WE THINK BOTH THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION HAVE AN INTEREST IN SHORING THEM UP.

-- BOTH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION FAVOR A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN, ALTHOUGH WE DIFFER ON THE MEASURES THAT WOULD BE NEEDED TO ENFORCE SUCH A PROHIBITION. IT SEEMS THAT SHOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE A JOINT EFFORT TO PREVENT THE PROBLEM FROM GETTING WORSE, WHILE WE NEGOTIATE TOWARDS ELIMINATING THESE WEAPONS ALTOGETHER.

-- WE DISCUSSED IN HELSINKI THE ALARMING EXPANSION OF THE USE AND POSSESSION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THIS IS AN AREA WHERE WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO FIND COMMON GROUND, AS WE HAVE ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION.

-- WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO SPEEDING UP THE PACE OF CW TALKS IN THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, BUT RECOGNIZE THAT IMMEDIATE PROGRESS WILL BE DIFFICULT.

-- WHEN WE MET IN HELSINKI, I MADE TWO SUGGESTIONS FOR BEGINNING TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM:

- o THAT SOVIET EXPERTS VISIT THE US TO DISCUSS THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF DESTRUCTION;
- o AND THAT WE EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON THE USE OR POTENTIAL USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE IRAN - IRAQ WAR.

-- THOSE IDEAS REMAIN ON THE TABLE. REGRET NO SOVIET RESPONSE THUS FAR.

-- HAVE ANOTHER PROPOSAL TO MAKE TODAY.

- o YOU MAY BE AWARE THAT WE HAVE WORKED TO DEVELOP A LIST OF PRECURSORS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- THE RAW MATERIALS FROM WHICH THEY ARE MADE.
- o THE PURPOSE OF THE LIST IS TO FACILITATE JOINT EFFORTS TO DENY SUCH MATERIALS TO COUNTRIES WHICH MAY BE SEEKING TO DEVELOP A CW CAPABILITY.
- o WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SHARE THAT LIST WITH YOU.
- o ONCE YOU HAD STUDIED THE LIST, US AND SOVIET EXPERTS MIGHT MEET IN OCTOBER TO CONSIDER BILATERAL STEPS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN TO CONTROL THE AVAILABILITY OF CHEMICAL PRECURSORS AND TO ACCELERATE EFFORTS FOR A CW TREATY.

-- THIS WOULD SEEM TO BE A NON-CONTROVERSIAL STEP WHICH WE COULD HAVE IN SHAPE FOR NOVEMBER IF WE START NOW. PERHAPS WE COULD HAVE AN INITIAL REACTION BY FRIDAY.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

REGIONAL ISSUES

GENERAL REMARKS

-- EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES HAS MAJOR INTERESTS AT STAKE IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD. OUR RELATIONS WITH EACH OTHER REGARDING THESE REGIONS WILL ALWAYS BE COMPETITIVE. WE'RE CONFIDENT OF OUR ABILITY TO HANDLE THIS COMPETITION. YOU THINK YOU HAVE HISTORY BEHIND YOU.

-- WE BOTH HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO KEEP OUR COMPETITION PEACEFUL, BOTH FOR THE SAKE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE REGIONS CONCERNED, AND FOR THE SAKE OF PREVENTING TURBULENCE THERE FROM PRODUCING A CRISIS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

-- SO WE THINK REGIONAL ISSUES ARE SOMETHING THAT DESERVE CLOSE ATTENTION BY THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY IN NOVEMBER.

-- WE THINK THE EXPERTS TALKS WE HAVE HAD ON REGIONAL QUESTIONS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR HAVE GIVEN US A GOOD START FOR SUCH A DISCUSSION IN GENEVA.

-- SINCE THE FIRST OF THE YEAR, WE HAVE HAD EXCHANGES ON THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AFGHANISTAN, AND EAST ASIA. BY THE TIME OUR LEADERS MEET IN GENEVA WE WILL HAVE HAD AN EXPERTS' EXCHANGE ON CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AS WELL, THUS COMPLETING THE CYCLE WE AGREED UPON EARLIER.

-- WHILE OUR MEETINGS SO FAR HAVE PRODUCED NO DRAMATIC RESULTS, WE HAVE FOUND THEM VALUABLE AS A MEANS OF COMMUNICATING POSITIONS, IN CLARIFYING WHERE EACH OTHER'S INTERESTS REALLY LIE AND THEREBY HELPING TO PREVENT MISCALCULATION.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

WLS E00-008/1 #112

BY GAS NARA, DATE 2/13/02

AFGHANISTAN

-- OUR DISCUSSIONS OF REGIONAL ISSUES HAVE REVEALED MANY AREAS OF DIFFERENCE, BUT THE QUESTION WHICH REPRESENTS THE BIGGEST OBSTACLE TO AN OVERALL IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS REMAINS AFGHANISTAN.

-- AFGHANISTAN REMAINS IMPORTANT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. THE MEMORY OF THE SOVIET INVASION AND EVIDENCE OF SOVIET TACTICS AIMED AT CIVILIANS IN AFGHANISTAN HAS LED MANY PEOPLE IN THE US TO QUESTION THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING OUR RELATIONS MORE PRODUCTIVE.

-- IN PART, THIS IS BECAUSE AMERICANS DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOVIET UNION HAS FELT COMPELLED TO ACT WITH SUCH FORCE AND BRUTALITY IN AFGHANISTAN.

-- WE HAVE SAID ON MANY OCCASIONS THAT WE RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF THE SOVIET UNION TO HAVE A SECURE SOUTHERN BORDER AND THAT WE DESIRE A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT.

-- FOR OUR PART, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IS NECESSARY AND FEASIBLE.

-- I DISCUSSED OUR VIEWS ON THIS WITH YOU AT HELSINKI AND OUTLINED WHAT I BELIEVE IS A PRACTICAL AND CONCRETE WAY TO LOOK AT THE PROBLEM.

--[TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE JUST A FEW ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE MORE TO SAY ON THIS SUBJECT WHEN YOU MEET WITH HIM IN WASHINGTON.]

Our handling of this point would depend on your decision on whether we should make a new initiative to test recent signs of Soviet interest in a negotiated withdrawal. You will be receiving an EUR/NEA memo on the subject])

-- WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY SIGNS THAT THE TALKS CONDUCTED AT GENEVA BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE COULD YIELD PROGRESS.

-- WHAT SEEMS TO BE MISSING AT THIS POINT IS SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS. THAT STEP COULD PROVIDE IMPETUS FOR THE CORDOVEZ MISSION AND FACILITATE RAPID PROGRESS TOWARD A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

-- WE ARE INTERESTED IN PURSUING A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO RESOLVING THIS PROBLEM. IF THE SOVIET UNION IS SIMILARLY INTERESTED YOU WILL FIND THAT THE US IS PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

MIDDLE EAST

-- WE DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE MIDDLE EAST IN HELSINKI, BUT IT REMAINS A CRUCIAL AND VOLATILE AREA OF THE WORLD WHERE OUR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS HAVE BROUGHT US TO THE BRINK OF CONFLICT IN THE PAST AND WHICH OUR RESPECTIVE LEADERS WILL BE SURE TO DISCUSS IN GENEVA.

--OUR EXPERIENCE OVER THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS HAS BEEN THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER THE WAY TO MAKE REAL PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE HAS BEEN TO FACILITATE DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

-- WE STILL BELIEVE THIS IS THE CASE. AS I TOLD MR. GROMYKO LAST MAY, THE US IS COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH THE PARTIES IN THE REGION TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT. THE ONLY REALISTIC PATH TO PEACE IS DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON UNSC RESOLUTION 242.

-- WE ARE CONTINUING TO WORK TOWARD THAT GOAL. SHOULD JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS ENTER INTO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, WE BELIEVE THEY SHOULD RECEIVE THE SUPPORT OF ALL STATES SEEKING TO FURTHER ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE.

-- THE SOVIET UNION HAS DENOUNCED DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BUT THE ALTERNATIVE YOU HAVE PRESENTED, AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, IN OUR VIEW HOLDS OUT THE CERTAIN PROSPECT OF FAILURE AND STALEMATE. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, HOW DO YOU SEE YOUR PROPOSAL AS LEADING TO A SOLUTION?

-- SYRIAN HOSTILITY TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE MILITARY BUILDUP THEY HAVE PURSUED SUGGEST THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY ARE CONSIDERING A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE.

-- IN OUR VIEW SUCH A COURSE IS DANGEROUS AND CARRIES WITH IT POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES FOR BOTH OF US. THE OUTCOME OF WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA WOULD BE PREDICTABLE; ISRAEL WOULD WIN. BUT THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE INCALCULABLE, EXCEPT FOR ONE THING. THE TRAGEDY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD CONTINUE.

-- WE HOPE YOU WILL USE YOUR INFLUENCE WITH DAMASCUS TO DISCOURAGE SYRIAN CONSIDERATION OF A MILITARY OPTION.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 4 -

IRAN-IRAQ

-- OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR WITH YOU AND BOTH OF US HAVE AGREED THAT THE WAR IS NOT IN OUR INTERESTS AND THAT IRAN REMAINS THE INTRANSIGENT PARTY.

-- AN EARLY END TO THE WAR, WITH THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF BOTH SIDES INTACT, IS THE UNITED STATES' GOAL AND IS IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST.

-- IT IS IMPORTANT THAT BOTH OUR COUNTRIES SUPPORT PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S AND OTHER'S EFFORTS TO ARRANGE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

-- SINCE IRAN CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE A GENERAL CEASEFIRE, THE BEST MEANS OF BRINGING ABOUT A PEACE SETTLEMENT IS TO CUT OFF IRAN'S ARMS SUPPLIES.

-- WE HAVE EXERTED OURSELVES TO CUT OFF ARMS SUPPLIES FROM THE WEST TO IRAN, BUT THE FLOW OF WEAPONS AND WAR MATERIAL FROM YOUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES CONTINUES.

-- WE HAVE ALSO RAISED WITH YOU THE PROSPECT OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE IN THE GULF WAR. IN MY VIEW, THIS ISSUE HAS IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FROM BOTH THE REGIONAL AND ARMS CONTROL PERSPECTIVES. WE HAVE OFFERED TO TALK WITH YOU ABOUT THIS PROBLEM AND WHAT MIGHT BE DONE ABOUT IT, BUT WE HAVE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE.

-- WE BELIEVE YOU COULD DO MORE ON THE GULF WAR. CONCRETE STEPS SUCH AS AN EFFORT TO CUT OFF IRAN'S SUPPLY OF SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES WOULD BE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE THAT YOU ARE PREPARED TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

EAST ASIA

-- OUR EXPERTS HAVE JUST ENGAGED IN A DETAILED REVIEW OF EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENTS.

-- IN OUR VIEW ASIAN ECONOMIC DYNAMISM AND POLITICAL STABILITY ARE ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS.

-- I FIND IT PARTICULARLY INTERESTING TO COMPARE THE TROUBLED, WAR-TORN ECONOMIES OF VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA TO THE THRIVING ECONOMIES OF THE ASEAN STATES. IF YOU VISIT SOME OF THESE PLACES, LIKE KUALA LUMPUR, YOU WILL GET A SENSE OF WHAT I AM TALKING ABOUT.

-- WHAT KIND OF LESSON CAN WE DRAW FROM A COMPARISON OF THE ECONOMIC PROSPERITY OF THE ASEAN NATIONS AND THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF VIETNAM?

-- AS I TOLD YOU IN HELSINKI, WE CONTINUE TO BE TROUBLED BY THE THREAT TO STABILITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA POSED BY THE VIETNAMESE INVASION OF CAMBODIA.

-- WE HOPE YOU WILL USE YOUR CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE WITH HANOI TO URGE THEM TO PURSUE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHICH PRESERVES VIETNAM'S SECURITY INTERESTS, REMOVES ITS TROOPS FROM CAMBODIA, AND LOWERS TENSIONS WITH ASEAN AND CHINA.

-- TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA ALSO REPRESENT AN ONGOING THREAT TO STABILITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA. WE BELIEVE THAT WE MUST BOTH DO WHAT WE CAN TO ENCOURAGE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH AND REDUCE THE LEVEL OF TENSION.

-- WE ANTICIPATE A SUCCESSFUL OLYMPIAD IN SEOUL AND LOOK FORWARD TO COMPETING AGAINST YOUR ATHLETES IN 1988.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 6 -

CENTRAL AMERICA

-- WE HAVE BOTH EXPRESSED OUR CONCERNS OVER INCREASED TENSIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

-- OUR EXPERTS WILL BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THIS IN MORE DEPTH WHEN THEY MEET IN OCTOBER.

-- IT IS WORTH RECALLING THAT PERHAPS THE MOST DANGEROUS CRISIS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN THE POSTWAR ERA AROSE IN THIS REGION. THERE IS NO NEED FOR THIS TO HAPPEN AGAIN AS LONG AS YOU DO NOT MISUNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS REGION TO US.

-- AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE, EMERGENCE OF JET FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN NICARAGUA WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES AS WOULD THE INTRODUCTION OF CUBAN COMBAT UNITS IN NICARAGUA.

-- IN GENERAL, CUBA AND NICARAGUA ARE STANDING AGAINST THE TIDE OF GREATER DEMOCRACY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. RECOURSE TO VIOLENCE TO UPSET DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS WHICH WE REGARD AS VITAL TO THE STABILITY OF THE REGION WILL CONTINUE TO BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE US. WE EXPECT CUBAN AND NICARAGUAN RESTRAINT IN ACTIVITIES IN THIS PART OF THE HEMISPHERE.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 7 -

SOUTHERN AFRICA

-- YOUR SIDE HAS SAID ON MANY OCCASIONS THAT SOUTHERN AFRICA IS NOT AN AREA WHERE EITHER OF US HAVE VITAL INTERESTS. WE AGREE.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE NATIONS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA SHOULD BE LEFT TO SOLVE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS. OUTSIDE INTERVENTION WILL NOT BE HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD.

-- SOUTH AFRICA HAS ENTERED A TURBULENT PHASE IN ITS HISTORY AND IT IS LIKELY TO REMAIN IN AN UNSETTLED STATE FOR SOME TIME TO COME. THIS UNDERLINES THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT BY OUTSIDE POWERS.

-- DURING THE 1970'S THE INTERVENTION OF YOUR PROXIES EXACERBATED THE PROBLEMS IN THIS REGION AND ENVENOMED OUR RELATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT SIMILAR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT COULD BE EVEN MORE EXPLOSIVE IN RESULT.

-- WE REMAIN INTERESTED IN HELPING THE NATIONS OF REGION REACH A PEACEFUL ACCOMMODATION OF THEIR DIFFERENCES, PARTICULARLY ON THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA.

-- MERE REITERATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF UNSC RESOLUTION 435 IS NOT ENOUGH. A PRACTICAL WAY MUST BE FOUND TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION. DO YOU HAVE AN ALTERNATIVE TO SUGGEST?

-- SOVIET INFLUENCE WITH KEY ACTORS AMONG THE FRONTLINE STATES IS CONSIDERABLE. WE HOPE THAT YOU WOULD USE THAT INFLUENCE TO ENCOURAGE THE CONTINUED SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 8 -

PROPOSAL FOR REGULARIZATION OF REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO REGULARIZE THE REGIONAL DIALOGUE WE HAVE BEGUN THIS YEAR. WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND IS ANNUAL SESSIONS TO PROVIDE A REGULAR CHANNEL FOR INDEPTH REVIEW OF THE AREAS WE HAVE DISCUSSED THUS FAR. WE COULD OF COURSE ADDRESS ADDITIONAL AREAS IF THE NEED AROSE IN THE FUTURE.

-- IF THEY ARE TO BE OF MAXIMUM VALUE, HOWEVER, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT OUR RESPECTIVE REPRESENTATIVES BE ABLE TO SPEAK WITH EQUAL AUTHORITY. I REALIZE THAT OUR MINISTRIES ARE NOT ORGANIZED EXACTLY ALIKE, BUT WE HAVE FRANKLY FELT THAT SOME OF YOUR SENIOR PEOPLE WERE SEEKING TO AVOID DISCUSSIONS.

-- ASSUMING THIS PROBLEM CAN BE OVERCOME, WE BELIEVE REGULARIZED SESSIONS OF THE TYPE WE HAVE PROPOSED MIGHT GROW INTO FORA WHICH CAN HELP PREPARE THE GROUND FOR OUR OWN DISCUSSIONS AND ALLOW US TO MAKE PROGRESS IN RESOLVING CONCRETE PROBLEMS.

-- WHEN CAN WE EXPECT TO HEAR YOUR RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL ?

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

BILATERAL ISSUES:

CIVIL AVIATION:

[NOTE: The civair/Northern Pacific Air Safety discussions are in considerable flux. The Soviets and the Japanese have yet to agree on the format for the exchange of notes to bring into effect the agreement we reached in July on Northern Pacific (NOPAC) Air Safety. We have said we will agree to schedule bilateral discussions on a new civil aviation agreement when this procedural question is resolved and the Soviets have agreed to dates for technical talks to implement the NOPAC agreement. We are working on this but the time is very short between now and your meeting with Shevardnadze.]

-- BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED TO MOVE FORWARD ON BILATERAL ISSUES, BUT THE PROCESS OFTEN SEEMS AGONIZINGLY SLOW. BECAUSE WE HAD SIGNED THE NORTHERN PACIFIC AIR SAFETY AGREEMENT BEFORE OUR HELSINKI MEETING, THE US ASSUMED THE DIPLOMATIC NOTES BRINGING IT INTO FORCE WOULD BE EXCHANGED, IMPLEMENTATION TALKS UNDERWAY, AND THE CIVIL AVIATION TALKS UNDERWAY WELL BEFORE NOW.

-- WE FRANKLY DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY IT HAS TAKEN SO LONG FOR THE SOVIET SIDE TO GET BACK TO US SO WE COULD FORMALLY ACTIVATE AN AGREEMENT THAT WE HAD REACHED BEFORE OUR MEETING IN JULY.

-- WE ARE READY TO BEGIN CIVIL AVIATION DISCUSSIONS WITHIN A FEW DAYS OF THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES AND AGREEMENT ON A DATE FOR AIR SAFETY IMPLEMENTATION TALKS. AS YOUR SIDE KNOWS, THERE ARE TWO BROAD ISSUES THAT MUST BE DEALT WITH BEFORE WE CAN RESOLVE THE CIVIL AVIATION QUESTIONS: FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PACIFIC AIR SAFETY AGREEMENT AND A FAIR BALANCE OF BENEFITS FOR AEROFLOT AND OUR DESIGNATED CARRIER, PAN AM.

-- WE EXPECT THAT THE PACIFIC AIR SAFETY IMPLEMENTATION TALKS WILL RAPIDLY PUT INTO PLACE THE MECHANISMS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE THREE COUNTRIES INVOLVED COMMUNICATE RAPIDLY TO RESOLVE ANY CIVIL AVIATION PROBLEM IN THE AREA, INCLUDING THE CASE OF A STRAYED OR DEVIATED AIRCRAFT.

-- WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON A SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT IN THIS REGARD, I MUST TELL YOU FRANKLY THAT WE CANNOT AGREE TO RESUME CIVIL AIR LINKS.

-- WE HOPE THE CIVIL AVIATION TALKS, ONCE BEGUN, WILL MOVE RAPIDLY TO CONCLUSION. WE EXPECT SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS THAT WILL ENSURE A BALANCE OF BENEFITS TO BOTH SIDES.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

045
FOO-008/1 #113
2/13/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

CONSULATES:

[NOTE: This talking point presupposes that we can raise the Soviet embassy/consulate ceiling to accommodate a consulate in New York and that we are making progress on the civair front -- a condition the Soviets have posed for a consulate exchange.]

-- WE AGREED TWO YEARS AGO TO MOVE TOWARD REOPENING OUR CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK. THIS SEEMED TO US TO BE A VERY EASY STEP THAT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY. THEN THE SOVIET SIDE DECIDED TO TIE THIS ISSUE TO THE TOTALLY UNRELATED ONE OF A NEW CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT. WE THOUGHT THIS WAS A SPECIOUS LINKAGE AT THE TIME AND STILL DO.

-- HOWEVER, WITH THE MOVEMENT ON AVIATION ISSUES, THIS IS NOW BASICALLY BESIDE THE POINT. IT IS HIGH TIME WE EITHER RESOLVE THIS QUESTION OR FORGET ABOUT IT.

-- WE SEE NO REASON THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD NOT ANNOUNCE IN GENEVA THAT WE HAVE AGREED TO OPEN THE CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK. THERE IS, OF COURSE, SOME PRELIMINARY SPADEWORK THAT HAS TO BE DONE. AS I TOLD YOU IN HELSINKI, WE NEED TO SEND A TEAM TO LOOK OVER THE BUILDINGS IN KIEV BEFORE WE CAN AGREE IT MAKES SENSE TO HAVE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT.

-- IF THE SOVIET SIDE IS SERIOUS ON THIS ISSUE OF AN EXCHANGE OF CONSULATES, I PROPOSE THAT A US TEAM GO TO KIEV WITHIN TEN DAYS. I WILL THEN ASK AMBASSADOR HARTMAN TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE WITH YOU AT GREATER LENGTH IN MOSCOW TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS.

EXCHANGES AGREEMENT:

-- WE HOPE YOU AGREE THAT WE SHOULD WRAP UP AN EXCHANGES AGREEMENT OVER THE NEXT MONTH. OUR PEOPLE HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING OVER A YEAR ON THIS AGREEMENT, BUT SOME MINOR AND SOME MORE SERIOUS ISSUES REMAIN.

-- SURELY, YOUR SIDE CAN HANDLE SUCH TRIVIAL ISSUES AS HOUSING FOR OUR EXCHANGEES AND SIMILAR REMAINING PROBLEMS. THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETED BY NOW AND IS HARDLY WORTH OUR TIME. THERE ARE ALSO SOME CENTRAL ISSUES THAT WE CAN RESOLVE.

-- AS I TOLD YOU IN HELSINKI, WE MUST HAVE ONE TO TWO EXHIBITS OVER THE THREE-YEAR LIFE OF THE PROGRAM, AS WELL AS VISITS TO A SIZEABLE NUMBER OF CITIES, TO MAKE AN AGREEMENT WORTHWHILE TO US. WE SIMPLY HAVE NO GIVE ON THAT POINT.

-- I ALSO TOLD YOU OF OUR STRONG INTEREST IN TELEVISION APPEARANCES IN EACH OTHER'S COUNTRY. DO YOU HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS ON WHAT WOULD BE A REASONABLE NUMBER OF SUCH RECIPROCAL APPEARANCES?

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

-- I HOPE YOU AND AMBASSADOR HARTMAN CAN WORK OUT THE DETAILS IN THE COMING WEEKS. IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO DRAFT FINAL DOCUMENTS. WE ALSO NEED TO DISCUSS HOW THEY SHOULD BE SIGNED.

OTHER BILATERAL AGREEMENTS:

-- WE ARE PLEASED THAT THE COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS UNDER OUR OTHER BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ARE MOVING FORWARD. SECRETARIES BLOCK AND PIERCE HAD GOOD DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW AND I AM SURE THE ENVIRONMENTAL DISCUSSIONS IN NOVEMBER WILL ALSO BE SUCCESSFUL. WE HAVE BEEN THINKING ABOUT OTHER AREAS WHICH WOULD BE GOOD FOR COOPERATION.

-- I MUST SAY, HOWEVER, THAT I AM DISAPPOINTED IN YOUR RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL I MADE IN HELSINKI THAT WE NEGOTIATE A NEW SPACE AGREEMENT. THIS WAS AN EASY ISSUE, ONE THAT SCIENTISTS IN BOTH OUR COUNTRIES LIKE, AND THE KIND OF COOPERATION THAT THAT IS IMPORTANT TO THE EFFORT TO BUILD BETTER RELATIONS. I OUR OFFER REMAINS ON THE TABLE AND I HOPE YOU WILL RECONSIDER.

-- IN HELSINKI, WE ALSO MENTIONED THE MARITIME BOUNDARY DISCUSSIONS. WE WILL GET TO YOU SOON WITH A PROPOSED DATE FOR ANOTHER ROUND. WE ARE PREPARED FOR A VARIETY OF OUTCOMES TO THIS NEGOTIATION, RANGING FROM A DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT TO NO SETTLEMENT AT ALL.

-- SINCE I LAST RAISED THE BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS PROBLEM WITH YOU IN HELSINKI, NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. SINCE YOU INSIST THE PROBLEM IS TECHNICAL, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO WORK OUT AN UNDERSTANDING QUICKLY AROUND THE TABLE AT THE WEEKLY BERLIN IR CONTROLLERS MEETINGS. WE WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON YOUR PART IN THE INTEREST OF REMOVING THIS ISSUE FROM OUR AGENDA.

-- A SECOND ISSUE RELATES TO OUR MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS IN GERMANY. AN APOLOGY AND COMPENSATION TO THE NICHOLSON FAMILY WOULD GO A LONG WAY TOWARD REMOVING THE OUTRAGE IN AMERICA FELT AT THIS TRAGEDY. WE SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT THE MILITARY-TO-MILITARY STAFF TALKS THAT ARE UNDERWAY ARE MORE EFFECTIVE IN PREVENTING FURTHER INCIDENTS.

-- ON GRAIN SALES, SECRETARY BLOCK WAS TOLD UNEQUIVOCALLY IN MOSCOW THAT THE SOVIET MINIMUM WHEAT PURCHASE COMMITMENT UNDER OUR LONG TERM AGREEMENT WOULD BE HONORED. HOWEVER, NO ADDITIONAL PURCHASES HAVE TAKEN PLACE. WE TRUST YOU WILL PURCHASE THE ADDITIONAL 1.1 MILLION TONS NEEDED TO MEET THAT COMMITMENT BEFORE THE END OF THE AGREEMENT YEAR ON SEPTEMBER 30.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

HUMAN RIGHTS/EMIGRATION

-- FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO OUTLINE FOR YOU SOME OF OUR VIEWS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. AS A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS RULED BY LAWS, THIS IS A DEEPLY HELD MATTER OF CONCERN COMMON TO ALL AMERICANS. WE BELIEVE IT IS ALSO A MATTER OF FIRST IMPORTANCE FOR THE WORLD AT LARGE. COUNTRIES THAT HAVE TAKEN ON SOLEMN OBLIGATIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS, HELSINKI, AND ELSEWHERE MUST LIVE UP TO THOSE AGREEMENTS JUST LIKE ANY OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.

-- THERE IS A PRACTICAL SIDE TO THIS ISSUE. SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES AND THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN WERE MAJOR FACTORS IN THE DOWNTURN OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. WE ARE MERELY STATING THE OBVIOUS WHEN WE SAY THAT SOME MOVEMENT ON THESE QUESTIONS WOULD HAVE A DRAMATIC EFFECT TO OUR EFFORT TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONSHIP.

-- STEPS THAT COULD BE TAKEN RANGE FROM RELEASING THE SAKHAROV FROM GORKIY OR ALLOWING SHCHARANSKIY OR ORLOV TO LEAVE, TO INCREASED EMIGRATION, TO SUCH SIMPLE STEPS AS CLEANING UP OUR OUTSTANDING DUAL CITIZENSHIP AND DIVIDED SPOUSES CASES.

[For your and/or the President's private discussion with Shevardnadze:

-- I KNOW THE SOVIET SIDE HAS BEEN INTERESTED IN INCREASING TRADE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN CERTAIN CATEGORIES AND YOU HAVE STATED YOUR VIEWS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. WE TOO ARE INTERESTED IN INCREASING TRADE, BUT THE ISSUE IS HISTORICALLY INTERTWINED WITH EMIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

-- PRINCIPLES ARE INVOLVED ON BOTH SIDES. WE DO NOT EXPECT EITHER SIDE TO GIVE THEM UP, NOR DO WE BELIEVE THAT MERELY DWELLING ON OUR DIFFERENCES WILL GET US ANYWHERE.

-- IT STILL SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR EACH OF US TO DO THINGS IN THESE AREAS RECOGNIZING THAT FOR BOTH SIDES, THE ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING OUR RELATIONSHIP IS SHAPED AND DEEPLY AFFECTED BY WHAT WE DO IN PRACTICE. WOULD IT NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR US EACH TO MOVE IN THESE AREAS, ONE OF SIGNIFICANCE TO US, ONE OF SIGNIFICANCE TO YOU.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

FOO-008/1 #114
GJ 2/13/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

-- JUST TO SPECULATE A BIT, PERHAPS YOUR SIDE COULD ALLOW SOME OF THE MORE PROMINENT DETAINED INDIVIDUALS TO GO ABROAD, CLEAR UP THE CASES OF SEPARATED SPOUSES AND AMERICAN CITIZENS THAT CANNOT LEAVE, AND MOVE ON JEWISH EMIGRATION. THIS COULD BE DONE UNILATERALLY, WITHOUT FANFARE OR EFFORTS ON OUR SIDE TO TAKE CREDIT. THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED WITH THE PENTECOSTALISTS IN OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TWO AND A HALF YEARS AGO.

-- ON OUR SIDE, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SHOW SOME MORE FLEXIBILITY ON THE QUESTION OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT.

-- THE PROCESS COULD ULTIMATELY GO QUITE FAR IN REMOVING THE BASIS FOR OUR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS AND IN REMOVING YOUR COMPLAINTS OF DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT ON TRADE. IF THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF AN UNDERSTANDING HERE, IT WOULD BE WELL TO SEE THE FIRST TANGIBLE EVIDENCE AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE THIS FALL. WE WILL BE WATCHING, AND WILL BE PREPARED TO RESPOND.]

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

STRUCTURE FOR FOLLOWUP

-- I BELIEVE OUR DISCUSSIONS THIS WEEK HAVE BEEN GOOD AND USEFUL ONES. WE NOW NEED TO AGREE ON WHERE WE GO FROM HERE.

-- ON THE GENEVA NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS, WE CAN AGREE THAT OUR DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA WILL DISCUSS THE MATTER IN DETAIL. IF THERE IS NEED TO GIVE THESE NEGOTIATIONS A FURTHER PUSH, WE CAN THEN CONSIDER THROUGH OUR AMBASSADORS WHETHER THE ISSUES CAN BE RESOLVED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS OR WHETHER SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS MAY BE NECESSARY TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD.

-- OUR NEGOTIATORS IN STOCKHOLM ARE WORKING ON DRAFTING PROCEDURES IN CDE. THEY SHOULD CONTINUE THAT PROCESS THERE. OUR DELEGATION IN VIENNA WILL BE EXAMINING WHAT MIGHT BE DONE IN THE MBFR TALKS.

-- AMBASSADOR KENNEDY WILL WORK ON FINAL LANGUAGE ON THE NONPROLIFERATION STATEMENT FOR NOVEMBER WITH MR. PETROVSKIY IN THEIR OCTOBER MEETING.

-- ON TESTING, SHOULD WE CONTINUE TO TALK THROUGH OUR AMBASSADORS, OR IS THERE INTEREST ON YOUR SIDE IN HAVING A DISCUSSION THROUGH SPECIAL ENVOYS ?

-- ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WHEN CAN WE EXPECT A RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL ON NON-PROLIFERATION?

-- WE ARE IN TOUCH ON THE CENTRAL AMERICA/CARIBBEAN TALKS, WHICH WE HOPE CAN TAKE PLACE IN LATE OCTOBER. IF WE ARE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD ANNOUNCE IN NOVEMBER A REGULARIZATION OF REGIONAL EXPERTS TALKS, OUR AMBASSADORS IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON SHOULD BE EMPOWERED TO WORK OUT APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE.

-- WOULD IT BE USEFUL FOR US TO HAVE FURTHER TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN?

-- LET ME REITERATE OUR HOPE THAT THERE CAN BE TANDEM IMPROVEMENT IN AREAS OF SPECIAL CONCERN TO EACH SIDE. WE BELIEVE IT IS IN YOUR OWN INTEREST TO SHOW A DIFFERENT FACE ON THESE MATTERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS/EMIGRATION. ADDITIONALLY, SUCH A NEW POSTURE WOULD HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD FIND A WAY TO DISCUSS THIS PRIVATELY. YOUR VIEW?

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

MS
FOO-008/1 # 115
BY CA NARA, DATE 2/13/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

-- ON BILATERAL ISSUES, THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE NORTH PACIFIC AIR SAFETY AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SIGNED IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS IN TOKYO. WE CAN AGREE ON IMPLEMENTATION TALKS TO BEGIN IN TOKYO IN EARLY OCTOBER. IF YOU AGREE TO THIS TIMETABLE, YOUR DELEGATION IS INVITED TO WASHINGTON TO BEGIN THE CIVIL AVIATION TALKS IN THE FIRST WEEK OF OCTOBER.

-- WE SHOULD FINISH UP THE EXCHANGES AGREEMENT IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. ART HARTMAN HAS MY AUTHORITY TO PUT THE FINAL TOUCHES ON AN AGREEMENT WITH YOUR PEOPLE IN MOSCOW PROVIDING OUR MINIMUM NEEDS ARE MET.

-- NOW THAT WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE CONSULATES, I ASSUME YOU WILL HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH OUR TEAM VISITING KIEV IN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS SO THAT WE CAN DECIDE WHEN AND HOW TO MOVE FORWARD. AS I MENTIONED EARLIER, ART WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU ON THIS.

-- WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS ON THE DATES FOR ANOTHER DISCUSSION OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY ISSUE.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

GENEVA AND BEYOND

-- REAGAN-GORBACHEV TOUR D' HORIZON [needs to be run by President]

- o OUR LEADERS WILL INEVITABLY WANT TO HAVE A FAR-RANGING DISCUSSION IN GENEVA OF THEIR RESPECTIVE WORLD VIEWS AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE OTHER'S MOTIVES AND BEHAVIOR. THIS WILL BE GOOD AND HELPFUL. I THINK YOU WILL FIND, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN IS QUITE A DIFFERENT PERSON FROM THE IMPRESSION CREATED BY THE SOVIET MEDIA.
- o IN ADDITION TO RUNNING THROUGH THE USUAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, HOWEVER, MIGHT IT NOT BE USEFUL TO BROADEN THE EXCHANGE A BIT ?
- o PERHAPS EACH LEADER COULD DESCRIBE HIS OWN INTERNAL OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS -- WHAT HE IS SEEKING TO ACCOMPLISH IN HIS OWN COUNTRY AND THE PROBLEM HE FACES.
- o THIS COULD GIVE THEM A GLIMPSE BEHIND THE STEREOTYPED IMAGES WHICH INEVITABLY DEVELOP AND ESTABLISH A COMMON GROUND FOR WHAT WE HOPE WILL BE AN EFFECTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP.

-- COMMUNIQUE: [recommend you let Shevardnadze raise]

- o WE ARE AGNOSTIC AT THIS POINT ON HOW WE SHOULD DOCUMENT THE MEETING. MUCH, OF COURSE, WOULD DEPEND ON HOW MUCH SUBSTANCE WE WOULD HAVE.
- o IF WE COULD LOCK UP EARLY AGREEMENT ON VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES WE HAVE DISCUSSED, AN OMNIBUS DOCUMENT MIGHT BE THE BEST VEHICLE; IF NOT, WE MIGHT CONSIDER A NUMBER OF SEPARATE STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES, E.G., NPT. LET'S SEE HOW WE DO.

-- POST-GENEVA MEETINGS: [recommend you let Shevardnadze raise]

- o AGAIN, WE HAVE NO STRONG VIEWS, AND MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT HAPPENS IN GENEVA.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

NLS EEO-0084 #110
BY CHS NARA, DATE 2/13/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

- o IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL IN STARTING A PROCESS WHICH COULD LEAD TO CONCRETE RESULTS IN THE YEARS AHEAD, WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE INTERESTED IN PRINCIPLE IN FOLLO-ON MEETINGS.
- o WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH MEETINGS WOULD BEST BE IN CAPITALS.
- o AS WE INDICATED IN SETTING UP THE FORTHCOMING MEETING, WE FEEL IT IS THE SOVIET LEADER'S TURN TO VISIT THE US. WERE HE WILLING TO DO SO, WE COULD PROBABLY AGREE SIMULTANEOUSLY THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD VISIT MOSCOW THE FOLLOWING YEAR.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~