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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files
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Archivist: loj/loj
FOIA ID: F00-009, Skinner
Date: 7/29/04

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo (8390731)	John Lenczowski to William Clark, re US and Soviet use of words, 1p <i>R 6/21/06 NLSF00-0091, #47</i>	6/17/83	B1
2. memo (8390731)	Lenczowski to Clark, re Soviet Calls..., 1p <i>R " " #48</i>	6/9/83	B1
3. memo (8390731)	Clark to the President, re Soviet Calls..., 2p <i>R " " #49</i>	ND	B1
4. cable	170416Z Jun 83, 8p <i>R " " #50</i>	6/17/83	B1
5. cable	170047Z Jun 83, 1p <i>Part " " #51</i>	6/17/83	B1 B2, B3
6. cable	161411Z Jun 83, 2p <i>R " " #52</i>	6/16/83	B1
7. memo (8303955)	Clark to the President, re Article on Andropov, 1p <i>R " " #53</i>	ND	B1
8. note	To Norman Bailey, re attached memo, 1p <i>Part " " #54</i>	6/7/83	B1 B3
9. memo	re implications for the US..., 5p <i>Part " " #55</i>	5/23/83	B1, B3
10. report	Re Andropov's Foreign Policy, 1p <i>Part " " #56</i>	1/25/83	B1 B2, B3
11. cable	211615Z Jan 82, 2p <i>D " " #57</i>	1/21/82	B1, B3
12. report	Re Andropov's domestic line, 1p <i>R " " #58</i>	1/9/83	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
 B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
 B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
 B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
 B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
 B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
 B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
 B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
 B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
 B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
 B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
 B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
 B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
 B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

Andropov

SYSTEM II
90731 add-on

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 17, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *JL*
SUBJECT: U.S. and Soviet Use of Words

Attached is an article (Tab I) on the "Semantic War" which can serve as an addendum to my recent memo of June 9 (copy attached, Tab II) on a suggested Presidential response to Andropov's calls for "normalization" and "peaceful" coexistence." It gives many concrete examples of how we have failed to recognize the importance of words in our political competition with the Soviets.

Attachments:

Tab I Article, Washington Inquirer, June 17, 1983
Tab II II 90731, June 9, 1983

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS R00-009/1 #47

at CN NARA, DATE 6/21/06

Losing the Semantic War

Jim Guirard

In a 1978 Senate speech, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan warned of the dangers of "semantic infiltration." He explained how simple words and phrases are used by Soviet propagandists—and parroted by naive Western leaders and journalists—to distort our thinking about the political systems which compete for our minds and loyalties.

Moynihan observed that such watchwords as "peace," "people," "democratic," and "liberation" were once democratic symbols "which the anti-democratic forces are somehow able to seize." He condemned our failure to combat the communist rhetoric by which "the most brutal totalitarian regimes in the world call themselves 'liberation movements.'"

The Senator reminds us that words are the primary tools by which the mind operates. False words and concepts move men in false directions, distracting from the truth. Repeat the false word often enough, make certain the truthful alternative is never clearly perceived, and you are able to imprison people within their own minds.

According to political historian Robert Tucker, Soviet dictator Josef Stalin felt that "of all monopolies enjoyed by the state, none would be so crucial as its monopoly on the definition of words. The ultimate weapon of political control would be the dictionary." Let Stalin choose the words by which you think and Stalin will tell you what to think—or not to think.

Yet, the watchword factor remains so hidden, so subtle, that even such experts on Soviet disinformation as Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss overlooked it in their bestseller novel "The Spike." They failed to show how a news story too hot to be "spiked"—kept entirely out of the press—can be distorted by manipulation of a single theme word or phrase. For instance, referring to Marxist terrorists as "progressive forces" or as a "patriotic front" greatly legitimizes their cause.

Consider these further examples of the warped semantics which distort the psychology of our conflict with Marxism-Leninism:

* Why do we foolishly refer to Soviet and Cuban imperialism by so positive a word as "adventure"?

* In a world which despises colonialism, why do we call Soviet colonies "satellites" and "client states"?

* Why not challenge the fraud by which one-party dictatorships call themselves "people's democracies"?

* Why did we persist in referring to Iranian terrorists who kidnapped our diplomats as "students"?

* Why do we label political prisoners in Poland by such neutral terms as "detainees" and "internees"?

The deception is endless: The military dictator of Poland is called a "martial law leader." One-party communist police states are called "socialist," the same as multi-party civil-libertarian states as Sweden, France, Greece, etc. *Dialectical materialists*, who say there is no God or abstract morality, mask as "Christian Marxists." *Slave laborers* on the Siberian gas pipeline are euphemistically labeled "guest workers."

But perhaps the most obscene semantic perversion of all is the insidious lie hidden within the concept of ideological "far-left" versus "far-right." Language conditions us to see conflicting ideologies in the left-right continuum. Thus, when we correctly recoil from the fascist evils of the ultra-right, we tend to slide mindlessly toward its apparent opposite, the ultra-left. Left is opposite right, n'est pas?

Such a windfall for communism: to be perceived by so many naive souls as a proper and moral alternative to the fascism it really is. In light of this misperception, how can a self-respecting progressive rise up against what his vocabulary and his mind's eye tell him is the opposite, the enemy, of fascism? And why should civil-libertarians react against the threat of enemies so apparently unthreatening as "democratic" socialism, or "progressive" fronts, or "liberation" movements?

These same human rights advocates would surely answer a call to arms against the spectre of world fascism. After all, who but the most craven and pseudo of liberals would knowingly hold hands with fascists? The tragic irony is that so many honest liberals fail to realize that this is exactly what they are doing—however unintentionally.

Imagine what historic reversals an awakening to this unsavory fact might make in prevailing liberal attitudes on such divisive issues as Vietnam, Central America, draft registration, the CIA, defense

spending, Radio Marti . . . On and on goes the list of issues over which so many "liberals" and "conservatives" fight each other tooth and nail, but on which they could easily become natural allies—if only they could agree on who the communists are and why they must be defeated.

In his famous 1978 speech at Harvard, Alexander Solzhenitsyn wondered why so many Americans seem to lack the willpower, the patriotic resolve and the spirit of sacrifice to oppose the Soviet plan for world domination. Such traits, he should have realized, must be rooted in a clear perception of what good it is we stand for and what evil it is we are supposed to be mobilizing against.

At present, perverted semantics tend to deny us this perception. We are confused not only about the identity and ambitions of our enemies but, even worse, about the propriety and justice of what we ourselves stand for.

Such national confusion and its concomitant failure of national resolve expose us to the terrible danger of which the great British philosopher Edmund Burke once warned: "All that is needed for the forces of evil to win is for enough good men to do nothing."

Dr. James Schlesinger may have described the dilemma best. Contending that while most people favor "good" and oppose "evil," they need to know which is which. They need to know "who the fellows are in the white hats and who the fellows are in the black hats." If we permit the communists to choose the words and images by which the distinction is made it is obvious who will be wearing the black hat and who the halo.

Needed instead is a truth-in-labeling system which begins to pull down the semantic masks behind which the Gestapo-left has for so long hidden its ugly, soul-less face.

Perhaps then the truly liberal Left—which, like the civil-libertarian Right supports such freedoms as speech, press, assembly, religion, emigration, privacy, property, information, due process, independent unionism and multi-party political options—will recognize the illiberal Left as the vicious enemy it really is. (Susan Sontag calls it "successful fascism . . . Fascism with a human face.")

Perhaps then true liberals and progressives will cease their unseemly search for ways of excusing communism's inherent brutality toward human beings and its rampant imperialism toward nations.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 9, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *JK*

SUBJECT: Soviet Calls for Normalization and Peaceful Coexistence

Andropov's recent meeting with Averell Harriman produced yet another salvo in the ongoing Soviet "peace offensive". Specifically, Andropov used the occasion to call again for "normalization of relations" with the U.S., and to reiterate that the Soviet Union fully supports a policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West.

Although the State Department publicly welcomed Andropov's comments in its customary way, it strikes me that this would be an appropriate time for the President to make a creative response that can not only make him appear as a man of peace, but educate the public and put the Soviets on the defensive.

Specifically, in a press briefing or some other public statement, the President could welcome the idea of peaceful relations with the USSR, but then would raise a question as to what the Soviets mean when they call for "normalization," "peaceful coexistence" and the like. He could then clarify to the public the Soviet definitions of these expressions, and expose them as being deceptive examples of "doublethink," thereby casting doubts on the Soviets' real intentions.

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President suggesting that he raise this issue in the context of a briefing with the press. The memo also contains the Soviet definitions of several of their key terms including an attachment (Tab A) which is an entry in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia defining the concept of "peaceful coexistence." The entry is written by Alexander Bovin, one of Moscow's foremost polemicists and a close advisor to Andropov. I have underlined several key passages.

JK for RS
Paula Dobriansky, Walt Raymond and Bob Sims concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum attached at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Excerpt from Great Soviet Encyclopedia

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90731THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Soviet Calls for Normalization and Peaceful
Coexistence

Issue: Renewed Soviet calls for "normalization of relations" and "peaceful coexistence" raise once again the question of Soviet intentions and present you with an opportunity to explain to the public what the Soviets really mean when they make such expressions.

Facts: At his recent meeting with Averell Harriman, Andropov called for "normalization" of relations with the U.S., and reiterated that the USSR fully supports a policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West. He called for "good neighborly relations, and declared that people "will benefit" from "normalization" and from "constructive" interaction between the U.S. and the USSR. These declarations are but the most recent salvos in the ongoing Soviet "peace" campaign and are intended as always to deceive the Free World about the true nature of Soviet intentions.

Discussion: Although the State Department has welcomed Andropov's remarks in a customary way, this might be a good opportunity for you to make a new kind of creative response to the Soviet initiative.

Specifically, at a press briefing, interview or other similar occasion, after having welcomed the idea of peaceful relations with the USSR, you could raise, in an almost off-the-cuff manner, the question of what the Soviets really mean when they use such expressions as "normalization," "peaceful coexistence" and the like. The objective here would be not only to educate the public and undercut the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda, but to emphasize your own peaceful intentions while casting doubt on the Soviets'.

For example, you could ask, rhetorically: "What do the Soviets mean when they call for 'peaceful coexistence' with the U.S.?" Then you could answer your own question, explaining the Soviet definition and comparing it with ours. Here, the real Soviet meaning of "peaceful coexistence" is a "form of struggle between capitalism and socialism" where all means of struggle are permissible except overt military attack. The Soviets repeat this definition to themselves constantly. In comparison, our

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common sense understanding of "peaceful coexistence" is: "We may dislike each other, but we are ready to live and let live." This is a far cry from the Soviet definition. (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia's authoritative definition by Alexander Bovin, a prominent Andropov advisor, is attached at Tab A. Although its important passages are underlined, the entire text is worth reading as a definitive theoretical explanation of Soviet foreign policy.)

The disparity between these definitions is explained simply by the fact that so much of Soviet terminology is "doublethink," whose purpose is to serve the goals of propaganda and deception.

Similarly, the term "normalization of relations" has an analagous double meaning. It refers to bringing relations to a "normal" state. And what is "normal" for communists is not normal for us. Their norm is class struggle on an international scale. Ours, again, is "live and let live." In fact, any Soviet word with a positive connotation is defined in a way that associates benefit or goodness with progressive movement toward communism. This is how the Soviets can twist the real meanings of words to their advantage.

No President in recent memory has pointed out these disparities. And as a result, with our public growing progressively less educated about communism, more and more people grow susceptible to communist propaganda, "peace" offensives and deception. A well-reported analysis by you of this issue would do much to educate the public, expose Andropov's true intentions, and emphasize the sincere quality of your desire for peace.

It would be yet another way that we could use the truth and public diplomacy to serve our national security in a non-military way.

RECOMMENDATION

OK No

— — That you raise the issue of the true meaning of Soviet words at the next appropriate press briefing or interview (to be determined).

Prepared by:
John Lenczowski

Attachment:

Tab A Excerpt from Great Soviet Encyclopedia

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ANDROPOV
~~INCOMING~~
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EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP, MPOL, UR
SUBJECT: HARRIMAN MEETING WITH ANDROPOV

REF: MOSCOW 6967 (NOTAL)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. GOVERNOR AND MRS. HARRIMAN BRIEFED THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY SEPARATELY JUNE 14 ON THEIR JUNE 2 MEETING WITH CPSU GENERAL SECRETARY ANDROPOV. THEY LEFT A MEMORANDUM OF THEIR CONVERSATION WHICH FOLLOWS IN THIS MESSAGE.

3. PRINCIPAL THRUST OF THE CONVERSATION WAS CALL BY ANDROPOV FOR STEPS BY BOTH SOVIETS AND US TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. ANDROPOV EMPHASIZED HIS CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT THROUGH MISCALCULATION. IN RESPONSE TO HARRIMAN'S PRESSING HIM, ANDROPOV PROVIDED HARRIMAN WITH POINTS TO BE MADE IN PUBLIC THAT SOVIETS WERE READY TO SEARCH FOR JOINT INITIATIVES TO MAKE CURRENT SITUATION EASIER. ANDROPOV AVOIDED SPECIFICS, HOWEVER. HARRIMAN FELT ANDROPOV'S COMMENTS WERE GENUINE. HARRIMAN SAID ANDROPOV WAS NO-NONSENSE IN HIS APPROACH TO THE MEETING AND SEEMED TO BE MAKING AN EFFORT TO KEEP IT AT A POSITIVE LEVEL. BOTH HARRIMAN'S FELT THAT ANDROPOV WAS IN GOOD WORKING HEALTH. HARRIMAN WILL BE TESTIFYING BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE JUNE 16 AND WILL RECOMMEND A WELL PREPARED SUMMIT MEETING.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF MEMCON:

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
MEETING WITH CPSU GENERAL SECRETARY ANDROPOV
3:00 P.M., THURSDAY, JUNE 2, 1983
CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE HEADQUARTERS, THE OLD SQUARE, MOSCOW

GENERAL SECRETARY ANDROPOV WELCOMED ME BACK TO THE SOVIET UNION, SAYING THAT HE WOULD NOT ASK ME HOW I FELT BEING

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BACK, SINCE I WAS AN OLD MUSCOVITE. I RESPONDED THAT I WAS STRUCK BY ALL THE BEAUTIFUL BUILDINGS THAT HAD GONE UP IN RECENT YEARS. IT WAS NOT SO WHEN I FIRST CAME HERE NEARLY SIXTY YEARS AGO.

I THEN SAID TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY THAT I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE HIM A REMEMBRANCE OF THE MAN WHO FIRST BROUGHT ABOUT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. I NOTED THAT IT WAS NOW THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE INSTITUTION OF U. S. -SOVIET RELATIONS, AND WE REALLY SHOULD HAVE A CELEBRATION, BUT I COULD ONLY LEAVE THE GENERAL SECRETARY AN AUTOGRAPHED PICTURE OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

I ALSO SAID THAT I WISHED TO GIVE HIM A COPY OF MY MEMOIRS OF OUR RELATIONS DURING THE WAR WITH STALIN. THE GENERAL SECRETARY THANKED ME WARMLY FOR THESE TWO GIFTS AND WENT IMMEDIATELY INTO READING A PREPARED STATEMENT. THE STATEMENT WAS AS FOLLOWS:

"MR. HARRIMAN, MRS. HARRIMAN, WE WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT WE VALUE THAT BOTH OF YOU CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY TO COME TO MOSCOW AT THIS TIME. WE KNOW YOU ARE ACTIVE CHAMPIONS OF IMPROVED U. S. -SOVIET RELATIONS AND KNOW YOU ARE GUIDED BY CONCERN WHERE RELATIONS ARE GOING AT THIS TIME."

I INTERJECTED THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY WAS ABSOLUTELY CORRECT IN THAT PERCEPTION.

THE GENERAL SECRETARY CONTINUED:

"LET ME SAY THAT THERE ARE INDEED GROUNDS FOR ALARM. THE SITUATION, SUCH AS IT IS, IS NO FAULT OF OURS AND UNLESS REASONABLE MEASURES ARE TAKEN THE RELATIONS COULD BECOME STILL WORSE. AT THIS TIME THEY ARE DEVELOPING QUITE UNFAVORABLY AND THIS DOES NOT SUIT US AT ALL. WE HOPE

THAT YOU CAN INFLUENCE THOSE WHO THINK ALONG THE SAME LINES.

"FORTY YEARS AGO, MR. HARRIMAN, YOU CAME AS AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE WERE THEN ALLIES. WE SUCCEEDED IN RISING ABOVE THE DIFFERENCES IN OUR SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND UNITED IN THE FACE OF THE FASCISTS AND DEFENDED PEACE IN THE WORLD. WE SAW YOUR OWN PERSONAL CONTRIBUTION AT THAT TIME, AND WE DO NOT FORGET IT.

"TODAY THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE A COMMON FOE -- THE THREAT OF A WAR INCOMPARABLE WITH THE HORRORS WE WENT THROUGH PREVIOUSLY. THIS WAR MAY PERHAPS NOT OCCUR THROUGH EVIL INTENT, BUT COULD HAPPEN THROUGH MISCALCULATION. THEN NOTHING COULD SAVE MANKIND.

"IT WOULD SEEM THAT AWARENESS OF THIS DANGER SHOULD BE PRECISELY THE COMMON DENOMINATOR WITH WHICH STATESMEN OF BOTH COUNTRIES WOULD EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND SEEK MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE, TO AVOID THE IRREPARABLE. HOWEVER, I MUST SAY THAT I DO NOT SEE IT ON THE PART OF THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION AND THEY MAY BE MOVING TOWARD THE DANGEROUS 'RED LINE'.

"I SHALL NOT PASS JUDGMENT ON THE PECULIARITIES OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM. NEVERTHELESS, WHY IS IT THAT EVERY ELECTION CAMPAIGN, ESPECIALLY THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS, MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY ANTI-SOVIET STATEMENTS? WHY MUST THERE BE A HULLABALOO ABOUT A LAG IN ARMAMENTS OR WINDOWS OF VULNERABILITY?

"IT IS PROBABLY FAR EASIER TO APPEAL TO CHAUVINISM AND TO OTHER SUCH SENTIMENTS THAN TO TELL THE TRUTH. THE

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ELECTIONS PASS, BUT THEY LEAVE THEIR AFTERMATH. MISTRUST AND ENMITY HAVE HEATED UP, AND THERE IS A SHARPENING OF THE ARMS RACE AND NEW ARMS PROGRAMS.

"BUT WE WOULD PREFER TO THINK THAT THE POLICY OF A COUNTRY SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE BUILT NOT ON A MOMENTARY BUT ON A REALISTIC, STABLE BASIS. FOR INSTANCE, WHAT IS THE LINE OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION IN RESPECT TO THE SOVIET UNION? IT APPEARS ORIENTED ON SPEAKING ILL, MILITARY PREPONDERANCE AND ECONOMIC AND OTHER KINDS OF HARM. I VENTURE TO SAY TO YOU, QUITE FRANKLY, THAT SUCH A LINE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE SHOWS A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE AND POTENTIAL OF MY COUNTRY AND OF THE UNITED STATES, AND YOU KNOW BETTER THAN US THE IMPACT IT HAS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES. IT IS EXCEPTIONALLY DAMAGING FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A WHOLE.

"THE PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES CAUTIONS BEYOND ALL DOUBT THAT SUCH A POLICY CAN MERELY LEAD TO AGGRAVATION, COMPLEXITY AND DANGER. NO RESULTS CAN BE EXPECTED FROM IT; BOTH SIDES LOSE -- NOT OURS ALONE. AND THE ENGENDERING OF NEW TYPES OF ARMS COMPLICATES OUR TASK.

"NOTHING IS LEFT TO THE IMAGINATION IN WHAT WASHINGTON THROWS DOWN AS THREATS, DAMNATIONS AND OUTRIGHT ABUSE, BUT THEY ARE MISTAKEN. WE ARE NOT THAT KIND OF PEOPLE NOR THAT KIND OF POLITICIANS. NOTHING CAN COME OF IT.

"WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE MILITARY SITUATION AND THE GROWING NUMBER OF EXPLOSIVE PROBLEMS, WE CANNOT AFFORD THE LUXURY OF DESTRUCTIVE RIVALRY IN INTERACTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

"WE TREAT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES SERIOUSLY, FULLY UNDERSTANDING THEIR SIGNIFICANCE FOR PEACE AND THE NEED TO AVOID NUCLEAR WAR. WE WOULD PREFER PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, MUTUALLY-BENEFICIAL OR, EVEN BETTER, GOOD RELATIONS AS OUR POLICY.

"HOWEVER, I WILL MAKE NO SECRET OF THE FACT THAT BEYOND ALL DOUBT THERE IS ONE VICTIM OF THE EVIL WHICH MAY COME FROM THE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY THE WHITE HOUSE. THAT IS CONFIDENCE, THE CONFIDENCE WHICH BEGAN IN THE LAST DECADE AND WAS VALUED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THESE ARE NOT JUST SWEAR WORDS THAT ARE BEING PUT OUT BUT AN ATTEMPT TO UNDERMINE ALL THE THINGS CREATED BILATERALLY AND ON A BROADER PLANE IN THAT PERIOD.

"IN THESE CONDITIONS, WE CAN SIMPLY HAVE NO CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION AND CERTAIN PEOPLE SHOULD REALLY GIVE THAT A LOT OF THOUGHT.

"NOR ARE WE IN THE HABIT OF INTERFERING IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS. WE CONDUCT OUR AFFAIRS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THOSE LEADERS ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE. WE MAKE NO LINKAGES FOR UNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO HOW THEY WOULD REFLECT ON CHANCES OF THIS OR THAT PARTY OR THIS OR THAT CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT. WE DO NOT EVADE CONTACT WITH THE REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRATIC PARTIES. OUR CONVERSATION TODAY IS A GRAPHIC EXAMPLE. WE WANT TO NORMALIZE OUR RELATIONS ON AN EQUITABLE BASIS TO BENEFIT ALL AMERICANS, REGARDLESS OF THEIR PARTY.

"FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT WE PAY TRIBUTE TO THE

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PERSONAL DEDICATION OF MRS. HARRIMAN AND THE GOVERNOR TO STRENGTHEN MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING FOR BETTER RELATIONS, FOR BUILDING ON OUR COMMON INTEREST IN PEACE AND GOOD RELATIONS. I ALSO NOTE THAT WE FOLLOW WITH INTEREST THE EFFORTS BY YOUR FAMILY THAT THE UNITED STATES HAVE SOLID AND THOUGHTFUL EXPERTS ON THE SOVIET UNION. WE WELCOME THAT THROUGH YOUR LUCKY HAND IT WOULD APPEAR THAT SCHOLARS, DIPLOMATS AND OTHERS CAN DEVELOP AN OBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET UNION.

"WE KNOW THAT THE HARRIMAN FAMILY IS ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE UNITED STATES. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR SETTING OUT A FEW VIEWS ON THE PROSPECTS IN YOUR COUNTRY AND FOR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION."

WHEN THE GENERAL SECRETARY FINISHED THIS STATEMENT, I RESPONDED THAT I WISHED TO ADDRESS FIRST HIS LAST REMARKS. I SAID THAT I WAS GRATEFUL THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE ATTITUDES OF MY WIFE AND MYSELF WHICH WE HOPED COULD BE TO THE BENEFIT NOT ONLY TO THE PEOPLE OF OUR COUNTRY, BUT OF HIS. I CONTINUED THAT HE HAD ASKED FOR MY COMMENTS. I WOULD BE GLAD TO MAKE SOME.

I WISHED TO SAY THAT HIS REMARKS APPEARED DIRECTED BOTH AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND AGAINST THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION. IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO ME WHICH OF HIS REMARKS WERE GENERAL AND WHICH WERE DIRECTED AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION. THE GENERAL SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT ALL OF WHAT HE SAID THAT WAS CRITICAL WAS RELATED TO THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION, BUT HE SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS CRITICIZING WHEN HE SAID THAT IT IS A FACT OF LIFE THAT IN AN AMERICAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN A WAVE OF ANTI-SOVIETISM IS RAISED. HE WAS, HOWEVER, NOT FAULTING THE PEOPLE OR THE UNITED STATES AS A NATION.

I RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR ME AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN TO MAKE COMMENTS REGARDING AN AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION. IF I WERE TO DO SO, THE PLACE WOULD BE IN THE UNITED STATES AND NOT IN THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S OFFICE. THE GENERAL SECRETARY IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED THAT THAT WOULD GO WITHOUT SAYING, AND IT WAS CERTAINLY NOT SOMETHING WHICH THEY EXPECTED OF ME.

I CONTINUED THAT REGARDING HIS SUGGESTION THAT IN AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN ADVERSE COMMENTS WERE ALWAYS BEING MADE ABOUT THE SOVIETS, MANY PEOPLE SPEAK DURING THESE

CAMPAIGNS AND MANY SAY SOME DIFFICULT THINGS. I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW THE SOURCE OF HIS INFORMATION, BUT IN MY VIEW THEY WERE NOT THE RULE BUT THE EXCEPTION. I ALSO CONTINUED THAT IT WAS OUR GENERAL POLICY TO DEVELOP SOUND RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, TO DEVELOP TRADE, AND TO TAKE ACTIONS WHICH WOULD BE BENEFICIAL NOT ONLY TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES BUT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION.

I COULD SAY THAT AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED, AND MY WIFE, OUR ATTITUDE WOULD BE AS WE HAVE SAID, AND ONE BENEFICIAL TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS.

I ADDED THAT I WISHED TO RECALL THAT I HAD BEEN IN MOSCOW UNDER MORE AGREEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHEN WE NEGOTIATED THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY, STILL ONE OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. ITS TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY WOULD BE NEXT MONTH. I SAID THAT I BELIEVED WE COULD RETURN TO THOSE DAYS, IF WE COULD COOPERATE, IF WE COULD WORK TOGETHER TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. I WAS DEDICATED TO THAT GOAL AND SO WAS MY

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WIFE, AND I FELT THAT OUR VISIT WOULD HELP IN THAT RESPECT.

I ALSO NOTED THAT I FULLY AGREED WITH THE GENERAL SECRETARY THAT IT WAS NOT HIS AFFAIR TO BECOME INVOLVED IN AMERICAN POLITICS, BUT I FELT IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE STEPS WHICH COULD HELP TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. I ALSO HAD TO NOTE THAT OTHER ACTIONS WERE SOMETIMES TAKEN WHICH MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO DO SO. I SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE GENERAL SECRETARY COULD GIVE ME A SIGNIFICANT MESSAGE TO TAKE BACK OR IF HE COULD MAKE SOME STATEMENT BENEFICIAL TO AND WHICH WOULD IMPROVE RELATIONS.

I NOTED THAT I WAS NOT HERE TO SPEAK OF THINGS WHICH COULD MAKE OUR RELATIONS MORE DIFFICULT; THE GENERAL SECRETARY KNOWS THEM ALREADY. I REPEATED THAT I HOPED THE GENERAL SECRETARY COULD MAKE STATEMENTS ON IMPROVING RELATIONS WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE AMERICAN OPINION TOWARDS THEIR IMPROVEMENT. I SAID THAT I FELT THERE WAS MORE GOODWILL IN THE UNITED STATES THAN PERHAPS APPARENT AT THIS TIME. THAT GOODWILL WAS LATENT, BUT READY TO EXPRESS ITSELF.

I THEN NOTED THAT MY WIFE WOULD LIKE TO SAY SOMETHING AT THIS TIME. MRS. HARRIMAN THEN EXPRESSED HER GRATITUDE TO BE INCLUDED IN THE CONVERSATION AND REAFFIRMED THAT SHE SHARED HER HUSBAND'S VIEWS. SHE SAID THAT SHE KNEW THERE WERE MANY THINGS WHICH WE CANNOT DO, BUT SHE SAID THAT WE SHOULD TALK ABOUT THOSE THINGS WHICH COULD WORK TO OUR COMMON GOOD.

MY WIFE ASKED WHETHER IT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA IF MORE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS SHOULD ASK TO VISIT THE SOVIET UNION THIS SUMMER. MRS. HARRIMAN NOTED THAT HOUSE MAJORITY WHIP TOM FOLEY WAS ALREADY HEADING A DELEGATION ARRIVING JULY

1. SHE SAID SHE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER THEY WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED. MRS. HARRIMAN EMPHASIZED HER BELIEF THAT IT WAS BETTER TO MEET AND TO TALK DIRECTLY RATHER THAN THROUGH WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS.

THE GENERAL SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT IN PRINCIPLE THE SOVIETS WERE IN FAVOR OF MEETINGS OF THAT SORT. EACH VISIT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE WEIGHED ON ITS MERITS, BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT PEOPLE MEET WITH EACH OTHER. THE MEETINGS DID NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE WITH THE GENERAL SECRETARY HIMSELF, BUT THEY CERTAINLY COULD BE WITH HIS COLLEAGUES. IN SHORT, HIS ANSWER WAS YES.

I THEN CONTINUED THAT I APPRECIATED HIS RECALLING OUR WARTIME RELATIONS. I HAD COME AT THAT PERIOD WITH THE BRITISH AND OTHER AMERICANS TO FIND OUT WHAT WAS NEEDED. WE WERE ABLE TO SEND SUPPLIES TO ENABLE THE RED ARMY TO RESIST SO GALLANTLY AS IT DID, SO EFFECTIVELY, AND EVENTUALLY TO DRIVE THE ENEMY OUT. I SAID THAT NOT JUST MYSELF BUT OTHERS WOULD BE READY TO SUPPORT THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS AGAIN IF THE SOVIETS COULD TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS.

THE GENERAL SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT IN MAKING MY OBSERVATIONS I HAD MENTIONED THAT THERE WERE SOME AMERICANS WHO WANTED GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. HE ALSO TOOK NOTE OF MY COMMENT THAT THE CRITICAL REMARKS WERE INCIDENTAL, SINCE AS HE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO WORK WITH ANY ADMINISTRATION IN OUR COMMON INTEREST. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE MY LEAVING HIM WITH THAT IMPRESSION.

THE GENERAL SECRETARY SAID HE STILL HAD ONE MORE POINT TO RAISE. HE ADDED THAT IN REGARD TO MY COMMENT THAT THE

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SOVIETS TAKE AT TIMES CERTAIN ACTIONS WHICH COMPLICATE THE SITUATION, HE WANTED TO NOTE THAT WE STAND ON DIFFERENT POSITIONS. WHAT THE SOVIETS BELIEVE ARE THE RIGHT STEPS, THE ADMINISTRATION THINKS ARE WRONG, AND VICE VERSA. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW TO DO THIS, BY WHAT MUTUAL STEPS. HE SAID, HOWEVER, IT COULD NOT BE BY THE ONE STEP WHICH IT APPEARS PRESIDENT REAGAN WANTS -- A SOVIET UNILATERAL LAYING-DOWN OF ITS ARMS. THAT COULD NOT BE.

I SAID THAT I AGREED ON THE NEED FOR RECIPROCITY. I EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT I WAS NOT HERE TO DISCUSS DIFFICULTIES -- THAT IS, TO REVIEW THE STEPS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE TAKEN OR WHAT THEY SAY THE U. S. HAS TAKEN. NEVERTHELESS, OUR DISCUSSION SHOULD BE IN GENERAL TERMS HOW TO WORK ON OR TO GET AROUND OUR DIFFICULTIES. I SAID WE MUST CONTINUE, HOWEVER, TO BE ABLE TO TELL THE SOVIETS FRANKLY WHAT WE ARE AGAINST. I SAID I WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THAT WHOEVER IS SAYING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE NOT FOR PEACE, AS ARE THE SOVIETS, WAS INFORMING THE GENERAL SECRETARY INCORRECTLY. AMERICANS ARE JUST AS ANXIOUS AS THE SOVIETS TO DEVELOP AND IMPROVE RELATIONS.

I REITERATED MY VIEW THAT WE SHOULD FIRST DEAL WITH THOSE MATTERS WHICH STAND THE BEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS. THERE ARE THOSE WHICH ARE MORE DIFFICULT AND IT IS NOT USEFUL IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO GO INTO THOSE WITH WHICH WE ARE AT VARIANCE. WE SHOULD GO INTO THOSE ON WHICH WE CAN HAVE AGREEMENT. I REPEATED MY BELIEF THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY KNEW THE AREAS IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS OPPOSED TO WHAT THE SOVIETS HAVE DONE. I FELT THEN WE COULD DISCUSS HOW TO OVERCOME THEM IF THE GENERAL SECRETARY INDICATED HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS.

FRANKNESS REMAINS ALL-IMPORTANT, AND FROM WHAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY HAD TOLD ME, I SAID THAT I BELIEVED THAT IT WAS HIS POINT OF VIEW. THE GENERAL SECRETARY INTERJECTED THAT THAT WAS CERTAINLY HIS POINT OF VIEW.

I THEN ASKED WHETHER THE GENERAL SECRETARY COULD TELL ME OF ANYTHING HE COULD DO TO MAKE THE SITUATION EASIER FOR THOSE WHO WANTED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS -- WHAT MESSAGES HE MIGHT HAVE OR WHAT ACTIONS HE MIGHT TAKE ON HIS OWN TOWARD PROGRESS AS A WHOLE. THE GENERAL SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD THINK IT OVER.

I REITERATED MY HOPE THAT HE WOULD DO SOMETHING, AND MY WIFE SUPPORTED ME. THE GENERAL SECRETARY THEN RESPONDED SOMEWHAT HEATEDLY, ASKING WHETHER WHAT THE SOVIETS WERE SUPPOSED TO DO WAS TO MAKE UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS. HE SAID THAT HE FELT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WAS DEMANDING ONE-SIDED ACTIONS BY THE SOVIETS AND REFUSING TO ACT RECIPROCALLY. HE MAINTAINED THAT THE SOVIETS' SUGGESTION OF THE FREEZE WOULD NOT WORK AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF EITHER SIDE. HE ALSO SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW, OF LATE THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION WAS NOT EVEN ANSWERING THE SOVIET APPROACHES.

I THEN ASKED IF I COULD TALK TO AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN WHENEVER I MET HIM, WHICH WAS REGULARLY, OF POSSIBILITIES, AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT I WAS ALWAYS WELCOME TO TALK. I SAID THAT I WAS GLAD TO HEAR THE GENERAL SECRETARY WAS READY TO THINK OVER WAYS OF MOVING RELATIONS FORWARD. I NOTED THAT I WOULD BE SEEING THE PRESS THIS AFTERNOON -- MY USUAL PRACTICE WHEN I AM IN MOSCOW. I ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING THAT I COULD SAY TO THEM TO ENCOURAGE THEIR REPORTS ALONG THIS LINE.

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THE GENERAL SECRETARY ASKED ME TO TELL THE MEDIA THAT IT WAS THE MOST SINCERE AND FERVENT DESIRE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO HAVE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND TO DEVELOP THEM IN THE BEST TRADITIONS OF THOSE RELATIONS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THERE WERE GOOD TRADITIONS IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT FORGET THEM.

WHEN I NOTED THAT THE PRESS AT THE CONFERENCE WOULD NOT BE JUST AMERICANS BUT FROM OTHER COUNTRIES AND SOVIETS AS WELL, THE GENERAL SECRETARY ASKED ME TO SAY IN ADDITION THAT HE WAS READY AND INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, TO SEARCH FOR JOINT INITIATIVES, PROPOSALS WHICH MIGHT MAKE THE PRESENT SITUATION EASIER. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD IN THAT INSTANCE BE AWAITING THE U. S. RESPONSE.

I THEN THANKED HIM FOR HIS COURTESY IN RECEIVING ME. I WISHED HIM WELL IN HIS IMPORTANT LEADERSHIP OF HIS GREAT COUNTRY. I HOPED THAT HE WOULD REMAIN IN GOOD HEALTH AND ACHIEVE WHAT HE DESIRED, WITH THE OBJECTIVE WE HAD DISCUSSED IN MIND. I NOTED THAT I HAD ONE LAST STATEMENT.

I WAS NOW 91 YEARS OLD, AND I DID NOT KNOW HOW MANY MORE TIMES I COULD COME TO THE SOVIET UNION. I WISHED TO LET THE GENERAL SECRETARY KNOW, HOWEVER, THAT I WAS SOMEONE IN THE UNITED STATES WITH WHOM I HOPED HE WOULD SPEAK, JUST AS I WOULD BE TALKING TO HIS AMBASSADOR, ON MATTERS IMPORTANT TO OUR RELATIONS. HE THANKED ME AND SAID THAT HE WOULD CERTAINLY DO SO.

I THEN NOTED THAT I SHOULD NOT TAKE ANY MORE OF HIS TIME AND HOPED THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN AS USEFUL TO HIM AS IT HAD BEEN TO ME. HE NOTED THAT HE WAS VERY HAPPY WITH THE MEETING (ARBATOV LATER INFORMED ME THAT ANDROPOV HAD PASSED THE WORD THAT HE FELT THE MEETING WAS A SUCCESS).

COMMENT:

THE PRINCIPAL POINT WHICH THE GENERAL SECRETARY APPEARED TO BE TRYING TO GET ACROSS TO MRS. HARRIMAN AND ME WAS GENUINE CONCERN OVER THE STATE OF U. S. -SOVIET RELATIONS AND HIS DESIRE TO SEE THEM AT LEAST "NORMALIZED", IF NOT IMPROVED. HE SEEMED TO HAVE A REAL WORRY THAT WE COULD COME INTO CONFLICT THROUGH MISCALCULATION. HE WAS CRITICAL OF THE CURRENT STATE OF RELATIONS, BUT WAS CAREFUL TO STRESS -- SEVERAL TIMES -- THAT EFFORTS FOR IMPROVEMENT HAD TO BE MUTUAL. THIS POINT ABOUT THE NEED FOR SOVIET, AS WELL AS U. S. STEPS WAS INCLUDED IN THE PRAVDA AND TASS SUMMARIES OF OUR TALK.

I FELT ANDROPOV WAS MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO BE NON-POLEMICAL IN OUR CONVERSATION.

I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO MAKE A REAL JUDGMENT ON ANDROPOV'S HEALTH, ALTHOUGH WE NOTED OCCASIONAL TREMORS OF HIS HANDS, BUT NOT WHEN THEY WERE IN REPOSE, AND A RATHER RIGID WALK. HE WAS IN FULL COMMAND OF HIMSELF AND HIS PART OF THE MEETING: READ HIS STATEMENT WITHOUT EFFORT, AND RESPONDED OR MADE POINTS DURING THE EXCHANGE QUICKLY AND WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ALEKSANDROV.

ALSO PRESENT, BESIDES MRS. HARRIMAN, THE GENERAL SECRETARY AND MYSELF, WERE THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S ASSISTANT, ANDREY M. ALEKSANDROV-AGENTOV, AND THE INTERPRETER, VIKTOR SUKHODREV, BOTH OF WHOM HAD BEEN AT ALL MY PREVIOUS MEETINGS WITH BREZHNEV, AS WELL AS PETER SWIERS, WHO WAS ABLE TO ACCOMPANY ME AGAIN ON A TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION

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THROUGH THE COURTESY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

END TEXT.

5. MOSCOW 6967 CONTAINING HARRIMAN PUBLIC STATEMENT MADE
FOLLOWING ANDROPOV MEETING IS BEING REPEATED TO ADDRESSEES
WHO HAVE NOT RECEIVED IT PREVIOUSLY. SHULTZ
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is not a deal between the imperialist powers concerning the division of the booty by the capitalist and their governments, but a really lasting and democratic peace, which cannot be achieved without a proletarian revolution in a number of countries" (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 31, p. 55).

The change in world politics from an imperialist peace, with the wars that grow out of it, to a durable democratic peace, which lays the foundation for the complete elimination of wars, began with the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in 1917. In the first enactment of the Soviet government, the Decree on Peace, the program of democratic peace was organically linked to the new principle of international relations engendered by the socialist revolution—the principle of peaceful coexistence between the socialist and capitalist systems. The creation of the crucial guarantees for a stable peace has been approached gradually. During the period between the two world wars, the Soviet state and the international working class, led by the parties of the Third International, struggled for the new principles of world politics proposed by socialism. The development and strengthening of the might of the first socialist power and later, of the world socialist system also contributed to the establishment of guarantees of peace.

The contemporary statement of the issue of peace, as set forth by the Communist and workers' parties at the international conferences of 1957, 1960, and 1969, rests on a new evaluation of the changed relationship between the power of socialism and capitalism. It proceeds from the fundamental fact that another world war is no longer inevitable owing to the consistently peaceful policies of the USSR and other socialist states, the growing influence of the concerted policies of these countries on world events, the redoubling of the struggle of the working class and the toiling masses in the capitalist countries, the growth of the national liberation movement, and the activity of democratic forces throughout the world in defense of peace.

As a result of the unprecedented growth in the destructive power of military weapons, peace has become a problem for all of humanity. Essential to its resolution is joint action in defense of peace by all who have an interest in saving the fruits of mankind's labor and creativity, regardless of their convictions and political views. On the one hand, the struggle for peace is inseparable from the development of the anti-imperialist movement; it merges with the struggle for the freedom of nations, for progress, and for democracy. On the other hand, the consolidation of peace creates favorable conditions for the liberation struggle of the toilers.

Communists reject both the pseudorevolutionary extremist idea that socialism and peace are consolidated as a result of war and the right-wing opportunist conception that peace is a repudiation of the class struggle and of the struggle against bourgeois ideology and politics. Because the offensive against imperialism—the source of the threat of war—has intensified, it is possible to gain a decisive victory over imperialism and to defeat its aggressive policies, to impose peaceful coexistence on the imperialists, and to realize the striving of peoples for peace. The chief preconditions for peace are the cessation of the arms race, disarmament, the abolition of military blocs and hotbeds of war, the repudiation of acts of aggression and international tyranny, and the development of international cooperation. In the first half of the 1970's the struggle of the Soviet state and other peace-loving forces to bring about fundamental change in the direction of peace led to a new situation, in which guaranteeing the irreversibility of progress toward peace and peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems became a practical task.

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PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, a type of relation between states with different social systems. The underlying principles of peaceful coexistence include the renunciation of war and the adoption of negotiations as a means of resolving disputes between states; equal rights, mutual understanding, and trust between states, as well as consideration of each other's interests; noninterference in the internal affairs of another state; and recognition of each people's right to choose freely its own socioeconomic and political system. In addition, peaceful coexistence presupposes a rigorous respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and the development of economic and cultural cooperation based on full equality and mutual benefit. A policy aimed at establishing and developing this type of relations between states is called a policy of peaceful coexistence. Its intent is to eliminate from the international arena relations of dominance and subjugation and to affirm the general democratic norms that have been crudely violated by imperialism.

Peaceful coexistence is a specific form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism in the international arena. The struggle is waged between two ruling classes, each of which possesses full state power. The basically antagonistic conflict between the two opposing socioeconomic systems is transferred from the level of military clashes to that of economic competition, comparison of political systems and ways of life, and ideological struggle. The organic relationship and unity of struggle and cooperation are characteristic of peaceful coexistence and are both the source of its internal contradictoriness and a continual stimulus for seeking mutually acceptable solutions that preclude military conflict.

The feasibility of peaceful coexistence as a system of relations, as a practical policy, and as a theoretical concept stems from a fundamental peculiarity of the historical process—the uneven development of the world socialist revolution. With the appearance of the first socialist state in 1917, the coexistence of the two socioeconomic systems became a fact. The question was, what kind of coexistence it should be and what kind it would be. The imperialists supported the formula proposed by the French premier G. Clemenceau: "Intervention and blockade." The communists expressed their point of view in Lenin's Decree on Peace. "What we prize most is peace and an opportunity to devote all our efforts to restoring our economy," declared Lenin (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 42, p. 313).

The elaboration of the concept of peaceful coexistence was one of the greatest achievements of the political theory of Leninism. While upholding on the battlefield the right of a socialist state to exist, Soviet Russia clearly formulated its view of the coming postwar period. "Our slogan has been and remains the same," proclaimed the report of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs delivered at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on June 17, 1920. "Peaceful coexistence with other governments, no matter what kind they are. Reality has made it necessary for us to establish long-term relations between the workers' and peasants' government and the capitalist governments" (*Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, vol. 2, 1958, p. 639). This conclusion, which was derived from an analysis of the international situation, particularly the condition of world economic ties and the conflicts among the imperialist powers, expressed the conviction that the preservation of the gains of the October Revolution and the building of socialism were the main internationalist duties of Russia's working class.

The principles of peaceful coexistence were affirmed in a sharp struggle with various left-extremist elements, including L. Trotsky and N. Bukharin, who rejected the possibility of "peaceful cohabitation" between the socialist republic and the imperialist powers and defended the right of "red intervention." Lenin proved that the irreconcilability of the class interests of the world bourgeoisie and the triumphant proletariat is not an insurmountable obstacle to peaceful relations between socialist and

capitalist countries. The struggle to establish such relations became one of the most important tasks of the socialist state's foreign policy.

The defeat of the foreign and internal counterrevolution and the stabilization of the situation in the country and on its borders confirmed that Lenin's position on peaceful relations between capitalist and socialist countries was correct. As early as 1921 he had ascertained the development of "a certain equilibrium, though a highly unstable one" (*ibid.*, vol. 44, p. 291) in the relations between Soviet Russia and the capitalist world. Because of the extremely unstable character of this equilibrium and the sober realization that it was highly probable that the balance of forces of that time would encourage new attempts by imperialism to destroy the emerging socialist world by force, the limited goal of achieving a "peaceful breathing space" was given priority in the foreign policy of the Republic of Soviets. The Soviet state achieved this goal, and war was avoided for two decades.

The decisive role played by the Soviet Union in the defeat of fascism, the formation of the world socialist system, the collapse of colonial empires, and the general upsurge in mass democratic movements led to radical changes in the international arena. The new balance of forces was characterized by the growing superiority of international socialism over imperialism. The forces of peace gained a real opportunity to narrow substantially the field of activity of the forces of war and aggression. Particularly after the USSR developed nuclear missiles, imperialism's reliance on a world thermonuclear war as a means of achieving political objectives became untenable. All of these changes created the preconditions for a substantial broadening of the framework and content of the policy of peaceful coexistence.

The world communist movement endorsed the fundamental conclusion reached by the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, that the prevention of a new world war is possible. As stated in the Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries (1957), the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between the two systems "is a stable basis for the foreign policy of the socialist countries and a reliable basis for peace and friendship of peoples" (*Programmye dokumenty bor'by za mir, demokratiu i sotsializm*, 1964, p. 9). The Statement of the Conference of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties (1960) emphasized that "through the united efforts of the world socialist camp, the international working class, the national liberation movement, all countries that oppose war, and all peace-loving forces, a world war can be prevented" (*ibid.*, p. 57). This profound conviction became the basis of the international foreign policy of the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and all peace-loving forces. Favorable conditions for détente and peace in Europe were created by the signing of treaties between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and between Poland and the FRG (1970), the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin (1971), the treaty on the principles of relations between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the FRG (1972), and the treaty on the normalization of relations between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the FRG (1973).

Major advances have been made in Soviet-American relations. Both countries are committed to do everything possible to avoid military confrontations and prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. Summarizing the results of the implementation of the Peace Program proposed by the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU, the April 1973 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU confirmed the change from the cold war to détente and noted that the principles of peaceful coexistence have received wide recognition as a norm of relations among states with different social systems. The Plenum set the goal of ensuring that the changes achieved in the international situation become irreversible.

The theoretical and political problems associated with the interpretation and embodiment of the principles of peaceful coexistence are focal points of the contemporary ideological struggle. Three groups of ideas are contrary to a correct understanding of peaceful coexistence: right-wing bourgeois ideology, certain liberal bourgeois points of view, and various leftist views.

Right-wing bourgeois ideologists stubbornly adhere to the idea that the policy of peaceful coexistence is a Communist "trap," "ruse," or "tactical maneuver" designed to cover up "the export of revolution." In practice, however, contemporary international relations and all of the actions of the socialist states in foreign policy serve as evidence that the policy of peaceful coexistence is not a tactical device but one of the fundamental elements of the foreign policy strategy of socialism. This strategy, which is oriented toward the attainment of a durable, stable peace, as well as security for the peoples of the world, makes a principled rejection of the export of revolution—that is, the forcible artificial imposition of revolutionary transformations on any people. F. Engels wrote: "The victorious proletariat can force no blessings of any kind upon any foreign nation without undermining its own victory by so doing" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Soch.*, 2nd ed., vol. 35, p. 298). V. I. Lenin, who held the same views, wrote that people who believed revolution could break out in a foreign country to order or by agreement were either mad or provocateurs (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 36, p. 457). "We exercise our main influence on the international revolution," wrote Lenin, "through our economic policy The struggle in this field has now become global. Once we solve this problem, we shall have certainly and finally won on an international scale" (*ibid.*, vol. 43, p. 341). The policy of peaceful coexistence is the logical culmination of this way of posing the question of world revolution.

Lenin wrote that no forces would have been able to undermine capitalism if it had not been undermined by history. Communists proceed from the premise that the capitalist social structure is doomed by its own internal laws of development. The fate of capitalism will be decided not by the export of revolution but by the class struggle in the capitalist countries.

The liberal group of bourgeois ideologists, and the Social Democrats and revisionists, lean toward a very expansive interpretation of the potential of peaceful coexistence, which is viewed as a way to extinguish the political and ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism and bring about the gradual convergence of the two systems. At best, this point of view is utopian. The struggle of the two systems is rooted in deep-seated social processes and in the opposition of the fundamental principles of the organization of society. Thus, ideological coexistence and the gradual interpenetration of the two social structures are ruled out. The policy of peaceful coexistence does not and cannot solve the cardinal social problems of our time and cannot prevent political and ideological clashes, which may occasionally be very sharp. Indeed, it is not required to solve these problems. It has a very different purpose—to preserve world peace, to prevent a global thermonuclear conflict, and to find mutually acceptable principles for cooperation between socialist and capitalist states.

The third group of false interpretations of the policy of peaceful coexistence is associated with various leftist views. Their spokesmen attempt to prove that in pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence, the socialist countries bar their own way from actively supporting revolutionary processes. Thus, from their point of view, peaceful coexistence contradicts the pursuit of proletarian socialist internationalism and impedes the development of mass anti-imperialist movements. As an alternative to peaceful coexistence they essentially propose increasing international tension, intensifying the confrontation of the two systems, and exporting revolution. Historical experience teaches that peaceful coexistence does not hinder but stimulates the world revolutionary process. In rejecting the export of revolution, victorious socialism is by no means isolating itself from liberation movements. Lenin said that the world socialist revolution "must be helped." However, he immediately added that "we have to know how to help it" (*ibid.*, vol. 35, p. 396).

By pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence and imposing it on imperialism, the socialist countries create favorable preconditions for the rapid development of their economies and for the all-around progress of socialist social relations. The stronger the world socialist system and the more fully its ideals are implemented, the greater its revolutionizing influence on the masses of the working people will be, and the broader the possibilities for supporting revolutionary movements, which is by no means the same as artificially spurring them on. Under the conditions

of peaceful coexistence, imperialism's opportunities for aggressive action in the international arena and for exporting counter-revolution are sharply curtailed. The policy of peaceful coexistence also influences the domestic situation in capitalist countries. In connection with a conference in Genoa, Lenin declared that it was a task of socialism "to split the pacifist camp of the international bourgeoisie away from the gross-bourgeois, aggressive-bourgeois, reactionary-bourgeois camp" (*ibid.*, vol. 44, p. 408). In carrying out this task, the policy of peaceful coexistence promotes the growth of all democratic, anti-imperialist forces. It blocks the imperialists' attempts to overcome internal conflicts, impeding their efforts to aggravate international tension, and it promotes the development of the class struggle against imperialism on a national and worldwide scale. The policy of peaceful coexistence "meets the overall interests of the revolutionary struggle against all forms of oppression and exploitation" (*Mezhdunarodnoe Soveshchanie kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii: Dokumenty i materialy*, Moscow, 1969, p. 318).

The policy of peaceful coexistence is a compromise in the sense that it is based on a quest for a reasonable balance of interests and for mutually acceptable agreements. Of course, within the framework of these agreements each side seeks to uphold its own principled, fundamental interests.

Lenin clearly defined the principles on which possible accords between a socialist state and capitalist states should rest. "Of course, an advocate of proletarian revolution may conclude compromises or agreements with capitalists. It all depends on what kind of agreement is concluded and under what circumstances. Here and here alone can and must one look for the difference between an agreement that is legitimate from the angle of the proletarian revolution and one that is treasonable, treacherous (from the same angle)" (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 40, pp. 289-90). Concretizing his ideas about the "price" of a compromise, Lenin wrote: "We must make it a rule not to make political concessions to the international bourgeoisie . . . unless we receive in return more or less equivalent concessions from the international bourgeoisie to Soviet Russia, or to other contingents of the international proletariat which is fighting capitalism" (*ibid.*, vol. 45, p. 142). Lenin's methodology forms the basis of the practical activities of the USSR and other socialist countries in establishing mutually beneficial cooperation with the capitalist world.

As the main principle of conducting international affairs, the principle of peaceful coexistence is applicable in theory only to relations between the two world systems—capitalism and socialism. In practice, however, there is a tendency to use and to regard peaceful coexistence as a regulatory principle of the entire system of international relations—that is, of relations between states, regardless of their socioeconomic systems. Without disputing the historical validity and political reality of this tendency, it is necessary to emphasize that the highest principle of relations between socialist countries is socialist internationalism. Nonetheless, peaceful coexistence still has meaning in this context. In a sense, it is taken for granted as a natural, minimal basis for relations between states. The center of gravity shifts to mutual assistance among fraternal socialist states on the basis of class solidarity.

With the growth in power and size of the world socialist system, with the deepening of progressive transformations in the Third World countries, with the further strengthening of ties between the socialist and the developing states, the principle of internationalism will play an increasingly important role in the evolution of international relations. Its consistent implementation leads to the creation of additional opportunities for solidifying peace and peaceful coexistence. The converse relationship between the implementation of a policy of peaceful coexistence and the growth of internationalism is not as clear-cut. In some instances, the relaxation of international tension dulls the sense of class solidarity and stimulates a weakening of internationalist bonds. Therefore, a well thought-out, realistic policy of peaceful coexistence that soberly takes into account all the positive and negative aspects of the situation presupposes a purposeful struggle for the further cohesion of the socialist countries and all states actively opposing imperialism.

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A. E. BOVIN [16-929-3]

PELÉE, MOUNT (Montagne Pelée), an active volcano on Martinique, in the West Indies. Elevation, 1,397 m. Mount Pelée is known for its catastrophic eruption in 1902, when a heavy hot cloud of ash and volcanic bombs and blocks destroyed the city of St. Pierre and its 26,000 inhabitants. The eruption led to the classification of such volcanoes as Pelean. Mount Pelée was less strongly active in 1929-32. [16-162-2]

PENNATULARIA (sea pens), an order of marine invertebrates of the class Actinozoa. A colony consists of a large main polyp, which forms the trunk of the colony, and usually numerous small secondary polyps, located on the upper end or on special lateral processes of the main polyp. In the latter case, the colony has the form of a feather. The base of the main polyp is embedded in the sea bottom. There are approximately 700 species of sea pens, distributed predominantly in tropical and subtropical waters from the littoral zone to a depth of 6 km. In the USSR, six species are found in the seas of the Far East, and four in the northern seas (including *Umbellula encrinurus*—which is up to 2.6 m tall). Many sea pens are luminescent. [16-1762-1]

PERENNIAL FORAGE GRASSES, herbaceous plants cultivated for livestock feed that have a life span of more than one year. The yearly life cycle of these grasses consists of the following phases: spring sprouting, tillering, heading, flowering, fruiting with repeated tillering, autumn vegetation, and winter dormancy. Plants of the families Gramineae (timothy, foxtail, wheatgrass) and Leguminosae (clover, alfalfa, sainfoin) are among those cultivated most often for forage. Grasses and legumes are generally sown together; this combination favorably affects the quality of the forage and the fertility of the soil. Because of the repeated tillering, it is highly advisable to fertilize perennial forage grasses in the second half of the vegetative stage. [16-1097-2]

PERENNIALS (also perennial plants), herbs and shrubs that persist through more than two winters. Some perennials live several years, and others 20 to 30 years. Some species have a life-span of 100 years (for example, tau-saghyz). Upon reaching a certain age, perennials may flower and bear fruit every year (polycarpic plants), this contrasts with annuals and biennials (monocarpic plants), which flower and bear fruit only one time. Some perennials retain their leaves year round (evergreens). In unfavorable periods (winter, drought), the leaves and other aboveground organs of most perennials die, and only the underground organs remain alive (rhizomes, tubers, bulbs, and roots). In some perennials the aboveground shoots are partially preserved as well (rosettes, creeping shoots, and the lower parts of erect stems).

Sometimes the division of plants into annuals, biennials, and perennials is conditional. For example, the tropical perennial castor oil plant (*Ricinus communis*) grows as an annual in moderate climates, and annual bluegrass (*Poa annua*), which generally grows on plains, develops as a perennial in the mountains. Trees and shrubs are sometimes referred to as perennials.

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ANDROPOV

12

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SERIAL: DIADIN 167-6A
SUBJ: USSR: ANDROPOV NAMED HEAD OF STATE. (U)
DOI: 16 JUN 83 (AS OF 1730 EDT)
TEXT: 1. ~~let~~ AT THE 16 JUNE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION IN MOSCOW, SOVIET LEADER ANDROPOV WAS NAMED CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM, MAKING HIM CHIEF OF STATE; THIS PROVIDES THE clearest sign to date of the extent of his consolidation of power.

2. ~~let~~ ANDROPOV WAS NOMINATED FOR THE POSITION BY POLITBURO MEMBER AND FORMER BREZHNEV PROTEGE CHERNENKO. EARLIER, AT THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM, CHERNENKO DELIVERED THE KEYNOTE IDEOLOGY ADDRESS, PRAISING ANDROPOV AND ADVOCATING MANY OF THE POLICY THEMES INITIATED BY HIM AS THE GENERAL SECRETARY.

3. ~~let~~ ANDROPOV NOW HOLDS ALL THREE MAJOR POSITIONS OF POWER -- HEADING THE PARTY AS GENERAL SECRETARY, DIRECTING DEFENSE POLICY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE DEFENSE COUNCIL, AND HEADING THE STATE AS CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET.

4. ~~let~~ COMMENT: ALTHOUGH ATTAINING THE THREE LEADERSHIP POSITIONS AFTER ONLY 7 MONTHS INDICATES THE DEGREE OF ANDROPOV'S CONSOLIDATION OF POWER; IT IS MISLEADING TO DRAW THE COMPARISON THAT IT TOOK BREZHNEV 13 YEARS TO ACCOMPLISH THE SAME FEAT. BREZHNEV CAME TO POWER THROUGH A JOINT EFFORT TO OUST KHRUSHCHEV AND WAS INITIALLY FORCED TO SHARE POWER. ANDROPOV HAD THE ADVANTAGE OF OPERATING IN A TOTALLY DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENT AND ACCOMPLISHED SOME OF THE PRELIMINARY MANEUVERING FOR POSITION PRIOR TO BREZHNEV'S DEATH.

5. ~~let~~ CHERNENKO'S SUPPORT APPEARS TO EFFECTIVELY REMOVE HIM AS A MAJOR CONTENDER OPPOSING ANDROPOV, WHILE STRENGTHENING ANDROPOV'S POSITION ACCORDINGLY. THE LEADERSHIP CHANGES THAT WERE ANNOUNCED AT THIS WEEK'S PLENUM, PARTICULARLY THE APPOINTMENT OF POLITBURO MEMBER ROMANOV TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT, APPEAR TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN ANDROPOV'S HAND. ROMANOV IS REPORTEDLY AN ANDROPOV SUPPORTER, AND HIS MOVE TO THE POWERFUL SECRETARIAT WILL ADD ANOTHER VOICE TO THE THREE OTHER FULL POLITBURO MEMBERS IN THE SECRETARIAT: ANDROPOV, CHERNENKO, AND GORBACHEV. WHILE IT MAY BE PREMATURE TO SAY THAT ANDROPOV HAS ESTABLISHED FULL CONTROL, THESE DEVELOPMENTS DO SUBSTANTIALLY SOLIDIFY HIS POSITION AND OVERALL AUTHORITY.

PREP: [REDACTED]
DECL: OADR
BT

B3

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By CU, NARA, Date 6/21/06

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ANDROPOV
INCOMING
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 07639

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINR, PINS, PGOV, UR
SUBJECT: ANDROPOV NAMED USSR PRESIDENT
REF: MOSCOW 7592

1. ~~AC~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. THE NAMING OF ANDROPOV TO BE CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET IS FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY IS SECURE IN HIS NEW POST. THE APPOINTMENT OF LENINGRAD PARTY BOSS ROMANOV TO THE SECRETARIAT PROBABLY REPRESENTS A MODEST CONSOLIDATION OF ANDROPOV'S INFLUENCE IN THE SECRETARIAT. DESPITE THESE GAINS, THE FAILURE OF THE PLENUM TO OUST ANY MEMBERS OF THE BREZHNEV "TEAM" FROM THE HIGH LEADERSHIP OR TO APPOINT NEW FULL MEMBERS TO THE POLITBURO INDICATES THAT ANDROPOV LACKS A FREE HAND IN MAKING CADRE APPOINTMENTS AND THAT LIMITATIONS REMAIN ON HIS ROOM FOR MANEUVER. JOURNALISTS REPORT THAT THERE WILL BE A SECOND DAY OF THE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION. THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT NO FURTHER PERSONNEL CHANGES WILL BE ANNOUNCED. END SUMMARY.

THE IMAGE OF ANDROPOV IN THE SADDLE

3. THE APPOINTMENT OF ANDROPOV TO THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET CONCLUDES UNUSUAL EFFORTS IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS TO UNDERSCORE ANDROPOV'S PRESTIGE AND AUTHORITY. THE PRESIDENCY CARRIED WITH IT A LITTLE REAL POWER, BUT THE SYMBOLISM OF ANDROPOV'S ACCOMPLISHING IN SEVERAL MONTHS WHAT IT TOOK BREZHNEV THIRTEEN YEARS TO ACCOMPLISH WILL NOT BE LOST ON KNOWLEDGEABLE SOVIETS. TAKEN TOGETHER WITH JST NOV'S RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF ANDROPOV'S CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE DEFENSE COUNCIL, THIS NEWEST APPOINTMENT MEANS THAT ANDROPOV NOW WEARS ALL THE HATS WORN BY BREZHNEV.

4. ALL THE ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING THE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET SESSION HAVE STRESSED ANDROPOV'S PREEMINENCE IN A HARMONIOUS LEADERSHIP. CHERNENKO, FOR INSTANCE, IN HIS SPEECH TO THE PLENUM LEFT LITTLE DOUBT ABOUT WHO IS IN CHARGE, REFERRING TO THE "POLITBURO LED BY GENERAL SECRETARY ANDROPOV." LATER IN HIS SPEECH CHERNENKO ALLUDED TO THE UNITY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND POLITBURO AROUND THE NOVEMBER PARTY PLENUM'S DECISION TO APPOINT ANDROPOV GENERAL SECRETARY. THE ORDER OF PRECEDENCE WAS OBSERVED IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESOLUTION ON IDEOLOGY, WHICH ALSO REFERS TO THE POLITBURO LED BY ANDROPOV. FINALLY, IT WAS NONE OTHER THAN CHERNENKO WHO NOMINATED ANDROPOV FOR THE POST OF CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET.

THE REALITY BEHIND APPEARANCES

5. ALTHOUGH WE LACK FIRM INFORMATION ON RELATIONS BETWEEN ANDROPOV AND ROMANOV, FOR REASONS OUTLINED IN REF, WE THINK IT PROBABLE THAT ROMANOV'S APPOINTMENT TO THE SECRETARIAT REPRESENTS A CONSOLIDATION OF ANDROPOV'S

POWER IN THE SECRETARIAT. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS MUCH EVIDENCE THAT THE PLENUM RESULTS FELL FAR SHORT OF ANDROPOV'S DESIRES AND THE EXPECTATIONS OF HIS SUPPORTERS. IN RECENT MONTHS SOVIET INSIDERS INDICATED TO AMERICAN INTERLOCUTORS THAT THIS PLENUM WOULD ANNOUNCE A SIGNIFICANT LEADERSHIP SHAKE-UP SOLVING MANY OF ANDROPOV'S LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS. NEWSDAY CORRESPONDENT ED STEVENS (STRICTLY PROTECT) SAYS TIKHONOV'S RETIREMENT AND REPLACEMENT BY ALIYEV, A MOVE ALLEGEDLY SPONSORED BY ANDROPOV, HAD BEEN 'VIRTUALLY DECIDED UPON' AND THAT ANDROPOV HAD ALSO WANTED TO ELEVATE SOLOMENTSEV AND DOLGIKH TO FULL BT

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NLS F00-009/1 #52

8. ~~CL~~ NARA, DATE 6/21/06

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINR, PINS, PGOV, UR

SUBJECT: ANDROPOV NAMED USSR PRESIDENT

MEMBERSHIP IN THE POLITBURO. PERHAPS TO COUNTER THE
IMPRESSION THAT THE PLENUM DID NOT LIVE UP TO ITS BILLING,
RUMORS CONTINUE TO CIRCULATE THAT CHERNENKO HAS CANCER
AND THAT THIS PLENUM WAS, IN EFFECT, HIS SWAN SONG.
WHILE WE ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT SUCH RUMORS, THEY INDICATE
THAT THE UNITY OF THE LEADERSHIP IS FAR FROM ABSOLUTE,
THAT ANDROPOV STILL CONFRONTS REAL CONSTRAINTS ON HIS
FREEDOM OF MANEUVER, AND THAT, AS CHERNENKO PUT IT, THE
POLITBURO WILL REMAIN A PLACE OF "FREE DISCUSSION."

COMING CHANGES

6. WE AGREE WITH THE LINE OF ANALYSIS THAT NEWLY APPOINTED
ALTERNATE MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO VOROTNIKOV WILL BECOME
SOLOMENTSEV'S REPLACEMENT AS RUSSIAN REPUBLIC PREMIER.
THIS IS LIKELY TO OCCUR AT THE SESSION OF THE RSFSR
SUPREME SOVIET SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 24. IN THE LONGER TERM,
WE EXPECT POLITICAL MANEUVERING TO CONTINUE AROUND THE
FATES OF BREZHNEV COHORTS TIKHONOV AND CHERNENKO.

PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS ON LEADERS' HEALTH

15
7. ANDROPOV'S PHYSICAL APPEARANCE AT THE SUPREME SOVIET
SESSION SEEMED IMPROVED OVER THE VOIVISTO VISIT, BUT HE
WAS OBVIOUSLY STILL FRAIL. HE WAS ABLE TO DESCEND THE
STEPS TO HIS SEAT UNPAIDED, ALBERT VERY SLOWLY AND CARE-
FULLY, USING THE BACKS OF OTHER SEATS AS SUPPORT. HE
STOOD UP TO DELIVER HIS ACCEPTANCE REMARKS IN PLACE
RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING TO DESCEND TO THE PODIUM.

8. CHERNENKO LOOKED IN GOOD COLOR ALTHOUGH THIN AND
SOMEWHAT EXHAUSTED. HIS DELIVERY OF HIS SPEECH NOMINATING
ANDROPOV WAS NOTICEABLY SLURRED, AND HE SEEMED TO BE SHORT
OF BREATH.

9. THE LINE-UP OF THE FULL POLITBURO MEMBERS AT THE
SUPREME SOVIET SESSION WAS AS FOLLOWS: FIRST ROW
(READING IN FROM THE CENTER AISLE), ANDROPOV, TIKHONOV,
USTINOV, GROMYKO, AND CHERNENKO; SECOND ROW, SHCHERBITSKIY,
KUNAYEV, GRISHIN, ROMANOV, AND GORBACHEV; THIRD ROW,
ALIYEV.
HARTMAN
BT

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6/17/83
Andropov

Dear Mr. President:

Please accept my congratulations upon your election as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

As you assume your new duties, I hope that together we can find ways to promote peace by reducing the levels of armaments and moving toward the elimination of force and threats of force in settling international disputes. You will have my full cooperation in moving toward these goals on a basis of equality, reciprocity, and respect for the rights and interests of all.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov
Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

6/16/83
Andropov

Dear Mr. President:

Please accept my congratulations upon your election as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

As you assume your new duties, I hope that we can find ways to promote peace by reducing the levels of armaments and moving toward the elimination of force and threats of force in settling international disputes. You will have my full cooperation in moving toward these goals on a basis of equality, reciprocity and respect for the rights and interests of all.

Sincerely,

His Excellency

Yuri Andropov

President of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics

MOSCOW

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By LOJ NARA, Date 7/23/04

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Article on Andropov

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NLS FOO-009/1 #53CI NARA, DATE 6/21/06

Max Friedersdorf has sent you an interesting article on Andropov by Edward Crankshaw, a journalist specializing in Soviet affairs (Tab A). The article is well worth reading. It shows how Andropov is the quintessential Kremlin Man. Its main points are as follows:

- The Kremlin has never adopted a foreign policy of "Live and Let Live" and is not likely to do so.
- For all the talk about Andropov's alleged intelligence, flexibility and culture, he is not responsive to the concerns of his people, and is therefore irresponsible in the deepest sense.
- Andropov will have to continue to pursue the irresponsible domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet state, because he and his colleagues are "prisoners" of the system, prisoners of the lies that are an institutionalized part of the system.
- The immutability of this system is reinforced by the vested interests of the "nomenklatura" (the party elite) and the enormous bureaucracy.
- Andropov himself is a Party Man and not a KGB man. The Party appointed him to straighten out the KGB. His ruthlessness in dealing with the Hungarians proved him to be indispensable for high Party responsibilities.

The article is right on the mark, and is a very useful reminder that we are dealing not so much with an individual but with a system. The only point that should have been raised by the author is that the communist ideology serves as the key to the internal security system of the state, thus compelling everyone, including Andropov, to follow it. The ideology sets the standard to which everyone must conform so that nonconformists are easily identified as a threat to the system. Thus when even a Party General Secretary tries to change the system even a little (such as Khrushchev), he may be ousted as a threat to the system.

Prepared by John Lenczowski

Attachment:
Tab A Crankshaw article

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Declassify on: OADR

Andropov

3955

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 13, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL
SUBJECT: Crankshaw Article on Andropov

Max Friedersdorf has sent the President an article on Andropov (Tab A) by Edward Crankshaw, a journalist specializing in Soviet affairs.

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President which forwards the article and comments upon it. At Tab II is a note of acknowledgement for your signature.

JL for PD
Paula Dobriansky and Bob Sims concur.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That you sign the acknowledging letter at Tab II.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Crankshaw article and memo from State, June 7
Tab II	Proposed letter for your signature

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Declassify on: OADR

LOS

3/7/01

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ANDROPOV: caught up in the lie



BREZHNEV: not as bright as Andropov



KRUSHCHEV: erratic and often dotty

THE I OF A

Edward Crankshaw, the respected Soviet expert, examines Moscow's current campaign of reassurance and pleas for detente.

WHAT COULD be more beguiling, what more in tune with the spirit of the age, than a plea from Moscow like the one by the *Izvestia* journalist Alexander Bovin for a new mood of tolerance and compromise between East and West and an easing of ideological, or "theological" conflict. Live and let live . . .

No doubt in the eyes of the Lord we are all sinners. If Yuri Andropov has been converted to this view, then let us give thanks. He will have a great deal of highly instructive confessing to do.

But there have been no confessions yet, so we have to assume that Bovin's article is part of a new and clever propaganda offensive: this should help to keep us on our toes, and we shall be none the worse for that.

Nobody, I imagine, could be more critical than the present writer of the crude imbecilities, and the sins, of so many Western leaders in their handling of the Soviet problem.

The fact remains that the Regans and the Thatchers and the others are, and have to be, responsive to ordinary men and women of goodwill who want to make the world a better place and expect (which is not the same as getting) certain standards from their champions. Andropov is not responsive in this way. He is, in the deepest sense, irresponsible.

Failures to recognise this simple little fact is one of the things that make all talk about the sort of man he is (intelligent? flexible? cultured?) largely irrelevant and vain. He is Kremlin Man. And Kremlin Man is different in kind from all other politicians, speaking his own language and basing his conduct on assumptions radically different from those of the rest of mankind.

The Soviet leadership does not accept, and has never accepted, the principle of "live and let live" in its relations with the outer world. In the person of Lenin it declared war on bourgeois society everywhere, and, for some time, thought it might win quickly.

It is very much to be doubted whether Andropov today really and actively believes that the entire world will one day be Sovietised, happy to look prayerfully towards Moscow for leadership and light, but he talks in these terms and his talk is reflected in his behaviour or vice versa.

If Andropov wants to change things all he has to say, in suitable arcane phrases, is that once upon a

NEVITABLE LIES KREMLIN MAN

time, and for what then seemed to be quite good historical reasons, the Bolsheviks believed that they were destined to revolutionise and re-order the world, and that anything or anybody standing in the way of this manifest destiny must be destroyed or helped to destroy itself.

But, he might go on, the world no longer looks quite so simple and the Soviet Union, having achieved the status of a great power, understands that other societies must be allowed to go to hell in their own way; it will devote its future energies to the promotion of its national interests in so far as this activity is compatible with maintaining a balance of peace — in other words, to behave like any other country, and, no doubt, with at least the same proneness to expansive error.

Discipline

He has not said this, or anything like it, nor is he likely to do so. Why not?

The Kremlin is the prisoner of its own lies. I don't mean the sort of shabby lies of expediency that all politicians and most of the rest of us fall into. All societies depend very much on hypocrisy and self-deception, and the active compulsive liar (who would not know the truth if he saw it) often supplies that little extra zing that keeps things moving. From time to time an entire people, or the greater part of it, goes mad (Dreyfus, McCarthy, Suez, Vietnam).

Sooner or later these failings, offences, crimes are publicly exposed and we hope to do better next time, and sometimes do. To go no farther from home, look at Germany. Like the preacher, we are all against sin.

But not Kremlin Man. In Russia there is no sin except against the State — which, at the moment, is Yuri Andropov. In the Soviet Union the lie is institutionalised, not a cheap expedient, brazen or furtive, but an instrument of policy, cherished, burnished. The sanctification of the lie by Lenin, who declared in effect that the only moral criterion was whether a given action helped the Revolution or hindered it, and the basing not only of the Soviet system of government but also of Soviet foreign policy on systematic deception, sets Kremlin Man apart.

An unfortunate by-product of this protracted aberration (how long must an aberration persist before it becomes what Andropov would call the norm?) is that Kremlin Man finds it virtually impossible to imagine that Western statesmen sometimes try to tell the truth. Incomprehension is therefore mutual.

Andropov is caught up in the lie. The Soviet Union is the only country in the Old World (of which, whether it likes it or not, the United States is now an honorary and magnificently powerful member) which has not begun to escape from its past by admitting its past crimes.

This is surely a most prohibitively heavy burden: not only crushing morale, initiative and human de-

cency, but also distorting and crippling an economy based on doctrinally inspired agricultural and industrial systems which have only faint connections with reality and have to be subverted before anything at all can be produced.

Clearly it needs something like a genius to break out of this situation, which would be ludicrous if it were not tragic. Brezhnev did not even try. It suited him down the ground, just as it suited, and suits, the horde of official functionaries (not just the upper crust, the gratin, the famous *nomenklatura*, but the party activists all down the line from Red Square to the remotest provinces) over whom Andropov has now assumed formal control — for how long, nobody can guess.

Krushchev, erratically and often dottily, tried very hard, somehow hanging on to full membership of the human race through all. But Andropov?

Even if he has perceived the lie, or some of it, and would like to break out of it, has he the power? Think for a moment of the almost insuperable difficulty facing any reforming minister in any Western democracy when he tries to get rid of the duds in his own department, and cut out red tape, overmanning, waste. Then reflect that every single aspect of life in the Soviet Union is in fact a part of the state apparatus and that the tempo and quality of life are regulated by literally millions of party officials and state functionaries, largely duds (this being a law of life) possessing almost infinite powers of obstruction and a vested interest in the status quo.

Andropov has a great deal to say about toughening up discipline. He then from the start paradoxically threatens the only men and women who keep things going at all — those in positions of responsibility who still retain the entrepreneurial spirit and like doing things well.

But when does he want to try? Andropov on the face of it is a Kremlin Man in excelsis. It would be quite wrong to think of him as one of those rather jolly and intelligent KGB careerists who know that almost everything is wrong but have decided that if you can't beat the system you had better join it and avail yourself of its fruits. There are not as many of these as is romantically believed, but they exist, sharing the uniforms and the privileges of the vilest of the vile.

Andropov is made of sterner stuff. He is not a KGB man at all. He was put in above the KGB to clean out the stables. And he was put in by the party, which is his only home.

After some years as a dedicated and quietly rising functionary in Stalin's party, which brought him into the power house of the machine, he was shunted off to Budapest, and there, first as counsellor, then as ambassador, made good. Somehow he persuaded Hungarians to trust him, and when the time came to put down the 1956 uprising he kept his head when all around him were losing theirs.

His crowning achievement was to make the Hungarians believe that the Soviet tanks were going away for good. He was able to persuade General Meleter, commander of the "rebel" Hungarian forces, to visit him under safe conduct at the Soviet Embassy to discuss the situation. There Meleter was seized, taken away, and in due course, shot. The tanks, of course, came back.

This display of firm and decisive treachery made him the obvious man to take charge of Communist parties inside the Soviet bloc. And it was from this eminence that in 1967, in good time to preside over the re-Sovietisation of Czechoslovakia, he was moved to run the KGB, reorganise it and make sense of it.

Certainly he improved its image, which needed a bit of polishing. But what he will be remembered for has been the systematic elimination of dissidents wherever they showed their head, while at the same time clearly perceiving the necessity of permitting, encouraging even, some degree of intellectual activity if the Soviet Union was not to die of intellectual inanition.

Compared with Stalin, Andropov has been gentleness itself; but it is a gentleness that shows itself in peculiar ways: for example, the practice of consigning awkward citizens to lunatic asylums (particularly those who base their position on the Soviet Constitution and/or the Helsinki agreement) became under Andropov a growth industry. And he has shown, still shows, particular harshness about the least manifestation of nationalistic sentiment in the constituent republics.

Party duds

Of course he is an improvement on Stalin, more intelligent than Brezhnev (therefore more worth watching). But it is hard to see how he can be expected to inaugurate a new era. The main hope for the Soviet Union now, it seems to me, is that Andropov will be intelligent enough to sack the party duds in droves and bring in new talent born into the post-Stalin era, new talent which might indeed, freed from antique institutions, see the way to change.

Stalin himself was forced to do this sort of thing as an emergency, war-time measure in 1941 and 1942 when the old guard of dug-out commanders had to give way to a new wave of younger generals who went on to win the war. But Stalin remained Stalin, and it is hard to believe that Andropov will suddenly transform himself.

It might be a good thing if the West made the most of this slow change to develop an intelligent and coherent policy of its own, based on unshakeable strength but also actively seeking ways and means of reducing the grounds for Russian distrust — perhaps by trying to behave at least as well as we should like the Russians to behave.

— London Observer Service

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Max:

Thank you for the copy of the Crankshaw article which you so kindly sent to the President. We have passed it on to him in your name.

It is always good to hear from you.

Sincerely,

William P. Clark

Max Friedersdorf, Esquire
American Consul General
Hamilton, Bermuda



8316744
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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June 7, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Response to Consul General Max Friedersdorf

US Consul General in Bermuda and former White House aide Max Friedersdorf has sent a copy of a newspaper article by the Sovietologist, Edward Crankshaw, to the President under cover of a short note. Both are attached.

In accordance with NSC instructions, we have prepared the attached draft reply, in which you thank Friedersdorf for the clipping and indicate that it has been passed to the President in Friedersdorf's name.

Conc

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Draft Response.
2. Note to the President from Consul General Friedersdorf, with clipping appended.

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Andropov
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Pls advise
Thank
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WHITEHOUSE FOR MORT ALLIN; USIA FOR P/FW-BLAND
E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: QUERY FOR WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE

1. A LOCAL NEWS AGENCY WHICH DOES NOT HAVE A CORRESPONDENT ACCREDITED TO THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS CORPS DESIRES TO PUT A QUESTION TO THE WHITE HOUSE. "ADN-KRONOS," A PRIVATELY OWNED NEWS ORGANIZATION WHICH IS CLOSE TO ITALY'S SOCIALIST PARTY, WISHES TO ASK WHETHER PRESIDENT REAGAN PLANS TO CHOOSE THE OCCASION OF SOVIET PARTY SECRETARY YURI ANDROPOV'S BIRTHDAY (ON JUNE 15) TO SEND A MESSAGE OF GREETINGS TO HIM.

2. IF WHITE HOUSE WILL NOT RESPOND, PLEASE ADVISE YOUR POLICY TOWARD QUERIES OF THIS KIND. BURNETT
BT

Mort - no birthday messages have been exchanged between Pres. Reagan and Brezhnev. Also, Andropov sent no B-Day message to the Pres. in of this year February. In sum, such mutual greetings have not been extended.

PAULA 6/8/83

Mort -

I see no reason under the circumstances why we should send such greetings.

- John L.

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Andropov 17

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

B3

National Intelligence Council

7 June 83

Mr. Norman Bailey
Staff Assistant, NSC Staff
Room 373 Old EOB

Dear Norm:

SUBJECT: Implications for the US
of Probable June Plenum

An interesting, forward-leaning piece on potential opportunities or dangers for us arising from the upcoming June Plenum. It was written by [REDACTED] of our NIO/USSR office and is worth a few minutes' perusal. Please note the recent death of Arvid Pelshe, which will assist a pro-Andropov result.

[REDACTED]

Charles E. Waterman
Vice Chairman

Attachment

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NLS FOUO-009/11 #54
By CH, NARA, Date 6/24/06

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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File - USSR

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NLS F00-009/1 #55

By CU, NARA, Date 6/21/06

National Intelligence Council

NIC #3826-83

23 May 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : 
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

SUBJECT : Implications for the US of the Probable June Plenum

1. June will be a very important month for Andropov:

- The Supreme Soviet will meet on 16 June and presumably select the Chairman of its Presidium (head of state or "President").
- The Central Committee will probably hold its first Plenum this year, possibly during the 13-15 June period. (It normally meets just before the Supreme Soviet session).
- The probability of a Plenum combined with an uncommonly high level of rumor-mongering about what will happen have fueled expectations that Andropov is about to consolidate his power.

To be sure, we cannot be certain there will be a Plenum; these sessions are not officially announced in advance, and in any case there is no absolute requirement to have one. But, given the expectations and Andropov's need to put a stronger stamp on the political landscape, the failure to hold a Plenum would be clear evidence that the fissures in the Soviet leadership are deeper than now believed. In either event - Plenum or no Plenum - we shall know more about Andropov's power position some three weeks from now. This paper is a brief assessment of what could happen and what it means for the U.S.

2. A word of caution:

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3. [REDACTED]
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4. So far, though, Andropov has made only slow progress: He has established himself as the main interpreter of ideology (an important precursor to policy formulation in the Soviet system); sketched out some very limited economic reforms which amount mainly to streamlining; and singled out increased efficiency as the key to revitalizing the Soviet economy, which means stricter cadre accountability and therefore widespread personnel changes. But to implement even his apparently modest substantive program and particularly his more worrisome (to present office holders) cadres policy, Andropov must have a reliable majority in the Politburo.

5. What is the situation today? Unfortunately, analyses of Politburo divisions can never be based on hard facts and are therefore very risky. Still it is worth hazarding an educated guess of a possible Politburo breakdown, not on a particular decision but on general policy and personal lines, so as to bring out what Andropov must eventually do in order to rule effectively. A line-up along the following lines seems plausible:

- The Andropov Group: Himself, Ustinov, Gromyko, and Gorbachev (whose star has risen remarkably since November and whose speeches suggest agreement with the thrust of Andropov's policies).
- An "anti-Andropov" group, not in the sense of a united faction which wants to oust Andropov but rather a group of individuals whose careers stand to be hurt rather than helped by Andropov's further rise and who want to keep him under fairly tight collective constraints: Chernenko, Grishin, Shcherbitskiy, Tikhonov, Kunayev, and Pelshe.
- The leaders with links in both camps: Romanov, who is not associated with the old Brezhnev clique, is ambitious, but who has not (yet?) benefited much from Andropov's ascension; and Aliyev, who has risen during the Andropov era but who is probably enough of an opportunist not to commit himself irrevocably to one side as long as the final outcome is not completely clear.

6. Every Sovietologist probably has his own version of a Politburo breakdown and none could prove that his is correct. The important point is that most agree Andropov's Politburo position is still not all that solid -- a view supported by the vacillating nature of Andropov's discipline

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campaign, clear differences in party organs about as important an ideological issue as the nature of contradictions in the USSR today, and the recurring rumors of Andropov's difficulties. Therefore, if Andropov wants to get away from the domestic immobilism that characterized the Brezhnev years - and his program indicates that he does -, he must change the Politburo political alignment.

7. With this as background, what could happen in June? As stated earlier, it is still possible that there will be no Plenum -- which would mean that Andropov's power is seriously constrained and that the political divisions in the Politburo are very serious. Andropov would have little choice but to continue chipping away at the power bases of his opponents if he is to have any chance of implementing his own program. However, it is much more likely that a Plenum will be held, in which case there seem to be four possible outcomes:

A. A Compromise, Non-Event Plenum. The policy declarations are unclear and any personnel decisions apparent compromises. I would see the filling of the "Presidency" unaccompanied by changes in the Politburo or Secretariat as essentially a draw. If the post were filled by Andropov or one of his allies (Ustinov, Gromyko), it would be a slight improvement in Andropov's position; if it were filled by a surprise candidate, it would probably signify some limited slippage in Andropov's position.

B. A Plenum with an Andropov Tilt. Andropov is clearly shown to be the first among equals: He or one of his allies takes the Presidency job; more importantly, he continues his present tack of gradually making second-tier changes and is able to steer the policy discussions in his direction; but he leaves the Politburo essentially unchanged.

C. A Clear Andropov Plenum. He pushes through a number of top-level personnel changes, the most important of which result in a new alignment in the Politburo, either through expulsions, new members, or a new alliance, or a combination of all three. For instance:

- Ustinov could leave the Defense Ministry to take on another important job ("Presidency", elevation within the Council of Ministers) in which he retains some say over the military-industrial complex;
- This would free up the Defense Ministry, possibly for the apparently politically pliant Commander of the Ground Forces, the recently promoted Marshal Petrov;

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- The ailing octagenarian Pelshe could be retired with honors and replaced as head of the Party Control Committee by the Georgian Party chief and Candidate Member of the Politburo Shevarnadze who has excellent experience in carrying out contained party purges.
- All these moves would entail only one honorable dismissal from the Politburo (Pelshe) but could set the stage for Andropov making at least three new full members: Petrov, Shevarnadze, and Chebrikov (whose elevation may have been signalled during his recent visit to Bulgaria by the unprecedented publicity and honors given a KGB chief).
- There is nothing intrinsically controversial or radical about such changes, or something akin to them, making them hard to oppose. But they would almost certainly give Andropov a political majority since doubters and some erstwhile opponents would most likely rally to the winning side.

D. An-anti-Andropov Plenum. The anti-Andropov leaders manage to unite, demonstrate their power by both personnel moves (for instance a Grishin-Shcherbitskiy seizure of the "Presidency" and Prime Minister slots, with Tikhonov taking the Party Control Committee) and by the way the Plenum is structured (for instance, by having Chernenko make the key ideological pronouncements.) It its most extreme form, this development would entail the ouster of Andropov.

8. While Outcomes A (Non-Event Plenum) and D (Anti-Andropov Plenum) would be the least worrisome for us as a Soviet leadership preoccupied with power consolidation would likely devote less time and energy to international affairs, they are unlikely in view of Andropov's apparent ascendancy in the last few months. The most probable result falls somewhere between Outcomes B (Pro-Andropov Plenum) and C (Clear Andropov Plenum), meaning that Andropov will probably acquire greater freedom to move decisively in all spheres without fearing that some decision could be used against him by his foes.

9. This probable outcome has a definite foreign policy implication. The further Andropov consolidates his power, the more formidable an adversary the Soviets are likely to be since the lines of authority in Moscow will be clear, the apparatus will function in increasingly integrated fashion, and Andropov will be able to devote more of his time, energy, and cunning to promoting the USSR's interests overseas.

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10. For us, this means he will be able to make life all that much harder, either as part of a direct offensive (for instance, by some move to really put us in an "analogous position", or by greater support for insurgency in Central America, or by escalating the Soviet stake in Syria) or as part of an indirect offensive by making concessions to our actual or putative allies in order to split them from us (for instance, by offering concessions to Japan or the PRC, or making a dramatic move in Europe on either troop reductions or the confidence-building measures which are at the heart of the prospective Conference on Disarmament in Europe being pushed by the FRG and France).

11. But there is an obverse side to this as well. An Andropov more firmly in command would also be in a better position to strike a deal with us (for instance on INF) if he thought the circumstances were right. And that is the major implication of the Central Committee Plenum for us: Andropov is likely to emerge from it strengthened and with greater ability either to make life as hard as possible for us or to try to come to some sort of an arrangement with us. To be sure, as we wrote in NIE 11-4-82, "a(n all) encompassing accord on bilateral relations or geopolitical behavior is precluded by fundamentally divergent attitudes toward what constitutes desirable political or social change in the international order." But, paraphrasing that same NIE, "limited accommodations in the areas of arms control or other bilateral issues" could become more possible with Andropov's consolidation of power.

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USSR: Andropov's Foreign Policy. ~~(U)~~

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ In his early months as party chief, General Secretary Andropov has largely emphasized the continuation of foreign policy lines initiated under Brezhnev, but there have been some shifts in emphasis and style.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Primary areas of emphasis under Andropov have included arms control and disarmament proposals, relations with other Warsaw Pact members, reduction of overt tensions with People's Republic of China, the Afghanistan problem, and efforts to achieve gains in relations with developing states.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The key foreign policy initiative has been Andropov's arms proposals. The goals of these initiatives include blocking the deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles, bolstering Western peace movements, and driving wedges between the US and its NATO allies. In the process, the Soviets have sought to seize the moral high ground and make the US appear belligerent by comparison, while laying the groundwork for eventual arms agreements that fully encompass Moscow's security priorities. The Soviets have pursued these objectives through a multilevel campaign using diplomacy, propaganda, and other tactics in an approach promising mutual security if the West cooperates and threatening countermeasures if it does not. Despite peaceful words, however, Soviet actions continue to reflect weapon modernization and deployment plans.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ In other areas, there has been no significant shift in foreign policy from that pursued during the later Brezhnev years. For example, in relations with Beijing, efforts to ease overt tensions through a dialogue between the two states continue. Similarly, there have been no major changes with respect to Soviet policy in Afghanistan. In fact, as a senior Soviet official, Andropov had a major hand in formulating these policies.

COMMENT: ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Andropov has attempted to project an image of openness and flexibility and of being the individual to whom the West must come in order to reach agreement. He has generally associated his name with offers of cooperation, while letting other -- often anonymous -- officials make more hardline points. This illustrates the effectiveness of his style. In this case, the results are already being seen in the West, where he is frequently portrayed as a moderate force and opinion has shifted in favor of a number of his views. Overall, while Andropov has continued many policies of his predecessor, he remains a pragmatist who can shift his position quickly if he sees an opportunity to score gains in support of Soviet interests and policy objectives. (DECL OADR)

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2. ANDROPOV'S DOMESTIC LINE: STRICTNESS AND CAUTION

The new Soviet leader has adopted a deliberate but tough stance in coping with internal problems. He is keeping a tight lid on organized social protest, while waging a harder fight against official corruption. The shakeup of senior personnel may indicate that he seeks to manage the economy more closely although major economic reforms do not yet seem to be in the offing.

* * *

Judging from the wording of the amnesty announced to mark the USSR's 60th anniversary, Andropov may adopt a less liberal attitude toward religious dissenters and common criminals. Unlike earlier amnesty decrees, this one specifically excluded religious believers and, in many cases, reduced from five to two years the upper limit on sentences from which prisoners could be reprieved. All political prisoners were excluded.

In addition, the Soviet leadership decreed new penalties--fines, prison terms, and forced labor--for a number of nonpolitical crimes. One provision dealing with the misappropriation of state property seems to be directed at corrupt officials.

Andropov evidently intends to use the anti-corruption drive to strengthen his hold on power. Pravda has kept alive the case of Sergey Medunov, who was removed from his post as party boss of the Krasnodar region last July amid rumors of involvement in local scandals. Medunov was reputedly a personal friend of Brezhnev and an adulator of Brezhnev's protegee, CPSU Secretary Konstantin Chernenko, Andropov's main rival for the succession. Now, Pravda is blaming "certain party officials" for having defended large-scale embezzlers of state funds in the Krasnodar region "during recent years."

Among Andropov's major innovations is the end to virtual lifetime tenure for key officeholders regardless of their performance. That measure could improve the quality of Soviet administration and could gain some popularity for the new regime. Any real progress toward solving the efficiency problem, however, will require the reform of over-centralized planning and management methods. Yet no drastic curtailment of such planning from above appears to be imminent. Despite the urging of the press for a broader use of price and profit incentives, and more autonomy for local managers, the Gosplan elders are still at their desks.

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