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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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JET 5/9/2005

File Folder USSR GENERAL 1/5 [1981-1983]

FOIA

F06-114/7

Box Number 26

YARHI-MILO

2602

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9841	MEMO	ODOM TO BRZEZINSKI RE EAST-WEST RELATIONS: A FORMULA FOR U.S. POLICY IN 1981 AND BEYOND <i>R</i> 7/7/2008 <i>NLRRF06-114/7</i>	8	9/3/1980	B1
9843	CABLE	310406Z JAN 81 <i>R</i> 11/24/2009 <i>F06-114/7</i>	4	1/31/1981	B1
9844	CABLE	070817Z FEB 81 <i>R</i> 7/7/2008 <i>NLRRF06-114/7</i>	1	2/7/1981	B1
9845	CABLE	090812Z FEB 81 <i>R</i> 11/24/2009 <i>F06-114/7</i>	8	2/9/1981	B1
9842	MEMO	PIPES TO ALLEN RE ANNIVERSARY OF SOVIET INVASION OF GEORGIA <i>R</i> 6/25/2009 <i>F2006-114/7</i>	1	2/12/1981	B1
9847	CABLE	USSR <i>D</i> 5/7/2013 <i>F2006-114/7</i>	3	2/17/1981	B1 B3
9846	CABLE	181539Z FEB 81 <i>R</i> 7/7/2008 <i>NLRRF06-114/7</i>	5	2/18/1981	B1

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947 Stonehill Lane
Los Angeles, California 90049
September 20, 1977

S.U.

Mr. Andrew W. Marshall
Director, Net Assessment
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Andy:

Here is the letter to you that Herb never finished. He started it at home probably during the first week of July and dictated the last part of it to me on July 8th at the hospital. He was not able to cover all the points he had in mind and, of course, he never read it through. I am passing it along just as it was left--a very rough draft.

I am also including a transcription of some notes I found in the same folder that may indicate some of the points he did not get to.

Best regards,

Joan

Joan Goldhamer

JG:tl

Enclosures: as noted (2)

2

July 1977

Dear Andy:

After completing my last two studies I sent you a letter discussing their implications for U.S. policy. My present study is a longterm undertaking whose significance for U.S. policy will be treated in my final chapter, which, unfortunately, is still some time off. For this reason I want to outline in the interim a few points that seem to deserve special attention today. They can equally well be derived from an understanding of the basic principles of political action or from a comparison of U.S. and Soviet pronouncements and political behavior although the materials of my study have lent a force to my convictions that they might not otherwise have had. My aim here is simply to express these convictions--not to argue or "prove" them. I think you probably will be aware of the sort of considerations that have led me to them. To some extent the points below overlap with those made in my previous letter.

1. (a) A stimulus to aggression to which insufficient attention is often paid are the images that the potential aggressor has of his prospective victim. These images may vary from being relatively well defined to being vaguely formulated beliefs. In either case they may exercise a strong influence in shaping military-political decisions which often depend on intuitions as well as clearcut calculations, and on the nature of the enemy rather than on his forces.

(b) When images of the potential victim view him as lacking in such qualities as will, discipline, determination, courage, sacrifice and as being subject to anxiety, inconsistency, hesitation and similar handicaps, the incentive to exploit or attack the potential victim is greatly increased.

(c) The U.S. and the West as potential victims of political and military aggression by the Soviet Union generally seek to reduce their anxieties on this score through qualitative and quantitative improvements in their forces. This tends to disregard or give insufficient emphasis to the role of Soviet images of them. The U.S. and the West forget that:

"Number itself importeth not much in armies, where
the people are of weak courage; for (as Virgil says)
it never troubles a wolf how many the sheep be."

(Francis Bacon)

Today it seems likely that an increased ability on the part of the U.S. and Western Europe to shape Soviet views of their will to resist political and military aggression and of their moral strength might have a greater deterrent effect than improved military capabilities.

The latter are by no means to be slighted, and indeed force improvements may favorably affect Soviet images of the Western spirit provided they are accompanied by what appear to the Soviets as independent indications of the West's spirit of resistance. Otherwise Virgil's maxim is operative and the marginal gain from force improvements is likely--from a deterrent standpoint--to be small.

(d) Paragraph 1(c) above implies the need for a program to affect the images that Soviet leadership has of U.S. and Western political-military leadership, of various economic, administrative and official elites, and of the masses, insofar as these images bear on attributes relevant to deterrence (see, e.g., 1(b)).

(e) A program for such a purpose can only in part be specified in advance. (Points 2 to ___ below deal with some aspects of such a program. *Most recommendations must be made in broad terms whereas success depends very much on the specific form in which events occur and the recommendations are to be executed. The general recommendations are not sufficiently specific to provide the guidance required for day-to-day execution. Perhaps the only way one could adequately provide the necessary instructions for future action would be to make a critique of U.S. political-military behavior and pronouncements as they occur day-to-day. In this way the reader might, if this were carried on over a sufficiently long period, say six months or a year, become sensitized to what is being recommended in a way and to a degree that general policy recommendation statements cannot convey.

2. It is imperative that the S.U. perceives Western leaders, elites and masses, but especially the leaders, as being confident and calm with respect to their future. This does not mean seeming to have a foolish disregard for difficulties and problems but nonetheless seeming unperturbed by them. U.S. leaders should avoid statements indicating they are "surprised" by actions of their antagonist or "disappointed" by them.** Indications of anxiety should be avoided. [To be expanded.]

3. U.S. spokesmen should not express optimism concerning the possibility of reaching agreements or that certain favorable developments will occur vis-à-vis themselves and the Soviets. These expressions of optimism convey a sense of considerable need to reach agreements, etc. One should note that the Soviets tend much more than do we to make pessimistic pronouncements, thus indicating that they can live without these agreements. As a democracy it is important the U.S. leaders should not convey to the Soviets a sense that they have to pacify mass opinion and preferences by optimistic statements.

*The dictated portion starts here.

** In the folder with his notes for this letter, Herb had a clipping from the Los Angeles Times of June 26/77 with the headline "Carter Surprised by Russ Rights Reaction" and the subhead "Feels His Stand is More of an Obstacle to Arms Talks Than He Had Thought."

4. On the whole one should assume that the Soviet failure to conceal their only too evident concern over the cruise missile and the human rights issue indicates that these are powerful instruments in the U.S. hand, and should not easily be dissipated. One should note that if the U.S. cruise missile is restricted to a 1500-mile radius this could give the Soviets a much greater incentive to ensure political control over Western Europe in order thereby to keep launching points for the cruise missile beyond this 1500-mile perimeter.

5. It is desirable in deterring Soviet aggression to increase in Soviet leaders their sense of the incalculability and riskiness of undertakings. In fact nothing is more striking in military history than the conviction of one military leader after another that wars, battles and similar ventures often have unpredicted consequences. A variety of means should be employed to make this sense of unpredictability--which used to be so strong in the past--more acute today. One means of doing this, for example, might be to get a scholar of international repute in military history to make a study of the role of unpredictability in military-political affairs. Military history would lend itself to very useful lessons on this score without the slightest stretching of the truth.

[Here the dictation ends.]

Herbert Goldhamer

Dictated but not read

JG'S TRANSCRIPTION OF HANDWRITTEN NOTES ON
POINTS TO BE COVERED IN HG'S LETTER TO AWM

- (1) Non-calculability - risk - uncertainty, increase SU appreciation of
- (2) Increase SU appreciation of West will, determination (or size of forces)

= Increase of cost to SU

= " " risk to SU

Sheep - Virgil

Resistance, * Terrorism all out resistance to aggression
--

- (3) Increase SU perception of Western self-confidence (cf McN & Laird)
LeMay

- (4) Choose } those things that SU most opposed to
Do e.g. cruise missile type of weapon

- (5) Give West image of future ^{both} Security and prosperity for ~~both~~ West
and SU ~~Party~~(?) ~~Party~~(?) * ^{Provenity}

optimistic
statements
pre
desirable

- (6) Public statements that developments look hopeful or aren't as bad as they seem, suggest to the opponent the great pressure one is under (domestically) for a resolution of issues, even at the cost of concessions and thus encourage the opponent to hold out for more or to play a waiting game to increase this pressure. It is essential not to give the impression that an agreement must be reached or that non-resolution will be a great disappointment or disaster.

- (7) Brezhnev Head of State--attempt ^{imp} to approximate Western legitimacy
(cf HG Soviet Soldier)

- (8) Paper on deception -- criteria *

- (9) Danger of provoking -- fear

- (10) Unwillingness to risk losing - as if backing down in advance is better than backing down after resistance.

-- 1948

* Words I am not sure I have read correctly.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4988-X 6

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SOVIET
GENERAL

INFORMATION

September 3, 1980

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: WILLIAM E. ODOM WO
SUBJECT: East-West Relations: A Formula for U.S.
Policy in 1981 and Beyond

NLRR FOI-114/7 #9841

BY CW NARA DATE 7/7/08

I want to offer some perspectives on the current state of East-West relations and an integrating formula for putting both the resources and a clear sense of strategic direction into our policies toward the Soviet Union in the next four years. You will recognize much of the analysis, but I hope the framework is helpful for tying rhetoric to actions and programs in a comprehensive fashion. The inspiration for this memo comes in part from Sam Huntington's recent paper on U.S.-Soviet relations which he wrote for Hedley Donovan, but it also stems from my own efforts in strategic doctrinal changes, the Persian Gulf Security Framework, and East-West technology transfers. We have accomplished a great deal over the past three years, and I would like to maintain the momentum and include additional areas and programs.

The East-West Balance

In early 1977 you told Sam and me to "tell us how we are doing in the world vis-a-vis the Soviets." PRM-10 Comprehensive Net Assessment was the reply. It treated military and non-military categories as well as all major regions of U.S.-Soviet competition.

1. The military balance was judged as "essential equivalence" and the trends as adverse. That judgment looks sound in retrospect.

2. In the non-military categories of technology, economics, diplomacy, and political institutions, the U.S. was ahead although the critical military-related technology gap was closing in several areas. In retrospect this judgment has been vindicated.

3. In the major regions outside Europe, Soviet prospects were judged best in Africa and the Persian Gulf region. The Caribbean was cited but without alarm. In retrospect, the record is mixed in Africa; Iran as a crisis point was predicted; we were too optimistic about the Caribbean; and Southeast Asia has been more volatile than anticipated. In East Asia, our normalization with the PRC faces the USSR for the first time ever with a China-Japan-U.S. tie of good relations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review September 3, 1986

4. In Europe, PRM-10 emphasized the certainty of political uncertainty in both Eastern and Western Europe. That judgment remains valid. The emergence of a more traditional German Ostpolitik, exploited by Moscow in the traditional manner, signals growing difficulties in West-West relations, i.e., within the Alliance. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has given unambiguous evidence of the strategic interaction between the Persian Gulf region and European-Soviet relations: Soviet power projection that affects the oil states of the Persian Gulf tends to reinforce the accommodationist politicizing forces in Western Europe and thereby exacerbates U.S.-European relations vis-a-vis Moscow and the Persian Gulf.

The Transition from Era I to Era II in East-West Relations

Critics within the U.S. and abroad have complained that the U.S. has not pursued a steady or consistent course in U.S.-Soviet affairs. The President, in particular, is believed by many to be responsible for this. It is, in their view, all his fault.

To some extent, the apparent inconsistency is real. Soviet power projection has been used more extensively in the last few years than even informed policy and intelligence circles believed it would be. "Changing" U.S. policy, therefore, has been "catching up" U.S. policy. Consistent policy outputs are impossible when the inputs differ substantially from those anticipated.

To a larger extent the inconsistency is only apparent. It looks that way because the foreign policy and press elites themselves are split on fundamental assumptions about U.S. foreign policy. They are awakening to and becoming disturbed by the transition from the first era in East-West relations -- 1945 to the mid-1970s (U.S. dominance and Pax Americana) -- to the second era -- the 1980s and 1990s (the nature of which is still being defined, as Soviet military power makes itself felt). But they are reacting to this awakening in quite different ways. At least three fissures divide foreign policy and media elite views, and perhaps even the broader public, as they assess the incipient realities of Era II.

First, there are fundamental differences over the political utility of military force. At the strategic nuclear level, some believe "assured destruction" is enough. Others believe force balances and capabilities make a political and diplomatic difference. At the conventional level, some argue that our Vietnam experience shows that conventional military power is greatly overrated. Others say that Vietnam proves the importance of using conventional military power effectively, of not squandering it where our interests are small.

The second fissure is East-West versus North-South primacy, between those who view East-West relations as still the cornerstone

of U.S. foreign policy and those who believe that North-South relations rival if not exceed East-West relations for the cornerstone role.

The third fissure concerns economics -- the growing incongruities between economic power on the one hand (Europe, Japan, and Saudi Arabia) and military security responsibilities on the other hand (the U.S. carries them all). It is only vaguely recognized, but it has enormous potential to evoke an "isolationist--internationalist" dichotomy in security policy prescriptions.

These fissures prevent a foreign policy consensus on East-West relations and mean that in the 1970s, and perhaps into the 1980s, no U.S. policy toward the USSR can have broad and constant support. The domestic need to accommodate both sides of each fissure, particularly in Congress for budgets, inevitably creates the impression, if not the reality, of a wavering U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and our allies. Thus, blaming the President is far from an adequate explanation.

The primary task for U.S. foreign and defense policy in the early 1980s, therefore, is to complete the transition to Era II peacefully and to give that era a definition and direction appropriate to changed realities. Success will depend in part on closing the three fissures, and a compelling formula articulated by the President will help close these. Only their closure will provide the liberal consensus necessary for a sustained realistic policy.

A U.S. Policy for Era II

Era II may or may not be dominated by the U.S. A return to the Cold War is not possible because regaining the military preponderance of that time is not feasible. Were it feasible, a Cold War balance would be the best choice because it was a period relatively secure from general war. A return to detente of the early 1970s is equally infeasible. The Soviets would demand higher terms and be no less aggressive in projecting power into the disputed regions. Even if the Soviet leaders personally desired a relaxation, the centrifugal forces within the USSR, in the Warsaw Pact, and in client states elsewhere would make it too risky. They are trapped in their own expansive dynamic which limits fundamental choices.

Neither the containment policy nor the detente policy alone is adequate to deal effectively with the new level of Soviet power. A more comprehensive approach is essential. The U.S. must neither rely largely on military power nor passively "contain" Soviet power. The U.S. must engage the USSR competitively.

Huntington defined four elements of a policy toward the USSR on which "competitive engagement" can be built.

- a. Maintenance of military deterrence.
- b. Containment of Soviet expansion where deterrence fails.
- c. Offers of politically conditioned economic benefits.
- d. Reduction of Soviet influence over client states, bloc states, and minority nationalities in the USSR.

A number of things have been accomplished over the past three years to provide the programs and policies for "competitive engagement" over the next four years. When they are specifically related to the four elements of the policy, a clear view of how to proceed in East-West relations begins to emerge. That follows for each element.

a. Maintenance of military deterrence through military pre-eminence.

The doctrinal changes marked by the "strategic" PD-41, 50, 53, 57, 58, and 59 provide the direction our military programs must take to maintain deterrence in the 1980s. The gap between our political objectives and our military capabilities must be reduced. This can be accomplished through simultaneous improvements in our force posture and meaningful arms control agreements.

- Force Improvements. We must address our military deficiencies in a three-pronged attack which includes:

- The Budget. Not only must the budget be increased, but Defense, FEMA, and the DCI must let the strategic PDs guide their program choices. To date, they have yielded little to the new doctrine.
- Organization. All three agencies must be reorganized to improve "factor productivity," with particular emphasis on the Pentagon. The President tried to reorganize DoD once, but the effort failed. He succeeded with FEMA. He must succeed in the next term with DoD.
- Manpower. We must also solve the military manpower problem. That probably means a return to the military draft.

The objective of these measures may not be "military superiority" but it should be "military pre-eminence" for the US and its allies, in terms of both nuclear and conventional forces.

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- Arms Control. Arms control, too, plays a part in the military balance. Arms control, however, is headed for indefinite dormancy in the 1980s unless it is tied symbiotically to our defense policy. PD-50 prescribed the process that can achieve that symbiosis. ACDA, State, and even ISA at Defense have failed to see this merit in the directive. Yet it is precisely arms control that is at risk without the PD-50 approach.

SALT I and II were developed to support our assured destruction defense policy of the 1960s. In the 1970s, that policy became inadequate. ACDA and State drifted into the position of seeing arms control as a surrogate for a defense policy. Now we are hesitantly awakening to the defense policy problem in Europe. We cannot move with confidence into TNF and SALT III negotiations because we are in transition with our defense policy. That is not the only defense policy problem for arms control. ASAT negotiations move on although we have not the slightest idea of our force goals for space. No military service has responsibility for them. The same is true for CTB. We have not developed our defense requirements for nuclear weapons development and production of nuclear materials. Yet we are on a CTB track that enjoys no interagency consensus.

Two major PD-50 tasks must be launched to extract us from this disastrous course on which arms control now proceeds toward self-destruction. First, an across-the-board assessment of all negotiations vis-a-vis one another is essential. Second, a somewhat more narrow review of the TNF/SALT III sector is needed to clarify what kind of SALT III can assist our national security in an unambiguous and objective way. To do that, we must also review the whole of our strategy and force structure for the defense of Europe. Both efforts should be complete by next spring. To make these serious endeavors, the President will have to reconfirm his commitment to the PD-50 process within the agencies.

b. Containment of Soviet expansion where deterrence fails.

We must devote special attention to the three interrelated strategic regions of Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. The Caribbean region is also overdue for our security attention as is Southeast Asia.

We have major work to accomplish in each area, notwithstanding much that has already been accomplished. NATO, as mentioned in connection with PD-50, needs a reassessment of our strategy for its defense. The Persian Gulf Security Framework effort must be kept on track, a separate unified command being one of the first steps next year. For the Caribbean we must begin a similar security framework effort. In East Asia, the nature of military ties with China will need further definition.

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In addition to these regional activities, some key functional area reviews must be accomplished:

- A successful policy of containment depends on capable conventional force projection. We have a modest beginning in the RDF.

- Security Assistance policy needs significant revision, budgeting, and perhaps changed legislation.

- Our intelligence capabilities in each region must be improved and expanded with all the speed possible.

- Military training assistance and advisory policy needs repair.

The most difficult area in the 1980s may prove to be Europe, West-West relations. Overcoming the lag between our own recovery from the hopes of the early 1970s and Europe's recovery from its present illusion of divisible detente, will not occur without political trauma. How to defend Europe effectively cannot be dodged as it has been for three decades. And until that is decided, arms control within that theater will be difficult to implement in a way that is not politically and militarily injurious to the West. The LTDP was a modest beginning which must be turned into a major revolution in the 1980s.

c. Offers of politically conditioned economic benefits to the East.

The Soviet Union and East Europe will continue to look to the West as a source of reprieve from their economic plight. The West must exploit that need with offers of economic assistance based on rigorous and measurable political conditions.

With the new COCOM policies, we have begun to control more effectively the strategic technology transfers. The next step is East-West trade coordination. Credits and trade must be coordinated on an alliance basis. Such a step logically follows from our COCOM policy. Otherwise, the "alternative supplier" problem will continue to deny us the political advantages of our greatest edge over the Soviets -- economic advantage. In the "process know-how" proposal to COCOM we have already moved slightly toward trade coordination. That is why Europe resists it. The diplomatic efforts now in progress to prevent the FRG (Kloeckner) and France (Creusot-Loire) from taking our ARMCO and ALCOA deals with the Soviet Union can be the seed from which East-West trade coordination grows. If the Germans believe that Soviet markets are critical for their machine exports, then we can retaliate by denying them our import market. We have strong laws that allow the President

to force Europe to choose between the US as a trading partner and the Soviet Bloc as a market. Once the allies are whipped into line, we can dictate the political terms of East-West trade.

The Soviets deeply fear a Western united economic front. If we do not present them with one in the 1980s, the incongruities between security burdens and economic power in NATO will create a political backlash in the US which will destroy public support for US troops in Europe. The Mansfield Amendment was merely a hint of what can come if the Europeans continue to can get without paying for, because we choose not to tax them.

To move from the rhetorical to the operational, we should use the post-Afghanistan policy with our allies to lay the basis for East-West trade coordination at the Economic Summit in Canada next summer. Once the Soviets see an emerging united economic front, we will have important opportunities for our economic diplomacy.

d. Reduction of Soviet influence over 1) client states, 2) bloc states, and 3) national minorities in the USSR.

It is time to reduce the spheres of Soviet influence, and the opportunities are large. We have the beginnings of a policy for the three non-Russian areas of Soviet influence.

- Client States. In Southwest Asia, in the Horn of Africa, in Southern Africa (Angola), in Yemen, in the Caribbean, and in Southeast Asia we can and should bring some reverses to the Soviet projection of power. This will involve more vigorous support for anti-Soviet movements afoot in all areas.

- Bloc States. We already have a policy for East Europe of encouraging its autonomy vis-a-vis the USSR. We must help Poland consolidate recent gains.

- Minorities in the USSR. We can do more on the nationality question within the USSR. The human rights policy is, of course, already a weapon in our arsenal. In an age of nationalism, there is nothing permanent about Soviet "internationalism" and Soviet borders --something we can imply and encourage others to say explicitly.

A competitive approach to spheres and areas of Soviet influence will make further Soviet projection of power more difficult. A passive containment approach will permit Soviet consolidation of recent gains and new efforts to expand further.

The Soviet Union, however militarily strong it is becoming, suffers enormous centrifugal political forces. A shock could bring surprising developments within the USSR, just as we have

seen occurring in Poland. The dissolution of the Soviet Empire is not a wholly fanciful prediction for later in this century. US policy should sight on that strategic goal for the longer run. When it comes, Era II will be at an end, and we can anticipate Era III.

To sum up, through a strategy of "competitive engagement" the President can, I believe, heal some of the fissures in our foreign policy and media elite opinion on the three key assumptions for US military, foreign, and economic policy. In a second term he will be freer to stand above the day-to-day criticisms that have heretofore made a steady course difficult to follow, particularly funding programs and pursuing adequate legislation. He also has the enormous advantage of several inchoate policy developments (as outlined above) that will allow him, rather than the Soviets and our allies, to define the nature of Era II in East-West relations. Basic steps have already been taken in each of the four elements of "competitive engagement." As policy slogans form each element, the following are possibilities:

a. Maintenance of military deterrence.

US "military pre-eminence" is the essential basis for deterrence and security. We shall acquire it and maintain it with our allies.

b. Containment of Soviet expansion where deterrence fails.

"Three interrelated security zones" are the basis for containing Soviet power projection.

c. Offers of politically conditioned economic benefits.

"Reciprocally advantageous East-West trade" is our goal, but trade is not compatible with threats to our security and foreign policy interests.

d. Reduction of Soviet influence over client states, Bloc states, and non-Russian minorities in the USSR.

"Resistance to Soviet internationalism" is encouraged wherever states and nations find it oppressive and unwanted.

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~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 1/20/01 (VEST, GEORGE)

TAGS: PEPR, PSDC, UR, US

SUBJECT: GROMYKO RESPONSE TO SECRETARY'S LETTER

REFS: A. MOSCOW 1088 B. STATE 19053

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ON JANUARY 29 DELIVERED TO THE SECRETARY A REPLY FROM GROMYKO TO THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 23 LETTER (REF B). THE TEXT FOLLOWS.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED YOUR LETTER OF JANUARY 24 TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AND TAKE NOTE OF THE WISH EXPRESSED THEREIN TO WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. THIS CORRESPONDS TO OUR INTENTIONS TOO.

INDEED, THERE EXISTS QUITE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, INCLUDING THE ONES WHICH DESERVE PRIORITY ATTENTION AND ON WHICH IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS. IT CAN ONLY BE REGRETTED THAT SUCH QUESTIONS, JUDGING BY YOUR LETTER, HAVE NOT YET FALLEN WITHIN THE FIELD

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

COLSON VP
EOB:EURE

PSN:057108 PAGE 01

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DTG:310406Z JAN 81

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NLRR F06-11417 #9843

BY RW NARA DATE 11/24/09

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OF VISION OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION.

AS TO CERTAIN SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TOUCHED UPON IN YOUR LETTER I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THE FOLLOWING.

RIGHT AFTER THE INCIDENT WHEN THE US EMBASSY PERSONNEL WERE SEIZED IN TEHRAN, THE SOVIET UNION IN CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS CAME OUT AGAINST ACTIONS OF THAT TYPE, IN FAVOR OF THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION PROVISIONS CONCERNING RESPECT FOR DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY AND, ACCORDINGLY, IN FAVOR OF THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE DETAINEES. THIS WAS ALSO THE POSITION WE ADHERED TO DURING THE DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL AT THE END OF 1979 AS WELL AS IN THE FOLLOWING PERIOD. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS ALSO FULLY AWARE OF THE FACT THAT IT WAS FROM THESE SAME POSITIONS THAT WE ADDRESSED OURSELVES DIRECTLY TO THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP.

THIS, HOWEVER, IS NOW PASSED OVER IN SILENCE. NEITHER YOUR LETTER NOR THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ADMINISTRATION CONTAIN A SINGLE KIND WORD ADDRESSED TO THE SOVIET UNION IN CONNECTION WITH THE POSITION IT ADOPTED. INSTEAD, CLEARLY TENDENTIOUS ASSESSMENTS ARE BEING GIVEN TO WHAT WAS REPORTED IN THE SOVIET NEWS MEDIA IN CONNECTION WITH THE RELEASE OF THE AMERICAN DIPLOMATS. MOREOVER, THIS IS BEING DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENTIRELY DISTORT IN THE EYES OF PUBLIC

OPINION THE POSITION HELD BY THE SOVIET STATE ON THIS MATTER. ONE CANNOT HELP ASKING THE QUESTION OF WHY ALL THIS IS BEING DONE AND WHETHER ANY THOUGHT IS BEING GIVEN AS TO HOW WE SHOULD REGARD SUCH DISTORTED INTERPRETATIONS.

NOW ABOUT POLAND. FIRST OF ALL I MUST SAY IN A TOTALLY DEFINITE WAY THAT THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THIS SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST STATE CANNOT BE A SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN THIRD COUNTRIES, INCLUDING BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA. IF ONE IS TO SPEAK, HOWEVER, OF OUTSIDE ATTEMPTS TO EXERT INFLUENCE ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN POLAND, THEN IT IS NECESSARY TO STATE THAT SUCH ATTEMPTS DO IN FACT TAKE PLACE AND THAT THEY ARE BEING UNDERTAKEN PRECISELY ON THE PART OF THE USA AND OTHER WESTERN POWERS. IN THIS REGARD IT IS SUFFICIENT TO MENTION AT LEAST THE PROVOCATIVE AND INSTIGATORY TRANSMISSIONS OF THE

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"VOICE OF AMERICA" AND OTHER US GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED RADIO STATIONS BROADCASTING TO POLAND. CONSTITUTING OPEN INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF POLAND, THOSE BROADCASTS ARE, IN ADDITION, AIMED AT AROUSING AMONG THE POLISH POPULATION UNFRIENDLY SENTIMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET UNION. THERE ARE ALSO FACTS WHICH INDICATE THAT THE INTERFERENCE OF WESTERN POWERS IN POLISH AFFAIRS IS NOT LIMITED TO RADIO BROADCASTS ALONE.

HERE AGAIN A QUESTION ARISES: WHAT PURPOSE THEN IS BEING SERVED BY THE ATTEMPTS OF THE AMERICAN SIDE TO INTRODUCE THE "POLISH THEME" INTO THE SOVIET-AMERICAN DIALOGUE AND TO MAKE AT THE SAME TIME INAPPROPRIATE "WARNINGS" ADDRESSED TO THE SOVIET UNION?

AS FAR AS POLAND IS CONCERNED WE, FOR OUR PART, ARE GUIDED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE JOINT STATEMENT--WHICH, I BELIEVE, YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH--ADOPTED AT THE BEGINNING OF LAST DECEMBER IN MOSCOW AT THE MEETING OF THE LEADERS OF THE WARSAW TREATY STATES. THIS DOCUMENT SPELLS OUT THE COLLECTIVE POSITION OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ITSELF, WHOSE LEADERS PARTICIPATED IN THAT MEETING.

SINCE YOU, MR. SECRETARY, DID NOT BYPASS IN YOUR LETTER THE AFGHANISTAN ASPECT EITHER, I WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT BRIEFLY OUR POSITION IN THIS RESPECT. ITS ESSENCE IS THAT THERE MUST BE A CESSATION OF THE ARMED INCURSIONS INTO THE TERRITORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN AND OF ALL OTHER INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND FIRM GUARANTEES MUST BE GIVEN THAT THIS WILL NOT BE RESUMED. DOING SO WOULD ALSO ELIMINATE THE REASONS THAT BROUGHT FORTH THE NECESSITY OF INTRODUCING INTO AFGHANISTAN A LIMITED CONTINGENT OF SOVIET TROOPS AT THE REQUEST OF THE DRA GOVERNMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

CONCRETE PATHS LEADING TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION AROUND AFGHANISTAN WERE SET FORTH IN THE DRA GOVERNMENT STATEMENT OF MAY 14, 1980. LATER, ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION, INCLUDING QUITE RECENTLY, THE DRA GOVERNMENT HAS CONFIRMED ITS READINESS TO START WORKING ON THE APPROPRIATE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN

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AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, AS WELL AS BETWEEN
AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN. THE UNITED STATES FOR ITS
PART COULD, NO DOUBT, CONTRIBUTE TO THE CAUSE
OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IF IT WERE TO FACILITATE
THE BEGINNING OF A DIALOGUE BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN
AND PAKISTAN AND DID NOT ATTEMPT, AS IS THE CASE
NOW, TO RAISE OBSTACLES THERETO.

IN CONCLUSION I WOULD LIKE ONCE MORE TO CONFIRM
OUR READINESS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON A WIDE
RANGE OF ISSUES. I HOPE THAT SUBSEQUENTLY IN OUR
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS A PROPER PLACE WILL BE ACCORDED
TO THE QUESTIONS ON THE RESOLUTION OF WHICH DEPEND,
IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, THE PROSPECTS FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT BOTH OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND
OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS A WHOLE.

SINCERELY, A. GROMYKO.
MOSCOW, JANUARY 28, 1981.
END TEXT. HAIG
BT

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USSR CHRONOLOGY

January 1-31, 1981

January

- 2 Nadezhda Mandel'shtam buried in Kuntsevo Cemetery.
- 8 Felix Serebrov arrested (last free member of Helsinki Group's Psychiatric Commission).
- 12 Lev Kopelev and Raisa Orlova deprived of Soviet citizenship while visiting in FRG.
- 15 Arstanbek Duysheyev (age 49) transferred from chairmanship of Presidium, Kirgiz Supreme Soviet, to premiership, replacing the assassinated Sultan Ibraimov.
- 16 Lithuanian Party Secretary R. B. Songayla named premier, replacing I. Manyushis, who retired.
- 16-17 22nd Turkmen Party Congress.
- 18 Sel'skaya Zhizn' published party and government decree permitting private plot owners to raise livestock on contract for sale to government procurement agencies.
- 20-22 17th Kirgiz Party Congress.
- 22-24 15th Moldavian Party Congress.
27th Armenian Party Congress.
26th Georgian Party Congress.
- 23 Central Statistical Administration reported 1980 grain harvest of 189.2 million metric tons.
Prosecutor General Roman Rudenko died at age 74.
- 23-25 19th Tadzhik Party Congress.
- 27-29 29th Belorussian Party Congress.
- 28-30 30th Azerbaydzhan Party Congress.
18th Estonian Party Congress.
- 29-30 23rd Latvian Party Congress.
18th Lithuanian Party Congress.

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- 5 -

As the Soviets See Themselves



— Ты чувствуешь, как подрос наш мальчик!

Рисунок Г. ИОРША

"You can feel how our boy has grown!"

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USSR CHRONOLOGY

February 1-28, 1981

February

- 3-5 20th Uzbek Party Congress.
- 4-6 15th Kazakh Party Congress.
- 7 Leningrad air crash killed Pacific Fleet Commander E. N. Spiridonov; fifty persons in all died, including a dozen flag officers.
- 10 Pravda reported that posthumous honors for Kosygin include the naming of streets in Moscow and Leningrad, a Moscow textile plant, and a ship and the placing of an apartment house plaque.
- Pravda announced the promotion of A. M. Rekunkov from first deputy to Prosecutor General USSR, replacing the late R. A. Rudenko.
- 10-12 26th Ukrainian Party Congress.
- 11 Foreign Ministry summoned Washington Post reporter Kevin Klose for oral reprimand for "slandorous assertions about Soviet life."
- Literaturnaya Gazeta correspondent Vladimir Simonov concluded a three-part series charging diplomats with smuggling ikons from USSR.
- 14 Pravda criticized USICA and CIA employees for briefing American newsmen at a Kennan Institute seminar.
- 15 Ivan Serbin, head of Defense Industry Department of CPSU Central Committee, died at age 71.
- 17 V. A. Kazakov, Minister of Civil Aviation USSR, died at age 65.
- Iosif Mendelevich released from confinement pre-term and deported to Israel; only two Russian participants in the 1970 skyjacking case now remain in confinement.
- 19 Vasily Baratz, a member of the Committee for the Right to Emigrate, arrested.

- 20 One-day session of CPSU Central Committee heard Brezhnev and Tikhonov give previews of their reports for the 26th Party Congress.
- TASS published its version of January 15 incident in a Rovno hotel involving Major R. Holbrook and Lt. Col. Spencer of USDAO.
- Ivan Stepanovich Silayev was named Minister of Civil Aviation USSR.
- Boris Vladimirovich Bal'mont was named Minister of Machine Building and Instrument Making USSR, replacing the transferred I. S. Silayev.
- 22 Pravda announced publication of a new CPSU Central Committee journal, Kadry sel'skogo khozyaystva (Agricultural Cadres), dedicated to personnel policy in the unified agro-industrial complex.
- 23 26th CPSU Congress opened; Brezhnev delivered 3-hour and 40-minute accountability report; G. F. Sizov gave report of Central Auditing Commission.
- 27 Premier Tikhonov gave report on economic guidelines for the 1981-85 period and for the period up to 1990.



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THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH:
ITS POLICIES, POLITICS, AND ACTIVISTS

Summary

Western observers and Soviet Orthodox Church activists have long portrayed the Russian Orthodox Church as a captive of the regime: dominated by central and local organs of the party and state, infiltrated by informers, hemmed in by restrictive legislation, paralyzed by inertia, and no longer capable of fulfilling its responsibilities or defending its interests. When Orthodox activists began to threaten established church-state relations, as well as the discipline and outward authority of the church, both church and state acted to silence them. This paper examines the nuances and tensions of the relationship the church has with its activists and the Soviet regime, using the judgments of an unusually candid confidential report of the Soviet Government agency in charge of religious affairs as a point of departure.

* * * * *

Coopting Organized Religion

The close control Soviet authorities exercise over policies and activities of registered (i.e., legal) religious denominations, at both the central and local levels, has been extensively documented by unofficial Soviet sources and Western observers as well as by available official internal documents of party and government organizations, including those of the State Council for Religious Affairs (the agency directly responsible for the supervision of church-state relations in the USSR).

Publication in the West^{1/} of a confidential document of the Council for Religious Affairs

1/ Vestnik russkogo Khristianskogo dvizheniya, Nos. 130 and 131, Paris, 1979-80.

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Report 64-AR
February 5, 1981

recently provided an unusually graphic glimpse of the actual relationship between church and state in the USSR, considerably at variance with the idealized version purveyed by Soviet officials and media for external consumption. The council's lengthy report to the CPSU Central Committee, prepared in 1975 and signed by its deputy director V. Furov, discussed the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church and its activities. The language of the report left no room for doubt as to the complete subservience of the church hierarchy to the council, which was shown as determining church policies and supervising the actions of the Episcopate in minute detail. It was also evident from the report that the council measured its own performance by the success it achieved in neutralizing the role of the church domestically, while using it as an instrument for propaganda abroad.

The report divides the entire Orthodox hierarchy (i.e., the Patriarch, metropolitans, archbishops, and bishops) into three categories, in some instances characterizing individual performances:

- those who wholeheartedly supported the regime and its policies, including policies with respect to religion (this category included Patriarch Pimen);
- those who were loyal to the regime but who nevertheless sought to further the interests of the church, although without violating the laws on religion; and, finally,
- those who were religious activists, with a record of attempts to evade or violate the law in order to strengthen the church, spread the faith, and oppose regime policies toward religion.

Although the report contains many previously unknown details, its chief value lies in the fact that an official document prepared for internal use by a responsible Soviet official portrays church-state relations in a way that is fully congruent with reports from unofficial Soviet sources and with the views of Western specialists regarding the status of the church in the USSR. It also leaves the reader with three principal impressions, although these were implied rather than stated in the report:

- The regime--committed to the implementation of atheism--has achieved near-total control over the Russian Orthodox Church and its hierarchy. The regime has maneuvered the church hierarchy into the position of participating in the implementation of policies aimed at the eventual destruction of the church and the gradual creation of an atheist society.

- 3 -

- Soviet interests are, however, for the time being, served by maintaining the outward integrity of the church and the authority of its hierarchy, so as to prevent the development of dissension or open protest within the hierarchy or among Orthodox believers. The authorities need church leaders to be sufficiently strong to keep their people in line and within the letter of Soviet law, because excessive enforcement of the law on religion by the authorities would generate charges that the regime was persecuting citizens for their religious beliefs.
- Despite the regime's attainment of "near-total" control over the church, there remains a substantial number of individuals among the clergy, including members of the hierarchy, who chafe under the Draconian restrictions imposed on the church by the authorities and who find the dilemma of being forced to act against their conscience and clerical responsibility to be an agonizing one. The council's report is shot through with a sense of distrust toward the clergy and exhortations for eternal vigilance by state and party organs.

Church and State in Russia

When Soviet authorities stepped up their repression of organized dissent in 1979-80, their targets included all four major categories of nonconformism: political, nationalist, cultural, and religious. The campaign against religious activism was in many respects an outgrowth of traditional Soviet attitudes and policies toward religion, but it was directed not so much against religion per se as against certain of its manifestations:

- religious activity serving as a vehicle for nationalist aspirations (as among Lithuanian Catholics);
- unregistered religious denominations; and
- unofficial activist groups within registered denominations.

The common denominator in all three instances was that religious activities were taking place outside the framework of established church-state relations and outside the bounds of permissible religious activity as defined by Soviet legislation and policy. In short, they were activities uncontrolled by the authorities.

The Historical Tradition. Church-state relations in the USSR have developed in a complex pattern reflecting the constant interaction between a Soviet regime unremittingly hostile toward

religion and the national cultures and religions of the multinational Soviet state. In this mosaic, the Russian Orthodox Church, as the church of the country's dominant culture and nationality, occupies a central and leading role. It remains, in a sense, the establishment church, and its historical experience still imparts a special character to its dealings with Soviet authorities.

As part of its legacy from Byzantium, the Russian Church received a tradition of regarding the Tsar's authority as a manifestation of God's will. To be sure, the royalty of Western Europe also ruled "by the grace of God," but in the East, the Patriarchate never institutionalized, as did the Papacy, its spiritual authority over the monarch, even though the Patriarch on occasion wielded great power if he happened to be a strong personality. This tradition was reenforced in Russia when Peter the Great abolished the Patriarchate and deprived the church of an independent institutional voice. For a period of 200 years, the church functioned virtually as an arm of the state and in turn taught obedience to the Tsar's authority as an obligation of Orthodox Christians.

Thus, when the activist priest Father Dimitriy Dudko was persuaded to make a public confession in June 1980, some six months after his arrest, the explanation he gave for repudiating his career as an outspoken defender of the rights of believers was firmly grounded in Orthodox tradition, even though it sounded incongruous in its application to the Soviet regime. Dudko explained that he finally realized that his activities were in fact political (and anti-Soviet) rather than religious when he remembered what he had earlier forgotten--that "every [secular] authority comes from God." And if the statement Dudko read over Soviet television was not his own but the product of KGB drafting, then the readiness of Soviet authorities to invoke tradition in discrediting religious activists and in reenforcing the legitimacy and authority of the Soviet state becomes all the more striking.

The Tradition Lost, Restored, and Betrayed. The appearance of Russian Orthodox activists in the 1960s paralleled the appearance of independent thought and action in other areas of Soviet life. But while the expansion of intellectual freedom--and, ultimately, overt dissent--developed in the wake of de-Stalinization under Khrushchev, the Orthodox Church experienced a different sequence of repression and liberalization. Following the initial brutal post-revolutionary phase of persecution, the church as an institution barely survived into the 1930s.

World War II provided a temporary remission from anti-religious pressures. The role of the church in rallying popular support for

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the Soviet regime at this critical period earned Stalin's recognition and served as the basis for a concordat restoring the Patriarchate and placing church-state relations on a stable basis. Thus, the institutional church achieved a measure of security and succeeded in reopening churches, monasteries, and seminaries by a policy of supporting and serving the regime, rather than by opposing it in a struggle for "religious freedom."

The liberalization of the intellectual climate under Khrushchev did not, however, bring similar benefits to religious believers. Quite to the contrary, Khrushchev set in motion a sweeping anti-religious campaign during the latter period of his rule (1959-64) that resulted in the wholesale closing of churches, a reduction in the number of priests from 20,000 to 7,000, and the loss of many of the gains the Orthodox Church had achieved under Stalin. The Patriarchate itself survived the onslaught but at the price of maintaining silence as churches were being closed or destroyed. Indeed, high-ranking Orthodox clerics continued to describe the status of the church in rosy colors at international religious conferences, citing as proof the guarantees of religious freedom found in the Soviet Constitution.

In general, official attitudes toward religion under Brezhnev have been more nuanced and differentiated than under Khrushchev. Pressures against religion have continued unabated but have been applied selectively and skillfully and carried out under the cover of legality. Some denominations have fared better than others because of local circumstances (i.e., the Armenian and Georgian churches) or international considerations (the Muslims). Relentless harassment of the unregistered evangelical sects--such as the Pentecostals and the Seventh Day Adventists--has been balanced by relatively generous treatment of the official (i.e., registered) segment of the Baptist Church, evidently in order to persuade the independent groups of the wisdom of registering and cooperating with the regime.

The Russian Orthodox Church, under Brezhnev, has continued to view its traditional policy of silence in the face of hostile pressure as the key to survival, but the wisdom of this policy has become increasingly questionable. The disadvantages now heavily outweigh the advantages, and the price the church has paid in the loss of its integrity is a heavy one. Subservience to the regime now provides not security and stability but, rather, a participatory role in helping the Council for Religious Affairs implement its salami tactics of gradually but steadily slicing away the substance of the moral, material, intellectual, and organizational resources of the church.

The Orthodox hierarchy continually has been placed in the position of failing to defend the interests of the church and the

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faithful; of turning a deaf ear to pleas for help from individuals and congregations; of acquiescing to manifest violations of Soviet law on religion by the authorities; of obediently executing all official instructions, including the disciplining of activist laypersons and priests; and of performing foreign assignments for the government whenever called upon to do so. Indeed, the regime has channeled the Patriarchate's activities primarily into the area of foreign contacts and, by numerous accounts, has closely controlled its Office for External Relations with KGB personnel.

Since the 1950s, the Patriarchate has all but ceased to perform its primary responsibility of administering the affairs of the church as the organizing and unifying center of religious life. Individual dioceses have found themselves in effect cast adrift and without support in coping with local problems, including the central one of dealing with the authorities. The Patriarch no longer visits individual dioceses and rarely issues orders or receives visitors, including ruling archbishops. His only direct link with believers has been reduced to appearances at religious services in several Moscow churches. His isolation is not self-imposed but forced upon him by official policy; in effect, his activities are limited to those suggested by advisers from the Council for Religious Affairs. Even his personal chauffeur is reportedly a KGB retired major. In private conversations, the Patriarch refers to himself as living in a "golden cage."

The Church in Disarray

One effect of the steady reduction in the number of churches, especially in rural areas, has been to deprive large numbers of believers of access to a working church or the services of a priest. As a result, the church experienced an appreciable loss of believers to other religious groups, particularly to the Baptists. Evangelical Protestant denominations proved far more resilient and better adapted to survival under conditions of oppression because they did not require priests for the performance of religious services and other essential functions or a hierarchy for maintaining an institutional church organization. Instead, they relied on the initiative of individual believers in maintaining small working congregations united by loose, informal ties geared to cooperation and mutual assistance.

Paradoxically, the decline of institutional Orthodoxy also created possibilities for its revival and renewal, in encouraging the appearance of unofficial study groups and religious seminars. Organized by activists, they functioned entirely outside the formal church structure, or--less frequently--gathered around courageous priests at the parish level. This spontaneous trend was able to absorb and gain strength from a modest revival of interest in religion among those Soviet citizens--especially the

youth--who were repelled by the spiritual vacuum of the official culture.

The formal church could not take advantage of this interest because the controls and policies imposed by the Council for Religious Affairs prevented it from engaging in proselytizing activities or showing any evidence of growth. Quite the contrary, the council expected the church to demonstrate the validity of the regime's ideological assumptions by showing, in its steady decline, the gradual loss of interest in religion in the USSR.

There is evidence that some members of the hierarchy welcomed the appearance of unofficial activists because the activists brought new blood, intellectual vigor, and--above all--integrity to the church. They were able to express openly what the church had to conceal, and they revived public discussion of issues vital to the continued survival of the church. There is little doubt that some members of the hierarchy provided activists with discreet support and encouragement, surreptitiously circulated samizdat literature (as well as Russian-language religious literature published abroad), and preferred not to discipline activists unless prodded by higher authority.

At the same time, relations between religious activists and the Patriarchate steadily deteriorated, partly because the Patriarchate came under increasing pressure from the Council for Religious Affairs to crack down on dissent within the church but also because the Patriarchate itself became the target of dissident criticism. The activists could hardly criticize the policies of the Soviet regime toward religion without at the same time reproaching the Patriarchate for inaction in failing to defend the interests of the church.

Published literature contains extensive documentation of how religious activists of various denominations--including the largely Orthodox Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights, the Lithuanian Catholic Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights, and similar groups established by the Pentecostals, Seventh Day Adventists, and the unofficial (i.e., unregistered) Baptists--have publicized and documented all aspects of official anti-religious policy, including repressive actions directed against the religious activists themselves. Much less attention has been focused on the Christian Committee's sweeping indictment of the Patriarchate and its policies and the possible consequences of these attacks on the Orthodox Church and its official status vis-a-vis the Soviet state.

Criticism of the Patriarchate by the Activists

Dereliction of Duty and Heresy. Documents of the Christian Committee contain frequent criticism of the internal and external policies of the Patriarchate, but perhaps the most cogent critique of its internal policy was contained in the letter the committee sent to Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch Demetrius of Constantinople in April 1978.^{2/} The committee praised Demetrius for proclaiming 1977 as a year of religious freedom and then explained why no support or sympathy from the Moscow Patriarchate could be expected. According to the committee, unremitting hostile pressure had forced the Patriarchate to deviate from its pastoral duties and responsibilities:

"The episcopate's rejection of the charisma of confession...led to a situation where the duty of a church leader to intercede for the people was forgotten....In a state dominated by an ideology hostile to Christianity, the struggle to preserve outward well-being has so transformed the minds of Church leaders that they are beginning to do what is completely unacceptable...to merge Christianity with the ideology of the adversaries of Christ."

This dereliction, in their view, led the Patriarchate into taking positions involving doctrinal error and, ultimately, heresy. The letter spelled out these errors in precise theological formulations.

Citing a statement by Patriarch Pimen that Orthodox believers are guided in their liturgical life by the canons of Orthodoxy, but in their working and public lives they live by the principles of the October Revolution, the letter noted: "This statement by the head of the Orthodox Church is tantamount to ecclesiological Nestorianism ... an official admission that under Soviet conditions, a Christian must be ambivalent and lead a double life...." For the clergy it meant that they were required to observe church canons in performing religious rites, but outside the church, "they must be guided by these canons only insofar as they do not contradict the general policy of destroying religion...." As a result, "Anyone who carries out missionary work not only risks being persecuted by state organs but also risks receiving canonical prohibitions from his superior in the Church."

The letter termed the argument of church leaders--i.e., that the condition of servitude of the church to the state was illusory,

2/ Arkhiv Samizdata, Munich, document No. 3249.

that in a spiritual sense the church remained completely free-- "an example of ecclesiological monophysitism in its extreme Docetic form." That doctrine reflects extreme distrust of all human activity and creativity and a denial that God can act in history through the human will. The church's position of nonresistance to evil translated in practice into a flight from reality and a rejection of any form of activism. In short, it was a religious attitude located at the opposite pole from the notion that God helps those who help themselves.

The two deviations from accepted Orthodox thought, the letter concluded, led "the episcopate and a significant portion of the clergy" to display "hostility, suspicion, or indifferent aloofness to human rights activity, to campaigns for the opening of churches and the registration of new parishes. It is not rare for the bishops to use their authority against such undertakings...."

Finally, the letter charged that by submitting to state supervision and control, the Russian Orthodox Church had violated the ordinances of the 1918 All-Russian Church Council that restored the Patriarchate and declared the church to be fully self-governing and independent of the state.

The activists' charges evidently stung the church sufficiently to elicit an unusual and defensive-sounding rebuttal in Patriarch Pimen's Christmas message of 1980 (i.e., on January 7, 1981, according to the Gregorian calendar). It stated that the Orthodox Church "performs its mission within contemporary society existing in the Soviet state, as before, in strict compliance with the teaching of Christ and his Apostles, the Holy Book, and the traditions of the Church."

Canonization of Martyred Clergy. In May 1975, three Orthodox activists--Father Gleb Yakunin, Viktor Kapitanchuk, and Lev Regelson (two of whom were to become founding members of the Christian Committee)--called upon the Orthodox Church to honor in its prayers those who were martyred for their faith by the communists during the Civil War and in the subsequent period of religious persecution. Moreover, in letters^{3/} addressed to the Patriarch and the Russian Orthodox Churches abroad,^{4/} they proposed the need for preparatory work leading

^{3/} Documents of the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights, Vol'noye Slovo, No. 28, Posev Publishers, Frankfurt, 1977.

^{4/} Russian Orthodox Churches outside the USSR include the following major groups: the Orthodox Church in America, the Russian Orthodox Synodal Church Abroad, the Russian Orthodox Diocese in Paris (under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople), and the Russian Orthodox Church (of the Moscow Patriarchate).

to the canonization of celebrated martyrs of that period. "The Moscow Patriarchate," they pointed out, "... has for all practical purposes disowned its martyrs and consigned them to oblivion." They also expressed regret that the Patriarchate had missed a favorable opportunity to seek official rehabilitation for at least some of the martyred Orthodox churchmen during the "personality cult" revelations when many victims of the terror were rehabilitated.

In 1979, the Christian Committee welcomed the resolution adopted the year before by the Russian Orthodox Synodal Church Abroad to initiate the canonization of martyred clerics, recommending only that this action should be taken, if possible, by all Russian Orthodox Churches jointly. Regarding the Synodal Church's second resolution--to consider canonization of the last Tsar, Nicholas II, as well--the committee reacted cautiously but on the whole favorably, although it noted the controversial nature of this proposal.^{5/}

A Threat To Split the Church. The ultimate weapon available to the Christian Committee and other Orthodox activists in goading the institutional church into action was to threaten a church split. In a letter of August 1978 to the Patriarch, the committee reproached him for his alleged complicity with the authorities in opposing the creation of new parishes. It warned that such policies raised the possibility that a bishop, unable to respond to pleas by the faithful in his diocese, might allow the creation of a parish recognizing the jurisdiction of another autocephalous orthodox church.^{6/}

Left unsaid but implied was the possibility that a bishop might shift allegiance to another orthodox church--perhaps that of the Ecumenical Patriarch, the Russian Synodal Orthodox Church Abroad, or the Orthodox Church in America. The committee pointed out the "possibility under canon law" for Orthodox parishes in the USSR to come under the jurisdiction of a non-Soviet orthodox church, given the precedent established in the US where some parishes of the Patriarchal Church had shifted to the Orthodox Church in America in accordance with their parishioners' wishes--and with the acquiescence of the Patriarchal Church.

In his last report to the Christian Committee, shortly before his arrest in November 1979, Yakunin argued that one of the basic principles of canon law, requiring that Orthodox Churches be organized on a territorial-geographic basis and precluding the operation

5/ Vol'noye Slovo, No. 35-36, 1979.

6/ Russkaya Mysl', Paris, November 30, 1978.

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of one church on the territory of another, had been irretrievably breached by historical events. Nor could canonical rules foresee "that a local Church would appear that refuses to care for its spiritual children and refuses to spread the Gospel in places where an atheistic state does not permit it." These circumstances, in his view, justified "exceptions corresponding to the reality of our time," including an action by the Orthodox Church in America (or some other Orthodox Church) "to take under its jurisdiction the suffering Orthodox flock in the USSR."^{7/}

The same idea was explored by Father Dimitriy Dudko in a 1978 letter to Metropolitan Filaret of the Orthodox Church in America. Dudko complained about the shortage of clergy and lack of "independent" bishops and wondered whether there was any feasible way of introducing additional priests and bishops into the USSR, either officially or unofficially.^{8/}

Repression and Collusion

The independent and insubordinate posture of the Orthodox activists presented a threat to the existing structure of church-state relations in the USSR. The Patriarchate faced the possibility, if dissent were to spread, of increased disarray within the church and a challenge to its authority. The authorities, for their part, understood that the Patriarchate and its hierarchy--the regime's principal instruments of control over the church--needed the outward image of their authority to be enhanced (if not their actual powers). Both Patriarchate and authorities perceived a need for silencing the religious activists. Evidence of their collusion to that end remains for the most part fragmentary and circumstantial, but it is suggestive.

The Arrests. During the general repression of organized dissent that began in 1978, Soviet authorities arrested and brought to trial most of the prominent Orthodox activists:

--Aleksandr Ogorodnikov: member of the Christian Seminar, arrested in November 1978; sentenced in January 1979 to one year of labor camp for parasitism.

--Vladimir Poresh: member of the Orthodox Seminar, arrested in August 1979; sentenced in April 1980 to five years in labor camp plus three years of internal exile on charges of anti-Soviet activity (Art. 70, RSFSR Criminal Code).

^{7/} Orthodox Monitor, Washington, No. 7-8, 1980, p. 101.

^{8/} Vol'noye Slovo, No. 33, 1978, p. 18.

- Tatyana Shchipkova: member of the Christian Seminar, arrested in September 1979; sentenced in January 1980 to three years in labor camp on charges of hooliganism.
- Gleb Yakunin: Orthodox priest, founder and intellectual force of the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights, arrested in November 1979; sentenced in August 1980 to five years in labor camp plus five years of internal exile on charges of anti-Soviet activity (Art. 70, RSFSR Criminal Code).
- Lev Regelson: member of the Christian Seminar, arrested in December 1979; sentenced in September 1980 to five-year suspended sentence on charges of anti-Soviet activity (Art. 70, RSFSR Criminal Code) after pleading guilty and confessing.
- Vladimir Burtsev: founder of the Christian Seminar, arrested in January 1980; sentenced in April 1980 to 18 months in camp on a charge of "forging documents."
- Dimitriy Dudko: Orthodox activist priest known for his outspoken sermons, arrested in January 1980; confessed over Soviet television on June 20, 1980, to engaging in anti-Soviet activities; now assigned to suburban parish outside Moscow.
- Viktor Kapitanchuk: member of the Christian Committee, arrested in August 1980; sentenced in October 1980 to five-year suspended sentence after pleading guilty to charges of anti-Soviet activity (Art. 70, RSFSR Criminal Code).

Signs of Favor. In May 1978, celebration by the Patriarchate of the 60th anniversary of its restoration received extensive coverage in the Soviet media, including the three-hour speech the Patriarch delivered at a reception in Moscow's Hotel Sovetskaya. Thereafter, especially in 1980, the Patriarchate began to receive unusual marks of official favor and media attention:

- The number of seminarians enrolled in Soviet Orthodox seminaries reportedly increased.
- In March 1980, TASS circulated a lengthy report on a synod of the Russian Orthodox Church and on the activities of the church in promoting world peace.
- In an authoritative article published in Kommunist (No. 5, 1980), Chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs

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Kuroyedov criticized various religious denominations in the USSR for violating Soviet laws on religion but did not mention the Orthodox Church or its activists in this context. Instead, Kuroyedov approvingly cited the "peace-loving" initiatives of the Patriarchate in supporting Soviet foreign policy objectives.

- On June 22, Izvestiya reported the award of the Order of the People's Friendship to Patriarch Pimen on his 70th birthday by an order dated June 20 (i.e., the day Father Dudko confessed over Soviet television).
- Although in September 1980 the church did not participate in the official celebration of the 600th anniversary of the Kulikovo Battle (when defeat of a Tatar army paved the way for the establishment of an independent Muscovite state), its role in the rebirth of Russian nationalism was reflected in Soviet media, especially by Russian neo-nationalists within the Soviet establishment.
- In early October 1980, the Patriarch formally opened a large workshop for the manufacture and restoration of religious objects and supplies. Although built and financed by the church, it could not, of course, have reached even the planning stage without prior approval of the authorities.
- A Soviet film on the Russian Orthodox Church, produced by the Moscow Central Documentary Film Studio and shown as part of a Novosti Press Agency's public lecture on October 31, portrayed the church without anti-religious overtones as a vital component of modern Soviet life; it included shots of church services, worshippers, and seminarians with a background soundtrack of Orthodox choral music.
- On November 18, in a ceremony in the Kremlin publicized by TASS, First Deputy Chairman Kuznetsov of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet presented the Order of the People's Friendship (awarded June 20) to Patriarch Pimen. The latter, in expressing thanks, declared that "We, the believers of the Soviet Union, highly appreciate the care shown by the leaders of our state for prosperity of the people, their devotion to the ideas of durable and fair peace, and wholeheartedly wish full success in their noble activities."

In return, the church continued to represent the regime abroad in support of Soviet foreign policy objectives, including attendance at the CSCE Review Conference in Madrid, where Archbishop Nikodim spoke at a press conference on behalf of the Soviet position.

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Aloofness and Noninvolvement

Outwardly, the church maintained a posture of aloofness and noninvolvement during the arrests and trials of its activists. All of the cases involved criminal charges against individual believers and did not implicate the church in any way. The failure of the Patriarchate to speak out in their defense may not have reflected credit on the church, but it did not, of itself, constitute evidence of collusion with the authorities.

The cases of the three activists who admitted their guilt did, however, raise questions about the methods used to obtain confessions and the motives of the defendants. Available evidence about two who chose to plead guilty--Regelson and Kapitanchuk--does not provide any clear answers. From what is known so far, they behaved with dignity during their trials, avoided compromising others by their testimony, and emerged with minimum damage to their integrity. Both admitted that their actions and writings had damaged Soviet interests and violated Soviet law.

The trial of one who did not confess--Father Gleb Yakunin--featured testimony for the prosecution by witnesses who held positions within the Patriarchate, raising the possibility of church involvement in his case:

- A. I. Osipov, a professor at the Moscow Theological Academy, and Igumen (Father-Superior) Iosif Pustoutov--both reportedly members of the Patriarchate's Office for External Relations--testified that Yakunin's writings had greatly impeded the work of the church abroad. In particular, they described a letter Yakunin sent in 1975 to the Conference of the World Council of Churches in Nairobi as having caused "irreparable harm." They also accused Yakunin of inciting Christians against the Soviet regime. After the trial, Pustoutov declared in a TASS interview that he had testified as a private person and not as a representative of the Patriarchate.
- Another witness against Yakunin was Aleksandr Shushpanov, a known KGB informant within the church, a former interpreter in the Patriarchate's External Affairs Office, and currently a parish official in Moscow. Although Yakunin and Kapitanchuk had exposed Shushpanov as a provocateur two years earlier, the Patriarchate has taken no action against him and has allowed him to continue holding responsible positions within the church.

The Case of Father Dudko

The Patriarchate was not able to maintain its posture of noninvolvement in the case of Father Dimitriy Dudko even though it attempted to do so.^{9/} The very circumstances of Dudko's confession, as arranged and highlighted by the authorities, pointedly carried a message for perceptive believers and indicated the active role of the Patriarchate. The confession Dudko read over Soviet television on June 20, as published in Izvestiya the following day, was dated June 5. The reason for the authorities' choice of June 20 as the date for putting Dudko on national television became apparent when Izvestiya announced on June 22 the award of the Order of the People's Friendship to Patriarch Pimen on his 70th birthday--June 20. Later, TASS reported Dudko's letter to the Patriarch asking Pimen to forgive his activities--but without indicating that the letter preceded, rather than followed, Dudko's television confession.

A. Levitin-Krasnov, an eminent Orthodox theologian, church historian, and friend of Dudko who emigrated from the USSR several years ago and is respected for his detailed, first-hand knowledge of Orthodox affairs and personalities, has now provided a more complete account of what actually happened. According to Levitin-Krasnov, Dudko wrote to the Patriarch during a period of depression while under arrest and in expectation of trial. Dudko knew Pimen well; Pimen, while still Archbishop of Dmitrovsk, had personally helped Dudko to become a priest (no simple matter, because Dudko had just been released from labor camp) and even ordained him personally. The letter provided the KGB the opportunity to exploit Dudko's personal relationship with Pimen.

In Levitin-Krasnov's account, soon after Dudko wrote to the Patriarch,

"...he was visited in the KGB building by Metropolitan Yuvenaliy...who began to urge him, in the name of the Patriarch, to sign [the confession]. I even know the exact language he used: 'Father Dimitriy, the Host awaits its consecration by you... your flock yearns for you. The Holy Patriarch himself asks this.' Later, they [the KGB] arranged an audience with the Patriarch and took him to Chisty pereulok, the Patriarch's residence. And here he decided to capitulate. The Patriarchate's role in his capitulation was indicated even

9/ The Orthodox Monitor, January-June 1980, pp. 26-27.

a month earlier, when Metropolitan Yuvenaliy stated during a visit to Belgium: 'I think that everything will be all right with Father Dudko.'"^{10/}

Following his release, Dudko celebrated liturgy for the first time in Moscow's Novodevichiy Monastery jointly with Metropolitan Yuvenaliy. Dudko stood at Yuvenaliy's side when he delivered the sermon. Later, Dudko received a parish in the Moscow suburbs, where he currently lives in seclusion.

The possibility, advanced by some admirers of Dudko, that his confession was induced by drugs and severe interrogations cannot be excluded, but this hypothesis remains unconfirmed. (There do not seem to be any documented cases of dissidents having been programmed by psychiatric methods to behave against their convictions. Soviet authorities employ psychiatry for political purposes primarily as a punitive measure. Activists who have been released from psychiatric detention usually return promptly to their former activities without any alteration of their convictions, although they often suffer physical after-effects and may require medical care.)

Future Prospects

Recent events have tended to tarnish the integrity of the Russian Orthodox Church, but despite some signs of disarray, there is no indication of change in its policy of survival through nonresistance to repression. The church has, however, failed to issue any formal condemnation of individual activism within its ranks, and the ferment associated with the activists continues to exist in spite of the recent arrests. The activists' considerable body of polemical, historical, and theological works circulates surreptitiously among clergy of all ranks, as well as among lay believers. Like all Soviet citizens, the Orthodox hierarchy and its clergy are afflicted by the schizophrenia and hypocrisies of Soviet life and must live with their own particular burden of conscience. They also see the example set by the evangelical sects, which survive despite severe repression, and by the tightly knit and well-organized Lithuanian Catholics, whose recent achievements have included a petition bearing the signatures of over 143,000 believers asking Brezhnev for the return of a Catholic Church in the town of Klaipeda.

^{10/} A. Levitin-Krasnov. "O tekhn kogo nedavno sudili," Posev, Frankfurt, No. 11, November 1980.

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Any future move by the authorities against vital Orthodox interests is bound to increase the already considerable pressures within the church, raising the possibility at some point of open protest by a member of the hierarchy. The authorities, for their part, base their strategy on avoiding confrontation by maintaining tight control over the hierarchy and by enforcing continuous incremental cuts in the structure of the church, none of which, taken individually, is of sufficient magnitude to serve as an issue for arousing major protest.

Nor have the arrests of Orthodox activists resolved their conflict with the Patriarchate. The Christian Committee survives, its ranks filled out by new members. Its operations, like those of other dissident groups, have taken on a semi-clandestine character under the current conditions of continuous repression.

In March 1980, the Christian Committee issued a statement announcing that it had accepted 10 new members, "taking into account its increased workload in the human rights field," but that it would not reveal their names. Subsequently, the committee decided to identify publicly only two members at all times in order to protect the rest and insure continuity of work. The well-publicized but not fully explained confessions by two of its members also impelled the two currently identified members--Father Fonchenkov and Vadim Shcheglov--to issue statements disavowing any confession they might make in the event of arrest.

Prepared by I. Belousovitch
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Approved by M. Mauntner
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Department of State

South
OUTGOING
TELEGRAM 39

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E. O. 12065: RDS-1 2/6/11 (VEST, GEORGE S.)

TAGS: PARM, UR, US, GW

SUBJECT: FALIN COMMENTS TO FRG AMBASSADOR
LIN COMMENTS TO FRG AMBASSADOR
REF: USNATO 628

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FRG EMBOFF CALLED ON EUR/SOV DEPUTY DIRECTOR
FEBRUARY 5 TO PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE
JANUARY 30 CONVERSATION IN MOSCOW BETWEEN FRG AMBASSADOR
AND SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE OFFICIALS ZAMYATIN AND FALIN
(REFTEL). FRG EMBOFF ASKED THAT HIS INFORMATION BE
CLOSELY HELD.

3. FRG EMBOFF SAID THAT FALIN HAD VOLUNTEERED THE
FOLLOWING POINTS REGARDING CURRENT U. S. POLICY:

--SECRETARY HAIG'S COMMENTS ON SOVIET SUPPORT FOR
TERRORISM SEEM TO HAVE BEEN PREMEDITATED AND PART OF
A CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE USSR. THE U. S. PROBABLY WILL
HENCEFORTH BLAME THE SOVIET UNION FOR ACTS OF TERRORISM
AROUND THE WORLD.

--THE USSR WILL RESPOND TO ALL SUCH CHARGES.

--THE SOVIET UNION NONETHELESS IS PREPARED TO
COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED STATES, AFTER THE "BAD"
CARTER YEARS, PARTICULARLY ON ARMS CONTROL. COOPERATION
IN THIS FIELD IS URGENT BECAUSE OF THE INEVITABLE
MOMENTUM IN ARMS TECHNOLOGY.

--CONTINUATION OF THE U. S. HARD LINE REGARDING
THE USSR WILL GRIND DOWN DETENTE AND WILL "PULL
THE SMALLER COUNTRIES BACK INTO THEIR RESPECTIVE
CAMPS."

--AMERICA'S EUROPEAN ALLIES SHOULD TELL WASHINGTON TO
THINK FIRST BEFORE COMPLICATING U. S. -SOVIET RELATIONS,
AND THE "SMALLER AND MEDIUM COUNTRIES" SHOULD DO
SOMETHING TO BRING THE U. S. TO COOPERATE WITH THE
USSR ON SUCH VITAL ISSUES AS ARMS CONTROL. HAIG

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BY CW NARA DATE 7/7/08

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RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY 201
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 0982

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/6/91 (DUNLOP, T.P.H.) OR-P
TAGS: PORG, YO
SUBJ: YUGOSLAV PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEW DELHI NAM MINISTERIAL

REF: (A) BELGRADE 948 (NOTAL) (B) BELGRADE 882 (NOTAL)

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

ACTION
INFO

(U,6,7,8)

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+CNO WASHINGTON DC
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2. SUMMARY: YUGOSLAVS HAVE BEEN DIPLOMATICALLY ACTIVE IN PREPARATION FOR NEW DELHI. GOY HAS CIRCULATED A WORKING PAPER ON PEACEFUL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT; THINKS EGYPTIAN MEMBERSHIP WILL NOT BE RESOLVED IN NEW DELHI; HAS TOLD INDIANS IT PREFERS THAT HENG SAMRIN AMBASSADOR NOT BE PRESENT FOR OPENING CEREMONIES; AND EXPECTS INFORMAL IRAN-IRAQ "GOOD OFFICES" COMMITTEE MEETING. YUGOSLAV NAM EXPERT TELLS US OF OPEN CUBAN SUGGESTIONS THAT 1982 NAM SUMMIT BE DELAYED OR REMOVED FROM BAGHDAD. THIS GOY OFFICIAL ALSO CLAIMS THAT CUBANS ARE SPREADING RUMORS THAT YUGOSLAVIA IS ANGLING TO HOST THE SEVENTH SUMMIT. THESE "FALRE" RUMORS ARE INTENDED TO ESTRANGE YUGOSLAVIA AND IRAQ. GOY OPPOSES VENUE CHANGE OR POSTPONEMENT BUT BELIEVES IRAQIS TO BE WORRIED ABOUT THIS CUBAN "CAMPAIGN." THE YUGOSLAV OFFICIAL INDICATED THAT SPECULATIONS ABOUT THE 1982 SUMMIT ARE WIDESPREAD. END SUMMARY.

3. COMMENT: WE HAVE HAD INDICATIONS FROM SEVERAL SOURCES LATELY THAT IRAQ AND CUBA ARE HAVING DIFFICULTIES. ONE LOCAL ARAB DIPLOMAT INDICATED TO US THAT IRAQ MAY BELIEVE THE CUBANS TO BE TAKING PRO-IRANIAN ACTIONS AS MOSCOW'S STALKING HORSE IN A LONG-RANGE SOVIET PLAN TO GAIN INFLUENCE IN IRAN (REF B). WHATEVER THE ACCURACY OF THIS VIEW, IT IS CERTAIN THAT THERE IS AT LEAST SOME NAM SPECULATION, LED BY CUBA, ABOUT MOVING THE SEVENTH SUMMIT. GREATLY INCREASED NAM SUPPORT FOR THIS EFFORT, THE GULF WAR'S DRAGGING ON INTO 1982 OR A MAJOR IRAQI SETBACK AND LOSS OF PRESTIGE WOULD PRESENT THE GOY WITH SOME PARTICULARLY PAINFUL IDEOLOGICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY REGARDING THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO LEARN HOW THE YUGOSLAVS APPROACH THIS PROBLEM IN NEW DELHI. END COMMENT.

4. AS USUAL, THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE BEEN VERY ACTIVE IN THE RUN-UP TO THE NEW DELHI MINISTERIAL, THE FIRST MAJOR NAM GATHERING TO BE HELD WITHOUT PRESIDENT TITO. IN RECENT WEEKS, THEY HAVE SENT EMISSARIES TO A NUMBER

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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OF KEY NAM STATES INCLUDING CUBA, SINGAPORE, AND PAKISTAN. VISITING BELGRADE HAVE BEEN THE IRAQI, CUBAN AND PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTERS AND SENIOR INDIAN AND INDONESIAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICIALS. THE YUGOSLAV FEDERAL ASSEMBLY, SERBIAN PRESIDENCY, FEDERAL SOCIAL COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND OTHER IMPORTANT BODIES HAVE MET TO DISCUSS THE UPCOMING MINISTERIAL AND TO GIVE SUGGESTIONS TO THE STATE PRESIDENCY WHICH ON FEB. 4 ADOPTED THE OFFICIAL YUGOSLAV "PLATFORM" FOR NEW DELHI. THE PLATFORM, AS REPORTED IN THE PRESS, IS A RATHER BLAND STATEMENT OF CONCERN OVER THE WORSENING WORLD POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION.

5. DELEGATION: THE GOY WILL HAVE A STRONG REPRESENTATION IN NEW DELHI LED BY FOREIGN SECRETARY JOSIP VRHOVEC. IN A FEB. 5 TELEVISION STATEMENT PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE, VRHOVEC CALLED INTRA-NAM DISPUTES A "SAD FACT" BUT SAID THE MINISTERIAL MUST NONETHELESS ADDRESS THE CONTROVERSIAL PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE MOVEMENT. OTHER MEMBERS OF THE YUGOSLAV DELEGATION INCLUDE UN PERM REP MILJAN KOMATINA; ASSISTANT FON SEC KAZIMIR VIDAS (MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC); NAM OFFICE DIRECTOR DJEVAT MUJEZINOVIC; UN DEPUTY PERM REP DARKO SILOVIC; AND UN ECONOMIC COUNSELOR ZORAN LAZAREVIC. THERE WILL ALSO BE A LARGE CONTINGENT OF YUGOSLAV PRINT AND ELECTRONIC JOURNALISTS.

6. GOY DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PAPER: AS NOTED IN REF A, PRINCIPAL YUGOSLAV CONCERN REMAINS TENDENCY BY MANY STATES -- ESPECIALLY THE USSR -- TO RESORT TO FORCE. THE GOY WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT RECENT UNGA WAS UNABLE TO ADOPT DECLARATION ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. WE SUSPECT THAT THE YUGOSLAVS ALSO BELIEVED THE INDIAN DRAFT COMMUNIQUE TOO TEPID ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PARTICULARLY AMONG NAM STATES. WE HAVE OBTAINED A COPY OF THE YUGOSLAV "WORKING PAPER ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES" WHICH WE UNDERSTAND IS BEING CIRCULATED

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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IN NEW DELHI. THE YUGOSLAV DRAFT REITERATES THAT
ALL STATES HAVE THE RIGHT TO DECIDE "WITHOUT
INTERFERENCE" THEIR OWN SOCIAL SYSTEM. "ANY ATTEMPT
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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*General
Jurek*

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RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 215
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 186
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY 202
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 632
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2125
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BELGRADE 0982

FROM OUTSIDE TO IMPOSE UPON THE PEOPLES A SOCIAL OR
POLITICAL ORDER DIRECTLY THREATENS WORLD PEACE."
THE PAPER WOULD OBLIGATE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES TO
"REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE DIRECTED
AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL
INDEPENDENCE OF ANY OTHER STATE." IT CALLS ON THE
MOVEMENT TO FORM "GOOD OFFICES" GROUPS TO ASSIST IN
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT.

ACTION

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7. SPECIFIC NEW DELHI ISSUES: ON FEBRUARY 4, POLCOUNS MET WITH STANKO NICK, ONE OF GOY'S PRINCIPAL NAM EXPERTS, TO ASCERTAIN YUGOSAV VIEWS ON SOME OF THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS WHICH WILL ARISE IN NEW DELHI:

-- EGYPTIAN MEMBERSHIP: THE MINISTERIAL WILL PASS THIS "HOT POTATO" TO THE 1982 SUMMIT.

-- KAMPUCHEA: THE HENG SAMRIN AMBASSADOR HAS ARRIVED IN NEW DELHI AND WILL PRESENT CREDENTIALS BEFORE THE MINISTERIAL OPENING. THE GOY HAS TOLD THE INDIANS THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER NOT TO HAVE HIM PRESENT AT THE OPENING CEREMONIES. EVEN IF HE IS, HOWEVER, IT WILL NOT BE TOO SERIOUS A PROBLEM SINCE MANY OF THE ENVOYS ATTENDING, "INCLUDING THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR," WILL NOT BE REPRESENTING NAM MEMBERS. (NOTE: BELGRADE MEDIA CARRY REPORT FEB. 6 THAT HENG SAMRIN REPRESENTATION WILL BE PRESENT; ONE SUCH NEWS ITEM IS HEADED "THROUGH THE NAM'S BACK DOOR.")

-- IRAN/IRAQ: THE GOY EXPECTS IRAN TO SEND A STRONG DELEGATION TO NEW DELHI. NICK RATIONALIZED THAT THE WAR IS NOT REALLY SUCH A "BAD PROBLEM" FOR THE NAM BECAUSE ALMOST NO ONE SUPPORTS IT. HE DID NOT KNOW ON FEBRUARY 4 WHETHER THE NAM "GOOD OFFICES" COMMITTEE WILL CONVENE FORMALLY BEFORE THE MINISTERIAL. THE INDIANS ARE NOT KEEN ON THE IDEA, AND THE CUBANS OPPOSE IT. NICK ALLEGED THAT CUBA DOES NOT WANT THE "GOOD OFFICES" MEDIATION EFFORT TO SUCCEED. NICK BELIEVES THAT THERE VERY LIKELY WILL BE SOME KIND OF INFORMAL MEETING OF AT LEAST SOME OF THE "GOOD OFFICES" MINISTERS.

8. 1982 SUMMIT: POLCOUNS ASKED WHETHER IRAN WOULD TRY TO CONVINCE OTHERS IN NEW DELHI THAT 1982 SUMMIT SHOULD BE MOVED FROM BAGHDAD. NICK EXPLAINED THAT THE MINISTERIAL COULD NOT CHANGE A DECISION TAKEN AT THE LAST SUMMIT. THIS WOULD TAKE AN EXTRAORDINARY NAM GATHERING OF DELEGATES ARMED WITH SPECIAL POWERS FROM THEIR HEADS OF STATE.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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IRAN, HE CONTINUED, HAS BEEN SURPRISINGLY "QUIET" ON THIS ISSUE "SO FAR".

9. CUBAN INTRIGUES: WHAT IS GREATLY UPSETTING THE YUGOSLAVS ARE PERCEIVED CUBAN INTRIGUES OVER THE SEVENTH SUMMIT. ACCORDING TO NICK, THE CUBANS HAVE BEEN "QUIET OPENLY" SUGGESTING A NEW VENUE FOR THE 1982 SUMMIT. WHILE HAVANA HAS "NOT EXACTLY" PROPOSED ITSELF, NICK HAS THE FEELING THAT CASTRO MAY BE ANGLING FOR ANOTHER TERM AS COORDINATOR OR AT THE LEAST FOR A POSTPONEMENT OF THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT SO THAT THE CUBAN COORDINATOR ROLE CAN BE EXTENDED. ACCORDING TO NICK, THE CUBANS HAVE EVEN PUT OUT RUMORS THAT THE YUGOSLAVS WANT THE 1982 SUMMIT MOVED TO BELGRADE. HE DENIED THAT ABSOLUTELY AND SAID THAT THE CUBANS ARE ONLY ATTEMPTING TO "ESTRANGE" THE YUGOSLAVS AND IRAQIS. NICK STATED FLATLY THAT THE GOY IS AGAINST MOVING OR POSTPONING THE SEVENTH SUMMIT AND BELIEVES THIS TO BE THE MAJORITY OPINION.

10. IRAQI WORRIES: ACCORDING TO NICK, BAGHDAD HAS TAKEN THE "UNUSUAL" STEP OF SETTING THE SEVENTH SUMMIT DATES (SEPT. 5-10) FAR IN ADVANCE. TO NICK (AND TO US) THIS INDICATES THAT THE IRAQIS ARE "NOT SO SURE OF THEMSELVES." INDEED, IRAQI CONCERN MAY BE JUSTIFIED; NICK INDIRECTLY INDICATED THAT THERE HAS BEEN IN FACT RATHER WIDESPREAD CONSIDERATION SURROUNDING THE SUMMIT TIMING AND VENUE. EVEN IF IT WERE "PROPER" TO SHIFT THE 1982 SUMMIT FROM BAGHDAD, WHICH THE GOY DOES NOT BELIEVE SHOULD BE DONE, THERE ARE MANY OBSTACLES TO FINDING ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION. FOR EXAMPLE, ACCORDING TO NICK, IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE TO RESCHEDULE THE SUMMIT IN A CITY WHICH HAS HOSTED A NAM SUMMIT BEFORE; THIS ELIMINATES ALGIERS, COLOMBO, HAVANA, BELGRADE, ETC.; NEW DELHI, WHICH IS HOSTING THE MINISTERIAL, WOULD ON THE SAME GROUNDS NOT BE APPROPRIATE. AMONG THOSE CITIES WHICH NICK INDICATED HAD BEEN MENTIONED IN THIS CONTEXT IS TRIPOLI; HE SAID FLATLY THE GOY "WOULD NOT LIKE" TO SEE THE 1982 SUMMIT IN

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* ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

TRIPOLI. PERHAPS SOME AFRICAN CITY WOULD BE THE MOST APPROPRIATE. NICK OBSERVED, BUT NONE HAVE VOLUNTEERED. (NOTE: AN ASIAN DIPLOMAT HERE CLAIMS TO HAVE HEARD FROM ANOTHER GOV OFFICIAL IN JANUARY THAT IN FACT YUGOSLAVIA ACTIVELY SUPPORTS LAGOS AS THE 1982 SUMMIT VENUE. NICK COULD HAVE BEEN LYING TO US OF COURSE, BUT GIVEN THE VIRTUAL CERTAINTY THAT A FIRM YUGOSLAV POSITION ON THIS MATTER WOULD BECOME KNOWN EVENTUALLY, PROBABLY SOONER RATHER THAN LATER, AND GIVEN YUGOSLAVIA'S ACUTE BILATERAL INTEREST IN MAINTAINING ITS SPECIAL IRAQI CONNECTION, WE DOUBT IT. POSSIBLY ANOTHER CUBAN DISINFORMATION EFFORT?)

11. BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
BENSON
BT

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

February 12, 1981

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

NLRR 106-114/7 # 9842

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *R*

BY CL NARA DATE 10/25/07

SUBJECT: Anniversary of Soviet Invasion of Georgia *(ST)*

February 16 will mark the 60th anniversary of the Red Army's invasion of the Republic of Georgia. It is an event of great historical importance. The previous year (1920), the Soviet Union had recognized by formal treaty the sovereignty of the Georgian Republic. The subsequent invasion and incorporation of Georgia into the USSR marks one of the earliest instances of Communist imperialism, the beginning of the process of expansion by military conquest now continued in Afghanistan. *(ST)*

A brief statement by the President to the Georgian people on this anniversary would:

1. Send a powerful signal to all the national minorities of the Soviet Union, especially those living in the Middle Eastern region, that we have not forgotten them; and ✓
2. Put Moscow on notice that "national liberalization" is a double-edged sword. *(ST)*

Would you like me to draft such a statement for submission to the President?

Yes _____

No _____

Let's discuss *I'd like to see*

VOA, RFE/RL put out a lot of stuff.

Rodney Dennis

Rather than have (P) make statement, why not have a Georgian group send something to him — and perhaps there could be a

~~SECRET~~

Review February 12, 2001
Extended by RVAllen
Reason: NSC 1.13 (f)

*WH. response.
2/16/81*

Soviet World Outlook

A monthly report on the
view from the Kremlin
on issues critical to U.S.
interests

Edited by:
Mose L. Harvey
Foy D. Kohler
Morris Rothenberg



Advanced
International
Studies
Institute

in association with the
University of
Miami

VOL. 6, No. 2

FEBRUARY 15, 1981

Highlights

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SOVIET

MOSCOW SIDESTEPS REAGAN CHARACTERIZATION OF SOVIET INTENTIONS: Soviet commentaries relied on a mix of scorn and hurt in efforts to refute President Reagan's statement on January 29 about Soviet aims to establish communism worldwide and to subordinate all morality to the communist cause. *Pravda* and Radio Moscow called Reagan's statements "unworthy." *Izvestia* saw a revival of the cold war. Nevertheless, Gromyko, writing in *Kommunist*, looked to the landmark role of the upcoming Soviet Party Congress in "our world's social renewal" and gave a revolutionary slant to concepts of proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence, the two "fundamental principles" in Soviet foreign policy. Past Brezhnev statements, recently published anew by Moscow, emphasize Moscow's "internationalist duty" to support the "world revolutionary process" and cite the higher moral force of communist obligations. Countless other Soviet spokesmen make the same points.

MASSIVE CAMPAIGN HERALDED AGAINST EUROMISSILES: Soviet media are intensifying efforts to induce West European governments to renege on NATO's December 1979 decision on deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. Encouraged by growing opposition on the part of Social Democrats especially in West Germany, Moscow is focusing (contrary to the facts) on the argument that the NATO decision was part of a deal requiring U.S. ratification of SALT II which the U.S. has allegedly violated. Moscow, notably in an article by Foreign Minister Gromyko, is demanding that the U.S. ratify SALT II as is. U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger's February 3 remarks on the neutron bomb have brought a renewed Soviet campaign on that issue.

NO LETUP IN ALARMS ABOUT POLAND: The Soviet media continue to portray the situation in Poland as touch-and-go between a beleaguered leadership and the all but subversive Solidarity trade union organization. The bulk of recent Soviet coverage has sought to discredit or weaken Solidarity. Soviet commentaries profess continued confidence in the Polish leadership and especially the Polish army, but the outcome of the Polish crisis is portrayed as still highly uncertain.

TWO TONGUES ON RELEASE OF U.S. HOSTAGES: Evidently stung by U.S. protests, Moscow officially denied that the Soviet media sought to complicate matters during final U.S. negotiations on the release of the hostages in Iran. However, Moscow never used the terms of indignation on the U.S. problem such as it used when Tehran demonstrators entered the Soviet Embassy in December 1980. Moreover, throughout January, Soviet commentaries and broadcasts to Iran took positions clearly aimed at hardened Iranian opposition to a deal. And after the hostage release, a Soviet-based broadcast praised the "occupation of the U.S. spy den" as a "patriotic act" which merited "deep appreciation and gratitude."

INVESTMENT PROBLEMS SPELLED OUT: A candid article in *Kommunist* on Soviet investment problems emphasized the impact of excessive investments on a tighter manpower situation, problems in attracting workers because of consumer goods shortages, cost overruns in unfinished projects, investment imbalances and inefficiencies especially in agriculture.

IN BRIEF: A new decree announced on January 18 called for a variety of measures to encourage expanded agricultural production on individual private plots. . . . The Soviet media are strongly attacking U.S. aid to the Salvadoran government against the guerrillas whose struggle is being called the apex of the revolutionary movement in Latin America.

Moscow Sidesteps Reagan Characterizations of Soviet Intentions

RATHER THAN outright denials, Soviet commentaries have relied on a mix of scorn and hurt in efforts to refute President Reagan's statements about the Soviet Union at his press conference on January 29.

Pravda on February 1 claimed "indignation in many public circles" over "a number of unworthy utterances about the aims and character of Soviet policy," and cited critical comments of NBC news commentator John Chancellor, NBC correspondent Bernard Kalb, the *Washington Post*, and the *New York Times* in support of its contention. And to this list, *Pravda* on February 2 added the Associated Press and columnists James Reston and Joseph Kraft.

A radio Moscow review of January 30 assumed a lofty pose:

"In an unworthy manner Reagan went on to talk about some sort of insidiousness in the Soviet Union's policy which allegedly aims to establish a worldwide socialist or communist state. Such words can only show that Washington evidently cannot understand the meaning of the changes taking place in the world. These changes stem from the peoples' striving for national liberation, independence and economic and social progress. These processes are not dependent on either the United States or the Soviet Union."

Izvestiia asked on February 1 what sort of "new beginning" was indicated by Reagan's remarks. This question was said to be "troubling many observers" who see "at least a new outbreak of the 'cold war' and, more likely, a deliberate strategy of returning to that inauspicious phase in international relations which lasted many years."

"President Reagan gave examples of this at his 29 January press conference. He claimed that the Soviet Union has repeatedly and firmly made statements to the effect that its goal must be the promotion of world revolution and the creation of a world socialist or communist state, call it what you will."

"His very words. Call it what you will, but it would be impossible to invent a claim which would so ostentatiously challenge the generally known facts as that cited above. Do people need reminding that at the dawn of Soviet power Lenin himself advanced the principle of peaceful coexistence as the fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy, or that this principle has been repeatedly and firmly reaffirmed since then at CPSU congresses, which have called for detente and, in particular, for the improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations, which are so important for a normal international situation as a whole?"

"There is no point in explaining what is self-explanatory. Neither is there any point in denying once again what life long ago completely refuted as the most absurd of anti-Soviet old wives' tales."

Similar hurt puzzlement was professed by *Pravda* on February 6: "With reference to the Soviet Union's 'intention' to establish world supremacy through world rule by communist states, it remains a mystery on what stand R. Reagan read or computed such an intention."

Current Gromyko Testimony

As circumstances would have it, almost coincidentally with President Reagan's remarks was the circulation of the January 1981 issue of *Kommunist* that included an article by Soviet Politburo member and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko which spoke frankly of the issues raised by the U.S. President. The forthcoming 26th Soviet Party Congress, wrote Gromyko, would not only be of domestic importance but a landmark "in the entire process of our world's social renewal," current Soviet jargon for the worldwide triumph of communism. Further, Gromyko emphasized that the fundamental principles of Soviet foreign policy are "proletarian internationalism" and "peaceful co-existence" to both of which he gave a decidedly revolutionary slant:

"Proletarian internationalism as the fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy means that this policy consistently upholds the fundamental interests of world socialism and of the forces of the international communist and workers movement. As for peaceful coexistence, it represents a specific form of class struggle—peaceful competition, ruling out the use of military force, between the two opposite socioeconomic systems—socialism and capitalism."

Brezhnev Testimony

Further, of course, the Soviet Government has been busy in recent times publishing anew Brezhnev statements which are replete with emphasis on the Soviet role in the revolutionary struggle to transform the world, as for example:

Speech to the Komsomol Central Committee, October 15, 1968:

"We have never divorced our tasks and affairs from the common cause of liberating the working people of all countries, from the cause of socialism and world peace. It may be said that internationalism is in the blood of all of us. It has been nurtured by several generations of Soviet people and each epoch has subjected it to a new test and set it new tasks."

Article in the World Marxist Review, August 1969:

"Throughout its history the CPSU has founded its policy on the Leninist concept of proletarian internationalism. We have always been guided by the well-known Leninist definition that to be an internationalist is to do 'the utmost possible in one country for the development, support and awakening of the revolution in all countries.' The CPSU has always striven to make full use of all inner potentialities to strengthen and promote socialism and communism to the utmost in the Soviet Union and, at the same time, to support and develop the revolutionary struggle throughout the world. Such is our idea of internationalist duty to the world communist and working-class movement."

Speech on the Lenin Centenary, April 21, 1970:

"The World revolutionary process is developing inexorably. The stronger and more influential the Marxist-Leninist Parties become, the greater will be the achievements of this process. The deeper the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism sink into the minds of the masses, the sooner will the revolution achieve new victories. Under the banner of Leninism we shall secure the complete triumph of our just cause."

Report to the 24th Party Congress, March 30, 1971:

"In recognition of its international duty, the CPSU will continue to pursue a line in international affairs toward promoting the further activation of the world anti-imperialist struggle and the strengthening of the combat unity of all its participants. The total triumph of socialism the world over is inevitable, and for this triumph, for the happiness of the working people, we will fight, unsparing of our strength."

Speech on the 60th Anniversary of the October Revolution, November 2, 1977:

"We are advancing towards the epoch when socialism, in some specific, historically determined form or other, will be the prevailing social system on earth, bringing with it peace, freedom, equality and well-being to the whole of working mankind. This is no Utopia, no beautiful dream. This is a real prospect. It is daily brought nearer by our work and struggles, comrades. It is brought nearer by the work and struggle of millions of our contemporaries. This work is the continuation of the cause begun by the October Revolution."

Other Representative Statements

Echoing Brezhnev are countless statements by numerous other authoritative Soviet spokesmen. Three of recent vintage are particularly revealing:

The first is contained in a book published in 1977 by Karen N. Brutents, Deputy Chief of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union entitled, "National Liberation Revolutions Today":

"In accordance with the whole course of the world revolutionary process, the question of alliance with the national liberation movement and the orientation of development of the once subjugated countries has now acquired both objectively and subjectively—in the light of the struggle between the two social systems—a largely different meaning than it had, say, in the early period of the Soviet state. At that time, it was largely a matter of defense of the first socialist revolution against imperialism, whereas today it is a question of carrying on the offensive against imperialism and world capitalism as a whole in order to do away with them."

The second appeared in *New Times*, a Soviet foreign affairs journal aimed primarily at audiences abroad, November 1980:

"Revolutions cannot be made to order. But, likewise, revolutions cannot be forbidden by order. The old world should reckon with the desire of the people to choose their own destiny. And the socialist world and the working-class movement have the right and even the duty to help establish the new world."

"The CPSU has never concealed its interest in the balance of world forces changing in favour of socialism, the working-class and national liberation movements, and the peace-loving forces, that is, to the detriment of imperialism, to the detriment of the handfals representing the dominant class in the capitalist countries which stake on war and suppression of democratic movements the world over for the sake of their self-seeking class exploitative interests."

The third appeared in the Soviet journal *Problems of Philosophy* in October 1980. The article argues that there are different kinds of peace as there are different kinds of war, and that as there are just and unjust wars, there are

just and unjust peaces which will continue as long as capitalism exists. "Lasting peace" can only come with the world triumph of communism. In the words of the article:

"100-percent durability of peace stems from the elimination of the source of war as a result of the transition from capitalism to socialism. Peace between socialist countries is the highest type of present-day peace. It is the existing model for the world peace of the first phase of the communist society. Socialism and peace are so inseparable that the concept 'peace' becomes redundant and is scarcely used in relations between socialist countries. It is replaced by the concepts of proletarian internationalism, friendship and cooperation, which reflect an especially durable peace. Unlike imperialism, which develops the foundations of war, socialism forms the foundations of peace."

The Soviet Morality Issue

Regarding President Reagan's charge that the "only morality they [the Soviet leaders] recognize is what will further their cause," the only notable Soviet response so far has been by *Pravda* on February 5. *Pravda* asserted that "we will not argue with the U.S. President" and that "our views on morality do not coincide." It then went on to claim the highest motivation for Soviet policies and the lowest for the U.S. However, neither *Pravda* nor other of the Soviet media made reference to the most authoritative pronouncement on the matter currently extant, that voiced by Brezhnev at the most recent Soviet Party Congress, the 25th which met in 1976:

"Let us recall Lenin's idea that everything is moral in our society that serves the interests of communist construction. Similarly, we can say that for us the democratic is that which serves the people's interests, the interests of communist construction. We reject everything that runs counter to these interests, and no one can persuade us that this is the wrong approach. We know exactly where we are going as we improve our political system. We are fully convinced that the course we have chosen is the right one."

Massive Campaign Heralded Against Euromissiles

SOVIET MEDIA indicate Moscow's intention to intensify efforts to induce the governments of Western Europe to renege on the NATO decision of December 1979 to modernize the alliance's long-range theater nuclear forces through deployment of 108 U.S. Pershing II medium range missiles and 464 ground-based cruise missiles. *Pravda* on January 12 foresaw the possibility of a "mass movement" unfolding in Belgium and the Netherlands; *New Times* No. 4 (January 23) noted the existence of mass campaigns in the UK and Italy; and *New Times* No. 5 (January 30) carried an article on rising protests in Germany.

N. Portugalov, a prominent Soviet commentator on European affairs indicated rising Soviet confidence that the campaign against the missiles will be successful. Writing in *Socialist Industry* on January 29, Portugalov asserted:

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"The United States and leading organs of the North Atlantic Alliance can now see a real threat to the implementation of the well-known resolution adopted at the NATO session of December 1979 in the growing active opposition of the public and political and even some military circles in the European NATO countries to the plans for Europe's 'nuclear upgrading.' They can in no way pass off the storm of protest against the missiles now arising in West Europe as an 'act of Moscow.' So, in Belgium and the Netherlands the governments and majority parties are not dropping their reservations to 'the nuclear upgrading' plan and in the FRG, the Social Democrats are beginning to protest against them with increasing resoluteness."

Linkage to SALT II Ratification Stressed

The focal point of immediate Soviet efforts is the contention that the Europeans had agreed to the NATO decision on the condition that the U.S. would ratify SALT II and that the U.S. was now violating its end of this bargain on SALT. Thus *New Times* No. 4 wrote:

"The whole Atlantic nuclear construction, carefully raised on two props—rearmament plus negotiations on the basis of ratification of the SALT II treaty—has begun to loosen. The refusal of the White House to ratify SALT II, the American doctrine of limited war for Europe has created a new situation. If the NATO leaders as before rely on rearmament, then broad popular opposition is focusing upon reconsideration of the disputed question, on the revision of the decision, one of two components of which, if it has not been finally dropped, has in any case become highly problematical."

Pravda on January 24 cited with approval a statement by William Borm of the West German Free Democratic Party that because of U.S. failure to ratify SALT II, "the basis agreed on by the Western alliance for NATO's decision to upgrade its armament has to a large extent been violated." Several Soviet commentaries cited a demand by 150 West German Social Democrats that the government admit the NATO decision was a mistake and its implementation would raise "mortal danger" for the FRG.

Contrary to such allegations, Western leaders were careful not to link SALT ratification with the Pershing question. The NATO Communiqué of December 12, 1979 merely welcomed the contribution the SALT II treaty would make toward stabilizing the strategic situation and supported U.S. efforts to negotiate with the USSR on medium range nuclear missiles. After issuance of the communiqué, Secretary of State Vance emphasized that the NATO members had rejected the idea of a freeze on deployment pending negotiations.

In focusing on the alleged link between NATO modernization and SALT II ratification, Moscow evidently anticipates a prolonged impasse on ratification which it intends to take advantage of to generate European pressures against the NATO decision. To intensify these pressures, Moscow is demanding that the U.S. ratify SALT II as is and is emphasizing that the USSR will not agree to any changes.

In the initial 1981 issue of the authoritative journal *Kommunist*, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko deplored U.S. "indefinite postponement" of SALT II ratification and declared:

"For its part the Soviet Union has frequently stated that it is prepared to ratify the SALT II treaty and observe all its provisions. We treat with due respect the results of the hard 7 years of labor which resulted in the emergence of this treaty which on the basis of a balance of the interests of the USSR and the United States—a verified balance open to mathematical analysis—sets forth clearly the two sides' commitments. The Soviet Union cannot and will not take part in talks aimed at canceling the SALT II treaty and breaking the fundamental principles on which this treaty was concluded and on which the SALT I accords are based and operate."

Neutron Bomb Again

U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger's remark on February 3 that the U.S. would reconsider deployment of neutron bombs in Europe is not surprisingly being woven into the Soviet campaign against NATO modernization. TASS on February 4 carried a dispatch entitled "Neutron Threat Over Europe Again" which recalled previous Soviet arguments against the weapon and warned "adoption by the West European countries of the American demands would adversely affect their relations with the socialist countries."

Another TASS dispatch on the same day recalled that "rejection of the neutron bomb by the former administration was forced upon it, that it happened as a result of the powerful protest by the peoples of the West European countries and the reluctance of the governments of certain member states of NATO to support the American plans." Radio Moscow on February 6 reported that "once again a wave of protest like the one three years ago has begun in Western Europe as elsewhere over the neutron threat." TASS on February 7 reported FRG "depression and perplexity" over Weinberger's statement and argued that the "potential for conflicts is accumulating between Bonn and Washington, particularly in the sphere of East-West relations, potential that might turn out to be even more explosive than in Carter's time."

No Let Up in Alarms About Poland

THE SOVIET MEDIA continued to portray the situation in Poland as touch-and-go between a beleaguered Polish leadership and an all but subversive Solidarity Trade Union organization. Moscow still suggested that it is confident of Polish ability to control matters. But Soviet rhetoric about anti-socialist forces in Poland and the design of outside forces—NATO and West German "revanchists"—grew shriller as the strikes continued in Poland. Thus, although avoiding any direct threats, Moscow kept open its option to intervene.

The Soviet reply to a reported warning against intervention by Secretary of State Haig, made public by Moscow on February 11, consisted of a charge that it was the United States which was intervening by making the subject a Soviet-American issue as well as through radio broadcasts and other unspecified actions. As has generally been the case in Soviet treatment of Poland, the Gromyko letter did not specify the nature of Haig's warning, but only described it as "inappropriate."

Attacks on Solidarity

The bulk of Soviet coverage in the past month has focused on a multifaceted attack on the Solidarity Trade Union organization. The most ominous charges against the organization concern its ties with three Polish dissidents—Moczulski, Kuron and Michnik. *Literary Gazette* on January 21, for example, accused the three of "sedition" and said they "make no secret of their hopes of undermining socialism in Poland and of tearing the country away from the Warsaw Pact." Singling out Moczulski in particular for favoring a "sovereign Poland free from Soviet domination," *Literary Gazette* said that "only a person without the elementary sense of responsibility for the life of his cocitizens and the fate of his homeland can set some Poles at loggerheads with others by calling for the destruction of the socialist system." Kuron was berated for aspiring to have Solidarity "replace the existing state power in Poland," a charge which was echoed in the number of other Soviet commentaries.

Izvestiia on February 4 charged that "the leadership of the Solidarity Trade Union is urged [by Western radios] to engage in 'political activity' by opposing the organs of power and by not submitting to them. Special emphasis is laid on undermining the PZPR's [Communist Party's] leading role." Interestingly, however, the Soviet media have not attacked Lech Walesa or other Solidarity leaders by name.

In efforts to discredit and weaken Solidarity, Moscow has resorted to a variety of other gambits. One is to suggest that the leadership of the organization is split. Radio Moscow on January 15 referred to an "extremist wing" which was seeking to pressure Polish authorities, while TASS on January 24 blamed continuing strikes in Poland on a "right, anti-socialist wing." Radio Moscow on January 29, however, suggested that Solidarity as a whole was "veering to the right."

A number of Soviet commentaries sought to convey an impression that significant numbers of Polish workers opposed Solidarity. Radio Moscow on January 12 and *Pravda* on January 19 claimed that a majority of Polish workers had gone to work on the preceding Saturday despite Solidarity's appeals for them not to do so. *Trud* on January 14 and February 3, *Pravda* on January 21 and February 6 reported interviews with Polish workers who were allegedly disturbed by Solidarity's actions and their impact on the Polish economy.

As echoed in Gromyko's letter to Haig, Soviet propaganda maintained a steady barrage of charges about nefarious Western activities in Poland. The Soviet army newspaper *Red Star* on January 28 said that NATO was backing anti-socialist elements in Poland and "striving to set People's Poland against its socialist allies." *Izvestiia* on February 4 accused Western radio stations of disseminating information "selected in such a way as to provoke an even greater complication and destabilization of the situation in Poland." *Izvestiia* contended that "the coordination of actions between certain Western circles and the anti-socialist elements in Poland is becoming increasingly brazen in character." *Izvestiia* and a rising number of other articles claimed that West German "revanchists" were meddling in Poland.

Situation Still on Razor's Edge

Direct Soviet commentaries and the quotations selected from Polish leadership statements portrayed the outcome of the Polish crisis as still highly uncertain. Soviet coverage increasingly included terms such as "anarchy" and "serious" to describe the situation. TASS on February 4 noted that Polish party leader Kania had spoken of "instances of dual power" and "the dangers of counterrevolution," concepts sure to trigger Soviet alarm about the direction of events. *Izvestiia* on February 1 suggested that the situation was at a razor's edge:

"The present situation, which has increased in complexity, is increasingly clearly drawing a dividing line. On one side there are those who really cherish working people's interests, are really worried about the destiny of Poland and the Polish people and really see their country's future as lying on the road of socialism, and on the other side are those who are increasingly clearly revealing their anti-socialist face by using demagoguery and exacerbating the difficulties."

For the time being, however, Soviet commentaries still stressed expectations that the Polish leadership will be able to control the situation. *Red Star* on January 28 described the opponents of socialism as "numerically weak but vociferous" and said the PZPR was taking the "necessary measures" against NATO subversive efforts. TASS on January 30 reported a Polish Government statement of intent to ensure "order and discipline."

The Soviet media sought to suggest that the Polish army is particularly concerned about what is going on. The Polish army newspaper was frequently cited with respect to the dangers facing Poland and to the good relations between the Soviet and Polish armed forces. One Soviet correspondent, writing in a Czech paper on January 14, reported that the Polish Army "is prepared at any moment to protect the socialist system."

Two Tongues on Release of U.S. Hostages

EVIDENTLY stung by U.S. charges, Moscow has officially denied that the Soviet media sought to complicate matters during U.S. negotiations for the final release of the hostages in Iran. In his February 11 letter to Secretary of State Haig, Foreign Minister Gromyko recalled that the USSR "in clear and unambiguous terms came out against type of actions in favor of the strict observance of the Vienna convention provisions concerning respect for diplomatic immunity and accordingly in favor of an immediate release of the detainees." Gromyko recalled a Soviet vote to that effect in the UN Security Council and claimed "that it was from these same positions that we addressed ourselves directly to the Iranian leadership."

While true as far as it went, Gromyko's disclaimer failed to address itself to the other aspects of the Soviet position which generated the U.S. protests.

Thus Soviet remarks on international law and the Vienna convention were minimal statements. At no time did any Soviet spokesman or commentator use such language on the Iranian seizure of the U.S. Embassy and U.S.

personnel as was used by the Soviet Foreign Ministry when the shoe was on the other foot, that is when it protested against demonstrators who had entered the Soviet Embassy in Tehran on December 27, 1980. In a first note of protest on December 28, Moscow charged that "a large group of raging elements armed with clubs, stones and knives broke into its [Soviet] territory. The life of members of staff of the Soviet Embassy was threatened, the state flag of the USSR insulted and serious damage was caused to the building of the embassy." A second note of January 12, 1981 said this was "a violation of both the norms in relations between states which have been sanctified by age-old practice and sealed in international conventions, and elementary notions of decency characteristic of civilized countries." The note criticized the Iranian government for not having condemned the "committed crimes" and said it "virtually took the pogrom-makers under their protection." The note also said the USSR "will have to protect the legitimate rights and interests of the Soviet state and its citizens if the Iranian Government does not wish or finds itself unable to perform its duty regarding the ensurance of the safety of Soviet institutions and their personnel in Iran." Also, it stated that the Soviet Government expected "complete compensation" for the damage done to USSR property in Iran.

Soviet propaganda both before and after the release of U.S. hostages confirmed U.S. charges that the USSR was taking positions which could only harden Iranian opposition to any deal with the U.S. The Soviet media almost every day during January reported U.S. hostility toward Iran. A Radio Moscow broadcast to Iran on January 6 said the U.S. was using the hostages as a means of "terrorizing your country." Another broadcast on January 13 told Iranians that the U.S. was trying "to coerce Iran into waiving its demands." Another one on January 17 said the U.S. was preparing "military aggression" in order to free the hostages.

Pravda on January 8 carried a series of items under the rubric "Anti-Iranian Campaign." A *Pravda* commentary on January 17 charged that there had been many opportunities to negotiate the release of the hostages but "Washington, however, did not use them, preferring to brandish arms." The U.S., *Pravda* continued, "did not stop its dishonorable game around the hostages" and "under the cover of negotiations on that problem, the Pentagon is preparing a new 'intimidating' operation against Iran."

Despite U.S. protests, the basic Soviet line remained unchanged after the release of the hostages. *Pravda* on January 22 declared:

"The fact is, as the development of events showed, the hostage problem could have been settled long ago by peaceful means through diplomatic channels after satisfying the Iranian people's legitimate demands. Even the local press and many politicians were forced to admit that the White House was the true author of the hostage drama."

While expressing "satisfaction" with the release of the hostages, a Soviet statement handed to the U.S. Chargé in Moscow on January 19, reaffirmed the Soviet charge of U.S. misuse of the hostage question. Rejecting U.S. protests regarding Soviet coverage, the statement asked why, then, had the U.S. not announced its "intention to bring

the American Navy from the Persian Gulf area back to the U.S. shores." Accordingly, it concluded:

"The thought prompts itself that the campaign around the question of the former American hostages, the campaign hostile to the Soviet Union, is being kindled in the United States exactly in a bid to cover up plans of consolidation of the American military presence in the above-mentioned area as a means of gross pressure upon the countries of that region."

Finally, in contrast to its denials when addressing the U.S., the Soviet-based National Voice of Iran took a much different line in a January 22 broadcast to Iran. According to this broadcast:

"The compromising liberals, who desire the return of U.S. imperialism to Iran, strove immensely during these 14 months to portray the patriotic act of the Muslim student followers of the imam's policy as an act contrary to the interests of the Iranian revolution. . . . The occupation of the U.S. spy den proved the impotence and helplessness of a powerful country such as the United States in the face of the invincible determination of a united and risen nation. . . . In response to the liberals and certain agents such as Ghotbzadeh, from the very beginning the struggling and liberated Iranian nation appraised the act by the Muslim student followers of the imam's policy as a patriotic act, and has expressed its deep appreciation and gratitude to those brave and pure sons of the Iranian nation."

Investment Problems Spelled Out

A CANDID article by V. Kirichenko, director of the USSR State Planning Commission Scientific Research Institute for Economic Sciences, in the authoritative journal *Kommunist* (no. 18, 1980) spelled out in some detail the problems being encountered by Soviet planners in maintaining the USSR's economic growth. According to Kirichenko:

"A concrete analysis of the last five-year plan and previous five-year plans shows that there exists in the USSR's national economy a significant tension—in a number of cases, increasing tension—in the coordination of available resources with requirements. This is manifested in the shortage of manpower (particularly skilled), the lack of correspondence between the construction work front and the volume of capital investment allocated, the shortage of certain types of raw material, construction materials and fuel, the lack of correspondence between the level of development of production and that of such elements of the infrastructure as railroad transport and the system for storing material valuables, the lack of alignment between export potential and existing demand for imports of resources and the outstripping increase in the population's financial income in relation to the increase in goods and paid services."

Manpower Shortages

Kirichenko asserted that investment policy was even more responsible than demographic trends for Soviet manpower problems. The latter is a problem for the fu-

ture, whereas "marked manifestations of manpower shortages began to occur as long ago as the first half of the seventies . . . when the demographic situation was entirely favorable." Accordingly, he concludes:

"The real reason for the increased complexity of the tasks involved in providing the national economy with manpower resources lies in the fact that recruitment of the able-bodied population into social production had already reached a high level (more than 90 percent) as a result of which additional manpower sources . . . were sharply reduced."

At the same time, there were continued demands for manpower as a result of accelerated investments which could not be met. Kirichenko cites a study by his organization showing that "in 1971-75 in industry alone more than 2 million new jobs were created for which the manpower was not fully provided; add to this in excess of one million in 1976-1978." Even more startling was Kirichenko's revelation that "this excessive commissioning of fixed capital (in terms of availability of manpower of quality for its utilization) . . . accounted for approximately one-fourth of total capital introduced."

Existent manpower shortages have generated practices exacerbating the problem. Thus, "new enterprises, especially in the machine-building sector, have to be staffed with skilled workers brought in from areas with large manpower shortages." To hedge against manpower raids, executives seek to hoard employees. According to Kirichenko, "the tendency to maintain excess personnel has intensified."

To meet this situation, Kirichenko proposes that job placement functions be taken out of the hands of Soviet executives and lodged with governmental agencies, a proposal certain to meet with considerable resistance. Kirichenko's proposal states:

"Considering that in the economically most developed regions of the country the release and redistribution of workers between sectors, enterprises and organizations will be the main source of supplying them with cadres, it is necessary to improve this entire practice substantially. It is expedient to transfer all job placement functions to local organs and absorb enterprise and organization leaders of this duty."

Weakened Incentives

Kirichenko emphasizes that efforts by Soviet enterprises to keep or attract skilled labor by economic incentives are increasingly running afoul of consumer goods shortages. In this connection he notes that savings bank deposits "a certain proportion" of which he said "are the result of unsatisfied demand" had increased by 13.8 billion rubles a year in the 1976-80 period, whereas in the previous decade they had increased by an average of 7.2 billion rubles. As a consequence, Kirichenko writes:

"Obstacles to normal spending of the money income the population receives for labor in social production and from social consumption funds reduce the effectiveness of material incentive measures, weaken labor incentives and thus impede the growth of social production and the raising of its efficiency."

Cost Overruns

Kirichenko noted that an effort had been made in the five-year plan just completed to solve the cost overruns problem by a "sharp deceleration in production investment growth rates" but that this expedient and timely economic maneuver "was not carried out consistently enough."

What happened, he said, was an expansion across the board on unfinished projects and sharp increases in the costs of new and unfinished projects, increases which Soviet planners did not take into account. In this connection, he writes, "the total estimated cost of projects under construction at the same time (the construction front) was 80-100 percent above the normative." On this point he concludes:

"The fragmentation of capital investments over an excessively broad front of construction and the frequently unjustified raising of the estimated cost of projects under construction as against cost reckoned when forming national economic plans thus act as what are in our view the main economic reasons for disruptions of the balance of capital investment plans."

Investment Inefficiencies in Agriculture

Kirichenko called special attention to the lack of coordination in agricultural investments. For one thing, he noted, "investments in the economic assimilation of reclaimed land has fallen significantly behind the actual reclamation process." For another, he emphasizes that, between 1966-1978, 54 billion rubles were earmarked for the construction and equipment of livestock premises but "the real increase in the number of animals was only 46, 36 and 20 percent of the number of places available" for cattle, hogs and sheep respectively. As a result "there are frequent cases where livestock raising complexes and large livestock units are not filled and where good buildings are written off prematurely and the buildings of existing units are used for the wrong purposes." Kirichenko notes that establishment of a better balance between animals and buildings would free resources for such important purposes as "increasing fodder production or capacities for storing agricultural produce."

In Brief

Private Plots Encouraged. The Soviet agricultural newspaper *Selskaia Zhizn* on January 18 published the summary of a party-government decree "on extra measures to increase production of agricultural products on citizen's personal plots." Of particular importance, the decree permits individuals or families who sign agreements with the collectives to "exceed the accepted norms for keeping livestock as the personal property of the family of a kolkhoz member, workers, employees or other citizens." Previously, that is according to Soviet regulations since 1935, individual citizens have been allowed one cow, one or two calves, one or two sows, from three to ten sheep.

The decree calls for a variety of incentives for Soviet collective and state farms to help individuals cultivate and increase production on their private plots. These farms

are to get credits so that they pay individuals quickly for their output of meat, vegetables, and fruit. They are enjoined to make available fodder, grazing land and tools for individual cultivation. It is stipulated that purchases from the private holdings can then be counted in the fulfillment of their obligations to the state.

The promulgation of the decree reflects the difficulties to which Soviet agriculture is currently subject. According to 1980 plan fulfillment figures published in *Pravda* on January 24, agricultural output was 97 percent that of 1979, itself a poor year. Although the grain harvest rose from 179 to 189 million tons, this was considerably below the target set. The lower value of agricultural output was evidently accounted for by the dramatic shortfall in potato production from 91 million tons in 1979 to 66.9 million in 1980. Vegetable production also fell from 27.2 million tons in 1979 to 25.9 in 1980. Meat production fell from 15.5 million tons in 1979 to 15.1 in 1980, milk from 93.3 to 90.7 million tons. However, sugar beet production rose from 76.2 million tons to 79.6; eggs from 65.6 to 67.7 million units.

The current importance of private plot production was emphasized in an interview in *Sovietskaia Rossiia* by the Russian Republic Minister of Agriculture L. Y. Florentiev. "Suffice it to say," he noted, "that the personal plots of our republics' rural population produce more than one-fourth of the total quantity of meat, milk, and eggs. These plots account for more than 32 percent of potato procurements, 17 percent of fruits and berries, and approximately 6 percent of vegetables, the bulk of which are the most valuable vegetables—onions and garlic."

Soviet handling of the new decree and treatment of certain of its specific elements suggest considerable ideological trepidation over this approach to improving Soviet agricultural output. Unlike the usual procedure in case of important directives, the decree was not published in *Pravda* or *Izvestiia*. The final sentence of the summary carried in *Selskaia Zhizn* stated that "it is important to create everywhere a social climate in which kolkhoz members, workers, employees and other citizens feel that they are doing useful, state work by raising livestock and poultry on their personal plots and by engaging in truck gardening and fruit farming." By implication, such a "social climate" does not now exist. In the words of the summary, "party, soviet and economic organs in a number of oblasts, kraia, and republics underestimate the role of personal plots in supplementing food resources."

El Salvador Pictured as Apex of Revolutionary Struggle in Latin America. Soviet media have paid almost daily attention to the insurgency in El Salvador, with principal focus on denunciation of the decision of both outgoing and incoming U.S. administrations to give military aid to the Salvadoran junta and on alleged U.S.-induced moves

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along the Salvadoran border by Guatemala and Honduras.

Of major import, an editorial in the Soviet foreign policy magazine *New Times* of January 30 suggested that the U.S. is laying down the gauntlet to world leftist forces in aiding the Salvadoran government in its flight against the Marxist led guerrillas. According to *New Times*:

"The Salvadorans in the situation being created have moved forward to the vanguard of the anti-imperialist movement in Latin America. To the degree that their struggle will be successful, in no small measure will depend the further development of this movement in the 80s."

On one side of the struggle, *New Times* listed the U.S. and "local reaction," on the other, the guerrillas and "all true champions of human rights." The editorial recalled a statement by the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with Asian and African Countries issued on January 17 which had pledged Soviet support for the Salvadoran struggle. In this connection, *New Times* cited the overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua as an illustration of the fruitful results which "the movement of international solidarity with fighting Latin American peoples has more than once brought."

Despite this call for international solidarity with El Salvador, the Soviet media denied U.S. charges reported in the *Washington Post*, that Cuba, Nicaragua and the Soviet Union are involved in the Salvadoran struggle. About Soviet involvement, *Izvestiia* on January 20 inquired: "What has the Soviet Union to do with it? The *Washington Post* reasons according to the old pattern: if a revolution takes place somewhere, that means the Soviet Union is to blame." On February 3, Radio Moscow denounced the "far-fetched accusations against Nicaragua and Cuba" as an attempt to rally the rest of Latin America around U.S. policy. Nevertheless, Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress on January 28 quoted a Salvadoran revolutionary to the effect that if the U.S. invaded El Salvador:

"El Salvador, as well as the rest of the Central American peoples, undoubtedly will react and the conflict could become more than a Central American issue, because the Cuban Government could intervene in the defense of the legitimate rights of our people, and I mean they will intervene with arms in hand and aid our country in a conflict which could become an international issue."

Meanwhile, since the advent of the Reagan administration the Soviet media have toned down their claims of guerrilla successes. *Izvestiia* on January 15 had written that the junta was "on the verge of collapse," and *Red Star* on January 18 that the guerrillas had the "strategic initiative." Except for a Radio Moscow reference on January 25 to "important victories," Soviet broadcasts and dispatches currently appear to avoid any characterization of the guerrilla operations.

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FROM ALLEN

DOCDATE 17 FEB 81

SOVIET
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KEYWORDS: USSR

SALT

SUBJECT: TASS SEES US LINKAGE POLICY AS CONFRONTATION

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MEMORANDUM

0500

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 17, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

RICHARD ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT:

TASS Sees U.S. "Linkage" Policy as "Confrontation"

The following is the text of an article which appeared in yesterday's TASS international service under the title, "Policy of Linkage in a Policy of Confrontation."

Begin text

The new American administration declares that the SALT II treaty agreed upon and signed by the leaders of the USSR and the United States in June 1979 in Vienna is unacceptable and that it does not intend to present it to Congress for ratification. Washington is thus demonstrating again the inconstancy, inconsistency and unpredictability of its foreign policy, and also its unreliability as a partner, not only in talks with the Soviet Union but also with regard to the West European countries.

In effect, the United States swindled them by promising to ratify SALT II in the event of an agreement by its NATO partners to deploy American medium-range missiles on their territories.

In order somehow to justify the violation of its obligations and promises, and also to lessen the worldwide wave of indignation at this decision, the Reagan administration declares that it is ready to hold talks on strategic arms limitation, but with the indispensable condition of "linkage" with other problems and events of international life, of correlation with the "behavior of the Soviet Union in the international arena."

Why do the new authorities in Washington reject SALT II, and do they intend at all to undertake serious efforts to limit the arms race? In the SALT II treaty, on which the two countries worked for 7 years, the principle of parity and identical security is set out. In signing the treaty, the Soviet Union and the United States took as their point of departure the fact that there exists approximate parity of military might between East and West, and they stipulated measures so that this balance would be maintained.

But, to all appearances, this is not to the liking of the new U.S. administration which openly proclaims a course of attaining military superiority over the Soviet Union. The SALT II treaty is an obstacle on this path; it hinders the efforts of the NATO countries to alter the world's strategic balance in favor of the bloc.

Washington's thesis that further talks with the USSR on strategic arms limitation must be conducted in "linkage" with other questions which have no relation to this problem should be considered in precisely this context. In essence, it is an attempt to lead the talks into a blind alley since the meshing of all problems into one will allow none of them to be solved. Such an approach would only create the appearance of talks, and would deliberately doom them to failure.

Washington's course of confrontation, the desire to use the "power factor," that is, an attempt to dictate its own conditions to the Soviet Union, to make "demands" on it, are concealed behind the proposal concerning talks with "linkage."

However, the White House is deeply mistaken if it thinks that it is possible to talk with the Soviet Union in such manner. The only reliable path along which relations between the USSR and the United States can develop is by observance of the principle of equality and equal security and rejection of "power factors" in politics. The Soviet Union is ready to do business with the United States only as an equal, if the American side also shows readiness for this."

End text

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Department of State

Soviet General

INCOMING
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PROBABLY BELIEVES THAT EVEN MENTIONING THE CULT OF
PERSONALITY NOW (SOMETHING THAT WOULD BE DIFFICULT
TO AVOID IF IT TOOK NOTE OF THE XX CONGRESS) MIGHT
DRAW TOO READY A COMPARISON WITH WHAT IS BEING
OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED ON BREZHNEV'S BEHALF. MATLOCK

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TAGS: PINS, PINT, UR
SUBJECT: STALIN'S "CULT OF PERSONALITY" IGNORED
ON EVE OF XXVI PARTY CONGRESS

1. SUMMARY. WE NOTE THAT THE SOVIET CENTRAL PRESS
HAS NOT YET OBSERVED THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE XX PARTY CONGRESS WHICH EXPOSED STALIN'S "CULT
OF PERSONALITY." IT MAY BE THAT THIS ANNIVERSARY, WHICH
WAS DULY NOTED FIVE YEARS AGO, HAS SO FAR BEEN PASSED OVER
IN SILENCE BECAUSE OF THE CULT NOW BEING MADE OF
BREZHNEV AS WELL AS HIS REGIME'S OVERALL RELUCTANCE
TO GIVE ANY NEW LIFE TO THE "STALIN QUESTION." END
SUMMARY.

2. THE SOVIET PRESS, AND IN PARTICULAR "RAVDA, TOOK
NO NOTICE ON FEBRUARY 14 OF THE 25TH XX PARTY CONGRESS.
THIS TREATMENT CONTRASTS WITH PRAVDA'S HANDLING OF THE
ISSUE FIVE YEARS AGO. AT THAT TIME THE PARTY PAPER
REFERRED BRIEFLY TO THE CONGRESS IN ITS LEAD EDITORIAL
"THE CONSISTENT LENINIST COURSE," NOTING THAT "IT
DIRECTED PRINCIPLED CRITICISM AGAINST MANIFESTATIONS
OF THE CULT OF PERSONALITY AND VIOLATIONS STEMMING FROM
THE CULT OF MOONS OF PARTY LIFE, PRINCIPLES OF PARTY
LEADERSHIP, AND REVOLUTIONARY LEGALITY." CRITICISM
OF SUCH "SINS," MOREOVER, APPEARED IN THE REVIEW
ARTICLES ON THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF STALIN'S BIRTH
(DECEMBER 21, 1979).

3. WE SUSPECT THE FAILURE TO NOTE THE ANNIVERSARY
REFLECTS BOTH THE REGIME'S DESIRE TO IGNORE THE
"STALIN ISSUE" AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND THE LEADERSHIP'S
EMBARRASSMENT AT MENTIONING THE PERSONALITY CULT AT THE
SAME TIME AS IT LAUDS BREZHNEV. THERE IS NO REAL
COMPARISON, OF COURSE, BETWEEN THE BREZHNEV CULT AND
THE ALMOST BYZANTINE DEVOTION ACCORDED STALIN. BUT
THE BREZHNEV CULT HAS BOOMED IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS
WITH NUMEROUS AWARDS AND PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF TRIBUTE
TO HIS LEADERSHIP. SUCH PRAISE IS PARTICULARLY
EVIDENT AS THE XXVI CONGRESS DRAWS NEAR. THE LEADERSHIP

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MILITARY ADDRESSEES FOR POLAD
 MADRID ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE
 E.O. 12065: GDS 2/18/87 (MATLOCK, JACK F. JR.) OR-M
 TAGS: PARM, PEPR, SOPN, SALT, UR
 SUBJECT: (U) PRAVDA EDITORIAL ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
 ON THE EVE OF THE XXVI PARTY CONGRESS
 REF: MOSCOW 837

1. ~~(C)~~ SUMMARY: IN A FRONPAGE EDITORIAL, PRAVDA
 REAFFIRMS SOVIET READINESS FOR "NORMALIZATION" AND
 "IMPROVEMENT" IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS ON THE BASIS
 OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. ON SALT, THE EDITORIAL
 REPEATS THE LINE TAKEN BY GROMYKO IN HIS "KOMMUNIST"
 ARTICLE THAT THE USSR WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIA-
 TIONS AIMED AT DESTROYING THE FOUNDING PRINCIPLES OF

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

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THE SALT II TREATY, AND IMPLIES THAT MOSCOW WILL CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE TERMS OF THE 1972 SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT. APPEARING LESS THAN A WEEK BEFORE THE XXVI PARTY CONGRESS, THE EDITORIAL PRESAGES A REAFFIRMATION OF THE "PEACE PROGRAM" ADOPTED AT THE XXIV CONGRESS IN 1971, WITH NO NEW FOREIGN POLICY DEPARTURES LIKELY. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) FEBRUARY 18 PRAVDA FEATURES AN UNSIGNED FRONT-PAGE EDITORIAL WHICH PROVIDES A PREVIEW OF THE MAIN LINES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY LIKELY TO BE ENUNCIATED AT THE XXVI CPSU CONGRESS BEGINNING FEBRUARY 23. RECALLING THE "PEACE PROGRAM" ADOPTED AT THE XXIV CONGRESS IN 1971 AND REAFFIRMED AT THE XXV CONGRESS IN 1976, THE EDITORIAL REPEATS THE STANDARD LIST OF PRINCIPLES THAT GUIDE THE USSR IN WORLD AFFAIRS: THE QUEST FOR PEACE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE "FAVORABLE INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNISM; COMPLETE DISARMAMENT AS THE ULTIMATE GOAL, BUT A READINESS TO PURSUE PARTIAL MEASURES LEADING TO THAT GOAL; THE "LENINIST PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" AS THE BASIS FOR RELATIONS WITH NON-SOCIALIST STATES, AND DETENTE AS THE MOST IMPORTANT MEANS FOR REALIZING THOSE PRINCIPLES. THE EDITORIAL SINGLES OUT SOVIET-INDIAN RELATIONS AS THE BEST EXAMPLE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND COUNTRIES WITH DIFFERING SOCIAL SYSTEMS.

3. (C) ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, THE EDITORIAL CONSPICUOUSLY IGNORES THE RECENT PUBLIC EXCHANGES OF POLEMICS, AND STATES THAT THE SOVIET UNION "IS READY FOR NORMALIZATION, FOR IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE USA FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PEOPLES OF BOTH COUNTRIES, IN THE INTERESTS OF OVERALL PEACE. THE ONLY HOPEFUL PATH TO THIS IS THE OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY." IN A POSSIBLE REPLY TO HARD-LINERS WITHIN THE CPSU WHO ARE CRITICAL OF SEEKING IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., THE EDITORIAL GOES ON TO STATE: "THE PEACE-LOVING DISPOSITION (MIROLYUBIYE) OF OUR COUNTRY IS NOT A SIGN OF WEAKNESS. OUR STRENGTHS AND POSSIBILITIES ARE GREAT...THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES WILL ALWAYS KNOW HOW TO STAND UP FOR THEMSELVES, TO GIVE A REBUFF TO ANY MILITARIST INTRIGUES."

4. (C) ON SALT, THE EDITORIAL TAKES A LINE SIMILAR TO THAT OF FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN THE CPSU

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THEORETICAL JOURNAL KOMMUNIST LAST MONTH (REFTEL):
THE AMERICAN SIDE, "REFERRING TO A NEED TO 'IMPROVE'
THE DOCUMENT FOR THE USA," IS SAID TO BE RESPONSIBLE
FOR "SABOTAGING" THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF SALT II;
WHILE NOT EXPLICITLY RULING OUT THE RENEGOTIATION
OF SALT II, THE EDITORIAL QUOTES THE GROMYKO ARTICLE
VERBATIM THAT "THE USSR CANNOT AND WILL NOT
PARTICIPATE IN TALKS HAVING THE PURPOSE OF RENDERING
NULL AND VOID THE SALT II TREATY, OF DESTROYING
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THAT TREATY WAS
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AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 1872
USMISSION USNATO 9185
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9198
USDEL MBFR VIENNA 1557
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 02384

MILITARY ADDRESSEES FOR POLAD
CONCLUDED, AND ON WHICH THE SALT I AGREEMENTS ARE
BASED AND ARE FUNCTIONING." (COMMENT: THE REFERENCE
TO THE "FUNCTIONING" OF THE SALT I AGREEMENTS IN
BOTH INSTANCES MAY BE MEANT TO IMPLY THAT THE USSR
WILL CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE TERMS OF THE INTERIM
AGREEMENT, AS AGREED AT THE TIME OF ITS EXPIRATION
IN 1977, EVEN THOUGH IT HAS MADE NO COMMITMENT TO
ABIDE BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNRATIFIED SALT II
TREATY. END COMMENT.)

5. (U) THE EDITORIAL ALSO REPEATS SOVIET COMMITMENT
TO THE TALKS ON EUROPEAN THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, TO
THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, AND TO THE CONFERENCE ON
MILITARY DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE PROPOSED

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BY THE WARSAW PACT AT MADRID. MATLOCK.
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