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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

File: Interim Restraint

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STOCKHOLM ALSO FOR CDE; GENEVA FOR USCD

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM, UR, US, SALT, START, INF, CTB
SUBJECT: ARMS CONTROL: PRESS CONFERENCE ON SALT II,
-- MAY 23

SUMMARY
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1. SOVIET OFFICIALS DEFENDED THE SALT II TREATY AS A BARRIER TO THE ARMS RACE AT A MAY 23 PRESS CONFERENCE. THEY ADVOCATED RECIPROCAL OBSERVANCE AND WARNED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD TAKE MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD ITS SECURITY IF THE UNITED STATES WRECKED THE TREATY. A LARGE CHART GAVE SOVIET STATISTICS ON DISMANTLING UNDERTAKEN TO STAY WITHIN SALT LIMITS. DURING THE QUESTION PERIOD, THE SPEAKERS:

--CHARGED THE U.S. WITH VIOLATING SALT II BY INF DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE AND CONCEALMENT ACTIVITIES AT WARREN AIR FORCE BASE;

--DEFENDED THE SOVIET COMPLIANCE RECORD WITH RESPECT TO TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION AND THE NEW TYPE RULE;

--TOUTED THE DRAFT INF AGREEMENT TABLED IN GENEVA ON MAY 15; AND

--ARGUED THAT POLITICAL ADVANTAGES JUSTIFIED EXTENSION OF THE SOVIET NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS MORATORIUM IN SPITE OF MILITARY DISADVANTAGES.

END SUMMARY

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2. CHIEF OF STAFF AKHROMEYEV, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH, AND MFA PRESS DEPARTMENT HEAD LOMEIKO HELD THE BRIEFING. COL.GEN. NIKOLAI CHERVOV, MAJ.GEN. YURIY LEBEDEV, AND THE CHIEF OF THE ARMS CONTROL SECTION OF THE MFA USA DEPARTMENT, YEVGENIY KOCHETKOV, SAT TOGETHER IN THE AUDIENCE BUT DID NOT SPEAK.

OPENING STATEMENT

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3. BESSMERTNYKH'S OPENING STATEMENT SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS CONSIDERING ITS FURTHER ATTITUDE TO THE SALT II TREATY, BUT THAT ALL THE OPTIONS IN ESSENCE INVOLVE "ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, TODAY OR TOMORROW, TO FLING THE GATE FULLY OPEN FOR A RACE IN THE MOST POWERFUL ARMS." BESSMERTNYKH SAID THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERED THE TREATY "A LIVING, EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT" IN SPITE OF ITS FORMAL EXPIRATION. "OF COURSE, SUCH A STATUS FOR THE TREATY CAN CONTINUE ONLY SO LONG AS THE U.S. SIDE ALSO REFRAINS FROM ACTIONS UNDERMINING THE BASIC PROVISIONS ...." BESSMERTNYKH CHARGED THAT THE U.S. WILL BE RESPONSIBLE IF THE TREATY IS WRECKED: "THE SOVIET UNION, IN THIS CONTEXT, WILL DRAW THE NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS AND TAKE STEPS EFFECTIVELY TO SAFEGUARD ITS SECURITY AND THE SECURITY OF ITS ALLIES."

4. A LARGE CHART OCCUPIED THE WALL BEHIND THE SPEAKERS. IT GAVE THESE TOTALS FOR STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS DISMANTLED TO STAY WITHIN THE SALT I AND SALT II AGREEMENTS:

--	SALT I		SALT II	
--	USSR	US	USSR	US
ICBM LAUNCHERS	192	24	72	Ø
SLBM LAUNCHERS	255	128	Ø	Ø
MIRV'D SLBM LAUNCHERS	Ø	Ø	Ø	16
HEAVY BOMBERS	Ø	Ø	21	Ø
TOTALS	447	152	93	16

A FOOTNOTE ASSERTED THAT AS OF MAY 23, 1986, THE SOVIET

UNION HAD 2504 STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES
AND THE UNITED STATES 2210.
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5. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE QUESTION PERIOD FOLLOW:

AMERICAN SALT II VIOLATIONS

6. WHEN ASKED ABOUT AMERICAN VIOLATIONS, AKHROMEYEV SAID THEY HAD BEEN OUTLINED IN A JANUARY 1984 AIDE MEMOIRE AND A JUNE 1985 TASS STATEMENT. AS EXAMPLES, HE CITED U.S. INF MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE AND CONCEALMENT ACTIVITIES AT WARREN AFB. HE SAID THE SOVIET COMPONENT IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (SCC) HAD INQUIRED ABOUT THE LATTER IN MARCH OF THIS YEAR BUT HAD RECEIVED NO REPLY.

SOVIET SALT II VIOLATIONS

7. JOURNALISTS ASKED ABOUT SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION AND NEW TYPE PROVISIONS OF SALT II. ON TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION, AKHROMEYEV SAID THE SOVIET UNION HAD PROPOSED TO SPECIFY THE TELEMETRY CHANNELS WHICH WERE NEEDED FOR VERIFICATION, BUT THE UNITED STATES REFUSED. CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIET UNION CONCLUDED THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT WANT TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE. SIMILARLY, HE SAID THE SOVIET SCC COMPONENT HAD FULLY EXPLAINED THAT THE "RS-12M" IS NOT A NEW TYPE BUT RATHER A PERMITTED MODERNIZATION OF THE "RS-12." HE ASSERTED THAT THE UNITED STATES IMPROPERLY CALCULATED THE THROWWEIGHT OF THE TWO MISSILES BECAUSE IT INCLUDED THE WEIGHT OF TEST INSTRUMENTS FOR THE RS-12M, BUT NOT FOR THE RS-12. HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION BELIEVED THAT THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN CREATED TO JUSTIFY U.S. DEPLOYMENT OF A SECOND NEW TYPE, THE MIDGETMAN.

CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBSERVE SALT II

8. WHEN ASKED FOR A MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. FAILURE TO OBSERVE SALT II, BESSMERTNYKH CITED A QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ARMS RACE, IMPEDED DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS. AND A DECLINE IN TRUST.

INF AGREEMENT

9. BESSMERTNYKH JUSTIFIED HIS WILLINGNESS TO ANSWER A QUESTION ABOUT THE NEW DRAFT INF AGREEMENT BY SAYING THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD MADE IT PUBLIC AND DISTORTED ITS MEANING. HE SUMMARIZED THE DRAFT BY SAYING,

--ITS CENTRAL PROVISION IS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE;

--IT ALSO INVOLVES MEASURES FOR NON-TRANSFER OF "MEDIUM-RANGE AND STRATEGIC SYSTEMS" TO OTHER COUNTRIES;

--IT INCLUDES A WIDE RANGE OF VERIFICATION MEASURES, INCLUDING ON SITE INSPECTION.

NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM

1Ø. AKHROMEYEV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT EXTENSION OF THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS MORATORIUM WHILE THE UNITED STATES CONTINUED TESTING GAVE THE UNITED STATES A MILITARY ADVANTAGE. HE ASSERTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE MORATORIUM GAVE THE SOVIET UNION A POLITICAL ADVANTAGE. HE EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR "THE PARTY AND GOVERMENT" IN THIS POLICY.
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Keep on file & —

do a set of the unclassified ones for me to take to Seattle —

Jack

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release May 27, 1986

SUMMARY OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY

The President has decided to retire two older POSEIDON submarines as the eighth TRIDENT submarine begins sea trials tomorrow. This means the U.S. will stay in technical observance of SALT for some months. This gives the Soviet Union still more time to correct their erosion of SALT. If they do, the President will take this into account.

Our attempt to use the structure of SALT as the basis for interim restraint until a START agreement can be achieved has always been based on the assumption of Soviet reciprocity. It makes no sense for the U.S. to continue to hold up the SALT structure while the Soviet Union undermines the foundation of SALT by its continued, uncorrected noncompliance. Therefore, the President believes we must now look to the the future, not to the past. The primary task we now face is to build a new structure, one based on significant, equitable and verifiable reductions in the size of existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. This is what we are proposing in the ongoing Geneva negotiations.

Until this is achieved, the United States will continue to exercise the utmost restraint. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the strategic modernization program, the U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviet Union.

Therefore, in the future, the United States will base decisions regarding its strategic forces on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, rather than on standards contained in expired SALT agreements unilaterally observed by the United States.

It is high time that the Soviets honor their obligations, match U.S. restraint, and get down to negotiating seriously in Geneva. If they do, we can move together now to build a safer and more secure world.

PRESS GUIDANCE May 27, 1986

U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY: RESPONDING TO SOVIET ARMS CONTROL VIOLATIONS

THE DECISION

Q1. What is new about this decision?

A1. The decision involves several major elements:

-- While the U.S. has gone the extra mile in trying to use the SALT structure as a basis for interim restraint until we can replace it with a START agreement, Soviet noncompliance has steadily undermined that structure.

-- There is an increasing national security risk caused by continued Soviet failure to meet the fundamental criteria of U.S. interim restraint policy established by the President on June 10, 1985, when he decided to go the extra mile to give the Soviets further opportunity and adequate time to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

-- In the face of continued Soviet noncompliance, the U.S. will make future decisions about its strategic programs not on the basis of the expired SALT I or SALT II agreements on strategic offensive weapons, but in terms of U.S. and Allied security requirements, which in turn will be largely dependent upon what the Soviet Union does.

-- The U.S. will dismantle, rather than refurbish, two older U.S. POSEIDON submarines now, due to current economic and military considerations of cost effectiveness.

-- However, later this year the U.S. will deploy U.S. B-52 bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft, without compensatory dismantlements under SALT II. The U.S. will remain in technical observance of SALT II for some months, until that time. If the Soviets use this time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation, we will certainly take this into account. (Concerning SALT I, even if the U.S. were not to retire older systems, the U.S. could remain in technical observance with its terms for several years until the 10th TRIDENT SSBN begins sea trials in mid-1989.)

-- The U.S. will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, and will seek to meet our strategic needs by means that minimize incentives for a continuing Soviet buildup. We will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit and we do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic forces. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement our needed strategic modernization program, the U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery

vehicles, or more strategic ballistic missile warheads, than does the Soviet Union.

-- The President also stressed the importance of the Administration's Strategic Modernization Program, including all 100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs, as well as full funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). These vital programs will be buttressed by a study assessing options for the US ICBM programs (including the Small ICBM program and basing of the PEACEKEEPER), as well as by acceleration of the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) Program.

Q2. What were the criteria for gauging future Soviet performance that the President established in going the extra mile in June 1985?

A2. The President indicated in his decision last June that as future U.S. strategic deployment milestones were reached, he would assess the overall situation and determine future U.S. actions on a case-by-case basis in light of U.S. programmatic options and of Soviet actions in: (1) correcting Soviet noncompliance, (2) reversing the unparalleled and unwarranted Soviet military buildup, and (3) seriously pursuing arms reductions agreements at the negotiations in Geneva.

Q3. Have we really given the Soviets adequate time, and is the President's decision consistent with the Administration's policy announced last June?

A3. As first announced by the President in 1982, U.S. interim restraint policy has always been conditioned on Soviet reciprocity, i.e. we would not undercut the strategic arms agreements so long as, or to the extent that, the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. The U.S. has for several years remained in a state of scrupulous compliance with its obligations, while the Soviet Union has not. During the past two and a half years the President has sent three comprehensive Administration reports to the Congress (the most recent one last December) making clear the serious U.S. concerns about Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, including those involving strategic arms.

Last June, the President once again laid out our legitimate concerns about the continued pattern of Soviet noncompliance. He stated that he was directing the dismantlement of a U.S. POSEIDON submarine later that year in order to give the Soviet Union adequate time to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. He explicitly rejected a double standard of unilateral treaty compliance for the United States, and he made clear that at the next U.S. strategic deployment milestone, which we have now reached, he would evaluate the situation in terms of Soviet behavior in meeting the specific criteria of correcting their noncompliance, reversing their arms build up and promoting

progress in Geneva. He reaffirmed this message in his December 1985 report to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance and also raised these concerns with General Secretary Gorbachev at last November's summit meeting in Geneva. During the same period, our concerns have also been raised repeatedly, and in great detail, at the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission.

The President believes that these clear Administration statements and efforts seeking to resolve our compliance concerns, and the period of nearly one year which has passed since he announced the step of going the extra mile last June, have in fact provided more than adequate time and opportunity for the Soviet Union to have demonstrated by concrete steps its readiness to exercise truly mutual restraint. Regrettably, the Soviets clearly did not use this time for that purpose. Instead, they have failed to correct their noncompliance, to respond constructively to our diplomatic approaches and to our continued unilateral self-restraint, or to negotiate seriously in the ongoing Geneva negotiations.

The United States simply cannot continue unilaterally observing the SALT structure as the basis of interim restraint if the Soviets continue to undermine the foundation of that structure by their noncompliance.

Q4. Does this mean that we are at the end of the "extra mile" the President announced last year?

A4. The President's Statement indicates that in the face of continued Soviet disregard of their obligations, U.S. security requires that in the future we must base decisions regarding our strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic programs, not on standards contained in a flawed agreement which was never ratified, and which is continuing to be violated by the Soviet Union.

The United States simply cannot continue unilaterally observing the SALT structure as the basis of interim restraint if the Soviets continue to undermine the foundation of that structure by their noncompliance.

Q5. But what about the next few months, before the 131st ALCM-carrying B-52 bomber is deployed by the U.S. near the end of this year?

A5. The President's Statement notes that the United States will remain in technical observance with the terms of SALT II for some months. He continues to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. The President's Statement indicates that should the Soviets do so, we will certainly take this into account.

Q6. Why did the President decide to dismantle two more U.S. POSEIDON submarines now? Why not refurbish these boats?

A6. The President's Statement indicates that had he been persuaded that refueling and retaining these two older POSEIDON submarines would have contributed significantly and cost-effectively to the national security, he would have directed that they be overhauled and retained. However, in view of present circumstances, including current military and economic realities and considerations of cost effectiveness, he directed their retirement and dismantlement.

Q7. Doesn't this decision contradict the Administration's goal of seeking an interim framework of mutual restraint? Won't this just accelerate an arms race?

A7. No, restraint cannot be one-sided; it requires Soviet reciprocity. The United States simply cannot continue unilaterally observing the SALT structure as the basis of interim restraint if the Soviets continue to undermine the foundation of that structure by their noncompliance.

Nor should this decision accelerate an arms race. For the future, the President's Statement makes clear that the United States will make future decisions about its strategic programs on the basis of its security requirements in the face of existing threats, which will in turn be largely dependent upon the Soviet Union.

The President's Statement makes clear that the U.S. will continue to exercise utmost restraint, seeking to meet our strategic needs by means that minimize incentives for a continuing Soviet buildup. For example: the U.S. will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit; we do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic forces; and, assuming no significant change in the threat we face, the U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, or more strategic ballistic missile warheads, than does the Soviet Union.

Q8. Does the President's statement represent a commitment that the U.S., under all conditions, will not exceed the SNDV and ballistic missile warhead levels of the Soviet Union? Doesn't that allow the Soviet Union to determine U.S. force size?

A8. As the President stated, given the lack of Soviet response to our call to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the United States in the future must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by the Soviet Union to the U.S. and our Allies. To that extent, Soviet actions do determine U.S. strategic force size.

At the same time, the President has indicated that we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit -- I repeat, as our national security requirements permit.

And, as the President stated, assuming no significant change in the nature of the threat that we face, as we implement the needed strategic modernization program, the U.S. will not deploy more SNDVs or strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

Q9. What about the nuclear arms reductions negotiations in Geneva?

A9. The President's Statement makes clear that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms, providing we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions continues to be the President's highest priority. It is his hope that the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement he reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to achieve early progress in the negotiations, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an interim agreement on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces.

We are disappointed that in the most recent round in Geneva, the Soviets did not act to carry out this mutual commitment. If the Soviet Union applies itself seriously in the current negotiating round, we can together move promptly toward agreement on real reductions in nuclear arms, as well as toward achieving greater strategic stability and a safer world.

SALT I and SALT II

Q10. What have been the U.S. legal obligations under the unratified SALT II Agreement? What about our political obligations?

A10. SALT II was signed in June 1979, but was never ratified by the U.S. Senate and, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, President Carter asked the Senate not to act on it. In 1981, after the U.S. made clear to the Soviet Union that the U.S. had no intention of ratifying the SALT II Agreement, legal obligations not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty pending ratification no longer applied. Subsequently, in 1982, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. undertook a political obligation not to undercut the provisions of SALT II. This U.S. commitment of interim restraint has always been conditioned on Soviet reciprocity. However, the U.S. has scrupulously adhered to its obligations, while the Soviet Union has not, and the

Soviets have failed to resolve our serious concerns about their noncompliance.

Q11. What was so bad about SALT II? Hasn't it significantly restrained the Soviet strategic buildup?

A11. The President's Statement points out that the unratified SALT II Agreement (which was clearly headed for defeat in the Senate and which the President's predecessor asked the Senate not to act on) was considered by a broad range of critics, including the Senate Armed Services Committee, to be unequal and unverifiable in important provisions, and that its most basic problem was that it codified major arms buildups rather than reductions.

As spelled out in the Statement, SALT II, for example, permitted each side substantially to increase MIRVed ICBM launchers to 820 at a time when the U.S. had, and only planned for, 550 and when the Soviet Union possessed only about 600. It permitted a buildup to 1,200 MIRVed strategic ballistic missile launchers (ICBMs and SLBMs) when the U.S. had only about 1,050 and the Soviets had only about 750. Since the signing of SALT II, Soviet strategic ballistic missile forces have grown to within a few launchers of the 820 and 1,200 MIRVed limits, and from about 7,000 to over 9,000 warheads today. It permitted the Soviets to retain all 308 of their heavy missiles. (The U.S. at that time had none, and still has none.) Its high limits applied to launchers rather than to missiles or to warheads, whose numbers will continue to grow very significantly even under the agreement's limits, in the continued absence of Soviet restraint.

Q12. Is it not true that the Soviets are in a better position to increase their nuclear forces in the absence of SALT restraints? The Soviets have said that they would "take measures effectively to ensure their own security". Could this set off an arms race?

A12. The Soviet Union has undertaken a massive build-up in their offensive nuclear forces over the past twenty years. As a result, they today already have numbers of nuclear weapons far in excess of any legitimate defensive need. While the Soviets could add still more weapons, it is difficult to understand what practical purpose such further expansion could serve.

What is more, the Soviets would be able to undertake substantial growth in their offensive forces even under SALT II. In the absence of SALT II, this would not necessarily be appreciably different from that which would occur if they were in compliance with the Agreement.

We are now negotiating with the Soviets in Geneva for deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in strategic and intermediate-range offensive nuclear forces. We hope that the

Soviets will work, in practice, toward the mutual goals for these negotiations that were expressed at the summit in Geneva in November, with the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We believe that they will find it in their interest, politically and militarily, to work with us toward significant reductions at the confidential negotiating table in Geneva, rather than to continue their unwarranted buildup.

Q13. Will we be the first to break a numerical limit associated with SALT II when we deploy the 131st ALCM-carrying B-52 bomber this fall?

A13. No. The Soviets have already broken a numerical limit associated with SALT II. As pointed out in the President's December 1985 report to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance, the Soviets are in violation of their SALT II commitment to abide by a cap on Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) at the level of 2,504 existing at the time SALT II was signed. The Soviet Union has deployed SNDVs above this 2,504 cap, an activity inconsistent with their political commitment under SALT II.

Q14. What about the SALT I Interim Agreement on offensive arms? Will the U.S. continue to comply with it?

A14. U.S. interim restraint policy has always involved both the SALT I Interim Agreement on offensive arms and SALT II. Both agreements have expired and are being violated by the Soviet Union. While we will no longer unilaterally observe these two agreements, the President has emphasized that the U.S. will continue to exercise the utmost restraint in determining our strategic programs. (Concerning SALT I, even if the U.S. did not retire older systems, the U.S. could remain in technical observance of its terms for several years until the 10th TRIDENT SSBN begins sea trials in mid-1989.)

Q15. What is the legal status of the SALT I Interim Agreement?

A15. The SALT I Interim Agreement on the Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms entered into force between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in 1972. Dismantling procedures implementing the Agreement were concluded in 1974. It was, by its own terms, of limited duration and it expired as a legally binding document in 1977.

The applicability of the Agreement to the actions of both Parties, however, was extended through a series of mutual political commitments, including the President's May 31, 1982 statement, that the U.S. would refrain from actions which would undercut existing strategic arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union showed equal restraint. The Soviets have told us that they would abide by the SALT I Interim Agreement and any actions

inconsistent with this commitment are violations of its political commitment with respect to the Agreement and its implementing procedures.

Q16. How have the Soviets violated SALT I?

A16. As indicated in the President's December 1985 report to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance, the Soviets' use of former SS-7 ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation of the SS-25 mobile ICBMs, is in violation of the SALT I provision which prohibits the use of facilities remaining at dismantled or destroyed ICBM sites for storage, support, or launch of ICBMS.

Q17. What was wrong with the SALT I Interim Agreement? The President's statement says it was unequal. How was it?

A17. Basic flaws in the agreement were that it froze rather than reduced arsenals and for its intended 5 year duration it froze numbers of U.S and Soviet ICBM and SLBM launcher at asymmetrical levels to the advantage of the Soviet Union.

Under the Agreement the U.S. was limited to only 1,054 ICBM launchers and 656 SLBM launchers. The Soviets, however, were permitted to have 1,607 ICBM launchers and 740 SLBM launchers. In addition, both sides were permitted to to expand their SLBM launcher numbers up to 710 and 950 respectively, by dismantling an equal number of older ICBM launchers or launchers of SLBMs on older submarines.

Because of concern about these inequities, the Congress passed a resolution at the time of SALT I in 1972 urging the President to assure that any future SALT agreements provide for U.S. levels (understood in terms of numbers and capabilities) not inferior to those permitted to the Soviet Union.

Q18. What about the ABM Treaty? Will we continue to observe this treaty even though the Soviets are violating it?

A18. Our obligations under the ABM Treaty of 1972 remain unchanged. The President has made clear that U.S. programs are, and will continue to be, in compliance with these obligations.

The President's statement today makes clear that we remain deeply concerned over Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. In contrast with SALT I and II, however, the ABM Treaty is not an expired or unratified agreement. One of our priority objectives in the Geneva negotiations, therefore, is to reverse Soviet erosion of this Treaty.

Q19. Even though the U.S. will no longer consider itself bound by the SALT II and SALT I agreements, will you still be trying to get the Soviet Union to correct its noncompliance with those agreements?

A19. We have indicated that if the Soviet Union alters its behavior we will take this into account, especially during the period of several months that we will remain in technical observance of the SALT II Treaty. Following the decision to dismantle two POSEIDON submarines at this point, we will be in technical observance of SALT I for several years.

Even as we exercise utmost restraint on our own part we will certainly continue to look for concrete steps by the Soviet Union in terms of our earlier interim restraint criteria: 1) correction of Soviet noncompliance, 2) reversal of the Soviet military build up and 3) serious pursuit of arms reductions agreements at the Geneva negotiations.

CONGRESS

Q20. Did you consult with the Congress? What do you think their reaction will be?

A20. We have consulted with numerous members of Congress and would note that there are different views among the members on various aspects of this complex issue. However, we are certain that the Congress shares the President's serious concern about the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance and about the requirement to assure U.S. and Allied security needs, as well as the President's hope that the Soviet Union will take concrete steps to correct its noncompliance, reverse its military build up and pursue serious progress at the negotiating table in Geneva.

We would also note that the Congress has specifically expressed its sense (in the FY 1986 DoD Authorization Act) that the U.S. "should vigorously pursue with the Soviet Union its resolution of concerns of the U.S. over Soviet compliance with existing strategic arms control agreements" and that the Congress would not endorse "unilateral United States compliance with existing strategic arms agreements" or actions "prohibiting the United States from carrying out proportionate responses to Soviet undercutting of strategic arms agreements".

ALLIES

Q21. What about the Administration's consultations with our Allies? What do you think their reaction will be?

A21. We have consulted very closely with our Allies and friends in Europe and Asia and have taken their views into account. While we cannot purport to speak for them, we believe they share

our concern about Soviet violations of existing agreements, and they understand the rationale for the decision. They continue to strongly support our efforts to achieve deep, equitable and verifiable arms reductions in Geneva. This will remain our highest priority objective.

Q22. How has Soviet noncompliance affected U.S. Allies? Can you give any examples?

A22. Like previous administrations, we believe U.S. and Allied security to be indivisible. Since U.S. strategic forces are an essential part of Western deterrent capability, Soviet noncompliance affects the security of our alliance as a whole. The specific areas of Soviet noncompliance that we have reported to the Congress and discussed with our Allies, clearly have the potential, if left uncorrected and without a response, of undermining the essential strategic balance and the credibility and viability of our deterrent.

To give an example, Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty with the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, along with other Soviet ABM activities that call into question Soviet commitment to that treaty and suggest the possibility of a future Soviet establishment of a nationwide ABM system, also have potentially threatening implications for the strategic balance and therefore for alliance security as a whole.

On the broad political level, the continued pattern of Soviet noncompliance with existing arms control agreements (including chemical weapons conventions, the Helsinki Act, and nuclear testing agreements) seriously undermines the integrity of the entire arms control process and thereby undermines as well the prospects for developing greater mutual confidence in East-West relations.

THE SOVIETS

Q23. Did you consult with the Soviets before the decision was made?

A23. We have been in touch with the Soviets through diplomatic channels, but I am not going to comment on the substance of our diplomatic contacts.

Q24. Did you inform the Soviets of the decision before it was made public? What was their reaction?

A24. Yes, we have informed them of the decision, but I am not going to comment on our diplomatic exchanges.

Q25. Did you anticipate how the Soviets would react?

A25. A wide range of possible Soviet reactions was taken into consideration in making the decision.

Q26. Do you think the Soviets might walk out of the Geneva negotiations because of the U.S. decision?

A26. Such a move would be unjustified and in no one's interest. The Soviet Union walked out of the arms control negotiations in 1983, and a year and a half of valuable negotiating time was lost. We hope the Soviet Union will not make the same mistake again, and that they will instead start to apply themselves seriously at the negotiating table.

Our objectives at the Geneva negotiations remain the same as stated at the U.S./Soviet summit last November: to seek common ground in negotiating deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in strategic and intermediate-range offensive nuclear arsenals and to discuss with the Soviet Union how we could enhance deterrence and stability by moving toward a world in which we would no longer rely exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation to preserve the peace. We hope the Soviets will negotiate seriously with us toward these important goals.

Q27. What about the impact of the decision on a summit this year?

A27. At last November's summit meeting, General Secretary Gorbachev and the President agreed that the Soviet leader would meet with President Reagan in the United States this year. We believe that such a meeting should take place. It would give the two leaders an opportunity to discuss the broad US/Soviet agenda - including arms control issues, regional problems, bilateral matters, and human rights.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release May 27, 1986

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRAINT

On the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in 1982, I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. I took this action, despite my concerns about the flaws inherent in those agreements, to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiations on arms reductions. I made clear that our policy required reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup.

Last June, I reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy. I found that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain. As I have documented in three detailed reports to the Congress, most recently in December 1985, the Soviet Union, regrettably, has not. I noted last June that the pattern of Soviet non-compliance with their existing arms control commitments increasingly affected our national security. This pattern also raised fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process itself. A country simply cannot be serious about effective arms control unless it is equally serious about compliance.

In spite of the regrettable Soviet record, I concluded last June that it remained in the interest of the United States and its allies to try, once more, to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursued, with renewed vigor, our objective of deep reductions in existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals through the Geneva negotiations. Therefore, I undertook to go the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, USS SAM RAYBURN, to give the Soviet Union adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. However, I made it clear that, as subsequent U.S. deployment milestones were reached, I would assess the overall situation and determine future U.S. actions on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet behavior in exercising restraint comparable to our own, correcting their non-compliance, reversing their unwarranted military build-up, and seriously pursuing equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements.

Later this month, the 8th TRIDENT submarine, USS NEVADA, begins sea trials. In accordance with our announced policy, I have assessed our options with respect to that milestone. I have considered Soviet actions since my June 1985 decision, and U.S. and Allied security interests in light of both those actions and our programmatic options. The situation is not encouraging.

While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in one or two areas, there has been no real progress toward meeting U.S. concerns with respect to the general pattern of Soviet non-compliance with major arms control commitments, particularly in those areas of most obvious and direct Soviet non-compliance with the SALT and ABM agreements. The deployment of the SS-25, a forbidden second new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) type, continues apace. The Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile testing in a manner which impedes verification. The Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic force build-up. Finally, since the November summit, we have yet to see the Soviets follow up constructively on the commitment made by General Secretary Gorbachev and myself to achieve early progress in the Geneva

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negotiations, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an interim agreement on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF).

Based on Soviet conduct since my June 1985 decision, I can only conclude that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate its readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. At the same time, I have also considered the programmatic options available to the U.S. in terms of their overall net impact on U.S. and Allied security.

When I issued guidance on U.S. policy on June 10, 1985, the military plans and programs for fiscal year 1986 were about to be implemented. The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near term for altering its planning is modest at best. Our military planning will take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous assumptions, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face. These budgetary conditions make it essential that we make the very best possible use of our resources.

The United States had long planned to retire and dismantle two of the oldest POSEIDON submarines when their reactor cores were exhausted. Had I been persuaded that refueling and retaining these two POSEIDON submarines would have contributed significantly and cost-effectively to the national security, I would have directed that these two POSEIDON submarines not be dismantled, but be overhauled and retained. However, in view of present circumstances, including current military and economic realities, I have directed their retirement and dismantlement as planned.

As part of the same decision last June, I also announced that we would take appropriate and proportionate responses when needed to protect our own security in the face of continuing Soviet non-compliance. It is my view that certain steps are now required by continued Soviet disregard of their obligations.

Needless to say, the most essential near-term response to Soviet noncompliance remains the implementation of our full strategic modernization program, to underwrite deterrence today, and the continued pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program, to see if it is possible to provide a safer and more stable basis for our future security and that of our Allies. The strategic modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles, is the foundation for all future U.S. offensive force options. It provides a solid basis which can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. The SDI program represents our best hope for a future in which our security can rest on the increasing contribution of defensive systems that threaten no one.

It is absolutely essential that we maintain full support for these programs. To fail to do so would be the worst response to Soviet noncompliance. It would immediately and seriously undercut our negotiators in Geneva by removing the leverage that they must have to negotiate equitable reductions in both U.S. and Soviet forces. It would send precisely the wrong signal to the leadership of the Soviet Union about the seriousness of our resolve concerning their noncompliance. And, it would significantly increase the risk to our security for years to come. Therefore, our highest priority must remain the full implementation of these programs.

Secondly, the development by the Soviet Union of its massive ICBM forces continues to challenge seriously the essential balance which has deterred both conflict and coercion. Last June, I cited the Soviet Union's SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under

SALT II, as a clear and irreversible violation. With the number of deployed SS-25 mobile ICBMs growing, I now call upon the Congress to restore bi-partisan support for a balanced, cost effective, long-term program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of the U.S. ICBM program. This program should include the full deployment of the 100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs. But it must also look beyond the PEACEKEEPER and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in the future, including the Small ICBM to complement PEACEKEEPER. Therefore, I have directed the Department of Defense to provide to me by November, 1986, an assessment of the best options for carrying out such a comprehensive ICBM program. This assessment will address the basing of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles and specific alternative configurations for the Small ICBM in terms of size, number of warheads, and production rates.

Finally, I have also directed that the Advanced Cruise Missile program be accelerated. This would not direct any increase in the total program procurement at this time, but rather would establish a more efficient program that both saves money and accelerates the availability of additional options for the future.

This brings us to the question of the SALT agreements. SALT II was a fundamentally flawed and unratified treaty. Even if ratified, it would have expired on December 31, 1985. When presented to the U.S. Senate in 1979, it was considered by a broad range of critics, including the Senate Armed Services Committee, to be unequal and unverifiable in important provisions. It was, therefore, judged by many to be inimical to genuine arms control, to the security interests of the United States and its allies, and to global stability. The proposed treaty was clearly headed for defeat before my predecessor asked the Senate not to act on it.

The most basic problem with SALT II was that it codified major arms buildups rather than reductions. For example, even though at the time the Treaty was signed in 1979, the U.S. had, and only planned for, 550 MIRVed ICBM launchers, and the Soviet Union possessed only about 600, SALT II permitted each side to increase the number of such launchers to 820. It also permitted a build-up to 1,200 MIRVed ballistic launchers (both ICBMs and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, SLBMs) even though the U.S. had only about 1,050 and the Soviet Union had only about 750 when the treaty was signed. It permitted the Soviet Union to retain all of its heavy ballistic missiles. Finally, it limited ballistic missile launchers, not the missiles or the warheads carried by the ballistic missiles. Since the signing of SALT II, Soviet ballistic missile forces have grown to within a few launchers of each of the 820 and 1,200 MIRVed limits, and from about 7,000 to over 9,000 warheads today. What is worse, given the failure of SALT II to constrain ballistic missile warheads, the number of warheads on Soviet ballistic missiles will continue to grow very significantly, even under the Treaty's limits, in the continued absence of Soviet restraint.

In 1982, on the eve of the START negotiations, I undertook not to undercut existing arms control agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union demonstrated comparable restraint. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union did not exercise comparable restraint, and uncorrected Soviet violations have seriously undermined the SALT structure. Last June, I once again laid out our legitimate concerns but decided to go the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, not to comply with or abide by a flawed and unratified treaty, but rather to give the Soviet Union one more chance and adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint The Soviet Union has not used the past year for this purpose.

Given this situation, I have determined that, in the future, the Unite States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has been undermined by Soviet non-compliance, and especially in a flawed

SALT II treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.

Since the United States will retire and dismantle two POSEIDON submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty until the U.S. equips its 131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. However, given the decision that I have been forced to make, I intend at that time to continue deployment of U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an appropriate response without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Treaty. Of course, since we will remain in technical compliance with the terms of the expired SALT II Treaty for some months, I continue to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, we will certainly take this into account.

The United States seeks to meet its strategic needs, given the Soviet build-up, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major motives in our pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. I do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the strategic modernization program the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United States will not deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

In sum, we will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, while protecting strategic deterrence, in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere for significant reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides. This is the urgent task which faces us. I call on the Soviet Union to seize the opportunity to join us now in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

Finally, I want to emphasize that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions has received, and continues to receive, my highest priority. I hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement I reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to achieve early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an interim INF agreement. If the Soviet Union carries out this agreement, we can move now to achieve greater stability and a safer world.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release May 27, 1986

FACT SHEET

U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY: RESPONDING TO SOVIET ARMS CONTROL VIOLATIONS

SUMMARY

The U.S. has completed a comprehensive review of its interim restraint policy and of the required response to the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. Based on this review, and following consultations with the Congress and key allies, we have been forced to the conclusion that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate a readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

Given the lack of Soviet reciprocity, the President has decided that in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT II Agreement of 1979 or the SALT Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972. SALT II was a flawed agreement which was never ratified, which would have expired if it had been ratified, and which continues to be seriously violated by the Soviet Union. The SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972 was unequal, has expired, and is also being violated by the Soviet Union.

After reviewing the programmatic options available to the U.S., the President has decided to retire and dismantle two older POSEIDON submarines this summer. The U.S. thus will thus remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Agreement until we equip our 131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. The President has determined that given the decision that he has been forced to make by lack of Soviet reciprocity, the U.S. will later this year continue deployment of B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft, without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Agreement.

The President has also called for: renewed bipartisan support for the Administration's full strategic modernization program including all 100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs; full funding of our research under the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI); an assessment of options on future ICBM programs, including PEACEKEEPER basing and the Small ICBM; and acceleration of the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) program.

The President has determined that in carrying out this policy, the United States will continue to exercise utmost restraint. We will seek to meet our strategic needs by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. We do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in the number of U.S. strategic offensive forces. Furthermore, the President has emphasized that, assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the needed strategic modernization program, the U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

The President indicated that since the U.S. will remain in technical observance with the terms of the expired SALT II Agreement for some months, the Soviet Union will have even more time to change the conditions that now exist. The President hopes that the Soviet Union

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will use this time constructively; if they do, the United States will certainly take this into account. (Concerning the SALT I Agreement, even without any U.S. retirement of older systems, the U.S. could remain in technical observance of its terms for several years until the 10th TRIDENT submarine begins sea trials in mid-1989.)

Finally, the President has reiterated that his highest priority in the nuclear arms control area is to obtain Soviet agreement to a new and more durable arms control framework -- one built upon deep, equitable and verifiable reductions in the offensive nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. He therefore calls upon the Soviet Union to carry out in the ongoing Geneva negotiations the agreement which he and General Secretary Gorbachev reached at the November summit, calling for 50 percent reductions, appropriately applied, in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, and an interim agreement on intermediate nuclear forces. If Moscow instructs its negotiators to apply themselves seriously and flexibly toward these goals, as the U.S. negotiators are prepared to do, we can move together now to build a safer and more stable world.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past two and a half years, the President has sent three reports to the Congress detailing the serious realities of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, including major agreements on strategic arms. The United States has unsuccessfully pressed the Soviet Union in the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and through other diplomatic channels to resolve our concerns.

In spite of this pattern of Soviet noncompliance, the President decided last June to go the extra mile in dismantling a U.S. POSEIDON submarine, USS SAM RAYBURN, to give the Soviet Union adequate time to take the opportunity to join the United States in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms. He stated that such a framework required that the Soviets correct their noncompliance, reverse their unwarranted military buildup, and make progress at the Geneva negotiations. In addition, he indicated that the United States, which has scrupulously complied with its arms control obligations and commitments, would be required to develop appropriate and proportionate responses to assure U.S. and Allied security in the face of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance. He directed that all programmatic responses be kept open, and he requested specific programmatic recommendations of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In recent months, the President has reviewed these issues in great detail with his senior advisers and has consulted extensively with Members of Congress and Allied leaders. He announced his decision in the Statement issued today. This Fact Sheet reports on the President's decision.

BACKGROUND

o 1982 Decision. In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), the President decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I Agreement or the unratified SALT II Agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. Despite his serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I Agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II Agreement, he took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint on force deployments conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START. He made clear that our policy required reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup. The Soviet Union also made a policy commitment not to undercut these agreements.

o 1985 Decision. In a decision reported to the Congress on June 10, 1985, the President reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy concerning strategic agreements in light of the continuing pattern of the Soviet Union's noncompliance with its arms control obligations and commitments. He found that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain and had scrupulously complied with the terms of its obligations and commitments.

By contrast, he noted with regret that the Soviet Union had repeatedly violated several of its major arms control obligations and commitments. His three reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance in January 1984, February 1985, and December 1985 enumerate and document in detail the serious facts and U.S. concerns about Soviet violations. The overall judgment reached by the President in his June 1985 decision was that while the Soviets had observed some provisions of existing arms control agreements, they had violated important elements of those agreements and associated legal obligations and political commitments.

The President noted that these are very crucial issues, for to be serious about effective arms control is to be serious about compliance. The pattern of Soviet violations increasingly affects our national security. But, perhaps even more significant than the near-term military consequences of the violations themselves, they raise fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process, concerns that, if uncorrected, undercut the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world.

The President also noted that the United States had repeatedly raised our serious concerns with the Soviet Union in diplomatic channels, including the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission. His assessment was that, despite long and repeated U.S. efforts to resolve these issues, the Soviet Union had neither provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective action. Instead, Soviet violations had expanded as the Soviets continued to modernize their strategic forces. U.S. interim restraint policy has always been conditioned on Soviet reciprocity. In his June assessment, the President was consequently forced to conclude that the Soviet Union was not exercising the equal restraint upon which U.S. interim restraint policy had been conditioned, that we could not accept a double standard of unilateral U.S. compliance coupled with Soviet noncompliance, and that such Soviet behavior was fundamentally inimical to the future of arms control and to the security of our country and that of our Allies.

At the same time, given the goal of reducing the size of Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals, the President made the judgment that it remained in the interest of the United States to go the extra mile in seeking to persuade the Soviet Union to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms, as we pursued with renewed vigor, through the negotiations in Geneva, our goal of deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

The President made clear, however, that the U.S. could not establish such a framework alone. Movement toward an acceptable framework required the Soviet Union to take the positive, concrete steps to correct its noncompliance, resolve our other compliance concerns, and reverse or substantially reduce its unparalleled and unwarranted military buildup. Although the Soviet Union had not demonstrated a willingness to move in this direction, the President announced that in the interest of ensuring that every opportunity to establish the secure, stable future we seek is fully explored, he was prepared to go the extra mile.

The President thus decided last June that to provide the Soviets a further opportunity to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint which could support ongoing negotiations, the

United States would continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union exercised comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursued arms reductions agreements in the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva. Further, he stated that the United States would constantly review the implications of this interim policy on the long term security interests of the United States and its Allies. He indicated that in doing so, the U.S. would consider Soviet actions to resolve our concerns with the pattern of Soviet noncompliance, continued growth in the strategic force structure of the Soviet Union and Soviet seriousness in the ongoing negotiations.

As an integral part of the implementation of this policy, the President announced that the U.S. would take those steps made necessary by Soviet noncompliance to assure U.S. national security and that of our Allies. He noted that appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are called for to make it perfectly clear to Moscow that violations of arms control arrangements entail real costs. He stated clearly that the United States would therefore develop appropriate and proportionate responses and would take those actions necessary in response to, and as a hedge against, the military consequences of uncorrected Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements.

The President decided last June that to provide still more time for the Soviet Union to demonstrate by its action a commitment to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the U.S. would deactivate and dismantle, according to agreed procedures, an existing older POSEIDON submarine as the seventh U.S. Ohio-class TRIDENT submarine put to sea in August 1985. However, the President also directed that the U.S. keep open all future programmatic options for handling such strategic deployment milestones as they occurred in the future. He made it clear that, as these later milestones were reached, he would assess the overall situation and make a final determination of the U.S. course of action on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet actions in meeting the criteria which he cited.

U.S. COMPLIANCE

In accordance with U.S. interim restraint policy and our efforts to build an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the United States has not taken any actions which would undercut existing agreements. We have continued scrupulously to live within all arms control agreements, including the SALT I and II agreements. For example, we have fully dismantled one POSEIDON and eight POLARIS missile-carrying submarines, and 27 TITAN II ICBM launchers, as new TRIDENT missile-carrying submarines have been deployed. Unfortunately, while the U.S. has been attempting to hold to the structure of SALT through our policy of interim restraint, the Soviet Union, through its continued noncompliance, has undermined the very foundation of that structure.

SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE

In the most recent of his three reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, issued on December 23, 1985, the President confirmed that the Administration's continuing studies supported the conclusion that the pattern of Soviet noncompliance continues, largely uncorrected. As documented in the President's reports, particularly the detailed classified versions, the Soviet Union has violated its legal obligations under, or political commitments to the SALT II Agreement of 1979, the SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons of 1925, and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. In addition, the U.S.S.R. has likely violated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974.

In his December 1985 report to the Congress, the President noted that through its noncompliance with arms control agreements, the Soviet Union has made military gains in the areas of strategic offensive arm as well as chemical, biological and toxin weapons. The President added that in the area of strategic defense, the possible extent of the Soviet Union's military gains by virtue of its noncompliance with the ABM Treaty is also of increasing importance and serious concern t the United States.

The President noted in his December report that in a fundamental sens all deliberate Soviet violations are equally important. He made clea that as violations of legal obligations or political commitments, the cause grave concern regarding Soviet commitment to arms control and darken the atmosphere in which current negotiations are being conducted in Geneva and elsewhere.

In another sense, the President noted, Soviet violations are not of equal importance. Some Soviet violations are of significant military importance -- like the illegal second type of new ICBM, telemetry encryption, and the Krasnoyarsk radar. While other violations are of little apparent military significance in their own right, such violations can acquire importance if, left unaddressed, they are permitted to become precedents for future, more threatening violations. Moreover, some Soviet actions that individually have little military significance could conceivably become significant when taken in their aggregate. Finally, even if a specific violation does not contain an inherent military threat, it still undermines the viability and integrity of the arms control process.

SPECIFIC SOVIET VIOLATIONS

Concerning SALT II, the President's December report, in addition to citing the Soviets' SS-25 ICBM development and extensive encryption of telemetry on ICBM missile flight tests as violations, also enumerated additional clear Soviet violations of SALT II, including exceeding the numerical limit of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) and concealment of the association between the SS-25 missile and its launcher. In addition, the President's report cited three areas of ambiguous Soviet behavior as involving possible violations or inconsistencies with regard to SALT II -- SS-16 ICBM activity, the BACKFIRE bomber's intercontinental operating capability and the BACKFIRE bomber's production rate.

Concerning the SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972, the President's December 1985 report cited a violation in Soviet use of former SS-7 ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation of the SS-25 mobile ICBMs.

Concerning the ABM Treaty of 1972, the President's December 1985 report indicated that in addition to illegal construction of the ballistic missile detection and tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk, the combination of other Soviet ABM-related activities involving missile mobility, testing, rapid reload, etc., also suggested that the Soviets might be preparing an ABM defense of their national territory, which is prohibited by the ABM Treaty. Such an action, if left without a U.S. response, would have serious adverse consequences for the East-West balance that has kept the peace.

Three key Soviet violations of strategic arms agreements enumerated below are particularly disturbing -- the SS-25 ICBM, encryption of telemetry, and the Krasnoyarsk radar:

o SALT II: SS-25 ICBM. The President stated in his December 1985 report that the SS-25 mobile ICBM is a clear and irreversible violation of the Soviet Union's SALT II commitment and has important political and military implications. Testing and deployment of this missile violates a central provision of the SALT II Agreement, which was intended to limit the number of new ICBMs. The Agreement permits only one new type of ICBM for each Party. The Soviets have informed

us that their one new ICBM type will be the SS-X-24, which is now undergoing testing, and have falsely asserted that the SS-25 is a permitted modernization of their old silo-based SS-13 ICBM. The President also concluded that the technical argument by which the Soviets sought to justify the SS-25, calling it "permitted modernization," is also troublesome as a potential precedent, as the Soviets might seek to apply it to additional prohibited new types of ICBMs in the future.

o SALT II: Telemetry Encryption. The President stated in his December report that Soviet use of encryption impedes U.S. verification of Soviet compliance and thus contravenes the provision of the SALT II Treaty which prohibits use of deliberate concealment measures, including encryption, which impede verification of compliance by national technical means. This deliberate Soviet concealment activity, he explained, impedes our ability to know whether a type of missile is in compliance with SALT II requirements. It could also make it more difficult for the United States to assess accurately the critical parameters of any future missile.

Since the SALT I Agreement of 1972, the President reported, Soviet encryption practices have become more extensive and disturbing. The President noted that these Soviet practices, Soviet responses on this issue, and Soviet failure to take corrective actions which the United States has repeatedly requested, demonstrate a Soviet attitude contrary to the fundamentals of sound arms control agreements, undermine the political confidence necessary for concluding new agreements, and underscore the necessity that any new agreement be effectively verifiable.

o ABM Treaty: Krasnoyarsk Radar. The President stated in his December 1985 report that the radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia is disturbing for both political and military reasons. First, it violates the 1972 ABM Treaty, which prohibits the siting of an ABM radar, or the siting and orienting of a ballistic missile detection and tracking radar, in the way the Krasnoyarsk radar is sited and oriented. Politically, he said, the radar demonstrates that the Soviets are capable of violating arms control obligations and commitments even when they are negotiating with the United States or when they know we will detect a violation.

Militarily, he noted, the Krasnoyarsk radar violation goes to the heart of the ABM Treaty. Large phased-array radars (LPARs) like that under construction near Krasnoyarsk were recognized during the ABM Treaty negotiations as the critical, long lead-time element of a nationwide ABM defense.

When considered as a part of a Soviet network of new LPARs, the President concluded, the Krasnoyarsk radar has the inherent potential to contribute to ABM radar coverage of a significant portion of the central U.S.S.R. Moreover, the Krasnoyarsk radar closes the remaining gap in Soviet ballistic missile detection and tracking coverage. Together with other Soviet ABM-related activities it suggests, as noted above, that the Soviets might be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory, which is prohibited by the Treaty and would have serious adverse consequences for the East-West balance that has kept the peace.

THE CURRENT U.S. DEPLOYMENT MILESTONE

On May 28, the eighth U.S. TRIDENT submarine, USS NEVADA, begins its sea trials. As called for by the U.S. interim restraint policy announced last June, the President has carefully assessed our options with respect to that milestone. He has considered Soviet behavior since his June 1985 decision to go the extra mile and he has considered U.S. and Allied security interests in light of that Soviet behavior and our own programmatic options.

Since the President made his decision in June 1985 to dismantle a POSEIDON, USS SAM RAYBURN, in order to give the Soviets adequate time to join us in establishing a truly mutual framework of interim restraint, the situation has not been encouraging with respect to the three criteria that the President established for gauging constructiv Soviet action -- i.e. 1) correction of Soviet noncompliance, 2) reversal of the Soviet military buildup, and 3) promoting progress in the Geneva negotiations.

While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in one or two areas of U.S. concern, for example with respect to the production rate of BACKFIRE bombers, there has been no real progress by the Soviets in meeting the most serious U.S. concerns. The deployment of the SS-25, a second new ICBM type forbidden by SALT II, continues. The Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile testing and impedes SALT II verification. The Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic force buildup. Finally, after a hopeful meeting in Geneva last November between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev, we have yet to see the Soviet Union follow-up in negotiations on the commitment made in the Joint Statement issued by the two leaders to seek common ground, especially through the principle of 50 percent strategic arms reductions, appropriately applied, and through an agreement on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF). In light of these circumstances, it is the President's judgment that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate by deed its readiness to join us in a framework of truly mutual interim restraint.

As the President has considered options associated with the current deployment milestone with the sea trials of the eighth TRIDENT, he has also carefully reviewed the military programmatic options available to the U.S. in terms of their overall net impact on U.S. and Allied security. It should be noted in this context that when the President issued guidance on U.S. policy in June of last year, the military plans and programs for Fiscal Year 1986 were about to be implemented. The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near-term for altering its planning is modest at best, and our military planning will take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous assumptions. This shadow lengthens and darkens with each reduction made in the funds available for our defense. Operating under such a shadow, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face, makes it essential that we make the very best possible use of our resources.

It had long been planned to retire and dismantle two of the oldest POSEIDON submarines. The President indicated in the decision announced today that had he been persuaded that refueling and retaining these particular two POSEIDON submarines would have contributed significantly and cost-effectively to the national security, he would have directed their overhaul and retention. However, in view of present circumstances, including current military and economic realities, it is the President's judgment that at this particular juncture, the proper course with respect to these two older POSEIDON submarines, is to retire and dismantle them, according to agreed procedures.

PROPORTIONATE U.S. RESPONSES

In announcing his decision last June, the President made clear at the same time that the U.S. would take appropriate and proportionate actions when needed to assure U.S. and Allied security in the face of Soviet noncompliance. It is the President's view that, while two POSEIDON submarines should be dismantled for military and economic reasons, certain new programmatic U.S. steps focused on the Administration's strategic modernization program are now necessitated by the continued lack of Soviet action up to this point in meeting the criteria established by the President's interim restraint policy decision last June.

Strategic Modernization Program. The Administration's highest priority in the strategic programs area remains the full implementation of the U.S. strategic modernization program to underwrite deterrence today, and the full pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program to seek to provide better alternatives in the future. The President's decision to retire the two older POSEIDON submarines at this point is fully in accordance with that program. Under any set of assumptions, our modernization program is, and will always be, designed to guarantee that our nation always has modern forces in sufficient quantities to underwrite our security and that of our Allies -- nothing more and nothing less. This goal ensures that the appropriate, best and proper use is made of our national resources.

The U.S. strategic modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles to the full program of 100 missiles, which was called for in 1983 by the Scowcroft Commission, is fully supported by our military leadership. The Administration's full strategic modernization program has been very carefully crafted by our best defense planners. It is the foundation for all future U.S. strategic program options and provides a solid basis which can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. The President believes it absolutely critical that this program not be permitted to erode. That would be the worst way to respond to the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance, would increase the risk to our security and that of our Allies, and would undercut our ability to negotiate the reductions in existing arsenals that we seek. It, therefore, would send precisely the wrong signal to the Soviet leadership.

o Bipartisan Support for the U.S. ICBM Program. Soviet actions to continue the accelerated development of their ICBM force are of great concern. Last June, the President cited the Soviet Union's flight-testing of the SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under the SALT II Agreement, as a clear and irreversible violation and noted that deployment would constitute a further violation. He noted that since the noncompliance associated with the development of this missile cannot, at this point, be corrected by the Soviet Union, the United States reserved the right to respond proportionately and appropriately. At that time, he also noted that the U.S. small ICBM program was particularly relevant in this regard. Given the events that have occurred since last June, including the Soviet Union's deployment of over 70 SS-25 mobile ICBMs, the President calls upon the Congress to join with him in restoring bi-partisan support for a balanced, cost effective, long-term program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of our own ICBM program.

o PEACEKEEPER (MX). The program we require should include the full 100-missile deployment of the PEACEKEEPER ICBM. It is sometimes forgotten by critics of the Administration's 100 missile PEACEKEEPER program that this represents a number only one half that requested by the previous Administration. The PEACEKEEPER missile has just completed another flawless flight test. It makes both good military and economic sense fully to exploit the great technical success that we have had with this missile.

o Small ICBM. The President believes that our ICBM program must also look beyond the PEACEKEEPER and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in the future. Our Small ICBM program makes a significant contribution not only in this regard, but also as an an appropriate and proportionate U.S. response to the irreversible Soviet violation associated with their SS-25 mobile ICBM.

o A Comprehensive Program. To ensure that he has a more robust range of options as he approaches future milestones, the President has in the decision announced today directed the Department of Defense to provide to him by November 1986 an assessment of the best options for carrying out a comprehensive ICBM program.

o Advanced Cruise Missile. Finally, the President has also directed the Secretary of Defense to take the steps necessary, workin with the Congress, to accelerate the production of the Advanced Cruis Missile (ACM) Program. The President is not, at this time, directing any increase in the total ACM program procurement, but rather is establishing a more efficient program that both saves money and accelerates the availability of additional options for the future.

U.S. AND SALT

Having completed a comprehensive review of U.S. interim restraint policy and of the required response to the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, and following consultations with the Congress and key allies, the President has beer forced to conclude that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate a readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

Given the lack of Soviet reciprocity, the President has decided that in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT II Agreement of 1979 or the SALT Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972. SALT II was a flawed agreement which was never ratified, which would have expired if it had been ratified, and which continues to be seriously violated by the Soviet Union. The SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972 was unequal, has expired, and is also being violated by the Soviet Union.

After reviewing the programmatic options available to the U.S., the President has decided to retire and dismantle two older POSEIDON submarines this summer. The U.S. thus will thus remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Agreement until we equip our 131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. The President has determined that given the decision that he has been forced to make by lack of Soviet reciprocity, the U.S. will later this year continue deployment of B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft, without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Agreement.

CONTINUED U.S. RESTRAINT

The President emphasized that the United States will continue to seek to meet its strategic needs, in response to the Soviet buildup, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major motives in our pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The President pointed out that as the U.S. modernizes, it will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. Therefore, he does not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces. The President also emphasized that, assuming no significant change in the threat that we face, as we implement the needed strategic modernization program the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

Since the United States will retire and dismantle two POSEIDON submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Agreement until the U.S. equips its 131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. However, given the decision that the President has been forced to make, he announced today that, at that time, he intends to continue deployment of U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Agreement. Of course, since the U.S. will remain in technical observance of the terms of the expired SALT II Agreement for some months, the President continues to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive

steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, the President noted that the U.S. will certainly take this into account.

In sum, the United States will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, while ensuring the credibility of our strategic deterrent, in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere for significant reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals of both sides. This is the urgent task that faces us.

THE ABM TREATY

Our obligations under the ABM Treaty remain unchanged. The President has made it clear that U.S. programs are, and will continue to be, in compliance with our obligations under the ABM Treaty. The President's statement today also makes it clear that we remain deeply concerned over Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. In contrast with SALT I and SALT II, however, the ABM Treaty is not an expired or unratified agreement. One of our priority objectives remains to have the Soviet Union return to compliance with their obligations under this Treaty.

HOPE FOR PROGRESS IN GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS

Time has not altered the basic truth that a policy of interim restraint is not a substitute for an agreement on deep, equitable and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Achieving such reductions has received, and continues to receive, our highest priority.

It therefore remains our hope the Soviet Union will take the necessary steps to give substance to the agreement which President Reagan reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to negotiate 50 percent reductions in strategic nuclear arms, appropriately applied, and an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear arms. If the Soviets agree to take those steps with us, we can together achieve greater stability and a safer world.

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SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

OAS 7/30/02

For Immediate Release May 27, 1986

SUMMARY OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY

Since the President came into office, he has done everything that he could to try to persuade the Soviet Union to meet its obligations with respect to SALT, and to agree to significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. In 1982, he said the United States would continue not to undercut the flawed SALT agreements so long as the Soviets exercised equal restraint. Regrettably, the Soviets didn't.

In June, 1985, the President tried again. He once again stated his great concern that Soviet noncompliance was ever more deeply undermining the SALT structure. He called upon the Soviet Union to join us in building an interim framework of truly mutual restraint until a START agreement replaces the SALT structure. He went the extra mile by dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, USS SAM RAYBURN, to give the Soviets even more time to hold up their side of the SALT structure. It has been almost a year, and the Soviet Union still has not responded.

Today, the President announced that the U.S. cannot continue to support unilaterally a flawed SALT structure that Soviet noncompliance has so grievously undermined and that the Soviets appear unwilling to repair. Therefore, in the future, the United States will base decisions regarding its strategic forces on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, rather than on standards contained in expired SALT agreements unilaterally observed by the United States.

The President has decided to retire two older POSEIDON submarines as the eighth TRIDENT submarine begins sea trials tomorrow. This means the U.S. will stay in technical observance of SALT for some months. This gives the Soviet Union still more time to correct their erosion of SALT. If they do, the President will take this into account.

Our attempt to use the structure of SALT as the basis for interim restraint until a START agreement can be achieved has always been based on the assumption of Soviet reciprocity. It makes no sense for the U.S. to continue to hold up the SALT structure while the Soviet Union undermines the foundation of SALT by its continued, uncorrected noncompliance. Therefore, the President believes we must now look to the the future, not to the past. The primary task we now face is to build a new structure, one based on significant, equitable and verifiable reductions in the size of existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. This is what we are proposing in the ongoing Geneva negotiations.

Until this is achieved, the United States will continue to exercise the utmost restraint. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the strategic modernization program, the U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviet Union.

It is high time that the Soviets honor their obligations, match U.S. restraint, and get down to negotiating seriously in Geneva. If they do, we can move together now to build a safer and more secure world.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By GJS NARA, Date 7/30/02

For Immediate Release May 27, 1986

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRAINT

On the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in 1982, I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. I took this action, despite my concerns about the flaws inherent in those agreements, to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiations on arms reductions. I made clear that our policy required reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup.

Last June, I reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy. I found that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain. As I have documented in three detailed reports to the Congress, most recently in December 1985, the Soviet Union, regrettably, has not. I noted last June that the pattern of Soviet non-compliance with their existing arms control commitments increasingly affected our national security. This pattern also raised fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process itself. A country simply cannot be serious about effective arms control unless it is equally serious about compliance.

In spite of the regrettable Soviet record, I concluded last June that it remained in the interest of the United States and its allies to try, once more, to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursued, with renewed vigor, our objective of deep reductions in existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals through the Geneva negotiations. Therefore, I undertook to go the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, USS SAM RAYBURN, to give the Soviet Union adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. However, I made it clear that, as subsequent U.S. deployment milestones were reached, I would assess the overall situation and determine future U.S. actions on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet behavior in exercising restraint comparable to our own, correcting their non-compliance, reversing their unwarranted military build-up, and seriously pursuing equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements.

Later this month, the 8th TRIDENT submarine, USS NEVADA, begins sea trials. In accordance with our announced policy, I have assessed our options with respect to that milestone. I have considered Soviet actions since my June 1985 decision, and U.S. and Allied security interests in light of both those actions and our programmatic options. The situation is not encouraging.

While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in one or two areas, there has been no real progress toward meeting U.S. concerns with respect to the general pattern of Soviet non-compliance with major arms control commitments, particularly in those areas of most obvious and direct Soviet non-compliance with the SALT and ABM agreements. The deployment of the SS-25, a forbidden second new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) type, continues apace. The Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile testing in a manner which impedes verification. The Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic force build-up. Finally, since the November summit, we have yet to see the Soviets follow up constructively on the commitment made by General Secretary Gorbachev and myself to achieve early progress in the Geneva

negotiations, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an interim agreement on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF).

Based on Soviet conduct since my June 1985 decision, I can only conclude that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate its readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. At the same time, I have also considered the programmatic options available to the U.S. in terms of their overall net impact on U.S. and Allied security.

When I issued guidance on U.S. policy on June 10, 1985, the military plans and programs for fiscal year 1986 were about to be implemented. The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near term for altering its planning is modest at best. Our military planning will take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous assumptions, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face. These budgetary conditions make it essential that we make the very best possible use of our resources.

The United States had long planned to retire and dismantle two of the oldest POSEIDON submarines when their reactor cores were exhausted. Had I been persuaded that refueling and retaining these two POSEIDON submarines would have contributed significantly and cost-effectively to the national security, I would have directed that these two POSEIDON submarines not be dismantled, but be overhauled and retained. However, in view of present circumstances, including current military and economic realities, I have directed their retirement and dismantlement as planned.

As part of the same decision last June, I also announced that we would take appropriate and proportionate responses when needed to protect our own security in the face of continuing Soviet non-compliance. It is my view that certain steps are now required by continued Soviet disregard of their obligations.

Needless to say, the most essential near-term response to Soviet noncompliance remains the implementation of our full strategic modernization program, to underwrite deterrence today, and the continued pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program, to see if it is possible to provide a safer and more stable basis for our future security and that of our Allies. The strategic modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles, is the foundation for all future U.S. offensive force options. It provides a solid basis which can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. The SDI program represents our best hope for a future in which our security can rest on the increasing contribution of defensive systems that threaten no one.

It is absolutely essential that we maintain full support for these programs. To fail to do so would be the worst response to Soviet noncompliance. It would immediately and seriously undercut our negotiators in Geneva by removing the leverage that they must have to negotiate equitable reductions in both U.S. and Soviet forces. It would send precisely the wrong signal to the leadership of the Soviet Union about the seriousness of our resolve concerning their noncompliance. And, it would significantly increase the risk to our security for years to come. Therefore, our highest priority must remain the full implementation of these programs.

Secondly, the development by the Soviet Union of its massive ICBM forces continues to challenge seriously the essential balance which has deterred both conflict and coercion. Last June, I cited the Soviet Union's SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under

SALT II, as a clear and irreversible violation. With the number of deployed SS-25 mobile ICBMs growing, I now call upon the Congress to restore bi-partisan support for a balanced, cost effective, long-term program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of the U.S. ICBM program. This program should include the full deployment of the 100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs. But it must also look beyond the PEACEKEEPER and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in the future, including the Small ICBM to complement PEACEKEEPER. Therefore, I have directed the Department of Defense to provide to me by November, 1986, an assessment of the best options for carrying out such a comprehensive ICBM program. This assessment will address the basing of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles and specific alternative configurations for the Small ICBM in terms of size, number of warheads, and production rates.

Finally, I have also directed that the Advanced Cruise Missile program be accelerated. This would not direct any increase in the total program procurement at this time, but rather would establish a more efficient program that both saves money and accelerates the availability of additional options for the future.

This brings us to the question of the SALT agreements. SALT II was a fundamentally flawed and unratified treaty. Even if ratified, it would have expired on December 31, 1985. When presented to the U.S. Senate in 1979, it was considered by a broad range of critics, including the Senate Armed Services Committee, to be unequal and unverifiable in important provisions. It was, therefore, judged by many to be inimical to genuine arms control, to the security interests of the United States and its allies, and to global stability. The proposed treaty was clearly headed for defeat before my predecessor asked the Senate not to act on it.

The most basic problem with SALT II was that it codified major arms buildups rather than reductions. For example, even though at the time the Treaty was signed in 1979, the U.S. had, and only planned for, 550 MIRVed ICBM launchers, and the Soviet Union possessed only about 600, SALT II permitted each side to increase the number of such launchers to 820. It also permitted a build-up to 1,200 MIRVed ballistic launchers (both ICBMs and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, SLBMs) even though the U.S. had only about 1,050 and the Soviet Union had only about 750 when the treaty was signed. It permitted the Soviet Union to retain all of its heavy ballistic missiles. Finally, it limited ballistic missile launchers, not the missiles or the warheads carried by the ballistic missiles. Since the signing of SALT II, Soviet ballistic missile forces have grown to within a few launchers of each of the 820 and 1,200 MIRVed limits, and from about 7,000 to over 9,000 warheads today. What is worse, given the failure of SALT II to constrain ballistic missile warheads, the number of warheads on Soviet ballistic missiles will continue to grow very significantly, even under the Treaty's limits, in the continued absence of Soviet restraint.

In 1982, on the eve of the START negotiations, I undertook not to undercut existing arms control agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union demonstrated comparable restraint. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union did not exercise comparable restraint, and uncorrected Soviet violations have seriously undermined the SALT structure. Last June, I once again laid out our legitimate concerns but decided to go the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, not to comply with or abide by a flawed and unratified treaty, but rather to give the Soviet Union one more chance and adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. The Soviet Union has not used the past year for this purpose.

Given this situation, I have determined that, in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has been undermined by Soviet non-compliance, and especially in a flawed

SALT II treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.

Since the United States will retire and dismantle two POSEIDON submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty until the U.S. equips its 131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. However, given the decision that I have been forced to make, I intend at that time to continue deployment of U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an appropriate response without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Treaty. Of course, since we will remain in technical compliance with the terms of the expired SALT II Treaty for some months, I continue to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, we will certainly take this into account.

The United States seeks to meet its strategic needs, given the Soviet build-up, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major motives in our pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. I do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the strategic modernization program the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United States will not deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

In sum, we will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, while protecting strategic deterrence, in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere for significant reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides. This is the urgent task which faces us. I call on the Soviet Union to seize the opportunity to join us now in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

Finally, I want to emphasize that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions has received, and continues to receive, my highest priority. I hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement I reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to achieve early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an interim INF agreement. If the Soviet Union carries out this agreement, we can move now to achieve greater stability and a safer world.

PRESS GUIDANCE ~~SECRET~~ May 27, 1986

U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY: RESPONDING TO SOVIET ARMS CONTROL VIOLATIONS

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CLS NARA, Date 7/30/02

THE DECISION

Q1. What is new about this decision?

A1. The decision involves several major elements:

-- While the U.S. has gone the extra mile in trying to use the SALT structure as a basis for interim restraint until we can replace it with a START agreement, Soviet noncompliance has steadily undermined that structure.

-- There is an increasing national security risk caused by continued Soviet failure to meet the fundamental criteria of U.S. interim restraint policy established by the President on June 10, 1985, when he decided to go the extra mile to give the Soviets further opportunity and adequate time to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

-- In the face of continued Soviet noncompliance, the U.S. will make future decisions about its strategic programs not on the basis of the expired SALT I or SALT II agreements on strategic offensive weapons, but in terms of U.S. and Allied security requirements, which in turn will be largely dependent upon what the Soviet Union does.

-- The U.S. will dismantle, rather than refurbish, two older U.S. POSEIDON submarines now, due to current economic and military considerations of cost effectiveness.

-- However, later this year the U.S. will deploy U.S. B-52 bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft, without compensatory dismantlements under SALT II. The U.S. will remain in technical observance of SALT II for some months, until that time. If the Soviets use this time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation, we will certainly take this into account. (Concerning SALT I, even if the U.S. were not to retire older systems, the U.S. could remain in technical observance with its terms for several years until the 10th TRIDENT SSBN begins sea trials in mid-1989.)

-- The U.S. will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, and will seek to meet our strategic needs by means that minimize incentives for a continuing Soviet buildup. We will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit and we do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic forces. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement our needed strategic modernization program, the U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery

vehicles, or more strategic ballistic missile warheads, than does the Soviet Union.

-- The President also stressed the importance of the Administration's Strategic Modernization Program, including all 100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs, as well as full funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). These vital programs will be buttressed by a study assessing options for the US ICBM programs (including the Small ICBM program and basing of the PEACEKEEPER), as well as by acceleration of the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) Program.

Q2. What were the criteria for gauging future Soviet performance that the President established in going the extra mile in June 1985?

A2. The President indicated in his decision last June that as future U.S. strategic deployment milestones were reached, he would assess the overall situation and determine future U.S. actions on a case-by-case basis in light of U.S. programmatic options and of Soviet actions in: (1) correcting Soviet noncompliance, (2) reversing the unparalleled and unwarranted Soviet military buildup, and (3) seriously pursuing arms reductions agreements at the negotiations in Geneva.

Q3. Have we really given the Soviets adequate time, and is the President's decision consistent with the Administration's policy announced last June?

A3. As first announced by the President in 1982, U.S. interim restraint policy has always been conditioned on Soviet reciprocity, i.e. we would not undercut the strategic arms agreements so long as, or to the extent that, the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. The U.S. has for several years remained in a state of scrupulous compliance with its obligations, while the Soviet Union has not. During the past two and a half years the President has sent three comprehensive Administration reports to the Congress (the most recent one last December) making clear the serious U.S. concerns about Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, including those involving strategic arms.

Last June, the President once again laid out our legitimate concerns about the continued pattern of Soviet noncompliance. He stated that he was directing the dismantlement of a U.S. POSEIDON submarine later that year in order to give the Soviet Union adequate time to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. He explicitly rejected a double standard of unilateral treaty compliance for the United States, and he made clear that at the next U.S. strategic deployment milestone, which we have now reached, he would evaluate the situation in terms of Soviet behavior in meeting the specific criteria of correcting their noncompliance, reversing their arms build up and promoting

progress in Geneva. He reaffirmed this message in his December 1985 report to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance and also raised these concerns with General Secretary Gorbachev at last November's summit meeting in Geneva. During the same period, our concerns have also been raised repeatedly, and in great detail, at the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission.

The President believes that these clear Administration statements and efforts seeking to resolve our compliance concerns, and the period of nearly one year which has passed since he announced the step of going the extra mile last June, have in fact provided more than adequate time and opportunity for the Soviet Union to have demonstrated by concrete steps its readiness to exercise truly mutual restraint. Regrettably, the Soviets clearly did not use this time for that purpose. Instead, they have failed to correct their noncompliance, to respond constructively to our diplomatic approaches and to our continued unilateral self-restraint, or to negotiate seriously in the ongoing Geneva negotiations.

The United States simply cannot continue unilaterally observing the SALT structure as the basis of interim restraint if the Soviets continue to undermine the foundation of that structure by their noncompliance.

Q4. Does this mean that we are at the end of the "extra mile" the President announced last year?

A4. The President's Statement indicates that in the face of continued Soviet disregard of their obligations, U.S. security requires that in the future we must base decisions regarding our strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic programs, not on standards contained in a flawed agreement which was never ratified, and which is continuing to be violated by the Soviet Union.

The United States simply cannot continue unilaterally observing the SALT structure as the basis of interim restraint if the Soviets continue to undermine the foundation of that structure by their noncompliance.

Q5. But what about the next few months, before the 131st ALCM-carrying B-52 bomber is deployed by the U.S. near the end of this year?

A5. The President's Statement notes that the United States will remain in technical observance with the terms of SALT II for some months. He continues to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. The President's Statement indicates that should the Soviets do so, we will certainly take this into account.

Q6. Why did the President decide to dismantle two more U.S. POSEIDON submarines now? Why not refurbish these boats?

A6. The President's Statement indicates that had he been persuaded that refueling and retaining these two older POSEIDON submarines would have contributed significantly and cost-effectively to the national security, he would have directed that they be overhauled and retained. However, in view of present circumstances, including current military and economic realities and considerations of cost effectiveness, he directed their retirement and dismantlement.

Q7. Doesn't this decision contradict the Administration's goal of seeking an interim framework of mutual restraint? Won't this just accelerate an arms race?

A7. No, restraint cannot be one-sided; it requires Soviet reciprocity. The United States simply cannot continue unilaterally observing the SALT structure as the basis of interim restraint if the Soviets continue to undermine the foundation of that structure by their noncompliance.

Nor should this decision accelerate an arms race. For the future, the President's Statement makes clear that the United States will make future decisions about its strategic programs on the basis of its security requirements in the face of existing threats, which will in turn be largely dependent upon the Soviet Union.

The President's Statement makes clear that the U.S. will continue to exercise utmost restraint, seeking to meet our strategic needs by means that minimize incentives for a continuing Soviet buildup. For example: the U.S. will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit; we do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic forces; and, assuming no significant change in the threat we face, the U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, or more strategic ballistic missile warheads, than does the Soviet Union.

Q8. Does the President's statement represent a commitment that the U.S., under all conditions, will not exceed the SNDV and ballistic missile warhead levels of the Soviet Union? Doesn't that allow the Soviet Union to determine U.S. force size?

A8. As the President stated, given the lack of Soviet response to our call to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the United States in the future must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by the Soviet Union to the U.S. and our Allies. To that extent, Soviet actions do determine U.S. strategic force size.

At the same time, the President has indicated that we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit -- I repeat, as our national security requirements permit.

And, as the President stated, assuming no significant change in the nature of the threat that we face, as we implement the needed strategic modernization program, the U.S. will not deploy more SNDVs or strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

Q9. What about the nuclear arms reductions negotiations in Geneva?

A9. The President's Statement makes clear that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms, providing we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions continues to be the President's highest priority. It is his hope that the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement he reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to achieve early progress in the negotiations, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an interim agreement on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces.

We are disappointed that in the most recent round in Geneva, the Soviets did not act to carry out this mutual commitment. If the Soviet Union applies itself seriously in the current negotiating round, we can together move promptly toward agreement on real reductions in nuclear arms, as well as toward achieving greater strategic stability and a safer world.

SALT I and SALT II

Q10. What have been the U.S. legal obligations under the unratified SALT II Agreement? What about our political obligations?

A10. SALT II was signed in June 1979, but was never ratified by the U.S. Senate and, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, President Carter asked the Senate not to act on it. In 1981, after the U.S. made clear to the Soviet Union that the U.S. had no intention of ratifying the SALT II Agreement, legal obligations not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty pending ratification no longer applied. Subsequently, in 1982, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. undertook a political obligation not to undercut the provisions of SALT II. This U.S. commitment of interim restraint has always been conditioned on Soviet reciprocity. However, the U.S. has scrupulously adhered to its obligations, while the Soviet Union has not, and the

Soviets have failed to resolve our serious concerns about their noncompliance.

Q11. What was so bad about SALT II? Hasn't it significantly restrained the Soviet strategic buildup?

A11. The President's Statement points out that the unratified SALT II Agreement (which was clearly headed for defeat in the Senate and which the President's predecessor asked the Senate not to act on) was considered by a broad range of critics, including the Senate Armed Services Committee, to be unequal and unverifiable in important provisions, and that its most basic problem was that it codified major arms buildups rather than reductions.

As spelled out in the Statement, SALT II, for example, permitted each side substantially to increase MIRVed ICBM launchers to 820 at a time when the U.S. had, and only planned for, 550 and when the Soviet Union possessed only about 600. It permitted a buildup to 1,200 MIRVed strategic ballistic missile launchers (ICBMs and SLBMs) when the U.S. had only about 1,050 and the Soviets had only about 750. Since the signing of SALT II, Soviet strategic ballistic missile forces have grown to within a few launchers of the 820 and 1,200 MIRVed limits, and from about 7,000 to over 9,000 warheads today. It permitted the Soviets to retain all 308 of their heavy missiles. (The U.S. at that time had none, and still has none.) Its high limits applied to launchers rather than to missiles or to warheads, whose numbers will continue to grow very significantly even under the agreement's limits, in the continued absence of Soviet restraint.

Q12. Is it not true that the Soviets are in a better position to increase their nuclear forces in the absence of SALT restraints? The Soviets have said that they would "take measures effectively to ensure their own security". Could this set off an arms race?

A12. The Soviet Union has undertaken a massive build-up in their offensive nuclear forces over the past twenty years. As a result, they today already have numbers of nuclear weapons far in excess of any legitimate defensive need. While the Soviets could add still more weapons, it is difficult to understand what practical purpose such further expansion could serve.

What is more, the Soviets would be able to undertake substantial growth in their offensive forces even under SALT II. In the absence of SALT II, this would not necessarily be appreciably different from that which would occur if they were in compliance with the Agreement.

We are now negotiating with the Soviets in Geneva for deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in strategic and intermediate-range offensive nuclear forces. We hope that the

Soviets will work, in practice, toward the mutual goals for these negotiations that were expressed at the summit in Geneva in November, with the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We believe that they will find it in their interest, politically and militarily, to work with us toward significant reductions at the confidential negotiating table in Geneva, rather than to continue their unwarranted buildup.

Q13. Will we be the first to break a numerical limit associated with SALT II when we deploy the 131st ALCM-carrying B-52 bomber this fall?

A13. No. The Soviets have already broken a numerical limit associated with SALT II. As pointed out in the President's December 1985 report to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance, the Soviets are in violation of their SALT II commitment to abide by a cap on Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) at the level of 2,504 existing at the time SALT II was signed. The Soviet Union has deployed SNDVs above this 2,504 cap, an activity inconsistent with their political commitment under SALT II.

Q14. What about the SALT I Interim Agreement on offensive arms? Will the U.S. continue to comply with it?

A14. U.S. interim restraint policy has always involved both the SALT I Interim Agreement on offensive arms and SALT II. Both agreements have expired and are being violated by the Soviet Union. While we will no longer unilaterally observe these two agreements, the President has emphasized that the U.S. will continue to exercise the utmost restraint in determining our strategic programs. (Concerning SALT I, even if the U.S. did not retire older systems, the U.S. could remain in technical observance of its terms for several years until the 10th TRIDENT SSBN begins sea trials in mid-1989.)

Q15. What is the legal status of the SALT I Interim Agreement?

A15. The SALT I Interim Agreement on the Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms entered into force between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in 1972. Dismantling procedures implementing the Agreement were concluded in 1974. It was, by its own terms, of limited duration and it expired as a legally binding document in 1977.

The applicability of the Agreement to the actions of both Parties, however, was extended through a series of mutual political commitments, including the President's May 31, 1982 statement, that the U.S. would refrain from actions which would undercut existing strategic arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union showed equal restraint. The Soviets have told us that they would abide by the SALT I Interim Agreement and any actions

inconsistent with this commitment are violations of its political commitment with respect to the Agreement and its implementing procedures.

Q16. How have the Soviets violated SALT I?

A16. As indicated in the President's December 1985 report to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance, the Soviets' use of former SS-7 ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation of the SS-25 mobile ICBMs, is in violation of the SALT I provision which prohibits the use of facilities remaining at dismantled or destroyed ICBM sites for storage, support, or launch of ICBMS.

Q17. What was wrong with the SALT I Interim Agreement? The President's statement says it was unequal. How was it?

A17. Basic flaws in the agreement were that it froze rather than reduced arsenals and for its intended 5 year duration it froze numbers of U.S and Soviet ICBM and SLBM launcher at asymmetrical levels to the advantage of the Soviet Union.

Under the Agreement the U.S. was limited to only 1,054 ICBM launchers and 656 SLBM launchers. The Soviets, however, were permitted to have 1,607 ICBM launchers and 740 SLBM launchers. In addition, both sides were permitted to to expand their SLBM launcher numbers up to 710 and 950 respectively, by dismantling an equal number of older ICBM launchers or launchers of SLBMs on older submarines.

Because of concern about these inequities, the Congress passed a resolution at the time of SALT I in 1972 urging the President to assure that any future SALT agreements provide for U.S. levels (understood in terms of numbers and capabilities) not inferior to those permitted to the Soviet Union.

Q18. What about the ABM Treaty? Will we continue to observe this treaty even though the Soviets are violating it?

A18. Our obligations under the ABM Treaty of 1972 remain unchanged. The President has made clear that U.S. programs are, and will continue to be, in compliance with these obligations.

The President's statement today makes clear that we remain deeply concerned over Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. In contrast with SALT I and II, however, the ABM Treaty is not an expired or unratified agreement. One of our priority objectives in the Geneva negotiations, therefore, is to reverse Soviet erosion of this Treaty.

Q19. Even though the U.S. will no longer consider itself bound by the SALT II and SALT I agreements, will you still be trying to get the Soviet Union to correct its noncompliance with those agreements?

A19. We have indicated that if the Soviet Union alters its behavior we will take this into account, especially during the period of several months that we will remain in technical observance of the SALT II Treaty. Following the decision to dismantle two POSEIDON submarines at this point, we will be in technical observance of SALT I for several years.

Even as we exercise utmost restraint on our own part we will certainly continue to look for concrete steps by the Soviet Union in terms of our earlier interim restraint criteria: 1) correction of Soviet noncompliance, 2) reversal of the Soviet military build up and 3) serious pursuit of arms reductions agreements at the Geneva negotiations.

CONGRESS

Q20. Did you consult with the Congress? What do you think their reaction will be?

A20. We have consulted with numerous members of Congress and would note that there are different views among the members on various aspects of this complex issue. However, we are certain that the Congress shares the President's serious concern about the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance and about the requirement to assure U.S. and Allied security needs, as well as the President's hope that the Soviet Union will take concrete steps to correct its noncompliance, reverse its military build up and pursue serious progress at the negotiating table in Geneva.

We would also note that the Congress has specifically expressed its sense (in the FY 1986 DoD Authorization Act) that the U.S. "should vigorously pursue with the Soviet Union its resolution of concerns of the U.S. over Soviet compliance with existing strategic arms control agreements" and that the Congress would not endorse "unilateral United States compliance with existing strategic arms agreements" or actions "prohibiting the United States from carrying out proportionate responses to Soviet undercutting of strategic arms agreements".

ALLIES

Q21. What about the Administration's consultations with our Allies? What do you think their reaction will be?

A21. We have consulted very closely with our Allies and friends in Europe and Asia and have taken their views into account. While we cannot purport to speak for them, we believe they share

our concern about Soviet violations of existing agreements, and they understand the rationale for the decision. They continue to strongly support our efforts to achieve deep, equitable and verifiable arms reductions in Geneva. This will remain our highest priority objective.

Q22. How has Soviet noncompliance affected U.S. Allies? Can you give any examples?

A22. Like previous administrations, we believe U.S. and Allied security to be indivisible. Since U.S. strategic forces are an essential part of Western deterrent capability, Soviet noncompliance affects the security of our alliance as a whole. The specific areas of Soviet noncompliance that we have reported to the Congress and discussed with our Allies, clearly have the potential, if left uncorrected and without a response, of undermining the essential strategic balance and the credibility and viability of our deterrent.

To give an example, Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty with the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, along with other Soviet ABM activities that call into question Soviet commitment to that treaty and suggest the possibility of a future Soviet establishment of a nationwide ABM system, also have potentially threatening implications for the strategic balance and therefore for alliance security as a whole.

On the broad political level, the continued pattern of Soviet noncompliance with existing arms control agreements (including chemical weapons conventions, the Helsinki Act, and nuclear testing agreements) seriously undermines the integrity of the entire arms control process and thereby undermines as well the prospects for developing greater mutual confidence in East-West relations.

THE SOVIETS

Q23. Did you consult with the Soviets before the decision was made?

A23. We have been in touch with the Soviets through diplomatic channels, but I am not going to comment on the substance of our diplomatic contacts.

Q24. Did you inform the Soviets of the decision before it was made public? What was their reaction?

A24. Yes, we have informed them of the decision, but I am not going to comment on our diplomatic exchanges.

Q25. Did you anticipate how the Soviets would react?

A25. A wide range of possible Soviet reactions was taken into consideration in making the decision.

Q26. Do you think the Soviets might walk out of the Geneva negotiations because of the U.S. decision?

A26. Such a move would be unjustified and in no one's interest. The Soviet Union walked out of the arms control negotiations in 1983, and a year and a half of valuable negotiating time was lost. We hope the Soviet Union will not make the same mistake again, and that they will instead start to apply themselves seriously at the negotiating table.

Our objectives at the Geneva negotiations remain the same as stated at the U.S./Soviet summit last November: to seek common ground in negotiating deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in strategic and intermediate-range offensive nuclear arsenals and to discuss with the Soviet Union how we could enhance deterrence and stability by moving toward a world in which we would no longer rely exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation to preserve the peace. We hope the Soviets will negotiate seriously with us toward these important goals.

Q27. What about the impact of the decision on a summit this year?

A27. At last November's summit meeting, General Secretary Gorbachev and the President agreed that the Soviet leader would meet with President Reagan in the United States this year. We believe that such a meeting should take place. It would give the two leaders an opportunity to discuss the broad US/Soviet agenda -- including arms control issues, regional problems, bilateral matters, and human rights.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CWS NARA, Date 7/30/02

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release May 27, 1986

FACT SHEET

U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY:
RESPONDING TO SOVIET ARMS CONTROL VIOLATIONS

SUMMARY

The U.S. has completed a comprehensive review of its interim restraint policy and of the required response to the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. Based on this review, and following consultations with the Congress and key allies, we have been forced to the conclusion that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate a readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

Given the lack of Soviet reciprocity, the President has decided that in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT II Agreement of 1979 or the SALT Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972. SALT II was a flawed agreement which was never ratified, which would have expired if it had been ratified, and which continues to be seriously violated by the Soviet Union. The SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972 was unequal, has expired, and is also being violated by the Soviet Union.

After reviewing the programmatic options available to the U.S., the President has decided to retire and dismantle two older POSEIDON submarines this summer. The U.S. thus will thus remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Agreement until we equip our 131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. The President has determined that given the decision that he has been forced to make by lack of Soviet reciprocity, the U.S. will later this year continue deployment of B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft, without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Agreement.

The President has also called for: renewed bipartisan support for the Administration's full strategic modernization program including all 100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs; full funding of our research under the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI); an assessment of options on future ICBM programs, including PEACEKEEPER basing and the Small ICBM; and acceleration of the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) program.

The President has determined that in carrying out this policy, the United States will continue to exercise utmost restraint. We will seek to meet our strategic needs by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. We do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in the number of U.S. strategic offensive forces. Furthermore, the President has emphasized that, assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the needed strategic modernization program, the U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

The President indicated that since the U.S. will remain in technical observance with the terms of the expired SALT II Agreement for some months, the Soviet Union will have even more time to change the conditions that now exist. The President hopes that the Soviet Union

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will use this time constructively; if they do, the United States will certainly take this into account. (Concerning the SALT I Agreement, even without any U.S. retirement of older systems, the U.S. could remain in technical observance of its terms for several years until the 10th TRIDENT submarine begins sea trials in mid-1979.)

Finally, the President has reiterated that his highest priority in the nuclear arms control area is to obtain Soviet agreement to a new and more durable arms control framework -- one built upon deep, equitable and verifiable reductions in the offensive nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. He therefore calls upon the Soviet Union to carry out in the ongoing Geneva negotiations the agreement which he and General Secretary Gorbachev reached at the November summit, calling for 50 percent reductions, appropriately applied, in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, and an interim agreement on intermediate nuclear forces. If Moscow instructs its negotiators to apply themselves seriously and flexibly toward these goals, as the U.S. negotiators are prepared to do, we can move together now to build a safer and more stable world.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past two and a half years, the President has sent three reports to the Congress detailing the serious realities of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, including major agreements on strategic arms. The United States has unsuccessfully pressed the Soviet Union in the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and through other diplomatic channels to resolve our concerns.

In spite of this pattern of Soviet noncompliance, the President decided last June to go the extra mile in dismantling a U.S. POSEIDON submarine, USS SAM RAYBURN, to give the Soviet Union adequate time to take the opportunity to join the United States in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms. He stated that such a framework required that the Soviets correct their noncompliance, reverse their unwarranted military buildup, and make progress at the Geneva negotiations. In addition, he indicated that the United States, which has scrupulously complied with its arms control obligations and commitments, would be required to develop appropriate and proportionate responses to assure U.S. and Allied security in the face of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance. He directed that all programmatic responses be kept open, and he requested specific programmatic recommendations of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In recent months, the President has reviewed these issues in great detail with his senior advisers and has consulted extensively with Members of Congress and Allied leaders. He announced his decision in the Statement issued today. This Fact Sheet reports on the President's decision.

BACKGROUND

o 1982 Decision. In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), the President decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I Agreement or the unratified SALT II Agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. Despite his serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I Agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II Agreement, he took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint on force deployments conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START. He made clear that our policy required reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup. The Soviet Union also made a policy commitment not to undercut these agreements.

o 1985 Decision. In a decision reported to the Congress on June 10, 1985, the President reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy concerning strategic agreements in light of the continuing pattern of the Soviet Union's noncompliance with its arms control obligations and commitments. He found that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain and had scrupulously complied with the terms of its obligations and commitments.

By contrast, he noted with regret that the Soviet Union had repeatedly violated several of its major arms control obligations and commitments. His three reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance in January 1984, February 1985, and December 1985 enumerate and document in detail the serious facts and U.S. concerns about Soviet violations. The overall judgment reached by the President in his June 1985 decision was that while the Soviets had observed some provisions of existing arms control agreements, they had violated important elements of those agreements and associated legal obligations and political commitments.

The President noted that these are very crucial issues, for to be serious about effective arms control is to be serious about compliance. The pattern of Soviet violations increasingly affects our national security. But, perhaps even more significant than the near-term military consequences of the violations themselves, they raise fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process, concerns that, if uncorrected, undercut the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world.

The President also noted that the United States had repeatedly raised our serious concerns with the Soviet Union in diplomatic channels, including the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission. His assessment was that, despite long and repeated U.S. efforts to resolve these issues, the Soviet Union had neither provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective action. Instead, Soviet violations had expanded as the Soviets continued to modernize their strategic forces. U.S. interim restraint policy has always been conditioned on Soviet reciprocity. In his June assessment, the President was consequently forced to conclude that the Soviet Union was not exercising the equal restraint upon which U.S. interim restraint policy had been conditioned, that we could not accept a double standard of unilateral U.S. compliance coupled with Soviet noncompliance, and that such Soviet behavior was fundamentally inimical to the future of arms control and to the security of our country and that of our Allies.

At the same time, given the goal of reducing the size of Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals, the President made the judgment that it remained in the interest of the United States to go the extra mile in seeking to persuade the Soviet Union to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms, as we pursued with renewed vigor, through the negotiations in Geneva, our goal of deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

The President made clear, however, that the U.S. could not establish such a framework alone. Movement toward an acceptable framework required the Soviet Union to take the positive, concrete steps to correct its noncompliance, resolve our other compliance concerns, and reverse or substantially reduce its unparalleled and unwarranted military buildup. Although the Soviet Union had not demonstrated a willingness to move in this direction, the President announced that in the interest of ensuring that every opportunity to establish the secure, stable future we seek is fully explored, he was prepared to go the extra mile.

The President thus decided last June that to provide the Soviets a further opportunity to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint which could support ongoing negotiations, the

United States would continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union exercised comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursued arms reductions agreements in the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva. Further, he stated that the United States would constantly review the implications of this interim policy on the long term security interests of the United States and its Allies. He indicated that in doing so, the U.S. would consider Soviet actions to resolve our concerns with the pattern of Soviet noncompliance, continued growth in the strategic force structure of the Soviet Union, and Soviet seriousness in the ongoing negotiations.

As an integral part of the implementation of this policy, the President announced that the U.S. would take those steps made necessary by Soviet noncompliance to assure U.S. national security and that of our Allies. He noted that appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are called for to make it perfectly clear to Moscow that violations of arms control arrangements entail real costs. He stated clearly that the United States would therefore develop appropriate and proportionate responses and would take those actions necessary in response to, and as a hedge against, the military consequences of uncorrected Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements.

The President decided last June that to provide still more time for the Soviet Union to demonstrate by its action a commitment to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the U.S. would deactivate and dismantle, according to agreed procedures, an existing older POSEIDON submarine as the seventh U.S. Ohio-class TRIDENT submarine put to sea in August 1985. However, the President also directed that the U.S. keep open all future programmatic options for handling such strategic deployment milestones as they occurred in the future. He made it clear that, as these later milestones were reached, he would assess the overall situation and make a final determination of the U.S. course of action on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet actions in meeting the criteria which he cited.

U.S. COMPLIANCE

In accordance with U.S. interim restraint policy and our efforts to build an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the United States has not taken any actions which would undercut existing agreements. We have continued scrupulously to live within all arms control agreements, including the SALT I and II agreements. For example, we have fully dismantled one POSEIDON and eight POLARIS missile-carrying submarines, and 27 TITAN II ICBM launchers, as new TRIDENT missile-carrying submarines have been deployed. Unfortunately, while the U.S. has been attempting to hold to the structure of SALT through our policy of interim restraint, the Soviet Union, through its continued noncompliance, has undermined the very foundation of that structure.

SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE

In the most recent of his three reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, issued on December 23, 1985, the President confirmed that the Administration's continuing studies supported the conclusion that the pattern of Soviet noncompliance continues, largely uncorrected. As documented in the President's reports, particularly the detailed classified versions, the Soviet Union has violated its legal obligations under, or political commitments to the SALT II Agreement of 1979, the SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons of 1925, and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. In addition, the U.S.S.R. has likely violated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974.

In his December 1985 report to the Congress, the President noted that through its noncompliance with arms control agreements, the Soviet Union has made military gains in the areas of strategic offensive arms as well as chemical, biological and toxin weapons. The President added that in the area of strategic defense, the possible extent of the Soviet Union's military gains by virtue of its noncompliance with the ABM Treaty is also of increasing importance and serious concern to the United States.

The President noted in his December report that in a fundamental sense all deliberate Soviet violations are equally important. He made clear that as violations of legal obligations or political commitments, they cause grave concern regarding Soviet commitment to arms control and darken the atmosphere in which current negotiations are being conducted in Geneva and elsewhere.

In another sense, the President noted, Soviet violations are not of equal importance. Some Soviet violations are of significant military importance -- like the illegal second type of new ICBM, telemetry encryption, and the Krasnoyarsk radar. While other violations are of little apparent military significance in their own right, such violations can acquire importance if, left unaddressed, they are permitted to become precedents for future, more threatening violations. Moreover, some Soviet actions that individually have little military significance could conceivably become significant when taken in their aggregate. Finally, even if a specific violation does not contain an inherent military threat, it still undermines the viability and integrity of the arms control process.

SPECIFIC SOVIET VIOLATIONS

Concerning SALT II, the President's December report, in addition to citing the Soviets' SS-25 ICBM development and extensive encryption of telemetry on ICBM missile flight tests as violations, also enumerated additional clear Soviet violations of SALT II, including exceeding the numerical limit of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) and concealment of the association between the SS-25 missile and its launcher. In addition, the President's report cited three areas of ambiguous Soviet behavior as involving possible violations or inconsistencies with regard to SALT II -- SS-16 ICBM activity, the BACKFIRE bomber's intercontinental operating capability and the BACKFIRE bomber's production rate.

Concerning the SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972, the President's December 1985 report cited a violation in Soviet use of former SS-7 ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation of the SS-25 mobile ICBMs.

Concerning the ABM Treaty of 1972, the President's December 1985 report indicated that in addition to illegal construction of the ballistic missile detection and tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk, the combination of other Soviet ABM-related activities involving missile mobility, testing, rapid reload, etc., also suggested that the Soviets might be preparing an ABM defense of their national territory, which is prohibited by the ABM Treaty. Such an action, if left without a U.S. response, would have serious adverse consequences for the East-West balance that has kept the peace.

Three key Soviet violations of strategic arms agreements enumerated below are particularly disturbing -- the SS-25 ICBM, encryption of telemetry, and the Krasnoyarsk radar:

o SALT II: SS-25 ICBM. The President stated in his December 1985 report that the SS-25 mobile ICBM is a clear and irreversible violation of the Soviet Union's SALT II commitment and has important political and military implications. Testing and deployment of this missile violates a central provision of the SALT II Agreement, which was intended to limit the number of new ICBMs. The Agreement permits only one new type of ICBM for each Party. The Soviets have informed

us that their one new ICBM type will be the SS-X-24, which is now undergoing testing, and have falsely asserted that the SS-25 is a permitted modernization of their old silo-based SS-13 ICBM. The President also concluded that the technical argument by which the Soviets sought to justify the SS-25, calling it "permitted modernization," is also troublesome as a potential precedent, as the Soviets might seek to apply it to additional prohibited new types of ICBMs in the future.

o SALT II: Telemetry Encryption. The President stated in his December report that Soviet use of encryption impedes U.S. verification of Soviet compliance and thus contravenes the provision of the SALT II Treaty which prohibits use of deliberate concealment measures, including encryption, which impede verification of compliance by national technical means. This deliberate Soviet concealment activity, he explained, impedes our ability to know whether a type of missile is in compliance with SALT II requirements. It could also make it more difficult for the United States to assess accurately the critical parameters of any future missile.

Since the SALT I Agreement of 1972, the President reported, Soviet encryption practices have become more extensive and disturbing. The President noted that these Soviet practices, Soviet responses on this issue, and Soviet failure to take corrective actions which the United States has repeatedly requested, demonstrate a Soviet attitude contrary to the fundamentals of sound arms control agreements, undermine the political confidence necessary for concluding new agreements, and underscore the necessity that any new agreement be effectively verifiable.

o ABM Treaty: Krasnoyarsk Radar. The President stated in his December 1985 report that the radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia is disturbing for both political and military reasons. First, it violates the 1972 ABM Treaty, which prohibits the siting of an ABM radar, or the siting and orienting of a ballistic missile detection and tracking radar, in the way the Krasnoyarsk radar is sited and oriented. Politically, he said, the radar demonstrates that the Soviets are capable of violating arms control obligations and commitments even when they are negotiating with the United States or when they know we will detect a violation.

Militarily, he noted, the Krasnoyarsk radar violation goes to the heart of the ABM Treaty. Large phased-array radars (LPARs) like that under construction near Krasnoyarsk were recognized during the ABM Treaty negotiations as the critical, long lead-time element of a nationwide ABM defense.

When considered as a part of a Soviet network of new LPARs, the President concluded, the Krasnoyarsk radar has the inherent potential to contribute to ABM radar coverage of a significant portion of the central U.S.S.R. Moreover, the Krasnoyarsk radar closes the remaining gap in Soviet ballistic missile detection and tracking coverage. Together with other Soviet ABM-related activities it suggests, as noted above, that the Soviets might be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory, which is prohibited by the Treaty and would have serious adverse consequences for the East-West balance that has kept the peace.

THE CURRENT U.S. DEPLOYMENT MILESTONE

On May 28, the eighth U.S. TRIDENT submarine, USS NEVADA, begins its sea trials. As called for by the U.S. interim restraint policy announced last June, the President has carefully assessed our options with respect to that milestone. He has considered Soviet behavior since his June 1985 decision to go the extra mile and he has considered U.S. and Allied security interests in light of that Soviet behavior and our own programmatic options.

Since the President made his decision in June 1985 to dismantle a POSEIDON, USS SAM RAYBURN, in order to give the Soviets adequate time to join us in establishing a truly mutual framework of interim restraint, the situation has not been encouraging with respect to the three criteria that the President established for gauging constructive Soviet action -- i.e. 1) correction of Soviet noncompliance, 2) reversal of the Soviet military buildup, and 3) promoting progress in the Geneva negotiations.

While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in one or two areas of U.S. concern, for example with respect to the production rate of BACKFIRE bombers, there has been no real progress by the Soviets in meeting the most serious U.S. concerns. The deployment of the SS-25, a second new ICBM type forbidden by SALT II, continues. The Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile testing and impedes SALT II verification. The Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic force buildup. Finally, after a hopeful meeting in Geneva last November between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev, we have yet to see the Soviet Union follow-up in negotiations on the commitment made in the Joint Statement issued by the two leaders to seek common ground, especially through the principle of 50 percent strategic arms reductions, appropriately applied, and through an agreement on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF). In light of these circumstances, it is the President's judgment that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate by deed its readiness to join us in a framework of truly mutual interim restraint.

As the President has considered options associated with the current deployment milestone with the sea trials of the eighth TRIDENT, he has also carefully reviewed the military programmatic options available to the U.S. in terms of their overall net impact on U.S. and Allied security. It should be noted in this context that when the President issued guidance on U.S. policy in June of last year, the military plans and programs for Fiscal Year 1986 were about to be implemented. The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near-term for altering its planning is modest at best, and our military planning will take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous assumptions. This shadow lengthens and darkens with each reduction made in the funds available for our defense. Operating under such a shadow, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face, makes it essential that we make the very best possible use of our resources.

It had long been planned to retire and dismantle two of the oldest POSEIDON submarines. The President indicated in the decision announced today that had he been persuaded that refueling and retaining these particular two POSEIDON submarines would have contributed significantly and cost-effectively to the national security, he would have directed their overhaul and retention. However, in view of present circumstances, including current military and economic realities, it is the President's judgment that at this particular juncture, the proper course with respect to these two older POSEIDON submarines, is to retire and dismantle them, according to agreed procedures.

PROPORTIONATE U.S. RESPONSES

In announcing his decision last June, the President made clear at the same time that the U.S. would take appropriate and proportionate actions when needed to assure U.S. and Allied security in the face of Soviet noncompliance. It is the President's view that, while two POSEIDON submarines should be dismantled for military and economic reasons, certain new programmatic U.S. steps focused on the Administration's strategic modernization program are now necessitated by the continued lack of Soviet action up to this point in meeting the criteria established by the President's interim restraint policy decision last June.

Strategic Modernization Program. The Administration's highest priority in the strategic programs area remains the full implementation of the U.S. strategic modernization program to underwrite deterrence today, and the full pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program to seek to provide better alternatives in the future. The President's decision to retire the two older POSEIDON submarines at this point is fully in accordance with that program. Under any set of assumptions, our modernization program is, and will always be, designed to guarantee that our nation always has modern forces in sufficient quantities to underwrite our security and that of our Allies -- nothing more and nothing less. This goal ensures that the appropriate, best and proper use is made of our national resources.

The U.S. strategic modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles to the full program of 100 missiles, which was called for in 1983 by the Scowcroft Commission, is fully supported by our military leadership. The Administration's full strategic modernization program has been very carefully crafted by our best defense planners. It is the foundation for all future U.S. strategic program options and provides a solid basis which can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. The President believes it absolutely critical that this program not be permitted to erode. That would be the worst way to respond to the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance, would increase the risk to our security and that of our Allies, and would undercut our ability to negotiate the reductions in existing arsenals that we seek. It, therefore, would send precisely the wrong signal to the Soviet leadership.

o Bipartisan Support for the U.S. ICBM Program. Soviet actions to continue the accelerated development of their ICBM force are of great concern. Last June, the President cited the Soviet Union's flight-testing of the SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under the SALT II Agreement, as a clear and irreversible violation and noted that deployment would constitute a further violation. He noted that since the noncompliance associated with the development of this missile cannot, at this point, be corrected by the Soviet Union, the United States reserved the right to respond proportionately and appropriately. At that time, he also noted that the U.S. small ICBM program was particularly relevant in this regard. Given the events that have occurred since last June, including the Soviet Union's deployment of over 70 SS-25 mobile ICBMs, the President calls upon the Congress to join with him in restoring bi-partisan support for a balanced, cost effective, long-term program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of our own ICBM program.

o PEACEKEEPER (MX). The program we require should include the full 100-missile deployment of the PEACEKEEPER ICBM. It is sometimes forgotten by critics of the Administration's 100 missile PEACEKEEPER program that this represents a number only one half that requested by the previous Administration. The PEACEKEEPER missile has just completed another flawless flight test. It makes both good military and economic sense fully to exploit the great technical success that we have had with this missile.

o Small ICBM. The President believes that our ICBM program must also look beyond the PEACEKEEPER and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in the future. Our Small ICBM program makes a significant contribution not only in this regard, but also as an an appropriate and proportionate U.S. response to the irreversible Soviet violation associated with their SS-25 mobile ICBM.

o A Comprehensive Program. To ensure that he has a more robust range of options as he approaches future milestones, the President has in the decision announced today directed the Department of Defense to provide to him by November 1986 an assessment of the best options for carrying out a comprehensive ICBM program.

o Advanced Cruise Missile. Finally, the President has also directed the Secretary of Defense to take the steps necessary, working with the Congress, to accelerate the production of the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) Program. The President is not, at this time, directing any increase in the total ACM program procurement, but rather is establishing a more efficient program that both saves money and accelerates the availability of additional options for the future.

U.S. AND SALT

Having completed a comprehensive review of U.S. interim restraint policy and of the required response to the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, and following consultations with the Congress and key allies, the President has been forced to conclude that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate a readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

Given the lack of Soviet reciprocity, the President has decided that in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT II Agreement of 1979 or the SALT Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972. SALT II was a flawed agreement which was never ratified, which would have expired if it had been ratified, and which continues to be seriously violated by the Soviet Union. The SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972 was unequal, has expired, and is also being violated by the Soviet Union.

After reviewing the programmatic options available to the U.S., the President has decided to retire and dismantle two older POSEIDON submarines this summer. The U.S. thus will thus remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Agreement until we equip our 131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. The President has determined that given the decision that he has been forced to make by lack of Soviet reciprocity, the U.S. will later this year continue deployment of B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft, without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Agreement.

CONTINUED U.S. RESTRAINT

The President emphasized that the United States will continue to seek to meet its strategic needs, in response to the Soviet buildup, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major motives in our pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The President pointed out that as the U.S. modernizes, it will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. Therefore, he does not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces. The President also emphasized that, assuming no significant change in the threat that we face, as we implement the needed strategic modernization program the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

Since the United States will retire and dismantle two POSEIDON submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Agreement until the U.S. equips its 131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. However, given the decision that the President has been forced to make, he announced today that, at that time, he intends to continue deployment of U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Agreement. Of course, since the U.S. will remain in technical observance of the terms of the expired SALT II Agreement for some months, the President continues to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive

steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, the President noted that the U.S. will certainly take this into account.

In sum, the United States will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, while ensuring the credibility of our strategic deterrent, in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere for significant reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals of both sides. This is the urgent task that faces us.

THE ABM TREATY

Our obligations under the ABM Treaty remain unchanged. The President has made it clear that U.S. programs are, and will continue to be, in compliance with our obligations under the ABM Treaty. The President's statement today also makes it clear that we remain deeply concerned over Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. In contrast with SALT I and SALT II, however, the ABM Treaty is not an expired or unratified agreement. One of our priority objectives remains to have the Soviet Union return to compliance with their obligations under this Treaty.

HOPE FOR PROGRESS IN GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS

Time has not altered the basic truth that a policy of interim restraint is not a substitute for an agreement on deep, equitable and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Achieving such reductions has received, and continues to receive, our highest priority.

It therefore remains our hope the Soviet Union will take the necessary steps to give substance to the agreement which President Reagan reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to negotiate 50 percent reductions in strategic nuclear arms, appropriately applied, and an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear arms. If the Soviets agree to take those steps with us, we can together achieve greater stability and a safer world.