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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/9/2005

File Folder USSR: GENERAL 3/5 [1981-1983]

FOIA

F06-114/7

Box Number 26

YARHI-MILO

2604

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9861	MEMO	ALLEN TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING OF FORMER U.S. AMBASSADORS TO THE SOVIET UNION <i>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</i>	1	6/1/1981	B1
9862	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9861 <i>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</i>	1	6/1/1981	B1
9863	MEMO	HAIG TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING OF FORMER U.S. AMBASSADORS TO THE SOVIET UNION <i>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</i>	1	5/27/1981	B1
9864	MEMO	STOESSEL RE MEETING OF FORMER US AMBASSADORS TO THE SOVIET UNION <i>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</i>	3	5/18/1981	B1
9865	MEMO	PIPES/DOBRIANSKY TO ALLEN RE REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S.-USSR BILATERAL COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS <i>R 6/25/2009 F2006-114/7</i>	1	5/29/1981	B1
9866	MEMO	PIPES TO NANCE RE SOVIET UNION/EASTERN EUROPE: CRISIS TOPICS <i>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</i>	1	6/26/1981	B1
9873	PAPER	SOVIET TRENDS: JUNE 1981 <i>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</i>	12	7/15/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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JET 5/9/2005

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FOIA

F06-114/7

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2604

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9874	PAPER	SOVIET TRENDS: AUGUST 1981 R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	8	9/18/1981	B1
9867	MEMO	PIPES TO ALLEN RE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL PAR 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7	1	11/3/1981	B3
9868	MEMO	ALLEN TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL PAR 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7	1	ND	B1 B3
9869	MEMO	PIPES TO ALLEN RE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL INTENDS TO BECOME MORE ACTIVE IN USA PAR 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7	1	10/28/1981	B1 B3
9879	CABLE	INTERNATIONAL/SOVIET UNION D 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7	4	10/22/1981	B1 B3
9870	FAX COVER SHEET	CHERNAY TO DOBRIANSKY RE CHITOV	1	2/2/1982	B1
9871	MEMO	CHING RE MEETING WITH CHITOV AND ODOM ON FEB 1 1982	1	2/1/1982	B1
9872	CABLE	011155Z FEB 82 PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/7	1	2/1/1982	B2 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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JET 5/9/2005

File Folder USSR: GENERAL 3/5 [1981-1983]

FOIA

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Box Number 26

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2604

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9876	PAPER	SOVIET TRENDS: JANUARY 1982 <i>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</i>	11	2/24/1982	B1
9877	PAPER	SOVIET TRENDS: FEBRUARY 1982 <i>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</i>	12	3/26/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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OK
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↑

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 1, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*
SUBJECT: Meeting of Former U.S. Ambassadors to the
Soviet Union

Al Haig forwarded an interesting memorandum of conversation (Tab A) between Walt Stoessel and other former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman, George Kennan, Jake Beam, Malcolm Toon and Tom Watson. Their views on U.S.-Soviet relations center on the importance of revitalizing arms control negotiations (specifically facilitating a new round of SALT talks) and seeking meaningful dialogue with the Soviet leadership. As Al Haig aptly points out, these views clearly manifest those "detente" perceptions which have characterized and guided U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union previously. (C)

cc: Ed Meese
Michael Deaver

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/7 #9861

BY CV NARA DATE 7/7/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review May 27, 1987.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 1, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *RA*

SUBJECT: Meeting of Former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union

Al Haig forwarded an interesting memorandum of conversation (Tab A) between Walt Stoessel and other former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman, George Kennan, Jake Beam, Malcolm Toon and Tom Watson. Their views on U.S.-Soviet relations center on the importance of revitalizing arms control negotiations (specifically facilitating a new round of SALT talks) and seeking meaningful dialogue with the Soviet leadership. As Al Haig aptly points out, these views clearly manifest those "detente" perceptions which have characterized and guided U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union previously. (C)

cc: Ed Meese
Michael Deaver

+ Jim Baker

6/2 sent JCP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review May 27, 1987.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/7#9862

BY CU NARA DATE 7/7/08

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 27, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 
Subject: Meeting of Former US Ambassadors
to the Soviet Union

Walt Stoessel recently attended a get-together of former US Ambassadors to the Soviet Union. He has prepared the attached memorandum of conversation on the views of some of the participants. I believe you will find these views interesting as a reflection of the legacy of "detente" perceptions which have surrounded the US-Soviet relationship in the past, and which will still prevail in certain circles, including these former representatives.

Attachment:

As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS 5/20/86

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/7 #9863

BY GS NARA DATE 7/7/08

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

May 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Meeting of Former US Ambassadors to the
Soviet Union

At the initiative of the Committee on East/
West Accord, chaired by Carl Marcy, a dinner meeting
was held May 13 of former US Ambassadors to the
Soviet Union. Present were Averell Harriman,
George Kennan, Jake Beam, Mac Toon, Tom Watson and
myself. Foy Kohler was unable to attend; Toon
participated in initial discussions over drinks
but could not stay for dinner.

Watson presented a draft letter which he proposed
should be sent to the President from the Ambassadors
stressing the importance of arms control negotiations
and urging prompt initiation of a new round of SALT
talks. The others present were not sure that such
a letter would be appropriate; I pointed out that
the Administration's review of SALT matters was still
underway and that a recommendation of the kind pro-
posed by Watson appeared premature. I also noted
that his letter did not include the concept of linkage
regarding other aspects of Soviet behavior. Toon
strongly supported this position and it was agreed
by all that the letter should not be sent.

Discussion at dinner was general in nature and
covered a number of topics. A recurrent theme,
however, voiced in particular by Kennan, was that the
Administration seemed to be overdoing the rhetoric
concerning the Soviet threat. Kennan noted that,
for example, the Soviets -- and the czarist regime
before them -- always maintained large military forces
and frequently engaged in activities which were not
regarded with approval by Western states. He did not

CONFIDENTIAL
GDS 5/20/86

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/7 #9864
BY CN NARA DATE 7/7/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

feel that we should be so upset by what the Administration refers to as "Soviet adventurism." He noted that the Soviets have many vulnerabilities and, in fact, have suffered a number of defeats in Africa and elsewhere. He also thought that there were some things in our own record which could be criticized.

Kennan said he felt it was important for the United States to seek a meaningful dialogue with the Soviet leadership, despite problems we have with Soviet behavior.

Kennan was supported in his remarks by Harriman and Watson. Beam was in general accord with Kennan although with less emphasis than Harriman and Watson.

I presented counter arguments to Kennan's thesis and feel sure I would have been supported by Mac Toon if he had been able to stay for the dinner discussion. In general, however, it seemed clear that Kennan, Harriman and Watson were not particularly sympathetic to Administration views on US-Soviet relations.

Kennan spoke with some emotion about his concern regarding the accumulation on both sides of nuclear weaponry. He said he would be making a speech next week in Washington on the occasion of his receiving the Einstein Peace Award in which he would speak about the dangers of the present situation and would recommend urgent actions toward a reduction of nuclear weapons on both sides.

Another meeting of this group is scheduled to be held in October. As a member of this Administration, and given the views of the others, I am not entirely comfortable with my participation but it would be awkward to refuse to join the meetings. I believe the views will be better balanced if it is possible

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

for Kohler and Toon to take part.

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

cc: S/S - Mr. Bremer
EUR - Ambassador Eagleburger

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

3051
af

7

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

May 27, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*
SUBJECT: Meeting of Former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President commenting on a memorandum of conversation between Walter Stoessel and other former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union, which was forwarded by Secretary of State Haig (Tab A). *(C)*

Stearman had no comment; Pipes was unavailable; Lord and Schweitzer gave no response. (U)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove ✓

what's the difference between no comment & no response?

I do not think this needs to go to President.

let Jim Baker decide. Send copies to Meese & Baker 6/2/81

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Secretary of State Haig's memorandum dated May 27, 1981 (with attachment)

CONFIDENTIAL

Review May 27, 1987.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *GSJ* NAHA, Date *7/17/02*

81 MAY 20 A 0: 55

JANET COLSON
BUD NANCE
DICK ALLEN
IRENE DERUS
JANET COLSON
BUD NANCE

Qx 28 / 10 53
Qx 28 / 12 55
MD 30 / 23 13
ije / 16 808
Je / 10 935

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2 JUNE

#3051

NOTE FOR FILE:

RVA signed memo to the Pres., however, he had noted on covering memo after doing so, "I do not think this needs to go to President. Let Jim Baker decide. Send copies to Meese & Deaver." However, pkg had already been taken to darman's office & jcp was unable to retrieve. As a result, jcp dispatched cc's to Meese/Deaver and Baker.

JCP

27 May
Taked up
receipt 2-05 27 May
to Kangerwick

#3051

June 2, 1981

TO: NSC/S

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

The NSC Staff has discussed the recommendation and query made by Mr. Allen: "circulate to?".

No further action is to be taken.

Paula Dobriansky

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

JN 30/1359
 RE 1/0953
 MW 1/1402
 JN 1/1922
 JN 1/1123
 Does this really have to go to the @??
 a

SHOW CC

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SHOW CC

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 29, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: RICHARD PIPES/PAULA DOBRIANSKY PD
SUBJECT: Report on the Implementation of U.S.-USSR
Bilateral Cooperative Agreements

The Report on the Implementation of Eleven U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Cooperative Agreements for the period January-June 1980 (Tab A), though nearly a year late, gives a fair and comprehensive overview of the subject matter. It conveys the impression that the principle of reciprocity in exchanges has been well adhered to. (C)

Stearman and Huberman concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President, forwarding the Report (Tab A).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Does not
need to go to
(P)
Circulate to ?

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Report on the Implementation of
U.S.-USSR Bilateral Cooperative
Agreements
Tab II Incoming covering memorandum from State
(includes memorandum signed by Dr. Brzezinski
on April 27, 1977)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review May 29, 1987.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 106714/7 #9865

BY CU NARA DATE 6/25/09

Secret General

12

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B. Morale Problems in the Military

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C. Nationalities (Repression/Competing Nationalism)

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"Party Recruitment and the Nationalities in the USSR: A Study of Centre-Republican Relationships" British Journal of Political Science, v. 10, Oct. 1980, pp. 461-487 (Author: Mary McAuley)

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The Soviet Germans in the USSR Today, Cologne Bundesinstitut fur Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1980, 135 p. (Author: Sidney Heitman)

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D. Religion

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F. General

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"On the Corruption of Morals in Russia" (Shcherbatov, Mikhail,) London, Cambridge U.P. 1969

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 26, 1981

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

FROM:

RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT:

Soviet Union/Eastern Europe: Crisis Topics

Below is the list of "crisis" topics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the coming months.

1. Poland: external threat. This is potentially the greatest destabilizing factor in Eastern Europe. Soviet accusations against Poland have escalated to the point where some kind of Red Army intervention has become all but inevitable. Soviet military action in Poland would certainly lead to resistance and bloodshed. It would compel the Western Alliance to take a variety of tough counter-measures. (S)
2. Poland: internal crisis. Even if there should be no Soviet intervention, Poland faces a massive economic problem. It is unable to service its debts or to maintain industrial and agricultural productivity. The country faces the prospect of a breakdown of essential supplies and services. (S)
3. Soviet Union: succession issue. Given the age and physical condition of Brezhnev, a change in government in the Soviet Union is a constant possibility. The change in administration would involve not only Brezhnev but also several other members of the Politbureau who are in his age group and/or closely associated with him. A power struggle may ensue with profound effects on Soviet foreign policy. If this occurs, opportunities will open up for United States initiatives. (S)
4. Sino-Soviet relations. There is always the possibility of a turn in the relations between the two Communist countries either for the better or for worse. This does not seem imminent but it must always be borne in mind because of the immense consequences such an event would have on the global balance of power. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Review June 26, 1987.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/7 #9806

BY GL NARA DATE 7/7/08

Sup General

6301 add-on

45

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

November 3, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: World Peace Council

As suggested, attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President regarding the activities of the World Peace Council in the United States. My earlier memorandum with your comments is at Tab II.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab II My original memorandum to you.

FOIA(b)(3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR FOI-114/7 #9867

BY KML NARA DATE 5/7/13

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ACTION

FOIA(b)(1)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


FOIA(b)(3)

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: World Peace Council

You may recall that several months ago I called your attention to the agenda for 1981 of the so-called "World Peace Council," a Soviet front organization operating out of Helsinki. (C)

This group seems so pleased with its success that it now plans to expand its activities into the United States.



Given the great experience of the WPC in organizing mass demonstrations on behalf of Soviet causes it would be very important to prevent it from carrying out its plans in the United States. The Department of State in particular should refuse to issue visas to foreign travelers planning to attend WPC functions in this country, which are usually international in scope. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That instructions be given to the Department of State to refuse visas to foreign visitors connected with the World Peace Council or individuals planning to attend WPC functions. (C)

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR F06-114/7 #9868

BY KML NARA DATE 5/7/13

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 28, 1981

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

FOIA(b)(1)

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FOIA(b)(3)

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*SUBJECT: World Peace Council Intends to Become More
Active in the U.S.A.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Presumably it would like to mount mass demonstrations on the model of those staged in Bonn, London, etc., against "nuclear armament" in major U.S. cities, possibly including Washington. We may want to take steps to prevent that. (S)

Attachment

Tab I

*This needs to
be put in a memo to
the President -
Also give me a draft,
and quote from
this info cable
11/2/81*

~~SECRET~~Derivative from CIA
Review October 22, 2001

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR F06-114/7 #9869

BY KML NARA DATE 5/7/13



BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

CURRENT
ANALYSES

BY GA NARA DATE 7/7/08

NRR 606-1147 #9873

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

FILE USSR

02104 15

P.D.

~~(U)~~ SOVIET TRENDS: JUNE 1981

Summary

(~~LOU~~) The leadership's decision not to hold a CPSU Central Committee plenum on the eve of the June 23-24 USSR Supreme Soviet session may stem from a reluctance to discuss the Polish situation before the full membership of the Central Committee. The foreign policy highlight of the Supreme Soviet session was Brezhnev's Appeal to Parliaments and Peoples.

(~~LOU~~) The legislature also adopted a law on housing and a law on the legal status of foreigners in the USSR. Soviet spokesmen emphasized that the new law extends to foreigners the same rights and duties enjoyed by Soviet citizens, but the text also enjoins foreigners to respect the "rules of the socialist community," including the "traditions and customs" of the Soviet people. This loose language in Article 3 could be used against foreigners in a variety of ways, depending on the climate of international and even bilateral relations.

(~~LOU~~) Article 3 also empowers the government to adopt retaliatory measures against citizens of states that place "special limitations" on the rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens. Article 16 provides the Soviets with language that appears aimed at preventing contacts between foreigners and Soviet religious activists. The real effect of the new law will be established by its enforcement, but, when taken together with other recent examples of tighter restrictions, its adoption promises increased difficulties for foreigners who attempt to make contacts with Soviet citizens.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RDS-4 7/15/01 (Stoddard, P.)

Report 181-CA
July 15, 1981

(C/NF) The series of ideological meetings begun in April continued at the republic level in June; speeches by party officials and press articles reveal continuing concern over party morale, youthful individualism, nationality frictions, wage egalitarianism, and the intelligentsia's quest for more professional autonomy. Controls over contacts with foreigners have intensified: security sections are now being established in cultural institutions, and employees are instructed to submit written reports on contacts with foreigners.

(C/NF) The medical community has joined in the examination of demographic problems. At the seventh Psychiatric Congress numerous reports discussed female alcoholism as a growing problem and one that obviously affects the physical and mental health of mothers and infants. The papers, nevertheless, avoided a national survey or even one of the alcoholism problem in the RSFSR as a whole. Papers on Central Asia revealed that alcoholism has become an urban problem there but that strong national and traditional (read Moslem) factors virtually prevented alcoholism in the rural areas. The authors of a Pravda article on the decline in family size among the Slavic and European peoples of the USSR called for meliorative programs, including sex education among young people.

(LOU) An unsigned article in the theoretical journal Kommunist gingerly endorsed the value of Russian nationalism as an antidote to Western influences on Soviet literature but warned that careful distinctions must be made between progressive and nonprogressive elements in works about the past, that Russian religious themes should not be overdrawn, and that Russian nationalism should not be set against "Soviet patriotism." The article apparently was aimed at the Seventh Congress of Soviet Writers, to be held in early July, where the treatment of Russian nationalism in literature will be one of the few hot issues on the otherwise drab literary scene. An unmentionable at the congress will be the efflorescence of Soviet literature abroad, a development encouraged by the emigration, willy-nilly, of the USSR's best writers during the Brezhnev regime.

* * * * *

(LOU) Party Plenum Omitted as Supreme Soviet Meets

Reluctance to discuss the Polish situation before the full membership of the CPSU Central Committee probably explained the leadership's decision not to convene a plenum on the eve of the mid-year session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Neither Brezhnev's health nor the legislative agenda seemed relevant to the decision. Several republic supreme soviets (with agendas unrelated to that of the USSR Supreme Soviet) met during June and were preceded by republic party plenums, as has been the custom.

There are several precedents for the failure to hold a plenum shortly before the legislature meets. Some cases were connected with leadership changes (not relevant this year), the others with international policy issues (as seems likely this time).

The two-day session of the USSR Supreme Soviet opened with the adoption of an Appeal to Parliaments and Peoples of the World, introduced and read by Brezhnev. This document was clearly intended to be part of the continuing Soviet campaign against NATO's decision on theater nuclear force modernization in Western Europe. (Publicity given to the Appeal also serves to divert attention from the failure of the Central Committee to meet.)

The other agenda items were two laws: one on the legal status of foreigners and one on fundamentals of housing legislation. Although housing is probably the second most pressing concern of Soviet citizens (food being the first), the new fundamentals offer little hope for rapid improvement of the housing situation. The old standard of nine square meters per person was retained, and favored persons, including high officials, are permitted above-norm housing allowances "in accord with the conditions and character of their work." The long list of categories rating priority in housing favors war veterans, wartime wounded, the chronically ill, and mother heroines. But Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of Socialist Labor hold second place on the list.

(LOU) Tighter Controls on Foreigners in USSR

The new Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the USSR, passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet on June 24, codifies, for the most part, existing practices in Soviet treatment of foreign citizens who enter the USSR as visitors or as long-term residents. Only time will tell if the codification of existing practices will materially affect the practices themselves; enforcement and interpretation of the law by Soviet officials will depend primarily on the climate of international relations and the political requirements of the regime.

Official Soviet comment justifies the statute as a measure extending to foreigners the same rights and duties that Soviet citizens enjoy. Deputy Premier Talyzin's discussion of the law before the USSR Supreme Soviet also described it as conforming fully to norms of international law and to the obligations of the USSR as a signatory in 1966 of two international pacts on economic, social, cultural, civil, and political rights and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Another Soviet official has portrayed it as conferring on foreigners greater rights than they often enjoy in their own countries.

At the same time, both the language of the law and the authoritative commentaries emphasize the obligations and duties of foreigners to observe socialist norms of behavior: to refrain from "anti-socialist behavior" and to respect the "rules of the socialist community," including the "traditions and customs" of the Soviet people. V. V. Zagladin, the secretary of the Supreme Soviet's Foreign Affairs Commission (and also first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department) cited the requirement of Article 3 of the law that "the enjoyment by foreign citizens of the rights and freedoms granted in the USSR must not harm Soviet society or the state" in adding that "Those who have committed crimes...must bear the responsibility for this on a common basis with USSR citizens." Failure of a foreigner to conform can result in expulsion from the USSR or criminal charges, presumably including those under Article 190 of the RSFSR Criminal Code (anti-Soviet slander) or Article 70 (anti-Soviet activities).

Thus, there is little doubt that Article 3 is specifically aimed against foreigners who engage in contacts with such Soviet dissidents as human rights and Jewish activists. Full effectiveness in inhibiting such contacts, moreover, requires that the law be enforced; this opens the possibility of at least a few show trials. Foreign residents and visitors can hardly be reassured by the prospect that they can expect to be treated like Soviet citizens if their behavior falls short of official expectations.

Several specific provisions of the law may complicate Soviet relations with other countries:

- In addition to its anti-dissident clause, Article 3 authorizes the USSR to impose retaliatory restrictions on citizens of states that place special restrictions on the rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens. This codification of the principle of reciprocity will probably encourage Moscow's self-righteous recriminations on issues ranging from the Polovchak (Polowczak) case to travel restrictions on Soviet diplomats.
- Article 16 guarantees "freedom of conscience to foreign citizens while in the USSR equally with USSR citizens" and prohibits "incitement of enmity and hatred in connection with religious beliefs." Here the law provides authorities with grounds they previously lacked for detaining foreign citizens who enter into contacts with Soviet religious activists. The application to foreigners of the highly restrictive Soviet laws and administrative practices pertaining to the exercise of religious rights by Soviet citizens could well violate the spirit and intent of the understanding that served as the basis for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and USSR in 1933. President Roosevelt then required as a precondition a Soviet promise that American citizens would enjoy the same religious freedom in the USSR that they do in the United States.
- Provisions of the law stipulating the grounds for expelling foreign citizens (Article 31) or forbidding them to leave the USSR (Article 25) appear to involve a fine legal distinction: A foreigner may be expelled for actions "conflicting with the interests of ensuring state security or safeguarding public order," for violating laws applying to foreigners (i.e., customs or currency violations), or in order to safeguard the health or morals of Soviet citizens. On the other hand, a foreigner may be forbidden to leave if charged with a crime warranting criminal prosecution or if departure would be "against the interests of ensuring state security."
- Moscow-based journalists are expressing concern that the law may restrict their professional activities by jeopardizing their contacts with Soviet citizens and their right to multiple-entry visas.

The assertion in Article 33 that the law does not affect privileges and immunities of diplomatic and consular missions "as well as other persons" does not define that open-ended final phrase, nor does the article preclude the abrogation of various peripheral, quasi-official privileges foreign residents have long enjoyed, and which helped to make life in the USSR a little easier for them. Restrictions on diplomatic personnel already entail, since late spring, tighter customs controls on the export of art, antiques, and other valuables. Resident foreign businesspersons and correspondents have just been denied the right to use hard-currency ruble coupons in the diplomatic food store. In another recent restrictive measure, bright yellow license plates are being issued to foreign correspondents and bright red ones to diplomats to ensure their high visibility for surveillance. Onerous fees and registration procedures are now mandatory when driving a private car across the Soviet border.

Campaign To Reinforce Party Authority

(U) The Suslov-led ideology conference held in late April launched another major drive against nonconformity. Party morale, individualism among the youth, nationality frictions, egalitarian sentiment, and the intelligentsia's quest for more professional autonomy appear to be the major focus of regime concern. The crisis in Poland and fears that new ideas there could filter into the USSR evidently underlie the Kremlin's latest moves to check internal dissent.

(U) Party Edicts and Meetings. Pravda reported on June 10 that in accordance with a decree of the CPSU Central Committee, propaganda conferences had been held in 13 cities of the Russian Republic. The first secretaries of regional party committees, along with Central Committee CPSU and government officials, addressed the meetings which focused on "measures to improve the effectiveness and quality" of mass indoctrination. Similar meetings had already begun in such union-republic capitals as Kiev, where Politburo member Shcherbitskiy stressed that "The ideological struggle in the world is intensifying...and imperialist reaction is waging real 'psychological warfare' aimed at subverting the socialist world and loosening it....The enemy is attacking all aspects of our socialist system: the economy, socio-political relations, culture and, primarily, the leading role of the party." (Pravda Ukrainy, June 9)

(U) A second, ideology-related decree of the CC CPSU, on improving political study courses for party members, was revealed in Pravda's June 11 editorial. According to that

decree, the final lessons in party training courses were to emphasize both the CPSU's activity as a wellspring of policy successes and the need for its dominance in national life to be further enhanced.

(U) Youth, Nationalism, and Leveling. The individualism of Soviet youth was attacked in Pravda's new column, "Party Life: Quality of Ideological Life," inaugurated on June 7 with an article by Estonian party head Vayno. Vayno complained that many high-school seniors in the dissent-riven Baltic republic wanted to work in retail stores and restaurants only for the easier satisfaction of their consumer wants and that the now popular discotheques could, if left alone by the party, turn into breeding grounds of young "philistines and individualists." Vayno also hit at Western radio broadcasts as sources of disruptive rumors and at emigre groups that promoted anti-Soviet nationalism.

(U) Soviet leveling was denounced by Professor Yu. Solodukhin in a Pravda (June 17) theoretical article. Solodukhin joined other ideologues who have lately cautioned against "rushing forward" with estimates as to how far class distinctions in Soviet society can be eliminated in the near future. He also assailed "theorists" who predict that the party's leading role would diminish in conditions of the scientific-technical revolution.

(U) Politburo member Grishin keynoted an ideological plenum of his Moscow City Party Committee. According to the June 18 Pravda, the plenum was told that the diverse ethnic makeup of the capital and the influx of foreign tourists necessitated more attention to "patriotic and internationalist upbringing" and "decisive struggle against bourgeois and revisionistic propaganda, the ideological subversion of imperialism." But it was clear from the reportage that the preachers of civic virtue were having trouble arousing any interest among economic managers and ordinary citizens.

(U) Science Restraints. The party's right to control scientific inquiry was upheld in Pravda's June 5 theoretical article by Academician Fedoseyev. The 73-year-old philosopher tactfully acknowledged the permissibility of a study of the relationship of biological and social factors in human development. But he flatly rejected the "biologization" of social phenomena, stating that "social law-governed patterns"--which party leaders devine and determine--"in full measure determine the 'behavior' of classes, nations and, generally speaking, all social groups of people." Fedoseyev likewise

opposed the emergence of an independent behavioral science in the USSR by arguing with "some scholars" who urge "a single science about man" in which the highly politicized humanities would be subsumed by the natural sciences.

(U) Fedoseyev's advocacy of ideological primacy for those seeking scientific truths coincided with an enlarged meeting of the Soviet Academy's social science section which Fedoseyev addressed and which was attended by the hardline chief of the party Secretariat's Department for Science and Higher Educational Institutions, Sergey Trapeznikov.

(C/NF) Limiting Foreign Contacts. Col. Gen. Viktor Chebrikov, KGB deputy chairman, writing on the theme of vigilance for the April issue of the Komsomol journal (Molodoy Kommunist, No. 4), denied that he was trying to sow "suspiciousness and distrust of people" but gave several examples of hostile acts supposedly committed by Western visitors to or residents in the Soviet Union. In the wake of the nationwide conference of KGB officers held in May and attended by Brezhnev, the order was given to create "first sections" for internal security in open institutions engaged in cultural work. Like their counterparts in closed institutions, these security offices would require written declarations from all employees having contacts with foreigners that they would report on the substance of their discussions with foreigners and not divulge information of "state importance."

Sex Books and Alcohol: Fighting the Demographic Decline

(C/NF) Alarmed by the implications of current demographic trends, the Soviet Government incorporated in the 11th Five-Year Plan (1981-85) a program of improved housing and medical services for mothers and working women. The Soviet medical community also focused on the demographic problem at the 7th All-Union Psychiatric Congress held in Moscow in the last week of May. Numerous papers devoted to female alcoholism and its effects on the birth rate and health of mothers and infants were presented at the Congress.

(C/NF) None of the 78 papers devoted to female alcoholism provided a national survey of the problem or of prophylactic measures. Surprisingly, there was no study of alcoholism in the RSFSR, the most severely afflicted area. But the papers indicate a rapid increase in cases of chronic alcoholism among women and of attendant psychiatric problems. Furthermore, the median age of women with chronic alcoholism is declining; one paper reported a significant incidence of alcoholism between the ages of 15 and 23.

(C/NF) The papers on alcoholism in the Central Asian republics concluded that the problem there is exclusively an urban one, with significant opposition to the use of alcohol encountered in rural areas. Although the researchers did not cite Islamic strictures against alcohol as the source of this opposition, they reported that the "influence of national-traditional factors" militated against drinking in the countryside.

(U) A Pravda article of June 19 by D. Valentey and A. Kvasha ignored the Muslim peoples (as well as alcoholism) in discussing current demographic trends. The authors decried the small size of families among the Slavic and European peoples who make up 80 percent of the USSR population, and singled out the rural RSFSR areas where low birth rates and youth emigration have led to "deformation of the age structure." They also indirectly admitted increased mortality rates among men by stating that the "gap in average ages of men and women is not closing."

(U) The Pravda piece endorsed Brezhnev's call at the 26th Party Congress for a planned demographic policy, but the most radical proposal was an appeal for sex education among young people. Furthermore, the article called for family counseling services, attention to the problems of working mothers, and more propaganda in favor of large families.

(LOU) Russian Nationalism: the Issue Behind the Soviet Writers Congress

The approach of the Seventh Congress of Soviet Writers (July 1-4) triggered some intense factional infighting within the Soviet literary establishment between "liberals" and establishment "conservatives." But the traditional labels did not quite fit the changing times, or the new alignments, nor did they provide an adequate framework for defining the issues.

During the 1970s, published Soviet literature moved steadily away from overt political themes, abandoning both the shrill ideological "Stalinist" exhortations as well as the social and political criticism that emerged during Khrushchev's cultural thaw. The better writers increasingly focused on individual moral problems of everyday life, using themes from Russian village life--often depicted in idealized terms--or contemporary urban family life and personal relationships, portraying their stresses and strains with considerable honesty and compassion. Officially encouraged works glorifying the Soviet experience in World War II and other historical themes continued to appear in mass editions, but they began to show

24

a strong overlay of Russian nationalistic themes, occasionally laced with xenophobic or anti-Semitic overtones.

During the same period, the political conservatism of the Brezhnev era discouraged literary experimentation or the treatment of controversial subjects, and the repression of political dissent in the late 1970s had the effect of either silencing or driving into emigration virtually all of the nonconformist authors including several major "official" writers. Surviving liberals moved toward safer, noncontroversial themes. Thus, the Soviet literary scene on the eve of the Writers Congress appeared gray and drab and lacking in writers of stature and independence.

During the same period, Soviet emigre literature experienced a virtual explosion of creativity. Soviet writers of major stature by world standards, unfettered by Soviet censorship, have published abroad literature of stylistic originality and unsparing in its portrayal of Soviet reality. Though largely unknown to the Soviet reading public, the works circulate among Moscow intellectuals who regard some of them as classics of contemporary Soviet literature.

Indeed, to a significant degree, the discussion of political and social issues by Soviet writers and intellectuals is now taking place outside the Soviet Union--as was the case, for example, when Soviet emigre writers resident in Western Europe and the US recently gathered in Los Angeles and debated the relationship between emigre and home literature. The offstage presence of the emigres will be acutely felt by their colleagues, the participants of the Writers Congress in Moscow, if only because of the necessity of reviewing a decade of Soviet literature without mentioning the major writers of that period.

The only truly controversial topic facing the Writers Congress was that of Russian nationalism and how it should be handled as a literary theme. This subject is by no means a minor one. Its political sensitivity has been repeatedly demonstrated by the caution with which it is treated by the authorities. Nationalism is the only unifying social force--aside from religion--capable of filling the void left in the wake of the general collapse of faith in Marxist ideology as a motivating force in Soviet society. Russian nationalism presents a special problem for the authorities, who are tempted to use it as a social lever for inspiring the dominant ethnic Russians, but who realize that this elemental force could consume the regime if it got out of control and set off a chain reaction in the other national republics.

The struggle over Russian nationalism within the Writers Union may have inspired an unusual unsigned article in the

current (No. 8) issue of the CPSU journal Kommunist. Ostensibly keyed to the campaign of ideological vigilance, the article cautiously endorsed the value of Russian nationalism as an antidote against "bourgeois consumerist cosmopolitanism" (i.e., Western influence). But the endorsement was gingerly phrased and hedged with caveats:

- a recommendation that attention to the past should be selective, with careful distinctions drawn between its "progressive" and "non-progressive" elements;
- a warning against preoccupation with Russian religious themes; and
- caution about setting Russian nationalism against "Soviet patriotism."

The article heatedly denied the patriotism of those who profess to love Russian history and culture but do not accept the revolution--in effect tarring them with the brush of dissent. At the same time, the article explicitly endorsed "giving due to those figures who objectively contributed to the power and independence of the Russian state." The necessity for issuing such guidelines suggests the presence of pressures at high levels for wider use of this ideological crutch. Kommunist also published a number of previously unpublished World War II documents, some signed by Stalin, demonstrating the "liberating mission" of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. The pointed message, in light of Polish events, seemed a warning to the Poles and simultaneously an appeal to the Russian chauvinists, whether in or outside the official establishment.

Prepared by D. Graves, x29204
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[Soviet factories are plagued by continual audits, inspections, and checks. The working arrangement is that the factory provides a feast for the auditors who turn a blind eye toward irregularities. But the system can be overloaded, as the Krokodil editors recognize.]



— Нет, мы первые
пришли ревизию делать.

"No, we got here first for the audit of the books."

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- 10 -

26

- I -

USSR CHRONOLOGY

June 1-30, 1981

June

- 1 Pravda announced publication of 12-volume Collection of Laws of the USSR, to be completed in 1985.
- 2 Brezhnev urged demilitarization of space during award ceremonies for Soviet cosmonauts.
- 3 "Moscow-Paris" Art Show opened four-month run at the Pushkin Museum.
- 4 Zarya Vostoka reported that V. A. Kobakhidze, chairman of a Tbilisi City rayon executive committee, was executed for taking 117,000 rubles in bribes in the 1976-79 period.

Sovetskaya Latviya published a story about several Soviet emigres who returned to Sverdlovsk from Chicago where they knew the Polovchak (Polowczak) family. The Polowczak case was also cited in a Ministry of Foreign Affairs note to Embassy Moscow on the occasion of International Children's Day (June 1).
- 5 A Khar'kov City court sentenced psychiatrist Anatoliy Koryagin to seven years in prison and five years of internal exile under Article 70 (anti-Soviet activity).

The Riga court sentenced Juris Bumeisters (age 63) to 15 years at hard labor and 10 years of internal exile for maintaining contacts with Social Democrats in Sweden and passing information to foreign intelligence services. Co-defendant Dainis A. Lismanis was sentenced to 10 years at hard labor. Bumeisters reportedly is the son of the founder of the Latvian Social Democratic Party in the interwar period.
- 7 Pravda Vostoka attacked Crimean Tatar emigre spokeswoman Ayshe Seitmuratova and, in passing, alleged a former Moscow Embassy officer had been expelled for espionage.
- 8-12 Defense Minister Ustinov and General Yepishev of the Main Political Administration visited Mongolian People's Republic; Ustinov spoke at June 11 ceremony on receipt of Order of Sukhe Bataar.

June

- 9 Brezhnev gave a speech at Kremlin dinner for Algerian President Benjedid.
- 10 Western press accounts claimed seven died and many injured in a fire at the Oktyabrskaya Metro station in Moscow.
- 10-11 Foreign Affairs Minister Gromyko participated in a two-day meeting of union-republic ministers of foreign affairs.
- 11 Central Committee CPSU Secretary Boris Ponomarev received SPD emissary Egon Bahr.
- 12 Pravda published the Central Committee CPSU letter to the Polish Central Committee.
- Brezhnev received Olof Palme, chairman of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security which met June 12-14 in Moscow.
- Gromyko met Cyrus Vance and David Owen, members of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security.
- 17 Brezhnev presented awards to crew of Salyut-6 space laboratory; Igor Fedorovich Dmitriev was listed as head of a Central Committee department, presumably the Defense Industry Department, succeeding the late I. F. Serbin.
- 18 Viktor Braylovskiy was sentenced to five years of internal exile under Article 190-1 (slander) at the close of a two-day trial in the Moscow City court.
- Brezhnev presented Order of Lenin to Romesh Chandra, president of the World Peace Council.
- 19 Pravda article by D. Valentey and A. Kvasha analyzed negative consequences of the small size of families among the 80 percent of the Soviet population comprised of Slavic and European stock.
- 22 Pravda published article by Defense Minister Ustinov on 40th anniversary of the Nazi attack on the USSR.
- 23-24 Brezhnev opened USSR Supreme Soviet session, announced an "Appeal to Parliaments and Peoples"; laws on Fundamentals of Housing Legislation and Legal Status of Foreigners in the USSR were adopted.

- III -

June

- 25 Brezhnev presented Hero of Socialist Labor medals to Gosplan chief Baybakov and brother-in-law K. N. Belyak, and Order of Lenin to Leningrad party boss G. V. Romanov.
- 27 Brezhnev hinted at Soviet concessions in the event of a Nordic nuclear-free zone in press interview with Suomen Sosialidemokraatti.
- 29 Academician V. Glushkov proposed in Pravda the creation of a USSR State Committee for Management Systems to centralize computer-based industrial management.
- 30 Brezhnev received Willy Brandt of FRG Social Democratic Party.

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BY GL NARA DATE 7/7/08



BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

CURRENT
ANALYSES

(U) SOVIET TRENDS: AUGUST 1981

Summary

~~(C/NF)~~ The CPSU Central Committee assured party members by circular letter in mid-August that sufficient grain would be imported to offset the current harvest disaster. Considerable belt tightening and hardship seem inevitable, however, because there will still be a large gap between estimated requirements and the combined total of domestic harvest and imports. The provisions of Brezhnev's "food program," now being worked on in Gosplan, should appear in the 1981-85 five-year plan when that is confirmed by the Supreme Soviet later this year.

~~(LOU)~~ Politburo member Chernenko (almost 70 years old) has been more in the limelight on important occasions and is assuming a higher profile in the party media, which recently awarded him the accolade of "talented theorist." His written articles still favor closer monitoring of public opinion.

~~(LOU)~~ Politburo member Gorbachev, also party secretary in charge of agriculture, continues to promote the spread of small work teams (or links) on collective farms as a means of increasing rural labor productivity. Gorbachev's most recent advocacy of links (in June) has been echoed several times since in Pravda. Ideologues remain opposed to links, however, regarding them as potential breeding grounds for kulaks or independent small farmers.

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RDS-1,2 9/18/01 (Stoddard, P.)

Report 229-CA
September 18, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- ii -

31

~~(C/NF)~~ Emigration of Jews, Germans, and Armenians has dropped sharply this year, reflecting a Soviet policy determination that large-scale emigration does not serve Soviet interests during a time of poor relations with the West. Although Israelis contend that the high rate of Jewish emigrants who choose the West over Israel is an embarrassment to the Soviets, the choice of destination actually seems more a function of the urban origin of most Jews allowed to emigrate in recent years. Jews from provincial, rural, or Asian areas and the veteran refuseniks usually opt for Israel, unlike the urban Jews, who prefer the West.

* * * * *

(C/NF) Party Letter Briefs Membership on Harvest Failure

Faced with worsening food shortages this winter and probable consumer protests, the Soviet Central Committee has taken the unusual step of reassuring the party membership that enough grain is to be imported to offset this year's harvest failure. Even so, some painful belt tightening will be necessary, because maximum possible imports cannot make up the shortfall.

A Central Committee circular letter of August 13 warned CPSU members of the consequences of this year's poor harvest and called for food conservation. Despite the letter's assurance that sufficient grain will be imported, existing food shortages promise to be even more severe this winter. US estimates of this year's grain harvest, plus a recently boosted port capacity of over 40 million metric tons (mmt), still leave the USSR far short of its estimated requirements of 228 mmt and the 1981 plan goal of 236 mmt. The resultant food shortages countrywide can be expected to spark isolated labor disturbances during the coming year, as was the case in 1980, but the regime evidently regards the situation as manageable.

There is no sign that the political leadership intends to find a scapegoat for poor farm performance. Politburo member Mikhail Gorbachev has had to cope with three straight harvest failures since he gained the farm portfolio, but it is Brezhnev who is touted as the formulator of Soviet agricultural policy. As long as he stays in power, criticism of agricultural policy probably will be restricted.

Brezhnev did announce an emergency "food program" in October 1980, but it is now ensconced in the State Planning Committee, which is expected to release it as part of the 1981-85 economic plan to be enacted into law sometime this fall.

The Brezhnev "program" was a bureaucratic response to the problems already created by bad harvests in 1979 and 1980. Although food rationing went into effect in many areas in the USSR as a palliative, labor disturbances occurred in the spring of 1980, triggered in part by local shortages. State food reserves were down last year (in the case of Leningrad by 15 days, leaving an 80-day reserve), and a third harvest shortfall this year means they cannot be built back up in 1981.

(LOU) Chernenko's Rising Political Fortunes

29

As he nears his 70th birthday (September 24), party secretary Konstantin Chernenko is assuming a somewhat higher profile. A review of his Selected Speeches and Articles in the July issue of the journal "Problems of Peace and Socialism" lauded it as a work that "enriches Marxist-Leninist theory." That praise was a notch above the accolade given his book Problems of Work of the Party and State Apparatus in the December 1980 issue of the same journal: it was merely a model of "profound Marxist-Leninist analysis" and "theoretical soundness." (Development of Soviet theory is usually ascribed to the General Party Secretary; Brezhnev is depicted in the media as the "talented theorist" whose speeches or actions represent "major contributions to the treasure house of Marxism-Leninism.") The implicit message of Chernenko's elevation to the status of theorist seems to be that he has real authority as the party secretary in charge of Politburo staff work.

Chernenko's pet cause of regularizing party-people contact is also being promoted more assiduously. Since entering the CPSU Secretariat in 1976, he has emphasized the value of officials keeping in close touch with the populace. He can thus be presumed to be associated with a party decree issued in April on the subject of improving work with citizens' letters to party offices. Another such edict summarized in Pravda August 16 ordered those drafting party decisions to "take into account the opinions and proposals of Communist and non-party people, the letters of working people." And a leading article in the August 29 Pravda comended the Penza Oblast Party Committee, where Chernenko once served as a secretary, for its work with letters.

Chernenko has been very much in the limelight during recent months. He usually attends some of Brezhnev's summer vacation talks with Soviet bloc leaders in the Crimea and did so again this year, including the key one with visiting Polish chiefs on August 14. He also:

- delivered the leadership report for Lenin's birthday in April;
- headed the Soviet delegation to the Cuban party congress in December 1980, a function that Suslov performed in 1975;
- outranked Kirilenko in a Pravda photo of the group welcoming Brezhnev on his return from India last December; and
- authored an article in the November 1980 issue of Kommunist that, evidently with an eye to Polish events, attacked political "capitulationists" in Bolshevik history and the old heresy of wanting free trade unions to manage the national economy.

The prime candidates for succession to the Soviet party leadership are in the Politburo and Secretariat. There, Chernenko, at age 70, stands between the very old Suslov (almost 79) and Kirilenko (75), and the youngest of them all, Gorbachev (50). This positive age factor and a strong identity with the party machine could tend to offset Chernenko's lack of technical knowledge and his poor rhetorical skills in the eventual competition for Brezhnev's party mantle.

(LOU) Gorbachev Hints Support of Farm Reform

The question of whether to try to increase the productivity of Soviet farm workers by creating small zvenya, or link, work has been under debate for years in the USSR. The links tend to divide a kolkhoz into a number of small farms, each worked by a few individuals whose incomes are basically determined by the output of the acreage they cultivate. Advocates of the links system claim that if it were introduced on a nationwide scale, the farm labor force would decline by millions, and production would increase at least fourfold. Critics argue that the links, if created in large numbers, could lead to a "rebirth of the kulak" and spell the end of party control in the countryside.

The links have been receiving high-level support since late 1978 when Mikhail Gorbachev was named CPSU secretary for agriculture. Pravda's leading article of March 16, 1979, extolled "unregulated links" as one of the "forms which express the economic and social creativity of the masses." Gorbachev himself was working as a farm mechanizer at the very time "unregulated" links were more or less policy (1946-50).

Gorbachev seemed to be promoting the links in an article he wrote for a party study journal (Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye, No. 7, signed to press June 25, 1981). On that occasion, he asserted that the question of "the normless system" of organizing farm labor, with payments for the final results, "merits attention." (The phrase "merits attention" is often used by Soviet leaders to advocate adoption of a disputed measure, without risking personal prestige if too-great opposition arises.)

In the wake of Gorbachev's hint, Pravda on June 30 ran an article by N. Vorobev commenting on readers' letters about farming. Vorobev observed:

"The cropland does not put up with de-personalization. Many writers believe that there must be one master of the fields, and that he be responsible for the harvest as a whole--from ploughing to gathering in the last ear of corn. In other words, labor must be organized so that people are entrusted with the land and machinery. And payment must be for the final product. V. Zakharenko and

other readers fight in particular for normless links. The experience for their successful work, the writers report, has been accumulated everywhere. And it is necessary to apply it more widely in practice."

Other letters purportedly argued that a bolder shift to the small teams acted as a deterrent to migration from the villages to the towns--something viewed as a main reason for low productivity.

Ten days later (July 10), Pravda gave the links ideological respectability by depicting them as an antidote to the evil of "wage leveling." The author of that article, V. Vershinin, an economist, criticized the existing wage system, whereby farm workers received advanced payments monthly regardless of individual performance, as fraught with the leveling illness. Countering the objection of "some" that supplementary wages were provided for excellent performance, Vershinin estimated that such bonuses in 1979 were only 1.5 percent of the overall earnings of RSFSR sovkhoz workers. He also acclaimed the successes of a number of famous links leaders in his advocacy of pay by individual contribution as the key to improved farm productivity.

A month later, Pravda gave further blessing to the idea of teams being responsible for the full farming cycle on a fixed portion of land and getting a share of the profits therefrom. In an August 18 article, Siberian agronomists called for more rapid changeover to the "normless system" and regretted that it was now only voluntary. Like Gorbachev and junior figures taking part in the discussion of farm policy reform, they, too, demanded more rights for the long-suffering agronomists.

(C/NF) Jewish Emigration and the Dropout Rate: Where is the Linkage?

Judging by the latest statistics, emigration has all but ceased to be a practical option for Soviet Jews: only 379 Israeli visas were issued in August (compared with 630 in July and 933 in June).

The fact that other emigrant flows from the Soviet Union (primarily Armenians and ethnic Germans) also dropped sharply during the past year suggests that Soviet policy was not directed against Jews alone but was the result of a policy decision to reduce emigration across the board. Moscow evidently concluded that large-scale emigration during a period of poor relations with the West was not furthering Soviet foreign policy interests. Domestic considerations probably played a less significant role in the decision, because they did not clearly militate either for or against continued emigration.

The argument has also been advanced--especially by Israeli authorities--that Moscow reduced the level of Jewish emigration in retaliation against the high dropout rate, i.e., the decision of most Jews who emigrate to settle in the US rather than in Israel. This view rests principally on the assumption that Moscow finds the dropout rate embarrassing, because the only grounds the USSR recognizes for emigration purposes is family reunification, and the dropout rate constituted prima facie evidence of mass fraud by those who claimed the desire to be reunited with relatives in Israel. When Moscow began to restrict emigration in mid-1979, Soviet authorities in fact did announce a policy of issuing exit visas only to applicants with first-degree relatives in Israel.

Curiously, as emigration began to decline steadily, the dropout rate continued to rise. Statistics are not available on the percentage of recent emigrants who in fact have first-degree relatives in Israel. Knowledgeable observers, however, doubt that the number is high enough to demonstrate that Moscow is trying very hard to enforce its stated policy. But this in turn suggests that the Soviet decision to reduce emigration had nothing to do with alleged concern over the high dropout rate (which currently is about 80 percent). It is also possible to argue that Moscow would find a dropout rate of zero even more embarrassing in the context of Soviet relations with the Arab world.

The ability of Soviet authorities to manipulate the dropout rate is an additional argument against the existence of a linkage between emigration level and dropout rate. If the dropout rate is high, it is only because Soviet emigration authorities have in recent years given preference in issuing exit visas to applicants from selected larger cities (such as Moscow, Leningrad, Odessa, and Kiev) who traditionally turn West. Provincial, rural, or Asian Jews, and veteran activist refusniks who initiated the back-to-Israel movement, are more likely to choose Israel.

Prepared by D. Graves, x29204
S. Ploss
I. Belousovitch

Approved by M. Mautner, x29536

As the Soviets See Themselves



(As the auditor departs the restaurant's back door)

"He knew too much."

USSR CHRONOLOGY

August 1-31, 1981

August

- 1 TASS termed Ambassador-designate to Pakistan Ronald Spiers a career intelligence officer and accused Ambassador Hummel of being the organizer of raids across the Pakistan border into Afghanistan.

USSR Gas Minister Dinkov gave the Urengoy gas project priority over the Yamburg line in Sovetskaya Rossiya article.
- 2 Czechoslovak leader Husak departed the Crimea for Prague after meeting Brezhnev.

General Secretary Pen Sovan of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party arrived in the USSR for a rest.
- 3 Brezhnev and Gromyko met with GDR leader Honecker in the Crimea.
- 3-6 Typhoon Felix caused massive floods in Sakhalin and Khabarovskiy Kray, leaving almost 2,400 families homeless and killing an unknown number.
- 4-5 The Leningrad City court tried Yevgeniy B. Lein under Article 191-1 (anti-Soviet slander) and imposed a sentence of two years in a labor camp.
- 5 Talgat Z. Khuramshin was named chairman of newly established USSR State Committee for the Supply of Petroleum Products (he previously was the chief of a similar body in the RSFSR Council of Ministers).
- 7 Brezhnev and Chernenko received Zhivkov in the Crimea; Zhivkov departed on the following day.

Komsomol'skaya Pravda article by Kabul correspondent V. Snegirev replied to an anxious mother's letter in which she wished for a speedy return of the troops from Afghanistan.
- 8 Pravda published Foreign Minister Gromyko's article on the 10th anniversary of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty.

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August

- 10 Brezhnev received Mongolian leader Tsedenbal in the Crimea.
- 12 Pravda published a Foreign Ministry statement rejecting Beijing's charges concerning the June 16 Soviet-Afghan border agreement.
- Pravda published Gromyko's accompanying letter to UN Secretary-General Waldheim transmitting the Soviet draft treaty banning weapons in outer space.
- General Secretary Kayson Phomvihan of the Laotian People's Revolutionary Party arrived in the USSR for a rest.
- Pravda published outlines of two party decrees on increased production of consumer goods in the 1981-85 plan period.
- Historian Arseniy Roginskiy was charged under Article 196 (forgery) with forging a pass to the reserved documents section of a library, according to Western press.
- 13 Party letter warned CPSU members of poor harvest but stated that grain imports would make up deficits.
- USSR announced war games in Belorussia and Baltic states set for September 4-12 with Ustinov directing the exercises.
- Ethnic German Artur Marshall was given 2-1/2 years for slander by Dushanbe court.
- Mikhail and Anna Polovchak (Polowczak) returned to Moscow from the US, accompanied by younger son Mikhail.
- 14-15 Brezhnev, Gromyko, Chernenko, and Rusakov met Polish leaders Kania and Jaruzelski in the Crimea.
- 17 Six ethnic German refuseniks were arrested in Red Square after a brief demonstration.
- 17-19 Party Secretary for agriculture Gorbachev toured rural Belorussia with republic leader Kiselev.
- 18 Dissident Aleksey Semer'yanov was arrested and charged with Article 190-1 (anti-Soviet slander) in Maloyaroslavets, Kaluzhskaya Oblast.

August

- 19-23 Ustinov visited Leningrad for a holiday.
- 23 Politburo endorsed Brezhnev's meeting with bloc leaders in the Crimea.
- 24-28 Deputy ministers of foreign affairs of the socialist camp met in Kiev in preparation for UN General Assembly.
- 25 Brezhnev flew from the Crimea to Moscow where he was greeted by all Politburo members except Grishin, Suslov, Pelshe, and Ponomarev.
- 27 Ivan S. Kovalev, a member of the Helsinki Monitoring Group, was arrested and charged under Article 70 (anti-Soviet activities).

SOV. GEN.

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 03039

BRUSSELS FOR USEEC
E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PORG, UNGA, UR, PARM
SUBJECT: SOVIET SPEECH IN UNGA GENERAL DEBATE, SEPT. 22.

1. SOVIET FONMIN ANDREI GROMYKO ADDRESSED SECRETARY HAIG AND A PACKED GA HALL FOR OVER AN HOUR, DEVOTING MUCH OF HIS ADDRESS TO HARSH CRITICISMS OF THE UNITED STATES, PARTICULARLY ON ARMS ISSUES. IN A WIDE-RANGING SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, HE DELIVERED RESTATEMENTS OF FAMILIAR SOVIET POSITIONS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH USUAL SOVIET PRACTICE, GROMYKO USED THE GENERAL DEBATE TO INTRODUCE ONE "NEW" SOVIET INITIATIVE RELATING TO THE ARMS RACE. THIS YEAR'S PROPOSAL WAS AN AGENDA ITEM ENTITLED "PREVENT NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE: DECLARATION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY", ACCOMPANIED BY A DRAFT DECLARATION DIRECTED AGAINST THE FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE ARMS RACE AND DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS WERE PREDOMINANT THEMES OF GROMYKO'S SPEECH, WHICH ACCUSED THE US, AMONG OTHER THINGS, OF:

- "WHIPPING UP" THE ARMS RACE
 - SEEKING MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE USSR
 - SETTING UP BASES AND STATIONING TROOPS AROUND THE WORLD
 - UNDERMINING AGREED PRINCIPLES OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS
 - "SLANDEROUS PROPAGANDA AGAINST COUNTRIES ADHERING TO THE POSITIONS OF PEACE" AND
 - THE USE OF "DECEPTION" TO CREATE "THE MYTH OF A SOVIET THREAT".
- MORE SPECIFIC CHARGES RELATED TO PARTICULAR REGIONAL

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CONFLICTS, WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND STRATEGIC DOCTRINES. US ACTIVITIES ATTACKED BY GROMYKO INCLUDED "IMPERIALIST INTERFERENCES" IN EL SALVADOR, THE FORMATION OF THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE, "SHAMELESS PRESSURE" AND "ARMED PROVOCATION" AGAINST LIBYA, DEVELOPMENT OF THE "INHUMANE" NEUTRON BOMB, AND THE ASSEMBLY OF "A WHOLE US NAVAL ARMADA IN THE PERSIAN GULF". GROMYKO WAS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL OF "THE CONCEPT OF AMERICAN VITAL INTERESTS", AND HE LISTED EUROPE, ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST AND LATIN AMERICA AS CLAIMED AREAS OF US INTEREST; "IT SEEMS THAT THE ONLY AREA STILL MISSING IS THE SOUTH POLE", HE SAID, "BUT IT MAY SOON BE ADDED TOO".

2. EARLY IN HIS SPEECH, GROMYKO REFERRED TO "ATTEMPTS BY CERTAIN QUARTERS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES". HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED POLAND, RECITING THE WARSAW PACT'S PLEDGE OF DECEMBER 5, 1980, TO GIVE "FRATERNAL SOLIDARITY AND SUPPORT" TO THE POLISH PARTY AND PEOPLE. THE COMMENTS ON POLAND WERE JUXTAPOSED WITH GROMYKO'S FIRST EXPLICIT ATTACK ON THE US, FOR "HOSTILE, CRIMINAL INTRIGUES AGAINST CUBA". GROMYKO THEN DEFENDED SOCIALISM AGAINST ITS CRITICS, SOME OF WHICH "EVEN GO AS FAR AS TO PREDICT AN EARLY SUNSET OF SOCIALISM". HE CHARGED THAT LEADERS IN NATO COUNTRIES "WORSHIP NOW BUT ONE GOD--AN UNRESTRAINED ARMS RACE." GROMYKO CONDEMNED THE WEST'S "ADVENTURISTIC" POLICIES AND CLAIMED THAT THE USSR HAS NEVER SOUGHT MILITARY SUPERIORITY. "BUT", HE WARNED, "WE WILL NOT PERMIT OTHERS TO BECOME SUPERIOR TO US". GROMYKO SAID THAT THE USSR IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ALL ASPECTS OF ENDING THE ARMS RACE, BUT HE REJECTED "CONDITIONS, LINKAGES AND INEQUITABLE APPROACHES". THE USSR IS PROPOSING NEGOTIATIONS, "NOT BEGGING FOR THEM", AND WILL ONLY NEGOTIATE "ON THE BASIS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY". GROMYKO SAID THAT THE USSR IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS WITH THE US, "RELYING ON WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED AND PRESERVING THE RESULTS ACHIEVED". REGARDING MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, GROMYKO REPEATED SOVIET PROPOSALS:

1) FOR A MORATORIUM ON DEPLOYMENTS AT THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS AND 2) TO CONSIDER REDUCING THE NUMBER OF
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BRUSSELS FOR USEEC
WEAPONS IN THE WESTERN USSR IF NO MEDIUM RANGE NATO
NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE DEPLOYED IN WESTERN EUROPE. HE SAID
THAT LIMITS ON MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND U.S.
FORWARD BASED WEAPONS SYSTEMS SHOULD BE "SETTLED CON-
CURRENTLY AND IN ORGANIC INTERRELATION." GROMYKO ADDED
THAT IF NATO DRAGS OUT THE MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS NEGO-
TIATIONS AND STARTS DEPLOYMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE, "THE
SOVIET UNION WILL HAVE TO TAKE MEASURES TO REESTABLISH
THE BALANCE". THE SOVIET FONMIN CONTRASTED HIS WILLING-
NESS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE U.S. REFUSAL TO RATIFY SALT
II, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS A BALANCED DOCUMENT THAT
WOULD LEAD TO SUBSTANTIAL ARMS REDUCTION. HE CLAIMED
THAT THE U.S. WAS ALSO DELAYING OR "WRECKING" OTHER
NEGOTIATIONS, RANGING FROM TALKS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN
AND A NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY TO THE LAW OF THE SEA
CONFERENCE.

THE SOVIET UNION WAS EVEN TODAY PROPOSING A NEW MEASURE
AGAINST THE ARMS RACE, ITS DRAFT "DECLARATION OF THE UN
GA." THE DRAFT PRESENTED BY GROMYKO IS A ONE-PAGE
DOCUMENT THAT RESEMBLES OTHER SOVIET "ARMS CONTROL"
INITIATIVES; THIS ONE IS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED AGAINST
THE FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DECLARING THAT SUCH
FIRST USE IS "THE GRAVEST CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY." IT
WOULD FURTHER DECLARE THAT "ANY DOCTRINE ALLOWING FOR
THE FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ANY ACTIONS PUSHING
THE WORLD TOWARDS A CATASTROPHE ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH
HUMAN MORAL STANDS AND THE LOFTY IDEALS OF THE UN."

3. TURNING TO A NUMBER OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS, GROMYKO

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BRIEFLY RESTATED SOVIET POSITIONS AND USED EVERY AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY TO LASH OUT AT THE U.S. HE CONDEMNED THE "ANTI-ARAB DEAL OF CAMP DAVID" AND CALLED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAID THE U.S. VETO HAD PREVENTED THE SECURITY COUNCIL FROM TAKING PROPER ACTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. WHEN GROMYKO BEGAN TO DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN AND "THE UNDECLARED WAR" BEING WAGED THERE, TWO PROTESTERS IN THE GA'S PUBLIC GALLERY SHOUTED "LIES, LIES, MURDER IN AFGHANISTAN" AND THREW LEAFLETS INTO THE HALL. GUARDS ESCORTED THE MEN AWAY. UNMOVED, GROMYKO CONTINUED HIS ATTACK ON THE U.S., ALLEGING THAT IT PLAYED THE PRIMARY ROLE IN WAGING AN UNDECLARED WAR ON AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION WITH "RELIABLE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES" WOULD ALLOW THE USSR AND AFGHANISTAN TO WORK OUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. RESPONDING TO REPORTS OF TOXIC CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, GROMYKO CALLED THE CHARGE A "FRAUD" AND SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. WAS ACTUALLY "GUILTY OF SUCH CRIMES". HE ALSO CONDEMNED U.S. MILITARY COOPERATION WITH CHINA, WHICH ALSO INVOLVED JAPAN, "FOR REASONS NO ONE KNOWS", BUT HE ADDED THAT THE USSR HAS MADE VALID PROPOSALS FOR NORMALIZATION OF ITS OWN RELATIONS WITH CHINA. ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES, GROMYKO MERELY STATED THAT NO FORUM WOULD GIVE POSITIVE RESULTS UNLESS DEVELOPED CAPITALIST COUNTRIES CHANGED THEIR APPROACH AND RENOUNCED "PLUNDERING" OF THE LDC'S. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE USSR'S SOCIALIST BLOC ALLIES, HE PRAISED ONLY ONE COUNTRY -- THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA -- AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, EXPRESSING "SOLIDARITY" WITH ITS "ANTI-IMPERIALIST ORIENTATION".

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CONFIDENTIAL 039

ADMIN MSG FOR DIA

SUBJ: INVITATION TO COMMANDER, ROMANIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

VISIT TO U.S. ((C)) NOTAL

REF: CNO 281344Z JAN 82

1. ((C)) IAW REF MSG, INVITATION IN ENGLISH AND ROMANIAN WAS DELIVERED TO FOREIGN LIAISON SECTION 29 JAN 82. ADDRESSING INVITATION THROUGH REAR ADMIRAL MUSAT, COMMANDER, ROMANIAN NAVY WAS VERY GOOD PROCEDURE AND MAY HELP CHANCES OF POSITIVE RESPONSE.

2. ((C)) FYI - IN AMBASSADOR FUNDERBURK'S THANK YOU LETTER TO GEN-LT OLTEANU FOR FRIENDLY AND CANDID VISIT DURING PROTOCOL VISIT ON 28 DEC 81, THE AMBASSADOR THANKED THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE FOR HIS PROMISE OF SUPPORT FOR THE CAPT ANGHELESCU, GEN-LT ZARNESCU VISITS AND INFORMED THE MINISTER THAT WE WERE HOPING TO FORWARD INVITATIONS FOR AN APRIL VISIT BY CAPT R1 ANGHELESCU AND A MAY VISIT BY GEN-LT ZARNESCU.

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PAGE 1 OF 1



BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

CURRENT
ANALYSES

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

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NLRR FC6-114/7 #9876

BY CU NARA DATE 7/7/08

~~(U)~~ SOVIET TRENDS: JANUARY 1982

Summary

~~(LOU)~~ Suslov's death removed a champion of party orthodoxy whose shoes cannot be filled by any one man. His absence may weaken Politburo cohesiveness and could improve prospects for an eventual pragmatic cast to some aspects of Soviet behavior.

~~(C/NF)~~ Chernenko has stepped forward since Suslov's death and improved his status indicators relative to his chief rival, Andrey Kirilenko. Chernenko is now more active in liaison work with foreign communist parties, and he signaled a tie with the KGB when he signed Tsvigun's obituary. But the new Kremlin pecking order is not yet firm.

~~(C)~~ Local rationing of meat and dairy products is spreading from the medium-sized cities to the metropolises. Equity and limiting industrial absenteeism are important considerations in the adoption of food distribution plans at factories, customer registration at stores, coupon issuance, and limitations on purchase amounts.

~~(LOU)~~ Klaypeda in Lithuania has been praised in the press for its model system of food rationing through the work plan. In one variant of the local system, the local trade-union staff controls access to such desirable goods as winter clothing. Fair as the food rationing system seems to be in Klaypeda, the per capita allowance of meat is still only one-third that of the national average consumption in the recent past.

~~(C/NF)~~ High-level warnings on the problems inherent in not meeting consumer demands are increasing. Premier Tikhonov's article in the January issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism

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Report 326-CA
February 24, 1982

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urged that economic plans be checked for their congruence with popular expectations. Pravda articles have also pointed to the danger of negative reactions caused by shortages.

* * * * *

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(LOU) Suslov's Demise: A Pillar of Conservatism Falls

The sudden death of Mikhail Suslov on January 25 removed an influential force in Kremlin politics. More than any other top leader, Suslov tended to see issues in ideological terms and oppose policies that could be interpreted as deviations from communist dogma. His death at age 79 is likely to reduce the cohesiveness of the Politburo and in time may even have the effect of putting a more pragmatic cast on at least some aspects of Soviet behavior.

No one can really fill Suslov's shoes as guardian of party orthodoxy and counterweight to disruptive tendencies within the ruling bodies. Official resistance to experimentation in theory and practice may weaken somewhat as a result of his absence. And the succession process could be more disorderly without Suslov around to referee the disputes of rivals for power.

Suslov had been a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee since 1947 and a voting member of its Politburo since 1955. In terms of tenure, he was the senior member of both Politburo and Secretariat, where he served under three successive party leaders--Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. He was the untitled second secretary of the CPSU, his name listed after Brezhnev's in the hierarchical ranking of Secretariat members elected at the 26th Party Congress in March. As such, Suslov was rumored to have discharged Brezhnev's functions as party leader when the latter was ill or out of the country. A major voice in party personnel matters was also a customary prerogative of the second secretary.

Suslov's general policy responsibilities included ideology, culture, and international communism. But his role went far beyond that of providing ideological guidance for Soviet domestic and foreign policy decisions. While not known ever to have made a serious bid for the number-one position himself, Suslov is believed to have played a decisive role in who was selected and to have made sure that the collective nature of party leadership was respected. It was he who delivered to the Central Committee the secret reports attacking, and reading out of the party command, Marshal Zhukov (1957) and Khrushchev (1964) for their moves to exert personal power. Under Brezhnev, Suslov was well suited to be the arbiter between various power groups and to prevent quarrels from getting out of hand.

In keeping with his known suspiciousness of Western motives, Suslov played a key role in the Stalinist Information Bureau (Cominform) and generally assumed the higher profile indicative of enhanced status at moments of Soviet-American tension during the Khrushchev years.

Strong in his opposition to Eurocommunism, Suslov had taken an equally hard stance toward Yugoslav and, later, Chinese defiance of Soviet wishes. The Soviet-Yugoslav quarrel illustrated Suslov's refusal to budge from old positions formed during Stalin's time. Khrushchev Remembers observes that after Stalin died and the new Kremlin leadership began to discuss the possibility of reestablishing contact with the Yugoslavs, "Mikhail Suslov was particularly adamant in resisting the idea of trying to relieve the tension between us and the Yugoslavs. He insisted that Yugoslavia was no longer a Socialist country."

Over 20 years later, Western communist liberals used the term "Suslovists" in private to describe CPSU conservatives. Nevertheless, Suslov's public endorsement of Brezhnev's detente initiatives and of socialist-communist cooperation was evidence of his adeptness at adjusting to prevailing political realities.

Known informally as the "gray cardinal" and "Misha," Suslov had many partisans throughout the Soviet establishment. A source of his authority inside the party bureaucracy was his firm belief that it must maintain strict control over intellectual life. He had participated in the Stalin-era purges of "cosmopolitans" and Jews in the fields of literature, art, and the social sciences. In 1975 he appeared before a meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences and announced the party's choice for Academy president--an unprecedented show of party power over the quasi-autonomous Academy and an apparent signal that the Academy would not be permitted to shelter dissident intellectuals.

In death, Suslov's importance was underscored by his obituary, which featured warmer praise than was accorded the late Premier Kosygin, and burial in a grave on Red Square rather than in the Kremlin wall, as was the case with Kosygin.

(U) Vintage Suslov

Suslov's Selected Speeches and Articles (Moscow: 1972) contains the following statement made at a festive-mourning meeting in Moscow devoted to the 24th anniversary of Lenin's death, January 21, 1948.

"The adventuristic policy of the U.S. imperialists is fraught with grave danger. It would seem that such lessons of history as the shipwreck of Hitler's Germany and its

accomplices ought to have taught something to the ringleaders of U.S. imperialism and their junior British partners. It is appropriate to recall Lenin's words, spoken yet after World War I:

"'We see,' Lenin said, 'how Great Britain and the United States--countries having a better chance than others to remain democratic republics--have risked their fortunes just as wildly and foolishly as did Germany in its day, and so they are just as rapidly and perhaps even faster drawing near to that end which German imperialism reached so successfully. At first it swelled out incredibly into three-quarters of Europe, grew fat, and then it suddenly burst, leaving behind a most awful stench. Now British and U.S. imperialism is hurrying towards that end' (V. I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, vol. 37, pp. 159-160."

This quotation has been deleted from a 1977 publication of Suslov's collected works, although it still appears in the 1972 edition published after the onset of detente. Other Politburo leaders apparently required no such editorial surgery when their works were republished, since none were in top positions during the Stalin-era heyday of anti-Americanism.

Since Suslov: Chernenko Stepping Forward

(U) Party Secretary Konstantin Chernenko stepped more into the limelight after Suslov's death. He appears to be refurbishing his ties to the state security service, an important asset in succession politicking. But not all of the obstacles to Chernenko's further advance have been removed.

(U) Chernenko, age 70 and in charge of Politburo staff work, moved up to Brezhnev's side in the honor guard at Suslov's lying-in-state. He thus outranked Premier Tikhonov and rival Secretary Kirilenko who had usually taken precedence over him in formal leadership appearances. Chernenko was also shown ahead of Kirilenko in press photos of the Politburo lineup on Lenin's tomb at the Red Square funeral. And his name was put before Kirilenko's--out of Russian alphabetical order--in the listing of members of the Suslov funeral commission.

(U) In addition, a close relationship between Chernenko and secret police leaders was suggested following the death of KGB First Deputy Chairman Tsvigun on January 19. Pravda's obituary was signed by Politburo members Andropov, Gorbachev, Ustinov, and Chernenko. (Brezhnev, oddly enough, did not sign despite Tsvigun's rank and rumored ties with Brezhnev's family.) But of that foursome, only Chernenko and KGB Chairman Andropov later stood vigil at Tsvigun's wake. The KGB, of course, can give

valuable assistance to those engaged in Kremlin intrigues; its executive protection work enables it to eavesdrop on or even neutralize a top leader at a time of crisis.

(U) Outside Moscow, Georgian leaders went still further in their drive to burnish Chernenko's image. The republic's party daily Zarya Vostoka on January 22 carried a full-page unsigned review of the 1981 volume of Chernenko's Selected Speeches and Articles. (The book was reviewed in Pravda months ago--on May 15, 1981.) The main theme of the review was enlargement of the party's role in Soviet society, but Chernenko's writings on world affairs were dwelt on at length and readers were reminded that he was at the 1975 CSCE summit.

(C/NF) Some Soviet officials abroad seem to have inferred from such data that Chernenko might assume Suslov's position as Number 2, if the late elder's duties were divided up among several officials. A subsequent decision to name him head of the CPSU delegation to the latest congress of the French Communist Party contributed to the speculation. At the same time, Kirilenko at 75 presumably recognizes a rival when he sees one; maneuvering on his part and by others may help to account for some of the signs of opposition to Chernenko.

(U) In contrast to usual practice, no chairman was named to the commission for organizing the Suslov funeral. The individual given that task on past occasions normally stood a good chance of succeeding to the job of the deceased. (Tikhonov was chairman of the Kosygin funeral commission and soon was named premier; Ustinov headed the Grechko funeral commission and took over Grechko's post of Defense Minister.) A second anomaly was that during the Red Square funeral, Kirilenko switched places with Chernenko in the Politburo lineup, thus outranking him for a few minutes. These anti-Chernenko moves could have been organized by the late Suslov's reputed allies (Grishin, Gorbachev, and Pelshe) in order to demonstrate support for a known champion of basic conservation causes--notably, heavy industry and social discipline.

(C/NF) To look at the succession struggle solely in terms of a Chernenko-Kirilenko rivalry may, however, be over-simplification. KGB Chief Andropov for one may feel that he has claims to elements of Suslov's portfolio which qualify him for a shot at the top spot; this appears to be the gist of recent comments of maverick historian Roy Medvedev. The clients of other high party leaders can also be expected to begin promoting the causes of their patrons in the post-Suslov atmosphere.

(C) Food Rationing Spreads in USSR

The practice of rationing meat and dairy products is spreading from smaller Soviet cities to the major centers such as

Moscow. The forms employed locally include distribution of supplies to the workers at factories, guaranteed minimum quotas at designated stores, monthly ration coupons issued by city authorities, and limitations on quantities purchased by a customer. The public regards such measures as equitable, and they can be expected to remain in effect through 1983 and perhaps through 1985.

The current food shortages in the USSR are directly attributable to three consecutive grain harvest failures. Despite large imports, the shortages, combined with distribution problems, have gradually forced local authorities to resort to rationing schemes to cope with the situation. Equity is one goal, but maintaining industrial labor productivity is equally important to the regime. Arranging for food distribution at factories also has served to curb absenteeism for shopping, a practice that had become very widespread.

Although no national rationing system seems likely at present, several different control procedures are in effect locally. The most common is the factory-order system which, according to the 1981-85 plan directives, is scheduled to be implemented even more widely. Under it, workers receive a monthly average ration of two kilograms of meat delivered directly to them on the factory premises. (They are free to make supplemental purchases at farmers' markets and in state stores when supplies are available.) Factories are now also being pressured to establish their own farms to raise food.

Some cities, for example Irkutsk, have established a system at state stores whereby registered customers are entitled to 1 kilogram of meat and 300 grams of butter each month. This small amount appears to be a guaranteed minimum (the national annual meat consumption was 57 kilograms). Other cities, such as Kazan, issue red and blue coupons for meat and dairy products good for up to 3 kilograms per month, but do not guarantee availability.

Another widespread and flexible system is the imposition of ceilings on the amount of such staples as bread, meat, butter, and sugar that a store will sell a customer. Individuals are free to visit several stores in the hope of stocking up, but this recourse is not available in small villages with only one general store. (Moscow food stores years ago were closed on Sundays to discourage suburban shoppers.)

Controls on bread may also become stricter, judging by Shcherbitskiy's complaints in a January 21 speech in Dneprodzerzhinsk. Such controls are a special problem, because the availability of bread and its low price are sacrosanct matters in the USSR. But cheapness has encouraged its use as animal feed, a practice Khrushchev fought unsuccessfully with police and court

63

sanctions. The present regime may be edging in the same direction as Khrushchev; an unpublished party decree limits bread sales to 1 kilogram per day in areas where bread has been used as animal feed. Bread assortment and weight have already been reduced, but so far quality has not been degraded.

(LOU) The Klaypeda System of Rationing: A Model for the Nation

"When there is no sausage, chicken, butter, or, let us say, smoked fish on a store counter, it does not always mean that the store does not have them." With this opening remark, the trade union paper Trud (January 8, 1982) recounted how shortages of food and consumer goods give rise to corrupt practices by store employees, and how this problem was licked in exemplary fashion by local authorities in the town of Klaypeda, Lithuania.

There, one store is assigned the monopoly on filling individual orders for food items in short supply, especially meat and dairy products. It prepackages the food, then trucks it daily to factories and other enterprises in Klaypeda which distribute it to individual workers. The system services some 100,000 workers in 260 enterprises on the basis of a contractual arrangement between the store and participating enterprises. Workers are given a choice of several food assortments, publicized each week at their place of work. In this way, a substantial majority of city residents receive their fair share of scarce food items without spending hours standing in shopping lines.

Trud gave the system high marks because it insured that food stocks earmarked for the city actually reached city residents instead of being bought up by speculators or shoppers from the countryside or nearby communities. To image-conscious authorities, the system also had the obvious advantage of disguising food rationing as a new and highly convenient form of shopping. To ensure fairness and to make the system responsive to workers' needs, city authorities also instituted a policy of meeting regularly with workers in participating enterprises to hear complaints and answer questions.

Subsequently, the system of food distribution was expanded to include such high-quality consumer goods as imported clothing, furs, furniture, rugs, etc. Stores receiving shipments of such items would prepare "receipts" containing descriptions of the articles and their prices which were then turned over to the trade union organization. Local union officials distributed these to those wishing to make purchases. This system of allocating consumer goods differs significantly from the food distribution system in that it gives union officials the opportunity to dispense--or withhold--favors by deciding which worker deserves the opportunity to purchase a scarce and highly desirable item.

Trud's detailed description of the Klaypeda rationing system was obviously intended to spur other communities to organize similar schemes. It also highlighted the reluctance of central authorities to undertake the responsibility--and the onus--of organizing and administering a nationwide system of rationing, preferring that this be handled by local authorities on an ad hoc basis.

The statistics provided by the article concerning the quantity of meat allotted Klaypeda on the basis of its population--10 tons per day for 185,000 inhabitants--allows a comparison of the current meat ration in Klaypeda with the official per capita figure for meat consumption. The current meat ration in Klaypeda is about 54 grams (2 ounces) of untrimmed carcass meat per day, or about 19.7 kilos of meat per year. Given the average per capita consumption of 57 kilos of meat per year claimed by Soviet statistics, citizens in Klaypeda are currently receiving about one-third of the national norm, even with an exemplary distribution system.

Public Discontent As a Developing Issue

(~~LOU~~) Soviet elites have been warned once again that ordinary citizens in the USSR could cause trouble if their basic wants are not satisfied. The Politburo has also called for allocation of resources to be brought into line with popular demands. The fear of worker discontent, or the potential for it, seems to be behind a concurrent campaign to upgrade the trade unions' role as a guardian of workers' welfare.

(U) Pravda on January 12 pointedly observed that the anti-communist uprising at the Kronshtadt naval base in 1921 was "not only of historical interest." The reviewer of a new play about Lenin noted that audiences were receiving a useful

"reminder of how dangerous social ills can become when they are neglected, either because of the political nearsightedness of the 'diagnosticians' or because of a selfish and cowardly desire to protect one's reputation. That is just the way it was with the soothing-windowdressing information on the state of affairs in Kronshtadt that came out of Petrograd from [party leader] Zinoviev. This hindered the party in forestalling the undesirable development of events. 'The truth,' Lenin says in this regard, 'must not be dependent upon who will be served by it'" (emphasis supplied).

(~~U~~) In effect, this warning mirrored Chernenko's, in the September 1981 issue of Kommunist, that

"an incomplete or belated analysis of social interests, disregard for the interests of any class or group and the

inability to find the socially necessary 'degree' of their combination are fraught with the danger of social tension and of political and socio-economic crisis" (emphasis supplied).

(U) Premier and Politburo member Nikolay Tikhonov went to the heart of the matter, addressing "the question of distributing the national income" and "decisions about priorities" for the economy in the January issue of the international communist journal Problems of Peace and Socialism. He underlined the importance of insuring the kind of political leadership and economic administration which could serve to guarantee a balance of investment and consumption. Tikhonov urged broad discussion of economic plans and checking on the proposals of technical experts in order to determine "how far they coincide with the masses' expectations." While Tikhonov also hit at "deeply consumerist 'ideals'" and recognized a need to strengthen Soviet defenses in view of "the unconcealed military threat" from the West, his remarks were still close to those of Brezhnev and Chernenko in favoring more effort to improve the lot of the consumer.

(U) A pro-consumer article in Pravda January 21 by economist V. Groshev argued that "even partial difficulties" in satisfying "all of the sensible needs of the workers" tended to "evoke a negative reaction in people, limiting in the end a person's activeness and lowering labor productivity." Groshev rejected "asceticism" and "scorning of the masses' material needs and demands" as foreign to Soviet ideology. He also assailed "one-sided enthusiasm for solving strictly production problems" and advised that a lag in the building of welfare facilities was especially harmful to development of the country's eastern regions.

(U) Keyed to the preparations for this spring's congress of trade unions, a January 5 Pravda article by union head Aleksey Shibayev reaffirmed the unions' "traditional defensive function," with particular concern for employees' working and living conditions. Union officials were told to strive for "a climate of sensitive regard for people, constant attention to their needs and demands" and to "give an uncompromising rebuff" to such management vices as "bureaucratism, hardness and arrogance."

(U) An editorial on unions in the January 19 Soviet Russia likewise directed attention to the building of sports and health centers for workers. It said that "perhaps" the main thing determining the nature of the unions' activity is that "the level of labor productivity and the boosting of production now depend, and will depend even more so the further we progress, on the degree to which the people's spiritual needs are satisfied and consequently on the level of their frame of mind." (Both Shibayev and Soviet Russia, of course, ignored the fact that unions' welfare activity is severely limited by the budgetary decisions taken by the central authorities.)

(C/NF) Clearly, the 1980 labor revolt in Poland has been the main impetus for the regime's campaign to check the decline of popular morale. But a contributing factor might be the brief strikes that reportedly occurred in various Soviet towns in the Ukraine, Baltics, and RSFSR last year.

(C) More recently, a story has gone around Moscow about a factory worker in Kaluga (southwest of Moscow) who refused his salary in rubles, saying that he wanted food and goods instead; the man, the story continued, was detained by the KGB.

(LOU) Farm Reform Is Expected

A third consecutive grain harvest failure may lead to some surgery on the web of red tape reaching out from Moscow to every collective and state farm in the USSR. Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the CPSU Secretariat's International Department, said in a Budapest TV interview aired on January 21 that "we will adopt quickly the methods of agriculture used in Hungary." Pravda's last look at Hungarian agriculture (December 7, 1981) spoke warmly of small production groups which "plan their own activity, determine tasks and freely distribute above-plan profit" within a socialized framework. In a less radical vein, an economist writing for the January issue of Planovoye Khozyaystvo, journal of the USSR State Planning Committee, decried "excessive" centralization in running agriculture and proposed that more rights be granted to district-level farm officials--which echoed past calls for more tinkering.

The airing of such views suggests that reformers may now be finding a more receptive audience on the Politburo level than they had previously. According to Brezhnev, a future plenum is to address the food program and some relaxation of farm restrictions may be possible once the larger program is accepted. But the rate of progress so far in formulating a farm program makes it unlikely that a spring plenum would undertake major changes in farm administration.

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- II -

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January

- 15 CPSU Secretary Kapitonov supervised the ouster of Severo-Osetinskaya ASSR Party Committee First Secretary Bilar Kabaloyev (a candidate member of CPSU Central Committee) for "leadership shortcomings" and installed as new first secretary Vladimir Ye. Odintsov, head of the Transcaucasus Sector of the Department of Party-Organizational Work of the CPSU Central Committee. Kabaloyev probably was ousted as a result of September 23-25 ethnic riots in Ordzhonikidze.
- 19 KGB First Deputy Chairman Semen K. Tsvigun died at 65.
- 19 Pravda published letter of worker N. I. Kvitka to President Reagan, rejecting US defense of human rights in Poland and USSR.
- 19 B. Tulepbayev's Pravda review linked history of the Basmachi movement with contemporary Afghanistan.
- 20 Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya reported the Kishinev trial of Evangelical Baptist M. Khorev, a contributor to the illegal Vestnik Istiny (Herald of Truth), and noted publication of illegal Bulletin of Council of Prisoners' Relatives.
- 20-22 All-Union Znaniye Society conducted seminar, "The 26th CPSU Congress on Strengthening the Defense Capability of the Country and Military-Patriotic Indoctrination of the Workers"; Vladimir Ye. Semichastnyy (KGB chief in 1961-67) was newly identified as a deputy chairman of the Znaniye Board.
- 21 Politburo member Shcherbitskiy's speech to voters in Dneprodzerzhinsk referred to shortages of meat and dairy products and complained of wastage of bread at weddings, parties, and induction ceremonies.
- 22 Literaturnaya Rossiya article by V. Kassis and L. Kolosov asserted in review of L. Korneyev's book on Western intelligence services that Andrey Sakharov was "co-opted by Zionist-imperialist intelligence services with the aid of the pro-Zionist, anti-Soviet Yelena Bonner."
- 22 Andropov, Chernenko, and Kapitonov attended funeral of KGB official S. K. Tsvigun; Brezhnev's family was represented by son-in-law Yuriy Churbanov, first deputy minister MVD USSR.

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- I -

USSR CHRONOLOGY

JANUARY 1-31, 1982

January

- 1 New year greetings signed by party, state, and government.
- 7 Ambassador Vladimir Ya. Pavlov transferred from Budapest to Tokyo; Vladimir N. Bazovskiy (first deputy head of Cadres Abroad Department of Central Committee CPSU) named ambassador to Budapest. Kyodo announced Ambassador Dmitriy S. Polyanskiy's departure from Tokyo on January 10.
- 8 Pravda article by M. Stepichev rehashed espionage accusations against former Embassy Moscow officers.
- 8 Ye. Kuz'min defended in Pravda the clause in the 1977 Soviet Constitution restricting individual rights when the latter conflict with interests of state or society.
- 8 Western press reported collapse of roof at Ordzhonikidze Plant in Moscow, killing 10 workers.
- 9 Sovetskaya Kirgiziya reported trial in Kantskiy Rayon of Baptist brothers Yakov (age 30) and Sergey (age 19) Mikhaylenko for religious activities; Yakov sentenced to 24 months and Sergey sentenced to 18 months in prison.
- 12 Politburo member Dinmukhamed Kunayev granted Order of Lenin and third Hammer and Sickle medal on occasion of 70th birthday.
- 12 Suslov received Polish Foreign Minister Czyrek, Suslov's last public act.
- 13 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium took away Soviet citizenship from Yelena Mikhaylovna Ul'mann, born in 1947 in Moscow, and Lyudmila Nurullova Myussigmann, born in 1947 in Tashkent, "for acts harming Soviet prestige." Both currently reside in the Federal Republic of Germany.
- 14 Sovetskaya Rossiya blamed archeological dig in seventh century village for outbreak of anthrax in Permskaya Oblast.

- III -

January

- 24 No grain harvest figure given in statistical report on 1981 plan fulfillment; population as of January 1 given as 268.8 million.
- 24 Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya noted Hare Krishna consciousness club established in Krasnoyarsk.
- 25 Mikhail A. Suslov died at 79 after suffering a stroke on January 21; medical report stated Suslov had arteriosclerosis and sugar diabetes and had experienced an infarct in 1976.
- 25 Army General Varennikov and Col. General Chervov touted Soviet publication "Whence the Threat to Peace" at Moscow press conference.
- 25 Pravda published a four-column letter attacking policies of Italian Communist Party.
- 27 Literaturnaya Gazeta article by E. Yusupov attacked Uzbek radio service of the Voice of America.
- 28 Leningrad port workers demonstrated against alleged US role in Polish problems.
- 28 Izvestiya featured an expose of Soviet emigre criminals in Los Angeles underworld.
- 29 Brezhnev and Grishin each delivered seven-minute eulogies at Suslov's Red Square funeral; burial was at foot of Kremlin wall.
- 29 Chernenko received Greek Communist Party delegation.
- 29 Georgiy Arbatov spoke at centennial tribute to FDR.
- 30 Hunger striker Lidiya Vashchenko taken to Botkin Hospital from US Embassy Moscow.
- 30 Pravda published a TASS article on alleged US intelligence agents in Embassy Moscow.



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CURRENT
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BY

CA NARADATE 7/7/68

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70

~~(U)~~ SOVIET TRENDS: FEBRUARY 1982

Summary

~~(LOU)~~ A flurry of rumors linking Brezhnev's children to corruption cases would seem to serve the interests of Kremlin leaders displeased with Konstantin Chernenko's rapid political rise. Chernenko, with other leaders and the media, has meanwhile urged that more attention be paid to the consumer demands of the population, obviously with an eye to the Polish experience.

~~(LOU)~~ A Moscow play attended by most of the Politburo is being interpreted as a call for more liberal regime policies and a warning of the possible consequences of hardliners winning the political succession.

~~(C/NF/NC)~~ An informed source judged that Brezhnev's food program would not be ready in March but might appear in late spring or summer. Food purchase ceilings in Moscow are still high enough compared with outlying areas to encourage shoppers to flood the capital. The Leningrad crackdown on illegal street trade in food and goods is netting large numbers of culprits.

~~(LOU)~~ Although Soviet political leaders are still paying lip service to the role of the Polish party, Deputy Defense Minister Altunin praised the Warsaw junta as the savior of socialism in Poland.

~~(C/NF)~~ Soviet Jewish emigration has slowed to a trickle. From a practical standpoint, the chances of any particular citizen emigrating are close to zero, but an absolute ban seems unlikely. Soviet officials offer different explanations to different foreign audiences, but the goal seems to be to divide rather than clarify.

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RDS-2,4 3/26/02 (multiple sources)

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

Report 346-CA
March 26, 1982

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- ii -

(LOU) New moves are under way against the remaining few members of the Moscow Helsinki Group, but the underground political press continues to function.

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(LOU) Moves To Discredit the Brezhnev Clan

High-level critics of Brezhnev's efforts to influence the succession almost certainly sparked a February flurry of rumors linking his children with corruption cases. The rumors tend to serve the interests of those Kremlin leaders displeased with the recent advance of Brezhnev's crony Chernenko in the pre-succession maneuvering.

Western reporters in late February picked up a series of sensational stories about scandals implicating Brezhnev's son Yuriy and daughter Galina:

- One story held that Yuriy Brezhnev was about to lose his job as first deputy minister of foreign trade USSR on grounds of involvement in a corruption case. A journalist inquiring at Brezhnev's Trade Ministry office was told that Yuriy was currently "on vacation."
- Another story alleged that a corruption case involving Yuriy Brezhnev had caused a falling-out between Brezhnev senior and KGB First Deputy Chief Tsvigun, who died in January. Brezhnev did not sign Tsvigun's obituary because of the spat over Yuriy's wrongdoing.
- Galina Churbanova, the wife of the MVD first deputy minister, was rumored to have had an affair with a former circus performer and hanger-on at the Bolshoy Theater named Boris the Gypsy. He was arrested on January 29, the day of Suslov's funeral, on diamond-smuggling charges.
- Anatoliy A. Kolevatov, director of the Soviet state circus, was arrested on February 17 for smuggling diamonds, reportedly in connection with the case against Boris the Gypsy. Kolevatov's deputy was arrested a week later on similar charges.

Considerable interest was also aroused by what seems to be a literary lampoon of Brezhnev in the Leningrad journal Aврора. The December issue featured on page 75 (Brezhnev turned 75 on December 19) a stinging piece on a famous but aged writer who refused to die. The issue was withdrawn soon after going on sale and is now bringing a high price on the black market.

73

The anti-Brezhnev rumors are highly unusual and come at a time of deepening economic problems inside the USSR as well as amid signs that Brezhnev wishes to insure a continuity of regime policies after he departs. Konstantin Chernenko, a long-time close associate, seems to be Brezhnev's nominee for Kremlin helmsman. His major rival, Andrey Kirilenko, appears to be losing ground in the competition. Kirilenko's adherents may be using the latest national crackdown against corruption as a vehicle for striking back at Brezhnev and his associates.

Food Program Delayed, Shortages Persist Outside Moscow

(C) Despite Brezhnev's repeated promises over the last two years that a new food program would soon be instituted to increase supplies for consumers, the program will not be ready in March but might appear in late spring or summer, according to a farm journalist. The journalist said that it would involve a new central organ in Moscow, with local affairs handled by rayon agro-industrial associations. (Such units are now being established in Georgia and Latvia.)

(S/NF/NC) The following food purchase ceilings--in other words, ration limits--were in effect in Moscow in February, according to one report: two kilos of meat, one-half kilo of butter, and two kilos of fruit. The relative abundance of food in Moscow has always drawn large numbers of shoppers from surrounding areas where supplies are substantially smaller. The effects of shortages in industrial cities in the Volga Valley reportedly include a monthly potato ration of only five kilos and much bread filler in the ground meat. Pensioners allegedly get no rations.

(C/NF) Leningrad bakers are said to be adding a filler to bread which crumbles after cooling. Leningrad authorities have cracked down on illegal street sales of food and consumer goods; both buyer and seller are fined 100 rubles each. A Leningradskaya Pravda article on "Operation Dragnet," an anti-corruption drive, asserted that the Leningrad police had arrested 1,500 people through January and intended to make the drive against speculation part of a long-term anti-crime campaign.

(LOU) Party-People Relations Get Still More Attention

One year ago, Brezhnev warned Soviet officials of the lessons to be drawn from the labor unrest in Poland. He told the 26th CPSU Congress that Polish events had shown how important it was for the party to strengthen its leading role by listening to the voice of the people and combating all forms of bureaucratic inertia. Brezhnev's words spurred a campaign aimed at improving the existing mechanism for meeting the consumer demands of Soviet citizens.

Recent statements from the party's main office and top leaders have now given new impetus to the Kremlin's lessons-of-Poland drive. A resolution of the CPSU Central Committee (Politburo or Secretariat) on the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, issued February 21, alluded to the Polish crisis and stated: "Practice shows how important it is for the ruling Communist party to take care to strengthen ties with the masses, pursue a well-considered, realistic policy...."

CPSU Secretary Chernenko also warned once again of the danger of internal crisis in an article for the February edition of the journal Problems of CPSU History. "The party must confirm its right to lead society every day with every decision," he wrote. "Otherwise, as the stern lessons of recent years indisputably show, the political situation can take on a crisis nature." Chernenko also invoked Lenin to say that "the greatest and most threatening danger for the party is the danger of isolation from the worker and peasant masses." (Chernenko had already cautioned in the September 1981 issue of Kommunist that disregard for popular interests was fraught with "the danger of social tension and of political and socio-economic crisis.")

Moscow party boss Grishin addressed a local trade union conference on February 5 and stressed the unions' protective function. In particular, he demanded the observance of laws governing overtime and women's work.

Kiev party leader Shcherbitskiy meanwhile focused on the party's links with the masses in a February 14 Pravda interview. Along with urging the recruitment of more workers and peasants into party units, Shcherbitskiy encouraged the ouster of misbehaving officials and cited as a case in point a factory manager in the Ukraine who lost his job and party status for cronyism, nepotism, and villa-building at state expense.

Pravda's lead article for February 27, devoted to the upcoming all-union trade union congress, demanded that unions "resolutely put a stop to any attempts to contravene labor laws and to abuses in the allocation of material benefits and strive to ensure that plans for the construction of housing and children's, medical, cultural and recreational facilities are fulfilled in full."

Writing in the February issue of Soviet Latvia's Kommunist, the trade union leader there depicted illness as the primary reason for loss of working time and decried poor hygienic conditions at factories in the area. The USSR Procuracy's organ ordered that legal action be taken against industrial managers who merely pass on to lax trade-union committees the requests from

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- 4 -

workers for housing, placement of children in day care centers, and higher priority for the purchase of autos. (Sotsialisticheskaya Zakonnost, No. 2, 1982).

At the same time, the regime evidently is afraid that local labor unionists or angry workers might begin to take things into their own hands and go too far if party officials do not carefully supervise the push to reactivate the mass organizations. Grishin, in any event, blasted the Solidarnosc phenomenon in his February 5 speech, noting:

"...the absurdity of the concepts of 'trade union independence' and the unviability of anarcho-syndicalism, which tries to represent trade union associations as a leading force, substitute them for the State and give them the functions of a political party."

An editorial article in the February 21 Pravda harked back derogatorily to the populist ideas in Khrushchev's party program:

"Nothing but harm has come from the pseudoinnovative theses about speeding up the process of the withering away of the State and the mechanical handing over of its functions to public organizations. On the contrary, 'historical experience teaches us that where a weakening of the rule and power of the socialist State occurs, elements of anarchy and uncontrollability grow and the gains of socialism are threatened.'"

Pravda was quoting from an article Brezhnev wrote in 1969, in the wake of the Prague Spring.

Controversial Play Hits Stalin and Urges Pragmatism

(LOU) Muscovites are interpreting a new play on Lenin as a call for liberalization and for anxiety about the prospect of hardliners inheriting Brezhnev's authority. The late Suslov is said to have been opposed to the play, whereas other Politburo members approved it. Signs of inner-party argument over policy issues raised in the play had cropped up in Soviet speeches and articles during 1981.

(U) Mikhail Shatrov's "And Thus We Will Triumph" opened in early January at the Moscow Art Theater. The play deals with Lenin's life from December 1922 to March 1923, when the Soviet leader was incapacitated by a stroke and made the pronouncements that came to be known as his "testament."

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(Q) Early in the play, Lenin is heard dictating a letter to the Party Congress: "Comrade Stalin, having become General Secretary, has accumulated enormous power in his hands, and I am not quite sure he will always be able to use this power carefully enough." The depiction of Stalin is later completed by Lenin's postscript to his letter: "Stalin is too rude, and this defect, which is tolerable in the intercourse between us Communists, is intolerable in the man filling the function of General Secretary." Lenin recommends Stalin's removal and replacement by a man "more tolerant, more loyal, kinder, less capricious." Having dictated these words to his secretary, Lenin slumps in his seat and for several seconds seems to ponder the horror that lies ahead.

(C) Stalin also comes in for criticism in connection with the nationality question. Lenin condemns Stalin and Orzhonikidze's handling of affairs in Georgia--the famous incident where Orzhonikidze struck a Georgian party opponent is recounted--and is seen overruling Stalin's proposal to incorporate the various national republics into the Russian Republic. Lenin then launches into a long monologue on the dangers of "Great Russian chauvinism" and the need for tolerance and respect for all the various nationalities.

(C) The theme of the need for political flexibility is especially evident in Lenin's handling of domestic economic policy. Lenin is depicted as constantly defending the New Economic Policy (NEP) adopted in 1921 in an attempt to combat the famine and restore party ties with the peasantry. He calls for an end to the requisitioning of peasant grain and declaims against those who want to industrialize at the peasant's expense. The message that comes across from Lenin's meeting with a group of peasants is that the party must avoid rule through coercion and must give the common citizen a "material interest" in the system. (NEP was likewise represented as an antidote to internal crisis in Prof. Anatoliy Butenko's February New Times article, "Socialism: Forms and Deformations.")

(C) The audience at the new Lenin play reportedly is struck silent at the close of a scene in which Lenin assures Armand Hammer that Soviet Russia favors peaceful coexistence and trade with the West. Hammer had presented Lenin with a bronze statue of a monkey with a reference to the monkey's role in evolution. Lenin and Hammer talk about trade and coexistence. When Hammer is ready to leave, Lenin strokes the monkey and says thoughtfully: "If we do not trade and coexist, that monkey will be around to collect our human skulls."

(C) Kremlin reaction to the new play is rumored to have been mixed, although the January 12 Pravda lauded it without mentioning the anti-Stalin episodes. Suslov is alleged to have frowned upon the play's "mistakes" in a Politburo discussion held on January 19. Culture Minister Demichev purportedly assured his colleagues that errors in an earlier version of the script had been corrected, and he carried the day when he declared that party leaders should see the play and then decide for themselves. Among those reportedly enthusiastic at various initial performances were Politburo members Grishin, Chernenko, and Gorbachev, along with Brezhnev's senior secretary. (On March 3, Brezhnev himself and six of the Moscow-based Politburo members, including Chernenko, put in a demonstrative appearance at the play. Kirilenko was conspicuously absent, perhaps because of identification with the hardline stance that the play castigates.)

(U) Only after Suslov's death did press reviews of the play mention its anti-Stalin thrust. The review in the February 12 edition of Literaturnaya Rossiya told how Lenin "warns of the danger of underrating the personal qualities of a political leader, in particular Stalin." Further evidence of the controversial nature of the new play is the polemical notes that were struck in CPSU literature during the past year.

(U) Kiev political economist Vilen Mazur argued in the March 1981 Kommunist that it would be wrong to make NEP-like concessions to small farmers or businessmen inside the USSR. He deplored what he termed "the temptation to solve present-day problems" with "the methods of past stages...in the channel of some kind of neo-NEP."

(U) Party Secretary for Culture Zimyanin assailed both the Russian chauvinists and foreign policy extremists in a report to the all-union seminar-conference of ideological workers held last April. Zimyanin was critical of "literary workers" who portrayed "intimate aspects of the life of the tsarist court" (e.g., Russian nationalist and anti-Semitic novelist Valentin Pikul). And he denounced "woebegone politicians and ideologues who try to ascribe our restraint and readiness for negotiations to virtual fear of the new American administration." (The term "woebegone politicians" has been used on past occasions to discredit high-level critics of Kremlin policy inside the country.)

(LOU) Army-Navy Day: Who Saved Socialism in Poland?

The articles published by Soviet military leaders for Army-Navy Day largely reiterated themes that have become standard in recent months. Defense Minister Ustinov and chief of the General Staff Ogarkov harshly attacked US policies. Ustinov in Pravda stated that the threat of war from the US was "real, not

imaginary." And Ogarkov on TV accused "forces of imperialism" of harboring the "wild idea of unleashing a new world war."

But one of Ustinov's deputies, Army Gen. Altunin, made an intriguing comment on the Polish situation. In the course of a Moscow radio talk on February 22, Altunin paid tribute to the Warsaw junta as the savior of socialism in Poland: "Martial law was introduced in Poland and the conspiracy between the internal counterrevolution and international imperialism was frustrated, thanks to the decisive actions of the Military Council of National Salvation."

Politburo member Grishin, in contrast, ignored the junta and praised the normal ruling bodies in Warsaw in a speech at the opening of "Moscow Days in Budapest" on February 23. Hungarian TV carried Grishin's reference to the "firm and well-founded measures which the party and state leadership of the Polish People's Republic has taken to prevent the counterrevolutionary turn, organized and supported from overseas."

Altunin's salute to his brother officers in Poland can be viewed as an expression of the special caste interest of the Soviet military. The corps of higher officers doubtless regards itself as a key element of stable authority at any given time of political flux within the bloc or the USSR itself. Grishin, on the other hand, may have been reflecting the Kremlin's concern that the prestige of both the Soviet model of socialism and the usually dominant party bureaucracy may erode if martial law drags on indefinitely in Poland.

(LOU) A Status Report on the Moscow Helsinki Group

Soviet authorities appeared to be preparing new moves against the Moscow Helsinki Group as the fifth anniversary of the arrest of the group's founder, Yuriy Orlov, approached. The three members who are still free include retired lawyer Sof'ya Kallistratova, Yelena Bonner (wife of Andrey Sakharov), and refusenik physicist Naum Meiman.

Dissident sources report that a formal investigation of Kallistratova is under way for possible prosecution on charges of slandering the Soviet state (Article 190, RSFSR Criminal Code). She and her family and friends have been hit with a series of apartment searches. If convicted, Kallistratova--74 and in failing health--faces a probable sentence of internal exile, in line with the relative leniency authorities have shown in the past to elderly women activists.

62

There is also a possibility of action against Bonner to restrict her freedom of movement between Gorkiy and Moscow as Sakharov's courier and remaining link with the outside world. A review of a book about Western intelligence activities in Sovetskaya Rossiya (January 22) portrayed Sakharov as a talented scientist whose weakness of character caused him "to cross the line beyond which good citizenship ends and treason begins." The charge linking Sakharov to Western intelligence, apparently the most specific on record, was coupled with a reference to Bonner as a "pro-Zionist and anti-Soviet" who encouraged Sakharov's fall.

The Moscow Helsinki Group continues to report on violations of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki accord by the Soviet regime, but arrests and harassments have so limited its capabilities that the occasional brief reports it now issues are more symbolic than informative. After four reports in December, the latest one, marking the fifth anniversary of Yuriy Orlov's arrest, appeared in February.

During her latest trip to Moscow, Bonner brought from Gorkiy a new statement by Sakharov in which he appealed to world opinion to support Georgiy Vladimov, a dissident writer whose arrest may be imminent following a recent search of his apartment and seizure of his papers. At the same time, the Chronicle of Current Events, the journal of record of the Soviet human rights movement, continues to appear despite the seizure by the KGB early in 1981 of issue No. 59, along with its editors. Nor did the repression of some Soviet human rights organizations affect unorganized manifestations of dissident thought. According to Soviet emigre activists and publishers, the flow of samizdat literature to the West increased substantially in 1981.

Moscow Explains Why Jewish Emigration Is Down

(C) For all practical purposes, emigration has ceased to be an option for Soviet Jews. Soviet authorities have achieved this goal without incurring the onus of a total cutoff by lowering the visa issuance rate to a trickle of less than 300 a month. The explanations Soviet officials offer Westerners when discussing emigration seem to be calculated to confuse public opinion and disrupt organized efforts in the West to resettle the emigres.

(C/NE) The 9,127 visas issued in 1981 constituted the lowest annual total since Moscow opened the doors to Jewish emigration in 1971, and emigration appears to be falling even further. After maintaining the monthly level in the 350-450 range during the last five months of 1981, authorities issued only 290 exit visas in January. At the current levels, emigration in 1982 may be less than half of the 1981 total.

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- 9 -

80

(C) Given these statistics, reports that Soviet emigration officials have been telling prospective applicants that "Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union has come to an end" describes an accomplished fact. But it is doubtful that the monthly levels will drop to zero, if only because Soviet authorities can avoid the onus of a total cut-off by maintaining a trickle of emigration as evidence that those who are truly qualified can still leave.

(C) When pressed by foreigners, Soviet officials generally offer one of three explanations for declining emigration: that all the Jews who wanted to leave have already left; that emigration cannot be expected to be high during a period of East-West tensions; and that emigration had been cut back because of the high "dropout rate" (i.e., the tendency of Jewish emigres to settle in the US rather than Israel). The first two reasons seem to be offered most often to American officials.

(C) In contacts with Israelis and prominent Western Jews, however, Soviet spokesmen usually blame the dropout rate as the reason why emigration was cut back:

--July 15, 1981: K. I. Zotov (then-chief of OVIR, the Soviet office in charge of emigration) did so to Sonya Lerner (an Israeli citizen and daughter of Soviet refusenik activist Aleksandr Lerner);

--September 24, 1981: Foreign Minister Gromyko said as much to Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir (as reported by Israeli press sources);

--October 1981: the Chief Rabbi of Moscow used the argument in a telephone conversation with Israel's Chief Rabbi, Rabbi Shlomo Goren (Jerusalem Post, October 12, 1981);

--November 1981: a Soviet diplomat in Australia stated it in conversation with a prominent Australian Jewish activist (Israeli press report);

--December 1981: Dr. Kislov, chief of the Middle East Department of the USA-Canada Institute, so briefed members of the Israeli peace delegation visiting the USSR.

(NOU) The apparently calculated, well-orchestrated Soviet tactic stirred up a row among groups engaged in assisting Jewish emigres--in the first instance, between those representing Israel and the American Jewish community. The Israelis, long distressed by the high dropout rate, seized upon the Soviet explanation to

justify stronger measures to discourage Soviet Jewish arrivals in Vienna from going to the US. Under heavy Israeli pressure, HIAS (the largest American Jewish agency engaged in assisting Jews to settle in the US) agreed temporarily to extend aid only to those emigres who already had first-degree relatives living in the US.

(LOU) In practice, this measure did not affect the dropout rate (which remains at about 75 percent) because emigres could still receive assistance from other US refugee relief groups. Soviet emigres in the US--in perhaps their first display of solidarity on a public issue--are expressing outrage in the American Russian-language press and subjecting both Israel and HIAS to criticism for, in their view, succumbing to KGB-inspired disinformation tactics.

(C) For their part, Soviet authorities are exploiting the resulting malaise and recriminations in order to heighten the already considerable level of uncertainty and apprehension among Jews in the USSR, who are no longer sure of what to expect if they emigrate. Prominent Jewish refuseniks in Moscow, including their titular head Aleksandr Lerner, expressed regret over the high dropout rate and offered various suggestions on how to lower it, but they also regard the chill in US-Soviet bilateral relations to be the principal reason for the emigration drop.


(LOU) A 10 years' accumulation of evidence strongly indicates that the Soviet regime regards emigration pressures as an embarrassing sign of internal weakness and prefers to suppress them unless the emigration issue can be used to advantage in negotiating economic or political concessions with the West. This attitude has not changed in all the years that the status of Soviet Jews and ethnic Germans figured as an issue in bilateral Soviet relations with the US and West Germany. At the same time, the regime insists on keeping its skirts clean by never permitting an overt linkage between bilateral issues and emigration as a quid pro quo.

(LOU) A recent scandal in the Soviet emigration office may have served as an additional factor in depressing emigration levels. Emigration chief General Konstantin Zotov was recently fired amid rumors that OVIR officials have been charging up to 3,500 rubles for an exit visa instead of the official fee of 350 rubles. Authorities are presumably investigating pending emigration cases for evidence of corruption and bribery.

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As the Soviets See Themselves



"Well, then. Shall we go up to look over the building or shall we sign the acceptance certificate right now?"

- I -

USSR CHRONOLOGY

FEBRUARY 1-28, 1982

February

- 1 MVD Minister Nikolay Shchelokov declared a crackdown on black marketeering at national MVD conference on crime prevention.
- 2 Chernenko and CPSU delegation departed Moscow to participate in 24th French Communist Party Congress.
Leningradskaya Pravda announced that 1,500 arrests had been made to date under "Operation Dragnet" in drive against illegal street trading.
- 3 Brezhnev and Ponomarev received members of Disarmament Consultative Committee of Socialist International.
Two Ukrainian prosecutors revealed in Pravda article that villagers feeding bread to livestock were being fined and imprisoned.
- 4 Izvestiya featured story on local speculator Iskan Taziyev; Trud exposed criminal ring that exported icons and imported illegal rubles.
- 6 Chernenko addressed rally in Villejuif near Paris, blaming US for Soviet military expenditures and calling American media campaign against USSR a new factor increasing the danger of war.
Izvestiya published article laced with Russian nationalist themes written by artist Ilya Glazunov.
Sovetskaya Rossiya carried an exposé of alleged smuggling by foreign tourists.
- 7 Pravda announced closing of Lenin Mausoleum for repairs from February 15 to April 15.
- 11 Pravda announced appointment of V. Ya. Pavlov as ambassador to Tokyo and transfer of D. S. Polyanskiy; Pravda announced on February 20 that Polyanskiy was named ambassador to Norway.

UNCLASSIFIED

- II -

24

February

- 11 Moscow TV rebroadcast a 1961 film denigrating Pentacostals. Pentacostalist hunger-striker Lydia Vashchenko left hospital and returned briefly to Embassy Moscow with relatives before flying next morning to rejoin relatives in Chernogorsk.
- 12 Prime Minister Tikhonov received Asahi Shimbun chief editor for interview; interview published in Pravda on February 17.
- 15 Brezhnev and Politburo members attended funeral of Col. Gen. K. S. Grushevoy, chief of Political Administration of Moscow Military District. Chernenko stood ahead of Kirilenko in honor guard.
- Brezhnev awarded gold medal by World Federation of Trade Unions at Havana congress.
- 16 Suslov memorialized by renaming of Rostov University, an irrigation canal, city streets, a school, and a passenger ship; wall plaques in his honor mounted in various locations.
- 17 Vechernyaya Moskva reported escalator collapse with loss of life at Aviamotornaya subway station. Western press sources reported at least 15 deaths.
- Western press reported the arrest of Soviet circus director Andrey A. Kolevatov on diamond smuggling charges. Press reports claimed Kolevatov was linked with Boris the Gypsy (a reputed friend of Brezhnev's daughter Galina) arrested January 29 for illegal dealings in diamonds.
- 18 Warsaw domestic radio cited a CPSU Politburo decision of February 18 to aid Poland with 60 million rubles worth of raw materials by mid-1982.
- 21 CPSU Central Committee issued decree on celebration of 60th anniversary of formation of USSR.
- 22 Unsigned review in Pravda of events since opening of 26th Party Congress condemned Khrushchev's past attempts to switch state functions to public bodies.
- 23 Armed Forces Day marked by articles by top military leaders.

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February

- 23 Red Star identified Georgiy K. Tsinev as first deputy chief of KGB (vice late Semen Tsvigun).
- Red Star article by Col. A. Sbigniyev likened military service in Afghanistan today with volunteers' service against Franco in Spanish Civil War.
- Radio Moscow charged US diplomat George Griffin was CIA agent responsible for murder of M. Rahman of Pakistan. This theme was developed by Iona Andronov in February 24 Literaturnaya Gazeta.
- 25 Brezhnev replied to unidentified Australian peace group's open letter to him and President Reagan.
- Brezhnev presented 70th birthday medals to Politburo member D. Kunayev; Kirilenko was not among members on hand for the occasion.
- 26 Rumors surfaced in Moscow about links between Brezhnev's children and figures involved in corruption scandals.