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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/26/2005

File Folder USSR-TREATIES/AGREEMENTS 3/24

FOIA

F06-114/11

Box Number 37

YARHI-MILO

3706

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11794	MEMO	LEVINE TO KIMMITT RE SOVIET ATTENDANCE AT UPCOMING WASHINGTON, D.C. MEETING ON ANTARTICA <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	10/25/1983	B1
11795	MEMO	KIMMITT TO HILL RE ANTARTICA: SOVIET ATTENDANCE AT A JANUARY MEETING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	ND	B1
11809	MEMO	HILL TO MCFARLANE RE ANTARTICA-SOVIET ATTENDANCE AT A JANUARY MEETING IN WASHINGTON <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	10/21/1983	B1
11796	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SPACE COOPERATION WITH SOVIETS <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	2	12/22/1983	B1
11797	MEMO	KIMMITT TO RYE RE SPACE COOPERATION WITH SOVIETS <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	12/15/1983	B1
11798	MEMO	LEHMAN/KRAEMER TO MCFARLANE RE CW TALKING POINTS FOR SHULTZ-WEINBERGER BREAKFAST	3	2/21/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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FOIA

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3706

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11799	MEMO	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY RE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ARMS <i>P 1/4/2010 F06-114/11</i>	7	ND	B1
11800	MEMO	JCS COMMENTS; OSD COMMENTS; STATE COMMENTS	3	ND	B1
11801	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE FORTHCOMING VISITS TO MOSCOW <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	3/26/1984	B1
11810	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE FORTHCOMING VISTS TO MOSCOW <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	3/19/1984	B1
11802	MEMO	DORNAN TO MCFARLANE RE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSALS FOR (A) CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS, (B) CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT AND REVIEW OF AGREEMENT ON ECONOMIC, INDUSTRIAL, AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION	3	4/13/1984	B1
11803	MEMO	KIMMITT TO HILL AND ROBBINS RE RENEWAL OF AGREEMENT TO FACILITATE ECONOMIC, INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION WITH USSR <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	6/6/1984	B1

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JET 5/26/2005

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FOIA

F06-114/11

Box Number 37

YARHI-MILO

3706

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11804	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE RENEWAL OF AGREEMENT TO FACILITATE ECONOMIC, INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION WITH USSR <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	6/4/1984	B1
11805	LETTER	BALDRIGE TO SHULTZ RE MEETING WITH SUSHKOV AND DOBRYNIN <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	5/25/1984	B1
11806	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11803 <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	6/6/1984	B1
11807	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11804 <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	6/4/1984	B1
11808	LETTER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11805 <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	5/25/1984	B1
11811	CABLE	310359Z OCT 85 <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	2	10/31/1985	B1
11812	CABLE	010828Z NOV 85 <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	11/1/1985	B1
11813	CABLE	010932Z NOV 85 <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	11/1/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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FOIA

F06-114/11

Box Number 37

YARHI-MILO

3706

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11814	CABLE	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11813 <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	11/1/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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USSR/Malaya

7622

File
11794

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 25, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: RICHARD LEVINE *RL*

SUBJECT: Soviet Attendance at Upcoming Washington, D.C.
Meeting on Antarctica

State has written to notify us that a Soviet delegation will take part in an upcoming multi-national Antarctic Treaty Consultative session (Tab II). This meeting is scheduled for January in Washington, D.C.

Thus far, the Antarctica Treaty sessions have been free of political overtones. It is in our interest to maintain this state of affairs, therefore, we should concur with State's position that we do not bar Soviet participation in this meeting.

✓ *Jack* Jack Matlock and John Lenczowski concur. *JL*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo (Tab I) to Charles Hill.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo for signature
II Incoming memo from Hill

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF06-114/11 #11794

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

3
11795

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
U.S. Department of State

SUBJECT: Antarctica: Soviet Attendance at a January
Meeting in Washington, D.C.

We concur with the State Department's approach as outlined in
your October 21 memo, with regard to Soviet participation in
the forthcoming meeting on Antarctica.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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NLRR F06-114/11 #11795
BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11



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11809

United States Department of State

XR-8332308
Washington, D.C. 20520

7622

October 21, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Antarctica - Soviet Attendance at a
January Meeting in Washington

During the past eighteen months, the sixteen Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, including the U.S. and U.S.S.R., have been engaged in negotiation of a regime for mineral resources in Antarctica. Conclusion of an acceptable regime is an important objective of U.S. Antarctic policy and would strengthen the Antarctic Treaty system which has preserved peace and international cooperation in the region for the past two decades.

At the most recent round of negotiations in Bonn, last July, there was general agreement that informal discussions in a working group (which had been established at the Bonn session) offered the best means of achieving further progress. There was also a general view that Washington was the most convenient venue for the informal meeting and that it should take place in January. By hosting the informal session we would have the opportunity to move the negotiations forward, as well as to influence drafting of the necessary agreement at an important point in its elaboration.

Activities under the Antarctic Treaty generally have been free of political overtones. Soviet attendance would be consistent with our past practice and that of the other Consultative Parties--Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, France, the FRG, India, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, and the U.K. Delegations to the meeting would be small and composed of working level representatives. Therefore, unless you perceive objection in our doing so, we intend to proceed to issue invitations to the meeting, including an invitation to the U.S.S.R.

*Charles Hill*Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLRR F06-114/11 #11809

DECL: OADR

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11796 6
SYSTEM II
91489
Treaties/Agreements~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 22, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Space Cooperation with Soviets

One of our most successful projects during the "detente" period was the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz joint mission. It was technically successful and got extensive publicity in both countries, being seen as a highly tangible symbol of cooperation.

Cooperation with the Soviets in this area has obvious potential for undesirable technology transfer. I am not competent to judge this aspect of it; I do recall that in the atmosphere of the 70's we judged that we got about as much out of it on the technology side as they did. I am not sure that this was an accurate judgment, however.

If we consider the technology transfer aspects manageable, it would be a powerful political gesture, indicating our willingness to consider limited cooperation in an important and highly visible area of activity. There are obvious political pros and cons for such a decision.

PRO

- Would symbolize our willingness to cooperate;
- Would attract major attention;
- Would be welcomed in many quarters in Congress and by our Allies.

CON

- Would have undesirable overtones of a "return to detente";
- Could lead to undesirable transfer of militarily-relevant technology;
- Unless accompanied by a general improvement in the political atmosphere, might be viewed by the Soviets as merely a propaganda stunt designed to embarrass them.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR EOL-114/11 #11796

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

If we decide that the Pros outweigh the Cons and wish to propose it, I would strongly suggest that the question be discussed with the Soviets privately in advance of inclusion in the State of the Union Message. If we spring it on them in a public statement, the Soviets will conclude that it is merely propaganda gesture, and furthermore one designed to capitalize on their recent embarrassments with their space station and the unalloyed success of the Columbia missions.

Therefore, if such a proposal is to be included in the State of the Union Message, I would suggest that we tell the Soviets in early January that we are interested in restoring cooperation in the field of peaceful use of outer space, that we will be making specific proposals in the near future, and that the President intends to announce our readiness to cooperate in this area when he makes his State of the Union address. (If we are in a position then to be more specific regarding the type of project we have in mind, that would also be a useful part of the message.)

cc: Gilbert Rye
Ron Lehman

MEMORANDUM

System II
91489

11797 8

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

December 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR GILBERT D. RYE

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*
SUBJECT: Space Cooperation with Soviets (C)

As you know, the State of the Union speech will have a major section on space. Bud and I discussed this morning whether the President should call for closer international cooperation in space, including with the Soviet Union. Bud would like your assessment of what the pros and cons would be of such a call vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. How would they respond publicly? Is there the possibility they can turn this to their advantage rhetorically or strategically? (C)

Please provide a memo to Bud by Monday, December 19. (U)

cc: Jack Matlock
Ron Lehman

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/11 #11797

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

10
A

TAB A

TAB 1

Executive Summary

FOIA(b)(3)

On January 4, 1982, the President signed NSDD-18, approving U.S. policy on chemical and biological weapons (CBW) arms control. This policy directive established, inter alia, that the U.S. would: (1) support the eventual objective of concluding a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons (CW) development, production and stockpiling; and (2) participate in work toward this end in the 40-nation Geneva Committee on Disarmament (CD) while "allowing the U.S./Soviet negotiations to lapse informally." In this context, it was recognized that, for the foreseeable future, ~~Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted~~. Therefore, the President directed that, in support of U.S. CW arms control objectives, a study be conducted, and recommendations submitted, on United States Government positions with respect to verification.

Pursuant to that directive, the study has been conducted by the Working Group of the Chemical and Biological (CBW) Arms Control Interdepartmental Group (IG). The study:

- (1) examines the activities and capabilities which contribute to an offensive CW warfighting capability;
- (2) assesses the level of verification needed for each activity and whether differing levels should be applied to certain states or categories of states;
- (3) evaluates current monitoring capabilities;
- (4) identifies monitoring problem areas;
- (5) outlines a series of specific measures, in addition to NTM, for enhancing verification; and
- (6) presents proposals for a U.S. position on verification of a comprehensive CW ban.

[illegible]

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NLRR FD-6-114/11 # 11799
BY RW NARA DATE 1-5-10

-2-

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-3-

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-4-

The Working Group submits the following for the U.S. position on verification of a comprehensive CW ban:

1. With respect to CW development, the U.S. position should be that:

- The accuracy of states' declarations concerning CW development facilities should be subject to verification using challenge procedures.
- Parties should be required to provide, on a regular basis, information about R&D activities involving the use of permitted quantities of key CW agents and other relevant information which could contribute to building confidence in states' compliance.

2. With respect to CW production, the U.S. position should be that:

- The accuracy of states' declarations concerning CW production/filling facilities and activities should be subject to international confirmation/verification promptly after declarations are made. All declared CW production/filling facilities should be submitted to international on-site inspection.
- Immediately following confirmatory inspection, all declared CW production and filling facilities should be completely shutdown, according to agreed procedures, and secured, using tamper-resistant, remote monitoring sensors. This should be verified by international authorities. An inventory of key equipment, verified by international authorities, should also be submitted.
- Thirty days after treaty entry into force for each party, states possessing chemical weapons should be required to submit a description of the methods and general timetable it will follow in destroying each of its declared CW production/filling facilities.
- Destruction of all CW production/filling facilities (by razing), and their equipment, should be verified by on-site monitoring of the operation by an international team of expert representatives.
- All declared plants producing chemicals agreed to pose a particular risk, but for purposes permitted

~~SECRET~~

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-5-

under the treaty, should be subject to on-site inspection on a random basis by an international team of expert representatives.

- Permitted production of super-toxic lethal chemicals up to an agreed amount, at a single, specialized production facility, should be subject to verification by a system combining tamper-resistant sensors and periodic, international on-site inspection.

3. With respect to CW stockpiling, the U.S. position should be that:

- The accuracy of states' declarations concerning CW stockpiles should be subject to confirmation/verification by international on-site inspection promptly after declaration.
- Immediately following confirmatory inspection, storage facilities should be secured by international inspectors using tamper-resistant remote monitoring sensors.
- Within thirty days after entry into force of the agreement for each party, each state possessing chemical weapons should be required to submit to international authorities a description of the methods and approximate timetable it will follow in destroying its CW stocks.
- Movement of CW stocks from storage sites to facilities for destruction should be verified by international monitoring at the storage site and destruction facility.
- Destruction of CW stocks should be subject to systematic international on-site verification. Remote monitoring sensors, as well as international inspectors, should be used. International inspectors should be present continuously during destruction operations.

4. With respect to CW transfer, the U.S. position should be that:

- The accuracy of declarations, as well as activities which raise concerns about compliance with the non-transfer obligation, should be subject to verification using challenge procedures.

~~SECRET~~

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-6-

- Verification of the declaration and destruction of CW agent/munitions and CW production capabilities transferred to another state party(ies) prior to entry into force of the agreement will be as specified in 2. and 3. above.

5. With respect to challenge verification measures, the U.S. position should be that:

- In the event any Party to the agreement has evidence or other compelling information which gives rise to concerns that another party is not complying in whole or part with its obligations under the treaty, that state should have the right to challenge the party which gave rise to such concerns and request clarification, including on-site inspection.
- Parties should not have a right to refuse inspection of declared CW storage sites or production facilities.
- With respect to other facilities/sites, if any Party rejects a challenge or a requested on-site inspection, all parties to the agreement should be informed and the UN Security Council should be promptly notified.

6. With respect to arrangements for conduct of on-site inspections, the U.S. position should be that:

- All parties should be strictly obligated not to interfere with or obstruct in any way the conduct of an on-site inspection.
- No bureaucratic constraints (e.g., failure to issue visas promptly, governmental travel approval, lack of appropriate Host Country liaison) should be imposed which would interfere with the inspection or provide the Host Country with sufficient advance notification of the declared plant to be inspected so that possible prohibited activities could be covered up prior to the inspection.

7. With respect to verification research, the U.S. position should be that:

- A co-ordinated program of CW verification research should be initiated by the Government.

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-7-

8. With respect to future CW treaty compliance requirements, the U.S. position should be that:

- A long-range plan for an interagency compliance monitoring support team, including assessments and recommendations for the additional personnel and funding resources required, should be developed.*
- An internal USG intelligence assessment and policy mechanism for early identification and action concerning possible compliance problems should be developed and established.**

* The DCI accepts that the Executive Branch should develop such a plan for the policy aspects, but notes that for the intelligence aspects, the need for this plan appears to be overtaken by events in the NSC Verification Committee and within US intelligence; e.g., by the agreement for analytic enhancements to the FY 85 intelligence budget and by the creation of a separate budget category for FY 86 and later years.

** The DCI believes this step is not needed, because such a mechanism already exists in the NSC Verification Committee.

~~SECRET~~

B

TAB B

TAB C

C

PM PRESS GUIDANCE
Thursday, January 19, 1984

Chemical Weapons Arms Control

Q: Today's Washington Post reported that Defense Secretary Weinberger and some other Administration officials were surprised at Secretary Shultz's announcement, earlier this week in Stockholm, that the U.S. would be tabling a draft treaty in Geneva for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Is this correct?

A: -- The Administration has long been studying the various components of an effective and verifiable chemical weapons ban. The Vice President presented our detailed views on the subject last February at the Committee on Disarmament.

Secretary Shultz's announcement is the culmination of this work and represents Administration views on the complete elimination of chemical weapons.

-- As we proceed with developing a specific treaty text, therefore, we will look for concrete evidence in the CD that the Soviet Union is now prepared to endorse the specific steps required to assure effective verification arrangements for such a ban. Given the record of Soviet non-compliance, we will insist that such arrangements are truly effective in assuring that an agreement will be fully observed.

IF PRESSED (regarding Weinberger's views):

-- I have no knowledge of that. In any case, we do not comment on internal Administration deliberations.

~~Diplomatic~~
~~Trailer~~

~~Mallock~~

File

3/27

usds-

- pres noted
- pls close out
- no folder

K

National Security Council
The White House

1060

System # I
Package # 2270

84 MAR 20 P 5: 39

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>Wm</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Tom Shull			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President has seen _____

2270

1984 MAR 23 10:44

11801

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 26, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: Forthcoming Visits to Moscow

George Shultz has sent you the memorandum at Tab A, calling your attention to plans of a number of Allied Foreign Ministers and several prominent private Americans to visit Moscow during the spring and early summer.

As George points out, we can expect the Soviets to try to use these visits to bring pressure to bear on us to make unilateral concessions.

Attachment:

Tab A - Memorandum from Secretary Shultz of March 19, 1984

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

cc: Vice President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/11 # 11801

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 20, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *AGW*
SUBJECT: Forthcoming Visits to Moscow

Secretary Shultz has sent the President a Memorandum calling his attention to a number of forthcoming visits to Moscow, by the German, Portuguese and British Foreign Ministers, and by several private Americans, including Congresswoman Pat Schroeder, the Co-Chairperson of Senator Hart's national campaign.

Recommendation:

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve ☒Disapprove ☐

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Shultz-President Memorandum of March 19, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CRS NARA, Date 2/8/02

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

84 MAR 20 A 3: 37

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: Forthcoming Visits to Moscow

We are now entering a period of more active East-West diplomacy. With Chernenko, the Soviets once again have a leader who can meet with foreign visitors. We are already witnessing an increase in prospective visits by Allied Foreign Ministers to the USSR:

-- German Foreign Minister Genscher has accepted an invitation from Gromyko to visit Moscow May 21-22;

-- Portuguese Foreign Minister Gama also plans to be in Moscow in May; and

-- British Foreign Secretary Howe is scheduled to visit Moscow July 2-3.

In addition to talks at the Foreign Minister level, the Soviets may fête each visitor with a session with the new General Secretary.

These may just be the beginning of an upsurge in pilgrimages to the Kremlin, as our Allies try to demonstrate that they are doing their part to explore the possibilities of improving the West's relations with the new Soviet leadership. As they did with SPD leader Vogel, the Soviets will try to use the Allied visits as a means of putting pressure on us to make unilateral concessions toward Moscow.

As government-to-government contacts increase, we can also expect an increase in visits to Moscow by American political figures, academics and private "peace" groups, along with reciprocal visits to the U.S. by their Soviet counterparts. Much of this will be critical of the Administration's policies. For example, the Co-Chairperson of Gary Hart's National Campaign, Pat Schroeder, is leading a delegation of Congresswomen to Moscow for talks on arms control in mid-April. The U.S. and Soviet scientists who last year publicized the "nuclear winter" concept are continuing to cooperate, and Senator Kennedy may attend one of their sessions in Moscow this spring.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

NLRRF06-114/11 #11810

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: MR. MCFARLANE
FROM: JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Long-Term Agreement
and Joint Commercial Commission

Regarding your note on Wilma's attached memo, the Baldrige letter has been approved and should have been delivered to Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Patolichev by Hartman today.

I have a call in to Verity to fill him in on this before his luncheon with Dobrynin.

35
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1984

FOR: AMB MATLOCK

FROM: Wilma Hall *WJH*

Mr. McFarlane would like for
you to call Bill Verity
re the attached.

Thanks.

24
June 13, 1984
8:30 AM

RCM:

Bill Verity called --

He is having lunch with Amb Dobrynin today. He expects that Dobrynin will ask if there is any word for Sushkov. In his meeting with you, Sushkov asked if you would consider reinstatement of the Commission at the Ministerial level that existed in 1979 between the US and the Soviet Government that had to do with trade; the way to get that started again is to start at a much lower level. You said that you would take a look at it and get back to Dobrynin.

Verity just wanted to check with you to get guidance on how you would like for him to handle this subject if Dobrynin raises it.

Do you wish to offer any guidance to Verity?

_____ Yes: _____

☒ Ask Matlock to call Verity

_____ No

Other: _____

Wilma

Bill Verity
Hay Adams Hotel
Suite 706
638-2260

*And let's move this
to a decision working
w/ State & Commerce*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 6, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MRS. HELEN ROBBINS
Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Department of Commerce

SUBJECT: Renewal of Agreement to Facilitate Economic,
Industrial and Technological Cooperation with USSR
(C)

Secretary Baldrige requested our review of a proposed letter to the Soviet Government which provides formal notification of our willingness to renew the Long Term Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation, and proposes that a working group be convened to establish the groundwork for a session of the U.S.-USSR Joint Commercial Commission. The draft letter was forwarded to the Department of State under cover of a letter of May 25, 1984, from Secretary Baldrige to Secretary Shultz. (C)

We have reviewed the draft letter in question and concur in the text. (U)


Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 506-114/11 #11803

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

MEMORANDUM


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 4, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER


FROM: JACK MATLOCK SUBJECT: Renewal of Agreement to Facilitate Economic,
Industrial and Technological Cooperation with USSR

Secretary Baldrige sent us a copy of a letter to Secretary Shultz on May 25, which reported on his conversation with Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Sushkov and transmitted a draft letter which would notify the Soviets officially of our willingness to renew the Long Term Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation and to convene a meeting of a working group to prepare for a session of the Joint Commercial Commission established by that agreement. Secretary Baldrige requested our approval of the draft letter.

State has now reviewed the draft letter and concurs. Bud saw an advance copy and noted that it looks OK to him. I have, therefore, prepared a memorandum from Kimmitt to Robbins and Hill approving the letter for transmittal.

Recommendation:

That you approve transmittal of the memorandum at TAB I.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to Robbins and Hill
Tab II	Incoming Correspondence

cc: Fortier
Levine
Robinson~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E06-114/11 #11804

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

~~SECRET~~



7480 39
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
Washington, D.C. 20230
11805

04 MAY 25 P 4: 20

MAY 25 1984

Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear George,

I met this morning with Soviet Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Sushkov and Ambassador Dobrynin. Following up on my conversations with you and Bud McFarlane, I informed them of the U.S. Government's willingness to renew the Long Term Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation (EITCA). I indicated this would be a simple extension which should be accomplished by an exchange of diplomatic notes.

We also discussed the possibility of convening a Working Group of Experts, as provided for by Article III of the Agreement, to explore ways of expanding our trade relationship. Sushkov and Dobrynin proposed that we begin by convening a meeting of the ministerial-level Joint Commercial Commission. In response, I indicated that we should hold the Working Group of Experts meeting first, and if that meeting is successful in establishing the groundwork for a meeting of the Joint Commercial Commission, a meeting of the Commission could be held when practical.

Sushkov and Dobrynin indicated that they would welcome a letter setting forth the substance of our discussion, and indicated they anticipated a positive response from their side. I enclose a proposed draft of this letter.

I defer to you as to who should send the letter and to whom in the Soviet government it should be addressed. If you think it appropriate, I would be pleased to send it to Minister of Foreign Trade Patolichev.

Sincerely,


Mac

Secretary of Commerce

Enclosure

cc: Honorable Robert McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/11 # 11805

~~SECRET~~

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

UNCLASSIFIED

40

PROPOSED LETTER TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

Dear _____:

At the May 25, 1984, meeting between Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige and Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Vladimir Sushkov, Secretary Baldrige expressed the willingness of the United States Government to renew the Long Term Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation. This agreement expires June 29, 1984, if not renewed. Secretary Baldrige and Deputy Minister Sushkov also discussed implementation.

Secretary Baldrige proposed that the first step be renewal of the Long Term Agreement without change for a ten-year period, by an exchange of diplomatic notes between the United States and the Soviet Union. Subsequent to renewal of the Agreement, we could convene a meeting of the Working Group of Experts provided for in the Long Term Agreement.

In response to the expressed interest of the Soviet side in convening a meeting of the Joint Commercial Commission, Secretary Baldrige indicated that if the Working Group is successful in establishing the groundwork for a meeting of the Joint Commercial Commission, a meeting of that Commission could be held when practical. The Joint Commercial Commission would discuss obstacles to trade and areas in which mutually beneficial trade could be expanded.

We await the response of the Soviet Union to these proposals.

UNCLASSIFIED

June 13, 1984

41

4280

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RCM HAS SEEN

TO: MR. MCFARLANE
FROM: JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Long-Term Agreement
and Joint Commercial Commission

Regarding your note on Wilma's attached memo, the Baldrige letter has been approved and should have been delivered to Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Patolichev by Hartman today.

I have a call in to Verity to fill him in on this before his luncheon with Dobrynin.

have talked

Y ool
Mary Hank

*file USSK / Reales / 92
Agmts*

June 13, 1984
8:30 AM

RCM:

Bill Verity called --

He is having lunch with Amb Dobrynin today. He expects that Dobrynin will ask if there is any word for Sushkov. In his meeting with you, Sushkov asked if you would consider reinstatement of the Commission at the Ministerial level that existed in 1979 between the US and the Soviet Government that had to do with trade; the way to get that started again is to start at a much lower level. You said that you would take a look at it and get back to Dobrynin.

Verity just wanted to check with you to get guidance on how you would like for him to handle this subject if Dobrynin raises it.

Do you wish to offer any guidance to Verity?

_____ Yes: _____

☒ Ask Matlock to call Verity

_____ No

Other: _____

Wilma

Bill Verity
Hay Adams Hotel
Suite 706
638-2260

*And let's move this
to a decision working
w/ State & Commerce*


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 6, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of StateMRS. HELEN ROBBINS
Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Department of CommerceSUBJECT: Renewal of Agreement to Facilitate Economic,
Industrial and Technological Cooperation with USSR
(C)

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We have reviewed the draft letter in question and concur in the text. (U)



Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLRR F06-114/11 #11806

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 4, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK 

SUBJECT:


Renewal of Agreement to Facilitate Economic,
Industrial and Technological Cooperation with USSR

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Recommendation:

That you approve transmittal of the memorandum at TAB I.

Approve Disapprove ☐

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to Robbins and Hill
Tab II	Incoming Correspondence

cc: Fortier
Levine
Robinson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/11 #11807

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

~~SECRET~~



7900 45
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
Washington, D.C. 20230
11808

04 MAY 25 P 4: 20

MAY 25 1984

Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear George,

I met this morning with Soviet Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Sushkov and Ambassador Dobrynin. Following up on my conversations with you and Bud McFarlane, I informed them of the U.S. Government's willingness to renew the Long Term Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation (EITCA). I indicated this would be a simple extension which should be accomplished by an exchange of diplomatic notes.

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I defer to you as to who should send the letter and to whom in the Soviet government it should be addressed. If you think it appropriate, I would be pleased to send it to Minister of Foreign Trade Patolichev.

Sincerely,

Mac

Secretary of Commerce

Enclosure

cc: Honorable Robert McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/11 # 11808

~~SECRET~~

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

UNCLASSIFIED

41

PROPOSED LETTER TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

Dear _____:

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In response to the expressed interest of the Soviet side in convening a meeting of the Joint Commercial Commission, Secretary Baldrige indicated that if the Working Group is successful in establishing the groundwork for a meeting of the Joint Commercial Commission, a meeting of that Commission could be held when practical. The Joint Commercial Commission would discuss obstacles to trade and areas in which mutually beneficial trade could be expanded.

We await the response of the Soviet Union to these proposals.

UNCLASSIFIED

the fight

Director : Mihai Korné

7/02/85

NUMBER 31

TARIF D'ABONNEMENT ANNUEL

En Francs Français :

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EUROPE

FRF 200
FRF 250

Par avion :

AFRIQUE
AMÉRIQUE DU NORD
ISRAËL
AMÉRIQUE DU SUD
AUSTRALIE

FRF 300
FRF 300
FRF 300
FRF 350
FRF 350

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SHEKEL 2560
USD 51 ou équivalent
DOLLAR AUSTRALIEN 60

125, Bureaux de la Colline - 92213 St-Cloud - France
Téléphone : (33-1) 602.29.29 - Téléc 270152F
Commission Paritaire N° 65481 - C.C.P. : 11 341 71 A Paris

WHAT YALTA WAS AND WHAT IS LEFT ?

Western historians used to represent Yalta as the partition of the world into spheres of influence among those who won the second world war. The result of this interpretation of Yalta is precisely that the Western powers cannot act each time when human rights and the rights of nations are violated by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. In fact, the Western allies have been acting for 40 years like «Pontius Pilate», washing their hands, when referring to Yalta as the historic pretext in order to justify their disastrous political immobility in Europe and to hide their egoism, their moral weakness in front of Soviet imperialism. Obviously, for 40 years «Yalta» has been the magic word of the dictionary used by the responsible politicians of the Free world, always on purpose and also related by the press each time when one tries to politically justify a negative attitude referring to the dramatic events in the Eastern European countries ! This happened in 1953, during the East-German crisis, in 1956 in Poland and Hungary, in 1968 in Czechoslovakia and the «might of Yalta» continues to haunt public opinion in the West even at present.

February 1985 is the 40th anniversary of these famous agreements among the victors, and we therefore have to look closer at the real image of Yalta and free it from those erroneous interpretations !

The truth is that the Yalta agreement was a national discrimination regarding the nations of Eastern Europe.

It was shocking shopping political act when we consider that the three victors of the second worldwar, Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, refused to grant those nations who most suffered during the war and who had a millenary past in the formation of the European civilisation, the right to a full national sovereignty.

It is incredible and unacceptable that the Eastern European countries still cannot enjoy the same international rights according to the Yalta agreement when this refers to national sovereignty at the very moment when each new country in Africa, Asia or the Middle East, which only a few years ago was only a colony, benefit totally from this international right at present.

What does «national sovereignty» mean?

It is the right of each country to chose freely the direction of her foreign policy, and establish its own internal regime, distinct from the one of the surrounding countries.

A country which fully enjoys national sovereignty can freely chose her friends in international policy, her economic relations, her military and political allies, by taking into account only her proper national interests.

At Yalta, these basic rights of national sovereignty were refused to the Eastern European countries.

In accordance with the Yalta agreement, our countries should follow a strongly restricted foreign policy in taking into account the interest of the Soviet Union, even if this policy is contrary to our own national interests !

It is also not accurate to speak of the partition of the world at Yalta, as this does not express the truth in as far as nobody ever required that the Western countries and those of the Third World had to fully follow the foreign policy and the national interest of the United States.

For example, Egypt could change her political orientations like Syria and Iraq who could freely endorse the Moscow policy without being subject to American reaction ; France could leave the military alliance of NATO and Paris was not occupied by the United States armies.

Consequently, we realize that there was no real partition of the world at Yalta, there only was national discrimination referring to the Eastern European countries who lost part of their national sovereignty suppressed in favour of the USSR.

In fact those who gained the Second World War wanted to find a «modus vivendi» for the world, among the two types of totally opposed societies after the end of the war, among capitalism and communism, who had been allied during the war against Hitler's Germany.

The victors tried to create at Yalta the necessary conditions to establish peace for a long period and set up the bases of a pacific coexistence among liberal democracies in the West and the Bolshevism of the Soviet Union.

For this reason, one tried to create at Yalta a corridor of security among the two opposed worlds by using for this purpose the Eastern European countries, obviously without asking their advice.

These sacrificed countries were due to be buffer states, by abandoning a part of their national sovereignty in favour of the Soviet Union in as far as their foreign policy orientations are concerned.

There is, however, another part of the Yalta agreement which has been totally forgotten.

The victors of 1945 committed themselves in a solemn way to guarantee to all nations which were liberated from the Hitler dictatorship, a free and democratic life without fear.

At Yalta, nobody ever mentioned that in these buffer states of Eastern Europe, democracy should also be suppressed in order to establish the dictatorship of the communist

party directed by Moscow.

At Yalta, there was no question that human rights should be constantly violated.

At Yalta, there was no question of building an iron curtain hermetically separating Eastern and Western Europe.

At Yalta, there was no question either that Hungary, Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany and Albania should become territories of Boshevic colonialisation.

The three who met at Yalta, despite restricting to a certain degree national sovereignty of the enumerated countries, nevertheless promised that a free and democratic existence would be granted to the nations who were living in these countries.

Then what remains of the spirit of Yalta ?

A long time ago, it was suppressed by Soviet imperialism, which at present threatens more and more the peace and liberty of the Western world.

These buffer states of Eastern Europe, which were intended at Yalta to establish a zone of security between the Soviet Union and the West, became purely colonised territories of the large Soviet empire.

There no longer exists a security zone among the two worlds ; Yalta no longer exists !

Already, 29 years ago, the Hungarian tragedy of 1956 clearly demonstrated that Moscow does not comply with the Yalta agreement, that it openly violates them cynically in front of world public opinion by bloodily crushing the Hungarian revolution !

Let us clarify a few points of these dramatic events.

In 1956, despite her popular revolution, Hungary did not exceed the Yalta agreement.

Hungary did not want to break her good relations with the Soviet Union, It did not want to follow a foreign policy hostile to Moscow.

Our country wanted only to put an end to her status of submission, and no longer be colonised by the Soviet Union. It wanted to establish new relations with the USSR based upon equality of rights and mutual respect among two states.

In 1956, our people were very moderate, and did not want to change sides, to follow an anti-Soviet and pro-American policy. We wanted to become neutral with regards to the two great powers and at the same time reestablished in our country human rights, freedom, democracy and human dignity as well as a life without fear for each citizen, precisely what the victors of 1945 had promised to all nations liberated from the nazi oppression.

(Continued Page 11)

The first article published by The Fight Nr 30 describes the obstacles facing Western diplomats and politicians, the growing pressure of the Third World and the military doctrines of the USA and of the Soviet Union.

Militarised Policy

The Soviet leaders remain true to the thesis of Clausewitz that War is merely a continuation of politics by other means. Therefore, military operations must be preceded by actions in the ideological, political and diplomatic sphere. These actions can be divided into two types:

1. Actions creating favourable conditions as the result of which political or military bases can be formed in the region or country.
2. Diplomatic and political steps in order to gain time, to hide behind a smokescreen of words and declarations the real and permanent intentions, to mislead, frighten and disorientate public opinion in countries within the orbit of the adversary, and by means of extreme secrecy at home and disinformation for foreign countries to lead to a false trail and thus safeguard the suddenness of the first strike.

Both these tasks are accomplished by the communist parties and their «progressive» entourage, as well by own agencies. If a particular country is in the opposing camp, the aim is to weaken it as an ally; if the country is neutral or hesitating, the aim is to bring the communist or sovietophiles to power and secure its entry into the Soviet orbit.

The situation in the Third World offers great possibilities to Soviet activity.

During the past few years, particularly since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, when the Soviet Union crossed the line agreed at Yalta, the world has come nearer to the danger point.

Let us consider a simile: A man is attacked by a robber who points a gun.

Three reactions are possible: The man pulls out his gun and shoots first; He tries adroitly to knock the gun from the hand of the robber; The man's friend, standing behind the robber, hits his arm, knocks out the gun and thus disarms him.

The first option corresponds to the present situation when the role of the attacked man is filled by the USA, if seen by the Soviet Union, and by the Soviet Union if seen by the USA. With this scenario, a nuclear strike is unavoidable, independently of who strikes first, and this means many millions of victims on both sides. The second option requires disarmament of the adversary without the use of arms and the third option necessitates the presence of a friend behind the back of the adversary.

It is clear, the problem is not solved in the military field, the answer must be found in other fields, preferably using the third option which has been used successfully by the Soviet side. This Soviet friend, grabbing the arm of the Western adversary of the Soviet Union, are the forces working for diplomatic concessions, for any compromise, and above all - for unilateral disarmament. The answer must be found in the economic or ideological-political sphere.

The lack of success of measures repeatedly taken in the economic field is obvious. This is due to the fact that the Western economy is based on the free market principle and competition. Attempts to use it to exercise pressure on the Soviet Union cannot give the required results as the USA has no world monopoly, and even at home meets strongest opposition from business and trade unions alike.

Quite different is the position in the Soviet Union, with its planned and rigidly led economy, entirely mobilised to fulfill the military requirements.

Thus we must conclude that the possibility of preventing the conflict must be sought in the ideological-political sphere, more accurately, in the search for a friend and ally in the adversary's camp. The Soviet successes in this field gives the Soviets some grounds for maintaining that the goal can be achieved without armed conflict, by capitulation of the adversary and the established in the world of a Pax Sovietica. People, placed before the dilemma, «to live or to die» may prefer the former. This makes speculation whether or not there will be a war, without substance, and poses the genuine and real task of removing the threat of war.

Does the West seek friends in the camp of the adversary?

Owing to the existence of the Iron Curtain activity of the West in the ideological-political sphere naturally commenced with radio transmissions. Their purpose was the creation in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet bloc of a political opposition and support of its freedom struggle with the regime. A group consisting of representatives of all political emigré activists existing abroad (from Socialist-internationalists and separatist-chauvinists to Russian patriots and «union-indivisibilists») was intended as a basis for this. Radio «Liberty» was supposed to be handed to them. Thus the preconditions for the formation of Fifth Columns (in the Soviet bloc through the radio transmitter Free Europe) were supposed to be laid, and for their subsequent supply with all material for the struggle.

However, this imitation of the Soviet tactics (though probably not so well thought out) fell through for two reasons:

1. It did not prove possible to create an «anti-comintern» or a collective, democratic «Vlasov» under the American aegis, as a collection of so many threads could not be brought to a common denominator and cooperation;
2. An even larger obstacle proved the outcome of the events in Hungary in 1956; there, the encouragements were taken seriously, but as soon as the opposition created the conditions for an overthrow of the regime, no help was forthcoming.

Leaving aside the question, whether help was at all possible, the result of the suppression of the Hungarian revolt was a revision of the American conception in the ideological-political sphere. The revised principles may be formulated thus: no interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc; information on the advantages of Western society, based on freedom, pluralism and democracy; moral support of persons fighting for these ideals; objective information on events in the Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc and the world.

Radio broadcasting on those lines has definitely created sympathy to the West and the USA, broken the Soviet information monopoly and assisted in intellectual circles the breakaway from the letters of Marxism. However, in the course of time, this activity also showed its reverse, negative side.

Suggestions reaching the Soviet Union via the ether basically ran as follows: «Follow our example, fight for freedom, affirm your rights». But as soon as people began the rea-

lisation of these suggestions they met formidable obstacles, and if they proceeded to overcome them, the people became victims of cruel persecutions. Help from the West was either ineffective or resulted in the expulsion of the recalcitrants overseas.

This exposed the West as a powerless ally, on whom no hopes can be placed in difficult conditions; taking risks one can only rely on one's own strength. This is basically a sound position, but reliance on one's own strength means following one's own aims and interest, and these may diverge from the interests of the West. In order to prevent this happening, the West must consider the interests of the people of the Soviet Union in its relationship with opposition forces, to create friends and allies there, not pawns in one's own game.

Thus, as an example, Polish Solidarity approached the West only for assistance with food, politically it looked eastwards, searching among Russian fellow sufferers for understanding and support and realising that a genuine liberation of Poland is only possible with parallel events in the USSR.

Concluding, it must be said that the ideological-political intrusion of the West has not radically changed the situation in the adversary's country, and has not removed the threat hanging over mankind, and therefore new approaches and decisions have to be found.

Unfortunately, it can be observed that these decisions are not visible on the horizon, on the contrary, something very sinister is discernible, ie, the increasing insertion into the ideological-political field of the demands of the laws of warfare. (to follow)

The political wisdom of the Hungarian revolutionaries in 1956 was surprising.

In order not to irritate our great Soviet neighbour during the revolution, instead of choosing an anti-communist government such as our heart would have dictated, we chose as head of free Hungary an old communist, Imre Nagy.

Despite this precaution, despite this moderate wisdom in order to comply with the spirit of Yalta and to remain in good relations with the Soviet Union, Moscow nevertheless ordered the Red Army to bloodily crush the free and democratic Hungaria which was born during the 1956 revolution.

At that time, the Soviet Union, broke the Yalta agreement.

Since then, we had Prague in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979, Poland in 1981.

These are irrefutable proofs that the spirit of Yalta is buried for ever by Moscow.

Yalta no longer exists and the West must awake from its political dream and become aware of reality.

Western powers must finally get rid of their Yalta complex, which has been paralyzing them since 1945 in front of the USSR, whenever a serious event or an internal tension appears in one of the Eastern European countries.

As Yalta has not existed for a long time due to Moscow's fault, then the West must also change its policy regarding the Soviet Union by helping morally, economically and militarily if this appears necessary those nations who want to become free from the Soviet yoke.

This is the only way to efficiently stop communist imperialism and to avoid at the same time the Third World War.

Only the inner desintegration of the Soviet bloc can save freedom in the West! Western powers must act consequently. Eugène SUJANSZKY, President of the Association of Hungarian Freedom Fighters. (Paris - France)

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 4240 DTG:310359Z OCT 85 PSN:065285
SIT118 TOR: 304/0759Z

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AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 334240

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

1. ~~SECRET~~, ENTIRE TEXT

2. EMBASSIES SHOULD DELIVER MESSAGE IN PARA 3 BELOW FROM
PRESIDENT REAGAN TO HEAD OF STATE/GOVERNMENT ASAP.
USNATO SHOULD PROVIDE COPY TO SECRETARY GENERAL
CARRINGTON. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR....:

AS I INDICATED IN MY ADDRESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS LAST
WEEK, I LOOK FORWARD TO A FRESH START IN RELATIONS WITH
THE SOVIET UNION WHEN I MEET WITH MR. GORBACHEV IN GENEVA
NEXT MONTH. IN PREPARATION FOR THAT MEETING, I HAVE
DECIDED THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ADVANCE ADDITIONAL
ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS PRIOR TO THE END OF THE CURRENT
ROUND OF THE TALKS IN GENEVA. OUR POSITIONS IN GENEVA
HAVE ENJOYED WIDE SUPPORT FROM OUR ALLIES, WHICH HAS
HELPED BRING THE SOVIETS TO MAKE COUNTERPROPOSALS OF
THEIR OWN. IT NOW APPEARS POSSIBLE TO BUILD ON ELEMENTS
OF THOSE COUNTERPROPOSALS, AS I SAID IN THE UNITED
NATIONS, "TO ESTABLISH A GENUINE PROCESS OF
GIVE-AND-TAKE". GIVEN THAT THERE IS LITTLE TIME BEFORE
THE END OF THE CURRENT ROUND, WE WILL BE MOVING RAPIDLY
TO PRESENT NEW PROPOSALS. I WANTED, THEREFORE, TO SHARE
WITH YOU MY THINKING AS WE MOVE AHEAD.

THE NEW US PROPOSALS WILL DEAL WITH ALL THREE AREAS UNDER
DISCUSSION IN GENEVA: STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS,
INTERMEDIATE RANGE FORCE REDUCTIONS, AND DEFENSE AND
SPACE.

IN THE AREA OF STRATEGIC ARMS, THE UNITED STATES AGREES
WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF A FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTION IN
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES. WE CANNOT AGREE TO AN
APPROACH WHICH WOULD HAVE US ABANDON OUR ALLIES AND OUR
LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO SDI RESEARCH OR WHICH PROVIDES FOR
REDUCTIONS IN WAYS THAT ARE DESTABILIZING. HOWEVER, WE
ARE PREPARED TO PROPOSE AN APPROACH WHICH APPROPRIATELY
BUILDS UPON THE FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTION PRINCIPLE
CONTAINED IN THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL.

THE ELEMENTS OF THIS APPROACH INCLUDE: A REDUCTION TO
4500 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS (A 50 PER CENT CUT), OF
WHICH 3000 COULD BE ON ICBMS. A 50 PER CENT CUT IN
MAXIMUM BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW WEIGHT. CONTINGENT ON
BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEAD AND THROW WEIGHT REDUCTIONS, A
LIMIT OF 1500 ALCMS. THE 4500 WARHEAD LIMIT AND 1500
ALCM LIMIT WOULD RESULT IN A TOTAL OF 6000 SUCH WEAPONS,
ALTHOUGH THE US WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN AGGREGATE LIMIT
INCLUDING BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS AND ALCMS UNDER A
SINGLE LIMIT. A RANGE OF 1250 TO 1450 ICBMS AND SLBMS,
REPRESENTING AN APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT CUT. A LIMIT OF
350 BOMBERS, MAKING A MAXIMUM TOTAL OF 1800 SNDOVS, BUT
ONCE AGAIN WITHOUT AGREEING TO A SINGLE LIMIT ON BOTH
BALLISTIC MISSILES AND BOMBERS. A BAN ON NEW HEAVY ICBMS
AND MOBILE ICBMS. THE REITERATION OF THE U.S. BUILD-DOWN
PROPOSAL, TO ENSURE THAT THE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED ABOVE
PROMPTLY TAKE EFFECT.

IN THE AREA OF INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES, WE WOULD MAKE
IT CLEAR THAT THE PREVIOUS U.S. NEGOTIATING POSITION
REMAINS ON THE TABLE. WE WOULD RESTATE OUR PREFERENCE
FOR A U.S./SOVIET ZERO-ZERO OUTCOME AND OUR CONTINUED
COMMITMENT TO ULTIMATELY ACHIEVING THE ELIMINATION OF THE
ENTIRE CLASS OF LAND-BASED LRINF MISSILES.

AT THE SAME TIME, AS ONE POTENTIAL INTERIM STEP TOWARD
THIS GOAL, WE WOULD PROPOSE AN APPROACH CONTAINING THE
FOLLOWING ELEMENTS: A CAP ON US LRINF MISSILE
DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE AT 140, THEIR LEVELS ON DECEMBER
31, 1985, IN RETURN FOR SOVIET AGREEMENT TO REDUCE SS-20S
WITHIN RANGE OF EUROPE TO 140 LAUNCHERS; FREEDOM TO MIX
WITHIN THE 140 LAUNCHER LIMIT (I.E., FOR THE U.S.,
BETWEEN P-11 AND GLCM LAUNCHERS), BUT WITH THE MIX A
SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIET UNION;
PROPORTIONAL REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET SS-20S IN ASIA; A
RESULTING EQUAL GLOBAL LRINF MISSILE WARHEAD NUMBER;
CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE MISSILES; AND DISCUSSION OF
CONSTRAINTS ON COMPARABLE AIRCRAFT ON BOTH SIDES.

I WOULD NOTE THAT SINCE THE P-11 IS A SINGLE MISSILE
LAUNCHER, WHILE THE GLCM CARRIES FOUR MISSILES PER
LAUNCHER, THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS WHICH THE US MIGHT HAVE
DEPLOYED IN EUROPE UNDER THIS PROPOSAL WOULD DEPEND ON
THE FINAL MIX. THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE 420 WARHEADS ON
140 SS-20S IN RANGE OF EUROPE; THE US WOULD BE PERMITTED
AT LEAST THAT NUMBER OF WARHEADS AND A MIX COULD BE
SELECTED THAT WOULD RESULT IN A SIMILAR WARHEAD LEVEL.

IN THE AREA OF DEFENSE AND SPACE, WE WOULD RESTATE THAT
THE SDI PROGRAM IS AND WILL REMAIN IN FULL ACCORD WITH
THE ABM TREATY AND WOULD REQUIRE SOVIET COMPLIANCE
THEREWITH AS WELL. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WOULD SEEK
SOVIET COMMITMENT TO EXPLORE HOW A COOPERATIVE TRANSITION
TO GREATER RELIANCE ON DEFENSES COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED.
WE WOULD ALSO PROPOSE AN "OPEN LABORATORIES" INITIATIVE.
UNDER THIS PROPOSAL, BOTH SIDES WOULD COMMIT TO PROVIDE,
ON A REGULAR AND RECIPROCAL BASIS, BRIEFINGS ON EACH
OTHER'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND
OPPORTUNITIES TO VISIT ASSOCIATED RESEARCH FACILITIES AND
LABORATORIES.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE PROPOSALS, WE WOULD STRESS THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE RELATED ISSUES OF VERIFICATION AND
COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING AGREEMENTS TO PROGRESS IN
REACHING ANY FUTURE AGREEMENTS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE
UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT THE SOVIET UNION
TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO CORRECT ITS CURRENT
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING AGREEMENTS. WE WOULD ALSO
SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIET UNION ALTER CERTAIN OF ITS
CURRENT PRACTICES WHICH HAMPER VERIFICATION OF

~~SECRET~~

11811

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DECLASSIFIED
NLRP-66-114/11 #11811
BY KML NARA DATE 4/24/11

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 4240 DTG: 310359Z OCT 85 PSN: 065285

COMPLIANCE. ONE SUCH STEP WOULD BE TO ALTER ITS CURRENT
TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION AND REVERT TO PRACTICES WITH REGARD
TO TELEMETRY IN USE AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING OF SALT
II.

I BELIEVE THAT THIS COMPREHENSIVE INITIATIVE OFFERS A
SERIOUS PROSPECT FOR OPENING A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE IN
THE GENEVA TALKS. AS I MENTIONED EARLIER, I INTEND TO

AUTHORIZE OUR NEGOTIATORS TO PRESENT IT TO THEIR SOVIET
COUNTERPARTS IN GENEVA BEFORE THE END OF THE CURRENT
ROUND, AND HAVE ASKED THEM TO SEEK SOVIET AGREEMENT TO
EXTEND THE CURRENT ROUND SUFFICIENTLY TO PERMIT A FULL
PRESENTATION. THIS WILL ALSO ENABLE THE SOVIET
DELEGATION TO SEEK ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NEEDED TO
ENSURE THAT THEY FULLY UNDERSTAND THE INITIATIVE PRIOR TO
THEIR DEPARTURE FROM GENEVA. (FOR NATO: I APPRECIATE
THE GREAT INTEREST WHICH ALL MEMBERS OF THE NATO ALLIANCE
HAVE FOR THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE ADVICE AND
COUNSEL WHICH MANY MEMBERS HAVE OFFERED. I LOOK FORWARD
TO THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU AND OUR OTHER
ALLIANCE COLLEAGUES IN BRUSSELS AFTER MY MEETING WITH
MR. GORBACHEV.) SHULTZ
BT

~~SECRET~~

ITEM RETURNED
TO NISC

SECRETARIAT

IN APRIL 1987

Log # Sus II 90320

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 5660 DTG: 010828Z NOV 85 PSN: 068010
SIT363 TOR: 305/1425Z

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OF IMMED
STU0762
DE RUEHMO #5660 3050828
O 010828Z NOV 85 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6741

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 15660

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR E06-114/11 #11812
BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV
REF: STATE 335446

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
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2. AMBASSADOR DELIVERED TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AT 9:00 A.M. MOSCOW TIME NOVEMBER 1. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE LETTER SET FORTH THE PRESIDENT'S THOUGHTS ON THE OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND THE UPCOMING GENEVA MEETING. IN PARTICULAR, THE LETTER EXPLAINED THE BASIS FOR OUR RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET COUNTER-PROPOSALS OUTLINED IN GORBACHEV'S SEPTEMBER 12 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. AND IT PROVIDED THE PRESIDENT'S REACTION TO SOME OF THE PROPOSALS SHEVARDNADZE RECENTLY HAD PUT FORWARD TO US IN NEW YORK. THE LETTER ALSO INDICATED THAT OUR NEGOTIATORS HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO EXPLAIN OUR PROPOSALS MORE FULLY IN GENEVA. OF COURSE, THE AMBASSADOR ADDED, SECRETARY SHULTZ WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS IN DETAIL DURING HIS UPCOMING MOSCOW VISIT.
--

3. AFTER THANKING THE AMBASSADOR FOR CONVEYING THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE LETTER WOULD BE STUDIED THOROUGHLY, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD WELCOME EVERYTHING CONSTRUCTIVE IN IT, AND A REPORT WOULD BE SENT TO GORBACHEV BY THE END OF THE DAY. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT A MESSAGE HAD BEEN RECEIVED YESTERDAY (OCTOBER 31) FROM THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA REGARDING THE U.S. DESIRE TO EXTEND THE CURRENT ROUND, AND THAT THE SOVIET SIDE SUPPORTED THIS IDEA.
--

4. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED HE WOULD BE LEAVING FOR HELSINKI LATE NOVEMBER 1 TO JOIN THE SECRETARY THERE. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT AS DOBRYNIN HAD TOLD THE SECRETARY, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD WELCOME THE SECRETARY'S COMING DIRECTLY TO MOSCOW ON SATURDAY OR SUNDAY, BUT OF COURSE THAT WAS ENTIRELY UP TO THE SECRETARY. SHEVARDADZE ASKED THAT AMBASSADOR HARTMAN CONVEY SHEVARDNADZE'S BEST REGARDS TO SECRETARY SHULTZ. HARTMAN
BT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 KABUL 1429 DTG: 010932Z NOV 85 PSN: 067801
SIT351 TOR: 305/1158Z

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UTS7153
DE RUDKLB #1429 3050940
O 010932Z NOV 85 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4525

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4341
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 3302
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 2820

~~SECRET~~ KABUL 1429

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIET DEFECTOR

REF: KABUL 1427

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. 15-20 REGIME MILITARY GUARDS REMAIN STATIONED AT NEUMANN FIELD AND MAIN ENTRANCES; MORE AFGHAN TROOPS ARE NEAR THE WALLS ON AFGHAN RADIO AND MINISTRY OF HEALTH SIDES OF COMPOUND AND THE SECONDARY ROAD BEHIND THE EMBASSY, BUT ARE STAYING OUT OF SIGHT. 5 OF THE STAFF HAVE MANAGED TO DEPART EMBASSY UNDER TIGHT SCRUTINY. IN ONE CASE, EMBOFF OPENED HOOD OF HIS VEHICLE; OTHER CASES EMBOFFS HAVE OPENED TRUNK, BUT ON EMBASSY GROUNDS AND AT SOME DISTANCE FROM DRA SOLDIERS. POLITICAL OFFICER MURRAY WAS NOT PERMITTED TO DEPART IN HIS CAR AS SOLDIERS INSISTED ON COMPLETE INSPECTION OF HIS VEHICLE.

3. WE HAVE HAD NO CONTACT WITH THE SOVIETS SINCE REFTTEL, AND HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONTACT ANYONE AT THE MFA (A NON-STARTER TO BEGIN WITH).

4. WE HAVE MANAGED TO KEEP THE FACT OF THE SOLDIER'S DEFECTION FROM THE REST OF THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY HERE, ALTHOUGH EVERYONE IS AWARE SOMETHING UNUSUAL IS AFOOT. WE ARE ANSWERING THE FEW INQUIRIES/CALLS BY SAYING WE HAVE A "SPECIAL SITUATION" BUT THAT WE CANNOT GO INTO ANY DETAILS.

5. SUKHANOV IS MORE RELAXED AND I HAVE NOT BROACHED ANY SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS WITH HIM SINCE THIS MORNING.
CLARKE
BT

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NLRR F06-114/11 #11813

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01
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KABUL 1429

DTG: 010932Z NOV 85 PSN: 067915
TOR: 305/1158Z-----
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OP IMMED
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DE RUDKLB #1429 3050940
O 010932Z NOV 85 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4525

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4341
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 3302
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 2820

~~SECRET~~ KABUL 1429

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIET DEFECTOR

REF: KABUL 1427

1. / - ENTIRE TEXT

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5. SUKHANOV IS MORE RELAXED AND I HAVE NOT BROACHED ANY SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS WITH HIM SINCE THIS MORNING.
CLARKE
BT

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NLRR F06-114/11 #11814

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By CSS NARA, Date 8/8/02

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BERN 6426
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DTG: 011440Z NOV 85 PSN: 068143
TOR: 305/1532Z

DISTRIBUTION: MART HENK SIT MILL MATL /006

PRIORITY
DE RUDKEBQ #6426 3051528
P 011440Z NOV 85 RUEADWW SVC 1194 H/W ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BERN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6498
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 4879

C O N F I D E N T I A L

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL~~ USE BERN 06426

STATE FOR DDD MARK PALMER

WHITE HOUSE FOR BILL HENKEL

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD), SZ
SUBJECT: DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL ARRIVAL STATEMENT FOR
MEETING IN GENEVA

FOLLOWING IS A POSSIBLE DRAFT FOR THE BILATERAL
SWISS PORTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S AIRPORT ARRIVAL STATEMENT.
IT IS PERHAPS A BIT LONG, BUT COULD EASILY BE REDUCED
DEPENDING ON NEED.

BEGIN TEXT:

- PRESIDENT FURGLER, ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE, MAY I EXTEND MY WARMEST THANKS TO SWITZERLAND,
AND TO YOU REMARKABLE PEOPLE -- THE SWISS, WHO HAVE DONE
SO MUCH TO MAKE POSSIBLE THIS MEETING BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

- IT IS PARTICULARLY FITTING THAT THIS MEETING TAKE
PLACE ON SWISS SOIL. SWITZERLAND HAS LONG PLAYED A
LEADING ROLE AMONG NATIONS IN THE SEARCH FOR INTERNATIONAL
PEACE, FREEDOM AND UNDERSTANDING, AND HAS VERY GENEROUSLY
PROVIDED HER TERRITORY AND HOSPITABLE ATMOSPHERE FOR
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES, AND HER
SERVICES FOR ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION OF DISPUTES. THE
SWISS GOVERNMENT HAS FOR MANY YEARS COURAGEOUSLY AND
ABLY REPRESENTED THE DIPLOMATIC INTERESTS OF OTHER
NATIONS, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, IN LANDS WHERE
THESE NATIONS HAVE NO RELATIONS. AS THE FOUNDERS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, YOU HAVE ALSO LONG BEEN WORLD
LEADERS IN PROVIDING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THOSE
IN DISTRESS ALL OVER THE WORLD.

- THE CONFEDERATION OF NEUTRAL SWITZERLAND HAS ITSELF
LONG BEEN AN EXAMPLE TO OTHER NATIONS, FOR ITS FIRM
DEFENSE OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT
AND ITS LONG TRADITION OF PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
AS YOU KNOW, OUR MOTTO IN THE UNITED STATES IS
"E PLURIBUS UNUM" -- OUT OF MANY, ONE. HERE IN
SWITZERLAND YOU HAVE GIVEN THE WORLD AN EXTRAORDINARY
EXAMPLE OF THIS UNITY FROM VARIETY -- A RELIGIOUS,
CULTURAL AND LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY THAT ENRICHES RATHER
THAN DIVIDES A NATION.

- I AM PROUD TO SAY THAT THE UNITED STATES AND

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 011440Z NOV 85 PSN: 068143

SWITZERLAND ALSO SHARE A LONGSTANDING HERITAGE OF POLITICAL, RELIGIOUS AND ECONOMIC LIBERTY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, FOUNDED UPON THE SANCTITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

- AND WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION SWITZERLAND AND HER DESCENDANTS IN AMERICA HAVE MADE TO THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, EVEN FROM THE VERY EARLIEST DAYS, WHEN ALBERT GALLATIN OF GENEVA BECAME ONE OF OUR MOST BRILLIANT AND FAMOUS STATESMEN, AS SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY AND THEN IN NEGOTIATION OF THE SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR OF 1812.

- PRESIDENT FURGLER, YOU RECENTLY MADE A BRILLIANT SPEECH AT BOSTON UNIVERSITY, WHERE YOU WERE AWARDED AN HONORARY DOCTORATE OF LAWS FROM THAT PRESTIGIOUS INSTITUTION. YOU CORRECTLY STRESSED THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH WE IN THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD MUST ASSUME TO MAINTAIN OUR WAY OF LIFE AND OUR SYSTEM OF VALUES, AGAINST RELENTLESS EXTERNAL ATTACKS DIRECTED AT ITS VERY FOUNDATIONS. I FULLY AGREE. OUR TWO COUNTRIES, EACH IN ITS OWN WAY, ARE IN THE FOREFRONT OF THIS STRUGGLE, TO ASSURE THAT THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES ENSHRINED IN OUR RESPECTIVE CONSTITUTIONS NOT ONLY SURVIVE, BUT PREVAIL.

- PRESIDENT FURGLER, MAY I CLOSE BY SAYING HOW DELIGHTED I WAS TO MEET WITH YOU LAST YEAR IN THE OVAL ROOM AT THE WHITE HOUSE, AND EXPRESS ONCE AGAIN NANCY'S AND MY GREAT PLEASURE IN BEING HERE IN YOUR LOVELY COUNTRY THIS EVENING. MAY I ALSO AGAIN CONVEY OUR HEARTFELT GRATITUDE TO THE GREAT PEOPLE AND NATION OF SWITZERLAND FOR THE STEADFAST FRIENDSHIP YOU HAVE EXTENDED TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OVER THE YEARS, AND FOR SERVING AS SUCH GRACIOUS HOSTS FOR THE IMPORTANT MEETINGS WHICH BEGIN NEXT TUESDAY IN THIS MAGNIFICENT CITY ON THE SHORES OF LAKE GENEVA. END TEXT.
WHITTLESEY
BT

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