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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files
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Archivist: loj/loj
 FOIA ID: F00-009, Skinner
 Date: 7/29/04

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. report	Re Andropov answers to Pravda arms talks questions, 5p <i>Part 6/21/06 NLSF00-009/1 #38</i>	1/24/84	B3
2. cable	151424Z Nov 83, 9p <i>R " " #39</i>	11/15/83	B1
3. report	Re Andropov, 1p <i>R " " #40</i>	10/29/83	B1
4. memo (8306903)	Matlock to Clark, re Andropov answers Reagan, 1p <i>R " " #41</i>	9/29/83	B1
5. memo	Charles Hill to William Clark, re Andropov answers Reagan, 2p <i>R " " #42</i>	9/28/83	B1
6. memo (8304209)	Clark to the President, re Andropov reply, 1p <i>R " " #43</i>	7/6/83	B1
7. memo (8304209)	Matlock to Clark, re Andropov reply, 1p <i>R " " #44</i>	6/27/83	B1
8. memo (8304209)	Matlock to Clark, re Andropov reply, 1p <i>R " " #45</i>	6/24/83	B1
9. report	Re Andropov's Foreign Policy, 1p <i>R " " #46</i>	6/17/83	B1

RESTRICTIONS

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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January 24, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Press Guidance on Andropov's Pravda Interview

Attached is the Department's recommended press guidance on Andropov's "interview" with Pravda responding to the President's January 16 speech on US-Soviet relations.

Attachment: As Stated

For Mr. Hill
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Chin - file
text of interview
with copy of chair
statement & President's
remarks -

JS

ANDROPOV'S PRAVDA INTERVIEW

Q: What is your reaction to Andropov's Pravda interview?

A: -- We will want to study it carefully, and discuss it with our Allies, but in a preliminary way it does not look as if President Andropov was trying to be constructive, and that of course is disappointing following President Reagan's speech last week.

-- As the President said, we think our policies over the past three years have made the world a safer place, but that does not mean we think it is safe enough, and we are ready to redouble efforts to work with the Soviets to reduce tensions and arms and make it safer still.

-- Steady American strength and purpose are essential if that effort is to be successful, and neither the Soviets nor anyone else have any reason to be afraid or to refuse to negotiate.

-- So we welcome President Andropov's assertion that the Soviets also believe in dialogue, and we agree wholeheartedly that our common objective should be concrete agreements on the issues that divide our two countries.

-- Some of the familiar Soviet proposals he mentioned do not seem very concrete to us. For our part, we have on the table a whole range of specific proposals that try to take into account some of the concerns he described.

-- On intermediate-range missiles, the President reiterated that we would have preferred not to have had to deploy any of our new missiles in Europe. We stand ready to reduce to any equal level in this area, including zero, and see no justification for walking away from the table as the Soviets have done in Geneva.

-- We want a joint effort to get down to the business of solving these problems, and we are ready if the Soviets are. We are ready to sit down at any time to discuss solutions that deal realistically and equitably with both sides' interests and concerns.

IN-ANDROPOV

ANDROPOV SAYS MOSCOW READY FOR DIALOGUE

BY MARK WOOD

MOSCOW, JAN 24, REUTER - SOVIET PRESIDENT YURI ANDROPOV SAID TODAY THAT MOSCOW WAS READY FOR A DIALOGUE WITH THE UNITED STATES BUT THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE CONDUCTED FROM A "POSITION OF STRENGTH AS IS PROPOSED BY RONALD REAGAN."

IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CALL FOR BETTER RELATIONS, THE COMMUNIST LEADER DECLARED THAT IT WAS UP TO THE UNITED STATES TO DEMONSTRATE GOOD WILL BY RESPONDING TO MOSCOW'S ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS.

ANDROPOV'S COMMENTS WERE PRESENTED IN THE FORM OF REPLIES TO QUESTIONS FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTY DAILY PRAVDA AND CARRIED IN ADVANCE BY THE TASS NEWS AGENCY.

THE 69-YEAR-OLD KREMLIN LEADER HAS NOT BEEN SEEN IN PUBLIC SINCE AUGUST.

"THERE IS NO NEED TO CONVINCE US OF THE USEFULNESS AND EXPEDIENCE OF DIALOGUE. THIS IS OUR POLICY. BUT THE DIALOGUE SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ON AN EQUAL FOOTING AND NOT FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH AS IS PROPOSED BY RONALD REAGAN," ANDROPOV SAID.

"THE DIALOGUE SHOULD NOT BE CONDUCTED FOR THE SAKE OF DIALOGUE," ANDROPOV SAID.

MORE 1420 DZ

R177R 14660>220TZSAZSA

AK-ANDROPOV 2 MOSCOW

"THE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP, AS ALL SIGNS INDICATE, HAS NOT GIVEN UP ITS INTENTIONS TO CONDUCT TALKS WITH US FROM POSITIONS OF STRENGTH, FROM POSITIONS OF THREATS AND PRESSURE.

"WE RESOLUTELY REJECT SUCH AN APPROACH AND IN GENERAL ALL ATTEMPTS TO CONDUCT A "POWER DIPLOMACY" TOWARD US ARE FUTILE."

ANDROPOV CALLED ON WASHINGTON TO LAY THE BASIS FOR RENEWED EAST-WEST CONTACTS BY AGREEING TO MOSCOW'S CALLS FOR A FREEZE ON ALL NUCLEAR ARMS DEPLOYMENT.

HE SAID THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ALSO RESPOND TO SOVIET PROPOSALS THAT BOTH SIDES PLEDGE NEVER TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THAT THE EAST AND WEST BLOCS SIGN A NON-AGGRESSION TREATY.

"IT IS BY PRACTICAL DEEDS THAT WE WILL JUDGE WHETHER THE UNITED STATES HAS SERIOUS INTENTIONS TO CONDUCT A SERIOUS DIALOGUE WITH US," HE ADDED.

HIS COMMENTS WERE IN RESPONSE TO A SPEECH BY REAGAN LAST WEEK IN WHICH THE U.S. PRESIDENT URGED MOSCOW TO RETURN TO SUSPENDED TALKS ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL.

MORE 1422 DZ

Jack Matlock ✓

R170K 14/167L20125HMYR

AM-ANDROPOV 3 MOSCOW

"IS IT THAT THE AMERICAN SIDE HAS REALIZED WHAT IT HAS DONE AND, DESIRING A DIALOGUE, IS PREPARED TO CHANGE ITS NEGATIVE APPROACH?" ANDROPOV ASKED.

"NO, THIS HAS NOT HAPPENED. THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH DOES NOT CONTAIN A SINGLE NEW IDEA, ANY NEW PROPOSALS EITHER ON THE QUESTION OF LIMITING NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE OR ON OTHER QUESTIONS," HE SAID.

ANDROPOV'S REMARKS CONTAINED NO SIGN OF A SOFTENING IN MOSCOW'S REFUSAL TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITING MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE.

HE REITERATED HIS EARLIER DEMANDS THAT THE WEST SHOW A READINESS TO RETURN TO THE SITUATION WHICH EXISTED BEFORE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. CRUISE AND PERSHING ROCKETS BEGAN LATE LAST YEAR.

IN TONE, HIS COMMENTS SUGGESTED THAT THE KREMLIN INTENDED TO MAINTAIN A TOUGH LINE TOWARD WASHINGTON AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DEMAND THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MAKE CONCESSIONS AS A FIRST STEP IN EASING TENSIONS.

REUTER 1425 02

UP171

R 1

PM-SOVIET SKED 1-25

ANDROPOV SAYS REAGAN'S PEACE TALK PART OF "GAME"

BY ANNA CHRISTENSEN

MOSCOW (UPI) -- SOVIET PRESIDENT YURI ANDROPOV TODAY REJECTED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RECENT BID FOR BETTER U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AS A PART OF A "GAME" AND CALLED FOR CONCRETE STEPS TOWARD NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE TONE OF ANDROPOV'S INTERVIEW WITH THE COMMUNIST PARTY NEWSPAPER PRAUDA WAS MUCH LESS HARSH THAN THAT OF HIS RECENT STATEMENTS.

MOSCOW FAVORS DIALOGUE, HE SAID, "BUT WE WILL NOT GO TO TALKS FOR THE SAKE OF TALKS AND WE WILL NOT PRETEND THAT IN WESTERN EUROPE THERE ARE NO NEW MISSILES TARGETED ON US AND OUR ALLIES.

"THIS GAME IS NOT FOR US," ANDROPOV SAID, REFERRING TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW U.S. PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES THAT BEGAN LAST MONTH IN WEST GERMANY AND BRITAIN. THE SOVIETS LEFT THE GENEVA ARMS CONTROL TALKS AS THE DEPLOYMENT BEGAN.

ANDROPOV SAID, "IT IS BY PRACTICAL DEEDS THAT WE WILL JUDGE WHETHER THE UNITED STATES HAS SERIOUS INTENTIONS TO CONDUCT A DIALOGUE WITH US."

THE REMARKS, ALSO READ ON THE NIGHTLY TELEVISION NEWS TUESDAY, WERE THE AILING 69-YEAR-OLD LEADER'S FIRST RESPONSE TO REAGAN'S SPEECH OF JAN. 16 CALLING FOR A RENEWED U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE.

THE REMARKS SEEMED TO MIRROR REAGAN'S APPROACH BY TURNING DOWN THE LEVEL OF RHETORIC WHILE TAKING A FIRM STAND ON THE ISSUES.

ANDROPOV SAID, HOWEVER, THAT REAGAN'S SPEECH DID NOT CONTAIN A "SINGLE NEW IDEA, ANY NEW PROPOSALS EITHER ON THE QUESTION OF LIMITING NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE OR ON OTHER QUESTIONS."

THE U.S. LEADERSHIP "HAS NOT GIVEN UP ITS INTENTIONS TO CONDUCT TALKS WITH US FROM POSITIONS OF STRENGTH, FROM POSITIONS OF THREATS AND PRESSURE. WE RESOLUTELY REJECT SUCH AN APPROACH AND IN GENERAL ATTEMPTS TO CONDUCT A POWER DIPLOMACY IN RESPECT TO US ARE A HOPELESS THING," HE SAID.

ANDROPOV SAID THERE WAS ONLY ONE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE.

"BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE, THE UNITED STATES AND NATO SHOULD DISPLAY READINESS TO RETURN TO THE SITUATION THAT HAD EXISTED BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PERSHING-2S AND CRUISE MISSILES."

AM-VIOLATIONS-SOVIET (2 TAKES)

MOSCOW ACCUSES REAGAN OF "ODIOUS CAMPAIGN" AGAINST KREMLIN
MOSCOW, JAN 24, REUTER - THE SOVIET NEWS AGENCY TASS TODAY
REJECTED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CHARGES THAT MOSCOW HAD VIOLATED
ARMS CONTROL ACCORDS AND ACCUSED HIM OF LAUNCHING A "NEW ODIOUS
CAMPAIGN OF SLANDER" AGAINST THE KREMLIN.

IN A SHARPLY-WORDED RESPONSE TO REAGAN'S MESSAGE TO
CONGRESS ON THE ISSUE, WHICH WAS RELEASED YESTERDAY, TASS SAID
HIS ALLEGATIONS WERE ABSURD AND INTENDED TO DIVERT ATTENTION
FROM U.S. MOVES TO BREACH PAST ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS.

REAGAN SAID THE UNITED STATES HAD REGISTERED SEVEN SOVIET
VIOLATIONS OR PROBABLE VIOLATIONS OF AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING THE
UNRATIFIED SALT II ARMS TREATY.

"THESE ABSURD ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE USSR REFLECT ONLY THE
FLIPPANT AND THOUGHTLESS ATTITUDE OF THE PRESENT U.S.
ADMINISTRATION TOWARD THE PROBLEMS OF LIMITING AND REDUCING
ARMS," TASS SAID.

"RONALD REAGAN, WHO HAS NOT SIGNED A SINGLE AGREEMENT ON
LIMITING THE ARMS RACE IN THREE YEARS ... HAS NOW LAUNCHED A
NEW ODIOUS CAMPAIGN OF SLANDER AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION," IT
ADDED.

MORE 1339 DZ

R164R I4301>LZ0TCYNUIV

AM-VIOLATIONS-SOVIET 2 MOSCOW

TASS SAID THE UNITED STATES HAD NOT RAISED ANY OF THE ARMS
VIOLATION CHARGES AT THE SPECIAL U.S.-SOVIET COMMISSION
MEETINGS WHERE THE SUBJECT OF VIOLATIONS WAS DISCUSSED BY
EXPERTS.

"IT IS CLEAR THAT REAGAN PREFERRED TO MAKE USE OF THE
SERVICE OF ILL-WILLED AND INCOMPETENT "SPECIALISTS" FROM HIS
OWN ENTOURAGE TO BACK UP THESE RIDICULOUS ALLEGATIONS," IT
ADDED.

TASS SAID REAGAN HAD USED THESE VAGUE FORMULATIONS AS A
"KIND OF INSURANCE POLICY" IN CASE HE WAS SHOWN TO HAVE BEEN
LYING.

TASS SAID THE UNITED STATES ITSELF WAS BREACHING PAST ARMS
TREATIES BY GOING AHEAD WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MX AND
MIDGETMAN MISSILES AND NEW SUBMARINES WHICH WOULD BE ARMED WITH
MULTI-WARHEADED MISSILES.

IT SAID THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAD IN ANY CASE
EFFECTIVELY UNDERMINED SALT II WHEN THE PRESIDENT DECLARED THAT
HE CONSIDERED THE TREATY BASICALLY FLAWED.

IN HIS MESSAGE, REAGAN ACCUSED MOSCOW OF USING CHEMICAL
WEAPONS IN BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND OF ENCODING
MISSILE TEST INFORMATION IN VIOLATION OF SALT II.

REUTER 1341 DZ

R165R I4330>1Z0TCYNHYD

B3

FEIS 050 (SEE 048)

FURTHER DETAILS ON ANDROPOV ANSWERS TO PRAVDA ARMS TALKS QUESTIONS

TAKE 1 -- ANDROPOV ANSWERS PRAVDA QUESTIONS

[REDACTED] MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1820 GMT 24 JAN 84

(TEXT) MOSCOW JANUARY 24 TASS -- FOLLOW YURIY ANDROPOV'S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER "PRAVDA":

QUESTION: CONTENTIONS THAT NOTHING ALARMING IS SUPPOSEDLY HAPPENING IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THAT IN GENERAL THE WORLD HAS BECOME "A SAFER PLACE" IN THE PRESENT CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN PUT LATELY INTO CIRCULATION IN THE LEADING CIRCLES OF THE UNITED STATES AND NATO. IS THAT SO?

ANSWER: THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR SUCH A CONCLUSION. THE MAIN CAUSES OF THE DANGEROUS TENSION IN THE WORLD, WHICH I HAVE ALREADY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK ABOUT, HAVE NOT BEEN REMOVED. HAS EUROPE ACQUIRED GREATER SECURITY WITH THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN MISSILES? OF COURSE NOT. THE NUCLEAR DANGER HAS GROWN. THIS IS NOT ONLY OUR ESTIMATION. THIS IS CLEARLY INDICATED BY THE ACUTE ALARM OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE OF EUROPE. NEITHER HAVE THE AMERICAN MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT CONSOLIDATED THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES ITSELF. HAVING SET ITSELF THE AIM OF TIPPING THE MILITARY BALANCE IN ITS FAVOUR THE UNITED STATES COMPELLED US TO TAKE REPLY MEASURES.

THE APPEARANCE OF AMERICAN MISSILES IN EUROPE INCREASED NOT ONLY THE MILITARY, BUT ALSO THE POLITICAL TENSION. THE TALKS DESIGNED TO LIMIT AND SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS HAVE BEEN TORPEDOED. INTER-STATE RELATIONS HAVE FOUND THEMSELVES IN THE FIELD OF DANGEROUS TENSION.

(MORE)

24 JAN 1858Z [REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED IN PART (RELEASED)
NLS FOC-009/1 #38
By GL, NARA, Date 6/21/06

PAGE 2 -- 054 (AMENDMENT ANSWERS PREVIOUS QUESTIONS)

///OF DANGEROUS TENSION

(TEXT) THE LEADERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS TURN OF EVENTS. IT IS WORSE ALSO BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF NATO COUNTRIES WHO CONTRARY TO THE WILL OF THEIR OWN PEOPLES MADE THEIR TERRITORY AVAILABLE FOR THE AMERICAN MISSILES.

AND WAS THE WORLD BECOME A SAFER PLACE NOW THAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AMERICAN SOLDIERS HAVE JOINED THE ISRAELI AGGRESSOR IN FIGHTING AGAINST THE ARABS, AND UNITED STATES WARSHIPS AND AVIATION ARE TURNING LEBANESE TOWNS AND SETTLEMENTS INTO RUDDLE?

THE SITUATION IS TENSE IN CENTRAL AMERICA WHERE THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION IS ENCRANCHING ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF SOVEREIGN STATES, THOSE WHO CONFEED THAT SUPPOSEDLY "NOTHING DANGEROUS" IS HAPPENING IN THE WORLD APPARENTLY WANT TO ERASE FROM THE MEMORY OF PEOPLE ALSO THE AMERICAN AGGRESSION AGAINST GRENADA. FOR IT IS CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO BREAK THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE AND RETURN BY FORCE OF ARMS THE HAIED DICTATORS WHO ARE PLACEMEN OF THE UNITED STATES. IN THE WHITE HOUSE IT IS A HABIT TO CALL ALL THIS A "STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS." IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO IMAGINE ANYTHING MORE CYNICAL.

IMPERIALIST BRIGANDAGE IS PERPETRATED ALSO IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD. SUCH IS THE REAL SITUATION. IT IS ACUTE AND DANGEROUS. IT IS IMPERMISSIBLE TO DISPLAY AN UNDERESTIMATION OF IT.

SO, ONE MAY ASK, WHAT IS THE REASON WHY THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE WORLD IS BEING DELIBERATELY DISTORTED IN THE STATEMENTS OF AMERICAN LEADERS? FIRST OF ALL TO TRY TO DISPEL THE CONCERN OF THE PEOPLES, THAT HAS BEEN MOUNTING WITH EVERY DAY, OVER WASHINGTON'S MILITARISTIC POLICY AND TO UNDERCUT THE GROWING RESISTANCE TO THIS POLICY.

IT IS A FACT OF UNQUESTIONABLY GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT PEOPLE EVERYWHERE ARE REALISING BETTER THE DANGER TO PEACE AND WHENCE IT IS EMANATING FROM. THE STRUGGLE OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE FOR PEACE IS ANOTHER OBJECTIVE REALITY OF OUR TIME.

QUESTION: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RECENTLY SPOKE OUT IN FAVOUR OF A SOVIET-AMERICAN DIALOGUE. IN HIS SPEECH IT SOUNDED AS FOLLOWS: "STRENGTH AND DIALOGUE GO HAND IN HAND." WHAT IS YOUR ATTITUDE TO THIS?

ANSWER: THERE IS NO NEED TO CONVINCE US OF THE USEFULNESS AND EXPERIENCE OF DIALOGUE. THIS IS OUR POLICY. BUT THE DIALOGUE SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ON AN EQUAL FOOTING AND NOT FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH, AS IT IS PROPOSED BY RONALD REAGAN. THE DIALOGUE SHOULD NOT BE CONDUCTED FOR THE SAKE OF DIALOGUE. - IT SHOULD BE DIRECTED AT THE ATTAINMENT OF CONCRETE ACCORDS. IT SHOULD BE CONDUCTED HONESTLY AND NO ATTEMPTS SHOULD BE MADE TO USE IT FOR SELFISH AIMS.

B3

FEIS 052

TAKE 3 -- 050 (ANDROPOV ANSWERS PRESSING QUESTIONS)

///FOR SELFISH AIMS.

(TEXT) THE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP, AS ALL SIGNS INDICATE, HAS NOT GIVEN UP ITS INTENTIONS TO CONDUCT TALKS WITH US FROM POSITIONS OF STRENGTH, FROM POSITIONS OF THREATS AND PRESSURE. WE RESOLUTELY REJECT SUCH AN APPROACH, AND IN GENERAL ATTEMPTS TO CONDUCT A "POWER DIPLOMACY" IN RESPECT OF US ARE A HOPELESS THING.

OUR APPROACH TO THE IDEA OF CONDUCTING TALKS FOR THE SAKE OF TALKS IS ABSOLUTELY THE SAME. ALSO, WE HAVE ALREADY ENCOUNTERED SUCH AN APPROACH OF THE PRESENT UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION. I WOULD LIKE TO REMIND ABOUT THE GENEVA TALKS ON EUROPE MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR ARMS. IT IS AN OPEN SECRET NOW THAT FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES IN GENEVA HAVE BEEN, SO TO SAY, BEATING THE AIR. IN THE MEANTIME THE PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON WERE PREPARING FOR THE PRACTICAL DEPLOYMENT OF NEW FIRST-STRIKE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE.

WE HAD WARNED MANY TIMES WHAT THIS WOULD BEING ABOUT. THE AMERICAN SIDE WITH ITS OWN HANDS BROKE UP THE TALKS IN GENEVA AND INFLECTED MUCH DAMAGE TO THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES. NOW THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES DECLARES THAT THE UNITED STATES SUPPOSEDLY IS READY TO RESUME THE TALKS AND RETURN TO GENEVA.

THE QUESTION ARISES: IS IT THAT THE AMERICAN SIDE HAS REALISED WHAT IT HAS DONE AND, DESIRING A DIALOGUE, IS PREPARED TO CHANGE ITS NEGATIVE APPROACH? NO, THIS HAS NOT HAPPENED. THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH DOES NOT CONTAIN A SINGLE NEW IDEA; ANY NEW PROPOSALS EITHER ON THE QUESTION OF LIMITING NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE OR ON OTHER QUESTIONS. THERE IS NO SIGN OF THIS IN THE AMERICAN POSITION.

I HAVE ALREADY SAID AND I WANT TO EMPHASISE AGAIN THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO USE ANY REAL CHANCE FOR CONDUCTING TALKS WITH THE AIM OF ATTAINING PRACTICAL AGREES ON THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. BUT WE WILL NOT GO TO TALKS FOR THE SAKE OF TALKS AND WE WILL NOT PRETEND THAT IN WESTERN EUROPE THERE ARE NO NEW MISSILES TARGETED ON US AND OUR ALLIES. THIS GAME IS NOT FOR US.

(PAGE)

FBI 053

TAKE 4 -- 050 (ANDROPOV ANSWERS PRAVDA QUESTIONS)

///NOT FOR US.

(TEXT) AT THE SAME TIME I WANT TO CONFIRM THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE ONLY ON A CONSTRUCTIVE, MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS. THIS REQUIRES ONLY ONE THING -- BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE THE UNITED STATES AND NATO SHOULD DISPLAY READINESS TO RETURN TO THE SITUATION THAT HAD EXISTED BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PERSHING-2S AND CRUISE MISSILES. WE ARE RAISING THIS QUESTION BEFORE THE UNITED STATES AND ITS NATO ALLIES BECAUSE WE WANT TO AVOID YET ANOTHER SPIRAL OF THE ARMS RACE, THIS TIME ON A NEW, STILL MORE DANGEROUS LEVEL WHICH LEADS TO A GROWTH OF TENSION AND INSTABILITY IN EUROPE.

IT IS BY PRACTICAL DEEDS THAT WE WILL JUDGE WHETHER THE UNITED STATES HAS SERIOUS INTENTIONS TO CONDUCT A DIALOGUE WITH US.

QUESTION: WHAT OTHER PROBLEMS COULD BECOME A SUBJECT OF THE DIALOGUE?

ANSWER: THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS CONVINCED THAT THERE EXIST POSSIBILITIES FOR A SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS THE SOLUTION OF WHICH WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN THE WORLD AND SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. WE HAVE SET FORTH A BROAD COMPLEX OF CONCRETE PROPOSALS AND INITIATIVES DIRECTED AT STRENGTHENING PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. THEY REMAIN IN FORCE.

FOR INSTANCE, WERE THE UNITED STATES, AS THE SOVIET UNION HAS DONE IT, TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATION NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- ALREADY THIS WOULD HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE, ON THE ATMOSPHERE OF OUR RELATIONS. WHAT WOULD THIS MEAN IN PRACTICE? THAT THE TWO MOST POWERFUL NUCLEAR POWERS REFUSE TO USE NUCLEAR ARMS AGAINST EACH OTHER. THIS MEANS THAT THERE WILL BE NEITHER THE FIRST NOR SUBSEQUENT NUCLEAR STRIKES.

WERE THE NATO COUNTRIES TO CONSENT TO THE PROPOSAL OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW TREATY NOT TO USE MILITARY FORCE AGAINST EACH OTHER THIS, TOO, WOULD SERIOUSLY RAISE THE DEGREE OF TRUST IN EUROPE AND IN THE WHOLE WORLD. IN PRACTICE THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THE OPPOSING MILITARY GROUPINGS RENOUNCE THE USE OF FORCE FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES THAT ARISE. A BROAD VISTA FOR TALKS WOULD BE OPENED. INCIDENTALLY, QUITE A LOT COULD BE DONE IN THIS RESPECT ALSO BY THE CONFERENCE THAT HAS JUST BEGUN IN STOCKHOLM AND WHOSE FIRST STAGE IS PRECISELY DEVOTED TO THE DRAFTING OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND MEASURES OF STRENGTHENING SECURITY.

FBIS 054

TAKE 5 OF 5 -- 054 (ANDROPOV ANSWERS PRAVDA QUESTIONS)

///OF STRENGTHENING SECURITY.

[REDACTED]

(TEXT) THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE SHOULD NOT BE PUT OFF. OTHERWISE MANKIND WILL CONFRONT A NEW THREAT OF A SCOPE THAT IT IS EVEN DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE NOW. THE SYSTEMS OF NEW WEAPONS THAT ARE BEING DEVELOPED IN THE UNITED STATES ARE MAKING SUCH A PROSPECT QUITE REAL. THE SOVIET UNION HAS MADE CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON HOW TO WARD OFF THE DANGER OF THE USE OF FORCE FROM OUTER SPACE AND IN OUTER SPACE, AND CALLS ON THE UNITED STATES TO START TALKS ON THIS QUESTION PROMPTLY.

GIVEN READINESS ON THE PART OF THE WEST IT IS POSSIBLE TO COMMENCE THE PRACTICAL SOLUTION OF THE QUESTIONS DISCUSSED AT THE VIENNA TALKS ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE HAVE LONG PLACED OUR CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON THIS SCORE ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THEY OFFER A QUICK APPROACH TO AGREEMENT GIVEN, OF COURSE, THAT THERE IS A MUTUAL STRIVING TO REACH THE ACCORD.

WITHIN THE COMPLEX OF MEASURES DIRECTED AT LESSENING THE WAR DANGER WE OFFER THE UNITED STATES AS A BEGINNING A SIMPLE AND AT THE SAME TIME SUFFICIENTLY EFFECTIVE STEP -- TO FREEZE NUCLEAR ARMS. EFFORTS DIRECTED AT THE SPEEDIEST REACHING OF AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATIONS AND RADICAL REDUCTIONS OF THESE ARMS SHOULD BE STEPPED UP. THE PEOPLES HAVE A RIGHT TO EXPECT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT A DISPLAY OF COMMON SENSE AND REALISM IN THESE QUESTIONS.

WHAT IS NEEDED FIRST OF ALL FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF AGREEMENT ON ALL THESE QUESTIONS IS DESIRE AND POLITICAL WILL ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER NATO COUNTRIES. IN TURN THIS WOULD CREATE A FAVOURABLE SITUATION FOR TACKLING OTHER QUESTIONS AS WELL, MOVING FROM ONE TO ANOTHER. WE SEE IN THIS AN EARNEST OF SUCCESS OF THE POLICY OF PRESERVING PEACE.

IT IS ONLY ADVANCE ALONG THIS ROAD, AND NOT HOPES SET ON STRENGTH AND NOT RHETORICS THAT CAN MAKE THE WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE A REALLY SAFER PLACE. WE EXPECT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PRACTICAL DEEDS AND READINESS TO MAKE PRECISELY SUCH A CHOICE. THIS WILL FIND AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE FROM US.

(ENDALL)

24 JAN 19437 [REDACTED]

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ANDROPOV

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 09 MOSCOW 14266

E.O. 12356: OEC: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, UR
SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION UNDER ANDROPOV: A YEAR LATER
REF: MOSCOW 14070

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: GIVEN THE FACT THAT ANDROPOV IS AT PRESENT SERIOUSLY ILL OR INCAPACITATED, AN ASSESSMENT OF HIS FIRST YEAR AS GENERAL SECRETARY SHOULD PERHAPS ALSO BE VIEWED IN TERMS OF THE LEGACY THAT HE MAY SHORTLY BE LEAVING HIS SUCCESSORS. WILL HE PROVE TO HAVE BEEN PURELY AN INTERIM FIGURE OF NO OR SMALL CONSEQUENCE, OR WILL HE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN SETTING THE TONE IF NOT THE DIRECTION OF SOVIET DOMESTIC POLICY FOR THE NEXT DECADE? MORE SPECIFICALLY, HAVE HIS EFFORTS TO INFUSE NEW LIFE INTO THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND TO REVAMP THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP ACQUIRED SUFFICIENT MOMENTUM AND SUPPORT TO CONTINUE WITHOUT HIS GUIDING HAND, OR WILL THE UNCERTAINTY ATTENDANT UPON A DIFFICULT AND PERHAPS PROTRACTED SUCCESSION SPELL A FURTHER PERIOD OF DRIFT AND IMMOBILISM? MOST OBSERVERS WOULD PROBABLY AGREE THAT ANDROPOV'S FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE WITNESSED LITTLE IN THE WAY OF CONCRETE DOMESTIC ACHIEVEMENTS, BUT THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY TO LABEL HIM A FAILURE (THUS FAR) OR TO IMPLY THAT, WERE HE SHORTLY TO DISAPPEAR FROM THE SCENE, HE WOULD LEAVE NO TRACES ON SOVIET SOCIETY.

3. UPON HIS ACCESSION TO POWER, ANDROPOV MADE IT THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF HIS STEWARDSHIP TO OVERCOME THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STAGNATION AND IDEOLOGICAL DRIFT THAT HAD CHARACTERIZED THE Waning YEARS OF BREZHNEV. THIS DOMESTIC CHALLENGE UNDOUBTEDLY CONSUMED MUCH MORE OF HIS TIME AND PRIORITIES THAN FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES (SEE REFTEL FOR AN ANALYSIS OF ANDROPOV'S FOREIGN POLICY). THE ALACRITY WITH WHICH ANDROPOV INITIALLY SET ABOUT HIS PRIMARY OBJECTIVE CREATED THE POPULAR IMPRESSION THAT THE COUNTRY WAS ON THE MOVE AGAIN AND THAT BOLD NEW DEPARTURES WERE ON THE HORIZON. BY MID-1983, HOWEVER, EXPECTATIONS FOR RAPID AND FAR-REACHING CHANGE HAD LARGELY BEEN STILLLED. IN A FLURRY OF ACTIVITY THIS PAST SPRING AND SUMMER, A SERIES OF MEASURES WAS INTRODUCED TO STIMULATE BETTER ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, BUT THEIR THRUST WAS LARGELY HORTATORY AND THEIR IMPACT HAS BEEN MARGINAL--AT LEAST TO DATE. THE STRUCTURAL REFORMS THAT MANY WESTERN AND SOVIET EXPERTS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL TO REINVIGORATING THE SOVIET ECONOMY FAILED TO APPEAR, WHETHER BECAUSE OF ELEMENTAL OPPOSITION ON THE PART OF ANDROPOV AND HIS ASSOCIATES TO ANY SYSTEMIC CHANGE--WITH ITS SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL RAMIFICATIONS--OR BECAUSE THE LEADERSHIP HAD NOT HAD SUFFICIENT TIME TO DECIDE WHAT SPECIFIC CHANGES WERE DESIRABLE AND POLITICALLY POSSIBLE. ANDROPOV WAS PREPARED TO SANCTION, AND IMPLICITLY TO STIMULATE, A WIDE-RANGING AND INTENSIVE DEBATE ON THE ECONOMY, ALTHOUGH IT BECAME INCREASINGLY CLEAR AS THE YEAR WORE ON THAT THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM WERE VIEWED BY THE LEADERSHIP AS INVIOABLE. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE OF THE LEDGER, ANDROPOV HAS TO SOME EXTENT SUCCEEDED IN INSTILLING A MORE BUSINESS-LIKE AND DISCIPLINED APPROACH IN BOTH ECONOMY AND GOVERNMENT--AN APPROACH TO WHICH MAJOR SEGMENTS OF SOVIET SOCIETY HAVE BEEN RECEPTIVE.

4. REINVIGORATING THE SOVIET POLITICAL LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN OF EQUAL--SOME WOULD SAY GREATER--IMPORTANCE TO ANDROPOV. THROUGHOUT HIS CAREER, HE HAS ATTACHED GREAT WEIGHT TO APPOINTING SUBORDINATES WHO ARE COMPETENT AND DEDICATED AND CAN BE COUNTED UPON TO SUPPORT HIS POLICIES LOYALLY. GIVEN THE FACT THAT HE INHERITED BREZHNEV'S POLITBURO AND WAS OBLIGED TO OPERATE WITHIN A CONSENSUS FRAMEWORK, THE NEW GENERAL BT

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, UR
SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION UNDER ANDROPOV: A YEAR LATER
SECRETARY WAS HARDLY IN A POSITION TO MAKE HIGH-LEVEL
OR WHOLESALE CHANGES IMMEDIATELY. IN FACT, THERE HAS
BEEN ONLY ONE NEWCOMER TO THE FULL POLITBURO RANKS--
ALIYEV--SINCE ANDROPOV TOOK OVER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE
PARTY. BUT ANDROPOV DID MOVE QUICKLY TO OUST A FEW
OF THE MORE NOTORIOUSLY CORRUPT OFFICIALS AND PROMOTED
AN ANTI-CORRUPTION AND ANTI-INEFFICIENCY DRIVE THROUGH-
OUT THE COUNTRY. GRADUALLY, OVER THE COURSE OF A YEAR,
ANDROPOV MADE SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
APPARATUS--RIDDING IT, IN PARTICULAR, OF BREZHNEV
CRONIES--AND BEGAN TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR OVERHAULING
PARTY LEADERSHIP AT THE MIDDLE AND SENIOR LEVELS. THE
OUTCOME OF THE CURRENT "ELECTIONS" TO OBLAST LEADERSHIP
POSITIONS (TO BE COMPLETED IN JANUARY) SHOULD INDICATE
WHETHER ANDROPOV--IF HIS HEALTH PERMITS--WILL BE IN A
POSITION TO HOLD HIS OWN CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THEREBY
TO CONTROL SENIOR APPOINTMENTS.

4A. ANY WOULD-BE SOVIET REFORMER--WHETHER HIS GOAL BE
RADICAL OR MODERATE CHANGE--FACES FORMIDABLE SYSTEMIC
CONSTRAINTS. HE IS AT ONCE FETTERED BY AN ENTRENCHED
AND COMPLEX ECONOMIC PLANNING SYSTEM; A RIGID IDEOLOGY;
AND A PARTY AND STATE BUREAUCRACY WHOSE POWER AND WAY
OF LIFE ARE INTIMATELY DEPENDENT ON PRESERVATION OF
THE EXISTING ORDER. THE REFORMIST LEADER IS LIKEWISE
BOUND BY A SERIES OF INTERNALIZED CONSTRAINTS, IN THAT
SINCE HE IS IPSO FACTO COMMITTED TO PRESERVATION OF

PARTY SUPREMACY AND CENTRALIZED POLITICAL CONTROL
HE MUST CONSTANTLY BE CONCERNED LEST ANY LOOSENING OF
THE REINS IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE STIMULATE POLITICAL
PLURALISM OR DIMINISH THE UTILITY AND LEADING ROLE OF
THE PARTY. THESE SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINTS ARE SUCH AS
IN PRACTICE TO RULE OUT RADICAL STRUCTURAL REFORM SUCH
AS LARGE-SCALE DECENTRALIZATION OF THE ECONOMY AND
DISMANTLING OF THE BULK OF THE PLANNING APPARATUS.
EVEN A RELATIVELY MODEST STRUCTURAL REFORM SUCH AS
PARTIAL ECONOMIC DECENTRALIZATION RESTRICTED BY SECTOR
OR BY REGION WOULD DOUBTLESS RUN AFOUL OF POWERFUL
BUREAUCRATIC INTERESTS, AND ITS SUCCESS WOULD BE PROBLEM-
ATICAL IN VIEW OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF INTERACTING WITH
STILL-CENTRALIZED ELEMENTS OF THE ECONOMY. THUS WHATEVER
CHANGES ANDROPOV AND HIS ALLIES MIGHT IDEALLY WISH TO
INTRODUCE IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY, THEIR RANGE OF CHOICE AND
SCOPE OF ACTION WILL INEVITABLY BE RESTRICTED. WE CANNOT
EXPECT CHANGE IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM TO BE OTHER THAN
LIMITED, PIECEMEAL, CAUTIOUS, AND SLOW.

5. ALTHOUGH ANDROPOV HAS BROUGHT ABOUT LITTLE IN THE
WAY OF CONCRETE CHANGE DURING HIS FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE,
IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT HE HAS MADE A REASONABLE BEGINNING
IN LIGHT OF THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEMS HE FACED AND OF
THE ENDEMIC SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINTS JUST DESCRIBED.
ALTHOUGH THE ULTIMATE SHAPE OF HIS ECONOMIC PROGRAM
REMAINS UNCLEAR--AND THE PROSPECTS FOR LONG-TERM ECONOMIC
REVIVAL EQUALLY SO--HIS QUEST FOR A REVAMPING OF PARTY
LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO BE ON TRACK AND A SENSE OF DOMESTIC
MOVEMENT HAS BEEN GENERATED. NEVERTHELESS, EVEN IF THE
GENERAL SECRETARY RECOVERS FROM HIS PRESENT ILLNESS,
THE DEMONSTRATION THAT THIS HAS AFFORDED OF HIS EXTREME
PHYSICAL FRAILTY WILL ALMOST INEVITABLY DIMINISH TO A
CERTAIN EXTENT HIS POLITICAL STRENGTH AND CONSEQUENT

ABILITY TO PUSH HIS PROGRAM FORWARD. THIS WOULD PROBABLY
MEAN IN THE FIRST INSTANCE A SLOWER PACE OF PERSONNEL
CHANGE, EVEN IF THE OBLAST "ELECTIONS" WERE TO RESULT IN
THE INSTALLATION OF ANDROPOV'S NOMINEES.

6. NO SINGLE FIGURE WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS
POISED TO ASSUME THE GENERAL SECRETARSHIP SHOULD
ANDROPOV DIE OR RESIGN IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND THE
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, UR

SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION UNDER ANDROPOV: A YEAR LATER
UNCERTAINTIES OF THE SUCCESSION AND THE PROBABLE EMERGENCE
OF A MORE GENUINELY COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP COULD SLOW EVEN
THE MARGINAL PROCESS OF CHANGE THAT HE HAS INITIATED.
OUR JUDGMENT, HOWEVER, IS THAT A MAJORITY IN THE PRESENT
POLITBURO SHARES ANDROPOV'S CONCERN OVER THE GLOOMY
LONG-RUN OUTLOOK FOR THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND THAT EFFORTS
TO IMPROVE ITS PERFORMANCE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY
CONTINUE, BUT WITH EVEN LESS PROSPECT OF SEEING ACTUAL
SYSTEMIC REFORM INTRODUCED. PERSONNEL CHANGE MAY WELL
SLOW CONSIDERABLY, PARTICULARLY WHILE THE LEADERSHIP
REMAINS COLLECTIVE, ALTHOUGH THE STANDARDS OF COMPETENCE
AND INCORRUPTIBILITY THAT ANDROPOV HAS SOUGHT TO ENFORCE
WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO BE MAINTAINED, IN THEORY IF
NOT ALWAYS IN PRACTICE. TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE, OF
COURSE, THE FATE OF ANDROPOV'S PROGRAM WILL DEPEND ON
WHO IS ELECTED GENERAL SECRETARY. ANOTHER INTERIM
FIGURE--SAY CHERNENKO OR USTINOV--MIGHT WELL BE RELUCTANT
OR UNABLE TO DO MORE THAN PRESIDE OVER DAY-TO-DAY BUSINESS.
ON THE OTHER HAND, A LEADER FROM THE "YOUNGER" GENERATION--
SAY GORBACHEV OR ROMANOV--WOULD NO DOUBT FAVOR A MORE
ACTIVIST COURSE AND WOULD SEEK FROM THE START TO EXPAND
HIS OWN POLITICAL BASE WITHIN THE APPARATUS AND THE
PARTY AT LARGE. THIS SAID, OF COURSE, A SUCCESSOR GENERAL
SECRETARY WOULD NECESSARILY OPERATE UNDER THE SAME SYSTEM-
IC CONSTRAINTS AS ANY WOULD-BE SOVIET REFORMER.

7. IN SUM, WE BELIEVE THAT ANDROPOV HAS SUCCEEDED IN
IMPLANTING THE STIMULUS FOR EFFORTS TO REINVIGORATE
THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND TO ENFORCE HIGHER STANDARDS OF
PERFORMANCE BY PARTY AND GOVERNMENTAL LEADERS. THESE
EFFORTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO MOVE FORWARD--IF HESITANTLY--
DESPITE THE UNCERTAINTIES THAT HIS ILLNESS OR DISAPPEAR-
ANCE FROM THE SCENE WILL ENTAIL. IN ONE AREA, AT LEAST,
ANDROPOV'S LEGACY IS ABUNDANTLY CLEAR. UNDER HIS
ADMINISTRATION, THE REPRESSION OF SOVIET DISSIDENTS
HAS INTENSIFIED AND EMIGRATION LEVELS HAVE CONTINUED
TO DECLINE. SHORT OF A MAJOR UPSWING IN RELATIONS WITH
THE U.S., WE WOULD NOT ENVISAGE ANY MORE ENLIGHTENED
HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY UNDER ANDROPOV OR HIS SUCCESSOR.
END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

CADRES

8. THE ABILITY TO INSTALL COMPETENT KEY PERSONNEL LOYAL
TO HIMSELF AND WHO BROADLY SPEAKING SHARE HIS IDEAS IS
CRUCIAL TO WHATEVER LONG-RANGE PLANS ANDROPOV MAY HAVE
FORMED FOR MAJOR RESTRUCTURING OF POLICY IN THE DOMESTIC
SPHERE. THE SOVIET SYSTEM POSSESSES NO INSTITUTIONAL
MECHANISM FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRANSFER OF POWER AFTER
A SUCCESSION: THUS ANY NEW SOVIET LEADER INHERITS A
"CABINET" NOT OF HIS OWN CHOOSING. ANDROPOV'S SITUATION,
HOWEVER, DIFFERS SHARPLY FROM THAT OF ANY OF HIS PREDE-
CESSORS IN THAT HE HAS ASSUMED THE TOP SPOT AT A FAR
MORE ADVANCED AGE THAN ANY OF THEM. HIS AGE AND UNCERTAIN
STATE OF HEALTH HAVE NO DOUBT GIVEN RISE TO THE IMPRESSION
IN THE MINDS OF MANY THAT HE WILL BE ONLY AN INTERIM
LEADER AND MAY CONSEQUENTLY HEIGHTEN THEIR RESISTANCE
TO HIS LEAD, DESPITE PUBLIC RHETORIC TO THE CONTRARY.
ANDROPOV'S CURRENT SERIOUS ILLNESS OR INCAPACITATION,
AS EVIDENCED BY HIS ABSENCE FROM THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION
CEREMONIES, HAS CLEARLY SHARPENED THE UNCERTAINTY OVER
HIS PROSPECTS.

9. THE PAST YEAR HAS WITNESSED ONLY ONE INDUCTION INTO
THE VOTING RANKS OF THE POLITBURO--THAT OF GEIDAR ALIYEV--
WHICH WAS RUMORED TO HAVE BEEN AGREED TO BEFORE BREZHNEV'S
DEATH. WHILE THIS FALL'S PLENUM MAY PRODUCE NEW POLIT-
BURO MEMBERS, ANDROPOV MAY HAVE BEEN FORCED TO DEFER
HIGH LEVEL CHANGES UNTIL HE HAD DEVELOPED GREATER CLOUT
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, UR

SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION UNDER ANDROPOV: A YEAR LATER
IN THE SENIOR COUNCILS OF POWER. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT
SEEMS CLEAR THAT ANDROPOV HAS A WORKING MAJORITY IN
THE POLITBURO AND THAT THE ERSTWHILE BREZHNEV CLIQUE
IS EFFECTIVELY ISOLATED.

10. THE UNUSUAL ATTENTION BEING FOCUSED ON THE CURRENT
(SEPTEMBER THROUGH JANUARY) PARTY "ELECTIONS" AT THE
SUB-REPUBLIC LEVEL (UP TO AND INCLUDING OBLAST AND
KRAI) NO DOUBT REFLECTS THE IMPORTANCE ANDROPOV HIMSELF
ATTACHES TO INSTALLING DEDICATED AND COMPETENT LEADERS
AT ALL LEVELS WITHIN THE PARTY. BY EARLY NEXT YEAR,
WHEN OBKOM SECRETARIES WILL HAVE BEEN ELECTED, IT SHOULD
BE POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE HOW SUCCESSFUL ANDROPOV HAS BEEN
IN "RENEWING" LOWER-LEVEL PARTY OFFICIALDOM AND WHETHER
HE WILL HAVE THE STRENGTH TO BRING ABOUT FURTHER HIGH-
LEVEL PERSONNEL CHANGE (OBKOM FIRST SECRETARIES BEING IN
EFFECT ENTITLED TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP). SINCE
ANDROPOV, AS DISTINCT FROM HIS PREDECESSORS, HAD NO
PREVIOUS CAREER OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD UP REGIONAL POWER
BASES, THESE "ELECTIONS" ARE CLEARLY OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE
TO HIM. IF A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF NEW OBKOM SECRETARIES
ARE IN FACT INSTALLED, ANDROPOV MAY BE TEMPTED TO MOVE
UP THE NEXT PARTY CONGRESS, WHICH IS THE ONLY BODY WITH
THE AUTHORITY TO INDUCT NEWCOMERS INTO THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE.

11. ANDROPOV HAS BEEN MOST SUCCESSFUL IN MAKING NEW
APPOINTMENTS TO THE STAFF OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE--
ROUGHLY ONE-THIRD OF THE CC DEPARTMENT HEADS HAVE BEEN
CHANGED OVER THE PAST YEAR AS WELL AS NUMEROUS DEPUTY
DEPARTMENT CHIEFS. PERSONNEL CHANGES UNDER ANDROPOV
HAVE INCREASINGLY BEEN HANDLED IN A MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD
WAY THAN IN THE PAST. RETIREMENTS OF MANY OFFICIALS
HAVE BEEN FORMALLY NOTED, WITH THANKS EXPRESSED FOR
THEIR SERVICES. THIS TREND, COUPLED WITH ANDROPOV'S
AUGUST 15 SPEECH TO PARTY VETERANS, VERY LIKELY REPRESENTS
AN ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY RETIREMENT AS AN HONORABLE END TO
A CAREER AND THUS PAVE THE WAY FOR FURTHER CHANGES IN
THE RANKS. AT THE SAME TIME, CORRUPTION OR GROSS IN-
COMPETENCE HAVE OCCASIONALLY BEEN PUBLICIZED AND THE
OFFENDERS REMOVED FROM THEIR POSITIONS. ANDROPOV'S
PERSONNEL APPOINTMENTS DO NOT REFLECT THE CRONYISM
WHICH WAS SO CHARACTERISTIC OF HIS PREDECESSOR. HE
HAS SOUGHT TO DEPICT THE CARDINAL QUALIFICATIONS OF
LEADERS AS DISCIPLINE AND COMPETENCE.

12. OF THE FEW APPOINTMENTS TO THE SENIOR RANKS
(ROMANOV, ALIYEV, VOROTNIKOV, RYZHKOV) WHICH HAVE BEEN
MADE SINCE ANDROPOV'S ACCESSION, ONLY VOROTNIKOV MAY
BE CONSIDERED TO BE AN ANDROPOV PROTEGE. REPORTEDLY
AT ANDROPOV'S BEHEST, VOROTNIKOV WAS BROUGHT BACK FROM
OBSCURITY AS AMBASSADOR TO CUBA TO REPLACE THE DISGRACED
MEDUNOV BRIEFLY IN KRASNODAR BEFORE BEING NAMED RSFSR
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS CHAIRMAN AND CANDIDATE POLITBURO
MEMBER IN JUNE. ALIYEV'S ELEVATION HAD REPORTEDLY BEEN
AGREED TO BEFORE BREZHNEV'S DEATH, AND ROMANOV IS CLEARLY
A POWER IN HIS OWN RIGHT DUE TO THIS LONG TENURE AS
LENINGRAD PARTY BOSS. RYZHKOV HAD NO KNOWN TIES TO
ANDROPOV BUT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN ELEVATED BY ANDROPOV
ON THE STRENGTH OF HIS RECORD IN INDUSTRY AND ECONOMIC
MANAGEMENT.

13. ANDROPOV HAS NEITHER THE REGIONAL POWER BASE TO
DRAW ON FOR CURRENT APPOINTMENTS NOR APPARENTLY THE
INCLINATION TO SELECT OFFICIALS PURELY ON THE BASIS
OF PAST PERSONAL TIES. ANDROPOV MAY BE SEEKING TO
CLEAR THE WAY FOR THE SUCCESSOR GENERATION AS IS
SUGGESTED BY THE PROMINENCE ACCORDED TO GORBACHEV AND
ALIYEV. WHILE ROMANOV HAS NOT BEEN PARTICULARLY ACTIVE
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, UR

SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION UNDER ANDROPOV: A YEAR LATER
SINCE HIS MOVE TO MOSCOW, HE APPARENTLY NOW HOLDS A
KEY SECRETARIAL PORTFOLIO, SUPERVISION OF DEFENSE
INDUSTRY. THUS, GORBACHEV, ROMANOV AND ALIYEV ARE ALL
MAJOR ACTORS NOW AND APPEAR TO BE KEY CONTENDERS IN A
FUTURE SUCCESSION. WHILE ERSTWHILE CONTENDER CHERNENKO
PUBLICLY GIVES ANDROPOV HIS DUE, AND IS CURRENTLY CARRY-
ING OUT THE DUTIES OF THE SENIOR SECRETARY FOR IDEOLOGY,
HE COMES ACROSS AS A DECLINING FIGURE WHOM ANDROPOV
WOULD PROBABLY LIKE TO RETIRE BEFORE TOO LONG. SHOULD
ANDROPOV'S PRESENT INCAPACITATION PERSIST, HOWEVER, WE
CAN PROBABLY EXPECT CHERNENKO TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
HIS POSITION AS "SECOND SECRETARY" TO REHABILITATE
HIS OWN POLITICAL FORTUNES. IF ANDROPOV DIES OR RESIGNS
FOR HEALTH REASONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE, CHERNENKO MAY
WELL EMERGE AS A TRANSITIONAL LEADER--HIS OWN HEALTH
PERMITTING--AND WILL IN ANY EVENT INFLUENCE THE
SUCCESSION.

14. WE SUSPECT THAT 78-YEAR-OLD COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
CHAIRMAN TIKHONOV MAY BE ANOTHER CANDIDATE FOR NEAR-
TERM RETIREMENT. THE HIGH-PROFILE ALIYEV IS A MAJOR
CONTENDER FOR TIKHONOV'S POST ALTHOUGH HIS NON-SLAVIC
ETHNIC BACKGROUND IS A STRIKE AGAINST HIM. WITH TIKHONOV,
A CLOSE BREZHNEV ASSOCIATE, OUT OF THE WAY, ANDROPOV
WOULD HAVE GREATER LEEWAY IN MAKING NEW APPOINTMENTS IN
THE GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC APPARATUS. SO FAR, THE TURNOVER

RATE HAS BEEN MODERATE AND SUGGESTS THAT BREZHNEV
HOLDOVERS--AND NOT AN ANDROPOV "TEAM"--ARE RUNNING THE
ECONOMY. AFTER TWELVE MONTHS IN OFFICE, ANDROPOV HAS
APPOINTED ONLY FIVE NEW MINISTERS TO HEAD THE MORE THAN
FIFTY ECONOMIC MINISTRIES. AT THE KEY STATE PLANNING
COMMITTEE (GOSPLAN), BAYBAKOV REMAINS AS CHAIRMAN, A
POST HE HAS OCCUPIED SINCE 1965. WHILE HE DOES HAVE
SEVERAL NEW DEPUTIES, THERE ARE NO SIGNS THEY ARE MAKING
MAJOR CHANGES IN THE PLANNING PROCESS. NOR HAS THERE
BEEN A MARKED TURNOVER WITHIN THE PARTY ECONOMIC APPARATUS,
ALTHOUGH THERE IS A NEWLY REORGANIZED ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT,
UNDER SECRETARY RYZHKOV. IN SUM, THE RATE OF CHANGE OF
ECONOMIC OFFICIALS IS NOT SUCH AS TO SUGGEST THAT MAJOR
ECONOMIC DEPARTURES ARE IN THE OFFING.

STYLE

15. ANDROPOV HAS SOUGHT TO PROJECT A MORE OPEN STYLE
OF LEADERSHIP, MOST NOTABLY THROUGH THE INNOVATION OF
PUBLISHING SUMMARIES OF THE WEEKLY POLITBURO MEETINGS--
ALTHOUGH THE ACCOUNTS ARE OBVIOUSLY EDITED TO DELETE
REFERENCES TO DISCUSSION OF SENSITIVE SUBJECTS SUCH AS
THE KAL DOWNING AND TO HIGHLIGHT THE ATTENTION PAID TO
POPULAR SUBJECTS SUCH AS CONSUMER GOODS. THE STENO-
GRAPHIC REPORT OF A CC PLENUM (JUNE 1983) HAS BEEN
PUBLISHED FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1965. THERE HAS
ALSO BEEN A MORE VIGOROUS DEBATE IN THE PRESS OVER WAYS
TO "PERFECT THE ECONOMIC MECHANISM" (THE RUBRIC UNDER
WHICH ECONOMIC CHANGE IS DISCUSSED).

16. ANDROPOV HAS AVOIDED THE MORE OSTENTATIOUS DISPLAYS
OF EGOISM TO WHICH BREZHNEV GREW INCREASINGLY ADDICTED,
ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN A GROWING INCIDENCE OF

ANDROPOV QUOTES DISPLAYED AROUND THE CITY AND POSTERS
OF HIM AVAILABLE IN BOOKSTORES, ETC. THERE HAS ALSO
BEEN A MARKED UPSURGE IN MEDIA ATTENTION TO ANDROPOV
STATEMENTS: THE CAMPAIGN OF ADULATION AFTER THE AUGUST
15 SPEECH TO PARTY VETERANS WAS EXCEEDED ONLY BY THE
ORCHESTRATED OUTPOURING OF SUPPORT FOR HIS SEPTEMBER 28
STATEMENT ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, UR
SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION UNDER ANDROPOV: A YEAR LATER

17. THE ROLE OF MILITARY LEADERS IN NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING, ALREADY SUBSTANTIAL DURING THE LATER BREZHNEV YEARS, HAS SOLIDIFIED FURTHER UNDER ANDROPOV. THE KAL EPISODE, IN WHICH THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP WAS OBLIGED TO ACQUIESCE IN AND SUPPORT A MILITARY DECISION DAMAGING TO SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND PRESTIGE, IS EVIDENCE OF THIS TREND. IT WOULD BE MISLEADING, HOWEVER, TO DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT THE MILITARY NOW CONTROLS THE PARTY, RATHER THAN VICE VERSA, OR THAT THE MILITARY IS SEEKING TO CARVE OUT A SPHERE OF INFLUENCE BROADER THAN ITS TRADITIONAL NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS. THE MILITARY WILL, OF COURSE, BE INTENT ON ASSURING CONTINUATION OF ITS FIRST CALL ON REVENUES AND RESOURCES, AND THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT ANDROPOV IS OR WILL BE INCLINED TO CHALLENGE THIS NOW TRADITIONAL PRIORITY. MOREOVER, IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT DEFENSE MINISTER USTINOV UNDOUBTEDLY PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN GETTING ANDROPOV THE TOP JOB AND--IF ANDROPOV'S TERM IS SHORT-LIVED--WILL PROBABLY PLAY AN EVEN LARGER ROLE IN THE NEXT SUCCESSION.

HUMAN RIGHTS

18. ANDROPOV'S FIRST YEAR HAS BEEN MARKED BY A FURTHER CRACKDOWN IN HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE POINT WHERE THE SITUATION

IS CONSIDERED BY SOME SOVIETS TO BE THE WORST SINCE THE TIME OF STALIN. JEWISH, GERMAN AND ARMENIAN EMIGRATION HAS SUNK TO THE LOWEST LEVEL SINCE THE 1960'S. A PUBLIC CAMPAIGN OF ANTI-SEMITISM THINLY VEILED AS ANTI-ZIONISM ASSUMED A HIGHER PROFILE WITH THE MARCH FORMATION OF AN OFFICIAL "ANTI-ZIONIST" COMMITTEE, AND A SERIES OF MEDIA ITEMS FULLY CHARACTERIZED EMIGRATION AS VIRTUAL TREASON WHICH IS ABETTED BY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. THERE HAS BEEN NO ABATEMENT IN THE HARSH TREATMENT OF DISSIDENTS ALREADY IN PRISON OR INTERNAL EXILE AND NEW TRIALS OF RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL DISSIDENTS OCCUR REGULARLY. JEWISH ACTIVIST IOSIF BEGUN AND UNOFFICIAL PEACE ACTIVIST OLEG RADZINSKIY ARE ONLY TWO OF THE MOST RECENT OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN CONVICTED FOR ALLEGED ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITY AND GIVEN HARSH SENTENCES. THE POSITIVE SIDE OF THE LEDGER HAS LITTLE TO SHOW EXCEPT FOR THE EMIGRATION OF THE PENTECOSTAL FAMILIES WHOSE MEMBERS HAD PREVIOUSLY LIVED IN THE U.S. EMBASSY. RESOLUTION OF THE PENTECOSTALS' CASE WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY AN ANDROPOV DECISION TAKEN FOR VERY SPECIFIC FOREIGN POLICY REASONS, AND THE RECORD IN RECENT MONTHS SUGGESTS THAT NO SIMILAR GESTURES ARE CONTEMPLATED.

19. THERE HAS BEEN A NOTABLE INCREASE IN CALLS FOR VIGILANCE AGAINST "ALIEN" INFLUENCES AND FOR IDEOLOGICALLY CORRECT ROLE MODELS. THE FORCED EXODUS OF MEMBERS OF THE CREATIVE INTELLIGENTIA CONTINUES WITH THE WRITER VLADIMOV NOW IN EXILE AND THEATER DIRECTOR LYUBIMOV'S STATUS ABROAD UNCERTAIN. EARLY ATTEMPTS TO PORTRAY ANDROPOV AS A LIBERAL STAND OUT AS EXERCISES IN WISHFUL THINKING OR DELIBERATE KGB PUBLIC IMAGE-BUILDING.

THE ECONOMY

20. WHEN ANDROPOV TOOK POWER TWELVE MONTHS AGO, THE SOVIET ECONOMY WAS LIMPING THROUGH THE LAST WEEKS OF ITS YEAR OF SLOWEST GROWTH IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD. IN THE WEST, AND IN SOME QUARTERS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION, THERE WAS THE FEELING THAT BASIC CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY WERE NEEDED AND THAT ANDROPOV WAS THE MAN WHO COULD MAKE SUCH CHANGES. HIS PRESUMED FAMILIARITY WITH ECONOMIC REFORMS IN HUNGARY, HIS REPUTATION AS A NO NONSENSE DISCIPLINARIAN, AND HIS LACK OF CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE ECONOMIC POLICY FAILURES OF THE
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, UR

SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION UNDER ANDROPOV: A YEAR LATER
BREZHNEV ERA ALL CONTRIBUTED TO THE EXPECTATION THAT
CHANGE WOULD SOON BE FORTHCOMING.

21. ANDROPOV HIMSELF SEEMED TO FUEL THESE EXPECTATIONS BY HIS OWN FRANKLY CRITICAL COMMENTS ON THE ECONOMY AT THE NOVEMBER 1982 PLENUM. HOWEVER, HIS FAILURE TO PRESENT ANY SOLUTIONS AT THE JUNE 1983 PLENUM DEFLATED EXPECTATIONS OF RAPID CHANGE AND LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT THE NEW GENERAL SECRETARY HAD YET TO CHART AN ECONOMIC COURSE. IN AUGUST, ANDROPOV IMPLICITLY ENDORSED SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY BY DECRYING THE "HALF-MEASURES" OF THE PAST, BUT HE AGAIN FAILED TO SPECIFY WHAT CHANGES HE HAD IN MIND AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT HIS WOULD BE A CAUTIOUS AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH. NOW, AFTER TWELVE MONTHS, ANDROPOV HAS STILL LEFT LITTLE PERMANENT IMPRINT ON THE SOVIET ECONOMY. HE HAS PURSUED POLICIES LARGELY INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THOSE PURSUED BY OTHER SOVIET LEADERS OVER THE PAST EIGHTEEN YEARS. WHERE CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED, AS IN AGRICULTURE, THEY HAVE RESULTED THROUGH VIGOROUS IMPLEMENTATION OF BREZHNEV-ERA POLICIES.

22. THE CENTRAL ISSUE HERE, AS WE SEE IT, IS WHETHER ANDROPOV IS FUNDAMENTALLY OPPOSED TO THE SYSTEMIC REFORM THAT MANY EXPERTS BOTH IN THE SOVIET UNION AND

IN THE WEST BELIEVE IS THE ONLY LONG-TERM CURE FOR THE SOVIET ECONOMY, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, HAS SIMPLY NOT HAD SUFFICIENT TIME IN WHICH TO DECIDE SPECIFICALLY WHAT CHANGES ARE NEEDED AND TO BUILD A POLITICAL CONSENSUS BEHIND THEM. IN SUPPORT OF THE LATTER THESIS, IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S OWN ECONOMIC EXPERIENCE WAS MINIMAL; THAT HE WAS ONLY TOO AWARE OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE TASK; THAT CONSOLIDATION OF POWER WAS HIS MAIN PRIORITY; AND THAT HIS OWN INNATE CONSERVATISM MILITATED IN FAVOR OF A CAUTIOUS AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH. DEVOTING A YEAR OR MORE TO THOROUGHGOING STUDY OF THE PROBLEM WOULD, BY THIS INTERPRETATION, NOT SEEM SURPRISING. BY ALL ACCOUNTS, ANDROPOV HAS STIMULATED--OR AT LEAST PERMITTED--A WIDE-RANGING DEBATE ON CHANGE IN THE SOVIET ECONOMIC SYSTEM, AND THE ASSUMPTION HAS BEEN MADE THAT HE WOULD ALLOW THIS DEBATE TO RUN ITS COURSE BEFORE MAKING ANY OF THE DIFFICULT DECISIONS. IN ADOPTING A CAUTIOUS APPROACH, ANDROPOV WOULD SURELY HAVE HAD IN MIND THE FATE OF PAST WOULD-BE REFORMERS--E.G. KHRUSHCHEV--WHO SOUGHT TO MOVE HASTILY AND WITHOUT BUILDING NECESSARY POLITICAL SUPPORT.

23. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE INCLINATION ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO ENDORSE ANY OF THE MORE FAR-RANGING REFORMS UNDER DISCUSSION, AND THERE HAVE BEEN HINTS THAT CHANGE IN THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM PER SE CANNOT BE ENVISAGED. THESE CLUES MAY REFLECT AN A PRIORI DECISION ON THE PART OF ANDROPOV AND HIS ASSOCIATES THAT, WHETHER FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS OR ON ACCOUNT OF THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL AND SOCIAL REPERCUSSIONS, SYSTEMIC CHANGE CANNOT BE TOLERATED. THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S CRITICISM OF THE "HALF-MEASURES" OF THE PAST MIGHT THUS BE INTERPRETED SIMPLY AS AN INTENT TO EXPAND TRIED-AND-TRUE METHODS AND TO IMPLEMENT THEM MORE ASSIDUOUSLY, RATHER THAN AS A COMMITMENT TO GENUINE REFORM. A CASE CAN BE MADE THAT, HAD HE HAD SUCH A COMMITMENT, TWELVE MONTHS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TOO BRIEF A PERIOD IN WHICH TO DEVISE AND INTRODUCE AT LEAST LIMITED STRUCTURAL CHANGE.

THE DISCIPLINE "CAMPAIGN"

24. THE ONE ELEMENT WHICH HAS COME TO CHARACTERIZE THE ANDROPOV ECONOMIC POLICY MORE THAN ANY OTHER IS THE
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, UR

SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION UNDER ANDROPOV: A YEAR LATER
DISCIPLINE CAMPAIGN. IN THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF THE
ANDROPOV REGIME, THE POLICE CARRIED OUT A FEW SHARP
CRACKDOWNS AGAINST WORKERS ABSENT FROM THEIR OFFICES
OR FACTORIES. THIS APPEARED TO FORESHADOW A MAJOR
EFFORT TO COMBAT ABSENTEEISM, CORRUPTION, AND DRUNKEN-
NESS. HOWEVER, AS TIME PASSED, THE DISCIPLINE "CAMPAIGN"
HAS SETTLED BACK INTO THE KIND OF LONG TERM TRENCH WAR-
FARE WHICH CHARACTERIZED EFFORTS UNDER PREVIOUS SOVIET
LEADERS TO IMPROVE WORKER AND MANAGERIAL DISCIPLINE.
THE PARTY/GOVERNMENT DECREE ON LABOR DISCIPLINE, ANNOUNCED
IN AUGUST, WAS MORE OF AN EXERCISE IN FINE TUNING WORK
RULES RATHER THAN A SHARP BREAK WITH PAST PRACTICES.
WHILE IT PROBABLY HAS HAD SOME POSITIVE EFFECT ON LABOR
PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SHORT RUN, THIS DECREE DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE A REFORM MEASURE SINCE IT DOES NOT ADDRESS
THE LACK OF INCENTIVES UNDER THE SOVIET SYSTEM FOR
WORKERS TO WORK HARDER OR FOR MANAGERS TO MAKE THEM DO
SO.

25. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE ATTACK ON SLOTH
AND CORRUPTION HAS BEEN GENUINELY POPULAR WITH THE RANK
AND FILE. ANDROPOV HAS AT LEAST MANAGED TO REPLACE
THE LEADERSHIP'S SLACK AURA OF THE LATE BREZHNEV PERIOD
WITH A MORE VIGOROUS AND DISCIPLINED IMAGE. HIS QUICK
STEPS EARLY IN 1983 TO COUNTERACT THE GRUMBLING OVER
THE MORE EXTREME FORMS OF THE CAMPAIGN'S IMPLEMENTATION

HAVE ALSO MET WITH PUBLIC APPROVAL. WE WOULD CONCLUDE,
THEREFORE, THAT LABOR DISCIPLINE HAS BEEN A POLITICAL
SUCCESS BUT A MARGINAL DEVELOPMENT IN ECONOMIC TERMS.

ANDROPOV'S MANAGEMENT "REFORMS"

26. BEYOND THE DISCIPLINE CAMPAIGN, ANDROPOV'S OTHER
EFFORTS TO MAKE CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY SEEM MODEST AND
CAUTIOUS. ALTHOUGH THE STREAM OF DECREES ON THE ECONOMY
AND MORE OPEN DEBATE ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS HAVE CREATED
THE APPEARANCE OF CHANGE, MOST OF THE "INNOVATIONS"
IN INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT ARE REPACKAGED VARIATIONS OF
THE 1979 "IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ECONOMIC MECHANISM" OR
OF OTHER MEASURES GOING BACK TO 1965. AUTHORITATIVE
STATEMENTS DECLARE THAT THERE WILL BE NO REDUCTION IN
THE PRIMACY OF CENTRAL PLANNING, AND IT IS CLEAR THAT
MARKET FORCES ARE STILL NOT GIVEN A MAJOR ROLE IN
DETERMINING ECONOMIC PRIORITIES.

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

27. IF ANDROPOV HAS MOVED SLOWLY--OR NOT AT ALL--TO
MAKE CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY, HE CAN POINT TO IMPROVED
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS AS A
SUCCESS. AGRICULTURE HAS DONE WELL, REMOVING THE THREAT
OF INADEQUATE FOOD SUPPLIES AND THEREBY MINIMIZING
POPULAR DISCONTENT. THIS YEAR'S GRAIN HARVEST, PROBABLY
THE SECOND HIGHEST EVER, WAS HELPED BY UNUSUALLY FAVORABLE
WEATHER. THE NETWORK OF FOREIGN GRAIN AGREEMENTS NOW
INCLUDES A LARGE, ASSURED SUPPLY FROM THE U.S. THE
IMPACT OF GOOD WEATHER AND HIGHER PROCUREMENT PRICES
MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT TO JUDGE THE SUCCESS OF LONGER-
TERM POLICY MEASURES SUCH AS BRIGADE CONTRACTS,

REGIONAL COORDINATION OF AGRIBUSINESS (RAPOS), AND
GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE AGRICULTURAL MINISTRIES.
GOOD WEATHER ALSO EASED TRANSPORTATION BOTTLENECKS AND
HELPED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION REBOUND FROM LAST YEAR'S
UNUSUALLY LOW LEVELS IN THE FIRST QUARTER WITH POSITIVE
EFFECT ON THE YEAR AS A WHOLE. THE 1983 PLAN TARGET
OF 3.2 PERCENT GROWTH IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IS
LIKELY TO BE SURPASSED, AND THERE IS SOME OPTIMISM THAT
1984 WILL BE EVEN BETTER.

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, UR
SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION UNDER ANDROPOV: A YEAR LATER

28. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, HOWEVER, ANDROPOV MUST BE AWARE OF PLENTIFUL SIGNS THAT SOVIET INDUSTRY IS STILL PLAGUED BY LATE DELIVERIES, SHORTAGES, POOR QUALITY GOODS, AND UNFINISHED CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION. ON BALANCE, WE EXPECT ANDROPOV TO TAKE FULL CREDIT FOR THE IMPROVEMENTS IN PERFORMANCE, AS HE DID AT THE END OF THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1983. IRONICALLY, THIS MODEST IMPROVEMENT WILL ALSO STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF THOSE WHO OPPOSE BASIC CHANGE AND WHO ARGUE THAT THE PAST YEAR'S MARGINAL POLICY CHANGES WERE ALL THAT WAS NEEDED. ANDROPOV'S SYMPATHIES MAY LIE WITH THE REFORMERS, BUT HIS BUREAUCRATIC PROBLEMS AND PERSONAL HEALTH SITUATION MAY PRECLUDE ANY STEPS THAT COULD BEGIN TO DEAL WITH FUNDAMENTAL SHORTCOMINGS.
HARTMAN
BT

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10/29/83

3. ANOMALIES IN ANDROPOV'S CALENDAR

Andropov appears to have cancelled two major activities--a trip to Bulgaria and a Warsaw Pact summit. One possible explanation is disarray in the Pact over INF, but an Andropov illness seems a more likely hypothesis.

* * *

It is almost certain that Andropov was scheduled to go to Bulgaria on October 25. Widespread rumors of the visit were corroborated by both Hungarian and Soviet sources, and physical preparations were observed in Sofia. There was no public announcement of the trip even though such visits are usually announced a week or two in advance. The Soviets may have held back on the announcement because of doubt that Andropov would be able to make the trip and then cancelled it because of his health. It seems more likely, however, that the planned visit conflicted with a later decision to hold a Pact summit.

The rumor that a Pact summit was slated for October 28 was less widespread and of shorter duration than the reports of the trip to Bulgaria. Even so, it was heard from multiple sources and there was an AFP story out of Moscow that there had been a cancellation. The extraordinary meeting of Pact defense ministers earlier this month could have been part of the preparation for a summit. The separation of the Soviet announcement about counterdeployments from the subsequent Andropov answers to Pravda suggest that Andropov's points may have been planned for release in connection with a summit.

If a Pact summit was in fact cancelled, it could have been because of differences in the Pact over INF. It is clear that the East Europeans are apprehensive over the effects of the INF issues on East-West relations. However, if one assumes that Andropov's replies to Pravda represented the basic elements on which the Soviets sought Pact consensus, even the Romanians could have subscribed to them.

Alternatively, the cancellation of the Pact meeting might have been the result of some illness on Andropov's part. We do not know what Andropov's medical problem may be or when it arose. He was well enough to receive the South Yemenis, presumably at his vacation resort, on September 28 but has not appeared in public or received any other foreign visitors since August 18.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 29, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Andropov Answers Reagan

State's analysis of Andropov's statement yesterday is attached at TAB I. I concur in the analysis, but would stress two points:

-- Andropov's wholesale denunciation of the United States has about it a tone of desperation. He is hurting badly from his handling of the KAL massacre, and the vehemence of his attack shows it.

-- The blatant attempt to frighten Western Europe is clearly aimed at blocking INF deployments. We had of course expected the Soviets to step up their propaganda campaign, but in issuing a statement this strong in Andropov's name, they may well be overplaying their hand.

In any event, Andropov's intemperate blast gives the President the opportunity to consolidate his position on the high ground which he occupied in his UNGA address. In my opinion, the most effective counter to Andropov's diatribe will be to stress that we continue, despite everything, to work in practical, concrete ways to resolve differences, and let the implicit contrast with Andropov's mud slinging do its work. Above all, we must undercut Andropov's obvious effort to heighten fears in Europe, which only feed the anti-nuclear groups.

DF Don Fortier and *DL* David Laux concur.

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum from State

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NLS F00-009/1 #44A. CV NARA, DATE 6/21/06

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 28, 1983

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Andropov Answers Reagan

Andropov's rejoinder to the President betrayed continuing sensitivity in the Soviet leadership over the KAL Incident and an apparent feeling that the President's latest INF move was getting the better of the USSR in the public-relations arena. The result was a shrill response.

Andropov used the unusual vehicle of a "statement" printed in Soviet newspapers to put on record a harsh and authoritative answer to the President's UNGA speech.

- He was exceptionally negative toward the President, asserting that if anyone had any illusions of any turn for the better in US policy, recent events had dispelled them once and for all.
- In his first statement on the issue, Andropov sought to depict the KAL incident as a bilateral US-Soviet issue. He repeated the charge that it was a provocation and dismissed the President's statements as "foul-mouthed abuse mingled with hypocritical sermons on morality..."
- Following up on Gromyko's statement yesterday, Andropov dismissed the latest US initiative on INF as nothing new. He charged that the US was not interested in any agreement but merely procrastinating until starting the Pershing deployment.
- Despite his bitter denunciation of those "blinded by anti-communism," Andropov insisted that "we have strong nerves and we do not build our policy on emotion." He reaffirmed Moscow's continuing desire for peace and disarmament, but used a reference to Soviet military to buttress his assertion that Soviet interest in agreement is not to be taken as a sign of weakness.

The final portion of the speech was an emotional appeal to Europeans to resist NATO INF deployments, which Andropov

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6/21/06

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DECL: OADR

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described as "a step of fundamental dimensions that is hostile to the cause of peace". Andropov depicted the Europeans as hostages of the US, who are preparing to accept a policy that disregards their own interests. He described opponents of the INF deployment as "manifesting the utmost force" of reason in the breadth and scope of their activities.

For minor McKinley
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

ANDROPOV STATEMENT ON U.S. POLICY, KAL, INF TALKS

PM281456 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Sep 83 First Edition p 1

["Statement by Yu.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Text] The Soviet leadership deems it necessary to inform the Soviet people, other peoples, and all who are responsible for determining states' policy of its assessment of the course pursued in international affairs by the current U.S. Administration.

In short, it is a militarist course that represents a serious threat to peace. Its essence is to try to ensure a dominating position in the world for the United States of America regardless of the interests of other states and peoples.

The unprecedented buildup of the U.S. military potential and the large-scale programs for the production of all types of weapons -- nuclear, chemical, and conventional -- are subordinated to precisely these aims. The United States is now planning to extend the headlong arms race to space as well.

The American military presence thousands of kilometers from U.S. territory is being expanded on all kinds of farfetched pretexts. Bridgeheads are being created for direct interference in the affairs of other states with the aid of armed forces and for the utilization of American weapons against any country that rejects Washington's diktat. As a result tension has increased in all regions of the world -- Europe, Asia, Africa, the Near East, and Central America.

The other NATO countries are increasingly being dragged into the implementation of all these dangerous plans of Washington's. Moreover, efforts are being made to revive Japanese militarism and to link it to the [NATO] bloc's military-political machine. In the process attempts are made to get people to forget the lessons of the past.

The peoples judge the policy of a particular government above all by its actions. So when the U.S. President bombastically declares from the UN rostrum his commitment to the cause of peace, self-determination, and sovereignty of the peoples, these rhetorical declarations can convince no one.

If anyone has any illusions about the possibility of an evolution for the better in the present American Administration's policy, recent events have dispelled them once and for all. The administration is going so far for the sake of achieving its imperial objectives that one cannot help doubting whether any restraints [tormoza] at all exist for Washington to prevent it from crossing a line before which any thinking person ought to stop.

The sophisticated provocation organized by the U.S. special services using a South Korean plane is also an example of extreme adventurism in policy. We have elucidated the factual side of this action in detail and authentically. The guilt of its organizers -- no matter how they dodge and no matter what bogus versions they put forward -- has been proved.

The Soviet leadership expressed regret at the loss of life which was the result of this unprecedented, criminal act of subversion. The loss of life is on the conscience of those who would like to arrogate to themselves the right not to reckon with states' sovereignty and the inviolability of their borders, who conceived and implemented this provocation, and who literally the next day hastened to force colossal military appropriations through Congress and are now rubbing their hands with satisfaction.

Thus the "humanism" of the figures who are endeavoring to shift onto others the blame for the death of the people who were on board the aircraft means new mountains of weapons of mass destruction -- from MX missiles to containers of neuroparalytic gas.

In their endeavor somehow to justify their dangerous, misanthropic policy, they are heaping mountains of slander on the Soviet Union and socialism as a social system, and the tone is being set by the U.S. President himself. It must be frankly said that it is an unseemly spectacle when, having set themselves the aim of denigrating the Soviet people, the leaders of a country like the United States resort to what is virtually foul-mouthed abuse mingled with hypocritical sermons on morality and humanity.

The world well knows the worth of this moralizing. In Vietnam morality as it is understood by Washington officials was instilled with the aid of napalm and toxins, in Lebanon it is being hammered in with volleys from ship's guns, and in El Salvador this morality is being introduced through genocide. This list of crimes could be extended. So we also have something to say about the moral aspect of U.S. policy, both when we remember history and when we are speaking of the present.

Now Washington, in addition to morality, is also flouting elementary rules of decency, displaying disrespect not only for statesmen and states but also for the United Nations. You may well ask whether an international organization designed to support peace and security can exist in a country where unbridled militarist hysteria is implanted and insults are hurled at that organization's good name?

Under cover of anticommunism, the claimants to the role of shapers of world destiny are trying to instill systems which suit them wherever they do not meet with a rebuff.

The concepts with which they try to justify this *modus operandi* would not, of themselves, be worthy of attention were it not for the fact that they are being preached by the leaders of a major power and are not simply being preached verbally but are also being implemented in practice.

Transferring ideological contradictions to the sphere of interstate relations has never brought anything good to those who have resorted to it in foreign affairs. But now, in the nuclear age, it is simply absurd and inadmissible. Transforming the confrontation of ideas into military confrontation would cost all mankind too dear.

But those who are blinded by anticommunism are obviously incapable of thinking about that. Beginning with the bogey of the "Soviet military threat" they have now reached the point of declaring a "crusade" against socialism as a social system. They are trying to suggest to people that socialism has no place at all in the world. True, they do not go so far as to admit that they are speaking of the world as Washington would like to see it.

But wishes and possibilities are far from the same thing. No one may reverse the course of history. The USSR and the other socialist countries will live and develop according to their own laws -- the laws of the most progressive social system.

In the 65 years of its existence the Soviet state has successfully come through many ordeals, including harsh ones. Those who have tried to encroach on our state's integrity, on its independence, on our system, have found themselves on the ash heap of history. It is time that all those whom it concerns realized that we will be able to safeguard the security of our country and the security of our friends and allies under any conditions.

Soviet people may be sure that our country's defense capability is at such a level that anyone would be ill-advised to stage a trial of strength.

We for our part do not seek such a trial of strength. The very thought of this is alien to us. We do not separate off the well-being of our people and the security of the Soviet state, still less counterpose them to the well-being and security of other peoples and other countries. In the nuclear age the world must not be looked at through the chink of narrow egoistic interests. Responsible statesmen have one option -- to do everything to prevent nuclear catastrophe. Any other position is shortsighted and, what is more, suicidal.

For the Soviet leadership the question of what line to follow in international affairs and in the present acute situation does not arise. Our policy is aimed, as before, at preserving and strengthening peace, easing tension, curbing the arms race, and broadening and deepening cooperation among states. This is the immutable will of the CPSU and the entire Soviet people. These, we are convinced, are also the aspirations of all peoples.

Of course, malicious attacks on the Soviet Union arouse in us a natural sense of indignation, but we have strong nerves, and we do not build our policy on emotions. It is founded on common sense, realism, and profound responsibility for the destiny of peace.

We proceed from the premise that mankind is not doomed to perish. The arms race must and can be ended. Mankind deserves a better lot than to live in a world torn by conflicts, suffocating beneath a burden of lethal weapons.

In advancing far-reaching proposals with regard to limitations and reductions of both strategic nuclear arms and medium-range nuclear arms in Europe we are concerned not only about the security of the USSR and the socialist community states but also about the security of all other countries.

As regards U.S. policy, its increasing militarization is also manifested in the reluctance to hold any serious talks and to reach agreement on questions of curbing the arms race.

The Soviet-American talks on a very acute problem -- the reduction of nuclear arms in Europe -- have now been going on for 2 years. The Soviet side's stance is aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions on an honest, just basis, solutions which infringe no one's legitimate interests. At the same time it has also become clear over these 2 years that our partners in the Geneva talks are certainly not there to reach an accord. They have a different task -- to procrastinate and then begin deploying Pershing II ballistic missiles and long-range cruise missiles in West Europe. And they do not even particularly hide this fact.

They merely take refuge in arguments about some kind of U.S. flexibility at the Geneva talks. A further portion of this "flexibility" has just materialized. And this time the deception involved [zalozhennyy] has become clear. If we leave the details to one side, the essence of the so-called new move in the American position, publicized as an "excellent" move, boils down to a proposal to reach agreement, as before, on how many Soviet medium-range missiles to reduce and how many new American missiles to deploy in Europe in addition to the nuclear potential which NATO already has.

In short, they are offering us a discussion on how to help the NATO bloc upset in its favor the balance which exists in the European zone in terms of medium-range nuclear means. And now, without batting an eyelid, they are portraying this move as something new.

From the captain's bridge in Washington, the operation of installing these U.S. nuclear missiles in Europe is seen as extremely simple and most advantageous for the United States -- advantageous at Europe's expense. The European allies of the United States are regarded as hostages. This is a frank policy, but a cynical one. But here is what is really incomprehensible: Is any thought given to this by those European politicians who, disregarding the interests of their peoples and the interests of peace, are helping the implementation of the U.S. Administration's ambitious militarist plans?

There must be no room for reticence [nedogovorennost] here. If, despite the will of the majority of the population in West European countries, the U.S. nuclear missiles appear on the continent of Europe -- this will be a step of fundamental dimensions that is hostile to the cause of peace on the part of the U.S. leaders and the figures of the other NATO countries acting in concert with them.

We do not discern on the American side any desire to really tackle the solution of the problem of limiting and reducing strategic arms. People in the American capital are now busy with something else: They are putting into production more and more new systems of these arms. And types of them are emerging that may altogether fundamentally overturn notions of strategic stability and of the very possibility of effectively limiting and reducing nuclear arms.

The Soviet Union's goodwill and its desire to reach agreement should not be taken by anyone as a sign of weakness. The Soviet Union will be able to give a suitable response to any attempt to disrupt the existing military-strategic balance, and its words will not be at variance with its deeds.

But we are principled opponents of competition in the production and stockpiling of mass destruction weapons. This is not our way. It cannot lead to the solution of any of the problems facing mankind: the economic development of states, the protection of the environment, and the creation of simply elementary conditions for people's life; for their nutrition, health, and education.

The release of the material resources which are being pointlessly wasted on the arms race and the revelation of man's inexhaustible creative capacities -- this is what can unite people, this is what must determine the policy of states at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. For all this to materialize it is necessary to stop the forces of militarism and through joint efforts to prevent the world from sliding into the abyss.

All peoples and each inhabitant of our planet must be aware of the threatening danger. Aware so as to unite their efforts in the struggle for their own existence.

Mankind has not lost and cannot lose its reason. This is manifested with the utmost force in the breadth of the scope of the antimissile and antiwar movement which has developed on the European and other continents -- a movement in which people of different social, political, and religious affiliations are taking part.

All those who are today raising their voices against the insane arms race and in defense of peace can be assured that the policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries is aimed at attaining precisely these goals. The USSR desires to live in peace with all countries, including the United States. It is not hatching aggressive plans, it is not forcing an arms race on anyone, it is not imposing its social order on anyone.

Our thoughts and aspirations are embodied in specific proposals aimed at securing a decisive change for the better in the international situation. The Soviet Union will continue to do everything possible to defend peace on earth.

Andropov Statement Publicized

Text of the "Statement by Yu.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium" was carried by the following Soviet media:

Page 1 of the 29 September issues of PRAVDA (First Edition), IZVESTIYA (Morning Edition), KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (First Edition), SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA (First Edition), SELSKAYA ZHIZN (First Edition);

Moscow TASS in English at 1812 GMT on 28 Sep 83;

Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1700 GMT on 28 Sep 83 (announcer-read);

Moscow Domestic Television Service in Russian at 1907 GMT on 28 Sep 83 (announcer-read);

U.S. PRESS REACTION TO REAGAN'S UN SPEECH CITED

LD281402 Moscow TASS in English 1102 GMT 28 Sep 83

[Text] New York September 28 TASS -- President Reagan's speech at the U.N. has again clearly shown that there has been no real change in the stand of the USA as regards not taking into account the nuclear weapons of Britain and France in the general balance of the forces of NATO and Warsaw Treaty. This is pointed out by the American press, which stresses that the so-called new proposals by the American President again provide for unilateral advantages for the USA in the field of strategic parity.

The newspaper CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR points out the controversial nature of the statement by the President on this issue and writes in particular that while President Reagan was offering at the U.N. a carrot in the form of flexibility on the question of limitation of weapons, the nuclear weapons stick, which, as he believes, is equally indispensable for maintaining peace, is becoming increasingly heavier. Noting that the U.S. Administration is planning to spend 450 billion dollars within the next few years on preparations for nuclear war, the newspaper points out that a larger part of these funds will be spent in any case.

Almost simultaneously with his speech at the UN President Reagan pointed out that a modernization of old nuclear weapons was inevitable, which implies major efforts for the deployment of ground, air and sea-based nuclear weapons systems.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

July 6, 1983

PR

Matlock
FileINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Andropov Reply to President's Congratulatory Message

Andropov's reply (Tab A) to your congratulatory message avoids the code words known to be offensive to us (such as "peaceful coexistence"). However, instead of speaking of working together, as you did in your message, he implies in his last sentence that the burden of proof is on us to take "practical steps."

This thrust is consistent with Gromyko's recent comments on the prospects for a summit, which also implied that a change in U.S. policy is necessary. I consider this an obvious but not surprising attempt to position the Soviets as the aggrieved party. The main implication for our own public statements is to continue the same cautious, non-committal line we have followed up to now in commenting on the prospects for a summit meeting.

Attachment:

Tab A Letter from Andropov

Prepared by
Jack F. Matlock~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOUO-009/1 #43CN NARA, DATE 6/21/06

Unofficial translation

His Excellency
Ronald Wilson Reagan
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

June 22, 1983

Dear Mr. President,

I thank you for congratulating me on my election as
Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Availing myself of this opportunity I would like to
reaffirm the unbending commitment of the Soviet leadership
and the people of the Soviet Union to the cause of peace,
the elimination of the nuclear threat, and the development
of relations based on mutual benefit and equality with
all nations, including the United States of America.

We shall welcome practical steps of your government
in this direction.

Sincerely,

Y. ANDROPOV

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Collection, Box 21, 1097

105 NARA, Dole 5/7/01

Его Превосходительству
Рональду Уилсону Рейгану,
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
Вашингтон, О.К.

Уважаемый господин президент,

Благодарю Вас за поздравление в связи с избранием меня
Председателем Президиума Верховного Совета СССР.

Пользуясь этим случаем, хотел бы подтвердить неуклонную
приверженность советского руководства и народа Советского
Союза делу мира, устранению ядерной угрозы, развитию взаимо-
выгодных, равноправных отношений со всеми странами, в том
числе с Соединенными Штатами Америки.

Мы будем приветствовать практические шаги вашего прави-
тельства в этом направлении.

С уважением,

Ю.АНДРОПОВ

22 июня 1983 года

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By LOS NARA, Date 3/7/01

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1983

Dear Mr. President:

Please accept my congratulations upon your election as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

As you assume your new duties, I hope that together we can find ways to promote peace by reducing the levels of armaments and moving toward the elimination of force and threats of force in settling international disputes. You will have my full cooperation in moving toward these goals on a basis of equality, reciprocity, and respect for the rights and interests of all.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov
Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

DECLASSIFIED

White House

123, 1397

by

ADS

date

3/7/01

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


June 17, 1983

Dear Mr. President:

Please accept my congratulations upon your election as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

As you assume your new duties, I hope that together we can find ways to promote peace by reducing the levels of armaments and moving toward the elimination of force and threats of force in settling international disputes. You will have my full cooperation in moving toward these goals on a basis of equality, reciprocity, and respect for the rights and interests of all.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov
Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

10-203

3/7/01

REFERRAL

DATE: 17 JUN 83

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: ANDROPOV, YURIY

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 17 JUN 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

HS


SUBJ: CONGRATULAORY LTR RE ELECTION AS CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF USSR

REQUIRED ACTION: FDI

ASAP

DUE DATE:

COMMENTS: HARD COPY OF LDX SENT EARLIER


FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 23, 1983

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Andropov Reply to Presidential Congratulatory Message

Attached is the Russian text and unofficial Soviet Embassy translation of a brief message to the President from Yuri Andropov as the new Chairman of the Soviet Presidium. In response to the President's earlier message of congratulations on the occasion of Andropov's election as head of the Presidium, the Soviet leader notes the Soviet commitment "to the cause of peace, the elimination of the nuclear threat, and the development of relations based on mutual benefit and equality with all nations, including the United States of America." The Andropov note concludes that "we shall welcome practical steps of your government in this direction."

Attachments as Stated

Charles Hill
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State, June 21, 1987
By LOS Date 3/7/01~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1983

Dear Mr. President:

Please accept my congratulations upon your election as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

As you assume your new duties, I hope that together we can find ways to promote peace by reducing the levels of armaments and moving toward the elimination of force and threats of force in settling international disputes. You will have my full cooperation in moving toward these goals on a basis of equality, reciprocity, and respect for the rights and interests of all.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov
Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

3/7/01

REFERRAL

DATE: 17 JUN 83

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: ANDROPOV, YURIY

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 17 JUN 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

HS


SUBJ: CONGRATULAORY LTR RE ELECTION AS CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF USSR

REQUIRED ACTION: FDI

ASAP

DUE DATE:

COMMENTS: HARD COPY OF LDX SENT EARLIER



FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

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URGE

MESSAGE NO. 358 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL PAGES 1

FROM J. PINDERSTER (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRES LTR TO ANDROPOV

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>STATE</u>	<u>Clay McManaway</u>		

REMARKS: PLS CABLE ASAP. ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW. REQUEST OF OUTGOING CABLE

OK for hard copy
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6/17/83
Dispatch
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

June 16, 1983

00 JUN '83 PM: 11

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET

SUBJECT: Presidential Message for Andropov

Attached for approval is a draft Presidential message for Andropov.

Charles Hill
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State, Office of Policy, July 21, 1997

By *MDI*

Date *3/7/01*

Department of State
Suggested Message

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On behalf of the American people, I wish to congratulate you upon your election as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I should like to take this occasion to convey to you my strong desire for an improved relationship between our two countries. I deeply believe that a relationship based on mutual restraint and reciprocity would contribute greatly to the cause of peace.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency

Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov,

Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Moscow.

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State
By LOT 3/7/01

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

June 27, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Andropov Reply to President's Congratulatory Message

Andropov's reply (Tab A) to the President's congratulatory message avoids the code words known to be offensive to us (such as "peaceful coexistence"). However, instead of speaking of working together, as the President did, he implies in his last sentence that the burden of proof is on us to take "practical steps."

This thrust is consistent with Gromyko's recent comments on the prospects for a summit, which also implied that a change in U.S. policy is necessary. I consider this an obvious but not surprising attempt to position the Soviets as the aggrieved party. The main implication for our own public statements is to continue the same cautious, non-committal line we have followed up to now in commenting on the prospects for a summit meeting.

At Tab I is a memorandum to the President incorporating these points.

RECOMMENDATION:OKNO*/*

—

That you send the memo at Tab I to the President.

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter from Andropov to the President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOUO-009/1 #44*OK* NARA, DATE 6/21/06

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Clark	
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Time Stamp

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C : Copy

O : Original

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET~~

June 24, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Andropov Reply to President's Congratulatory Message

Andropov's reply to the President's congratulations avoids code words known to be offensive to us (such as "peaceful coexistence"). However, instead of speaking of working together, as the President did, he implies in his last sentence that the burden of proof is on us to take "practical steps."

This thrust is consistent with Gromyko's recent comments on the prospects for a summit, which also implied that a change in U.S. policy is necessary. I consider this an obvious but not surprising attempt to position the Soviets as the aggrieved party. The main implication for our own public statements is to continue the same cautious, non-committal line we have followed up to now in commenting on the prospects for a summit meeting.

Attachment

Tab I Letter to President from Andropov

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

FOUO-009/1-#45

2

ON

NARA, DATE

6/9/06

Unofficial translation

His Excellency
 Ronald Wilson Reagan
 President of the United States of America
 Washington, D.C.

June 22, 1983

Dear Mr. President,

I thank you for congratulating me on my election as
 Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Availing myself of this opportunity I would like to
 reaffirm the unbending commitment of the Soviet leadership
 and the people of the Soviet Union to the cause of peace,
 the elimination of the nuclear threat, and the development
 of relations based on mutual benefit and equality with
 all nations, including the United States of America.

We shall welcome practical steps of your government
 in this direction.

Sincerely,

Y. ANDROPOV

Его Превосходительству
Рональду Уилсону Рейгану,
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
Вашингтон, О.К.

Уважаемый господин президент,

Благодарю Вас за поздравление в связи с избранием меня
Председателем Президиума Верховного Совета СССР.

Пользуясь этим случаем, хотел бы подтвердить неуклонную
приверженность советского руководства и народа Советского
Союза делу мира, устранению ядерной угрозы, развитию взаимо-
выгодных, равноправных отношений со всеми странами, в том
числе с Соединенными Штатами Америки.

Мы будем приветствовать практические шаги вашего прави-
тельства в этом направлении.

С уважением,

Ю.АНДРОПОВ

22 июня 1983 года

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - JUNE 17, 1983

1. ANDROPOV'S FOREIGN POLICY

Despite his election as head of state at yesterday's meeting of the Supreme Soviet, and the consolidation of his political position, Andropov apparently remains dependent on the coalition of forces in the Politburo which brought him to power--a factor which makes for continuity in foreign policy. Both Andropov's speech to the Central Committee plenum on June 15 and Gromyko's address to the Supreme Soviet reaffirmed existing policy lines.

* * *

The only new initiative this week was the Supreme Soviet's call for a qualitative and quantitative freeze on nuclear weapons by all nuclear powers, starting with the US and USSR. This resolution is an elaboration of an idea that Moscow has been disseminating in numerous arenas. In both the Andropov and Gromyko speeches, criticism of the US was sharp, but the themes were familiar. Both speeches denounced the "aggressiveness" of US policy; Gromyko urged the US to maintain normal relations with the USSR.

Andropov declared that closer relations with the socialist countries was "the paramount direction" of Soviet policy, an emphasis echoed by Gromyko. Although he explicitly noted past differences with the East Europeans, Andropov stressed his intent to strengthen bloc ties, particularly in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA.

Gromyko's speech advocated a rapprochement with China, a theme notably absent in recent months, and paid unusual attention to Latin America, noting specifically Moscow's "understanding" of the efforts of the Contadora Group. Gromyko also expressed the desire for progress in the talks on Afghanistan (although he reiterated that only the "external aspects" are open to negotiation), renewed Brezhnev's earlier proposal for a Middle East peace conference, and denounced the Iran-Iraq war as "senseless." Gromyko severely criticized Iran's policy toward Moscow, especially its recent expulsion of Soviet personnel. Gromyko further warned the FRG that Moscow will give "priority" to security issues when Chancellor Kohl visits next month, even though it favors broader economic relations with Bonn.

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