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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/9/2005

File Folder USSR: GENERAL 2/5 [1981-1983]

FOIA

F06-114/7

Box Number 26

YARHI-MILO

2603

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9854	PAPER	SOVIET TRENDS: JANUARY 1981 R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	7	2/23/1981	B1
9860	CABLE	WEST BERLIN/WEST GERMANY/EL SALVADOR D 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7	4	2/26/1981	B1 B3
9855	CABLE	031850Z MAR 81 R 11/24/2009 F06-114/7	5	3/3/1981	B1
9856	CABLE	170820Z APR 81 R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	4/17/1981	B1
9857	CABLE	MOSCOW A-101 R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	4	5/9/1981	B1
9848	MEMO	MATLOCK RE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	ND	B1
9849	MEMO	PIPES TO ALLEN RE REMARKS ON RECENT SOVIET MOVES R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	5/13/1981	B1
9850	MEMO	NAU TO PIPES RE COMMENT ON NSC #2696: MATLOCK CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	5/13/1981	B1

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9858	PAPER	MORNING SUMMARY	1	5/14/1981	B1	B3
9859	PAPER	CURRENT REPORTS	3	5/14/1981	B1	B3
9851	PAPER	USSR AND SA-6 MISSILES; FRANCE; AND TYPHOON SUBMARINE	1	ND	B1	B3
9852	PAPER	ROMANIA: THE CONSTRAINTS ON INDEPENDENCE AND SOVIET PLANS TO REUSE ICBM LAUNCHERS <i>P 11/24/2009 F06-114/7</i>	2	5/14/1981	B1	
9853	PAPER	SOUTH AFRICAN PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. RELATIONSHIP <i>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</i>	1	ND	B1	

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PERSPECTIVE #139
FRANK RONALDS

3-7245

FEBRUARY 19, 1981

SOVIET

SOVIET REALITY (DR. MURRAY FESHBACH)
(INSERTS IN TAPE LIBRARY: PEGGED TO COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS IN
MOSCOW, OPENING FEB. 23)

NOTE TO EDITORS: MAY BE USED TO COINCIDE WITH 26TH CONGRESS OF
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE USSR, OPENING FEB. 23.

ANNCR: THIS IS PERSPECTIVE, A SERIES IN WHICH PEOPLE WHOSE IDEAS OR
ACTIONS HELP SHAPE THE COURSE OF EVENTS SHARE THEIR THOUGHTS
ON OUR RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD.

TAPE: CUT ONE -- DR. MURRAY FESHBACH

"ACCORDING TO SOVIET OFFICIAL STATISTICS, THE LIFE
EXPECTANCY OF MALES AT AGE ZERO HAS DECREASED FROM THE YEARS
1965-66, THE AVERAGE OF THOSE TWO YEARS, FROM 66 YEARS TO 64
FOR THE LAST YEAR FOR WHICH THE SOVIETS PUBLISHED IT, WHICH
WAS 1971-72 ... WE NOW THINK IT'S AROUND 63, MAYBE EVEN
SLIGHTLY LOWER THAN THAT. IT'S A REMARKABLE DROP."

ANNCR: DOCTOR MURRAY FESHBACH, OF THE U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
WHO HAS JUST PUBLISHED AN IMPORTANT STUDY ON INFANT
MORTALITY IN THE SOVIET UNION. DOCTOR FESHBACH, WHO EARNED
HIS DOCTORATE AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN WASHINGTON, HAS BEEN
WRITING ABOUT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE USSR FOR THE LAST
QUARTER CENTURY. A FELLOW OF THE KENNAN INSTITUTE AT THE
WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, HE HAS
SERVED ON OFFICIAL GROUPS ORGANIZED ON THE BASIS OF THE
U.S./USSR AGREEMENT ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
COOPERATION, INCLUDING ONE WHICH DEALT WITH THE APPLICATION
OF COMPUTERS TO MANAGEMENT. DR. FESHBACH CAME TO THE VOA TO
DISCUSS RECENT POPULATION TRENDS IN THE SOVIET UNION WITH
FRANK RONALDS. WITH A REPORT, HERE IS-----.

REPORTER:

COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESSES ARE GENERALLY THE OCCASION FOR
SELF-CONGRATULATION, AND NO DOUBT THE 26TH PARTY CONGRESS OF

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH OPENS ON FEBRUARY TWENTY THIRD, WILL BE NO EXCEPTION TO THAT RULE (AND THE 26TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH OPENED ON FEBRUARY TWENTY THIRD, WAS NO EXCEPTION TO THAT RULE). HOWEVER, IF THE SUCCESS OF A REGIME IS TO BE MEASURED BY THE WELLBEING OF THE PEOPLE, THEN THE RULERS OF THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO ADMIT SERIOUS FAILURES. OVER THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS, THE LIFE EXPECTANCY OF THE AVERAGE SOVIET CITIZEN HAS DROPPED. INFANT MORTALITY HAS SHARPLY INCREASED. THE AVERAGE SOVIET WOMAN HAS SIX ABORTIONS IN THE COURSE OF HER CHILD-BEARING YEARS, AND PARTLY AS A RESULT OF THIS, THE NUMBER OF DEFORMED AND MENTALLY RETARDED CHILDREN HAS BEEN ON THE INCREASE. THERE IS ALSO THE FACT -- PARTICULARLY DISTURBING TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP -- THAT THE AVERAGE BIRTH RATE OF THE RUSSIANS, THE DOMINANT ETHNIC GROUP IN THE USSR, HAS BEEN DROPPING STEADILY, TO THE POINT THAT THEY WILL SOON BE OUTNUMBERED BY OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS. THE NET INCREASE IN THE COUNTRY'S POPULATION COMES ALMOST ENTIRELY FROM THE MUSLIM PEOPLES OF THE USSR. WHY ARE DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IMPORTANT -- ESPECIALLY IN THE SOVIET UNION? DOCTOR FESHBACH EXPLAINS:

TAPE: CUT TWO -- FESHBACH

"THE STUDY OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, WHETHER IT BE THE SOVIET UNION OR CHINA, OR THE UNITED STATES, OR AFRICAN COUNTRIES, LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, AFFECT POLICIES ON THE SOCIAL LEVEL, ON THE ECONOMIC LEVEL, HAVE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS... THE GENERAL STRENGTH OF A COUNTRY IS DETERMINED BY THE POPULATION AND MANPOWER FACTOR, AND IN THIS CASE IT'S A QUESTION ALSO OF THE RADICALLY CHANGED COMPOSITION TO OCCUR IN THE REST OF THE CENTURY IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND PROBABLY BEYOND... THERE ARE SOME ONE

HUNDRED THIRTY NATIONALITIES USUALLY REFERRED TO BY SOVIET SOURCES, THE RUSSIANS BEING ONLY ONE. TRUE, RIGHT NOW, ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL STATISTICS, MORE THAN HALF. BUT WE EXPECT THIS TO BE LOWER THAN HALF BY THE END OF THE CENTURY."

REPORTER:

SOVIET STATISTICS, WHICH DOCTOR FESHBACH HAS BEEN ANALYING FOR THE LAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, ARE NOT ALWAYS EASY TO COME BY. YET A CAREFUL ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT THE OVERALL RATE OF POPULATION INCREASE HAS BEEN STEADILY FALLING, AND THE RELATIVE PORPORTION OF MUSLIM PEOPLES IN THE COUNTRY IS STEADILY INCREASING:

TAPE: CUT THREE -- FESHBACH

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P
T "THE LEADING SOVIET DEMOGRAPHER, URLANIS, OF THE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, PUBLISHED SOME ESTIMATES BY NATIONALITY FOR THE PERIOD 1959 TO 1969. AND THE RATES FOR THE THREE SLAVIC NATIONALITIES -- RUSSIANS, UKRAINIANS AND BYELORUSSIANS, CENTERED AROUND 18 OR 19 AT THAT TIME, '59 TO '69, PER THOUSAND POPULATION, THEIR CRUDE BIRTH RATE. FOR THE POPULATION OF MUSLIM ORIGIN -- THE KIRGHIZ, THE TAJIKS, TURKMEN, KAZAKS AND UZBEKS IN PARTICULAR, THE RATES WERE 40 TO 45 PER THOUSAND. PROBABLY NOW THE RATES FOR BOTH ARE LOWER. THAT IS, WE SEE FROM THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC, WHICH IS COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF RUSSIANS, BUT NOT SOLELY, INCLUDING, IN FACT, MANY IN THE POPULATION OF MUSLIM ORIGIN, SUCH AS THE BASHKIRS AND TATARS, THE RATE FOR THE REPUBLIC IS NOW DOWN TO 15.1 THE NATIONAL RATE IS NOW AROUND 18 PER THOUSAND. IN UZBEKISTAN AND TAJIKISTAN, THE RATE IS STILL IN THE THIRTIES -- THIRTY THREE AND THIRTY FIVE."

REPORTER:

O
P
T THE AVERAGE AGE OF THE APPROXIMATELY FORTY FIVE MILLION SOVIET MUSLIMS IS THUS MUCH LOWER THAN THAT OF THE RUSSIANS. THIS HAS IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY MANPOWER. THE MUSLIMS PROVIDE AN EVER-INCREASING PERCENTAGE OF YOUNG MEN OF DRAFT AGE, THAT IS, EIGHTEEN YEARS OLD. MOST OF THEM SPEAK TURKIC LANGUAGES, RATHER THAN RUSSIAN. BUT IF THESE STATISTICS ON THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION PARTICULARLY DISTURB THE LEADERSHIP, THE AVERAGE RUSSIAN IS

PROBABLY MUCH MORE CONCERNED ABOUT SUCH QUESTIONS AS LIFE EXPECTANCY AND INFANT MORTALITY. SAYS DOCTOR FESHBACH:

TAPE: CUT FOUR -- FESHBACH

"INFANT MORALITY IS A MEASURE OF THE NUMBER OF DEATHS OF CHILDREN IN THEIR FIRST YEAR OF LIFE, PER THOUSAND LIVE BIRTHS. THIS IS USUALLY CONSIDERED TO BE ONE OF THE PRIME INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELLBEING OF A POPULATION... IN 1972, 73 AND 74, THE RATES INCREASED, ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL SOVIET STATISTICS, BY ABOUT TWENTY PERCENT, UP TO A RATE OF 27.9. AND THEN THEY STOPPED PUBLISHING THE FIGURES. SO WE ARE SURE THAT IT'S INCREASED, AND THEN THERE IS OTHER EVIDENCE THAT IT'S INCREASED FURTHER."

REPORTER:

TOGETHER WITH CHRISTOPHER DAVIS, OF BIRMINGHAM UNIVERSITY IN ENGLAND, DOCTOR FESHBACH HAS MADE CAREFUL STUDY OF THESE RISING RATES OF INFANT MORTALITY IN THE USSR. WHAT ARE THE CAUSES?

TAPE: CUT FIVE -- FESHBACH

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P
T
"AMONG THE VERY IMPORTANT ONES ARE THE QUESTION OF AN INABILITY TO RESPOND TO INFLUENZA, LEADING TO PNEUMONIA, LEADING TO DEATH. THAT IS, WE HAVE DATA FROM THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH 1970, AND REFERENCES TO AN INCREASE SUBSEQUENTLY, THAT APPROXIMATELY ONE QUARTER TO ONE THIRD OF ALL DEATHS OF INFANTS IN THE CITIES OF THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC, THAT IS, ONE OF THE FIFTEEN REPUBLICS, IS DUE TO INFLUENZA, AGAIN -- LEADING TO PNEUMONIA, LEADING TO DEATH."/

REPORTER:

WHY HAS THE SOVIET HEALTH SYSTEM BEEN UNABLE TO CONTEND WITH INFLUENZA, WHICH IS A VERY MINOR CAUSE OF DEATH IN OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES? ONE FACTOR MAY BE THE AMOUNT THE GOVERNMENT SPENDS ON HEALTH, WHICH HAS DROPPED FROM SIX POINT SIX PERCENT OF THE BUDGET IN THE EARLY 1960S TO FIVE POINT TWO PERCENT IN 1980 OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS. ANOTHER CAUSE OF INFANT MORTALITY IS THE FRIGHTENING RATE OF ABORTION -- TWELVE TIMES AS HIGH AS THAT OF THE UNITED STATES.

TAPE: CUT SIX -- FESHBACH

"IN ADDITION, THERE IS A QUESTION OF THE RATE OF PREMATURE CHILDREN BEING BORN... AND THE FREQUENCY OF LOW BIRTH WEIGHT CHILDREN IS HIGHER THERE BECAUSE OF THE NUMBER OF PRIOR- INDUCED ABORTIONS...THE SOVIET PATTERN SEEMS TO BE THAT ABORTION IS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF BIRTH CONTROL, AND WOMEN HAVE, ON THE AVERAGE, ABOUT SIX ABORTIONS PER WOMAN. THIS INCLUDES ALL WOMEN IN THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING WOMEN OF MUSLIM ORIGIN, WHO TEND TO HAVE ZERO OR ONE... THE AVERAGE FOR THE OTHERS WOULD BE EIGHT TO TEN. NOT ONLY RUSSIANS. UKRAINIANS, BYELORUSSIANS, THE BALTIC PEOPLES, ET CETERA."

REPORTER:

THE RATE OF INFANT MORTALITY IN PREMATURE CHILDREN, DOCTOR FESHBACH SAYS, IS TWENTY TO TWENTY FIVE TIMES HIGHER THAN THAT FOR FULL TERM CHILDREN. BUT THERE IS YET ANOTHER MAJOR REASON FOR THE RISING INFANT MORTALITY RATE: ALCOHOLISM.

TAPE: CUT SEVEN -- FESHBACH

"MINISTER OF HEALTH PETROVSKY ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBLEM IN AN ARTICLE (PRINTED) IN LITERATURNAYA GAZYETA, THE LITERARY GAZETTE, SIGNING AN ARTICLE CALLED 'ILLNESS NUMBER THREE', MEANING ALCOHOLISM, AFTER CANCER AND HEART DIFFICULTIES. AND IT'S NOT SO MUCH WOMEN BEING ALCOHOLIC AS MUCH AS THE IMPACT ON CHILDREN BORN TO THESE CHRONICALLY ALCOHOLIC WOMEN. IN A RECENT SURVEY IN MOSCOW, FOR EXAMPLE, OF 45 CHRONICALLY ALCOHOLIC WOMEN, ONE THIRD OF THEIR CHILDREN WERE BORN MENTALLY RETARDED. ABOUT EIGHT TO TEN PERCENT DIED VERY EARLY. AND ONLY FORTY PERCENT OF THE CHILDREN WERE BORN HEALTHY. THIS IS ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL SOVIET SURVEYS."

REPORTER:

ALCOHOLISM AMONG MALES IS ALSO A PRIMARY CAUSE OF THE RISING DIVORCE RATE:

TAPE: CUT EIGHT -- FESHBACH

"THE DIVORCE RATE ... HAS INCREASED TREMENDOUSLY IN THE SOVIET UNION. IT HASN'T QUITE ACHIEVED THE U.S. RATE OF ONE OUT OF EVERY TWO (MARRIAGES), BUT IT'S VERY CLOSE TO THAT. ...BUT THE QUESTION OF ALCOHOLISM IS, IN THE CASES WHERE THE WOMEN INITIATES THE DIVORCE ACTION, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR FORTY TO SIXTY PERCENT, DEPENDING UPON THE REGION, OF THESE CAUSES FOR APPLICATION FOR DIVORCE."/

REPORTER:

0 AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF WOMEN IN THE SOVIET UNION WORK
-- BUT THEY CAN NO LONGER COUNT ON THEIR CHILDREN RECEIVING
GOOD CARE IN NURSERIES PROVIDED BY THE STATE. AGAIN, DOCTOR
FESHBACH:

TAPE: CUT NINE -- FESHBACH

↑ "IT'S ADMITTED BY THE SOVIETS...THAT IN THE FIRST YEAR OF
LIFE THE MORBIDITY RATE, OR SICKNESS RATE, OF CHILDREN IN
CHILD CARE INSTITUTIONS IS THREE TIMES HIGHER THAN THAT OF
HEALTHY CHILDREN (CHILDREN REARED AT HOME). IN THE SECOND
YEAR OF LIFE, IT'S TWO TIMES HIGHER AND IN THE THIRD YEAR OF
LIFE, ONE AND A HALF TIMES HIGHER. SO THEREFORE MANY WOMEN
DON'T WANT THEIR CHILDREN TO BE IN THESE INSTITUTIONAL
FRAME-WORKS WHERE THEY BECOME ILL, LEADING PERHAPS TO ONE OF
THE CAUSES FOR MORTALITY (DEATH)."

REPORTER:

THESE STATISTICS SPELL TRAGEDY FOR MILLIONS OF PEOPLE. THE
DROP IN THE RATE OF LIVE BIRTHS AMONG RUSSIANS ALSO PRESENTS
SERIOUS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS FOR THE LEADERSHIP
IN MOSCOW. SAYS DOCTOR FESHBACH:

TAPE: CUT TEN -- FESHBACH

"THIS HAS EMERGED PARTICULARLY SINCE THE STATEMENT OF
SECRETARY BREZHNEV AT THE 1976 PARTY CONGRESS, WHERE HE USED
THE WORDS, 'THE NEED FOR AN EFFECTIVE DEMOGRAPHIC POLICY.'
NOW, WHAT IS THE DEFINITION OF EFFECTIVE? BUT PARTICULARLY,
SHOULD IT (THE POLICY) BE UNIFIED, THAT IS, THE SAME FOR THE
COUNTRY AS A WHOLE, OR SHOULD IT BE DIFFERENTIATED? ...THE
FACT OF IT BEING DIFFERENTIATED MEANS THAT PERHAPS YOU WILL
ENCOURAGE BIRTHS IN THE SLAVIC REPUBLICS, PARTICULARLY THE
RUSSIAN, AND TRY TO HOLD THEM DOWN IN THE REPUBLICS WHICH
ARE GENERALLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE MUSLIM POPULATIONS IN
PARTICULAR, GIVEN THEIR MUCH HIGHER BIRTH RATES."

REPORTER:

GUIDELINES PREPARED FOR THE 26TH PARTY CONGRESS CALL FOR THE
INTRODUCTION OF LONGER MATERNITY LEAVES, QUOTE, "BY REGION",
UNQUOTE, -- AN INDICATION THAT THE NEW POLICY IS LIKELY TO
BE DISCRIMINATORY (AS ONE SOVIET KAZAKH DEMOGRAPHER,

TATIMOV, FEARED). ANOTHER EFFORT TO MAINTAIN RUSSIAN SUPREMACY IN THE COUNTRY IS THE INTENSIFIED TEACHING OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE TO THE CHILDREN OF ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS. DOCTOR FESHBACH COMMENTS:

TAPE: CUT ELEVEN -- FESHBACH

"IN THE PAST, THERE WERE POLICIES ADOPTED, ONE IN 1938 AND ONE IN 1958, ABOUT INCREASING RUSSIAN LANGUAGE KNOWLEDGE AMONG THE OTHER POPULATIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION. BUT THOSE WERE NOTHING COMPARED TO THE EFFORT THAT'S NOW UNDERWAY, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE EARLY 1970s, AND EVEN MORE SO SINCE 1975. THERE WAS A VERY IMPORTANT DECREE IN OCTOBER OF '78 AND AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT CONFERENCE IN TASHKENT, -- THAT IT WAS HELD IN TASHKENT IS NOT ACCIDENTAL -- OF MAY OF '79. AND THIS EFFORT REACHES DOWN TO THE PRE-SCHOOL LEVEL, WHERE OF ALL OF THE NATIONALITIES, NON-RUSSIAN NATIONALITIES, ARE NOW BEING TAUGHT SOME HOURS IN THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE...AND THIS STRETCHES ALL THE WAY UP TO HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS... SO I WOULD SAY THIS EFFORT IS NOT ONLY THERE, IT'S INCREASING AND INCREASING VERY DRAMATICALLY."

REPORTER:

A LESSON IN SOVIET DEMOGRAPHY FROM AMERICA'S NUMBER ONE EXPERT ON THE SUBJECT: DR. MURRAY FESHBACH, OUR GUEST TODAY ON PERSPECTIVE.

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BML/RT



BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

CURRENT
ANALYSES

BY

CN NARA DATE 7/7/08

NLRB 60-1147 #9854

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00517

~~PIPS~~

SOVIET

~~(U)~~ SOVIET TRENDS: JANUARY 1981

Summary

~~(LOU)~~ Unlike its reporting before the 25th Party Congress, Pravda led off its coverage of preparations for the 26th Congress with emphasis on regional military meetings. Defense Minister Ustinov's warning about the intensified threat of war thus was highlighted. Pravda also paid special attention to the living and working conditions of blue-collar workers. ||

~~(C/NF)~~ The chronic shortage of meat and dairy products evidently impelled the regime to borrow a procedure from Eastern Europe aimed at increasing the private sector's contribution to livestock raising. A joint decree authorized state collective farms to provide young animals and feed to private citizens who will raise the animals under contract for delivery to state procurement agencies. But little progress has been made so far in building an organization to implement Brezhnev's food program. No central organization yet exists, and informed Soviet sources do not anticipate substantial return from the program before the second half of the decade. |

~~(C/NF)~~ New details about the crackdown on student demonstrations in Estonia last fall reveal that "establishment" intellectuals recently expressed their concern to the Moscow leadership about the popular climate. Collective letters in Estonia and Georgia argued that the causes of nationalist discontent must be examined and rectified and that simply repressing the manifestations will only exacerbate the hostilities and conflicts and not offer hope of resolution. |

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RDS-4 2/23/01 (Stoddard, P.)

Report 75-CA
February 23, 1981

(LOU) Regional Party Conferences

In its 1975-76 reporting on the traditional round of party conferences held before the 25th Congress, Pravda downplayed the various military district or armed forces meetings which had taken place. This time, Pravda began its detailed coverage of major regional conferences with that of the Moscow Military District (December 10) and highlighted Defense Minister Ustinov's warning that "the threat of war has intensified." Pravda also cited Ustinov's attack on "foreign enemies" who were allegedly targetting Poland.

A January 4 Pravda account of the Transbaykal Military District Conference similarly spotlighted the presentation of Army Gen. Yepishev, top political officer of the armed forces, and his call for preparedness and discipline in a more troubled world. Notably missing from Pravda's coverage of the recent round of meetings was reference to Brezhnev's "Peace Program," even though the program is still occasionally mentioned in the press, and Soviet sources indicate it will be reconfirmed at the congress. In 1975-76, Pravda cited the program favorably on a number of occasions in its accounts of the preliminary meetings.

On the other hand, Pravda's editorial at the start of the latest round emphasized that the party had to pay special attention to the working and living conditions of ordinary citizens and that the USSR's trade unions had to be activated and public complaints taken seriously. Those themes were not stressed in the parallel Pravda editorials in 1975-76. Despite this clear signal of top-level concern about a possible spillover of the Polish unrest, press treatment of the recent regional meetings themselves reveals that the leadership still finds party bureaucrats even in the Moscow vicinity to be far too negligent or lackadaisical about popular complaints.

In more than 100 pre-congress regional elections, only about 10 incumbent party first secretaries were replaced, a level of personnel change consistent with the party's traditional 11 percent rate of annual turnover. Adherence to that long-established quota indicates there is to be no significant infusion of new or younger blood into the party at the 26th Congress. It also indicates that the present leadership is firmly orchestrating the congress preparations and that present policy lines will be little changed during the proceedings.

(C/NF) Moscow Insiders Claim Little Progress on Brezhnev's Food Program

Few basic decisions evidently have been made to date on the bureaucratic structure of the agro-industrial complex which is to implement Brezhnev's food program. A Pravda source said nothing had been decided about creating a central organ despite earlier reports that a new state committee would run the food program. He also claimed that there is some support for a role for Gosplan in the new program.

Nor was any information provided about the duties of the new deputy premier, Ivan Bodyul, formerly Moldavian party boss. Significantly, Moldavia's experimentation with coordination of farms and industry was described by the same Pravda source as the product of Moldavia's local conditions and, therefore, by implication, not applicable to the country as a whole.

Another official asserted that planning institutes in Moscow had been tasked with planning for the food program but that the multitude of pending decisions was complicating and delaying progress. A more pessimistic planner in Kiev said that heavier investments in rural infrastructure would be part of the program and that significant results should not be expected before the second half of this decade.

(LOU) Another Attempt To Boost Meat Production

Faced with a severe shortage of meat and dairy products, the regime is trying to enlist the private sector in expanding livestock raising. A joint decree published in the January 18 issue of Sel'skaya Zhizn' authorized the raising of animals by private citizens under contract with procurement agencies. The young animals and feed are to be supplied by state and collective farms. These farms are also permitted to purchase animals from private citizens and to deliver them under state procurement quotas.

The contract system worked well in Hungary and was vigorously advocated last year by several Soviet regional leaders. Although such use of the private sector conflicts with ideology, economic necessity had evidently now forced the regime to adopt the procedure nationwide. The contract system also appears to be more efficient and cheaper than large state-financed and -operated livestock fattening centers.

Regime expectations of the contract system may be adversely affected by the attitudes of private citizens who in recent years have put less effort into their private plots, preferring to buy food for cash. The regime's rural urbanization program also makes

it difficult, if not impossible, for many resettled families to maintain private plots as they move from individual houses into apartment buildings.

(U) Aftermath of Student Demonstrations in Estonia

New details continued to seep out of Estonia about the student demonstrations and the aftermath of the demonstrations that took place there early last fall. The demonstrations were precipitated by a riot on September 22 over the cancellation of a rock concert. In early October, they acquired a nationalistic and anti-Russian character, spread to other localities, and by some accounts involved several thousand young people in Tallinn alone. Apparently, some labor unrest and brief work stoppages occurred at about the same time. Authorities avoided mass arrests and concentrated instead on filming the riots and then systematically identifying the participants from the films. The KGB then invited the participants' parents in for "discussions." Republic press and radio referred to the disorders in veiled language, portraying them as "hooliganism," and gave wide publicity to the slogan coined by the Estonian Minister of Internal Affairs: "Parents are responsible for their children's behavior."

Local authorities hastily stepped up the level of a vigilance and law-and-order campaign, focusing especially on "educational-propaganda" work in the schools and youth organizations. Arrests of several Estonian nationalists were followed by trials of those nationalists arrested months earlier. On January 13, Sovetskaya Estoniya reported the trial and conviction of Juri Kukk (arrested last March), sentenced to 10 years of labor camp plus 5 years of internal exile, and Mart Niklus (arrested last April), sentenced to two years of camp. According to one Western press source (still unconfirmed), KGB chief Andropov visited Estonia personally and sacked its KGB chief, apparently in late January.

Pleas to Moscow From "Establishment" Nationalists

(U) The insensitivity of Soviet authorities to nationalist grievances aroused expressions of unease from "establishment" intellectuals in Estonia, as well as in Georgia. Until recently, such grievances were expressed primarily by the unofficial nationalist activists who long have been an important element of the Soviet dissent movement. Now two letters, Estonian and Georgian, signed by well-known figures from professional, cultural, and academic circles, have warned Moscow in urgent but temperate language that its lack of sensitivity to legitimate nationalist interests is creating needless hostility, alienation, and national division.

(C/NF) The Estonian letter, signed by 40 individuals--many of them well-known Estonians not previously associated with dissident activities--was sent last December to Estonian newspapers and to Pravda in response to an official press campaign against the demonstrations by Estonian students. The letter urged that the authorities examine the causes of the disturbances instead of dismissing them as "hooliganism." The letter noted that the use of force against demonstrators indicated that "perilous splits have formed in our society, splits indicative of antagonism between the teachers and those they teach, of conflict between the leaders and the led...it would be unforgivable to ignore the deeply rooted causes that have given rise to the present state of affairs."

(C/NF) According to the letter, the real cause of the protest marches was mounting concern over the systematic Russification of the country, although food shortages, a mounting crime rate, and alcoholism were significant secondary issues. Signers of the letter reportedly received many messages of encouragement from fellow Estonians, although some hardline nationalists denounced its avoidance of basic criticism of the Soviet system.

(U) The Georgian letter, signed by 365 prominent Georgians and addressed to Brezhnev and Georgian First Secretary Shevardnadze

--protested measures downgrading the role of the Georgian language in education;

--criticized the introduction of Russian as a required language in implementation of "bilingualism"; and

--described as insufficient and unsatisfactory the teaching of Georgian history in republic schools.

The letter warned that these trends "lead to the gradual loss of national rights by the Georgian people which were won in the struggle against Tsarism; it contradicts Leninist national policy and represents a violation of the constitutional status of the Georgian people."

(U) Radio Liberty, in publishing the undated text of the letter, described it as probably written in 1980. However, it may have been written earlier. The status of the Georgian language has been a live issue since 1978, when an attempt to eliminate a reference in the new Georgian Constitution to Georgian as the official language of the Republic provoked widespread protests and a demonstration in Tbilisi.

Prepared by D. Graves, x29204
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As the Soviets See Themselves



— Ты чувствуешь, как подрос наш мальчик!

Рисунок Г. ИОРША

"You can feel how our boy has grown!"

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14

USSR CHRONOLOGY

January 1-31, 1981

January

- 2 Nadezhda Mandel'shtam buried in Kuntsevo Cemetery.
- 8 Felix Serebrov arrested (last free member of Helsinki Group's Psychiatric Commission).
- 12 Lev Kopelev and Raisa Orlova deprived of Soviet citizenship while visiting in FRG.
- 15 Arstanbek Duysheyev (age 49) transferred from chairmanship of Presidium, Kirgiz Supreme Soviet, to premiership, replacing the assassinated Sultan Ibraimov.
- 16 Lithuanian Party Secretary R. B. Songayla named premier, replacing I. Manyushis, who retired.
- 16-17 22nd Turkmen Party Congress.
- 18 Sel'skaya Zhizn' published party and government decree permitting private plot owners to raise livestock on contract for sale to government procurement agencies.
- 20-22 17th Kirgiz Party Congress.
- 22-24 15th Moldavian Party Congress.
27th Armenian Party Congress.
26th Georgian Party Congress.
- 23 Central Statistical Administration reported 1980 grain harvest of 189.2 million metric tons.
Prosecutor General Roman Rudenko died at age 74.
- 23-25 19th Tadzhik Party Congress.
- 27-29 29th Belorussian Party Congress.
- 28-30 30th Azerbaydzhan Party Congress.
18th Estonian Party Congress.
- 29-30 23rd Latvian Party Congress.
18th Lithuanian Party Congress.

UNCLASSIFIED

Пролетарии всех стран, соединяйтесь!

Коммунистическая партия Советского Союза



КОММУНИСТ

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МОСКВА ★ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО «ПРАВДА»

Б. ЛИХАЧЕВ

СОЮЗ АНТИИМПЕРИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ СИЛ

Берлинская конференция октября 1980 года стала вехой в борьбе за единство революционных сил современности. Она по праву может быть отнесена к событиям, в которых подытоживается опыт борьбы, накопленный годами и десятилетиями.

Это было собрание, объединившее представителей политического авангарда трех основных революционных потоков нашего времени. Это был первый широкий международный форум, в котором совместно участвовали коммунисты социалистических и несоциалистических стран, революционно-демократические партии и национально-освободительные движения; эта была, как говорилось в заключение конференции, «самая крупная и широкая в своем роде встреча в истории революционного движения». Наряду с 77 коммунистическими партиями, в том числе 11 правящими из социалистических стран, в ней приняло участие 39 революционно-демократических партий и национально-освободительных движений, олицетворяющих наиболее последовательные антиимпериалистические силы.

Сам факт ее созыва, как говорил уже по ее завершении Первый секретарь ЦК Компартии Уругвая Родней Арисменди, означает крупный успех в борьбе за сплочение революционных сил. Успех для борцов за национальное освобождение, ибо она засвидетельствовала активное как никогда включение их в общемировую борьбу за мир и социальный прогресс, за решение вопросов, определяющих судьбы всего человечества. Вместе с тем конференция дала актуальное подтверждение того, что коммунисты умеют, не поступаясь своими идеями и принципами, устанавливать и развивать живые и действенные связи с другими революционными силами.

Не только в рядах освободительного движения, но и среди самой широкой общественности берлинская встреча нашла и находит заинтересованный отклик. Не оставили ее без внимания и наши идейные и политические противники, не скрывающие своей тревоги по поводу

20—24 октября 1980 года в Берлине проходила международная научная конференция «Совместная борьба рабочего движения и национально-освободительного движения против империализма, за социальный прогресс», созданная по инициативе Социалистической единой партии Германии и журнала «Проблемы мира и социализма». Доклад, с которым выступил кандидат в члены Политбюро ЦК КПСС, секретарь ЦК КПСС Б. Н. Пономарев, опубликован в № 16 нашего журнала за 1980 год. Он был заслушан наряду с выступлением Генерального секретаря ЦК СЕПГ Э. Хонеккера и докладами члена Политбюро, секретаря ЦК ФКП М. Гремца и члена ЦК ФРЕЛИМО (Мозамбик) С. Виейры на первом объединенном заседании. Участники конференции высоко оценили доклад главы делегации КПСС как яркое свидетельство интернационализма и непреходящей ценности революционного опыта КПСС.

этого успеха. Стоит отметить, что тема конференции была включена в антикоммунистическую «работу» еще до того, как она была созвана. И очень характерно, с помощью какого приема осуществлялась подобная акция: буржуазная печать, в том числе ее ведущие органы — такие, как парижская «Монд», поспешили «всерьез» предостеречь коммунистические партии от того, чтобы они не потеряли своей самостоятельности из-за участия в международной конференции.

Впрочем, берлинская конференция ни с какой, даже самой формальной точки зрения не давала повода для опасений за чью-либо самостоятельность. Как это и было известно с самого начала, речь шла о научной конференции, о широком и свободном обмене опытом и результатами анализа актуальных проблем антиимпериалистической борьбы. Тем самым конференция вооружала всемирную армию борцов за свободу более глубоким пониманием задач, встающих в этой борьбе, более ясным представлением о ее международных условиях и масштабах, наконец, более острым чувством интернациональной ответственности за общее дело. Подтверждением такого итога служат оценки, которые были даны конференции самими ее участниками.

Это прежде всего мысль о том, что берлинская конференция свидетельствует о ширящихся масштабах борьбы против империализма, подчеркивает ее международный характер и интернациональное значение каждого из ее «внутренних», национальных участков, подтверждает жизненную важность общения и взаимодействия участвующих в этой борьбе сил и вносит вклад в развитие их взаимодействия.

Один из главных источников успеха берлинской конференции заключен в ее своевременности, в ее актуальности, усиленной той сложной международной обстановкой, в которой как никогда велика потребность в сплоченном отпоре реакции. А для решения этой задачи безотлагательно необходим конкретный, целенаправленный поиск наиболее эффективных путей к совместным практическим действиям и в этой связи поиск ответов на новые, выдвигаемые жизнью вопросы.

Берлинская конференция направила эти поиски в верное русло, исходя из реальной мировой ситуации и опираясь при этом на живой опыт и реальные возможности, которыми располагают антиимпериалистические силы. Ее участникам были присущи неподдельный интерес к опыту борьбы других революционных отрядов и, главное, стремление найти, так сказать, равнодействующую, которая вела бы к достижению общих целей. Отсюда такие характерные черты конференции, как свободный, открытый, товарищеский обмен мнениями при единодушии в коренных вопросах, господствовавший на ней дух интернациональной солидарности, равноправие и взаимное уважение, оптимизм и нацеленность на практические действия.

ИНТЕРНАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ХАРАКТЕР АНТИИМПЕРИАЛИСТИЧЕСКОЙ БОРЬБЫ

Из всего многообразия задач антиимпериалистической борьбы участники конференции выделили прежде всего те, которые являются общими для всех них. И берлинская встреча доказала: между интернациональным и национальным не существует «рокового барьера», как это пытается внушить реакционная пропаганда, делающая ставку на разжигание национализма, и решение собственно интернациональных задач может выступать как неотложная национальная потребность, а национальные задачи той или иной страны могут быть общей заботой и общим делом революционеров не только данной страны. Эту мысль, занявшую видное место в выступлениях делегатов из Чехословакии, Никарагуа и Коста-Рики, Лаоса и Афганистана, целой группы афри-

канских стран, четко выразил португальский коммунист А. Нунеш: «Мы всегда считали наши национальные задачи неразрывно связанными с нашими интернациональными обязательствами».

«Взаимосвязь борьбы за мир и социализм с борьбой за национальную независимость, против империализма»; «Борьба против неоколониализма, за демократическую перестройку международных экономических отношений»; «Опыт и проблемы борьбы за национальное и социальное освобождение» — сами названия этих трех секций, в которых проходила работа конференции, выражают тот внутренне целостный взгляд на мировые проблемы, который дает возможность найти в них узловые, центральные звенья. Ее участники были решительны и единодушны в политически ясном и недвусмысленном выборе главного связующего звена совместных действий, определив в качестве первостепенной задачу предотвращения новой мировой войны и обеспечения международного мира, задачу, означающую в сегодняшних условиях сохранение и развитие политики разрядки, действенный отпор нацеленному на ее подрыв агрессивному курсу империализма и блокирующихся с ним других реакционных сил, прекращение гонки вооружений и практические, реальные шаги к разоружению.

Но они далеко не ограничились провозглашением этой общей для них позиции. В материалах конференции содержится развернутое ее обоснование, показ жизненной необходимости борьбы за мир, за разрядку, против гонки вооружений и за разоружение, доказательство того, что эта борьба, отвечая общечеловеческим интересам, теснейше связана с борьбой за социальный прогресс.

Участники конференции выразили твердое убеждение в том, что мир и ведущая к нему политика разрядки создают наиболее благоприятные условия для осуществления жизненных интересов народов. И, пожалуй, наглядней, чем другие факты, как в числе многих ораторов специально указал представитель Народной партии Ирана Х. Сафари, об этом говорит опыт национально-освободительного движения последнего десятилетия, включающий в себя исторические победы народов азиатского, африканского, латиноамериканского континентов.

Конечно, эти победы, как и достигнутые в период разрядки успехи всех прогрессивных сил, вовсе не означают вопреки ложным заверениям реакционной пропаганды, будто разрядка служит чем-то вроде «троянского коня» в мировой политике. Как раз империализм пытался превратить разрядку в подрывное орудие контрреволюции.

Об этом напомнили делегаты братских партий социалистических стран — Венгрии, Чехословакии, Кубы; как и многие другие делегаты, разоблачившие диверсионный смысл идеологических кампаний империализма и его политические действия, которые, как заявил представитель Компартии Финляндии О. Пойколайнен, означают разрыв с принципами, зафиксированными в хельсинкском Заключительном акте. Больше того, сказал Национальный председатель Компартии США Генри Уинстон, империализм, убедившись в провале расчетов на использование разрядки в целях замаскированной экспансии, вновь взял курс на силовую конфронтацию, на материальную и идеологическую подготовку войны.

В противоположность этому политика разрядки действительно направлена на осуществление общедемократических целей в международных отношениях, она не подменяет, да и не может этого сделать, революционной борьбы в тех или других странах. Но такова диалектика самой демократической борьбы в нашу эпоху, что последовательность и принципиальность в этой борьбе требуют новых и новых шагов в противовес империализму и в первую очередь его агрессивным поползновениям. Именно поэтому политика разрядки собирает вокруг себя все политические и общественные силы, выступающие за демократию и со-

храняющие так или иначе верность демократическим идеалам. И, наоборот, отступление от этой политики, а тем более противодействие разрядке, столь же неизбежно означает разрыв с демократией.

Национально-освободительное движение опять-таки с особой остротой испытало на себе эту повелительную логику. Ибо, как писал В. И. Ленин, есть «только одно решение национального вопроса, поскольку вообще возможно таковое в мире капитализма, и это решение — последовательный демократизм» (Полн. собр. соч., т. 24, стр. 137—138).

Отсюда тот решительный сдвиг в позиции национально-освободительного движения в пользу разрядки, который ярко засвидетельствовала берлинская конференция.

Участники встречи, что называется, дали бой всякого рода двусмысленности и ложному объективизму в оценке главных противоборствующих сил в современном мире. Пресловутая концепция «двух сверхдержав» и ее ответвления в виде идеи «равной вины» за обострение международной обстановки были разоблачены как идеологическое оснащение проимпериалистической политики.

«Сегодня, — говорил делегат из Гайаны Ф. Мохамед, — все яснее и получая все новые подтверждения, предстает правота Ленина в его борьбе за мир и мирное сосуществование, а также неразрывная связь ее с многогранной борьбой, которую ведут народы мира против империализма, реакции и национального угнетения. Борьба за мир неотделима от социализма и составляет фактически краеугольный камень внешней политики социалистического содружества».

Участники конференции, основываясь на опыте своих стран и народов, показали, что СССР, социалистическое содружество в целом, действуя на мировой арене силой своего позитивного, созидательного примера, обеспечивают коренное условие и гарантию поступательного хода борьбы за международную безопасность и вместе с тем за национальное освобождение. Такова объективная роль мирового социализма, не зависящая от того, насколько осознают ее те или иные отряды освободительного движения. Сама возможность перехода той или иной страны к социализму, заявил иракский коммунист З. Каири, немыслима без союза и тесного сотрудничества с социалистическим содружеством и в особенности с СССР.

На конференции был четко указан виновник нынешнего обострения международной обстановки, целиком и преднамеренно вызванного наиболее агрессивными кругами международного империализма. Наступление империализма на мир и международную безопасность — таково сегодня направление его главного удара против социального прогресса, центральный пункт политики «социального реванша».

«Вот почему, — сказал на встрече Э. Хонеккер, — свой главный удар империализм направляет против социалистических государств, реального социализма, мирового коммунистического движения».

Классовая нацеленность международной политики империализма отчетливо проступает и в его действиях по отношению к рабочему и демократическому движению в развитых капиталистических странах. Коммунисты этих стран показали, что антисоветизм составляет центральный пункт антирабочей стратегии империализма, который не прекращает попыток втянуть рабочее и демократическое движение в разного рода антисоветские кампании, проводимые в духе самой беззастенчивой демагогии, будь то лицемерные проповеди о «правах человека» и «свободе профсоюзов» или миф о «советской военной угрозе». Они разоблачили также империалистические маневры, направленные на дальнейшую милитаризацию экономики, политики, всей общественной жизни своих стран под флагом антисоветизма, а исходя из этого обосновали необходимость действенной борьбы за международ-

ную безопасность в жизненных интересах собственных народов. В этом плане обратило на себя внимание своей содержательностью выступление австралийского делегата Т. Макдональда.

Особое место отводится в милитаристских планах империализма развивающимся странам, силам национального освобождения в целом. Что означают для них взвинчивание гонки вооружений, провоцирование военных конфликтов, объявленные и необъявленные войны, ставка на террористические диктатуры, давление посредством военных баз, создаваемых, между прочим, и на территории освободившихся стран? Что означает сама претензия империализма на то, чтобы включать в сферу своих «жизненных интересов» заморские и заокеанские страны и держать там свои вооруженные силы?

Неудивительно, что участники конференции, о каком бы районе земного шара ни шла речь — Персидском заливе или Центральной Америке, Средиземноморье или Юго-Восточной Азии, Тихом или Индийском океане, — говорили о необходимости сплоченной борьбы против милитаристских происков, за то, чтобы превратить свои жизненные районы в районы прочного мира. Никогда прежде народы тех стран, которые входят в зону национально-освободительного движения, не испытывали столь тяжкого и нарастающего бремени, создаваемого этими происками.

И не только экономического, — хотя как раз здесь, в условиях и без того отсталой экономики, груз военных расходов возрастал в последние два десятилетия быстрее, чем где-либо, и увеличился не только в абсолютном выражении, но и в доле национального продукта.

И не только политического бремени, — хотя оно прямо означает усиление внешней зависимости ряда стран от империализма, ослабление и даже утрату такого их исторического завоевания, как национальный суверенитет, а внутри страны — подрыв политической стабильности, подавление демократических тенденций и насаждение реакционных, репрессивных режимов; наконец, разжигание всяческой розни в самих этих странах и между ними и даже попытки взаимоудушения их в междоусобных конфликтах, подстрекаемых империализмом.

В ходе берлинской конференции было неоспоримо доказано, что империалистический милитаризм во всех его формах означает консервацию социальной отсталости освободившихся стран, а нередко и движение вспять.

Именно эта черта берлинской конференции — доведение конкретного анализа международной политической ситуации до социально определенных выводов — позволяет увидеть, почему на таком широком и многообразном по составу участников форуме удалось прийти к согласованным, а в решающих пунктах и к единым взглядам на задачи совместной борьбы за мир, за прекращение гонки вооружений, являющейся сегодня самым опасным возбудителем международной напряженности. Такова повелительная необходимость политической жизни, больше того — исходное условие общественного прогресса по всем его направлениям. В этой борьбе отчетливо виден противник — международный империализм. Достаточно ясно определились и те, кто блокируется с империализмом, на кого он, в свою очередь, делает авантюрные ставки, — это прежде всего Пекин, совершивший вероломное предательство интересов освободительной борьбы, а также самые реакционные режимы, вплоть до фашистских диктатур, принимающие на себя в международной политике роль провокаторов и наемников.

В свете данного конференцией анализа мировой обстановки определилось политически осознанное понимание той роли, которую призвана выполнить каждая из революционных сил в совместной борьбе, национально-освободительное движение в том числе.

В этом плане нужно отметить не раз прозвучавшую на конференции — начиная с доклада М. Гремца — мысль о стимулирующем значении солидарности с национально-освободительным движением для рабочего движения развитых капиталистических стран. Такие акции и кампании, а вернее назвать их — направления деятельности коммунистов, как солидарность с народами Индокитая или чилийскими демократами, борьба против экспорта вооружений и вовлечения своих стран в неокOLONиалистские авантюры или разоблачение расистской идеологии и политики, стали для многих компартий — Австрии, Швеции, ФРГ, Нидерландов — школой массовых действий и практики широких демократических союзов.

Для конференции было характерно, что ее участники не затушевывали тех трудностей, которые возникают перед национально-освободительным движением по мере углубления его противоборства с империализмом и такими его партнерами, как Пекин. Возникают и — в соответствии с требованиями всемирной классовой борьбы — находят свое единственно правильное разрешение. Наглядное подтверждение этого — растущее понимание правды об афганской революции и связанных с ней международных событиях, понимание их принципиального смысла для судеб освободительного движения и отсюда крепнущая интернациональная солидарность с революционным афганским народом, выраженная, по существу, конференцией в целом.

Об этом говорили представители всех континентов, и в их выступлениях были освещены самые разные грани общей для них позиции революционного интернационализма. Греческий коммунист Д. Сарлис разоблачил беспочвенность попыток объявить советскую помощь Афганистану причиной обострения международной обстановки, отметил, что усилия империализма, нацеленные на возврат к «холодной войне», были предприняты задолго до того. Делегат из Эфиопии Р. Джигано показал, что цель пропагандистской истерии вокруг Афганистана — обострение международной обстановки и раскручивание гонки вооружений. Представитель Мадагаскара М. Ракотобе подчеркнул законный характер мер, принятых Афганистаном для защиты его суверенитета. Чилийский коммунист Х. Инсунса говорил о советской помощи афганскому народу как акте той интернациональной солидарности, которая жизненно необходима для защиты революции перед лицом интервенции империализма. Об этом же говорил секретарь ЦК Компартии Бангладеш М. Рахман. Наконец, пакистанский товарищ заклеил «нечестивый союз, сколоченный американским империализмом, китайскими шовинистами и арабской реакцией против революционного Афганистана». «Мы знаем события в Афганистане, — уверенно заключил он. — Мы знаем, что национально-демократическая революция пользуется поддержкой широких народных масс».

Правда, на конференции прозвучали — поистине одинокие — голоса, выражавшие сомнения или несогласие с такой позицией. Но в них нельзя было найти доводов, выходящих, по существу, за рамки такого избитого штампа, как «блоковая политика».

Ответом на них было прежде всего выступление члена Политбюро ЦК НДПА, заместителя председателя Революционного совета Демократической Республики Афганистан С. А. Кештманда, встреченное с особым вниманием берлинской конференцией; с ее трибуны он охарактеризовал афганскую революцию как неотъемлемую часть всемирного антиимпериалистического движения и, заключая речь, повторил приглашение представителям всех прогрессивных сил приехать в его страну и удостовериться в успехах афганского народа на пути социальных и демократических преобразований.

Очень важно, что несостоятельность «блокового» ярлыка показали сами представители национально-освободительных сил, и в частности

движения неприсоединения. Надо сказать, что вопрос о месте этого движения в антиимпериалистической борьбе занял заметное место в берлинской дискуссии. При этом речь шла не только о той важной роли, которую оно уже сыграло и играет в борьбе против империализма и неоколониализма, против гонки вооружений и политики конфронтации, против разного рода насильственных методов в международных отношениях. Обсуждение вопросов, затрагивающих самую природу и сущность неприсоединения, раскрыло ошибочность тезиса о его «равноудаленности» от двух социальных систем современности. Несомненно являясь по своей сути антиимпериалистической концепцией, неприсоединение выступает за общедемократические принципы международных отношений, ставя во главу угла защиту завоеванного в суровой борьбе национального суверенитета. Антиимпериалистическая направленность движения имеет спланированное значение, позволяет ему играть позитивную роль в мировой политике. Если кто и подрывает демократическую основу неприсоединения, то это империализм и его приспешники.

Движение неприсоединения, как известно, и зародилось в качестве протеста против втягивания освободившихся государств в империалистические блоки, против попыток поставить тем самым под вопрос их национальную независимость. В своем противодействии империализму эти государства и прибегли к такому средству, как солидарность на основе позитивного нейтралитета, строившегося на общеизвестных ныне принципах мирного сосуществования и означавшего прежде всего отказ от участия в агрессивных блоках. Надо ли уточнять, что вопрос о включении этих стран в военно-политическую организацию социалистического содружества попросту не возникал?

ЭКОНОМИКА И ПОЛИТИКА В НАЦИОНАЛЬНО-ОСВОБОДИТЕЛЬНОЙ БОРЬБЕ

Предпринятое империализмом наступление на мир и международную безопасность болезненно затронуло национально-освободительное движение. Натиск империализма охватил практически все регионы и субрегионы, в которых ведется национально-освободительная борьба. Именно развивающиеся страны оказались во многих случаях непосредственным объектом агрессивных устремлений и действий империализма, нередко осуществлявшихся к тому же путем раскола и натравливания друг на друга самих этих стран. Участники конференции уделили большое внимание разоблачению этой коварной тактики империализма, характерного для нее сочетания пресловутой «гибкости» с более чем очевидной жесткостью, явно усилившегося агрессивного давления с демагогией реформистских версий неоколониализма.

Стоит отметить, что как раз в данной связи, в том числе в выступлениях западноевропейских коммунистов, были подвергнуты критике теории и практика международной социал-демократии.

Частью дискуссии о путях и средствах борьбы за мир и разрядку, против агрессивной политики империализма стало и обсуждение проблем борьбы против неоколониализма, которую представители всех революционных потоков рассматривали как свое общее дело.

Среди этих проблем обращают на себя внимание те, что относятся к области международных экономических отношений. Обеспечение национальной независимости с неизбежностью поставило в повестку дня вопросы освобождения от капиталистической эксплуатации, которые имеют не только свой внутренний, но и внешний адрес, поскольку нацелены против империалистического засилья в мировом хозяйстве. Этот внешний адрес и указала широко известная ныне программа де-

мократической перестройки международных экономических отношений, выдвижение которой обозначило важный и перспективный сдвиг в динамике антиимпериалистической борьбы.

Детально и обстоятельно обсуждая эти вопросы, участники дискуссии исходили из анализа целей и методов современного неокOLONиализма, показывали гигантские масштабы и изощренные формы осуществляемой империализмом эксплуатации, конкретные особенности его действий в отдельных районах и странах и связь их с неокOLONиалистской стратегией в целом. Они обратили внимание на роль «коллективного неокOLONиализма» и включение в него таких стран, как ЮАР. На конференции наглядно раскрывалась грабительская роль транснациональных корпораций, которые были охарактеризованы как ударная сила современного неокOLONиализма, как общий эксплуататор и классовый враг трудящихся и развивающихся и развитых капиталистических стран. В целом неокOLONиализм был расценен как взаимосвязанная система действий империализма, преследующего при этом и *экономические* цели — например, перекладывание бремени кризисов и инфляции и иных трудностей капиталистического развития, включая технологические или экологические, и *политические* цели — подчинение этих стран диктату империализма, подрыв антиимпериалистической солидарности и изоляция национально-освободительных сил от мирового социализма и рабочего класса в цитаделях капитализма, и цели *социальные* — укрепление консервативных социальных групп и удержание развивающихся стран в системе капитализма в роли опутанной сетями зависимости «периферии».

Десятки выступлений, в которых говорилось о том, что демократическая перестройка международных экономических отношений может служить важным инструментом борьбы против современного неокOLONиализма, определенно свидетельствуют о шаге вперед в последовательно антиимпериалистическом понимании данной задачи.

Прежде всего об этом говорит четко показанная связь возможностей и путей ее решения с борьбой за мир и разоружение. Ограничение гонки вооружений и разоружение — это важнейший источник ресурсов, которые могут быть направлены на помощь в преодолении отсталости, тогда как ныне ресурсы, выкачиваемые посредством империалистической эксплуатации, расходуются на гонку вооружений.

Во-вторых, участники конференции высоко оценили ту роль в борьбе за демократизацию международных экономических отношений, которую исторически сыграл и играет сегодня мировой социализм, уже самим фактом своего присутствия в мире утверждающий ее, выдвинутые еще Лениным, исходные принципы. Советский Союз и другие социалистические страны, подчеркивали они, установили с развивающимися странами экономические отношения качественно нового типа, которые служат живым примером подлинного равноправия, и именно в лице социалистического содружества развивающиеся страны находят самого верного союзника. Вот почему на конференции — в выступлениях коммунистов Шри Ланки, Уругвая, ФРГ и других — получили отповедь концепции «богатого Севера» и «бедного Юга», пытающиеся поставить социалистические и империалистические государства на одну доску исторической ответственности за отсталость развивающихся стран, а заодно замаскировать сегодняшнюю ответственность империализма за неокOLONиальный грабеж. Характерно, что веское слово в разоблачении этого грабежа, творимого и поныне «своей» буржуазией, принадлежало коммунистам из развитых, в том числе наиболее крупных капиталистических стран — США, Франции, ФРГ.

«В течение всего лишь тридцати лет после краха колониальной системы, — сообщил швейцарский коммунист Б. Деген, — промышленно развитые капиталистические страны выкачали из молодых нацио-

нальных государств больше реальных ценностей, чем бывшие метрополии из своих колоний за 300 предшествующих лет».

В то же время участники конференции показали, что и реформистские проекты перестройки международных экономических отношений полны внутренних противоречий, а в конечном счете служат интересам транснациональных корпораций и империализма в целом. Подчеркивая, что действительная демократизация возможна лишь на путях принципиальной борьбы в мирохозяйственной сфере при активном участии масс, они отвергали заложенные в подобных проектах упования на империалистическую «филантропию» и делали упор на необходимость мобилизации собственных сил и возможностей.

И, наконец, в полной мере оценивая и трудность и масштабность поставленной задачи (и, кстати, разоблачая маневры империализма, который пытается буквально перехватить эту идею и выражает готовность к разговорам на данный счет, но только не к практическим шагам), участники конференции решительно заявили, что отсталость не результат некоего рока, а итог эксплуатации и насилия, и выразили оптимистический взгляд на перспективы демократической перестройки международных экономических отношений.

Было, в частности, подчеркнуто, что существует несомненная возможность удовлетворения ряда конкретных, хотя и частичных, требований, входящих в программу такой перестройки, а ведь для многих развивающихся стран, учитывая реально существующую среди них социально-экономическую дифференциацию, это означает если и не устранение зависимости, то, во всяком случае, существенное ослабление ее.

Но дело не только в этом. Речь шла не о том, чтобы ждать «милости» равноправия от империализма, а о том, как заставить его на деле принять демократические нормы в этой области. Конечно, марксистам-ленинцам ясно, что и в данном случае ответ на вопрос лежит в реальном соотношении и расстановке сил на мировой арене. Материалы берлинской конференции имеют большое значение для углубленного понимания этой проблемы, а именно, для утверждения реалистичности требований демократической перестройки. В них охарактеризованы основные элементы этого соотношения сил в мирохозяйственной сфере, включая, с одной стороны, кризис, который затронул саму структуру капиталистической эксплуатации и обострил все противоречия мирового хозяйства, а с другой стороны, те экономические рычаги, которыми располагают мировой социализм, развивающиеся страны и международный рабочий класс в целом, имея в виду, например, его борьбу против транснациональных корпораций. И самое главное, в материалах берлинской встречи показан широкий спектр политических возможностей борьбы за демократизацию международных экономических отношений: начиная с того, что они во многом реализуются по государственным каналам, и кончая тем огромным потенциалом, который содержит в себе интернациональная солидарность антиимпериалистических сил. Новый международный экономический порядок, было сказано на конференции, может быть осуществлен как структурный элемент борьбы за демократизацию всей международной жизни, как составная часть антиимпериалистической борьбы.

На обсуждение берлинского форума был вынесен богатейший опыт борьбы за национальное и социальное освобождение. Материалы конференции содержательны и поучительны как отражение многих его аспектов. Попытаемся обозначить наиболее важные из них.

В выступлениях собравшихся в Берлине борцов за свободу вырисовывались грандиозные масштабы развертывающегося в мире национально-освободительного движения. На это стоит указать уже потому, что вопреки всяческим «прогнозам» после волны 60-х годов не произошло спада национально-освободительной борьбы и, напротив, воз-

ник целый ряд новых ее очагов, а само ее содержание стало более глубоким, приобрело новое качество. Наглядное свидетельство этого — вслед за исторической победой вьетнамского народа — победы эфиопской и никарагуанской революций.

Далее, одна из самых ярких особенностей берлинской конференции — конкретное многообразие обсуждавшегося на ней опыта борьбы, представленного вместе с тем в обобщенной, проблемной форме, которая позволяет увидеть общие закономерности движения в живом материале региональных и страновых ситуаций, тем более что этот материал включает в себя едва ли не все «горячие точки» в зоне национального освобождения и содержит не только позитивный анализ, но и принципиальные, самокритичные оценки ошибок и поражений. Особый интерес вызывает разбор практических действий империализма и блокирующихся с ним сил. Это также позволяет увидеть достаточно четкие линии их политического и идеологического натиска, нацеленного на возврат утраченных позиций. Здесь и национализм, прикрытый революционной фразой; и занимающая все более заметное место стратегическая установка на «социал-демократизацию» развивающихся стран, нашедшая, в частности, выражение в антикоммунистических и антисоциалистических маневрах вокруг проекта создания африканского «социинтерна»; и поддержка местных эксплуататорских классов с расчетом на возможное предательство ими национальных интересов; и самое грубое давление, вплоть до угрозы вооруженной интервенции и использования террористических диктатур фашистского и расистского толка.

Обсуждая весь этот многообразный опыт, участники конференции сделали особый упор на реальные, действенные стороны интернационализма, на огромное значение интернациональной помощи — и со стороны Советского Союза и других социалистических стран и во взаимодействии различных отрядов самого национально-освободительного движения. Материалы берлинской встречи, в частности яркие выступления делегатов Замбии, Зимбабве, представляют в этом отношении большую ценность как историческими данными, так и с точки зрения актуальной практики. Впечатляющую картину интернационализма на деле воссоздал делегат Мадагаскара М. Ракотобе, рассказав и о той международной поддержке, которой на протяжении всей своей истории пользовалась освободительная борьба его народа со стороны родины Октября, а также со стороны французских коммунистов, и о солидарности с движениями африканских народов, как и других стран, которой и сегодня верен строящий новое общество Мадагаскар. Характерно, что само знакомство с опытом национально-освободительной борьбы, особенно таких стран, как Вьетнам, которые продвинулись далеко вперед по пути строительства нового общества, оценивалось во многих выступлениях как одна из действенных форм интернациональной взаимопомощи.

И, наконец, тот аспект берлинской дискуссии, который определяет понимание исторических ориентиров и конечных целей национально-освободительной борьбы, — анализ конкретных форм взаимосвязи национального и социального освобождения. Берлинская конференция подтвердила, что вопрос о выборе пути социально-экономического развития приобрел критически злободневный характер под давлением неотложных задач сохранения и обеспечения независимости и улучшения положения масс. Участники конференции подчеркивали, что капитализм не способен решить эти жизненные вопросы и альтернатива ему — это социалистическая ориентация, курс на построение нового общества на основе научного социализма, минуя капиталистическую стадию развития, причем реальность такой перспективы подкрепляется опорой на мировой социализм, на международный рабочий класс.

Отмечая, что полноценное решение этих сложных вопросов требует достаточно длительного времени хотя бы потому, что оно связано с формированием необходимой для этого социальной структуры (а в ряде стран и идущим одновременно сложным, как подчеркнул, например, С. Виейра, процессом формирования нации); присутствующие сосредоточили внимание на творческом поиске того, что некоторые участники конференции назвали «реалистическим оптимумом», как плацдарма для движения от завоеванной государственности к подлинному освобождению и в перспективе к социалистическим целям.

Обсуждение названных проблем было как бы пронизано мыслью о первенстве, решающем значении политики в иерархии средств сегодняшней национально-освободительной борьбы. При всем разнообразии конкретных условий совершающихся сегодня антиимпериалистических революций на передний план выдвигается проблема реальной политической власти — ее завоевание, сохранение и упрочение в противовес нажиму и проискам империалистической и местной реакции.

Роль народных масс, и особенно растущего рабочего класса, в сломе старого государственного аппарата, в установлении и упрочении народовластия, в проведении социально-экономической политики в интересах трудящихся; роль широких демократических союзов, выражающих единство в борьбе за политическую независимость, и их роль после ее завоевания, в условиях обнажающейся классовой дифференциации; выбор форм и методов борьбы, опять-таки с упором на характер и степень участия масс, в том числе и готовность к вооруженной борьбе, представляющейся в некоторых ситуациях единственным путем к победе, а стало быть, точный учет позиции армии; идейное воспитание масс и в особенности освоение революционной теории; наконец, строительство революционных партий, партий авангардного типа как решающего условия обеспечения демократической активности масс и реального движения к социалистическим целям — вот самые важные из проблем, в которых участники берлинской конференции видят ключ к решению сегодняшних задач национально-освободительной борьбы.

Все это, разумеется, никак не умаляет значения экономических факторов и не подменяет той истины, что надежное обеспечение подлинной свободы требует достижения экономической независимости и соответствующего уровня экономического развития. «Важнейшей сферой деятельности авангардных партий является *экономическая политика*», — отметил на конференции Б. Н. Пономарев и подчеркнул, что «решающим, можно сказать, переломным моментом, гарантирующим успех курса социалистической ориентации, является достижение такого положения, когда трудящиеся реально почувствуют плоды революции, причем не только в морально-политическом смысле — в плане обретенного человеческого достоинства, уважения к человеку труда, — но и в плане заметного улучшения жизненных условий».

Жизненный опыт убеждает борцов за свободу в том, что к экономическому освобождению нет иного пути, кроме все более последовательной и протекающей во все более развитых формах политической борьбы. Антиимпериалистический потенциал национально-освободительного движения полнее всего раскрывается сегодня в его политической конфронтации с империализмом, в углублении социально-политического содержания этого движения, то есть последовательности и радикальности демократических завоеваний как во внутренней, так и во внешней политике.

Конечно, возрастание «социальности» в деле национального освобождения происходит неравномерно и не прямолинейно, и участники конференции с обостренным вниманием рассматривали сложности и противоречия этого процесса. Но в их выступлениях уверенно прозвучала мысль о том, что гарантом успеха здесь служит интернациона-

листская политика партии, руководствующейся идеями научного социализма, а важным критерием социального содержания национально-освободительной революции является ее связь с мировым социализмом и революционным рабочим движением. Здесь залог успешной борьбы по всем ее направлениям, которые стали предметом научной и политической оценки на конференции в Берлине: борьбы против империалистического экспорта контрреволюции, против гонки вооружений, за международную разрядку и мир; борьбы против экономической экспансии империализма; борьбы за общие цели революционного развития и социального прогресса.

Ленин учил: «Не ожидая невозможного — быстрого объединения всех на солидарных, точно выработанных взглядах, мы должны добиваться *точного* выяснения *основных течений и направлений* в современном интернационалистском социализме, а затем того, чтобы рабочие массы ознакомились с этими течениями, обсудили их всесторонне, проверили их опытом своего практического движения» (Полн. собр. соч., т. 27, стр. 32).

Берлинская конференция открывает новые перспективы коллективных усилий, которыми всегда развивалась и творчески развивается революционная мысль, — перспективы постановки и обсуждения новых вопросов, перспективы практического решения задач антиимпериалистической борьбы.

MAINTAIN CHRONOLOGY-

Soviet Union General #32

381

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 01275

FOR EUR/SOV AND INR/RSE
I.O. 12065: GDS 03-03-87 (BERLIND, ALAN D.) OR-P
TAGS: NATO, UR, XH
SUBJECT: (C) SOVIET/EAST EUROPE EXPERTS' MEETING:
- IS CHRONOLOGY

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. AS A NEW FEATURE OF THE SOVIET/EAST EUROPEAN
NATO EXPERTS' MEETING, NOW IN SESSION, THERE IS TO BE
APPENDED TO THE EXPERTS' REPORT A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
DURING THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION. NATO
INTERNATIONAL STAFF HAS CIRCULATED A DRAFT CHRONOLOGY
(PARA 4, BELOW) WHICH IS LESS COMPREHENSIVE THAN MIGHT
BE USEFUL AND ALSO SUFFERS FROM MINOR INACCURACIES.

3. ACTION REQUESTED: VISITING US TEAM WOULD APPRECIATE
DEPARTMENT'S CHECKING IS DRAFT AND PROVIDING ANY
DESIRED CORRECTIONS OR AMENDMENTS BY COB MARCH 5.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF IS DRAFT:
EXPERT WORKING GROUP ON THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

(24TH OCTOBER 1980 TO 5TH MARCH 1981)

OCTOBER 1980

20/24 OCT.

CONFERENCE ON THE "STRUGGLE AGAINST IM-
PERIALISM AND FOR SOCIAL PROGRESS" IN
EAST BERLIN.

23 OCT.

REPLACEMENT OF MR. KOSYGIN BY MR. TIKHONOV
AT THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

ROB:EURE,EEUR,WEUR,DEPOL

PSN:024432

PAGE 01

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BY RW NARA DATE 11/24/09

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28 OCT. ACTION BY THE EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO
 - RESTRICT MOVEMENT BETWEEN THE GDR AND
 - POLAND.
 30 OCT. VISIT TO MOSCOW BY MR. KANIA AND MR. PINKOW-
 - SKI ON THE EVE OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN
 - "SOLIDARITY" AND THE PRIME MINISTER.
 NOVEMBER 1980
 3 NOV. RETURN TO POLITICS OF GENERAL MOCZAR WITH
 - A TELEVISED SPEECH TO THE UNION OF FIGHTERS
 - FOR FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY.
 10 NOV. REGISTRATION OF "SOLIDARITY" BY THE POLISH
 - SUPREME COURT.
 10/11 NOV. VISIT TO SOFIA BY MR. STROUGAL, HEAD OF THE
 - CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT.
 10/12 NOV. VISIT TO MOSCOW BY THE ITALIAN FOREIGN
 - MINISTER.
 12 NOV. KADAR-HUSAK MEETING IN BRATISLAVA.
 12/14 NOV. VISIT BY THE FRENCH PREMIER TO YUGOSLAVIA.
 12/17 NOV. VISIT TO MOSCOW BY MR. KEKKONEN.
 13 NOV. POLAND ASKS THE UNITED STATES FOR ECONOMIC
 - AID.
 14 NOV. KANIA-WALESA TALKS.
 21 NOV. VISIT TO PARIS BY MR. JAGIELSKI, POLISH
 - DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER.
 24 NOV. TASS WARNING TO POLAND, PUBLISHED IN
 - "PRAVDA" AND "IZVESTIA".
 26/30 NOV. TALKS IN MOSCOW BETWEEN SOVIET LEADERS
 - AND SENATOR PERCY, MR. REAGAN'S UNOFFICIAL
 - ENVOY.
 29 NOV./ FRONTIER REGIONS BETWEEN THE GDR AND POLAND
 9 DEC. CLOSED TO WESTERN MILITARY OBSERVERS.
 DECEMBER 1980
 1ST DEC. TALKS IN WASHINGTON BETWEEN MR. DOBRYNIN,
 - SOVIET AMBASSADOR AND MR. NEWSOM, UNITED
 - STATES ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE WHO
 - WARNED AGAINST SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5462

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 USNATO 01275

1/3 DEC. 7TH PLENARY SESSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
- OF THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS' PARTY.
- -REMOVAL FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
- MR. GIEREK WHO WAS ALSO INVITED TO RESIGN
- HIS SEAT IN THE DIET AS WELL AS HIS MEMBER-
- SHIP OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE; DISMISSAL
- OF SEVERAL OF HIS STAFF.
- -POLITBUREAU RESHUFFLE; GENERAL MOCZAR AND
- MR. TADEUSZ GRABSKI BECOME FULL MEMBERS
- AND MR. PISZBACK, FIRST SECRETARY AT GDANSK,
- CANDIDATE MEMBER.
1/3 DEC. REGULAR MEETING OF THE WARSAW PACT DEFENCE
- MINISTERS IN BUCHAREST.
1/4 DEC. IN POLAND, NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN "SOLIDARITY"
- AND MR. JAGIELSKI ON THE CONTROL OF THE LAW
- ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.
2 DEC. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG,
- WARNS AGAINST ALL FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN
- POLAND.
2 DEC. PUBLICATION OF THE ELEVENTH SOVIET FIVE YEAR
- PLAN (1981-1985).
2 DEC. VISIT TO MOSCOW BY THE RUMANIAN FOREIGN
- MINISTER.
4 DEC. PLENARY MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
- OF THE YUGOSLAV LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS.
5 DEC. MEETING IN MOSCOW OF THE WARSAW PACT POLITI-
- CAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE.
7 DEC. MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CARTER REPEATING HIS
- WARNING TO THE KREMLIN.
12/14 DEC. TWENTY FOURTH CONGRESS OF THE HUNGARIAN
- TRADE UNIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF "SOLIDARITY"
- REPRESENTATIVES.
16 DEC. EEC FOREIGN MINISTERS APPROVE THE EUROPEAN
- COMMISSION'S PROGRAMME FOR THE SUPPLY OF

35

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- FOODSTUFFS TO POLAND.
19 DEC. DEATH OF MR. KOSTYGIN.
22 DEC. VISIT BY THE NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO
- USSR.
23 DEC. VISIT BY MR. GROMYKO TO SOFIA.
JANUARY 1981
3 JAN. GENERAL MOCZAR NAMED VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE
- NATIONAL UNITY FRONT IN POLAND.
13/19 JAN. VISIT TO ROME BY LECH WALESA.
13 JAN. VISIT TO WARSAW BY MARSHAL KULIKOF, WARSAW
- PACT COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.
22/24 JAN. WARNING STRIKES IN SUPPORT OF POLISH TRADE
- UNION DEMAND FOR A FIVE-DAY WORKING WEEK.
24 JAN. MESSAGE BY FRENCH PRESIDENT TO MR. BREZHNEV.
31 JAN. COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND
- "SOLIDARITY" ON THE FIVE-DAY WORKING WEEK
- ISSUE AND A RELAXATION OF CENSORSHIP SO AS
- TO ALLOW MASS MEDIA COVERAGE OF "SOLIDARITY".
24 & 28 JAN. LETTER FROM SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG TO
- MR. GROMYKO WARNING THE SOVIET UNION
- AGAINST INTERVENTION IN POLAND AND LETTER
- FROM MR. GROMYKO TO GENERAL HAIG DENOUNC-
- ING INTERFERENCE IN POLAND.
FEBRUARY 1981
2 FEB. TASS STATEMENT DENOUNCING THE UNITED STATES
- CAMPAIGN AGAINST "INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
- ORGANIZED BY THE USSR".
4 FEB. BREAKDOWN, IN POLAND, OF NEGOTIATIONS BE-
- TWEEN A GOVERNMENT DELEGATION AND STRIKING
- WORKERS AT BIELSKO-BIALA DEMANDING DIS-
- MISSAL OF A SCORE OF OFFICIALS; APPEAL BY
- LECH WALESA FOR A FACTORY SIT-IN SHOULD THE
- AUTHORITIES RESORT TO FORCE.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 USNATO 01275

6 FEB. SOLUTION OF BIELSKO-BIALA DISPUTE FOLLOW-
 - ING CHURCH INTERVENTION.
 10 FEB. PLENARY SESSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
 - OF THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS' PARTY: GEN-
 - ERAL JARUZELSKI, MINISTER OF DEFENCE,
 - APPOINTED HEAD OF GOVERNMENT.
 12 FEB. SPEECH BY THE NEW POLISH HEAD OF GOVERNMENT
 - TO THE DIET PROPOSING A THREE-MONTH TRUCE
 - TO THE TRADE UNIONS.
 16 FEB. IN POLAND, STUDENTS' STRIKE, IN ITS 27TH
 - DAY, GAINS MOMENTUM.
 - IN HUNGARY, THE LABOUR MINISTER ANNOUNCES
 - THE INTRODUCTION OF A FIVE-DAY WORKING
 - WEEK IN THE MAJOR ENTERPRISES AS FROM JULY.
 17 FEB. IN POLAND, THE INDEPENDENT STUDENTS' UNION
 - IS OFFICIALLY REGISTERED.
 19/20 FEB. IN POLAND, AGREEMENT WITH THE PRIVATE
 - FARMERS BRINGS AN END TO RURAL UNREST.
 23 FEB. OPENING OF THE TWENTY-THIRD CONGRESS OF THE
 - SOVIET PC AND SPEECH BY MR. BREZHNEV.

END TEXT. BENNETT
 BT

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2. U S S R

filed 3/31
SOVIET UNION
31

TODAY'S PRAVDA CARRIES AN ARTICLE THAT DENOUNCES THE "UNPRECEDENTED SUPER-ARMING" OF THE UNITED STATES AND CRITICIZES THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION FOR MULTIPLYING THE MISTAKES OF PREVIOUS US ADMINISTRATIONS. THE ARTICLE IS SIGNED BY "IGOR ALEKSANDROV"; "I. ALEKSANDROV" HAS BEEN THE PSEUDONYM USED IN THE PAST FOR MAJOR, AUTHORITATIVE PRONOUNCEMENTS EMANATING, IT IS BELIEVED, FROM THE POLIT-BURO. DESPITE ITS SHARPLY CRITICAL TONE, THE ARTICLE DOES AFFIRM THAT THE SOVIET UNION DESIRES NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. ALTHOUGH THE INDIVIDUAL CRITICISMS LISTED IN THE PRAVDA ARTICLE, AS SUMMARIZED BY RADIO MOSCOW, HAVE ALL APPEARED BEFORE, THEY DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ASSEMBLED PREVIOUSLY IN SUCH A PROMINENT AND AUTHORITATIVE VEHICLE. THE TIMING OF THE ARTICLE IS CURIOUS, JUST ONE DAY AFTER WHAT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN A CONCILIATORY TALK BETWEEN HAIG AND DOBRYNIN, BUT THAT ISSUE OF PRAVDA WAS PROBABLY UNDER WAY BEFORE THE TALK STARTED.

TASS REPORTS THAT THE MINSK TRACTOR FACTORY HAS STARTED PRODUCTION OF THE "BELARUS MTZ-05" MINI-TRACTOR, SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED FOR WORK ON PRIVATE PLOTS. THE NEW MODEL HAS A FIVE-HORSE-POWER MOTOR AND WEIGHS 140 KILOGRAMS. IF THE MINI-TRACTOR IS TO BE MASS-PRODUCED AND IF IT IS TO BE MADE AVAILABLE AT A REASONABLE PRICE OR RENTAL TO OWNERS OF PRIVATE PLOTS, THEN THE TASS REPORT IS TO BE WELCOMED. HOWEVER, DURING THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS OR SO, THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL ANNOUNCEMENTS ABOUT THE PRODUCTION OF MINI-TRACTORS, BUT NONE OF THESE MACHINES HAS FOUND ITS WAY TO THE PRIVATE PLOTS. INDEED, A LETTER TO PRAVDA OF DECEMBER 8 SUGGESTED THAT THE PRODUCTION RUN OF MINI-TRACTORS AT THE MINSK PLANT WAS VERY MODEST, CITING A FIGURE OF A FEW HUNDRED. THE LAST PROGRESS REPORT ON THE MINI-TRACTOR SAGA APPEARED IN RL 3/81. A FURTHER NOTE WILL BE PREPARED.

END MSG
1819

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Pipes ✓
JSSM



BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

CURRENT
ANALYSES

CPSU MAY DAY SLOGANS--LESS STRIDENT

The CPSU Central Committee's annual slogans issued to mark Moscow's May Day and November 7 celebrations are meant both as propaganda for the susceptible and as guidelines for the faithful. For the outside observer, each list reveals certain shifts in Soviet priorities and policy orientations.

The 1981 May Day slogans mark a partial return to an earlier detente line. While the Soviets reiterated commitments to Poland, their policy stance toward the West, especially Europe, is less harsh than in 1980. The domestic slogans stressed the need articulated earlier by Brezhnev to pay attention to popular needs.

Foreign Policy Slogans

Although most of the current May Day slogans are nearly identical to those for 1980, several changes indicate a renewed stress on detente. Absent again is the CPSU's commitment to its "Peace Program" (adopted in 1971 and the centerpiece of the annual listings until last year). This year's slogans, however, indicate a partial return when they urge implementation of Brezhnev's celebrated "initiatives" announced at the 26th CPSU Congress.

This line is also apparent in Moscow's urging of the peoples of the world to "strengthen peace, deepen detente and curb the arms race." Last May Day, the appeal was to struggle against "the threat of a new world war."

Other themes covered include:

--Poland. The ongoing crisis was alluded to only indirectly in the slogan expressing "unshakeable determination to defend socialism's gains."

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- 2 -

- Europe. Last year, a slogan which had regularly called on Europeans and Americans to support the implementation of CSCE decisions was dropped in favor of an invitation to the peoples of Europe to struggle against American theater nuclear force deployments. The same language appears currently with the stress on "peace, security and cooperation for Europe" (emphasis supplied). No mention was made of Madrid.
- Latin America. The focus on the struggle in Latin America has shifted to the US. Earlier attention was on the need to fight against "reaction and fascism," i.e., domestic forces; the call now is to struggle against "imperialism and reaction," i.e., the US and domestic forces. While no mention is made of Nicaragua or El Salvador, greetings are again addressed to the Cuban people "opposing American imperialism's intrigues."
- Asia. The peoples of the region are urged to struggle against the "collusion between imperialism and hegemonism" (the US and China) and to transform Asia into a continent of "trust and cooperation"--a reiteration of Brezhnev's call for confidence-building measures in Asia.

Domestic Slogans

The internal political slogans registered heightened concern about popular morale. For the first time, industrial workers were told to pay "daily" attention to the output of consumer goods. State officials were enjoined to "be sensitive to Soviet people's needs and demands." Health care workers got a reminder to take a "daily" interest in providing timely and qualified medical assistance.

Sensitivity about the Polish events may account for dropping an on-again, off-again slogan encouraging the trade unions to play a greater role in the management of state and public affairs; the unions were simply called "an influential force in our society."

Prepared by M. Schwartz, S. Ploss
x20189

Approved by R. Baraz
x29194

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Department of State

SOVIET GENERAL

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

40

strikes

PAGE 01
ACTION EUR-12

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INFO	OCT-01	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-15	CIAE-00	EB-08	DODE-00
	H-01	<u>NSC-05</u>	NSAE-00	COME-00	HA-06	LAB-04	PM-09
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 05268

E.O. 12065: RDS 4 4/16/01 (MCCALL, SHERROD) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, UR, ELAB
SUBJECT: MORE ON REPORTED STRIKES IN THE URALS

REFS: (A) MOSCOW 5131 (B) 80 MOSCOW 9985

1. ~~IC~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. ELABORATING ON HIS REMARKS TO EMBOFF (REF A), SOVIET POET YEVGENIY YEVTUSHENKO (PROTECT) QUIETLY TOLD CHARGE' DURING A RECEPTION APRIL 15 THAT THERE HAD BEEN TWO STRIKES IN THE CITY OF MAGNITOGORSK AND UNSPECIFIED "PROBLEMS" IN CHELYABINSK. HE SAID THESE EVENTS WERE ALL RELATED TO WORKERS' DISSATISFACTION WITH THE FOOD SITUATION.
3. YEVTUSHENKO'S IS THE SECOND REPORT OF LABOR UNREST AT CHELYABINSK: LAST SUMMER AN AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN RETURNING TO MOSCOW FROM A TDY AT THE KAMA RIVER TRUCK FACTORY TOLD AN EMBOFF HE HAD HEARD OF A ONE-DAY STRIKE IN MID-JUNE 1980 AT A TRACTOR FACTORY IN CHELYABINSK AS WELL AS A FOUR-HOUR WORK STOPPAGE AT THE KAMA RIVER TRUCK FACTORY (REF B).
4. COMMENT: BOTH MAGNITOGORSK AND CHELYABINSK ARE MAJOR INDUSTRIAL CITIES IN THE HEAVY-INDUSTRY HEARTLAND OF THE USSR WHICH IS LARGELY CLOSED TO FOREIGNERS. OUR SOVIET CONTACTS HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE THE POINT TO US OVER THE PAST YEAR THAT THE FOOD SUPPLY IN SUCH AREAS IS GENERALLY VERY POOR, AND HAS DETERIORATED NOTICEABLY IN RECENT YEARS. IN THIS REGARD, WE NOTE THAT ALMOST ALL REPORTED INCIDENTS OF WORKER PROTEST SO FAR HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN SUCH AREAS. END COMMENT. MATLOCK

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NLRR F06-114/7 #9856

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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USIA NSA CIA

ROUTINE

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HANDLING INDICATOR

NO.

TO

Department of State
Info: Leningrad, US Mission US Nato

DEPT FOR OES/SCT, EUR/SOV and INR/B
DEPT PASS NSF/DIP for JCSS? NOT PASS BY
NAS FOR MITCHELL J FAIM

FROM

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

DATE: 9 MAY 81

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/5/87 (MCCALL, S.) OR-M

SUBJECT WHO CONTROLS THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCE?

TAGS: TSPA, UR, PINT, MMOL
REF :

(A) Moscow 2825^{EUR} (B) 80 Moscow A-298^{OES} (C) 80 Moscow A-98^{NSF}
(D) 80 Moscow 17077^{OES} (E) Moscow 5593^{EUR} (F) Moscow 486^{OES}
(G) Moscow A-96 (H) Moscow A-84 (G) Moscow A-101^{OES}

SUMMARY:

This airgram cites scattered indications that Politburo Member Mikhail Suslov's control over the Soviet Academy of Sciences may be under challenge by economic rationalists grouped around Politburo Member Andrey Kirilenko. According to the hypothesis developed below, Suslov's control over "big science" began to slip about two years ago, apparently because Brezhnev began to side with the economic rationalists.

If the foregoing admittedly speculative scenario of a turf battle between Suslov and Kirilenko is correct, this helps explain why the USSR has been so slow to propose far-reaching remedies to the long existing problem of poor coordination between "big science" and industry. We leave it to others to get out onto even thinner ice in predicting what the consequences outside the field of science and innovation might be if either Suslov or Kirilenko should win decisively over the other.

END SUMMARY

Suslov's Control over the Academy of Sciences

Since the first days of Soviet power, the leadership figure with ultimate responsibility over the Russian, and now the Soviet Academy of Sciences has been the man also responsible for education. In the first decade of Soviet power, this was People's Commissar

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Date:

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FORM 10-64 DS-323

Drafted by:

SCI:RBHOUSTON:bc

Drafting Date:

5/4/81

Phone No.:

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Contents and Classification Approved by:

ADCM:SMCCALLsm

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BY Cu NARA DATE 7/10/01
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for Enlightenment Lunarcharski; Politburo ideologue and Central Committee Secretary Mikhail Suslov appears to be the descendent of Lunacharski in being the current ultimate arbiter of the fate of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

Suslov of course knows virtually nothing about hard science, nor probably did Lunacharski. But it probably seemed reasonable in 1917 to lump the intellectuals of the Russian Academy of Sciences together with their ideological colleagues in institutions of higher learning and let Lunacharskiy, one of the best-educated of Lenin's associates, deal with both groups of presumed class enemies. Communist control over the Academy was greatly strengthened when what had been set up as the Socialist Academy of Sciences in 1918 and staffed with strong Bolshevik supporters was "merged" in 1936 with the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which had just been uprooted from Leningrad and brought to Moscow where the Party could keep a closer eye on it. The 1936 "merger" still shows up in the Social Sciences Section of Academy, which provides a home for such political types as Candidate Politburo Member Boris Ponomarev (a Suslov protege), Central Committee members Georgiy Arbatov and Nikolay Inozemtsev, and the Soviet front-man for charming Western businessmen and scientists, Dzherman Gvishiani. The Academy's Vice President for Social Sciences, P.N. Fedoseyev, often replaces Academy President Aleksandrov when guidance from on high must be delivered. The presence in the Soviet Academy of Sciences of the Social Sciences Section is an argument for keeping the whole Academy under ideologue Suslov's control.

Suslov last publicly played a role in important Academy business in 1975 when he showed up at the fall General Meeting to muscle through the election as Academy President of A.P. Aleksandrov, who was and is the head of an institute not belonging to the Academy but instead closely related to the military. However, Central Committee Secretary Mikhail Zimyanin, who supervises the CC Science and Education Department and who reports to Suslov, always shows up at important Academy meetings to assert Suslov's claim to the turf.

Suslov's view of the Soviet economy after the XXVI Congress was set forth in an article in Problems of Peace and Socialism no. 5. The only person he quoted on the economy besides Brezhnev was Academy President Aleksandrov. While noting the Congress decision that consumer goods output should increase faster than capital goods, Suslov added that "the prerequisite for fulfilling all national economic tasks...was development of the basic branches of heavy industry." He also employed language bordering on the autarchic by noting that labor productivity in the USSR was rising faster than in the US, that the growth of Soviet industrial output in 1970-1980 exceeded the absolute level of industrial production in France and the UK put together, and that the USSR has an enormous scientific and productive potential along with vast fuel and raw material possibilities. Finally, Suslov added a caution about the need to provide for defense. He wrote that the international situation did not permit "significantly decreasing expenditures on defense."

Are Suslov and the Academy Losing Stature?

In retrospect, one can see the action of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the spring of 1979 in taking science away from what had previously been Commissions on Science and Education, and setting up Commissions on Science and Technology, as representing a shift of legislative responsibility for science from realm of Suslov to the realm of Kirilenko. The shifting of science in the 1981-85 draft directives away from the previous self-standing section on science to a section on science and technical progress can also be seen as giving Kirilenko standing where Suslov presumably formerly held sway alone. At the same October 1980 CC Plenum which approved these draft directives, Brezhnev lumped the Academy of Sciences and the defense industries together in calling for "big science" to make a more varied contribution to the country by helping to improve Soviet machine-building capacity (ref D). Although press treatment of this call by Brezhnev was so cautious as to raise doubts whether he would get his way, it has since become clear that the defense industries have been forced to do what Brezhnev called for (ref E). It should also be noted that at the December 26, 1980 meeting at Gosplan where the Academy apparently appealed for restoration of the status quo, it was not Suslov but Kirilenko who presided.

The Embassy earlier reported a series of indications that the Academy of Sciences has lost stature (Ref F). One could add to these the moves in the Ukraine and Leningrad for Party organizations to move in and assert local Party influence over affairs which should be controlled or at least coordinated by the Academy from Moscow. Politburo Members Shcherbitskiy and Romanov probably belong in the camp of the economic rationalists on the issue of what science should be doing. The Leningrad situation may be particularly galling to conservatives around Suslov. Glebov, installed two years ago as head of the Academy in Leningrad, is not connected with an Academy institute, nor with the defense industries as is Aleksandrov or as was the last Academy President to pay much attention to Leningrad, Vavilov (Leningrad's State Optical Institute), but comes from Elektrosila, a purely industrial organization belonging to the Ministry of Power Machine Building.

What Could It Mean?

If the hypothesis is correct that Suslov and Kirilenko have been battling for turf to see who controls the Academy of Sciences, this would contribute to an explanation why the regime has been so long in coming up with a solution to the problem of lagging innovation and deciding if the Academy of Sciences or the State Committee on Science and Technology will really coordinate science. It would also help explain why the July 1979 Planning reforms avoided touching the Academy.

The Military-Scientific Complex

Leading scientists of the Academy of Sciences have played major roles in developing military weapons since at least the 1930's. Former Academy President Keldysh was honored for his contributions both to the Soviet nuclear weapons program and to the Soviet space program (ref G). Academician Andrey Sakharov is credited with being the father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb. Current Academy President Aleksandrov has been associated closely with the Soviet nuclear weapons program, and at both the beginning and end of his XXVI Congress speech spoke of Academy of Sciences' contributions to the Soviet defense effort.

The so-called "civil" space program of the Academy's Interkosmos organization is basically military. The Academy of Sciences cannot claim to control Star City northeast of Moscow where cosmonauts are trained, nor the Flight Control Center at Kaliningrad near Moscow shown on TV in connection with every manned flight, nor the manned flight launch complex at Baykonur. It was Lt. Gen. German Titov, not an Academy of Sciences representative, who was talking to Gosplan on the night of a recent Znaniye Society lecture (ref H). The space vehicles and most of the hardware in the manned space program are of military origin. At Kremlin ceremonies honoring cosmonauts from other countries who have flown in the "civil" Interkosmos program, it has been the head of the Central Committee's Department for the Defense Industries who attends, not Trapeznikov, head of the CC Department on Science and Education which oversees the rest of the Academy.

Soviet Academy of Sciences President Aleksandrov has been very outspoken on the subject of Soviet invulnerability to embargoes and Soviet ability to accomplish on its own any technical task it wishes (refs. A, B, and C). Vestnik no. 4 reports further remarks in this direction made by Aleksandrov at the November 1980 General Meeting of the Academy. Aleksandrov's autaric, nationalistic remarks are not surprising, given his long identification with the Soviet nuclear weapons program. These remarks show his spiritual kinship with the Soviet military who do not believe in relying on anyone else for anything if they can avoid it, but Aleksandrov does not speak for the civilian leadership. It may be more than a coincidence, after Aleksandrov's remarks about autarchy in his speech on the occasion of the first day of Soviet Science in April 1979, that Pravda shortly thereafter published a leading article endorsing international science cooperation.

It is a closely guarded secret how many scientists are employed in the defense industries in the USSR, but 20% of all Soviet scientists would seem to be a conservative guess. If to this one adds the scientists in Suslov's bailiwick (the 10% of all Soviet scientists who work in the Academy of Sciences system, and the 35% of all Soviet scientists who work in institutions of higher learning), one can hypothesize that an alliance of Suslov with Politburo Member and Defense Minister Ustinov would command the support of about 2/3 of all Soviet scientists.

If the further hypothesis is correct that Brezhnev has begun to exert his influence on behalf of Kirilenko and against Suslov, this would help explain the evidence which we have noted that the Academy's position seems to be weakening and that of the State Committee's strengthening. It would also be consistent with the hints that there is some movement at last on drawing up a new innovation policy (ref G). It should be noted that the departure of Alexey Kosygin from power does not seem to have weakened the position of the economic rationalists of which he presumably was a strong supporter. Indeed, the really forceful actions to clamp down on the Academy of Sciences and to squeeze the defense industries harder seem to have come after Kosygin ceased to be a strong influence in the leadership.

Projecting the consequences further into the future, one might say that E.P. Velikov, the presumed candidate of the military-scientific complex to succeed Aleksandrov as President of the Academy of Sciences in 1985, will possibly lose out to a candidate such as Boris Ye. Paton, who is the USSR's outstanding example of a scientist dedicated to practical applications, or possibly to Yuri Ovchinnikov, who plays a key role in relating to the specialized Academy of Medical Sciences and to the Academy of Agricultural Sciences and whose institute recently received an award from SCST Chairman Marchuk for contributions to solving practical problems.

More far reaching consequences would flow if the hypothesized alliance between the Academy and the military suffers defeat at the hands of economic rationalists backed by Brezhnev and his associates. We leave it to others to speculate what the consequences may mean in terms of Soviet foreign policy. Suffice it to note that the increased pressure on the defense industries since the October 1980 plenum to help the civilian sector suggest that the usual discussion of trends in the Soviet economy in terms of goods of Group A vs. Group B might better be conducted in terms of Group A vs. Group B. vs. military goods. With the defense industries now forced to turn out not only consumer goods like refrigerators and TV sets but also industrial robots and lasers, the old division of output into the two categories of Group A and B no longer seems adequate to describe what is going on.

MATLOCK

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NLRR F06-114/7 #9848

BY CW NARA DATE 7/7/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2705

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~~SECRET~~

May 13, 1981

Pipes:

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: RICHARD PIPES
SUBJECT: Remarks on Recent Soviet Moves

Before I leave on a three-day trip to Bürgenstock for the Bilderberg meeting, I would like to call your attention to two recent Soviet moves that may signal deliberate efforts to test the Reagan Administration:

1. The offer of aid to Nicaragua. This comes after two months during which Moscow has deliberately disassociated itself from Central American ventures. It is true that the economic situation in Nicaragua is very poor and that without external aid (especially from Libya) the Sandanistas may lose domestic support and fall. Still, it is a significant departure from previous policy. /
2. The backing of the Syrians in Lebanon. There are rumors that the Russians are urging caution on the Syrians but there is no solid evidence that they are telling them to back down. Are they trying to show to the Third World that they are more reliable allies of the Arabs than the United States is of Israel? I do not know but they seem to be involved in a deliberate Reagan-testing maneuver in Lebanon. (S) /

~~SECRET~~

Review May 13, 1987.

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NLRR FOI-114/7 #9849

BY CV NARADATE 7/7/08

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD PIPES

FROM: HENRY R. NAU *LRN*

SUBJECT: Comment on NSC #2696: Matlock's Conversation with Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister

I would add a paragraph to your memo along the following lines:

The key objective for us is to undermine the Soviet strategy of counting on European pressure to force us eventually into non-substantive discussions. This could be done by sharing with our allies the results of the exchanges with the Soviet Union over the next several months, beginning if possible with the President's letter to Brezhnev. Unless this is done, the Soviets will be in a position at any point in time to provide the allies with their version of these exchanges. If the allies hear it first from Moscow, they may be suspicious of counter-efforts by us to bring them up-to-date or to correct the Soviet version. On the other hand, if the allies have been told at each point what we are saying to the Soviets and what their response is, they will have the necessary background for interpreting Soviet attempts to misrepresent our position. There is of course the danger that the allies, knowing what the exchanges are, may offer their advice. But we could establish the precedent of simply informing them in a general way, working in our interpretation of the results. There is also the danger that the information may leak, and the Soviets would try to make a big case about lack of confidentiality in US-Soviet exchanges. However, this reaction would play into our hands of delaying talks with the Soviets until they agree to discuss our issues.

DECLASSIFIED/RE/ASE
NLRR FOL-114/7 #9850
BY *CN* NARADATE 7/7/68

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH ANALYSIS: May 14, 1981

1. ROMANIA: THE CONSTRAINTS ON INDEPENDENCE

Ceausescu is currently assuming a less confrontational stance toward the Kremlin. His foreign policy maneuverability has been constrained by domestic troubles and a series of international setbacks. Nevertheless, Ceausescu remains intent on preserving Romania's independence--as indicated by his effort to host the next CSCE review meeting.

* * *

Foreign Minister Andrei's May 14-15 visit to Washington is seen by Ceausescu as an important opportunity to test the new administration. Not since 1978--when Ceausescu visited Washington and Beijing, hosted Hua Guofeng in Bucharest, and publicly criticized Moscow's domination of the Warsaw Pact--has the Romanian leader felt satisfied with the level of US support. US criticism of Romanian human rights practices and defections by prominent Romanian personalities to the West added to Romania's problems in strengthening ties to the US.

Doubts about the US could not have come at a worse time. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan--which Ceausescu indirectly criticized--reconfirmed the Romanian view of the USSR as an expansionist power apt to move against his country. The crisis in Poland jolted Ceausescu, who criticized the concept of independent trade unions under communism but also insisted that the Poles must be left to solve their own problems.

International economic developments also were increasing Romania's dependence on the USSR. The Iranian revolution disrupted Bucharest's major source of imported oil (a good part of which the Shah had agreed to barter) at a time when Romania's own oil production was declining. Russian oil became a necessary partial substitute and contributed to Bucharest's more tolerant view of trade with the Soviet Union. At the same time, increased oil imports from OPEC countries helped to push Romania's hard currency debt to \$9 billion in 1980, and added to the attractiveness of Romania's barter arrangements with its East European neighbors.

Ceausescu's personal popularity meanwhile has been undermined by the serious economic decline and sporadic popular unrest spurred by food shortages, his unpredictable behavior, burgeoning personality cult, and rampant nepotism. This unrest recently took an unprecedented confrontational dimension when some 500 Romanians ransacked offices of the militia and mayor in northern Romania to protest police brutality and poor living conditions. Hand bills calling for independent trade unions also were widely circulated.

Nevertheless, Ceausescu remains in control. While he has done little to tackle internal problems, he is determined to maintain, albeit more cautiously, independence in foreign policy. Should the satisfaction Romanians derive from provoking Moscow decline significantly, his regime would be in for serious trouble.

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3. SOUTH AFRICAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE US RELATIONSHIP

Foreign Minister Roelof "Pik" Botha will be anxious to portray his visit to Washington as successful. But immediate advantages may be less important than the visit's effect in setting the scene for the development of closer bilateral relations. There are critical national interests at stake and Botha will press his case hard on Pretoria's major concerns, particularly Namibia and the Soviet and Cuban presence in southern Africa.

* * *

The South Africans view their ties to the US as an indicator of their international legitimacy, even though their links with other countries are measurably more advantageous in material terms. The UK has more important trade and investment ties. Taiwan and Israel have contributed significantly to Pretoria's efforts to achieve military self-sufficiency. But the US is uniquely important to South Africa because:

- It is the leader of the Western alliance, and controls the only credible challenge to Soviet expansion in Africa.
(This issue transcends election rhetoric and is of continuing concern in Pretoria.)
- It is a truly capitalist country while other Western countries have major political parties which to some degree have been tainted with "Marxist" ideology.
- It has also experienced interracial conflict, and thus--in Pretoria's eyes--should be more sympathetic to South Africa's racial dilemma.

South African expectations of the US are often unrealistic. Even constant monitoring of the US political scene does not always enable Pretoria to interpret Washington accurately. The South African analysis is hampered by desperation. Even the most sophisticated of South African diplomats, as a result, can badly misjudge the outside world.

Botha and his entourage will seek common ground with the US. Their focus will be on creating areas of cooperation by highlighting mutual concerns. Botha is aware, of course, that Namibia will be the focus of the discussion.

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BY CN NARADATE 7/7/08

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*File under
Soviet Union
(permanent
file)*

Analysis Report

THE POLISH RIPPLE EFFECT:
SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN CONCERNS ABOUT WORKER UNREST

CAS 7/17/02

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THE POLISH RIPPLE EFFECT:

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN CONCERNS ABOUT WORKER UNREST

One of the more remarkable effects of the workers movement in Poland has been an evident stir of concern among Poland's communist neighbors about the status and attitudes of their own workers. Apparently alarmed about the possibility that the Polish example might stimulate similar events within their own borders, these regimes have been trying to ensure continued stability in their labor forces. They have used a variety of carrot-and-stick methods, ranging from blustering insistence on the need for strict adherence to traditional trade union organizations and methods to encouragement of officials to be more attentive to the needs and demands of the workers. These signs of heightened concern provide evidence that the Soviet and East European regimes believe their workers are susceptible to the temptations posed by the successes of the Polish workers.

Some of the most striking signs of concern have occurred in the Soviet Union, where trade union questions have received significant attention in recent months and some unusual measures have been taken to demonstrate concern for the rank-and-file workers. In East Europe even the most orthodox regimes have exhorted their trade unions to protect workers' interests more adequately and overcome bureaucratic resistance. Romania and Bulgaria have replaced their trade union leaders, Hungary has candidly discussed the issue of strikes, and the normally low-key Yugoslav unions have shown signs of greater assertiveness.

SOVIET UNION

The Soviet Union's first line of defense against the potentially destabilizing influences from Poland has been its limitations on the quantity and the detail of the information it has disseminated on the course of events in that country. While Soviet media occasionally have provided the home audience with dramatic reports on rampant "anarchy" in Poland, those have been the exception rather than the rule, intended apparently to lend weight to Soviet pressure tactics against Poland. Beyond limiting domestic awareness of the Polish labor struggle, Moscow has clearly been leaning toward preventive rather than repressive measures, apparently hoping to remove causes of worker discontent. Brezhnev offered clear evidence of this attitude when he called upon the delegates to the CPSU congress in February to draw a lesson from "mistakes" in Poland and lend a more

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"sensitive ear to the voice of the masses." In addition, Soviet officials have been encouraging a new look at the appropriate role of trade unions in a communist society, and discussions on this subject have begun in the Soviet press.

het → Shortly after the start of the Polish crisis, Soviet leaders began encouraging official trade unions in the Soviet Union to take a more active role on behalf of the workers. The first to express the policy publicly was Lithuanian Second Secretary Dybenko, who complained at a republic plenum in August that many local unions were not sufficiently independent but were "under the thumb of overzealous administrators." He urged the unions to defend workers' interests more vigorously. Similar themes soon began to appear in the central press. Writing in a November issue of KOMMUNIST (No. 17), for example, Politburo member Chernenko called on workers to take a "broader" role in monitoring the decisions of factory managers.

Brezhnev spoke to the same effect at the CPSU congress, chastizing Soviet trade unions for their lack of initiative in exercising their legal rights and urging them to play a more active role in planning and management. These remarks were the focus of discussion at a 20 March plenum of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, where its chairman, Aleksey Shibayev, interpreted Brezhnev's speech as a mandate for an "enhancement" of trade union functions and reported that the Politburo and the Central Committee had recently been showing a "new concern" for the unions. In addition to these new themes, which are now regularly reflected in the press, articles have continued to emphasize the traditional role of trade unions as organizers and promoters of increased production.

Concrete measures for expanding the influence of Soviet trade unions proposed in recent articles suggest that there is a serious commitment to this objective. Perhaps the most significant new theme has been a recent stress on the need for local party organizations to provide greater support for an expanded union role. A 16 April PRAVDA editorial, for example, called on party organizations to promote trade union initiative "in every possible way," and an article in the 14 April TRUD reprimanded members of the Donetsk obkom for their failures in this area. In an apparent effort to encourage unions to take a bolder stance, there have been several reports of dismissals of negligent administrators at the initiative of local unions, and the fact that about 150 managers were fired in this way in 1979 has been featured in several recent articles.

Many other recent articles have been promoting an enhanced role for trade unions by suggesting that factory production conferences--the

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principal forum for trade unions and administrators to resolve disputes--play a more vital role in the management of enterprises. Thus a 6 May PRAVDA editorial was sharply critical of managers who rigidly defined the agenda of these meetings, inhibiting the free flow of ideas. Other articles have attempted to build up the image of the production conferences by portraying them as a vital part of the management process.

Perhaps the most notable demonstration of the leadership's professed solicitude for the worker was the addition of rank-and-file workers to the top policymaking bodies of five republics in January. This remarkable break with longstanding practice bears at least a surface resemblance to the democratization trend that has been taking place in the Polish communist party. In two of the Baltic republics, the moves appear to have been prompted directly by the Polish crisis. In Lithuania, which elected the leader of a painters brigade a member of the republic Bureau, party leaders have been showing an unusual degree of solicitude toward local trade unions since the crisis in neighboring Poland began. The Latvian party also appeared to take a defensive measure against possible spillover from Poland when it elected a milling machine operator to its top leadership and made him a local celebrity by frequently featuring him in the local press. Party leaders from the Caucasus, well isolated from Polish events, appeared to be pursuing longer range efforts to improve party responsiveness to public needs when they added workers to all three republic bureaus.

While Soviet leaders have been encouraging an expanded role for official trade unions, specialists have been seeking to define more clearly the role of unions in communist societies. At the heart of these discussions has been the sensitive subject of the relationship between the party and the trade unions. Some of the contributors to the discussion have taken a flexible approach, apparently concerned to keep the door open for some future accommodation with Solidarity-type unions. This position was expressed most clearly in a 26 December PRAVDA article by M. Baglay, which endorsed the principle that "each fraternal party" must determine the appropriate form for its own trade unions and dismissed the need for unions to follow any "set model" or "mechanically copy" each other. Although Baglay accepted the principle that trade unions cannot question the leading role of the party, he suggested that party influence over unions be limited to the persuasive power of party members who also belong to the union. An 8 March PRAVDA article by V. Ivanov took a more rigidly doctrinaire approach, criticizing "opportunists" who wanted to turn economic management over to the trade unions, thereby denying the party its legitimate role, and calling on the party to

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strengthen its control over the unions "in every possible way." At the CPSU congress Brezhnev hinted that he favored a flexible approach, asserting in regard to Poland that there were a "wealth of ways and methods" of conforming to the socialist model, but suggesting also that there were limits beyond which these adaptations could not go.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Perhaps more than any other Soviet bloc country, Czechoslovakia has reacted to the Polish upheavals in a highly negative way, issuing denunciations of Solidarity and insisting on the need for strict ideological orthodoxy. Nevertheless, Prague has shown signs of nervousness over the Polish innovations and has let it be known that its own trade unions and other bodies could improve their work by paying closer attention to workers' needs. The earliest signs of concern came in several RUDE PRAVO editorials and articles in late August exhorting trade union and party workers to be more responsive to a broad range of workers' complaints. More recently, party leader Husak at the CPCZ congress in April stressed that the unions play a big role in promoting workers' rights and in government decisionmaking and that in the future "it will not be possible to drop the standards of their activity." A similar mixture of defensive justification and positive prompting came from trade union leader Karel Hoffman, who said at the congress that any weaknesses in trade union activity were caused primarily by their failure to sufficiently exploit "the existing extensive laws."

In addition to such indirect acknowledgments of the need for improvements in trade union activity, Prague spokesmen have admitted from time to time that the workers themselves have expressed discontent. Party Secretary Fojtik in December acknowledged that the Polish events have influenced the way Czechoslovak workers look at their trade unions, but warned them not to overstep the line between justifiable criticism and "demagoguery." A miners union official conceded in January that some workers believe that "nothing has been done for the miners," and he urged stepped-up indoctrination efforts. Similar complaints were noted by Slovak trade union official Ladislav Abraham, who admitted in March that women and young people often feel that "trade unions no longer safeguard their interests adequately."

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EAST GERMANY

East Germany has reacted similarly to the Polish events with defensive posturing about the efficacy of its own trade unions and, at the same time, efforts to encourage officials to be more responsive to citizens' concerns. Party leader Honecker exhibited defensiveness about the GDR trade unions in his April party congress speech, when he declared that they enjoyed rights "unprecedented in the history of the German trade union movement." He also called the unions "our party's loyal allies." East Germany also showed concern to prevent an infiltration of Polish ideas about trade unions--and a depletion of food and consumer goods supplies to Polish visitors--when it initiated bilateral travel restrictions with Poland in October.

The most striking evidence of East German concerns about the effect of Poland's renewal has been the initiation of a campaign to encourage the trade unions and the government bureaucracy to be more attentive to workers' opinions. In September trade union chief Harry Tisch cited more than a million proposals put forward by workers and called on "every trade union executive to ensure that every initiative and proposal is used." Trade union officials and regional party leaders reiterated this theme in the following weeks, and in January Politburo members and government ministers held almost daily meetings with plant workers and public forums to address citizens' concerns. In a series of regional party meetings in mid-February, Politburo member Axen urged communists to have an "open ear and understanding" for citizens' opinions, Politburo member Sindermann warned state bodies against bureaucratism and "heartlessness," and one regional leader said that officials failing to heed citizens' suggestions "cannot be members of the state apparatus."

HUNGARY

Hungary has shown greater self-confidence about the impact of the Polish unrest than some of its East European counterparts, no doubt reflecting the relatively stable internal conditions it has enjoyed by virtue of its liberalized economy and fairly tolerant political system. Budapest has claimed that its trade unions already enjoy a degree of autonomy and responsibility adequate to safeguard workers' interests. Party leader Kadar said in a trade union congress speech in December that the unions' participation in national decisionmaking "is no formality" and that while they respect the party's leading role, they "must work autonomously." Trade union chief Sandor Gaspar, in an interview with NEPSZABADSAG

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on 19 October, said the unions had a "veto" over government actions affecting workers, and Politburo member Sarlos said in February that he "could not see how the trade unions in Hungary could become any more independent than they are."

Budapest has attempted to finesse the issue of whether strikes can be tolerated in a socialist country by treating it as a matter of little importance rather than as a matter of principle. Gaspar said in October that while Hungarian law did not explicitly guarantee the right to strike, "there is no law that prohibits striking," and he conceded that "a few hours' cessation of work, or a stoppage, or a strike if you like, has occurred at a few plants' units in our country." A Budapest foreign radio commentary on 26 November implied that the official unions could even call a work stoppage, saying that they had temporarily closed down some plants to protest poor working conditions. Budapest has also sought to defuse the question of a five-day workweek--introduced in Poland after a major confrontation--by announcing that it would be implemented in Hungary in stages starting in July 1981 and January 1982.

ROMANIA

Romania has indicated some nervousness about the impact of the Polish events on its own sporadically troubled labor scene. Early in the crisis, a 28 August SCINTEIA editorial acknowledged that "the economic difficulties in Poland can emerge in any country," but it said they should be resolved "not by means of work stoppages" but through "rallying of the whole people's efforts" and consolidating of discipline. Three days later a SCINTEIA article marking the 36th anniversary of Romania's unified trade unions--an event the paper had failed to mark on the more important quinquennial anniversary the year before--highlighted problems in the precommunist "division" of the Romanian trade union movement and stressed the benefits of the existing system. Another possible sign of Bucharest's concern was the announcement in September of a reallocation of funds from defense and administrative spending to consumer and investment sectors.

Despite its staunch defense of the existing trade union structures, Bucharest has made stepped-up efforts in recent months to exhort the unions to exercise their rights more fully and improve working and living conditions. Romanian leader Ceausescu stressed these themes in speeches to a party plenum in October and to a trade unions congress in April. On the latter occasion he asserted that the leading role of the party "by no means diminishes the role of trade unions" and cautioned party bodies not to "subordinate and

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patronize the trade unions." Another apparent sign of Bucharest's interest in encouraging greater trade union activism was the replacement in March of its trade union leader and the separation of the role of union chief and minister of labor, positions held jointly since 1977.

BULGARIA

Geographically and culturally removed from Poland, Bulgaria appears to have been affected less by the Polish unrest than most of the northern countries of East Europe, although it too has taken some tentative steps to upgrade the role of its trade unions and pay greater attention to its work force. Bulgarian leader Zhivkov has been in the forefront of these efforts, asserting in December that "the working people have the right to demand from the trade unions more active assistance" in meeting their needs and calling on the unions to play a greater role in involving workers in management and "expanding democracy." Bulgaria replaced longtime trade union chief Misho Mishev in March, and at the party congress on 31 March Zhivkov reasserted that the unions should "listen more carefully to workers' proposals" and wage an "uncompromising struggle" against "manifestations of bureaucracy." The Sofia press has kept in tune with these efforts, carrying almost daily articles on the need to improve supplies of food and consumer goods and services.

YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavia's trade unions, normally overshadowed by other aspects of the country's "workers self-management" system, have shown signs of growing assertiveness and revitalization since the start of the Polish upheavals. While the Yugoslav Government has been trying to hold down wage increases in the face of continuing inflation, the unions have been posturing themselves as staunch defenders of the workers' living standards. Trade union officials in recent months have repeatedly protested the detrimental effects on workers of the government's economic stabilization program, urging such remedial measures as price controls and wage hikes for those workers hardest hit. A trade union leadership meeting on 19 March, according to BORBA the next day, "unanimously" insisted for the fourth time in 20 days that workers' living standards be protected "regardless of resultant problems in production and disruptions in the market."

In addition to trying to influence government economic planning, the unions appear to be discussing their potential role--and shortcomings--more candidly. An unusually critical discussion of

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union weaknesses was aired at a roundtable of union officials, reported by BORBA on 24 October, which featured admissions that unions are often incapable of adequately defending aggrieved workers, that workers bypass their local union branches, and that there is an incorrect belief that the self-management system itself can handle any labor problems. Trade union leader Miran Potrc, in an interview reported by TANJUG on 27 February, acknowledged some of these shortcomings and called the strengthening of workers' confidence in the unions one of the major tasks they face.

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