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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 5/24/2005

**File Folder** SPEECHES [PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO EUROPEAN  
PARLIAMENT IN STRASBOURG 5/8/85 (8/12)

**FOIA**

F06-114/10

**Box Number** 35

YARHI-MILO

3515

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11547	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE REDRAFT OF PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GORBACHEV [ 66 - 66 ]	1	4/25/1985	B1
		<b>R 6/25/2009 NLRRF06-114/10</b>			
11548	LETTER	REDRAFT PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV [ 68 - 81 ]	14	ND	B1
		<b>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</b>			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NSC  
April 29, 1985  
1330 hrs

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: TO EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  
STRASBOURG, FRANCE  
WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 1985

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. It is an honor to be with you on this day.

We mark today the anniversary of the liberation of Europe from tyrants who had seized this continent and plunged it into a terrible war. Forty years ago today, the guns were stilled and peace began -- a peace that has endured to become the longest of this century.

On this day 40 years ago, they swarmed onto the boulevards of Paris, rallied under the Arc de Triomphe, and sang the "Marseillaise" in the free and open air. In Rome, the sound of church bells filled St. Peter's square and echoed through the city. On this day 40 years ago, Winston Churchill walked out onto a balcony in Whitehall and said to the people of Britain, "this is your victory" -- and the crowd yelled back, "no, it is yours," in an unforgettable moment of love and gratitude. Londoners tore the blackout curtains from their windows, and put floodlights on the great symbols of English history. And for the first time in six years Big Ben, Buckingham Palace, and St.

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Paul's Cathedral were illuminated against the sky.

Across the ocean, a half million New Yorkers flooded Times Square and, being Americans, laughed and posed for the cameras. In Washington, our new president, Harry Truman, called reporters into his office and said, "the flags of freedom fly all over Europe." ~~And, he added, "it's my birthday too."~~

On day 40 years ago, I was at my post at the Army Air Corps installation in Culver City, California. And as I passed a radio I heard the words, "ladies and gentlemen, the war in Europe is over," and like so many people that day I felt a chill, as if a gust of cold wind had just swept past, and-even though, for America there was still a war on the Pacific Front- I realized: I will never forget this moment.

This day can't help but be emotional, for in it we feel the long tug of memory; we are reminded of shared joy and shared pain and the terrible poignance of life. A few weeks ago in California an old soldier touched on this. With tears in his eyes he said, "it was such a different world then. It's almost impossible to describe it to someone who wasn't there but, when they finally turned the lights on in the cities again, it was like being reborn."

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If it is hard to communicate the happiness of those days, it is even harder to remember Europe's agony.

So much of it lay in ruins. Whole cities had been destroyed. children played in the rubble and begged for food.

By this day 40 years ago, 40 million lay dead, and the survivors composed a continent of victims. And to this day, we wonder: how did this happen? How did civilization take such a terrible turn? After all the books and the documentaries, after all the histories, and studies, we still wonder: How?

Hannah Arendt spoke of "the banality of evil" -- the banality of the little men who did the terrible deeds. We know what they were: totalitarians who used the state, which they had elevated to the level of "God," to inflict war on peaceful nations and genocide on innocent peoples.

We know of the existence of evil in the human heart, and we know that in Nazi Germany that evil was institutionalized -- given power and direction by the state, by a corrupt regime and the jack-boots who did its bidding. And we know, we learned, that early attempts to placate the totalitarians did not save us from war. In fact, they guaranteed it. There are lessons to be learned in this and never forgotten.

But there is a lesson too in another thing we saw in those days: perhaps we can call it "the commonness of virtue." The common men and women who somehow dug greatness from within their souls-- the people who sang to the children during the blitz, who joined the resistance and said 'No' to tyranny, the people who hid the Jews and the dissidents, the people who became, for a moment, the repositories of all the courage of the West -- from a child named Anne Frank to a hero named Raoul Wallenberg.

These names shine. They give us heart forever. And the glow from their beings, the glow of their memories, lit Europe in her darkest days.

Who can forget the days after the war? They were hard days, yes, but we can't help but look back and think: life was so vivid then. There was the sense of purpose, the joy of shared effort, and, later, the incredible joy of our triumph. Those were the days when the West rolled up its sleeves and repaired the damage that had been done. Those were the days when Europe rose in glory from the ruins.

Old enemies were reconciled with the European family. Together, America and Europe created and put into place the Marshall Plan to rebuild from the rubble. Together we created

the Atlantic Alliance, an alliance which proceeded not from transient interests of state but from shared ideals. Together we created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a defense system aimed at seeing that the kind of tyrants who had tormented Europe would never torment her again. NATO was a triumph of organization and effort, but it was also something new, very different. For NATO derived its strength directly from the moral values of the people it represented. It was infused with their high ideals, their love of liberty, their commitment to peace.

But perhaps the greatest triumph of all was not in the realm of a sound defense or material achievement. No, the greatest triumph of Europe after the war is that in spite of all the chaos, poverty, sickness, and misfortune that plagued this continent --in spite of all that, the people of Europe resisted the call of new tyrants and the lure of their seductive ideologies. Europe did not become the breeding ground for new extremist philosophies. Europe resisted the totalitarian temptation. Instead, the people of Europe embraced democracy, the strongest dream, the dream the fascists could not kill. They chose freedom.

Today we celebrate the leaders who led the way-- Churchill and Monnet, Adenauer and Schuman, de Gasperi and Spaak, Truman and Marshall. And we celebrate, too, the free political parties

that contributed their share to greatness: the Liberals and the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats and Labour and the Conservatives. Together they tugged at the same oar, and the great and mighty ship of Europe moved on.

If any doubt their success, let them look at you. In this room are ~~the sons and daughters of soldiers~~ <sup>those</sup> who fought on opposite sides 40 years ago, ~~and perhaps some of the soldiers themselves.~~ <sup>and their sons and daughters.</sup> Now you govern together and lead Europe democratically. You buried animosity and hatred in the rubble. There is no greater testament to reconciliation and to the peaceful unity of Europe than the men and women in this room.

In the decades after the war, Europe knew great growth and power. You enjoyed amazing vitality in every area of life, from fine arts to fashion, from manufacturing to science to the world of ideas. Europe was robust and alive, and none of this was an accident. It was the natural result of freedom, the natural fruit of the democratic ideal. We in America looked at Europe and called her what she was: an Economic Miracle.

And we could hardly be surprised. When we Americans think about our European heritage we tend to think of your cultural influences, and the rich ethnic heritage you gave us. But the industrial revolution that transformed the American economy came

from Europe. The financing of the railroads we used to settle the West came from Europe. The guiding intellectual lights of our democratic system--Locke and Montesquieu, Hume and Adam Smith--came from Europe. And the geniuses who ushered in the modern industrial-technological age came from--well, I think you know, but two examples will suffice. Alexander Graham Bell, whose great invention maddened every American parent whose child insists on phoning his European pen pal rather than writing to him--was a Scotsman. And Guglielmo Marconi, who invented the radio--thereby providing a living for a young man from Dixon, Illinois, who later went into politics-- I guess I should explain that's me--now you know it's Marconi's fault--Marconi was born, as you know in Italy.

Tomorrow will mark the 35th anniversary of of the European Coal and Steel Community, the first block in the creation of a united Europe. The purpose was to tie French and German -- and European- industrial production so tightly together that war between them "becomes not merely unthinkable but materially impossible." Those are the words of Robert Schuman; the Coal and Steel Community was the child of his genius. And if he were here today I believe he would say: We have only just begun!

I am here to tell you America remains, as she was 40 years ago, dedicated to the unity of Europe. We continue to see a

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strong and unified Europe not as a rival but as an even stronger partner. Indeed, John F. Kennedy, in his ringing "Declaration of Interdependence" in the freedom bell city of Philadelphia 23 years ago, explicitly positioned this objective among the key tenets of post-war American policy, a policy which foresaw the New World and the Old as twin pillars of a larger democratic community. We Americans still see European unity as a vital force in that historic process. We favor the expansion of the European Community; we welcome the entrance of Spain and Portugal into that Community, for their presence makes for a stronger Europe, and a stronger Europe is a stronger West.

Yet despite Europe's Economic Miracle which brought so much prosperity to so many, despite the visionary ideas of John Kennedy and the European leaders who preceded him, despite the enlargement of democracy's frontiers within the European continent, I am told that a more doubting mood is upon Europe today. I hear words like "Europessimism" and "Europaralysis." I am told that Europe seems to have lost the sense of confidence that dominated that postwar era. I cannot believe this is so--but if there is something of a "lost" quality these days, I suspect it is connected to the fact that some, in the past few years, have begun to question the ideals and philosophies that have guided the West for centuries. Some have even come to question the moral and intellectual worth of the West.

I wish to speak, in part, to that questioning today. And there is no better place to do it than Strasbourg--where Goethe studied, where Pasteur taught, where Hugo first knew inspiration. This has been a lucky city for questioning and finding valid answers. It is also a city for which some of us feel a very sweet affection. You know that our statue of Liberty was a gift from France, and its sculptor, F.A. Bartholdi, was a son of France. I don't know if you have ever studied the face of the Statue, but immigrants entering New York Harbor used to strain to see it, as if it would tell them something about their new world. It is a strong, kind face; it is the face of Bartholdi's mother; and she was a woman of Alsace. And so, among the many things we Americans thank you for, we thank you for her.

The Statue of Liberty - made in Europe, erected in America - helps remind us not only of the past ties but present realities. ~~It is to those realities.~~ It is to those realities we must look in order to dispel whatever doubts may exist about the course of history and the place of free men and women within it. The fact of the matter is, we live in a complex, dangerous, divided world, yet a world which can provide all of the good things we require, spiritual and material, if we but have the confidence and courage to face history's challenge.

Some of the doubts about the West are directly connected to the performance of the West's economies, others relate to our relationship with the USSR and others relate to our resolve to meet international commitments to support the democratic way of life.

We in the West have much to be thankful for -- peace, prosperity and freedom. If we are to preserve these for our children, and for theirs, today's leaders must demonstrate the same resolve and sense of vision which inspired Churchill, Adenauer, DeGasperi and DeGaulle. Their challenge was to rebuild a democratic Europe under the shadow of Soviet power. Our task, in some ways even more daunting, is to keep the peace with an evermore powerful Soviet Union, to introduce greater stability in our relationship with it, and to coexist in a world in which our values can prosper.

The leaders and people of postwar Europe had learned the lessons of their history from the failures of their predecessors. They learned that aggression feeds on appeasement and that weakness itself can be provocative. We, for our part, can learn from the success of our predecessors. We know that both conflict and aggression can be deterred, that that democratic nations are capable of the resolve, the sacrifices and the consistency of policy needed to sustain such deterrence.

From the creation of NATO in 1949 through the early 1970's, Soviet power was effectively deterred and Soviet ambitions effectively limited. The strength of Western economies, the vitality of our societies, the wisdom of our diplomacy, all contributed to such restraint; but certainly the decisive factor must have been the countervailing power -- ultimately, military, and above all, nuclear power -- which the West was capable of bringing to bear in the defense of its interests.

It was in the early 1970's that the United States lost that superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear weapons which had characterized the postwar era. In Europe, the effect of this loss was not quickly perceptible. But seen globally, Soviet conduct changed markedly and dangerously. First in Angola in 1975, then, when the West failed to respond, in Ethiopia, in South Yema<sup>e</sup>n, in Kampuchea and ultimately in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union began courting more risks, and expanding its influence through the indirect and direct application of Soviet military power. Today, we see similar Soviet efforts to profit from and stimulate regional conflicts in Central America.

The ineffectual Western response to Soviet adventurism of the late 1970's had many roots, not least in the crisis of self-confidence within the American body politic wrought by the

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Vietnam experience. But just as Soviet decision-making in the earlier postwar era had taken place against the background of overwhelming American strategic power, so the decisions of the late 1970's were taken in Moscow, as in Washington and throughout Europe, against the background of growing Soviet and stagnating Western nuclear strength.

One might draw the conclusion from these events that the West should reassert that nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union upon which our security and our strategy rested through the postwar era. That is not my view. I am certain that we cannot and should not seek to build our peace and freedom perpetually upon the basis of expanding nuclear arsenals.

In the short run, we have no alternative but to compete with the Soviet Union in this field, not in the pursuit of superiority, but merely of balance. It is thus essential that the United States maintain a modern and survivable nuclear capability in each leg of the strategic triad -- sea, land and air based. It is similarly important that France and Britain maintain and modernize their strategic capabilities. In all these countries, our publics appreciate the need for nuclear deterrence, and will support its sustenance.

The Soviet Union, however, has not been content to sustain,

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weapons by developing defenses against these weapons. It is to investigate this possibility that in 1983 I launched a new research program -- the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The state of modern technology may soon make possible for the first time the ability to use non-nuclear systems to defeat ballistic missiles. It will take time, and will be for my successors to reach decisions with our Allies as to the desirability and feasibility of deployment. It is essential now that a prudent research program be sustained. The Soviets themselves have long recognized the value of defensive systems and have invested heavily. Indeed, they have spent as much on defensive systems as they have on offensive systems for more than 20 years.

As we proceed with this research program, we will remain within existing treaty constraints. We will also consult in the closest possible fashion with our Allies. And when the time for decisions on the possible production and deployment of such systems comes, we must and will discuss and negotiate these issues with the Soviet Union. We, for our part, have no intention of unilateral deployment.

Both for the short and long term I am confident that the West can maintain effective military deterrence. This is the

fundamental requirement in East-West relations. But surely we can aspire to more than maintaining a state of highly armed truce in international politics. <sup>H</sup> We in the U.S. have ~~thought~~ <sup>great</sup> thought so. During the 1970's we went to ~~considerable~~ <sup>great</sup> lengths to restrain unilaterally our strategic weapons programs out of the conviction that the Soviet Union would adhere to certain rules in its conduct--rules such as neither side seeking to gain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other. Those efforts of the early 1970's resulted in some improvements in Europe, the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement being the best example. But the hopes for a broader and lasting modernization of the East-West competition foundered in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua.

The question before us today is whether we have learned from those mistakes and can undertake a serious relationship with the Soviet Union based upon stable military deterrence and the reduction of tensions in other areas. I believe we can. I believe we have learned that successful cooperation with the Soviet Union must be accompanied by successful competition in areas-- particularly Third World areas--where the Soviets are not yet prepared to act with restraint. I believe we have learned the importance of conducting our trade with the Soviet Union within the broader framework of our security interests, avoiding decisive dependence upon Soviet energy sources, curtailing

preferential credit arrangements, and bringing our regulations in restraint of strategic trade in military relevant goods and technologies up to date.

**INSERT A**

It is in this <sup>hope</sup> belief that I have directed the Secretary of State to engage with the Soviet Union on an extended agenda of problem solving with the Russians.

Yet even as we embark upon new efforts to sustain a productive dialogue with the Soviet Union, we are reminded of the obstacles imposed by our so fundamentally different concepts of humanity, of human rights, of the value of a human life. The murder of Major Nicholson by a Soviet soldier in East Germany, and the Soviet Union's refusal to accept responsibility for this act is only the latest reminder.

**INSERT B**

We have much to do-- and we must do it together. We must remember anew that the road to peace does not run through Munich. We must remain unified in the face of attempts to divide us. We must remain strong in spite of attempts to weaken us. And we must remember that our unity and our strength are not a mere impulse of like-minded allies, not a mere geopolitical calculation. Our unity is the natural result of our shared love for liberty.

**INSERT**

I am here today to reaffirm to the people of Europe the constancy of the American purpose. We were at your side through two great wars; we have been at your side through 40 years of a sometimes painful peace; and we are at your side today. It is not mere sentiment that dictates this, though sentiment we feel. We are here because, like you, we have not veered from the ideals of the West -- the ideals of freedom, liberty, and peace. Let no one -- no one -- doubt our purpose.

The United States is committed not only to the security of Europe--we are committed to the recreation of a larger and more genuinely European Europe. The United States is committed not only to a partnership with Europe-- the United States is committed to an end to the artificial division of Europe.

**INSERT**

A Europe undivided will make for a more peaceful world; and God knows it will make for a happier one. And this is not a dream; we can make it into reality, if we work together with commitment and trust and patience.

All of us in this room want to preserve and protect our own democratic liberties -- but don't we also have a responsibility to encourage democracy throughout the world? Only in an atmosphere of democracy can man peacefully resolve his differences through the ballot, through a free press, through

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free speech and free political parties and the right to redress injustice.

More and more of the countries of the world are turning to democracy--turning each day, turning at great price, turning with great effort. In the past 10 years alone \_\_\_\_\_ countries that did not know political freedom, for whatever reason, have become democratic. As we seek to encourage democracy, we must remember that each country must struggle for democracy within its own culture; emerging democracies have special problems and require special help. Those nations whose democratic institutions are newly emerged and whose confidence in the process is not yet deeply rooted need our help. They should have an established community of their peers, other democratic countries to whom they can turn for support or just advice.

In my address to the British Parliament in 1982. I spoke of the need for democratic governments to come together and spread the democratic word throughout the world. Soon after, the Council of Europe brought together delegates from four continents, and I congratulate these European Members of Parliament for what is now known as the "Strasbourg Initiative."

I would hope that this initiative could be continued, gathering not only Europe's own, but all the emerging democracies

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to craft a sense of common purpose to help move the world forward to social justice, human dignity, economic growth and political democracy. IIn the three years since my speech at Westminster, we in our country have engaged in a broad bipartisan effort to strengthen and promote democratic ideals and institutions. Following a pattern first started in democratic West Germany, two years ago, the United States Congress approved the National Endowment for Democracy. This organization subsequently established institutes of labor, business, and political parties dedicated to programs of cooperation with democratic forces around the world. I can report to you that the Endowment is off to a fine start. I would encourage other European democracies to create similar organizations to foster democracy.

~~[But I believe we need more. I believe we need a formal community to which nations can look for help as they try to strengthen their institutions. Let us establish an Association of Democracies. We should establish such a democratic forum, in which all democracies are free to participate, to strengthen and foster democracy among both the developed and the developing countries, arrange for exchanges of the democratic experience, promote free communications and media, foster human rights, combat terrorism, and examine the impact of social and economic problems on democratic systems. Such as Association, working closely with parallel efforts in the nongovernmental sector,~~

could provide practical training, moral encouragement, and financial support to pro-democratic political, labor, business, and civic organizations. Whether this forum is begun here in Strasbourg, or elsewhere, let us begin. And let us use as our byword a simple phrase-- but one that carries within it all the best of our past and the promise of our future: Freedom Works!]

And as we work, we will remember those who have for now, but only for now, lost out on the long fight for freedom.

The force of the democratic ideal does not stop short because there are arbitrary borders, some with barbed wires and control towers. Here in Western Europe, you have created a Europe for yourselves in which there is a free flow of people, of information, of goods and of culture. It is the natural bent of all Europeans to move freely in all directions. sharing and partaking of each other's ideas and culture. It is my hope, our hope, that in the 21st century-- which is only 15 years away-- all Europeans, from Moscow to Lisbon, can travel without a passport and the free flow of people and ideas will include the other half of Europe. It is my fervent wish that in the next century there will once again be one, free Europe.

There are those who say the West lacks energy -- the moral and spiritual energy to carry forth these hopes and plans. But

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that it not true. As Churchill said, "we have not come this far because we are made of sugar candy."

I do not believe those who say the people of Europe today are paralyzed and pessimistic. *And I would say to those who think this!* ~~But if this is so, then all I can say as an objective friend who has observed you for over 40 years is:~~ Europe, beloved Europe, you are greater than you know. You are the treasury of centuries of Western thought and Western culture, you are the father of Western ideals and the mother of Western faith.

Europe, you have been the power and the glory of the West, and you are a moral success. In fact, in the horrors after World War II, when you rejected totalitarianism, when you rejected the lure of new "Superman," and a "New Communist Man," you proved that you were -- and are -- a moral triumph.

You in the West are a Europe without illusions, a Europe firmly grounded in the ideals and traditions that made her greatness, a Europe unbound and unfettered by a bankrupt ideology. You are, today, a New Europe on the brink of a new century -- a democratic community with much to be proud of.

We have much to do. The work ahead is not unlike the building of great cathedral. The work is slow, complicated, and

painstaking. It is passed on with pride from generation to generation. It is the work not only of leaders but of ordinary people. The cathedral evolves as it is created, with each generation adding its own vision -- but the initial spark of vision remains constant, and the faith that drives the vision persists. The results may be slow to see, but our children and their children will trace in the air the emerging arches and spires and know the faith and dedication and love that produced them. My friends, Europe is the Cathedral, and it is illuminated still.

And if you doubt your will, and your spirit, and your strength to stand for something, think of those people 40 years ago -- who wept in the rubble, who laughed in the streets, who paraded across Europe, who cheered Churchill with love and devotion, and who sang the "Marseillaise" down the boulevards. May I tell you: spirit like that does not disappear; it cannot perish; it will not go away. There's too much left unsung within it.

Thank you, all of you, for your graciousness on this great day. Thank you, and God bless you all.



National Security Council  
The White House

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System # II

Package # 90419

85 APR 25 P 3: 41

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Matlock</u>	<u>6</u>		<u>A</u>

I = Information    **A = Action**    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Regan Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: ASAP

(Date/Time)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 25, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Redraft of President's Letter to Gorbachev

I have redrafted the President's letter to Gorbachev to take account of the Soviet action Monday in disavowing an essential part of what we had understood to be the Otis-Zaitsev agreement.

So that you can quickly see what I have done, I have put a red line to the right of those paragraphs added, and a dotted line where there was some revision.

As you can see, I have tried to couch the comments on Nicholson in terms of principle that the Soviets can understand, and have toughened the tone of some other comments. I tried to focus on the nub of the issue, and to state it very plainly. I have also included a few implicit hints that Gorbachev may not be in a position to control his own military. I believe this is done in a way as not to seem provocative, but rather to challenge Gorbachev to demonstrate that he is in control. I believe these comments by the President will be a useful backdrop for other actions we might take on this matter.

Since the letter contains other points which I believe it is useful to get on the record at the highest level, I would hope that the President would be willing to sign it tomorrow so that we can get it to Hartman for delivery early next week. I have not yet attempted to clear the revised text with State, but will do so if you approve.

Recommendation:

*ok* That you approve or amend the attached text, following which I will clear with State (if you instruct) and send a memorandum to the President requesting his signature.

Approve *JM* Disapprove      *2 ps.*

Attachment: *see yads*

Tab I -- Redraft of President's Letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
Declassify on: OADR

NLRR F06-114/10 #11547

BY CU NARA DATE 6/25/07

I

Redraft of Letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASABLE

NLRR FOI 114/10 #11548

BY CV NARA DATE 1/2/08

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As I mentioned in my letter of April 4, delivered by Speaker O'Neill, I have given careful thought to your letter of March 24 and wish to take this opportunity to address the questions you raised and to mention others which I feel deserve your attention. Given the heavy responsibilities we both bear to preserve peace in the world and life on this planet, I am sure that you will agree that we must communicate with each other frankly and openly so that we can understand each other's point of view clearly. I write in that spirit.

I had thought that we agreed on the necessity of improving relations between our countries, and I welcomed your judgment that it is possible to do so. Our countries share an overriding interest in avoiding war between us, and -- as you pointed out -- the immediate task we face is to find a way to provide a political impetus to move these relations in a positive direction.

Unfortunately, certain recent events have begun to cast doubt on the desire of your government to improve relations. In particular, I have in mind the public retraction of ~~what we understood to be~~ the commitment made earlier by a responsible Soviet official to take steps to make certain that lethal force is not used against members of the United States Military Liaison Mission in Germany.

Mr. General Secretary, this matter has importance beyond the tragic loss of life which has occurred. It involves fundamental principles which must be observed if we are to narrow our differences and resolve problems in our countries' relations. For this reason, I will give you my views in detail. The principles are those of dealing with each other on the basis of equality and reciprocity. The current Soviet position recognizes neither of these principles.

Now, I can understand that accidents occur in life which do not reflect the intention of political authorities. But when they do, it is the responsibility of the relevant political authorities to take appropriate corrective action.

For decades, members of our respective military liaison missions in Germany operated pursuant to the Huebner-Malinin agreement without a fatal incident. That encouraging record was broken when an unarmed member of our mission was killed by a Soviet soldier. Our military personnel are instructed categorically and in writing (in orders provided to your commander) never to use lethal force against members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, regardless of circumstances. Our forces have never done so, even though Soviet military personnel have been apprehended repeatedly in restricted military areas. In fact, some Soviet officers were discovered in a prohibited area just three days before the fatal shooting of our officer and were escorted courteously and safely from the area.

The position which your Government most recently presented to us, therefore, is neither reciprocal in its effect nor does it reflect a willingness to deal as equals. Instead of accepting the responsibility to insure that members of the United States Military Liaison Mission receive the same protection as that we accord members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, what we see is the assertion of a "right" to use lethal force under certain circumstances, determined unilaterally by the Soviet side, and in practice by enlisted men in the Soviet armed forces.

Now I will offer no comment on the desirability of allowing subordinate officials -- and indeed even rank-and-file soldiers -- to make decisions which can affect relations between great nations. If you choose to permit this, that is your prerogative. But in that case, your Government cannot escape responsibility for faulty acts of judgment by individuals acting in accord with standing orders.

I hope that you will reconsider the position your Government has taken on this matter, and take steps to see to it that your military personnel guarantee the safety of their American counterparts in Germany just as American military personnel guarantee the safety of their Soviet colleagues. If your Government is unwilling or unable to abide by even this elementary rule of reciprocity, the conclusion we will be forced to draw will inevitably affect the prospects for settling other

issues. After all, this is not the first time American lives have been lost as the result of a policy on the Soviet part of using lethal force without determining whether the circumstances justified it. And no agreements will be possible between us if one of the sides insists on preserving unilateral advantages.

Your letter mentioned a number of other important principles, but here too our agreement on the principle should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, in our opinion, the principle cited has not been observed on the Soviet side. For example, I could not agree more with your statement that each social system should prove its advantages not by force, but by peaceful competition, and that all people have the right to go their chosen way without imposition from the outside. But if this is true, what are we to think of Soviet military actions in Afghanistan or of your country's policy of supplying arms to minority elements in other countries which are attempting to impose their will on a nation by force? Can this be considered consistent with that important principle?

Mr. General Secretary, my purpose in pointing this out is not to engage in a debate over questions on which we disagree, but simply to illustrate the fact that agreement on a principle is one thing, and practical efforts to apply it another. Since we seem to agree on many principles, we must devote our main effort to closing the gap between principle and practice.

In this regard, I am pleased to note that we both seem to be in agreement on the desirability of more direct consultation on various regional issues. That is a healthy sign, and I would hope that these consultations can be used to avoid the development of situations which might bring us to dangerous confrontations. I believe we should not be discouraged if, at present, our positions seem far apart. This is to be expected, given our differing interests and the impact of past events. The important thing is to make sure we each have a clear understanding of the other's point of view and act in a manner which does not provoke unintended reaction by the other.

One situation which has had a profoundly negative impact on our relations is the conflict in Afghanistan. Isn't it long overdue to reach a political resolution of this tragic affair? I cannot believe that it is impossible to find a solution which protects the legitimate interests of all parties, that of the Afghan people to live in peace under a government of their own choosing, and that of the Soviet Union to ensure that its southern border is secure. We support the United Nations Secretary General's effort to achieve a negotiated settlement, and would like to see a political solution that will deal equitably with the related issues of withdrawal of your troops to their homeland and guarantees of non-interference. I fear that your present course will only lead to more bloodshed, but I want you to know that I am prepared to work with you to move the region toward peace, if you desire.

Above all, we must see to it that the conflict in Afghanistan does not expand. Pakistan is a trusted ally of the United States and I am sure you recognize the grave danger which would ensue from any political or military threats against that country.

Turning to another of your comments, I must confess that I am perplexed by what you meant by your observation that trust "will not be enhanced if, for example, one were to talk as if in two languages...." Of course, this is true. And, if I am to be candid, I would be compelled to admit that Soviet words and actions do not always seem to us to be speaking the same language. But I know that this is not what you intended to suggest. I also am sure that you did not intend to suggest that expressing our respective philosophies or our views of actions taken by the other is inconsistent with practical efforts to improve the relationship. For, after all, it has been the Party which you head which has always insisted not only on the right but indeed the duty to conduct what it calls an ideological struggle.

However this may be, your remarks highlight the need for us to act so as to bolster confidence rather than to undermine it. In this regard, I must tell you that I found the proposal you made publicly on April 7 -- and particularly the manner in which it was made -- unhelpful. As for the substance of the proposal, I find no significant element in it which we have not made clear in

the past is unacceptable to us. I will not burden this letter with a reiteration of the reasons, since I am certain your experts are well aware of them. I cannot help but wonder what the purpose could have been in presenting a proposal which is, in its essence, not only an old one, but one which was known to provide no basis for serious negotiation. Certainly, it does not foster a climate conducive to finding realistic solutions to difficult questions. Past experience suggests that the best way to solve such issues is to work them out privately.

This brings me to the negotiations which <sup>have begun</sup> ~~were~~ [have now been] underway in Geneva, ~~for several weeks.~~ They have not made the progress we had hoped. It may now be appropriate to give them the political impetus about which we both have spoken. Let me tell you frankly and directly how I view them.

First, the January agreement by our Foreign Ministers to begin new negotiations was a good one. The problem has not been the terms of reference on the basis of which our negotiators met, even though each side may in some instances interpret the wording of the joint statement somewhat differently in its application to specifics. The problem is, rather, that your negotiators have not yet begun to discuss concretely how we can translate our commitment to a radical reduction of nuclear arsenals into concrete, practical agreements.

A particular obstacle to progress has been the demand by Soviet negotiators that, in effect, the United States agree to ban research on advanced defensive systems before other topics are dealt with seriously. I hope that I have misunderstood the Soviet position on this point, because, if that is the Soviet position, no progress will be possible. For reasons we have explained repeatedly and in detail, we see no way that a ban on research efforts can be verified, nor do we think such a ban would be in the interest of either of our countries. To hold the negotiations hostage to an impossible demand creates an insurmountable obstacle from the outset. I sincerely hope that this is not your intent, since it cannot be in the interest of either of our countries. In fact, it is inconsistent with your own actions -- with the strategic defense you already deploy around Moscow and with your own major research program in strategic defense.

In this regard, I was struck by the characterization of our Strategic Defense Initiative which you made during your meeting with Speaker O'Neill's delegation -- that this research program has an offensive purpose for an attack on the Soviet Union. I can assure you that you are profoundly mistaken on this point. The truth is precisely the opposite. We believe that it is important to explore the technical feasibility of defensive systems which might ultimately give all of us the means to protect our people more safely than do those we have at present, and to provide the means of moving to the total abolition of

nuclear weapons, an objective on which we are agreed. I must ask you, how are we ever practically to achieve that noble aim if nations have no defense against the uncertainty that all nuclear weapons might not have been removed from world arsenals? Life provides no guarantee against some future madman getting his hands on nuclear weapons, the technology of which is already, unfortunately, far too widely known and knowledge of which cannot be erased from human minds.

This point seems, at one time, to have been clearly understood by the Soviet Government. I note that Foreign Minister Gromyko told the United Nations General Assembly in 1962 that anti-missile defenses could be the key to a successful agreement reducing offensive missiles. They would, he said then, "guard against the eventuality ... of someone deciding to violate the treaty and conceal missiles or combat aircraft."

Of course, I recognize that, in theory, the sudden deployment of effective defenses by one side in a strategic environment characterized by large numbers of "first-strike" weapons could be considered as potentially threatening by the other side. Nevertheless, such a theoretical supposition has no basis in reality, at least so far as the United States is concerned. Our scientists tell me that the United States will require some years of further research to determine whether potentially effective defensive systems can be identified which are worthy of consideration for deployment. If some options should at some

time in the future be identified, development of them by the United States could occur only following negotiations with other countries, including your own, and following thorough and open policy debates in the United States itself. And if the decision to deploy should be positive, then further years would pass until the systems could actually be deployed. So there is no possibility of a sudden, secretive, destabilizing move by the United States. During the research period our governments will have ample time to reduce systems which could pose a "first-strike" threat and to develop a common understanding regarding the place of possible new systems in a safer, more stable, arrangement.

If such defensive systems are identified that would not be permitted by the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the United States intends to follow the procedures agreed upon at the time the Treaty was negotiated in 1972. In particular, Agreed Statement D attached to that Treaty calls upon the party developing a system based upon other physical principles to consult with the other party pursuant to Article XIII, with a view to working out pertinent limitations which could be adopted by amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article XIV. I presume that it continues to be the intention of the Soviet Union to abide by Agreed Statement D in the event the long-continuing Soviet program in research on directed energy weapons were to have favorable results.

I hope this discussion will assist you in joining me in a search for practical steps to invigorate the negotiations in Geneva. One approach which I believe holds promise would be for our negotiators on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear systems to intensify their efforts to agree on specific reductions in the numbers of existing and future forces, with particular attention to those each of us find most threatening, while the negotiators dealing with defensive and space weapons concentrate on measures which prevent the erosion of the ABM Treaty and strengthen the role that Treaty can play in preserving stability as we move toward a world without nuclear weapons. Proceeding in this fashion might avoid a fruitless debate on generalities and open the way to concrete, practical solutions which meet the concerns of both sides.

I believe we also should give new attention to other negotiations and discussions underway in the security and arms control field. We know that some progress has been made in the Stockholm Conference toward narrowing our differences. An agreement should be possible this year on the basis of the framework which we have discussed with your predecessors. Specifically, we are willing to consider the Soviet proposal for a declaration reaffirming the principle not to use force, if the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate agreements which will give concrete new meaning to that principle. Unfortunately, the response of your representatives to this offer has not been encouraging up to now. I hope that we may soon see a more favorable attitude toward this idea and

toward the confidence-building measures that we and our allies have proposed.

One pressing issue of concern to us both is the use of chemical weaponry in the Iran-Iraq war. This situation illustrates the importance of curbing the spread of chemical weapons, and I suggest that it might be useful in the near future for our experts to meet and examine ways in which we might cooperate on this topic. A verifiable complete global ban on these terrible weapons would provide a lasting solution, and I would ask you therefore to give further study to the draft treaty we have advanced in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Steps to improve our bilateral relationship are also important, not only because of the benefits which agreements in themselves can bring, but also because of the contribution they can make to a more confident working relationship in general.

Several of these issues seem ripe for rapid settlement. For example, we should be able to conclude an agreement on improving safety measures in the North Pacific at an early meeting and move to discussions of civil aviation issues. We are ready to move forward promptly to open our respective consulates in New York and Kiev. Our efforts to negotiate a new exchanges agreement have, after six months, reached the point where only a handful of issues remain to be resolved. But if I had to characterize these remaining issues, I would say that they result from efforts on

our side to raise our sights and look to more, not fewer, exchanges. Shouldn't we try to improve on past practices in this area? I am also hopeful that the meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission in May will succeed in identifying areas in which trade can increase substantially, but it is clear that this is likely to happen only if we succeed in improving the political atmosphere.

Hold  
on this  
til after  
9/27 mtg

Finally, let me turn to an issue of great importance to me and to all Americans. As the Vice President informed you in Moscow, we believe strongly that strict observance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the Helsinki Final Act is an important element of our bilateral relationship. Last year we suggested that Ambassador Hartman meet periodically with Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko to discuss confidentially how we might achieve greater mutual understanding in this area. I am also prepared to appoint rapporteurs as you suggested to the Vice President, perhaps someone to join Ambassador Hartman in such meetings. Whatever procedures we ultimately establish, I hope we can agree to try, each in accord with his own legal structure, to resolve problems in this area. If we can find a way to eliminate the conditions which give rise to public recrimination, we will have taken a giant step forward in creating an atmosphere conducive to solving many other problems.

I was glad to receive your views on a meeting between the two of us, and agree that major formal agreements are not necessary to

justify one. I assume that you will get back in touch with me when you are ready to discuss time and place. I am pleased that arrangements have been made for Secretary Shultz to meet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Vienna next month, and hope that they will be able to move us toward solutions of the problems I have mentioned as well as others on the broad agenda before us.

As I stated at the outset, I have written you in candor. I believe that our heavy responsibilities require us to communicate directly and without guile or circumlocution. I hope you will give me your frank view of these questions and call to my attention any others which you consider require our personal involvement. I sincerely hope that we can use this correspondence to provide a new impetus to the whole range of efforts to build confidence and to solve the critical problems which have increased tension between our countries.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev  
General Secretary of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
The Kremlin  
Moscow