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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/26/2005

File Folder USSR-TREATIES/AGREEMENTS 8/24 [CONTACTS, EXCHANGES, AND COOPERATION] 2/3

FOIA

F06-114/11

Box Number 37

YARHI-MILO

3711

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11858	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON CONTACTS, EXCHANGES, AND COOPERATION <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	7	4/4/1984	B1
11859	MEMO	KIMMITT TO HILL RE EXCHANGES AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	ND	B1
11860	MEMO	NSC CHANGES TO U.S.-USSR EXCHANGES POLICY <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	4	ND	B1
11861	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11858 <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	7	4/4/1984	B1
11862	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11859 <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	ND	B1
11863	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11860 <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	4	ND	B1
11864	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR ON CONTACTS, EXCHANGES, AND COOPERATION <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	2	4/17/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11865	MEMO	KIMMITT TO HILL RE AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR ON CONTACTS, EXCHANGES, AND COOPERATION <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	2	ND	B1
11873	MEMO	HILL TO MCFARLANE RE AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR ON CONTACTS, EXCHANGES, AND COOPERATION <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	3/23/1984	B1
11874	REPORT	AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR ON CONTACTS, EXCHANGES, AND COOPERATION <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	4	ND	B1
11875	REPORT	GENERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE USSR ON CONTACTS, EXCHANGES, AND COOPERATION <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	35	ND	B1
11866	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11858 <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	7	4/4/1984	B1
11867	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11859 <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	ND	B1
11868	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11860 <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	4	ND	B1

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3711

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11869	MEMO	DORNAN TO MCFARLANE RE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSALS FOR (A) CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS; (B) CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT AND REVIEW OF AGREEMENT ON ECONOMIC, INDUSTRIAL, AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION	2	4/13/1984	B1
11870	MEMO	O'MALLEY TO DE GRAFFENREID PAR 11/24/2008 NLRRF06-114/1	2	4/12/1984	B1
11871	MEMO	LEYDEN TO DORNAN RE REVIEW OF PROPOSED AGREEMENTS WITH USSR ON CONTACTS, EXCHANGES, AND COOPERATION D 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	2	4/12/1984	B1 B2 B3 B6
11872	MEMO	KIMMITT TO HILL RE SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS ON AGREEMENT WITH USSR ON CONTACTS, EXCHANGES, AND COOPERATION R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	1	4/24/1984	B1

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MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90307

Matlock
11858

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 4, 1984

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

NLRR F06-114/11 #11858

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI

BY KML NARA DATE 4/22/11

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation

I have examined carefully the State Department strategy paper on negotiating a new U.S.-Soviet exchange agreement, the draft General Agreement, the draft Program of Exchanges, and Ambassador Matlock's memorandum recommending approval of these documents as they stand. If, as the Ambassador suggests, our purpose is to achieve full reciprocity with the Soviets, the State Department strategy as presented will not succeed. As it currently stands, it contains so many serious defects and loopholes that the Soviets will be able to exploit it in such a way as to render the arrangement very one-sided and damaging to U.S. interests. As I have learned from Ken de Graffenreid, this strategy was not submitted to the Committee on Exchanges or any properly constituted counterintelligence interagency group for proper scrutiny. Thus, I believe much more work needs to be done to ensure that we do not hastily commit ourselves to a major mistake with considerable national security consequences.

The Lack of Reciprocity in Political Interests

Signing almost any exchange agreement with the USSR is bound to be unreciprocal arrangement no matter how skillfully we craft the treaty language. This is so because of the very nature of the two different political systems. Since the President has made the decision to negotiate such an agreement without, to my knowledge, having had the benefit of any coherent explanation of this point of view, suffice it to review four major points which should be kept in mind when considering the treaty provisions:

1. Soviet objectives in any such agreement are clear and unambiguous. They are to conduct disinformation, propaganda and technology theft against the American people for the purpose of perpetuating false U.S. perceptions of the Soviet system and its intentions, encouraging political change in the United States and to increase Soviet military strength. Soviet exchangees in the educational field are to engage in disseminating political messages and conducting strategic deception. Exchanges in the arts and sports are to conduct "conditioning" propaganda, designed to "soften up" audiences to make them more susceptible to subsequent political

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messages. Sportsmen are often Spetsnaz personnel conducting reconnaissance operations with an eye to future military special operations. Scientific and technical exchangees are sent mostly to acquire U.S. technology for the Soviet military.

2. Our objectives are either not entirely clear or not entirely reciprocal. When Secretary Shultz made his initial pitch for an exchange agreement and opening new consulates a year ago, his memo to the President was entitled "Promoting Political Change in the USSR." This was a clear public diplomacy objective as set forth in NSDD 75. In subsequent strategy memoranda, however, it soon became clear that the Presidentially mandated objective of promoting political change through public diplomacy was taking a distant second place to the higher State Department priority, namely, improved relations between governments as opposed to peoples. In the current strategy there is no reference to promoting political change and the draft agreements are presently constructed entirely to promote government-to-government relations as opposed to public diplomacy.
3. Governmental objectives versus Exchangee objectives. Because of the way the Soviet system works, Soviet exchangees and hosts will almost all be working as Soviet government agents. Most will have been trained to conduct their specific propagandistic or other missions with the result that the Soviet government's objectives will be congruent with those of their exchangees. Because of the nature of our system, the same cannot be the case with our exchangees and American hosts, most of whom will participate, not for purposes of encouraging political change or detente, but for the advancement of culture, knowledge or their own personal careers.
4. Granting Versus Receiving Legitimacy. Almost any exchange agreement of this sort will have the effect of giving the Soviet regime the appearance of having the legitimacy it craves but can never have in reality -- both in international eyes as well as internally. When a genuine American Congressman or journalist exchanges visits with Soviet government propagandists disguised as "Parliamentarians" or "journalists," we are accomplices to a deception. We, of course, gain no reciprocal benefits in legitimacy. And, in addition, we give up one of the only forms of leverage we have in dealing with the Soviets. As Dr. Pipes wrote in his recent article, this leverage "consists in doing nothing that might enhance the legitimacy of the Soviet dictatorship." Thus, if we are to avoid the worst potential pitfalls, the challenge we face is to attempt to have exchanges with real people, and genuine, legitimate organizations and not with fake ones.

Given these realities, most any agreement we sign is likely to be unreciprocal and therefore biased in favor of Soviet interests. The Soviets have many times declared their support of such agreements: they certainly are not going to buy a pig in a poke. The agreement at hand is something the Soviets will sign with alacrity (after trying to squeeze more from us in negotiations), because it gives the appearance of reciprocity in form but is utterly unreciprocal in political substance.

Defects in the State Department Strategy and Draft Agreements

1. The principal defect is that the existing documents are based on the premise of accepting Soviet institutions at face value. This is nothing other than falling for the ruse of Potomkin villages, and transmitting the message to the world that these Potemkin villages are the reality of Soviet life. The draft agreements are constructed so that we will deal with ersatz organizations rather than real ones, with Soviet government agents rather than with real authors, editors, artists and Parliamentarians. These documents were drafted with complete disregard to the Action Plan for Public Diplomacy on U.S.-Soviet Relations (which both you and Under Secretary Eagleburger approved after full interagency clearance). This Action Plan specifically says: "an Exchanges Agreement should attempt to maximize contacts with unofficial society (rather than with ersatz 'Soviet life' as it is displayed by the Soviet regime). Specifically, we should attempt, where possible, to provide for relations with such unofficial groups as exist in the USSR rather than official groups." The State Department documents have no provisions which follow this advice.

2. The existing documents include certain types of exchanges which do not really serve the goals of the Agreement as set forth in its preamble, namely "to promote better understanding between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and to help improve the general state of relations between the two countries." Specifically, scientific and technical exchanges are only of extremely limited value to the achievement of these goals. There is even a tacit admission of this fact in the strategy's expressed desire to limit scientific and technical exchanges to no more than 50 percent of academic exchanges. In fact, this represents recognition that the Soviets are less interested in the stated objectives than in securing technological and military advantages. And, indeed, the aforementioned Action Plan specifically recommends that scientific and technical contacts be reduced. There is consequently no reason why we should not restrict academic exchanges to those which actually promote better understanding between peoples.

3. Insofar as the existing documents would have us deal with official and ersatz Soviet institutions, they put us in the position of being accomplices to Soviet efforts to enforce communist conformity within the USSR. By receiving exchangees that are to be chosen by the Soviet government, we encourage subservience by Soviet citizens to the regime. This occurs

because the exchange agreement enables the regime to reward faithful conformists with one of the most coveted of Soviet luxuries: plum trips abroad and the chance to escape the gray tedium of Soviet daily life. This process, needless to say, can only help to demoralize those Soviet citizens who seek true artistic and scholarly independence from Soviet ideological strictures. It is ironic that these people, who are spiritually the greatest allies America has in Soviet society, will be the very ones denied the fresh breath of air of freedom that an exchange could give them. I seriously doubt that this is the result the President wants to be responsible for.

4. The existing documents contain large loopholes on the question of reciprocity in access to the respective societies. The State Department is forever complaining about lack of access to Soviet officialdom, and in its previous strategy papers, stressed that an exchange agreement would improve this situation. Perhaps the draft Agreements will help this objective a little but they certainly give short shrift to the real access problem, namely, access to people, to libraries, to research facilities, to the mass media, and to different regions of the USSR. The existing documents offer complete lack of reciprocity in travel. Soviet exchangees are not prohibited from entering areas in the U.S. that are closed to Soviet diplomats, whereas U.S. exchangees in the USSR (with very few exceptions) are so restricted. This lack of reciprocity is compounded by the fact that Soviet closed areas are much larger in practice than on the official maps, and total some 99 percent of Soviet territory. U.S. exchangees will thus be restricted to the remaining one percent which Soviet citizens call "Soviet Tourlandia."

5. The State Department documents fail to cover critical features of exchanged TV appearances. The President might appear on Soviet TV, but as things stand, the Soviets might demand prior censorship of his remarks (if the State Department drafters themselves don't try to reduce the speech to the level of self-censored pabulum that appears in America Illustrated). Further, the President's remarks might be translated for Soviet viewers by a Soviet interpreter who, as has happened in the past, will employ a tone of indifference, impatience, exasperation, turgidity, pompousness, ridicule and acid. In addition, State's draft ignores the possibility and desirability of TV appearances by people other than official representatives. U.S. Government officials will always be restrained from telling the blunt truth and conducting optimum public diplomacy because of the exigencies of bilateral governmental relations.

6. The proposal to engage in joint cooperation in film projects, TV, and textbooks is an idea with a very dubious track record that we should avoid at all costs. Such projects will pit trained Soviet professional propagandists against naive American idealists. The net result will inevitably be like previous such endeavors: namely, Soviet propaganda (e.g., the jointly produced propaganda film, The Unknown War, narrated by Burt Lancaster, but with 98 percent Soviet film footage).

7. For all its emphasis on exhibits, State has failed to construct sufficient precautions in its draft agreement. There is no assurance of free and unlimited access to U.S. exhibits in the USSR, and no suggested mechanisms, like U.S. responsibility for security inside and outside the exhibits, which could ensure such access. The idea that the subject matter of exhibits should be subject to diplomatic agreement violates the entire purpose of the enterprise. Each side should be free to exhibit whatever it chooses. And if the Soviets object to this, they will be telling us unequivocally that their objectives are not as stated in the agreement's preamble.

8. The regular references in the agreement to the Russian language as the language of the USSR serves only to legitimize Soviet efforts at Russification of the captive nations within the Soviet empire. All references to language study exchanges should include the possibility of studying other Soviet languages, e.g., Ukrainian, Armenian, Uzbek, etc.

9. The reference to "nation-wide" Soviet television is an example of sloppy semantics which gives legitimacy to the idea that the Soviet empire is a real nation. This only has the effect of supporting the grip the Soviets have over real nations which desire the right to self-determination.

10. The State documents omit other categories of possible exchangees such as workers, farmers, churchmen and seminarians, and real youth of the ages 13 to 25 (the kind the Soviets spirited out of Moscow during the 1980 Olympics to isolate them from foreign influences). Any Soviet youth involved in State's proposed exchange agreement will inevitably turn out to be 45-year old Komsomol apparatchiks.

11. Finally, State's strategy utterly fails to address one critical issue which an exchange agreement was supposed to solve (at least according to previous State Department justifications). This is the problem of private exchanges that go on outside the framework of any agreement. If we are to be sensitive about the counterintelligence issues here, the draft agreement should channel all exchanges through the official exchanges framework.

Suggested Remedies to Approach Greater Reciprocity

In addition to those remedies that are suggested by the above defects, there are a variety of other constructive measures we can add to the draft agreements and to our overall exchanges policy to attempt to approach what is in fact unachievable -- namely, full reciprocity. Among others, these measures include:

- Changing the principle by which exchanges are invited from exclusively a "sending side nominates" principle to a 50-50 arrangement between that principle and a "receiving side invites" principle.

- Inviting groups unaffiliated with Party or state except where such groups do not exist. (E.g., there are independent peace groups, veterans' rights groups, handicapped peoples' rights groups, human rights groups, cultural heritage groups, etc.).
- Establishing an independent Board of International Exchanges (BIE), analagous to the Board for International Broadcasting, which would identify non-official groups and uncoopted individuals, establish criteria for measuring their true independence from the regime, and put these people in contact with their U.S. counterparts. This mechanism would enable us to invite scholars who refused to participate in regime-organized revocations of refuseniks' academic degrees, or scholars who refused to sign official letters attacking Sakharov. This process would give moral support and encouragement to conscientious behavior rather than rewarding subservience to the regime and complicity in official violations of human rights.
- Changing the visa granting process so that we can enforce reciprocity and enhance our negotiating position.
- Proposing permanent exhibits in the respective capitals which would distribute literature, show films, etc. These should have unlimited access with Americans and not Soviets providing security on the outside at the Moscow exhibition site.
- Establishing a training program for U.S. exchangees and hosts. All participants would have to read materials explaining: the realities of Soviet life, the types of Potemkin villages they will be shown, what to expect from Soviet exchangees and hosts, and how Soviet personnel are trained in propaganda, disinformation and technology theft techniques.
- Establishing a debriefing program for U.S. exchangees.

These and other, more specific remedies are outlined in Tab A, an attachment with NSC-recommended changes for the draft agreements and our exchanges policy. If you agree with these recommended changes, this attachment would accompany the Kimmitt-Hill memorandum at Tab I.

Conclusion

The State Department documents, as they stand, amount to a windfall for the Soviets in political, technological, propaganda, disinformation and espionage benefits. The lack of reciprocity in these documents can send the Soviets only one message: we are not serious about public diplomacy, but rather, we are so eager for the appearances of good relations between governments that we are willing to be accomplices to Soviet deceptions and willing to sacrifice principle as well as reciprocal political benefits to ourselves.

If better bilateral governmental relations are what we really want here, then there are better ways of doing it than running the many political, intelligence and even military risks to which State's documents will subject us.

If we want to be serious about upholding the first pillar of the President's policy toward the USSR, namely "realism" (in addition to "strength" and "willingness to negotiate"), then we must reconstruct our negotiating position so as to enhance realistic perceptions of the USSR rather than subverting them as the current documents will do.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to send the attached memorandum (Tab I) to the Department of State with the accompanying set of NSC changes (Tab A).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That you share this memo with the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Proposed Kimmitt to Hill memorandum.
Tab A Attachment to Tab I.

cc: Jack Matlock
Walt Raymond
Steve Steiner
Ken de Graffenreid

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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SYSTEM II
90307

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Exchanges Agreement with the USSR (S)

The strategy paper for negotiations with the USSR on exchanges with accompanying draft agreements transmitted by your memorandum to Mr. McFarlane of March 23 has not been approved. (S)

Attached at Tab A is a list of NSC changes to the negotiating strategy, the draft agreements and our overall exchanges policy. These changes should be incorporated into a new strategy paper and new draft agreements and then these should be submitted for full interagency review to the U.S.-Soviet Public Diplomacy Subcommittee of the International Political Committee, the TTIC/Committee on Exchanges, and the IG for Counterintelligence. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Tab A NSC Changes to U.S.-USSR Exchanges Policy (S)

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NLRR E06-114/11 #11859

BY KML NARA DATE 4/22/11

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SYSTEM II
90307 - Tab A

NSC Changes to U.S.-USSR Exchanges Policy (S)

What follows is a list of changes that should be made in our general negotiating strategy, the draft General Agreement, the draft Program of Exchanges and our overall exchanges policy. (S)

1. Both the General Agreement and the Program of Exchanges should be amended to take into account the exchanges policy as determined by the Action Plan for Public Diplomacy on U.S.-Soviet Relations, approved by the NSC on December 5, 1983. Specifically the agreements should be reconstructed so as to maximize contact with non-official Soviet groups and individuals. The principle here is to avoid equating genuine Congressmen, journalists, etc., with ersatz Soviet parliamentarians, "journalists," etc., and thus to ensure that exchanges will be on a genuine people-to-people basis as opposed to a people-to-government basis. (S)
2. Exchanges should be conducted only with non-official groups and individuals except in fields where they do not exist. These include: human rights groups, independent peace groups (such as the Group for the Promotion of Trust between the U.S. and USSR), the Group for the Defense of the Rights of Disabled People, the independent Veterans' rights group, The All-Russian Society for the Preservation of the Monuments of History and Culture, samizdat writers and publishers, etc. (S)
3. To facilitate exchanges with independent groups and individuals, the principle by which exchangees should be nominated should be changed from exclusively "sending-side nominates" to a 50-50 arrangement between that principle and "receiving-side invites." (S)
4. The agreements should be modified so as to minimize the degree to which the U.S. aids the Soviet regime in its attempts to enforce political conformity. This means we should minimize exchanges with individuals whose political conformity the regime can reward with exchange trips to the United States. Instead, we should seek out individuals who refuse to participate in such regime-orchestrated efforts as revocation of refuseniks' academic credentials, public letters attacking Sakharov, and the like. (S)
5. We should set up an independent agency entitled the Board of International Exchanges (BIE) (analogous to the Board for International Broadcasting), whose responsibilities would include: identifying independent, non-official Soviet groups and individuals, establishing criteria to measure their independence, putting such independent groups in contact with their U.S. counterparts, and reviewing Soviet

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exchange candidates requested by U.S. private groups. The last of these functions is important because private U.S. parties may have motivations for receiving Soviet visitors that are irrelevant or contrary to the purposes of the exchanges, such as career advancement, justification of monetary claims on universities for return visits to the USSR, etc. (S)

6. Full reciprocity in access to people, mass media, libraries, archives, research facilities, copying machines, and geographic areas should be ensured in the texts. Soviet exchangeees should be subject to the same travel restrictions as Soviet diplomats, or American exchangeees must be permitted access to those closed areas of the USSR that reciprocate U.S. restricted areas. All publications of articles and other literature, and media appearances by Soviet exchangeees must be reported to the BIE, which, in turn, will ensure that analogous media in the USSR will offer reciprocal opportunities for publication and media appearances. The agreements should be modified to contain such a media-access provision. (S)
7. All private exchanges must be subsumed under the framework of these agreements. (S)
8. All Soviet exchanges must be subjected to prior review by the interagency group on Counter-Intelligence and the Interagency Committee on Exchanges. (S)
9. No scientific or technical exchanges will be part of these agreements. (S)
10. All references to joint cooperation in film projects, TV, textbooks and the like should be eliminated from these agreements. (S)
11. The provisions on exchanged TV appearances should incorporate the following points: a) U.S. speakers will have the right to use a U.S. interpreter over Soviet TV and vice versa; b) U.S. representatives must be permitted to monitor the TV signal (while the U.S. speaker is on the air) in locations throughout the USSR and vice versa; c) if the signal is not sufficiently widespread, subsequent TV appearances by the opposite side will be reduced accordingly; d) there will be no prior review or censorship of televised remarks; and e) 50 percent of TV speakers must have no professional affiliation with party or state. The choice of American non-governmental spokesmen will be made by the National Endowment for Democracy. (S)
12. The U.S. will unequivocally reject any Soviet attempt in negotiations to secure the return of defectors. (S)

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-3-

Tab A

13. Before negotiations proceed, the U.S. will change the existing visa-granting process to permit foreign policy controls. This must be done either: a) by final passage of new legislation eliminating the McGovern Amendment; or b) invoking the Baker Amendment until such time as it may be necessary to change existing law. This will immediately enhance our negotiating position and establish immediate control over private exchanges. (S)
14. All "Congressional" and federal (or All-Union) government exchanges should be eliminated from these agreements. If governmental exchanges are to take place, it should be in the category of tourism. (S)
15. No exchanges between journalists or trade union officials should take place unless it can be determined that the Soviet participants are not representatives of the Soviet government. (S)
16. The distribution of publications should be made fully reciprocal. The two sides should be able to distribute copies of America Illustrated and Soviet Life to any citizen of the other country free of charge, not just at exhibits but through kiosks or other vending devices. Diplomatic personnel should be permitted to share these publications with any citizen of the host country. (S)
17. The provisions on exhibits should not include any references to prior diplomatic approval of the exhibits' contents. Instead the agreement will represent the good faith of both parties to conduct exhibit exchanges in the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act. Access to exhibits must be free and unrestricted. Security both inside and outside the exhibit halls will be provided by the exhibiting country so as to ensure free access. The U.S. will propose as part of the agreement (and will make public the proposal when it is put forward) that both sides should establish permanent exhibits in each other's capitals where the public can have free access to books, films, television programs, and other exhibits. (S)
18. The U.S. shall make proposals for exchanges of workers, farmers, churchmen, seminarians and other non-official, independent groups. Youth exchanges should also be included, however with the definition of "youth" specified as including persons 13-to-25 years old. Our youth strategy -- especially for high schoolers -- should include large numbers of exchangees, include unstructured itineraries (so the youth can engage in independent explorations) and should encompass long periods of time (several months). (S)
19. The treaty language should not contain any politically-oriented homonyms which can be subject to different, ideologically-based interpretations. As an example, the

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Tab A

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word "cooperation" should be eliminated from the agreement's title. The purpose here is not only to avoid differing interpretations but to avoid gratuitous legitimation of illegitimate Soviet institutions and concepts. (S)

20. The reference to "nation-wide" Soviet TV should be changed to "country-wide" so as to avoid legitimizing Soviet "nationhood." (S)
21. A training program, composed mostly of written briefing materials, must be initiated for all U.S. exchangees and hosts as a mandatory requirement for participation. Materials must explain: the basic nature of the Soviet system, what to expect from Soviet exchangees and hosts, and how the Soviets are trained in propaganda, disinformation, and technology theft techniques. This is to help the process of understanding the USSR. (S)
22. All references to the Russian language as the official Soviet language should be eliminated from the agreements. These only serve to legitimize Soviet efforts at Russification. Instead all references to language exchanges must include the possibility of the choice of language so that U.S. exchangees might study Ukrainian, Armenian, etc. (S)
23. The U.S. should establish a debriefing program for all U.S. exchangees travelling to the USSR. This should be done in cooperation with the intelligence community as well as with those agencies working on public diplomacy. (S)
24. All sports exchanges should take place in a single locality to be recommended by the counterintelligence community so as to avoid giving Soviet Spetsnaz personnel the opportunity for reconnaissance operations. (S)
25. U.S. negotiators are instructed not to yield on any question of reciprocal access. (S)

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 4, 1984

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

NLRR F06-114/11 #11861

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI

BY KML NARA DATE 4/22/11

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation

I have examined carefully the State Department strategy paper on negotiating a new U.S.-Soviet exchange agreement, the draft General Agreement, the draft Program of Exchanges, and Ambassador Matlock's memorandum recommending approval of these documents as they stand. If, as the Ambassador suggests, our purpose is to achieve full reciprocity with the Soviets, the State Department strategy as presented will not succeed. As it currently stands, it contains so many serious defects and loopholes that the Soviets will be able to exploit it in such a way as to render the arrangement very one-sided and damaging to U.S. interests. As I have learned from Ken de Graffenreid, this strategy was not submitted to the Committee on Exchanges or any properly constituted counterintelligence interagency group for proper scrutiny. Thus, I believe much more work needs to be done to ensure that we do not hastily commit ourselves to a major mistake with considerable national security consequences.

The Lack of Reciprocity in Political Interests

Signing almost any exchange agreement with the USSR is bound to be unreciprocal arrangement no matter how skillfully we craft the treaty language. This is so because of the very nature of the two different political systems. Since the President has made the decision to negotiate such an agreement without, to my knowledge, having had the benefit of any coherent explanation of this point of view, suffice it to review four major points which should be kept in mind when considering the treaty provisions:

1. Soviet objectives in any such agreement are clear and unambiguous. They are to conduct disinformation, propaganda and technology theft against the American people for the purpose of perpetuating false U.S. perceptions of the Soviet system and its intentions, encouraging political change in the United States and to increase Soviet military strength. Soviet exchangees in the educational field are to engage in disseminating political messages and conducting strategic deception. Exchanges in the arts and sports are to conduct "conditioning" propaganda, designed to "soften up" audiences to make them more susceptible to subsequent political

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Declassify on: OADR

messages. Sportsmen are often Spetsnaz personnel conducting reconnaissance operations with an eye to future military special operations. Scientific and technical exchangees are sent mostly to acquire U.S. technology for the Soviet military.

2. Our objectives are either not entirely clear or not entirely reciprocal. When Secretary Shultz made his initial pitch for an exchange agreement and opening new consulates a year ago, his memo to the President was entitled "Promoting Political Change in the USSR." This was a clear public diplomacy objective as set forth in NSDD 75. In subsequent strategy memoranda, however, it soon became clear that the Presidentially mandated objective of promoting political change through public diplomacy was taking a distant second place to the higher State Department priority, namely, improved relations between governments as opposed to peoples. In the current strategy there is no reference to promoting political change and the draft agreements are presently constructed entirely to promote government-to-government relations as opposed to public diplomacy.
3. Governmental objectives versus Exchangee objectives. Because of the way the Soviet system works, Soviet exchangees and hosts will almost all be working as Soviet government agents. Most will have been trained to conduct their specific propagandistic or other missions with the result that the Soviet government's objectives will be congruent with those of their exchangees. Because of the nature of our system, the same cannot be the case with our exchangees and American hosts, most of whom will participate, not for purposes of encouraging political change or detente, but for the advancement of culture, knowledge or their own personal careers.
4. Granting Versus Receiving Legitimacy. Almost any exchange agreement of this sort will have the effect of giving the Soviet regime the appearance of having the legitimacy it craves but can never have in reality -- both in international eyes as well as internally. When a genuine American Congressman or journalist exchanges visits with Soviet government propagandists disguised as "Parliamentarians" or "journalists," we are accomplices to a deception. We, of course, gain no reciprocal benefits in legitimacy. And, in addition, we give up one of the only forms of leverage we have in dealing with the Soviets. As Dr. Pipes wrote in his recent article, this leverage "consists in doing nothing that might enhance the legitimacy of the Soviet dictatorship." Thus, if we are to avoid the worst potential pitfalls, the challenge we face is to attempt to have exchanges with real people, and genuine, legitimate organizations and not with fake ones.

Given these realities, most any agreement we sign is likely to be unreciprocal and therefore biased in favor of Soviet interests. The Soviets have many times declared their support of such agreements: they certainly are not going to buy a pig in a poke. The agreement at hand is something the Soviets will sign with alacrity (after trying to squeeze more from us in negotiations), because it gives the appearance of reciprocity in form but is utterly unreciprocal in political substance.

Defects in the State Department Strategy and Draft Agreements

1. The principal defect is that the existing documents are based on the premise of accepting Soviet institutions at face value. This is nothing other than falling for the ruse of Potemkin villages, and transmitting the message to the world that these Potemkin villages are the reality of Soviet life. The draft agreements are constructed so that we will deal with ersatz organizations rather than real ones, with Soviet government agents rather than with real authors, editors, artists and Parliamentarians. These documents were drafted with complete disregard to the Action Plan for Public Diplomacy on U.S.-Soviet Relations (which both you and Under Secretary Eagleburger approved after full interagency clearance). This Action Plan specifically says: "an Exchanges Agreement should attempt to maximize contacts with unofficial society (rather than with ersatz 'Soviet life' as it is displayed by the Soviet regime). Specifically, we should attempt, where possible, to provide for relations with such unofficial groups as exist in the USSR rather than official groups." The State Department documents have no provisions which follow this advice.

2. The existing documents include certain types of exchanges which do not really serve the goals of the Agreement as set forth in its preamble, namely "to promote better understanding between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and to help improve the general state of relations between the two countries." Specifically, scientific and technical exchanges are only of extremely limited value to the achievement of these goals. There is even a tacit admission of this fact in the strategy's expressed desire to limit scientific and technical exchanges to no more than 50 percent of academic exchanges. In fact, this represents recognition that the Soviets are less interested in the stated objectives than in securing technological and military advantages. And, indeed, the aforementioned Action Plan specifically recommends that scientific and technical contacts be reduced. There is consequently no reason why we should not restrict academic exchanges to those which actually promote better understanding between peoples.

3. Insofar as the existing documents would have us deal with official and ersatz Soviet institutions, they put us in the position of being accomplices to Soviet efforts to enforce communist conformity within the USSR. By receiving exchangees that are to be chosen by the Soviet government, we encourage subservience by Soviet citizens to the regime. This occurs

because the exchange agreement enables the regime to reward faithful conformists with one of the most coveted of Soviet luxuries: plum trips abroad and the chance to escape the gray tedium of Soviet daily life. This process, needless to say, can only help to demoralize those Soviet citizens who seek true artistic and scholarly independence from Soviet ideological strictures. It is ironic that these people, who are spiritually the greatest allies America has in Soviet society, will be the very ones denied the fresh breath of air of freedom that an exchange could give them. I seriously doubt that this is the result the President wants to be responsible for.

4. The existing documents contain large loopholes on the question of reciprocity in access to the respective societies. The State Department is forever complaining about lack of access to Soviet officialdom, and in its previous strategy papers, stressed that an exchange agreement would improve this situation. Perhaps the draft Agreements will help this objective a little but they certainly give short shrift to the real access problem, namely, access to people, to libraries, to research facilities, to the mass media, and to different regions of the USSR. The existing documents offer complete lack of reciprocity in travel. Soviet exchangees are not prohibited from entering areas in the U.S. that are closed to Soviet diplomats, whereas U.S. exchangees in the USSR (with very few exceptions) are so restricted. This lack of reciprocity is compounded by the fact that Soviet closed areas are much larger in practice than on the official maps, and total some 99 percent of Soviet territory. U.S. exchangees will thus be restricted to the remaining one percent which Soviet citizens call "Soviet Tourlandia."

5. The State Department documents fail to cover critical features of exchanged TV appearances. The President might appear on Soviet TV, but as things stand, the Soviets might demand prior censorship of his remarks (if the State Department drafters themselves don't try to reduce the speech to the level of self-censored pabulum that appears in America Illustrated). Further, the President's remarks might be translated for Soviet viewers by a Soviet interpreter who, as has happened in the past, will employ a tone of indifference, impatience, exasperation, turgidity, pompousness, ridicule and acid. In addition, State's draft ignores the possibility and desirability of TV appearances by people other than official representatives. U.S. Government officials will always be restrained from telling the blunt truth and conducting optimum public diplomacy because of the exigencies of bilateral governmental relations.

6. The proposal to engage in joint cooperation in film projects, TV, and textbooks is an idea with a very dubious track record that we should avoid at all costs. Such projects will pit trained Soviet professional propagandists against naive American idealists. The net result will inevitably be like previous such endeavors: namely, Soviet propaganda (e.g., the jointly produced propaganda film, The Unknown War, narrated by Burt Lancaster, but with 98 percent Soviet film footage).

7. For all its emphasis on exhibits, State has failed to construct sufficient precautions in its draft agreement. There is no assurance of free and unlimited access to U.S. exhibits in the USSR, and no suggested mechanisms, like U.S. responsibility for security inside and outside the exhibits, which could ensure such access. The idea that the subject matter of exhibits should be subject to diplomatic agreement violates the entire purpose of the enterprise. Each side should be free to exhibit whatever it chooses. And if the Soviets object to this, they will be telling us unequivocally that their objectives are not as stated in the agreement's preamble.

8. The regular references in the agreement to the Russian language as the language of the USSR serves only to legitimize Soviet efforts at Russification of the captive nations within the Soviet empire. All references to language study exchanges should include the possibility of studying other Soviet languages, e.g., Ukrainian, Armenian, Uzbek, etc.

9. The reference to "nation-wide" Soviet television is an example of sloppy semantics which gives legitimacy to the idea that the Soviet empire is a real nation. This only has the effect of supporting the grip the Soviets have over real nations which desire the right to self-determination.

10. The State documents omit other categories of possible exchangeees such as workers, farmers, churchmen and seminarians, and real youth of the ages 13 to 25 (the kind the Soviets spirited out of Moscow during the 1980 Olympics to isolate them from foreign influences). Any Soviet youth involved in State's proposed exchange agreement will inevitably turn out to be 45-year old Komsomol apparatchiks.

11. Finally, State's strategy utterly fails to address one critical issue which an exchange agreement was supposed to solve (at least according to previous State Department justifications). This is the problem of private exchanges that go on outside the framework of any agreement. If we are to be sensitive about the counterintelligence issues here, the draft agreement should channel all exchanges through the official exchanges framework.

Suggested Remedies to Approach Greater Reciprocity

In addition to those remedies that are suggested by the above defects, there are a variety of other constructive measures we can add to the draft agreements and to our overall exchanges policy to attempt to approach what is in fact unachievable -- namely, full reciprocity. Among others, these measures include:

- Changing the principle by which exchanges are invited from exclusively a "sending side nominates" principle to a 50-50 arrangement between that principle and a "receiving side invites" principle.

- Inviting groups unaffiliated with Party or state except where such groups do not exist. (E.g., there are independent peace groups, veterans' rights groups, handicapped peoples' rights groups, human rights groups, cultural heritage groups, etc.).
- Establishing an independent Board of International Exchanges (BIE), analagous to the Board for International Broadcasting, which would identify non-official groups and uncoopted individuals, establish criteria for measuring their true independence from the regime, and put these people in contact with their U.S. counterparts. This mechanism would enable us to invite scholars who refused to participate in regime-organized revocations of refuseniks' academic degrees, or scholars who refused to sign official letters attacking Sakharov. This process would give moral support and encouragement to conscientious behavior rather than rewarding subservience to the regime and complicity in official violations of human rights.
- Changing the visa granting process so that we can enforce reciprocity and enhance our negotiating position.
- Proposing permanent exhibits in the respective capitals which would distribute literature, show films, etc. These should have unlimited access with Americans and not Soviets providing security on the outside at the Moscow exhibition site.
- Establishing a training program for U.S. exchangees and hosts. All participants would have to read materials explaining: the realities of Soviet life, the types of Potemkin villages they will be shown, what to expect from Soviet exchangees and hosts, and how Soviet personnel are trained in propaganda, disinformation and technology theft techniques.
- Establishing a debriefing program for U.S. exchangees.

These and other, more specific remedies are outlined in Tab A, an attachment with NSC-recommended changes for the draft agreements and our exchanges policy. If you agree with these recommended changes, this attachment would accompany the Kimmitt-Hill memorandum at Tab I.

Conclusion

The State Department documents, as they stand, amount to a windfall for the Soviets in political, technological, propaganda, disinformation and espionage benefits. The lack of reciprocity in these documents can send the Soviets only one message: we are not serious about public diplomacy, but rather, we are so eager for the appearances of good relations between governments that we are willing to be accomplices to Soviet deceptions and willing to sacrifice principle as well as reciprocal political benefits to ourselves.

If better bilateral governmental relations are what we really want here, then there are better ways of doing it than running the many political, intelligence and even military risks to which State's documents will subject us.

If we want to be serious about upholding the first pillar of the President's policy toward the USSR, namely "realism" (in addition to "strength" and "willingness to negotiate"), then we must reconstruct our negotiating position so as to enhance realistic perceptions of the USSR rather than subverting them as the current documents will do.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to send the attached memorandum (Tab I) to the Department of State with the accompanying set of NSC changes (Tab A).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That you share this memo with the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Proposed Kimmitt to Hill memorandum.
Tab A Attachment to Tab I.

cc: Jack Matlock
Walt Raymond
Steve Steiner
Ken de Graffenreid

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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SYSTEM II
90307

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Exchanges Agreement with the USSR (S)

The strategy paper for negotiations with the USSR on exchanges with accompanying draft agreements transmitted by your memorandum to Mr. McFarlane of March 23 has not been approved. (S)

Attached at Tab A is a list of NSC changes to the negotiating strategy, the draft agreements and our overall exchanges policy. These changes should be incorporated into a new strategy paper and new draft agreements and then these should be submitted for full interagency review to the U.S.-Soviet Public Diplomacy Subcommittee of the International Political Committee, the TTIC/Committee on Exchanges, and the IG for Counterintelligence. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Tab A NSC Changes to U.S.-USSR Exchanges Policy (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR File-114/1 # 11862

BY KML NARA DATE 4/22/11

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SYSTEM II
90307 - Tab A

NSC Changes to U.S.-USSR Exchanges Policy (S)

What follows is a list of changes that should be made in our general negotiating strategy, the draft General Agreement, the draft Program of Exchanges and our overall exchanges policy. (S)

1. Both the General Agreement and the Program of Exchanges should be amended to take into account the exchanges policy as determined by the Action Plan for Public Diplomacy on U.S.-Soviet Relations, approved by the NSC on December 5, 1983. Specifically the agreements should be reconstructed so as to maximize contact with non-official Soviet groups and individuals. The principle here is to avoid equating genuine Congressmen, journalists, etc., with ersatz Soviet parliamentarians, "journalists," etc., and thus to ensure that exchanges will be on a genuine people-to-people basis as opposed to a people-to-government basis. (S)
2. Exchanges should be conducted only with non-official groups and individuals except in fields where they do not exist. These include: human rights groups, independent peace groups (such as the Group for the Promotion of Trust between the U.S. and USSR), the Group for the Defense of the Rights of Disabled People, the independent Veterans' rights group, The All-Russian Society for the Preservation of the Monuments of History and Culture, samizdat writers and publishers, etc. (S)
3. To facilitate exchanges with independent groups and individuals, the principle by which exchangees should be nominated should be changed from exclusively "sending-side nominates" to a 50-50 arrangement between that principle and "receiving-side invites." (S)
4. The agreements should be modified so as to minimize the degree to which the U.S. aids the Soviet regime in its attempts to enforce political conformity. This means we should minimize exchanges with individuals whose political conformity the regime can reward with exchange trips to the United States. Instead, we should seek out individuals who refuse to participate in such regime-orchestrated efforts as revocation of refuseniks' academic credentials, public letters attacking Sakharov, and the like. (S)
5. We should set up an independent agency entitled the Board of International Exchanges (BIE) (analogous to the Board for International Broadcasting), whose responsibilities would include: identifying independent, non-official Soviet groups and individuals, establishing criteria to measure their independence, putting such independent groups in contact with their U.S. counterparts, and reviewing Soviet

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/22/11

exchange candidates requested by U.S. private groups. The last of these functions is important because private U.S. parties may have motivations for receiving Soviet visitors that are irrelevant or contrary to the purposes of the exchanges, such as career advancement, justification of monetary claims on universities for return visits to the USSR, etc. (S)

6. Full reciprocity in access to people, mass media, libraries, archives, research facilities, copying machines, and geographic areas should be ensured in the texts. Soviet exchangeees should be subject to the same travel restrictions as Soviet diplomats, or American exchangeees must be permitted access to those closed areas of the USSR that reciprocate U.S. restricted areas. All publications of articles and other literature, and media appearances by Soviet exchangeees must be reported to the BIE, which, in turn, will ensure that analogous media in the USSR will offer reciprocal opportunities for publication and media appearances. The agreements should be modified to contain such a media-access provision. (S)
7. All private exchanges must be subsumed under the framework of these agreements. (S)
8. All Soviet exchanges must be subjected to prior review by the interagency group on Counter-Intelligence and the Interagency Committee on Exchanges. (S)
9. No scientific or technical exchanges will be part of these agreements. (S)
10. All references to joint cooperation in film projects, TV, textbooks and the like should be eliminated from these agreements. (S)
11. The provisions on exchanged TV appearances should incorporate the following points: a) U.S. speakers will have the right to use a U.S. interpreter over Soviet TV and vice versa; b) U.S. representatives must be permitted to monitor the TV signal (while the U.S. speaker is on the air) in locations throughout the USSR and vice versa; c) if the signal is not sufficiently widespread, subsequent TV appearances by the opposite side will be reduced accordingly; d) there will be no prior review or censorship of televised remarks; and e) 50 percent of TV speakers must have no professional affiliation with party or state. The choice of American non-governmental spokesmen will be made by the National Endowment for Democracy. (S)
12. The U.S. will unequivocally reject any Soviet attempt in negotiations to secure the return of defectors. (S)

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Tab A

13. Before negotiations proceed, the U.S. will change the existing visa-granting process to permit foreign policy controls. This must be done either: a) by final passage of new legislation eliminating the McGovern Amendment; or b) invoking the Baker Amendment until such time as it may be necessary to change existing law. This will immediately enhance our negotiating position and establish immediate control over private exchanges. (S)
14. All "Congressional" and federal (or All-Union) government exchanges should be eliminated from these agreements. If governmental exchanges are to take place, it should be in the category of tourism. (S)
15. No exchanges between journalists or trade union officials should take place unless it can be determined that the Soviet participants are not representatives of the Soviet government. (S)
16. The distribution of publications should be made fully reciprocal. The two sides should be able to distribute copies of America Illustrated and Soviet Life to any citizen of the other country free of charge, not just at exhibits but through kiosks or other vending devices. Diplomatic personnel should be permitted to share these publications with any citizen of the host country. (S)
17. The provisions on exhibits should not include any references to prior diplomatic approval of the exhibits' contents. Instead the agreement will represent the good faith of both parties to conduct exhibit exchanges in the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act. Access to exhibits must be free and unrestricted. Security both inside and outside the exhibit halls will be provided by the exhibiting country so as to ensure free access. The U.S. will propose as part of the agreement (and will make public the proposal when it is put forward) that both sides should establish permanent exhibits in each other's capitals where the public can have free access to books, films, television programs, and other exhibits. (S)
18. The U.S. shall make proposals for exchanges of workers, farmers, churchmen, seminarians and other non-official, independent groups. Youth exchanges should also be included, however with the definition of "youth" specified as including persons 13-to-25 years old. Our youth strategy -- especially for high schoolers -- should include large numbers of exchangees, include unstructured itineraries (so the youth can engage in independent explorations) and should encompass long periods of time (several months). (S)
19. The treaty language should not contain any politically-oriented homonyms which can be subject to different, ideologically-based interpretations. As an example, the

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Tab A

word "cooperation" should be eliminated from the agreement's title. The purpose here is not only to avoid differing interpretations but to avoid gratuitous legitimization of illegitimate Soviet institutions and concepts. (S)

20. The reference to "nation-wide" Soviet TV should be changed to "country-wide" so as to avoid legitimizing Soviet "nationhood." (S)
21. A training program, composed mostly of written briefing materials, must be initiated for all U.S. exchangees and hosts as a mandatory requirement for participation. Materials must explain: the basic nature of the Soviet system, what to expect from Soviet exchangees and hosts, and how the Soviets are trained in propaganda, disinformation, and technology theft techniques. This is to help the process of understanding the USSR. (S)
22. All references to the Russian language as the official Soviet language should be eliminated from the agreements. These only serve to legitimize Soviet efforts at Russification. Instead all references to language exchanges must include the possibility of the choice of language so that U.S. exchangees might study Ukrainian, Armenian, etc. (S)
23. The U.S. should establish a debriefing program for all U.S. exchangees travelling to the USSR. This should be done in cooperation with the intelligence community as well as with those agencies working on public diplomacy. (S)
24. All sports exchanges should take place in a single locality to be recommended by the counterintelligence community so as to avoid giving Soviet Spetsnaz personnel the opportunity for reconnaissance operations. (S)
25. U.S. negotiators are instructed not to yield on any question of reciprocal access. (S)

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 17, 1984

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

NLRR ~~FOI~~-114/11 #11864FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*BY KML NARA DATE 4/22/11

SUBJECT: Agreement with the USSR on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation

Attached at Tab II is State's submission of a negotiating plan for an Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation with the USSR, and a draft agreement and program of exchanges to serve as the basis of our position in these negotiations. The paper has been approved by USIA and State and there are no differences of view between these agencies on the issues.

The U.S. objective in the negotiation would be to seek full reciprocity from the Soviets within the framework of the agreement. State would also seek to have the McGovern Amendment rescinded or modified in order to strengthen its control over visa issuance for the purpose of enforcing reciprocity.

Among the exchange programs proposed, the restoration of travelling thematic exhibits and assuring access to Soviet television by our representatives, including the President, have the highest priority.

Regarding the venue of negotiations, the paper recommends that they be conducted in Moscow, with Ambassador Hartman the head of our delegation and the Embassy Counselor for Press and Cultural Affairs in charge of the day-to-day negotiations.

Comment:

I believe that this is basically a sound negotiating plan which correctly defines priority American objectives. Past precedent would indicate that the Soviets will accept our position on exhibits, but resist access to their television. They may also attempt to secure formal assurances on the return of would-be defectors (as was the case in 1979, when we last held negotiations on this agreement). Such an attempt would of course be rejected.

Therefore, although negotiations may be prolonged and difficult, I believe that our package is appropriate and in fact negotiable. I also concur that there are advantages to holding the negotiations in Moscow, since this will facilitate rapid Soviet decision making and provide some insulation against leaks.

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Since it was developed by State and USIA, the package has been examined by John Lenczowski, Walt Raymond and Steve Steiner, and referred to the IG/CI and DIA for comment by Diane Dornan. While Walt and Steve agree with me that the basic approach in the State/USIA paper is sound, John has major problems with it. His separate memo is at TAB III. Diane's comments, and those of the FBI and DIA are at TAB IV.

I have studied carefully the various suggestions made in these papers. Many relate more to implementation than to the agreement itself, and I have therefore incorporated in the approval memorandum a number of guidelines which should be followed in the implementation, which should take care of the more important of these concerns. I would also note that, as regards reciprocity and technology transfer concerns, each concrete exchange must be vetted by the appropriate interagency committees before is organized.

As regards John's more basic critique, I will not attempt a point-by-point comment, but in general I believe it ignores the fact that if we are to have exchanges at all, we cannot insist on the Soviet government approving procedures which would only be acceptable in a free society. Rather, we must try to maximize the "people to people" content of exchanges within a framework of official approval. In practice, many of his objectives can be substantially obtained within an agreement such as that proposed, and I have incorporated some of his suggestions in the Kimmitt-Hill Memo. If you wish, I can provide a more detailed comment on his specific suggestions.

Finally, while I believe the draft agreement is sound as regards an acceptable final outcome of our negotiations, I am concerned that it has very little that can be used to trade during the negotiations. Therefore, I have suggested in the approval memo that the draft be amended to add several provisions which, while desirable from our point of view, could be dropped during the negotiation in return for concessions from the Soviets. One example of this sort of provision would be a proposal for cultural centers in each other's capitals.

Recommendation:

That you authorize the Kimmitt to Hill memorandum at Tab I which approves the negotiating plan and draft subject to several suggestions for amendments and for implementation.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum for signature
- Tab II - Hill McFarlane Memorandum of March 23, 1984, with attachments
- Tab III - John Lenczowski's Memorandum of April 4, 1984
- Tab IV - Diane Dornan's Memorandum of April 13, 1984, with FBI and DIA comments

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of StateSUBJECT: Agreement with the USSR on Contacts, Exchanges and
Cooperation (S)

The strategy paper for negotiations with the USSR on an agreement on contacts, exchanges and cooperation, transmitted by Mr. Hill's memorandum to Mr. McFarlane of March 23, has been approved, subject to the reservations and guidelines for implementation noted below. (S)

1. Before submission to the Soviets for negotiation, the draft agreement should be expanded to provide for some features which would be desirable from the U.S. point of view even though they are unlikely to be accepted by the Soviets. This could include a proposal for the establishment of cultural centers in both capitals, and other measures which, in the opinion of the Department and USIA, would be useful to provide increased negotiating room for the U.S. negotiators.

2. In negotiating the agreement, and in implementing any agreement reached, U.S. objectives should include the following:

a. Maximizing people-to-people contact and minimizing Soviet manipulation of the exchanges to reward loyalists and exclude independent-minded Soviet citizens.

b. Maximizing the opportunity for participation of groups which hitherto have not been importantly involved in the exchange program, such as young people, workers, farmers, and members of unofficial groups.

c. Insuring that all exchanges which have the potential for unauthorized technology transfer be reviewed by the appropriate agencies or interagency committees before they are implemented.

d. Making every effort to reach younger scholars in the academic exchanges, and minimizing any disproportion in the balance of scientific and non-scientific topics studied.

e. Insuring the maximum feasible degree of reciprocity in all aspects of the various exchange programs. (S)

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/22/11

3. If an agreement is concluded, the Department and USIA should establish a program for briefing U.S. participants and hosts in advance of actual exchanges, and for debriefing them following their exchange experience. Such briefings and debriefings should be considered mandatory for all participants and hosts in exchanges financed in whole or in part by the U.S. Government.
(C)

When the suggested changes noted in numbered paragraph 1 above have been introduced into the draft agreement, it may be presented to the Soviets with a proposal that negotiations begin in Moscow at a mutually acceptable date. The Department's suggestions regarding composition of the U.S. negotiating team are approved. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

March 23, 1984

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Agreement with the USSR on Contacts, Exchanges and
Cooperation

Pursuant to the National Security Council memorandum of March 12, 1984, attached herewith for review by the President is a strategy paper for negotiations and proposed texts for a new US-USSR General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation, and for the more specific 3-year Program of Cooperation and Exchanges.

Emekmley
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated~~SECRET~~
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BY KML NARA DATE 4/22/11

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Agreement with the USSR on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation

BACKGROUND

From 1958 through 1979 the United States and the Soviet Union were parties to a series of General Agreements on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation which served as the general document for cultural, educational, scientific, technical, and other types of exchanges with the USSR. Negotiations to renew the last Agreement broke down in late 1979 and were terminated following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Secretary Shultz, with the authorization of the President in June 1983, proposed to Ambassador Dobrynin that negotiations leading toward conclusion of a new bilateral Agreement be renewed. The Soviet Government responded positively to the Secretary's proposal on July 15, 1983, but we suspended further movement toward negotiations following the shootdown of the KAL airliner. Pursuant to the NSC memorandum of March 12, 1984, the Department and USIA have prepared language for a U.S. proposal for a new General Agreement (attached at Tab A) and for a specific 3-year Program of Cooperation and Exchanges (attached at Tab B) for interagency coordination if this general approach is approved.

NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

Our strategy for the negotiations is to seek full reciprocity from the Soviets within the framework of an official Exchanges Agreement. This recognizes that unless the U.S. has an effective official framework for handling exchanges, the Soviets may make separate arrangements with private U.S. sponsors, while denying us reciprocal access to the Soviet Union. To ensure that U.S.-Soviet exchanges are properly monitored to protect U.S. security and intelligence interests, the Office of Soviet Union Affairs in the Department of State will be tasked to serve as the central clearinghouse, in close liaison with USIA, for exchanges conducted under the General Agreement and the Program of Cooperation and Exchanges. Moreover, the Department intends to pursue the objective of rescinding or modifying the McGovern Amendment in order to strengthen its control over authorization or denial of visas to Soviet groups and individuals.

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Following are brief notes on the major types of exchanges proposed in cultural, educational and informational fields [the science and technology fields are covered by separate agreements; Article II of the General Agreement (Tab A) lists the seven agreements which are still operative.]

1. Travelling thematic exhibits These highly effective exhibits, viewed by millions of Soviet citizens throughout the USSR, have great impact among the Soviet populace. We propose at least two such thematic exhibits to circulate in the Soviet Union during the 3-year period of the Program of Cooperation and Exchanges and a total of at least four during the 6-year validity of the General Agreement. Each would be shown in six cities of the Soviet Union, with one month's actual showing time in each city.

2. Television Appearances We are introducing this as part of a new Agreement in order to reach the Soviet population with statements of U.S. policy. The draft Agreement provides for an annual exchange of at least six television appearances by representatives of each country, including at least one exchange by the Chiefs of State. We believe that we can obtain the cooperation of the U.S. TV networks on this exchange when we explain to them that we are not trying to place any limits on their access to Soviets, but simply concerned that we obtain improved TV access to the Soviet people.

3. Performing Arts Groups and Individual Performers In spite of the absence of an Exchanges Agreement, the Soviets have continued to show interest in sending performing arts groups (PAGs) and individual performers to the U.S., and there are signs of a resurgence of interest by American impresarios. The draft Program provides for tours of at least 10 major PAGs and at least 20 individual performing artists from each side during the 3-year period of the Program. We have inserted language of reciprocity in the draft Program providing that, should one side send more than the numbers indicated above, the other side would be accorded the opportunity, if it wished, to send like numbers of additional PAGs or individual performing artists. With these provisions in an official agreement, we will be able to send our performers on tour in the USSR and to have control over the quality and type of American PAGs and individual performing artists touring the Soviet Union. In turn, we will have better control over the Soviet PAGs and individual performers coming to the United States. American PAGs such as

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the New York City Ballet, the Alvin Ailey Dancers, Duke Ellington and his Orchestra, and the American Conservatory Theater of San Francisco had tremendous impact in the Soviet Union.

4. Educational/Academic Exchanges Despite the absence of an official exchanges agreement since 1979, both countries have continued the higher educational/academic exchanges, although in reduced numbers. These exchanges are organized and administered by the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) in close coordination with USIA and our Embassy in Moscow. They will continue to be implemented on the basis of reciprocity in numbers under any new agreement. We are, moreover, seeking in the draft Program agreement that not more than half of the participants on either side will be in the natural and physical sciences, which is where the Soviets seek to concentrate their exchangees. The U.S. currently has numerous private academic programs which are in our favor, for which the Soviets have not raised questions of reciprocity. Hundreds of Americans go to the Soviet Union annually under such programs primarily to study Russian for academic credit. The Soviets have avoided such programs in the U.S. for that age group, but we have inserted language in the draft Program to encourage them to send Soviet youngsters to the U.S.

5. America Illustrated and Soviet Life Magazine Exchange Our Russian-language America Illustrated magazine is extremely popular in the Soviet Union. Its sales in the USSR are permitted only through the Soviet government's distributing organization, which can control the number of copies sold out of the total number of copies of each issue delivered to it each month. Supposedly "unsold" returns of America Illustrated have been a problem through most of the history of the exchanges program, and currently average about 10,000 copies per issue. The provision in the draft Program that both sides may distribute unsold copies of the magazines free of charge to visitors to mutually arranged exhibits is a crucial factor in implementing the contingent provision that the distribution level of the magazines might possibly be increased once the currently agreed distribution level of 62,000 copies per issue has been achieved.

6. U.S. Film Weeks and Film Premieres in the USSR Although we have not been active under this provision in our previous exchanges agreements, we intend to use every opportunity aggressively to implement it under any new agreement, in reciprocity for Soviet film weeks and premieres organized in the U.S.

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7. Congressional and Other Governmental Exchanges Article X of the Agreement allows for the exchange of members of Congress, officials of the national governments, and representatives of municipal, local and state governments of the two countries, which has proven an especially effective means of gaining access to Soviet political leaders.

8. Sports Exchanges and Tourism Articles XII and XIV of the Agreement provides a framework for continuing these types of activities which have been supported by the private sector in the U.S. and are useful in providing low-key access to "non-political" sectors of Soviet society.

MAJOR OBJECTIVES

The major problems in negotiating a new Exchanges Agreement with the Soviets will involve our highest priority objectives -- reinstituting USIA thematic exhibits and assuring access to Soviet television by our representatives, including the President. Unless we achieve those objectives in the negotiations, the overall value for the U.S. of an Exchanges Agreement will be in doubt. In any event, we should be prepared to refuse to conclude an agreement if we judge the balance of benefits inadequate in relation to our objectives.

VENUE OF NEGOTIATIONS

The exchanges negotiations should be held in Moscow. This would balance the negotiations on the establishment of additional consulates to be held in Washington at about the same time. More important, it should accelerate the decisionmaking process for the Soviets by providing them with ready access to senior levels of their regime. Ambassador Hartman would be protocolary head of the delegation, with the Embassy Counselor for Press and Cultural Affairs, an officer with extensive experience in Soviet exchanges, conducting the day-to-day talks for the American side.

RECOMMENDATION

That this strategy paper and the attached drafts of a General Agreement and Program of Cooperation and Exchanges be forwarded to the President for his review and approval.

Attachments:

- A. Proposal for a New General Agreement
- B. 3-Year Program of Cooperation and Exchanges

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BY CIM NARA DATE 4/22/11~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GENERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON CONTACTS, EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION

The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Desiring to promote better understanding between the peoples
of the United States and the Soviet Union and to help improve
the general state of relations between the two countries;

Believing that the further expansion of strictly reciprocal
and mutually beneficial contacts, exchanges and cooperation will
facilitate the achievement of these aims;

Taking into account the positive experience achieved through
previous agreements on exchanges in the scientific, technical,
educational, cultural and other fields;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. The Parties will encourage and develop contacts, ex-
changes and cooperation in the fields of education and culture,
the humanities and social sciences, the natural sciences,
technology, and in other fields of mutual interest on the basis
of strict and full reciprocity, equality and mutual benefit.

2. Such contacts, exchanges and cooperation shall be subject
to the Constitution and applicable laws and regulations of the
respective countries. Within this framework, the Parties will
make every effort to promote favorable conditions for the ful-
fillment of these contacts, exchanges and cooperation.

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ARTICLE II

1. The Parties take note of the following specialized agreement on cooperation in various fields and reaffirm their commitments to achieve the fulfillment of them:

a. The Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environment Protection between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Moscow on May 23, 1972 and extended until May 23, 1987, by means of an exchange of diplomatic notes;

b. The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Field of Medical Science and Public Health, signed at Moscow on May 23, 1972, and extended until May 23, 1987, by means of an exchange of diplomatic notes;

c. The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture, signed at Washington on June 19, 1973, and extended until June 19, 1988, by means of an exchange of diplomatic notes;

d. The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in Studies of the World Ocean, signed at Washington on June 19, 1973, and extended until December 15, 1984, by means of an exchange of diplomatic notes;

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e. The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in Artificial Heart Research and Development, signed at Moscow on June 28, 1974, and extended until June 28, 1987, by means of an exchange of diplomatic notes;

f. The Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, signed at Washington on June 21, 1973, and extended until June 20, 1986, by means of an exchange of diplomatic notes;

g. The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Field of Housing and Other Construction, signed at Moscow on June 28, 1974, and extended until June 28, 1989, by means of an exchange of diplomatic notes.

2. When it is considered mutually beneficial on the basis of strict and full reciprocity, the Parties will encourage within the framework of this Agreement, conclusion of specialized agreements, including mutually agreed upon amendments, between:

a. The National Academy of Science of the United States of America and the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and

b. The American Council of Learned Societies and the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

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3. On the basis of strict and full reciprocity the Parties will encourage the conclusion of additional agreements in other specific fields within the framework of this Agreement.

ARTICLE III

1. The Parties will encourage and facilitate on the basis of strict and full reciprocity contacts, exchanges and cooperation between organizations of the two countries in various fields of education, the humanities and social sciences, natural sciences, technology and in other related fields of mutual interest which are not being carried out under specialized agreements concluded between the Parties. These activities may include:

a. The exchange of students, researchers and faculty members for study and research; professors and teachers to lecture, offer instruction, and conduct research; as well as specialists and delegations in various fields of education; and the organization of lectures, seminars and symposia for such specialists;

b. The participation of specialists in professional congresses, conferences and similar meetings being held in the two countries, and the conducting of specialized exhibits and of joint research work;

c. The facilitation of the exchange, by appropriate organizations, of educational and teaching materials on methodology, samples of teaching instruments and visual aids; and,

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d. The facilitation of other forms of contacts, exchanges and cooperation which may be mutually agreed upon on the basis of strict and full reciprocity.

2. The Parties will also encourage the study of each other's languages through the development of the exchanges and cooperation listed above and through mutually agreed upon, and other, measures.

ARTICLE IV

In order to promote mutual acquaintance with the cultural achievements of each country, the Parties will facilitate on the basis of strict and full reciprocity:

1. Exchanges of theatrical, musical and choreographic ensembles, orchestras, other artistic and entertainment groups, and individual performers;

2. The development of contacts and exchanges in the fields of the performing arts, thus to increase in the host country:

a. The production of the sending country's works, and

b. Performances by the sending country's artists including on the premises of the sending side's Embassy or Ambassador's or Consul General's Residences.

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ARTICLE V

1. The Parties will encourage the organizations of the film industries of both countries, as appropriate, to consider means of further expanding the purchase and distribution of a commercial basis of films produced in each country.

2. Film weeks and the holding of film premieres in each country will be organized on the basis of strict and full reciprocity for the other country.

3. The Parties will facilitate the exchange of delegations of creative and technical specialists in various aspects of film making.

4. The Parties further agree that, when requested to do so by organizations and individuals of their respective countries, they will consider proposals for joint production of feature films and short and full-length educational and scientific films and proposals for filming or production of films in the other country.

ARTICLE VI

1. The two Parties agree that the views of their governments on issues of interest to the world and important to their bilateral relationship should be communicated directly to the publics of the host country through that country's television and radio programs. This will be accomplished by, among other means, an exchange of television appearances by official representatives of each country on the other's nation-wide television on the basis of strict and full reciprocity.

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2. The Parties agree also that, when requested to do so by organizations and individuals of their respective countries, they will consider proposals for joint production of television films and proposals for filming of television specials or programs and production of radio programs in the other country. The Parties further agree that each side will facilitate access by representatives of the other's television and radio organizations to the sources of information they consider necessary to the success of such proposals.

3. The Parties will, on the basis of reciprocity, facilitate contacts and encourage exchanges between organizations of the two countries in the fields of radio and television, including the exchange of radio programs and television films, both for purposes of study and for transmission to local audiences, and exchanges of delegations of creative and technical specialists in various aspects of radio and television production.

ARTICLE VII

The Parties will encourage:

a. The exchange of books, magazines, newspapers and other publications devoted to scientific, technical, cultural, and general educational subjects between libraries, universities and other organizations of each country, as well as the reciprocal distribution of the magazines Amerika and Soviet Life; and

b. Exchanges and visits, on a strictly reciprocal basis, of journalists, editors and publishers, translators of literary works, as well as their participation in appropriate professional meetings and conferences.

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ARTICLE VIII

1. The Parties will encourage and facilitate:

a. The exchange of exhibitions on various topics of mutual interest, with showings in a total of 20 cities in every five-year period of 3 to 4 different exhibits, each to show in up to 6 different cities. The exhibits will be concerned with various topics of mutual interest. The organization and themes of these exhibits will be subject to additional agreements, contracts, and protocols between the sending organization and the receiving organization.

b. Appropriate participation by one Party in exhibitions which may take place in the other's country.

2. The Parties will also render assistance for the exchange of exhibitions between the museums of the two countries.

ARTICLE IX

On the basis of strict and full reciprocity the Parties will provide for exchanges and visits of architects, art historians, artists, composers, musicologists, museum specialists, playwrights, theater directors, writers, specialists in various fields of law and those in other cultural and professional fields, to familiarize themselves with matters of interest to them in their respective fields and to participate in meetings, conferences and symposia.

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ARTICLE X

1. The Parties will render assistance to members of the Congress of the United States of America and Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as to officials of the national government of both countries, making visits to the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively. Arrangements for such assistance will be agreed upon in advance through diplomatic channels.

2. The Parties will encourage exchanges of representatives of municipal, local and state governments of the United States and the Soviet Union to study various functions of government at these levels.

ARTICLE XI

The Parties will encourage, on the basis of strict and full reciprocity, exchanges between appropriate organizations active in civic and social life, including youth and women's organizations. (See 79 agreement)

ARTICLE XII

The Parties will encourage exchanges of athletes and athletic teams as well as visits of specialists in the fields of physical education and sports under arrangements made between the appropriate sports organizations of the two countries.

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ARTICLE XIII

The Parties note that commemorative activities may take place in their countries in connection with the celebration of anniversaries recognized by major international bodies.

ARTICLE XIV

The Parties will encourage the expansion of tourist travel between the two countries and the adoption of measures to satisfy the requests of tourists to acquaint themselves with the life, work and culture of the people of each country.

ARTICLE XV

The Parties agree to hold a meeting each year of their representatives for a general review of the implementation of contacts, exchanges and cooperation in various fields and to consider exchanges which are not being carried out under specialized agreements concluded between the Parties.

ARTICLE XVI

1. In implementation of various provisions of this Agreement, the Parties have established a Program of Exchanges for 1985-89, which is annexed to and constitutes an integral part of this Agreement. The terms of this Program shall be in force from . . . to December 31, 1989, and thereafter, unless

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and until amended by agreement of the Parties, will provide the basic guidelines for the Program of Exchanges in 1991-1994.

2. The Parties agree that their representatives will meet prior to the end of 1989 and will develop the Program of Exchanges for the succeeding three years.

ARTICLE XVII

The Parties agree that:

a. The programs and itineraries, lengths of stay, dates of arrival, size of delegations, financial and transportation arrangements and other details of exchanges and visits, except as otherwise determined, shall be agreed upon, as a rule, not less than thirty days in advance, through diplomatic channels or between appropriate organizations requested by the Parties to carry out these exchanges;

b. Applications for visas for visitors participating in exchanges and cooperative activities shall be submitted, as a rule, at least fourteen days before the estimated time of departure;

c. Guest-of-the-Ambassador or Guest-of-the-Consul General visas to accommodate visitors participating in exchanges, cooperative activities, exhibits, performances by groups or individuals or involved in any way in organizing or carrying out these activities shall be handled expeditiously and with priority attention within this fourteen day period.

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d. Unless otherwise provided for in specialized agreements between the Parties, and except where other specific arrangements have been agreed upon, participants in exchanges and cooperative activities will pay their own expenses, including international travel, internal travel and costs of maintenance in the receiving country.

ARTICLE XVIII

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on signature and shall remain in force until December 31, 1989. It may be modified or extended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

2. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prejudice other agreements concluded between the two Parties.

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DONE AT _____, this _____
day of _____, in duplicate, in the English and
Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

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PROGRAM OF EXCHANGES FOR 1984-1986

In implementation of various provisions of the General Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation signed at _____ on _____, the Parties have agreed on the following Program of Exchanges for the period January 1, 1984, to December 31, 1986.

SECTION I

HIGHER EDUCATION

1. The Parties will exchange annually from each side:

a. For long-term advanced research: At least 40 researchers, instructors, and professors for study and scholarly research in the humanities and the social, natural and physical sciences for periods of stay from one semester to one academic year. In nomination for this exchange the Parties will give due consideration to young scholars preparing dissertations, as well as young instructors, and they will take into account the desirability of appropriate representation of the humanities and social sciences.

b. For short-term advanced research: At least ten professors, instructors, and researchers to conduct scholarly research in the humanities and the social, natural and physical sciences for periods of stay between two and five months, the total not to exceed 50 person-months for each side.

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c. At least 30 language teachers and two leaders from universities and other institutions of higher learning to participate in summer courses of eight weeks to improve their competence in the language of the receiving side.

d. For the exchanges specified under paragraph 1.a and b, above, the Parties agreed that not more than half of the participants on each side shall be in the natural and physical sciences.

e. In the practical implementation of these programs, the Parties will strive to maintain the levels of exchange already achieved, where the existing levels exceed the minimum levels given above.

2. The Parties will exchange annually at least three graduate-level students or young specialists in culture and the arts, including, among others, dance, music, theater, and fine arts, architecture and historic preservation and restoration, for the purpose of study, research and training for periods of one semester to one academic year in universities and other appropriate cultural institutions.

3. a. In accordance with the desires of the sending and receiving sides, the Parties will exchange annually from each side at least 15 professors or specialists from universities and other institutions of higher learning. At least four will be lecturers on the languages and literatures of the sending side at courses for teachers and students. The exchanges will be for periods of one to 10 months, normally corresponding to the receiving side's academic calendar, to lecture and, as time permits, to conduct research at universities and other institutions of higher learning.

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b. The Parties agree that not more than half of the lecturers exchanged over the period of this Agreement shall be in the natural and physical sciences.

4. The Parties will exchange during the period of this Program at least two delegations of specialists in higher education consisting of up to five persons from side for periods of two to three weeks each, including two to three days of seminars with specialists of the other country. The subjects of the seminars and itineraries of the visits will be agreed upon subsequently.

5. The Parties will encourage the conclusion of arrangements for direct exchanges between universities and other institutions of higher learning of the two countries for the purpose of study, research and lecturing. These exchanges would take place over and above the exchange quotas mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, but on the basis of strict and full reciprocity for both sides.

6. The Parties agreed to continue to exchange information and to conduct appropriate consultations regarding the equivalency of diplomas and scholarly degrees. The Parties expect that the UNESCO Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas and Degrees Concerning Higher Education in the States Belonging to the Europe Region, in the elaboration of which the United States and the Soviet Union have taken part, will lead to closer cooperation in this field.

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SECTION II

Primary and Secondary Education
and the Pedagogical Sciences

1. The Parties will exchange annually from each side at least five professors or specialists in primary and secondary education from universities and other educational institutions in the United States, and from pedagogical institutes and other institutions of higher learning in the Soviet Union, in accordance with the desires of the sending and receiving sides, for periods normally corresponding to the receiving side's academic calendar.

2. The Parties will exchange annually from each side, beginning in 1984, at least 15 language teachers from secondary schools in the United States, and from secondary schools or pedagogical institutes in the Soviet Union, to participate in summer courses of six weeks duration, including two weeks of travel, to improve their competence in the teaching of the Russian and English languages and their knowledge of the Soviet Union and the United States. Each group of language teachers may be accompanied by a leader.

3. The Parties will exchange one delegation annually of specialists in primary and secondary education of up to five persons from each side for a period of two to three weeks each, including two to three days of seminars with specialists of the other country. The subjects of the seminars and itineraries of the visits will be agreed upon subsequently.

4. The Parties will encourage the exchange of textbooks and other teaching materials, and, as is deemed appropriate, the conducting of joint studies on textbooks, between appropriate organizations in the United States and the Soviet Union.

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5. The Parties will encourage the annual exchange of six teachers for periods of three months to conduct practical instruction classes in the English and Russian languages at secondary schools, colleges, universities, and pedagogical training institutions of the United States and the Soviet Union.

SECTION III

Arts and Culture

1. The Parties will facilitate the tours of at least 10 major performing arts groups from each side during the period of this Program on the basis of strict and full reciprocity in numbers of groups. If tours of more than 10 major performing arts groups are feasible, additional groups may be accommodated, but only on the basis of equal numbers of groups exchanged between the two countries. The detailed arrangements for tours of these groups will be provided for in contracts to be concluded between the following entities: for American groups, between the Embassy of the United States of America in Moscow or authorized representatives of the groups themselves, and concert organizations of the Soviet Union; for Soviet groups, between appropriate organizations or impresarios of the United States and concert organizations of the Soviet Union. The receiving side, taking into consideration realistic possibilities, will seek to satisfy the wishes of the sending side concerning the selection of groups and timing, with the duration of the tours in-country and the number of cities to be visited to be based on a principle of rough equivalence between countries for similar type performing arts groups. The receiving side will make a decision on each proposal by the sending side as soon as possible.

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2. The Parties will facilitate an equal number of tours by individual performers from each side. The detailed arrangements for these tours will be provided for in contracts to be concluded between the following entities: for tours of American performers, between the Embassy of the United States of America in Moscow or authorized representatives of the performers themselves, and concert organizations of the Soviet Union; for Soviet performers, between appropriate organizations or impresarios of the United States and concert organizations of the Soviet Union.

3. For the tours of the groups and individuals specified under paragraphs 1 and 2, above, the Parties will do all within their legal powers to ensure maximum favorable conditions for those performances and tours.

4. The Parties will render assistance for the exchange of art exhibitions of equal quality or other exhibitions between museums of the two countries, on the basis of reciprocity where possible, and will encourage the establishment and development of direct contacts between these museums with the aim of exchanging informative materials, albums, art monographs and other publications of mutual interest. In the case of art exhibitions, their content and the conditions for conducting them, including questions of governmental financial responsibility in the event of loss or damage, will be subject to negotiation and special agreement in each case between the relevant museums or interested organizations of the United States and the Ministry of Culture of the Soviet Union.

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5. The Parties will encourage exchanges of delegations and individual specialists in various fields of art and culture, including, among others, such fields as libraries, museums, music, theater, architecture and historic preservation and restoration.

6. The Parties will encourage and facilitate exchanges of theater directors, composers, choreographers, stage designers, performers, musicians and other creative artists for productions and participation in performances. The conditions for these exchanges will be agreed upon in each case on the basis of strict and full reciprocity.

7. The Parties will do all within their legal powers to facilitate such performances by groups or individuals as the sending side may wish to organize on the premises of its Embassy or of the Ambassador's or Consul General's Residences, these to be above and beyond the tours of the groups and individuals specified under paragraphs 1 and 2, above.

SECTION IV

Publications

The Parties will render practical assistance for the distribution of the magazines Amerika in the Soviet Union and Soviet Life in the United States, on a reciprocal basis, and agree to consult, as necessary, in order to find ways to increase the distribution these magazines. The Parties will distribute free of charge unsold copies of the magazines among visitors to mutually arranged exhibitions. Upon reaching full distribution of the 62,000 copies of each magazine as currently provided for, the Parties will expand to 82,000 their reciprocal

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distribution, this to be accomplished by various means, including sales at kiosks and by subscription.

SECTION V
Exhibitions

1. The Parties agree to accord each other the opportunity for two circulating exhibitions during the three-year period of this Program. The subjects of the exhibitions will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels. The Parties will discuss in a preliminary fashion the nature and general content of each exhibition and will acquaint each other with the exhibitions before their official opening, in particular through the exchange of catalogues, prospectuses and other information pertinent to the exhibitions. Other conditions for conducting the exhibitions (dates, size and character of premises, number of personnel, financial terms, etc.) shall be subject to agreement by the Parties. Arrangements for conducting the exhibitions will be concluded no later than five months before their opening.

2. The Parties will agree through diplomatic channels on arrangements for other exhibitions and on participation in national exhibitions which may take place in either country.

SECTION VI
Other Exchanges

1. The Parties agree to implement the exchange of television appearances as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article VI of the General Agreement by an annual exchange of six television appearances by official representatives of each

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country or by the other country's nation-wide television, including at least once annually a television address by the Chief of State of each country. Any arrangements for additional appearances on the other country's television will be made on a strictly reciprocal appearance basis. The level of official representation, the time span, and the relative degree of nation-wide television coverage for each such exchange of television appearances will be determined and agreed upon through diplomatic channels. The Parties agree that those official representatives of each side who can speak the language of the host country may use that language in his/her telecast. The Parties further agree that each of the television appearances will be duly announced publicly in the host country's major newspapers and television.

2. The Parties agree that film weeks and the holding of film premieres in each country will be organized on the basis of strict and full reciprocity for the other country. Reciprocity will involve not only the holding of such events reciprocally in each country, but also rough equivalence in the number and population-size of the cities in which the events are held.

3. The Parties will encourage cooperation and exchanges in the fields of film, television and radio: in joint productions, in exchanges of programs, delegations of creative and technical specialists, and in facilitative assistance to organizations and individuals in films, television radio under conditions as provided in paragraph 4 of Article V and paragraphs 2 and 3 of the General Agreement.

4. The Parties will encourage invitations to journalists for familiarization with the print and broadcast media in the receiving country. To this end the Parties will facilitate the

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exchange of at least three journalists annually from each side on the basis of strict and full reciprocity.

5. The Parties will encourage exchanges and contacts in the field of book publishing.

6. The Parties recognize the value of the visits by other specialists in addition to those noted elsewhere in this Agreement, for lectures and participation in seminars, meetings and discussions which contribute to better understanding between the peoples of the two countries.

7. The Parties will encourage the further development of contacts and cooperation between archival institutions of the two countries.

SECTION VI

General

1. The Parties will hold periodic meetings of their representatives for a general review of the implementation of this Agreement. The times and places of such meetings will be further agreed upon.

2. Each of the Parties shall have the right to include in delegations interpreters and/or members of its Embassy who shall be considered as within the agreed total membership of such delegations.

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CONDITIONS

HIGHER EDUCATION (Section I)

A. Long-Term Advanced Research (Section I, paragraph 1a), Short-Term Advanced Research (Section I, paragraph 1b), and Language Teachers and Leaders (Section I, paragraph 1c):

1. These exchanges will be conducted between the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) of the United States and the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education of the Soviet Union (Ministry).

2. The receiving side will provide for participants in these programs:

- a. necessary fees for study and research in universities and other institutions of higher learning;
- b. appropriate research conditions necessary for conducting their scholarly research programs;
- c. suitable living quarters;
- d. a monthly stipend;
- e. medical costs, including dental care for the emergency alleviation of pain and for dental work necessitated by injury, as well as hospital expenses as agreed between the two sides in cases of illness of, or accident resulting in injury to, a participant in the receiving country;

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f. language instruction during the course of the academic year as indicated by initial testing.

3. The sending side will bear all costs for travel of its participants.

4. The receiving side will assist in providing suitable accommodations for spouses and minor children accompanying or following to join participants within the receiving country, with the exception of participants in the Summer Exchange of Language teachers. In cases of illness of, or accident resulting in injury to, a spouse or minor child in the receiving country, the receiving side will bear medical costs, including hospital expenses, as agreed between the two sides. The sending side will bear all other costs, including travel, for spouses and minor children accompanying or following to join the participants. The receiving side will assist participants in enrolling dependent children in schools during the participants' programs.

B. Long-Term Advanced Research (Section I, paragraph 1a):

1. IREX and the Ministry will exchange lists of nominees and the necessary information about each nominee and his or her program of study before January 15 for study to commence the following academic year. The information provided for each nominee will include full biographic data, previous and current study and professional experience, publications, details of the proposed research program, places, institutions and archives to be visited, and the names of specialists whom the nominee wishes to consult.

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2. Representatives of IREX and the Ministry will meet in alternate years in New York and Moscow no later than April 1 to inform the sending side of their decisions concerning the acceptance of each nominee, the names of universities or other institutions where each nominee will be placed, the names of advisors and the archives and other institutions named in the application, to which each nominee will have access. Costs for up to two persons for up to one week related to these meetings within each country will be borne by the receiving side. Each side may also make additional visits to the other country at its own expense to review these exchanges and to visit educational institutions.

3. The placements of candidates accepted by each side will be considered complete and final on July 1. Any placement still pending by the date will be considered rejections. The two sides retain the right to make appropriate adjustments at that time in order to achieve a balanced exchange. After July 1 there will be no substitutions for any withdrawals made by the sending side.

4. Participants who are to start their work at the beginning of the academic year will arrive in the receiving country in August as agreed between IREX and the Ministry. Participants accepted for the second semester will arrive during the period January 2-10. If a participant cannot arrive on the agreed date, the sending side will inform the receiving side as far in advance as possible, and a new date for the arrival will be agreed upon.

5. The period of study will normally be nine months. Applications for extension of agreed periods of study will be considered by the receiving side.

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6. Both sides will facilitate travel by participants to other appropriate locations in the receiving country for study trips directly related to their research projects. The receiving side will arrange and pay for accommodations during such trips. Costs of travel for these study trips will be paid by the sending side.

7. Both sides, with the agreement of the host institutions, will facilitate travel by participants for cultural or leisure purposes during their stay in the receiving country, at the going rates for the native citizens of that country. Costs of such travel and accommodations will be paid by the sending side.

8. Both sides agreed to provide favorable conditions essential to carry out research programs agreed upon, including the use of academic and scholarly materials and, in those cases where it is appropriate and possible, work in laboratories, archives and institutions which are not a part of the system of higher educational establishments. Academic programs drawn up at the beginning of the year can, with the approval of the academic advisors, be corrected and supplemented in the course of the academic year.

9. The receiving side will provide participants with the following monthly stipends for a period of nine months the first payment to be made on arrival in the receiving country:

In the United States () dollars

In the Soviet Union () rubles

C. Short-Term Advanced Research (Section I, paragraph 1b):

Provisions of Section B above will apply except that:

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1. Participants will arrive in the receiving country as agreed between IREX and the Ministry.

2. The receiving side will provide participants with the following monthly stipends, the first payment to be made on arrival in the receiving country:

In the United States () dollars a month

In the Soviet Union () rubles a month

D. Exchange of Language Teachers (Section I, paragraph 1c):

1. IREX and the Ministry will agree on the dates for the courses, will provide a daily course plan and will exchange biographic data on the participants by April 20 of each year.

2. The receiving side will provide participants and leaders the following monthly stipends, the first payment to be made on arrival in the receiving country:

In the United States () dollars a month

In the Soviet Union () rubles a month

3. The receiving side, at its expense, will arrange excursions to at least two of its cities, for a total duration of up to one week, to be included within the agreed duration (eight weeks) of the exchange.

E. Graduate Students and Young Specialists in Culture and the Arts (Section I, paragraph 2):

Conditions for these exchanges will be the same as those for Young Researchers and Instructors, Section A above, except that nominations will be exchanged between the American Embassy in

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Moscow on one side and the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education of the USSR on the other side. The Soviet side will fill this quota with graduate students from institutions under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture and of the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education. The number of students and young specialists will be over and above the quota under Article I, paragraph 1a. Nominations will be submitted by January 15 and notifications of acceptance and placements by April 1 for each following academic year.

F. Lecturers (Section I, paragraph 3):

1. The Parties by March 15 (18 months prior to the start of the academic year in which the exchange will take place) will exchange priority requests and information on the disciplines in which they wish to receive lecturers.

2. The Parties by November 15 will exchange nominations including full biographic data, previous and current study and professional experience, publications and program proposals in response to the priority requests exchanged by March 15 (paragraph 1, above), as well as similar data for at-large nominations.

3. Representatives of the Parties will meet in alternate years in Washington and Moscow no later than April 1 of the following year to inform each other of their final decisions on acceptance of the nominations exchanged by November 15 (paragraph 2 above). Costs related to these meetings will be borne by the sending side. Each side may also make additional visits to the other country at its own expense to review these exchanges and to visit educational institutions. The receiving side will

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facilitate appointments at institutions of higher learning outside Washington, D.C., and Moscow in accordance with the desires of the sending side for these additional visits.

4. The normal lecturer terms will be for periods of three months (academic quarter), four months (academic semester) to 10 months (academic year). However, cases of exceptional distinction (as defined by criteria of the sending side) may be considered for periods of one to three months for up to four lecturers exchanged on each side.

5. Agreement on acceptance of a lecturer will include the exact dates and duration of the lecturer's stay in the receiving country, the name of the host institution, faculty host and details of the academic program including specific information regarding the syllabus and lecturing hours.

6. Approximately half of the lecturers exchanged shall be scholars specifically requested by the receiving side or equally qualified scholars in the same disciplines (priority requests); the remainder will be selected from those nominated by the sending side (at-large nominations).

7. The sending side will provide international round-trip travel to the host institution in the receiving country (via Washington, D.C., in the United States).

8. The receiving side will provide for the lecturers it receives:

a. appropriate housing for the lecturers and, where possible, for spouses and minor children;

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b. medical costs, including dental care for the emergency alleviation of pain for dental work necessitated by injury, as well as hospital expenses as agreed between the two sides in cases of illness of, or accident resulting in injury to, a participant in the receiving country;

c. at least two scholarly trips to universities when the universities requested in the applications express their interest in receiving the lecturers; the itineraries of the lecturers will be agreed upon before their arrival in the receiving country; the receiving side will arrange and pay for accommodations during such trips; costs of travel for these scholarly trips will be paid by the sending side;

d. a monthly allowance, the first payment to be made on arrival in the receiving country:

In the United States 600 dollars

In the Soviet Union 420 rubles;

e. an allowance of 200 dollars in the United States and 100 rubles in the Soviet Union for the purchase of books, scholarly materials, and payment for duplicating services.

G. Seminars (Section I, paragraph 4):

1. The Parties will consult in advance through diplomatic channels on the subjects, procedures, locations, dates and numbers of participants in seminars in higher education.

2. The receiving side will organize the seminars and prepare the programs for visiting delegations, taking into consideration the requests of the sending side.

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3. The receiving side will cover the costs of seminars in its own country, including the costs of maintenance and internal travel for the visiting participants. Maintenance will be paid in accordance with rates currently in effect in each country.

H. Exchanges Between Universities (Section I, paragraph 5):

Conditions for direct exchanges between universities and other institutions of higher learning will be determined by the participating institutions.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
AND THE PEDAGOGICAL SCIENCES (Section II)

A. Lecturers (Section II, paragraph 1):

1. The normal lecturer terms will be for periods of three months (academic quarter) or four months (academic semester). However, cases of exceptional distinction (as defined by criteria of the sending side) may be considered for periods of one to three months, as agreed to by the receiving side, for up to two participants exchanged on each side.

2. Half of the participants exchanged over the period of the Agreement will be scholars specifically requested by the receiving side or equally qualified scholars in the same disciplines (priority requests); the remainder will be selected from those nominated by the sending side (at-large nominations).

3. All other conditions for exchanges of lecturers will be the same as those for lecturers under Higher Education, Section F, above.

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B. Language Teachers (Section II, paragraph 2):

1. The Parties will agree on the dates and location for the courses by January 15, will exchange lists of nominations by March 15, and will inform each other of their acceptance of the nominations by May 15.

2. A leader may accompany each group of participants.

3. The receiving side will provide for the costs of instruction, maintenance and the two weeks of internal travel for the participants and the leader. The monthly stipends for the period of instruction, to be paid on arrival in the receiving country, will be:

In the United States () dollars

In the Soviet Union () rubles

C. Seminars (Section II, paragraph 3):

Conditions for these exchanges will be the same as those for seminars under Higher Education, Section G, above.

ARTS AND CULTURE (Section III)

A. Exchanges of Performing Artists (Section III, para 2 and 3)

With reference to the conditions governing performances in the Soviet Union by United States performing arts groups and individual artists, payment by Soviet concert organizations for such performance will be made in an agreed combination of U.S. dollars and rubles. The ruble amount shall not exceed the

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estimated costs of food for the performing artists during their stays in the Soviet Union.

B. Exchanges of Exhibitions Between Museums (Section III, paragraph 4):

Conditions for these exchanges will be agreed upon between the participating museums of interested organizations of the United States and the Ministry of Culture of the Soviet Union.

C. Exchanges of Delegations and Specialists (Section III, paragraphs 5 and 6)

The receiving side will provide for the costs of maintenance, accommodations and internal travel for delegations and specialists exchanged between the Parties under the Agreement. Conditions for such exchanges will be agreed upon in each specific case. Maintenance will be paid in accordance with current rates in each country.

EXHIBITIONS (Section V)

All costs for escort officers assigned by the receiving side to accompany exhibitions received under these exchanges will be paid by the receiving side.

OTHER EXCHANGES (Section VI)

Specialists in Radio or Television (paragraph 3), Journalists (paragraph 4), and Film Specialists (paragraph 3):

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The receiving side will provide for the costs of maintenance, accommodations and internal travel for delegations and specialists exchanged between the Parties under the Agreement. Conditions for such exchanges will be agreed upon in each specific case. Maintenance will be paid in accordance with current rates in each country.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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April 4, 1984

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

NLRR E06-114/11 #11866

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

BY KML NARA DATE 4/22/11

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation

I have examined carefully the State Department strategy paper on negotiating a new U.S.-Soviet exchange agreement, the draft General Agreement, the draft Program of Exchanges, and Ambassador Matlock's memorandum recommending approval of these documents as they stand. If, as the Ambassador suggests, our purpose is to achieve full reciprocity with the Soviets, the State Department strategy as presented will not succeed. As it currently stands, it contains so many serious defects and loopholes that the Soviets will be able to exploit it in such a way as to render the arrangement very one-sided and damaging to U.S. interests. As I have learned from Ken de Graffenreid, this strategy was not submitted to the Committee on Exchanges or any properly constituted counterintelligence interagency group for proper scrutiny. Thus, I believe much more work needs to be done to ensure that we do not hastily commit ourselves to a major mistake with considerable national security consequences.

The Lack of Reciprocity in Political Interests

Signing almost any exchange agreement with the USSR is bound to be an unreciprocal arrangement no matter how skillfully we craft the treaty language. This is so because of the very nature of the two different political systems. Since the President has made the decision to negotiate such an agreement without, to my knowledge, having had the benefit of any coherent explanation of this point of view, suffice it to review four major points which should be kept in mind when considering the treaty provisions:

1. Soviet objectives in any such agreement are clear and unambiguous. They are to conduct disinformation, propaganda and technology theft against the American people for the purpose of perpetuating false U.S. perceptions of the Soviet system and its intentions, encouraging political change in the United States and to increase Soviet military strength. Soviet exchanges in the educational field are to engage in disseminating political messages and conducting strategic deception. Exchanges in the arts and sports are to conduct "conditioning" propaganda, designed to "soften up" audiences to make them more susceptible to subsequent political

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messages. Sportsmen are often Spetsnaz personnel conducting reconnaissance operations with an eye to future military special operations. Scientific and technical exchangees are sent mostly to acquire U.S. technology for the Soviet military.

2. Our objectives are either not entirely clear or not entirely reciprocal. When Secretary Shultz made his initial pitch for an exchange agreement and opening new consulates a year ago, his memo to the President was entitled "Promoting Political Change in the USSR." This was a clear public diplomacy objective as set forth in NSDD 75. In subsequent strategy memoranda, however, it soon became clear that the Presidentially mandated objective of promoting political change through public diplomacy was taking a distant second place to the higher State Department priority, namely, improved relations between governments as opposed to peoples. In the current strategy there is no reference to promoting political change and the draft agreements are presently constructed entirely to promote government-to-government relations as opposed to public diplomacy.
3. Governmental objectives versus Exchangee objectives. Because of the way the Soviet system works, Soviet exchangees and hosts will almost all be working as Soviet government agents. Most will have been trained to conduct their specific propagandistic or other missions with the result that the Soviet government's objectives will be congruent with those of their exchangees. Because of the nature of our system, the same cannot be the case with our exchangees and American hosts, most of whom will participate, not for purposes of encouraging political change or detente, but for the advancement of culture, knowledge or their own personal careers.
4. Granting Versus Receiving Legitimacy. Almost any exchange agreement of this sort will have the effect of giving the Soviet regime the appearance of having the legitimacy it craves but can never have in reality -- both in international eyes as well as internally. When a genuine American Congressman or journalist exchanges visits with Soviet government propagandists disguised as "Parliamentarians" or "journalists," we are accomplices to a deception. We, of course, gain no reciprocal benefits in legitimacy. And, in addition, we give up one of the only forms of leverage we have in dealing with the Soviets. As Dr. Pipes wrote in his recent article, this leverage "consists in doing nothing that might enhance the legitimacy of the Soviet dictatorship." Thus, if we are to avoid the worst potential pitfalls, the challenge we face is to attempt to have exchanges with real people, and genuine, legitimate organizations and not with fake ones.

Given these realities, most any agreement we sign is likely to be unreciprocal and therefore biased in favor of Soviet interests. The Soviets have many times declared their support of such agreements: they certainly are not going to buy a pig in a poke. The agreement at hand is something the Soviets will sign with alacrity (after trying to squeeze more from us in negotiations), because it gives the appearance of reciprocity in form but is utterly unreciprocal in political substance.

Defects in the State Department Strategy and Draft Agreements

1. The principal defect is that the existing documents are based on the premise of accepting Soviet institutions at face value. This is nothing other than falling for the ruse of Potemkin villages, and transmitting the message to the world that these Potemkin villages are the reality of Soviet life. The draft agreements are constructed so that we will deal with ersatz organizations rather than real ones, with Soviet government agents rather than with real authors, editors, artists and Parliamentarians. These documents were drafted with complete disregard to the Action Plan for Public Diplomacy on U.S.-Soviet Relations (which both you and Under Secretary Eagleburger approved after full interagency clearance). This Action Plan specifically says: "an Exchanges Agreement should attempt to maximize contacts with unofficial society (rather than with ersatz 'Soviet life' as it is displayed by the Soviet regime). Specifically, we should attempt, where possible, to provide for relations with such unofficial groups as exist in the USSR rather than official groups." The State Department documents have no provisions which follow this advice.

2. The existing documents include certain types of exchanges which do not really serve the goals of the Agreement as set forth in its preamble, namely "to promote better understanding between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and to help improve the general state of relations between the two countries." Specifically, scientific and technical exchanges are only of extremely limited value to the achievement of these goals. There is even a tacit admission of this fact in the strategy's expressed desire to limit scientific and technical exchanges to no more than 50 percent of academic exchanges. In fact, this represents recognition that the Soviets are less interested in the stated objectives than in securing technological and military advantages. And, indeed, the aforementioned Action Plan specifically recommends that scientific and technical contacts be reduced. There is consequently no reason why we should not restrict academic exchanges to those which actually promote better understanding between peoples.

3. Insofar as the existing documents would have us deal with official and ersatz Soviet institutions, they put us in the position of being accomplices to Soviet efforts to enforce communist conformity within the USSR. By receiving exchangees that are to be chosen by the Soviet government, we encourage subservience by Soviet citizens to the regime. This occurs

because the exchange agreement enables the regime to reward faithful conformists with one of the most coveted of Soviet luxuries: plum trips abroad and the chance to escape the gray tedium of Soviet daily life. This process, needless to say, can only help to demoralize those Soviet citizens who seek true artistic and scholarly independence from Soviet ideological strictures. It is ironic that these people, who are spiritually the greatest allies America has in Soviet society, will be the very ones denied the fresh breath of air of freedom that an exchange could give them. I seriously doubt that this is the result the President wants to be responsible for.

4. The existing documents contain large loopholes on the question of reciprocity in access to the respective societies. The State Department is forever complaining about lack of access to Soviet officialdom, and in its previous strategy papers, stressed that an exchange agreement would improve this situation. Perhaps the draft Agreements will help this objective a little but they certainly give short shrift to the real access problem, namely, access to people, to libraries, to research facilities, to the mass media, and to different regions of the USSR. The existing documents offer complete lack of reciprocity in travel. Soviet exchangees are not prohibited from entering areas in the U.S. that are closed to Soviet diplomats, whereas U.S. exchangees in the USSR (with very few exceptions) are so restricted. This lack of reciprocity is compounded by the fact that Soviet closed areas are much larger in practice than on the official maps, and total some 99 percent of Soviet territory. U.S. exchangees will thus be restricted to the remaining one percent which Soviet citizens call "Soviet Tourlandia."

5. The State Department documents fail to cover critical features of exchanged TV appearances. The President might appear on Soviet TV, but as things stand, the Soviets might demand prior censorship of his remarks (if the State Department drafters themselves don't try to reduce the speech to the level of self-censored pabulum that appears in America Illustrated). Further, the President's remarks might be translated for Soviet viewers by a Soviet interpreter who, as has happened in the past, will employ a tone of indifference, impatience, exasperation, turgidity, pompousness, ridicule and acid. In addition, State's draft ignores the possibility and desirability of TV appearances by people other than official representatives. U.S. Government officials will always be restrained from telling the blunt truth and conducting optimum public diplomacy because of the exigencies of bilateral governmental relations.

6. The proposal to engage in joint cooperation in film projects, TV, and textbooks is an idea with a very dubious track record that we should avoid at all costs. Such projects will pit trained Soviet professional propagandists against naive American idealists. The net result will inevitably be like previous such endeavors: namely, Soviet propaganda (e.g., the jointly produced propaganda film, The Unknown War, narrated by Burt Lancaster, but with 98 percent Soviet film footage).

7. For all its emphasis on exhibits, State has failed to construct sufficient precautions in its draft agreement. There is no assurance of free and unlimited access to U.S. exhibits in the USSR, and no suggested mechanisms, like U.S. responsibility for security inside and outside the exhibits, which could ensure such access. The idea that the subject matter of exhibits should be subject to diplomatic agreement violates the entire purpose of the enterprise. Each side should be free to exhibit whatever it chooses. And if the Soviets object to this, they will be telling us unequivocally that their objectives are not as stated in the agreement's preamble.

8. The regular references in the agreement to the Russian language as the language of the USSR serves only to legitimize Soviet efforts at Russification of the captive nations within the Soviet empire. All references to language study exchanges should include the possibility of studying other Soviet languages, e.g., Ukrainian, Armenian, Uzbek, etc.

9. The reference to "nation-wide" Soviet television is an example of sloppy semantics which gives legitimacy to the idea that the Soviet empire is a real nation. This only has the effect of supporting the grip the Soviets have over real nations which desire the right to self-determination.

10. The State documents omit other categories of possible exchangeees such as workers, farmers, churchmen and seminarians, and real youth of the ages 13 to 25 (the kind the Soviets spirited out of Moscow during the 1980 Olympics to isolate them from foreign influences). Any Soviet youth involved in State's proposed exchange agreement will inevitably turn out to be 45-year old Komsomol apparatchiks.

11. Finally, State's strategy utterly fails to address one critical issue which an exchange agreement was supposed to solve (at least according to previous State Department justifications). This is the problem of private exchanges that go on outside the framework of any agreement. If we are to be sensitive about the counterintelligence issues here, the draft agreement should channel all exchanges through the official exchanges framework.

Suggested Remedies to Approach Greater Reciprocity

In addition to those remedies that are suggested by the above defects, there are a variety of other constructive measures we can add to the draft agreements and to our overall exchanges policy to attempt to approach what is in fact unachievable -- namely, full reciprocity. Among others, these measures include:

- Changing the principle by which exchanges are invited from exclusively a "sending side nominates" principle to a 50-50 arrangement between that principle and a "receiving side invites" principle.

- Inviting groups unaffiliated with Party or state except where such groups do not exist. (E.g., there are independent peace groups, veterans' rights groups, handicapped peoples' rights groups, human rights groups, cultural heritage groups, etc.).
- Establishing an independent Board of International Exchanges (BIE), analagous to the Board for International Broadcasting, which would identify non-official groups and uncoopted individuals, establish criteria for measuring their true independence from the regime, and put these people in contact with their U.S. counterparts. This mechanism would enable us to invite scholars who refused to participate in regime-organized revocations of refuseniks' academic degrees, or scholars who refused to sign official letters attacking Sakharov. This process would give moral support and encouragement to conscientious behavior rather than rewarding subservience to the regime and complicity in official violations of human rights.
- Changing the visa granting process so that we can enforce reciprocity and enhance our negotiating position.
- Proposing permanent exhibits in the respective capitals which would distribute literature, show films, etc. These should have unlimited access with Americans and not Soviets providing security on the outside at the Moscow exhibition site.
- Establishing a training program for U.S. exchangees and hosts. All participants would have to read materials explaining: the realities of Soviet life, the types of Potemkin villages they will be shown, what to expect from Soviet exchangees and hosts, and how Soviet personnel are trained in propaganda, disinformation and technology theft techniques.
- Establishing a debriefing program for U.S. exchangees.

These and other, more specific remedies are outlined in Tab A, an attachment with NSC-recommended changes for the draft agreements and our exchanges policy. If you agree with these recommended changes, this attachment would accompany the Kimmitt-Hill memorandum at Tab I.

Conclusion

The State Department documents, as they stand, amount to a windfall for the Soviets in political, technological, propaganda, disinformation and espionage benefits. The lack of reciprocity in these documents can send the Soviets only one message: we are not serious about public diplomacy, but rather, we are so eager for the appearances of good relations between governments that we are willing to be accomplices to Soviet deceptions and willing to sacrifice principle as well as reciprocal political benefits to ourselves.

If better bilateral governmental relations are what we really want here, then there are better ways of doing it than running the many political, intelligence and even military risks to which State's documents will subject us.

If we want to be serious about upholding the first pillar of the President's policy toward the USSR, namely "realism" (in addition to "strength" and "willingness to negotiate"), then we must reconstruct our negotiating position so as to enhance realistic perceptions of the USSR rather than subverting them as the current documents will do.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to send the attached memorandum (Tab I) to the Department of State with the accompanying set of NSC changes (Tab A).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That you share this memo with the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Proposed Kimmitt to Hill memorandum.

Tab A Attachment to Tab I.

cc: Jack Matlock
Walt Raymond
Steve Steiner
Ken de Graffenreid

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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SYSTEM II
90307

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Exchanges Agreement with the USSR (S)

The strategy paper for negotiations with the USSR on exchanges with accompanying draft agreements transmitted by your memorandum to Mr. McFarlane of March 23 has not been approved. (S)

Attached at Tab A is a list of NSC changes to the negotiating strategy, the draft agreements and our overall exchanges policy. These changes should be incorporated into a new strategy paper and new draft agreements and then these should be submitted for full interagency review to the U.S.-Soviet Public Diplomacy Subcommittee of the International Political Committee, the TTIC/Committee on Exchanges, and the IG for Counterintelligence. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Tab A NSC Changes to U.S.-USSR Exchanges Policy (S)

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NLRR F06-114/11 #11867

BY KML NARA DATE 4/12/11

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SYSTEM II
90307 - Tab A

NSC Changes to U.S.-USSR Exchanges Policy (S)

What follows is a list of changes that should be made in our general negotiating strategy, the draft General Agreement, the draft Program of Exchanges and our overall exchanges policy. (S)

1. Both the General Agreement and the Program of Exchanges should be amended to take into account the exchanges policy as determined by the Action Plan for Public Diplomacy on U.S.-Soviet Relations, approved by the NSC on December 5, 1983. Specifically the agreements should be reconstructed so as to maximize contact with non-official Soviet groups and individuals. The principle here is to avoid equating genuine Congressmen, journalists, etc., with ersatz Soviet parliamentarians, "journalists," etc., and thus to ensure that exchanges will be on a genuine people-to-people basis as opposed to a people-to-government basis. (S)
2. Exchanges should be conducted only with non-official groups and individuals except in fields where they do not exist. These include: human rights groups, independent peace groups (such as the Group for the Promotion of Trust between the U.S. and USSR), the Group for the Defense of the Rights of Disabled People, the independent Veterans' rights group, The All-Russian Society for the Preservation of the Monuments of History and Culture, samizdat writers and publishers, etc. (S)
3. To facilitate exchanges with independent groups and individuals, the principle by which exchangees should be nominated should be changed from exclusively "sending-side nominates" to a 50-50 arrangement between that principle and "receiving-side invites." (S)
4. The agreements should be modified so as to minimize the degree to which the U.S. aids the Soviet regime in its attempts to enforce political conformity. This means we should minimize exchanges with individuals whose political conformity the regime can reward with exchange trips to the United States. Instead, we should seek out individuals who refuse to participate in such regime-orchestrated efforts as revocation of refuseniks' academic credentials, public letters attacking Sakharov, and the like. (S)
5. We should set up an independent agency entitled the Board of International Exchanges (BIE) (analogous to the Board for International Broadcasting), whose responsibilities would include: identifying independent, non-official Soviet groups and individuals, establishing criteria to measure their independence, putting such independent groups in contact with their U.S. counterparts, and reviewing Soviet

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- exchange candidates requested by U.S. private groups. The last of these functions is important because private U.S. parties may have motivations for receiving Soviet visitors that are irrelevant or contrary to the purposes of the exchanges, such as career advancement, justification of monetary claims on universities for return visits to the USSR, etc. (S)
6. Full reciprocity in access to people, mass media, libraries, archives, research facilities, copying machines, and geographic areas should be ensured in the texts. Soviet exchangeees should be subject to the same travel restrictions as Soviet diplomats, or American exchangeees must be permitted access to those closed areas of the USSR that reciprocate U.S. restricted areas. All publications of articles and other literature, and media appearances by Soviet exchangeees must be reported to the BIE, which, in turn, will ensure that analogous media in the USSR will offer reciprocal opportunities for publication and media appearances. The agreements should be modified to contain such a media-access provision. (S)
 7. All private exchanges must be subsumed under the framework of these agreements. (S)
 8. All Soviet exchanges must be subjected to prior review by the interagency group on Counter-Intelligence and the Interagency Committee on Exchanges. (S)
 9. No scientific or technical exchanges will be part of these agreements. (S)
 10. All references to joint cooperation in film projects, TV, textbooks and the like should be eliminated from these agreements. (S)
 11. The provisions on exchanged TV appearances should incorporate the following points: a) U.S. speakers will have the right to use a U.S. interpreter over Soviet TV and vice versa; b) U.S. representatives must be permitted to monitor the TV signal (while the U.S. speaker is on the air) in locations throughout the USSR and vice versa; c) if the signal is not sufficiently widespread, subsequent TV appearances by the opposite side will be reduced accordingly; d) there will be no prior review or censorship of televised remarks; and e) 50 percent of TV speakers must have no professional affiliation with party or state. The choice of American non-governmental spokesmen will be made by the National Endowment for Democracy. (S)
 12. The U.S. will unequivocally reject any Soviet attempt in negotiations to secure the return of defectors. (S)

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Tab A

13. Before negotiations proceed, the U.S. will change the existing visa-granting process to permit foreign policy controls. This must be done either: a) by final passage of new legislation eliminating the McGovern Amendment; or b) invoking the Baker Amendment until such time as it may be necessary to change existing law. This will immediately enhance our negotiating position and establish immediate control over private exchanges. (S)
14. All "Congressional" and federal (or All-Union) government exchanges should be eliminated from these agreements. If governmental exchanges are to take place, it should be in the category of tourism. (S)
15. No exchanges between journalists or trade union officials should take place unless it can be determined that the Soviet participants are not representatives of the Soviet government. (S)
16. The distribution of publications should be made fully reciprocal. The two sides should be able to distribute copies of America Illustrated and Soviet Life to any citizen of the other country free of charge, not just at exhibits but through kiosks or other vending devices. Diplomatic personnel should be permitted to share these publications with any citizen of the host country. (S)
17. The provisions on exhibits should not include any references to prior diplomatic approval of the exhibits' contents. Instead the agreement will represent the good faith of both parties to conduct exhibit exchanges in the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act. Access to exhibits must be free and unrestricted. Security both inside and outside the exhibit halls will be provided by the exhibiting country so as to ensure free access. The U.S. will propose as part of the agreement (and will make public the proposal when it is put forward) that both sides should establish permanent exhibits in each other's capitals where the public can have free access to books, films, television programs, and other exhibits. (S)
18. The U.S. shall make proposals for exchanges of workers, farmers, churchmen, seminarians and other non-official, independent groups. Youth exchanges should also be included, however with the definition of "youth" specified as including persons 13-to-25 years old. Our youth strategy -- especially for high schoolers -- should include large numbers of exchangees, include unstructured itineraries (so the youth can engage in independent explorations) and should encompass long periods of time (several months). (S)
19. The treaty language should not contain any politically-oriented homonyms which can be subject to different, ideologically-based interpretations. As an example, the

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Tab A

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word "cooperation" should be eliminated from the agreement's title. The purpose here is not only to avoid differing interpretations but to avoid gratuitous legitimation of illegitimate Soviet institutions and concepts. (S)

20. The reference to "nation-wide" Soviet TV should be changed to "country-wide" so as to avoid legitimizing Soviet "nationhood." (S)
21. A training program, composed mostly of written briefing materials, must be initiated for all U.S. exchangees and hosts as a mandatory requirement for participation. Materials must explain: the basic nature of the Soviet system, what to expect from Soviet exchangees and hosts, and how the Soviets are trained in propaganda, disinformation, and technology theft techniques. This is to help the process of understanding the USSR. (S)
22. All references to the Russian language as the official Soviet language should be eliminated from the agreements. These only serve to legitimize Soviet efforts at Russification. Instead all references to language exchanges must include the possibility of the choice of language so that U.S. exchangees might study Ukrainian, Armenian, etc. (S)
23. The U.S. should establish a debriefing program for all U.S. exchangees travelling to the USSR. This should be done in cooperation with the intelligence community as well as with those agencies working on public diplomacy. (S)
24. All sports exchanges should take place in a single locality to be recommended by the counterintelligence community so as to avoid giving Soviet Spetsnaz personnel the opportunity for reconnaissance operations. (S)
25. U.S. negotiators are instructed not to yield on any question of reciprocal access. (S)

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

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Washington, D.C. 20535

BY LIAISON

Date: April 12, 1984

To: Mr. Ken de Graffenreid
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Ms. Dianne Dornan

From: Edward J. O'Malley *EJO*
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division

Subject: [REDACTED]

This document is classified "~~Secret~~" in its entirety.

Reference is made to a draft memorandum to Mr. Robert C. McFarlane, the White House, dated March 23, 1984, entitled as above, item 4, Educational/Academic Exchanges.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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Add On

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April 24, 1984


MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Supplemental Instructions on Agreement with USSR
on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation (S)

In addition to the instructions in my memorandum of April 21, 1984 the following change should be made to the draft agreement.

The last sentence of paragraph 8 on page 27 which reads "Academic programs drawn up at the beginning of the year can, with the approval of the academic advisors, be corrected and supplemented in the course of the academic year," should be deleted. This provision would provide a loophole to avoid our technology transfer restrictions.

cc: ☒ Jack Matlock
Ken DeGraffenreid

for 
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRRF06-114/11 #11872

BY KML NARA DATE 4/22/11

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