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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

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Withdrawer

JET 5/10/2005

File Folder GENERAL 5/5 [1984-1986]

FOIA

F06-114/7

Box Number 26

YARHI-MILO

2611

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9966	CABLE	021416Z MAY 86 R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	5/2/1986	B1
9963	PAPER	MOSCOW PROCLAIMS CDE BREAKTHROUGH R 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7	4	7/23/1986	B1
9964	PAPER	SOVIET MEDIA AIR WESTERN VIEWS ON SENSITIVE SUBJECTS R 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7	3	7/23/1986	B1
9965	PAPER	IRAN R 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7	1	7/23/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 22, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ↗

SUBJECT: Clearance Request/Proposed Presidential Message
for Ukrainian Congress Committee of America

I have reviewed and concur with the proposed Presidential Message (Tab A) for the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. Attached at Tab A is a memorandum to Anne Higgins for your signature noting our concurrence.

gm
Matlock concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to Anne Higgins

Tab A Message

Tab II Incoming

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Clearance Request/Proposed Presidential Message
for Ukrainian Congress Committee of America

We have reviewed and concur with the proposed Presidential message (Tab A) for the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America.

Attachment:

Tab A Presidential Message

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 22, 1986

I am very happy to extend warm greetings to the members of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America as you gather to commemorate the 68th anniversary of the proclamation of independence in Ukraine.

This day is not entirely a joyful one for Ukrainians in America and abroad. The campaign against defenders of the long persecuted Ukrainian Catholic Church continues unabated. Ukrainians who defend their basic human rights, such as Yosyp Terelia, the Reverend Vasyl Kobryn, and others, now face long and severe imprisonment for advocating their belief in freedom and democratic principles. While attempts to russify Ukraine have increased, I remain confident that the strong ties Ukrainians have historically had to their history, their families and to their faith will endure and that their cultural traditions will once again flourish.

Ukrainians throughout the world are sustained by the hope that nothing can extinguish their deep sense of nationhood or forever thwart the yearning of the human spirit for liberty. I wish to join in solidarity with all Ukrainians in your continuing courageous efforts to secure freedom, human rights, and to preserve the national identity of your beloved homeland. Nekaj Bokh bude z'vamy!

January 22, 1986

I am very happy to extend warm greetings to the members of the [redacted] as you gather to commemorate the 68th anniversary of the proclamation of independence in Ukraine.

This day is not entirely a joyful one for Ukrainians in America and abroad. The campaign against defenders of the long persecuted Ukrainian Catholic Church continues unabated. Ukrainians who defend their basic human rights, such as Yosyp Terelia, the Reverend Vasyl Kobryn, and others, now face long and severe imprisonment for advocating their belief in freedom and democratic principles. While attempts to russify Ukraine have increased, I remain confident that the strong ties Ukrainians have historically had to their history, their families and to their faith will endure and that their cultural traditions will once again flourish.

Ukrainians throughout the world are sustained by the hope that nothing can extinguish their deep sense of nationhood or forever thwart the yearning of the human spirit for liberty. I wish to join in solidarity with all Ukrainians in your continuing courageous efforts to secure freedom, human rights, and to preserve the national identity of your beloved homeland. Nekaj Bokh bude z'vamy!

SENT TO:

Call Paula Dobriansky re pick-up x3912
L. Kojelis to hand carry

RR:CV:PN:AVH:reno PM41

cc: K.Osborne/C.Korte/C.Vedlik/ CF

EVENT: January 23

DUE: January 22

1/22 Ukrainian Congress Committee

Draft Provided

OFFICE OF PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES
REQUEST FOR CLEARANCE - COMMENTS

To: NSC

Please provide clearance on the attached Presidential Message for
the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America

Date Due: COB, JANUARY 22

Date of Event: January 23

Subject: 68th anniversary of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America

Requested by: Paula Dobriansky

Background:

Signature:

Laura Eddy x 2941

Date:

Jan 22

Presidential Messages
Old Executive Office Building
Room 18
(202) 456-2941

Your Recommendation/Comments:

Signature:

Date:

DRAFT/Date January 21 SPECIAL DEADLINE ASAP
(printing, e.g.)
RR/ CV DATE OF EVENT January 23
(drafter) (Rev.)
(Straight Wire/Telegram)
(Special Delivery/Express Mail)

Clear w/ NSC

Hand-carry by KOJELIS

I am very happy to extend warm greetings to the members of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America as you gather to commemorate the 68th anniversary of the proclamation of independence in Ukraine.

This day is not entirely a joyful one for Ukrainians in America and abroad.

The campaign against defenders of the long ^{persecuted} ~~oppressed~~ Ukrainian Catholic Church continues unabated with increased arrests and continued persecution. Ukrainians who defend their basic human rights, such as Yosyp Terelia, the Reverend Vasyl Kobryn, and others, now face long and severe imprisonment for advocating their belief in freedom and democratic principles. While attempts to russify Ukraine have increased, I remain confident that the strong ties Ukrainians have ^{historically} had to their family ^{history, their} and to their church ^{faith} will endure and that their cultural traditions will once again flourish.

Ukrainians throughout the world are sustained by the hope that nothing can extinguish their ^{deep} sense of nationhood or ^{forever thwart} the yearning of the human spirit for liberty. I wish to join in solidarity with ^{all Ukrainians}

in your continuing ^{courageous} efforts to secure freedom, human rights, and national ^{to preserve the} identity ^{of} your beloved homeland. ~~Book z'vamy.~~

Nekaj Bokh bude z'vamy.

cc to C. Kedlik, Rm. 93.

Date: 1/13/86

TO:

Clancha

FROM:

LINAS KOJELIS *LK*
Special Assistant to the President
for Public Liaison
Room 196 OEOB, Ext. 6573

*Linus wants
to hand comp
for
1/15*

The attached is for your:

- | | |
|---|---|
| ☐ Information | ☐ Review & Comment |
| ☐ Direct Response | ☐ Appropriate Action |
| ☐ Draft Letter | ☐ Signature |
| ☐ File | ☐ Other |
| ☐ Please Return By _____ | |

Comments:

*Please assist with a
presidential message.
Thanks.*



Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Inc.

8

NATIONAL OFFICE:
203 Second Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10003
Phone (212) 228-6840/6841

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
810 18th St. N.W. Suite 807
Washington, D.C. 20006
Phone (202) 638-0988

PRESIDIUM OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

IGNATIUS M. BILLINSKY
President

WOLODYMYR MASUR
First Vice President

JOSEPH LESAWYER
Vice President

STEPAN SKROBACH
Vice President

ASKOLD LOZYSKY
Vice President

GEORGE NESTERCHUK
Vice President

MICHAEL SNIHURWYCH
Vice President

DARIA STEPANIAK
Vice President

BOHDAN FEDORAK
Vice President

MYROSLAW CHARKEWYCH
Vice President

IHOR DLABOHA
Secretary

JOHN TELLIK
Treasurer

OLEXA KALYNKYH

MYKOLA SEMANYSHYN

January 9, 1986

Rush / Jan 22

Assign to

CV

1/21

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, it is with honor that I request your presence at a reception on Thursday, January 23, 1986 at 6:00 p.m. in room B 339 of the Rayburn House Office Building to commemorate the 68th anniversary of the proclamation of independence in Ukraine.

Although the independent republic endured only three years, until communist takeover in 1921, the Ukrainian spirit of freedom has not been quenched, for it is as prevalent in the hearts of Ukrainians today as it was in 1918.

However, this day is not an entirely joyful one for Ukrainians in America and abroad. There are constant reminders of the efforts of the Soviet regime to deprive the Ukrainian people of their national identity, culture, and religious traditions. Indeed, Ukrainians who speak out against this oppression have received especially harsh treatment and particularly long terms of imprisonment for espousing the principles of democracy and freedom.

We look forward to a positive response to our invitation. Knowing your demanding schedule, if previous commitments do not allow for your participation, a greeting showing solidarity with the Ukrainian people in their struggle for freedom, human rights, and national independence on the day which we celebrate the anniversary of a once independent Ukraine will be most meaningful.

Sincerely,

Ignatius M. Billinsky

Ignatius M. Billinsky
President
Nat'l. Executive Committee

cc: ✓ Linas Kojelis
Sp. Asst. to the Pres.

- *Clear w/ NSC*
- *OK to do message per Paula Dobriansky, WSC 1/21*

- *L. Kojelis wants to hand carry*

- *Suggested lang. provided*

- *Previous msg to Committee attached*

Member: National Captive Nations Committee (NCNC)
U.S. Council for World Freedom

SUGGESTED GREETING

I am honored to send my warm greetings to Ukrainian Americans and to the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America as you gather to honor your traditions and call attention to the plight of your bretheren struggling for their religious and human rights.

This day is not an entirely joyful one for Ukrainians in America and abroad. The campaign against defenders of the long repressed Ukrainian Catholic Church continues unabated with increased arrests and continued persecution. Indeed, Ukrainians who defend their basic human rights, such as Yosyp Terelia, the Rev. Vasyl Kobryn, and others, now face long and severe terms of imprisonment for advocating their beliefs in freedom and democracy. While attempts to 'russify' Ukraine have increased, I remain confident that the strong ties Ukrainians have historically had to their family and to their church will persevere and their cultural traditions will once again flourish.

Nevertheless, I give my full support to the continuing struggle by Ukrainians everywhere to assert and preserve their national identity and culture. The Ukrainian spirit for freedom can never be quenched, as long as free Ukrainians continue to speak up for their oppressed kin and give them the moral support they so desperately need.

September 27, 1985

10
COPY
from ORM

It is an honor to join with members of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America as you gather to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II.

In his farewell address to the cadets of West Point, General Douglas MacArthur reminded us that "The soldier, above all other men, is required to practice the greatest act of religious training -- sacrifice... he must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war." More than forty years ago, your brothers-in-arms gave flesh-and-blood meaning to General MacArthur's words as they offered their last full measure of devotion in resisting the twin tyrannies of Nazism and Communism that ravaged their homeland. In the darkness of untold hardships, their spirit of courage and self-sacrifice shone brightly.

Although the shadow of tyranny continues to darken your ancestral lands, a spirit of hope and the yearning for liberty live on to inspire a new generation. I wish to express my solidarity with the brave people of Ukraine in your resolve to advance the cause of freedom and self-determination for your beloved homeland. God bless you.

SENT TO:

L. Kojelis will hand carry

RR:CV;PN:CAD:reno-PM33

cc: K.Osborne/C.Korte/C.Vedlik/P.Nicolaides/ CF

EVENT: October 6

DUE: October 1

9/27 Ukrainian Congress Committee

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

104 365628

11

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JANUARY 13, 1986

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. IGNATIUS M. BILLINSKY

SUBJECT: INVITATION TO ATTEND RECEPTION COMMEMORATING
THE 68TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE PROCLAMATION OF
INDEPENDENCE IN UKRAINE ON JAN 23 86 IN
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Jan. 22

Linas wants
to hand carry

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
MARY RAWLINS		ORG	86/01/13			/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:			/ /			/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:			/ /			/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:			/ /			/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:			/ /			/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:			/ /			/ /

COMMENTS: IV 860123 860123 DC WASHINGTON

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 4400 4900

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

*ACTION CODES: *DISPOSITION *OUTGOING *
* * * *CORRESPONDENCE: *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL * OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE *C-COMPLETED * CODE = A *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC * OUTGOING *
*P-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * * *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE * * *
*X-INTERIM REPLY * * *

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING.
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 7, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *JL*

SUBJECT: Draft Rowny Article

Attached is a memo from you to State forwarding some amendments to a draft article by General Ed Rowny on why the Soviets are not like us.

NOT AVAILABLE
MANLEY
WANT FOR LINHARD
McClock and Linhard concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to Platt

Tab A Draft article with changes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Draft Rowny Article

Attached are some recommended changes to the draft article by General Rowny.

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Tab A Draft articles with changes

Washingtonian Magazine

The Soviets Are Not "Just Like Us"

by

Edward L. Rowny

Speaking recently to graduate students at a large university, a bright young woman asked me, "When it really comes down to it, Mr. Ambassador, aren't the Russians just like us?" It's a question I'm often asked, regardless of the sophistication of the audience.

It causes my mind to flash back more than a quarter of a century ago when I, myself, was a graduate student. Just then, beginning to study the Soviets in earnest, I asked myself the same question. And the answer, especially since we were exposed to a great deal of Russian literature -- Dostoevsky, Gogol, Herten and the like -- seemed a simple "yes, the Soviets are like us." It was only after I began studying the Soviets in earnest that the simple "yes" turned to a "perhaps." Ten years ago, after beginning to negotiate with the Soviets, the answer shifted to "no." Through first-hand experience, I learned that the Soviets are more unlike, than like us.

Let me be clear that the average Soviet most likely wants the same things out of life as his American counterpart. He wants a good job, a nice place to live, good medical care when he's sick, and the opportunity of having an occasional good time. On another level, both would like to be able to educate their children well and to travel. And on still

another level, both would like to feel secure from the ravages of war. The similarities of the "wants" (sociologists would say "needs") are there.

Over the past decade, I have spent nearly a thousand hours negotiating with the Soviets on arms control. Away from the negotiating table, I have encountered Soviets in a myriad of situations, professional and social. This is what I have observed.

o The Soviets appear to be ^{resigned to living under} ~~comfortable with~~ totalitarianism. Long before Lenin and Trotsky introduced Communism to the Russian people at the beginning of the century, the Russians had been living under the yoke of the Czars. ^(Having inherited a political culture of authoritarianism) The Russians have been more accustomed than others to living under oppressive conditions. ~~the repressiveness of Communist rule with its disregard for the rights of the individual was, therefore, nothing new. It~~ Communism, however, introduced even greater oppression than had ever been experienced before, and ~~extended itself over millions of people in neighboring nations such as Lithuania and Ukraine whose~~ ~~was the pattern under which the Russians have always lived,~~ peoples had enjoyed greater freedoms than the Russians. The communists demonstrated their willingness to ~~whether their leaders were Russian princes, Tartars, or~~ stop at nothing to enforce their rule and liquidated between 40 and 70 million of their own people. ~~Czars.~~ This was sufficient to teach the survivors that resistance to communist rule would be futile. Thus, one must never forget that there is a distinction between the leaders and the people. Americans forget that their history and culture have

their roots in the Judeo-Christian ethic. We take for granted such values as freedom of choice and dignity of the individual. Truths which we hold to be "self-evident" are not at all ^{communist leadership.} evident to the Soviets. [^] Certainly there are Soviets who challenge authority. The Sakharovs and the Refusniks are examples of Soviets possessing the conviction and courage to fight for freedom at tremendous personal sacrifice. But they represent a small minority. The vast majority of Soviets see ^{possibility to} no ~~reason for~~ ^e ~~challenging~~ [^] the status quo. The basic attitude

has been part of the Soviet mindset since ^{Lenin's} ~~Stalin's~~ time and part of the mentality of their Russian forebearers for centuries.

o Another area where Soviets and Americans share no commonality is their penchant for secrecy, which is remarkably entrenched in the Soviet mind having seeped into every nook and cranny of Soviet society. ^{given its atmosphere of fear.} Early in my negotiating experience, I attended a reception in Geneva for US and Soviet negotiators and their wives. Always ready to hone my Russian language skills, not to mention my desire to be friendly, I tried to make small talk with the wife of one of my Soviet counterparts. Knowing that parents are always eager to talk about their children, I asked in my best Russian: "And how many children do you have, Mrs. ____?" To my astonishment, she paled noticeably, excused herself, and went over to talk to one of the Soviet officials I knew to be KGB. I could overhear her asking: "Why should he want to know about my children?" Later, I didn't have the heart to tell her I really didn't care how many children she had, but was merely being polite.

o Life in America, as I imagine in every other society, is one endless negotiating process. From earliest childhood, we learn to negotiate in order to achieve our goals. "If you let me stay up late tonight, Mom, I'll be good tomorrow!" Later on, when we have children of our own, we negotiate with our spouses over whether Junior can use the family car. And so it goes throughout our entire life cycle. We cajole,

dissent, argue, and negotiate, almost always winding up with a compromise.

The Soviets do much the same thing, except that their concept of compromise is different. They literally don't have a word in their lexicon for "compromise." The current word used to convey that thought is adapted from the West. To the Soviets, only those dealing from a position of weakness are forced to compromise. Whereas an American is taught from little up to meet the other person half-way, the Soviet is taught that there must always be a winner. It is foreign to his mentality that both sides can emerge winners. This causes the typical Soviet to start off the bargaining with a position so outlandish as to guarantee that the final outcome will be to his side of the middle. All of the above does not mean that negotiating with the Soviets is impossible. It just means that you have to know the rules by which the Soviets operate.

o Russians are no strangers to having a good time. They have a rich cultural tradition of gathering together on the smallest pretext. Away from the negotiating table, they are a very warm and personable people. I would be less than completely honest if I did not admit that there have been many occasions where I fully enjoyed myself in the company of these exuberant people. I recall a boat ride on Lake Geneva I organized for my Soviet counterparts and their wives. At the last minute, the Soviets announced, "Sorry, our wives have headaches; they can't come." Undaunted, we

embarked, fully prepared to have a good time without the Soviet ladies. However, I was unable to get the Soviets to mix with us and our wives.

In the end, I began to play my harmonica in hopes that the initially reserved Russians might let down their hair and dance with our wives. The ice was finally broken and, subsequently, a good time had by all.

Washingtonians who may find themselves entertaining the Soviets when they arrive with the General Secretary may be interested in what happened at the end of this nautical exercise in East-West relations. The head of the Soviet Delegation went around the boat and passed the hat. I was quite touched at the thought that he might be taking up a collection for me, the provider of the musical entertainment. Beaming, with a hat full of French and Swiss francs, he said "Okay." "We'll split 50-50!" Whereby he reached into the hat, took out all of the money and deposited it in his coat pocket. Tossing me a quick wink, he said: "You get 50 percent of the pleasure of playing and I get 50 percent of the pleasure of spending all the money. Fifty-fifty!"

o It bears remembering that the Russian people and the Soviet leaders do not have identical ideas. One only needs to recall, for example, that whereas the Soviet communist leaders are atheists, millions of their subject peoples are devout religious believers. I have no doubt that when you encounter your first Russian, be he official or private citizen, you will be pleased with the meeting. However, it is the beliefs that the Soviet leaders espouse and, most importantly, how they act upon those beliefs, that matters. Mikhail Gorbachev has a "nice guy" image the likes of which

we have not seen in a Soviet leader since Khrushchev. Maybe he is the "New Soviet Man" we have been hearing so much about. However, regardless of image, and regardless of what we want to believe, "nice guy" images emanating from the Soviet Union don't mean a thing.

In objectives, and in ways of going about reaching them, the Soviets are not like us. That does not mean that we cannot coexist peacefully. But we would do well to remember the closing thoughts in the Marquis de Custine's classical work: Journey for Our Time: "I don't blame the Russians for being what they are, I blame them for pretending to be what we are."

8603973 - 8603975



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

1076

February 6, 1986

MEMORANDUM

TO: NSC - Mr. Rodney B. McDaniel-8603973 ✓
OSD - Col. David Brown ----- 8603974
ACDA - Mr. William Staples - 8603975

SUBJECT: Draft Rowny Article

The Washingtonian magazine has asked Ambassador Rowny to provide it with a short article on what it is like negotiating with the Soviets. The attached piece has been prepared for this.

Please submit clearance and comments to S/ART - Larry Wolbers (647-4153) by noon, Friday, February 7th.

Nicholas Platt
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

21

URGENT

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:

1026

ACTION OFFICER:

Matlock

DUE:

11 AM Today

☐ Prepare Memo For President

☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew

☐ Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier

☒ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

☐ Prepare Memo

to

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext.

FYI

FYI

FYI

☐ Burghardt

☐ Levine

☐ Sachs

☐ Cannistraro

☒ Linhard

☐ Sestanovich

☐ Childress

☐ Mahley

☐ Sigur

☐ Cobb

☐ Major

☐ Small

☐ Covey

☐ Mandel

☐ Sommer

☐ Danzansky

☐ Matlock

☐ Soos

☐ deGraffenreid

☐ May

☐ Stark

☐ Djerejian

☐ Menges

☐ Steiner

☐ Dobriansky

☐ Miller

☐ Tahir-Kheli

☐ Donley

☐ North

☐ Teicher

☐ Douglass

☐ Platt

☐ Thompson

☐ Grimes

☐ Pugliese

☐ Tillman

☐ Hughes

☐ Raymond

☐ Wigg

☐ Kraemer

☐ Reger

☐ Wright

☐ Laux

☐ Ringdahl

☐

☒ Lenczowski

☐ Sable

☐

INFORMATION ☐ McDaniel

☐ Pearson

☒ Secretariat

☐ Rodman

☐ Lehman

☐

☐ Poindexter (advance)

☐ Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

Return to Secretariat

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 11, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM PAULA DOBRIANSKY ^{PD}

SUBJECT: Proposed Message to Dallas Estonian Society/68th
Anniversary of Declaration of Independence of
Estonia

I have reviewed and concur with the proposed Presidential message (Tab A) for the 68th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence of Estonia commemoration by the Dallas Estonian Society. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Charles Donovan for your signature noting our concurrence.

SM ^{SA} ^{SS}
Matlock, Mandel and Sestanovich concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Memo to Charles Donovan
Tab A Presidential Message
Tab II Incoming

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES A. DONOVAN

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL

SUBJECT: Presidential Message for the 68th Anniversary of
Declaration of Independence of Estonia

We have reviewed and concur with the proposed Presidential message (Tab A) for the 68th Anniversary of the Declaration of Independence of Estonia commemoration by the Dallas Estonian Society.

Attachment:

Tab A Presidential Message

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 7, 1986

I am very happy to extend warm greetings to the members of the Dallas Estonian Society as you gather to commemorate the 68th Anniversary of the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Estonia.

Sixty-eight years ago, the bells of liberty and independence pealed joyfully throughout Estonia, echoing and reechoing among the towns and sunlit hills and valleys. For the people of this ancient land, the biblical injunction of Leviticus had at last been realized: "Proclaim liberty throughout all the land, unto all the inhabitants thereof."

But the joyful sounds of freedom were all too quickly silenced in 1940 by the tyranny of Soviet occupation. Liberty gave way to the grim horror of forced relocation and cruel repression. Yet, despite the darkness of untold hardships, the flame of courage and hope has not ceased to burn in the hearts of the brave Estonian people.

Although the shadow of tyranny continues to darken your ancestral land, Estonians throughout the world are sustained by the knowledge that nothing can extinguish their deep sense of nationhood or forever thwart the yearning of the human spirit for liberty. I join in solidarity with all Estonians in your courageous efforts to advance the cause of freedom and self-determination for your beloved homeland. Jumak onnistagu Teid.

OFFICE OF PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES

REQUEST FOR CLEARANCE - COMMENTS

To: RODNEY McDANIEL - NSC

1038

Date Due: February 10

Date of Event: February 23

Subject: 68th Anniversary of Declaration of Independence of Estonia -- commemoration by the Dallas Estonian Society.

Requested by: Dallas Estonian Society

Background: I'm told that in past years the Secretary of State sends a message to the Consul General of Estonia in New York and that the text is made available to domestic organizations for their observances.

The closing phrase in Estonian is "God bless you."

Signature: CHARLES A. DONOVAN

Date: 2/7/86

Presidential Messages
Old Executive Office Building
Room 18
(202) 456-2941

Your Recommendation/Comments:

Signature:

Date:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 24, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*SUBJECT: Clearance Request for Presidential Message/5th
Annual Human Rights Conference of Baltic American
Freedom League

I have reviewed and concur with the attached Presidential message (Tab A) for the 5th Annual Human Rights Conference of the Baltic American Freedom League, Los Angeles. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Anne Higgins for your signature noting our concurrence.

N/A
Mandel, Lenczowski, and Matlock concur. *JM*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to Anne Higgins
Tab A Presidential Message

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL

SUBJECT: Clearance Request for Presidential Message/Fifth
Annual Human Rights Conference of Baltic American
Freedom League

We have reviewed and concur with the proposed Presidential message for the Fifth Annual Human Rights Conference of the Baltic American Freedom League.

Attachment:

Tab A Proposed Presidential Message

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1455

February 21, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY McDANIEL, NSC

SUBJECT: 5th Annual Human Rights Conference of the
Baltic American Freedom League, Los Angeles
(FEBRUARY 25 Printing Deadline)

Attached for your approval is a proposed Presidential message for the above event. We would like to send the message out Monday by Express Mail so that it will be there in time for the FEBRUARY 25 printing deadline. I would appreciate it if you would have someone call in any changes or NSC clearance ASAP (extension 2941).

Thank you.


ANNE HIGGINS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 21, 1986

It gives me great pleasure to extend warm greetings to all those gathered to commemorate the Fifth Annual Human Rights Conference of the Baltic American Freedom League.

Throughout their history, Americans have had a keen appreciation for human rights. Their spirit was forged in the fires of a revolution whose bedrock principles included a belief in liberty and human dignity under God and the right of men to choose their own destinies.

Those same inalienable rights that are a part of the very fabric of American life have, since 1940, been denied to the brave people of the Baltic States by the tyranny of Soviet occupation. Human rights have given way to the grim nightmare of forced relocation and internal persecution.

Despite the darkness of untold hardships, Baltic peoples throughout the world are sustained by the hope that nothing can extinguish their deep sense of nationhood or forever thwart the yearning of the human spirit for liberty. God is the Sovereign of nations as well as of history and, with His help, I am confident that the light of liberty will spread until it illuminates every corner of the earth. I wish to join in solidarity with all Baltic peoples in your continuing courageous efforts to secure human rights and to preserve the national identity of your beloved homelands. God bless you.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 7, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ^{PD}

SUBJECT: H.J. Res 409 - Lithuanian Independence Day

I have reviewed and concur with H.J. Resolution 409 (Tab A) which designates February 16, 1986 as "Lithuanian Independence Day." Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for your signature noting our concurrence.

SM ^{VS} ^{pd}
Matlock and Sable concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to Chew
Tab A Resolution
Tab II Incoming

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1845

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID L. CHEW

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL

SUBJECT: H.J. Resolution 409 - Lithuanian Independence Day

We have reviewed and concur with the H.J. Resolution 409 (Tab A) which designates February 16, 1986 as "Lithuanian Independence Day."

Attachment:

Tab A Resolution



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

Received 95

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MAR 07 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Enrolled Resolution H.J.Res. 409 - Lithuanian
Independence Day
Sponsors - Rep. Moakley (D) Massachusetts and 250
others

Last Day for Action

March 14, 1986 - Friday

Purpose

Designates February 16, 1986, as "Lithuanian Independence Day."

Agency Recommendations


Office of Management and Budget Approval

Department of State No objection (initially)

Discussion

H.J.Res. 409 designates February 16, 1986, as "Lithuanian Independence Day." February 16, 1986, marked the 68th anniversary of the declaration of independence of Lithuania. The enrolled resolution directs the President to issue a proclamation for the observance of "Lithuanian Independence Day" and calls on the American people to celebrate the day with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

H.J.Res. 409 passed both Houses of the Congress by voice vote.


James C. Miller III
Director

Enclosures

Ninety-ninth Congress of the United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the twenty-first day of January, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-six

Joint Resolution

To direct the President to issue a proclamation designating February 16, 1986, as "Lithuanian Independence Day".

Whereas February 16, 1986, marks the 68th anniversary of the declaration of independence of Lithuania;

Whereas on February 16, 1918, the Council of Lithuania, the sole representative of the Lithuanian people, in conformity with the recognized right to national self-determination, proclaimed the restitution of the independent and democratic state of Lithuania and declared rupture of all ties which formally subordinated Lithuania to other nations;

Whereas a free Lithuania existed until the Soviet takeover in 1940;

Whereas the United States opposes tyranny and injustice in all forms and supports the cause of a free Lithuania;

Whereas the oppressed people currently living in Lithuania should keep the flame of freedom forever burning in their hearts: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President shall issue a proclamation designating February 16, 1986, as "Lithuanian Independence Day" and calling on the people of the United States to celebrate such day with appropriate ceremonies and activities.


Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Speaker pro Tempore


Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate pro Tempore

Document No. 366279ss**URGENT****WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM**DATE: 3/7/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 9:00 a.m. 3/10/86SUBJECT: H.J.RES. 409 - LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☒	LACY	☐	☐
REGAN	☐	☒	POINDEXTER	☒	☐
MILLER	☐	☐	RYAN	☐	☐
BALL	☒	☐	SPEAKES	☐	☒
BUCHANAN	☒	☐	SPRINKEL	☐	☐
CHAVEZ	☒	☐	SVAHN	☒	☐
CHEW	☐	☒ P SS	THOMAS	☒	☐
DANIELS	☒	☐	TUTTLE	☐	☐
FIELDING	☒	☐	_____	☐	☐
HENKEL	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
HICKS	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
KINGON	☒	☐	_____	☐	☐

REMARKS: Please give your recommendations to my office by 9:00 a.m. Monday, March 10th. Thanks.

RESPONSE:

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY REFERRAL

TIME STAMP

SYSTEM I LOG NUMBER: 1845
☐ (FIRST DRAFT OF REMARKS)

ACTION OFFICER: DOBRIANSKY DUE: 0800, 3/10

- ☒ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- ☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott
- ☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Speakes
- ☐ Prepare Memo _____ to _____

URGENT

*** PUT RESPECTIVE STAFF OFFICER'S NAME IN MARGIN BESIDE CHANGES.

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS* DUE: 1800, 3/7

*PHONE to action officer at ext. 3912

- | | | |
|--|---|--------------------------------------|
| ☐ Burghardt | ☐ Levine | ☐ Sachs |
| ☐ Cannistraro | ☐ Linhard | ☐ Sestanovich |
| ☐ Childress | ☐ Mahley | ☐ Sigur |
| ☐ Cobb | ☐ Major | ☐ Small |
| ☐ Covey | ☐ Mandel | ☐ Sommer |
| ☐ Danzansky | ☐ Matlock | ☐ Soos |
| ☐ deGraffenreid | ☐ May | ☐ Stark |
| ☐ Dobriansky | ☐ Menges | ☐ Steiner |
| ☐ Donley | ☐ Miller | ☐ Tahir-Kheli |
| ☐ Douglass | ☐ North | ☐ Teicher |
| ☐ Grimes | ☐ Platt | ☐ Thompson |
| ☐ Hughes | ☐ Pugliese | ☐ Tillman |
| ☐ Kraemer | ☐ Raymond | ☐ Wigg |
| ☐ Laux | ☐ Reger | ☐ Wright |
| ☐ Lehman | ☐ Ringdahl | ☐ _____ |
| ☐ Lenczowski | ☒ Sable | ☐ _____ |

INFORMATION

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| ☒ McDaniel | ☒ Pearson | ☒ Secretariat |
| ☐ Rodman | ☐ Lehman | ☒ Exec. Sec. Desk |
| ☐ Poindexter (advance) | ☐ Fortier (advance) | |

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

36

PAGE 01
SIT313

USDEL MBFR VIENNA 0400

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STATE FOR NITZE; OSD FOR IKLE; JCS FOR CHAIRMAN CROWE;
NSC FOR POINDEXTER; CIA FOR GATES; STATE PASS ACDA FOR
ADELMAN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADP

TAGS: MBFR, PARM, U

SUBJECT: ANALYZING THE APRIL 18 GORBACHEV INITIATIVE

REF: (A) MBFR 302; (B) MBFR 364; (C) MBFR 372;
(D) MBFR 373; (E) STATE 131553; (F) LONDON 9329

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN REFTELS A-D, THE DELEGATION ANALYZED THE MANY
NEGATIVE FEATURES OF THE GORBACHEV APRIL 18 SPEECH IN EAST
BERLIN. IN ITS PRESENT FORM, THE SOVIET CONCEPT IS BOTH
VAGUE AND UNACCEPTABLE. THIS, OUR PRESENT TACTIC
OF DEFERRED RESPONSE (REFTEL E), MAY BE A GOOD ONE FOR NOW AND, DEPENDING ON
WHAT MOSCOW DOES NEXT AND WHEN, PERHAPS FOR SOME TIME TO
COME.

IN MY JUDGMENT, HOWEVER, THIS RELATIVELY AGNOSTIC
TACTIC APPROACH WILL LAST THE BEST ONLY SO LONG AS THE
SOVIETS REFRAIN FROM GIVING DETAILS OF THEIR IDEA AND/OR
INTRODUCING THE PROPOSAL FORMALLY INTO ONE OF THE CURRENT
NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH UNLIKELY, THIS COULD OCCUR AS
EARLY AS THE OPENING OF THE ROUND HERE ON MAY 15. SHOULD
THAT HAPPEN THEN OR SOMEWHAT LATER, THE ALLIES WOULD
PROBABLY QUICKLY ARGUE FOR A SUBSTANTIVE RATHER THAN A
PROCEDURAL RESPONSE TO THE GORBACHEV INITIATIVE. THE
BRITISH AGREE (REF F) AND I NOTE THAT GENSCHER SOUGHT
SUPPORT EARLIER THIS WEEK AT THE WEU MINISTERIAL MEETING
IN VENICE FOR AN "OFFENSIVE REACTION" TO THE SOVIET
PROPOSAL. IT SEEMS PRUDENT FOR WASHINGTON TO ANALYZE
URGENTLY IN DEPTH THE APRIL 18 MOVE AND ESPECIALLY TO
FURTHER IDENTIFY ITS NEGATIVE FEATURES. FOR CONTINGENCY'S
SAKE, THAT IS THE LEAST WE SHOULD DO TO PROTECT OURSELVES
FROM ANOTHER UNPLEASANT SURPRISE FROM MOSCOW.

BUT I BELIEVE MORE ANALYSIS ON OUR PART IS REQUIRED.
WE SHOULD SEE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS IF THERE IS ANY
WAY TO SPIN GOLD OUT OF THIS SOVIET STRAW:

- A WHOLLY NEGATIVE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE GORBACHEV
INITIATIVE WOULD NOT BE CREDIBLE WITH THE ALLIES;
- SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS CONCEPT

- OPENS UP AT LEAST THE THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY OF
RIDDING OURSELVES AT LAST OF THE GEOGRAPHICALLY
LIMITED MBFR ZONE WITH ALL ITS INHERENT LIABILITIES IN
SERIOUSLY ADDRESSING THROUGH ARMS CONTROL THE SOVIET
CONVENTIONAL MILITARY THREAT TO EUROPE;

- THERE IS NO REASON IN PRINCIPLE WHY WE COULD NOT FILL
GORBACHEV'S VAGUE PROPOSITION WITH A SET OF MEASURES
WHICH PROMOTES NATO, AND NOT SOVIET, OBJECTIVES; AND

- OUR CURRENT POSITION IN MBFR IS THE MINIMUM WE NEED
AND MAY BE INHERENTLY NON-NEGOTIABLE AS PRESENTED; IT
COULD BE VULNERABLE OVER THE LONG TERM AS A RESULT OF
EVENTUAL ALLIED ATTEMPTS TO WEAKEN OUR VERIFICATION
REGIME BECAUSE OF IMPATIENCE, DOMESTIC POLITICAL
PRESSURE OR CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT (VIZ NORWAY); AND
BECAUSE THE MILITARY STATUS QUO IN EUROPE SUITS MOSCOW
FAR MORE THAN IT DOES US.

5. IT COULD PROVE IMPOSSIBLE TO THINK OF A SCHEME WHICH
IS BOTH PLAUSIBLE TO THE ALLIES AND IN OUR INTERESTS. IF
THAT IS SO, WE SHOULD GO ON TRYING TO FORESTALL A CDE
PHASE II AND MAKING THE BEST OF IT IN MBFR BECAUSE
EUROPEANS WILL INSIST ON CONTINUING A EUROPEAN
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL FORUM. AND IN ANY EVENT, WE
CERTAINLY DO NOT WANT TO EXCHANGE MBFR WITH ALL ITS
PROBLEMS FOR SOMETHING WORSE. BUT ONLY AN INTENSIVE
INTERAGENCY EFFORT WILL GIVE US THE ANSWERS WE NEED. I
RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON BEGIN THAT EFFORT IMMEDIATELY.

1/S PLEASE PASS TO OTHER AGENCIES, TO USUNTO, US DEL
CDE, AND TO EMBASSIES BERN, LONDON AND MOSCOW.

BLACKWILL

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NLRR F06-11417 #9966

BY CW NARADATE 7/7/08

SECRET

File!
CDE

East-West Relations

Moscow Proclaims CDE Breakthrough

The USSR's assertion that compromise has produced a "major breakthrough" on military confidence-building measures at the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) appears to reflect Moscow's eagerness to come out of the conference with an agreement that would lay the groundwork for a continuation of European security talks. At the same time, Moscow appears to be concerned that there is not enough time left to resolve outstanding differences before the conference ends on 19 September.

Apparently hoping to build momentum toward a CDE agreement, Moscow gave wide international coverage to Soviet CDE delegation head Oleg Grinevskiy's optimistic remarks at the 18 July closing session of the most recent CDE round. An 18 July TASS report from Stockholm, carried in abridged form by *Pravda* on the 19th, announced that Grinevskiy had claimed "a major breakthrough was achieved at the conference over the past few days," attributing progress to a mutual willingness to compromise.

Other Soviet reporting also asserted that progress had been made but reflected fears that serious obstacles remain to be overcome. A Moscow radio commentary on 19 July asserted that an "important breakthrough" had taken place in the final days of the last CDE round but that "not all the problems concerned with strengthening mutual confidence have been solved." Another commentary, broadcast on Soviet television's *Vremya* program on the 18th, claimed that "progress" had been made "in a number of important spheres," but also warned that "no few obstacles" remain and complained that the NATO countries were not backing up their conciliatory words with specific actions. The *Vremya* commentary also cautioned that time could run out before an overall agreement is reached "even if there is good will."

Air Force Exercises Moscow has portrayed the compromise on air exercises as the most significant agreement reached thus far. The 18 July TASS report described prior notification of air exercises as "one of the biggest difficulties" that had long "stood in the way of

advancement." Saying that the East bloc has "always favored notification of all major exercises involving the air force" but that NATO had "rejected altogether" the idea, TASS announced, apparently paraphrasing Grinevskiy, that "a compromise was found" to establish an "air force sublevel within the framework of notification about exercises of ground troops" that would cover "practically 90 percent of the entire air force activity in Europe, including that considered most dangerous from the viewpoint of a sudden attack."

**Ground Force
Exercises**

Moscow is claiming it has also compromised on prior notification of ground force maneuvers and appears to be hinting it is willing to compromise further on this issue in order to secure an agreement. TASS reported Grinevskiy's assertion that a "substantial common basis" on the question of notification of exercises by ground troops "became visible" toward the end of the round. The report said that the conferees had agreed that notifications should cover the exercises of ground forces "conducted jointly with elements of the air force, navy, and amphibious and airborne troops." While acknowledging that the participants had still not agreed on a numerical threshold for notification of ground force exercises, TASS intimated that the East bloc countries, having gone "halfway" toward the wishes of "many nations" by agreeing to a threshold of 18,000 men, were willing to reduce this number further "taking as a basis the proposals advanced by the neutral and nonaligned nations." The report implied that Moscow saw some promise in the NATO countries' stance on this issue, noting that they had "expressed their readiness to raise the numerical level" of notification thresholds closer to the Warsaw Pact figure, but added that no "concrete proposals" had yet been tabled by the NATO states.

**Declaratory
Measures**

TASS's report on Grinevskiy's remarks also underscored Moscow's shift since the start of the conference in 1984 from emphasizing declaratory measures, such as pledges on nonuse of force and no-first-use of nuclear weapons, to accepting agreement on military confidence-building measures as the conference's prime task. After detailing at length the proposed compromises on prior notification of military exercises, TASS noted only that Grinevskiy had also stated that it was still necessary to complete "the elaboration of an agreement that would specify and impart effectiveness to the principle of nonuse of force." It made no reference to a need for the conference to adopt declarations on no-first-use of nuclear weapons or nuclear-free zones. By contrast, when then-Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko addressed the opening session of CDE in January 1984, he called for a treaty outlawing the

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23 July 1986

use of force, a no-first-use pledge by states possessing nuclear weapons, the creation of nuclear-free zones in "various parts" of Europe, and the removal of all chemical weapons from Europe, among other measures.¹

Verification

While hinting at flexibility on military confidence-building measures, the report on Grinevskiy's remarks did not elaborate on the Soviet position on verification questions. According to TASS, Grinevskiy asserted that verification "was of prime importance" to the communist countries and that the East "insists" on "effective and adequate verification," but he gave no indication what specific measures Moscow would agree to with regard to notification of exercises.

In an apparent effort to create an incentive for continuing the CDE process beyond September, Grinevskiy hinted that the East might be more flexible on verification if the conference were to be extended to discuss actual force reductions. Referring to the Warsaw Pact's June proposal for conventional force reductions "from the Atlantic to the Urals," which the Pact said could be discussed at a "second stage" of CDE, Grinevskiy asserted that the communist countries are "ready to endorse an agreement" involving "on-site inspections of confidence-building measures in the process of monitoring the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments." An article on CDE in the 21 July *Izvestiya* by that paper's correspondent in Stockholm replicated Grinevskiy's remarks on the verification issue, adding only that the just-ended CDE round had seen the "beginnings of a solution" on two verification-related issues, namely, the "exchange of annual plans for military activity" and the "invitation of observers."

Background

In recent months, Moscow has indicated its interest in achieving some kind of agreement at the Stockholm parley so that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) review conference to be held in Vienna this fall will authorize a second CDE meeting. In a 19 May speech for visiting Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez, Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov declared that a "positive" outcome to the "first stage" of the CDE is necessary "both in itself, and for the new all-European meeting in Vienna." In the interest of "imparting a new impetus to the development of the Helsinki process," Ryzhkov said, the USSR would like the Vienna review conference to adopt a decision to "turn to the second phase of the [Stockholm] conference to deal with disarmament in Europe."

¹ Earlier signs of Moscow's shift on declaratory measures are discussed in the *Trends* of 6 February 1985, pages 4-6.

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The Soviet leadership has stepped up calls for compromise as CDE winds down and apparently has instructed its delegation to redouble efforts to conclude an agreement. According to the 27 June *Pravda* account of the Politburo meeting the previous day, Ambassador Grinevskiy delivered a report at the meeting on developments at CDE and was instructed to "actively seek a positive outcome on a reciprocal basis" at the talks. More recently, in a speech at a 7 July dinner for visiting French President Mitterrand, published in *Pravda* the next day, General Secretary Gorbachev noted that "little time is left" to reach a CDE agreement. Gorbachev said that "it is high time that all participants in the conference display responsibility and flexibility" and asserted that "only serious mutual concessions on the basis of equality and equal security" can "ensure success." In its 18 July report, TASS cited Gorbachev's statement to underscore the need for compromise in Stockholm. TASS added that "some delegations, regrettably, were in no hurry" to display those qualities. (U/FOUO)

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USSR

Soviet Media Air Western Views on Sensitive Subjects

In a dramatic relaxation of the restraints on airing Western criticisms of Soviet foreign policies, Soviet television in prime time has broadcast an open discussion of such sensitive issues as Soviet policies on INF and Afghanistan between Soviet officials and prominent West European political leaders. This expansion of the permissible range of discussion is part of a gradual loosening of media strictures under Gorbachev to improve the credibility of Soviet media both at home and abroad. The broadcasting of criticisms of Soviet policies that, for the most part, pre-date Gorbachev's tenure as general secretary also serves to justify the policy shifts Gorbachev has already made in such areas as arms control and potentially to prepare the way for future policy changes.

The 15 July broadcast of Soviet television's *Studio Nine* international affairs talk show broke new ground in carrying Western views to a Soviet audience via state-controlled television. For the first time since the program's debut in 1978, it included Western political leaders—British Social Democratic Party leader and former Foreign Minister David Owen and West German Social Democratic Party arms control expert Egon Bahr. They joined Georgiy Arbatov, head of the Academy of Sciences Institute of the USA and Canada, *Novosti* director Valentin Falin, and program moderator Valentin Zorin for a freewheeling discussion of East-West issues.¹

While Owen and Bahr obviously were invited because of the proximity of their views to some Soviet positions on arms control—they praised the recent Warsaw Pact proposal for conventional force reduction in Europe and

¹ Although Zorin introduced the show as a "regular" edition of *Studio Nine*, the broadcast was extraordinary both in the time of its broadcast and in its length. Normally a one-hour program broadcast on the last Saturday of the month—skipping some months altogether—the 15 July program, lasting 80 minutes, appeared on a Tuesday evening immediately prior to the widely watched *Vremya* evening news broadcast. It came less than three weeks after the last regular broadcast of the show on 28 June. This edition of *Studio Nine*, like its predecessors, was prerecorded and therefore subject to editing.

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42!

criticized the U.S. decision on SALT II, for example—they expressed opinions on a range of international issues that Soviet audiences are unaccustomed to hearing in Soviet media:

- In the liveliest exchange of the program, Owen criticized both the United States and the USSR for considering Nicaragua and Afghanistan, respectively, within their "spheres of influence." When Arbatov denied that Moscow made any such claim on Afghanistan, Owen replied: "For many years you have been interfering in the affairs of Afghanistan." Arbatov conceded that Soviet sensitivity about its borders is a legacy of "old thinking" that could be overcome by moving toward the concept of "universal security" articulated in Gorbachev's report to the 27th CPSU Congress. Falin and Zorin, on the other hand, rejected Owen's argument in strong terms, with Zorin claiming that the comparison between U.S. and Soviet policy was "absolutely absurd."
- Although Bahr characterized the current Soviet proposal for elimination of Soviet and U.S. INF forces in Europe as an "excellent position," he criticized Moscow for earlier inflexibility. If Moscow had made the same proposal "five years ago," he asserted, West Germany and other West European countries "would never have had cruise or Pershing missiles." Owen added that U.S. deployments were "caused by the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles in . . . 1977 and 1978."
- When Zorin observed that he had been "unable to fathom" any "independent factor" in recent British policies, Owen responded that "you must not think that Britain is simply and completely in the United States' pocket." At the same time he defended London's "close" friendship with Washington and accused Moscow of "striving to break Europe from the United States." Such attempts will be "fruitless," he contended, adding that the Soviet Union would be better served by efforts to "encourage dialogue between our countries."
- Owen engaged Arbatov in a debate over the prospects for an arms control agreement between Moscow and the current U.S. Administration. Owen expressed the hope that, like President Nixon in the early 1970's, President Reagan would "cross the threshold" of arms control in the coming months. When Arbatov responded that "Nixon did not have [Assistant Secretary of Defense] Perle or [Secretary of Defense] Weinberger," Owen retorted: "You all thought that Nixon and Kissinger were hawks before those agreements [on arms control] were signed." He maintained that the "same possibility" exists

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23 July 1986

for President Reagan and added that the President has the additional advantage that, if he signs an agreement, "he will manage to push it through Congress and achieve ratification." Arbatov responded that although he admired Owen's optimism, "time is running out" on the Reagan Administration. "We must be realists even if we are optimists," he said.

Background

The appearance of Owen and Bahr on *Studio Nine* was the latest in a series of small but cumulatively significant steps the Gorbachev regime has taken to open Soviet media up to allow the expression of a wider variety of views on international issues—usually by foreigners—and the raising of highly sensitive issues. On the eve of Gorbachev's visit to France in October 1985, for example, Soviet television broadcast most of a Gorbachev interview with French television, including questions posed by French journalists about political prisoners in the USSR—mentioning Sakharov and Shcharanskiy by name—and Jewish emigration. The following month, *Izvestiya* published an extraordinary, if slightly edited, full-page interview with President Reagan. Earlier in 1985, *Izvestiya* published an article by U.S. Ambassador Arthur Hartman marking the anniversary of the meeting of U.S. and Soviet servicemen at Torgau 40 years previous. In May 1986, *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* published letters from the U.S. charge d'affaires and the West German ambassador, respectively, protesting articles published in those newspapers.

Moscow has thus far been careful to ensure that Western arguments do not go unanswered. When it published the interview with President Reagan, *Izvestiya* also ran a full-page article by the journalists who conducted the interview criticizing the President's statements. Similar rebuttals were published alongside the protest letters of the U.S. and West German envoys.

Soviet broadcast media have invited Western spokesmen to participate in discussions of international issues on occasion in the past, but those broadcasts have usually involved nonpoliticians active in the peace movement and have steered clear of wide-ranging examination of Soviet foreign policy. One such program was aired in July 1982 featuring Soviet and U.S. members of Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War in a graphic discussion of the horrors of nuclear war.² It contained no criticisms of Soviet policy, however.
(U/FOUO)

² See the *Trends* of 8 July 1982, pages 4-6.

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44.

Iran

Rafsanjani Reiterates Support for Montazeri To Succeed Khomeyni

Iran's parliament Speaker 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani has strengthened his ties with Ayatollah Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri by repeating his endorsement of Montazeri as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni's designated successor, a delicate issue on which almost all other leaders have maintained wary silence.

Rafsanjani's 14 July remarks on Montazeri's leadership of post-Khomeyni Iran mark a rare departure from the reluctance of Iran's leaders to discuss this sensitive issue. As reported by Tehran radio on the 15th, Rafsanjani told a gathering of the Assembly of Experts, a body of theologians elected to decide on the succession issue, that "all the qualifications of leadership are present in Grand Ayatollah Montazeri." He called the Assembly's November 1985 designation of Montazeri as the future *faqih*, the Islamic jurist constitutionally endowed with supreme authority over the government, a "very important undertaking."

As the deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts, Rafsanjani was one of the few leaders to speak in favor of Montazeri after the Assembly's decision was quietly and unexpectedly announced on 23 November. In a 26 November press conference he said that Montazeri was "more distinguished" than other candidates.

Continuing Controversy

The choice of Montazeri apparently has been controversial, and Rafsanjani's reaffirmation of support suggests a willingness to risk his political future on the likelihood of Montazeri's succession. In his 26 November press conference Rafsanjani noted that the two-thirds majority required of the Assembly had been only barely attained by 50 of the 74 experts favoring Montazeri. Iran's highest clerical leadership, the grand ayatollahs who outrank Montazeri in age and scholarly standing, has withheld public endorsement, and Montazeri has developed little popular following. An additional problem has been the continuing rejection by some influential

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