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Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files

Folder Title: Andropov (2)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files
 OA/Box: 20
 File Folder: Andropov (2)

Archivist: loj/loj
 FOIA ID: F00-009, Skinner
 Date: 7/29/04

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. fax cover	1p <i>Part 6/21/06 NLSF00-009/1 #27</i>	2/10/84	B1 <i>B3</i>
2. paper	2p <i>D " " #28</i>	2/10/84	B1, <i>B3</i>
3. memo	Richard Burt to Charles Hill, re items for our response to Andropov's death, 1p <i>R " " #29</i>	2/10/84	B1
4. memo	George Shultz to the President, re our public response to Andropov's death, 2p <i>R " " #30</i>	1/10/84	B1
5. memo	Shultz to the President, re substantive approach to new Soviet leadership, 2p <i>R " " #31</i>	ND	B1
6. memo	Same as item #4, 2p <i>R " " #32</i>	1/10/84	B1
7. memo	Matlock to Robert McFarlane, re US representation at Andropov funeral, 2p <i>R " " #33</i>	2/10/84	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
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**WHSR
ROUTE SLIP**

RECEIVED Time Stamp

STAFF	C/O	4 FEB 10 P 5: 14
McFarlane	C	
Poindexter	C	
Kimmitt		
Shull	C	
MATLOCK	C	
SPEAKES	C	
SIMS	C	
Martin	C	
Merchant		LDX
NSC S/S	C	Approval: _____

C : Copy

O : Original

Sent to CALIF.

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

84 FEB 10 P 5:10

B

S/S #

RECEIVED

84 FEB 10 P 5:13

MESSAGE NO. 1630 CLASSIFICATION (LOU) No. Pages 1

FROM [Signature] (Officer name) [Symbol] (Office symbol) [Extension] (Extension) [Room] (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Press Statement

TC (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>Mr. Jack Matlock</u>		

FOR CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS URGENT

S/S Officer: [Signature]

DRAFT

ANDROPOV FUNERAL DELEGATION

SUGGESTED PRESS STATEMENT

The President has today asked Vice President Bush to be his personal representative to the funeral of Soviet Chairman Yuriy Andropov. The Vice President will be accompanied by Secretary Shultz and American Ambassador to the Soviet Union Arthur Hartman. The President has asked the Vice President when in Moscow to extend the condolences and best wishes of the American people to the people of the Soviet Union and to express to them our strong desire for peace.

The President also has requested the Vice President to convey to the new Soviet leadership our hope for an improved dialogue and cooperation which can lead to a more constructive relationship between our two countries. [To this end, the Vice President is carrying a letter from the President emphasizing his personal commitment to the goal of improved relations based on mutual respect and serious dialogue on the issues between us.]

per Lms
Drafted: EUR/SOV: B4 Pascoe

2/10/84 x21452 (0478b)

ANDROPOV FUNERAL DELEGATION

Q. Why did the President decide not to go to Moscow?

A. As you know, it is not usual American practice for the President to attend funerals of other leaders. In choosing the Vice President and Secretary Shultz to represent him, he picked a team that will convey his desire for more constructive relations with the Soviets accurately and authoritatively. I would also point out that he looks forward to his very important discussions with President Mubarak and King Hussein next week, and felt it would have been a shame to miss that opportunity to explore the possibilities for further progress toward peace in the Middle East.

Q. Does the President's refusal to go to Moscow mean he sees no need to deal personally with the Soviet leadership?

A. Of course not. The President has stated many times that he is ready to meet with Soviet leaders if our dialogue has shown that there is a chance for constructive results. That remains his position.

Q. What signal will the Soviets get from the fact that other foreign leaders like Chancellor Kohl are there but the President is not?

A. I would hope they would understand that we have a steady and consistent approach to the Soviet Union, and that the Vice President and Secretary Shultz enjoy the President's full confidence and will be speaking for him in Moscow.

Q. What message will the Vice President be carrying from the President?

A. It would not be appropriate to talk about the details of the President's private communications with the Soviets here, but you can be sure that it will convey the President's desire to work with the Soviets to reduce tensions, to reduce armaments and to increase mutual understanding in every area where they are willing to meet us halfway.

Q. (If asked in case of no Congressional representation) Why are no Congressional leaders included in the delegation?

A. Soviet practice is to invite only very small delegations for State funerals, and that was the determining factor in this case.

Drafted: EUR/SOV: TWSimons, Jr.
2/10/84 x23238 (0476b)

Cleared: EUR: MPalmer

DRAFT

ANDROPOV FUNERAL DELEGATION

SUGGESTED PRESS STATEMENT

The President has today asked Vice President Bush to be his personal representative to the funeral of Soviet Chairman Yuriy Andropov. [The Vice President will be accompanied by Secretary Shultz and American Ambassador to the Soviet Union Arthur Hartman.] The President has asked the Vice President when in Moscow to extend the condolences and best wishes of the American people to the people of the Soviet Union and to express to them our strong desire for peace.

The President also has requested the Vice President to convey to the new Soviet leadership our hope for an improved dialogue and cooperation which can lead to a more constructive relationship between our two countries. [To this end, the Vice President is carrying a letter from the President emphasizing his personal commitment to the goal of improved relations based on mutual respect and serious dialogue on the issues between us.]

February 10, 1984

ANDROPOV FUNERAL DELEGATION

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Q. (If asked in case of no Congressional representation) Why are no Congressional leaders included in the delegation?

A. Soviet practice is to invite only very small delegations for State funerals, and that was the determining factor in this case.

Q - Other members of delegation?

A - Not decided yet.

DATE/TIME TRANSMITTED

WASHFAX MESSAGE NUMBER

DATE/TIME RECEIVED

FEB 10 3 31 PM '84

C I A
OPERATIONS CENTER

SITE A

WASHFAX MESSAGE RECEIPT

RECEIVED

84 FEB 10 P 3: 43

USE
SITE TELEPHONE

FROM

CPAS

SUBJECT

SOV

B3

CLASSIFICATION

~~Confidential~~

PAGES

2

SENT TO:

DELIVER TO:

EXTENSION

ROOM

WH R

McFarlane

AMB MATLOCK

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS EOO-00911 H27

By CH

NARA, Date

6/21/06

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 2 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER. *pt 2*



United States Department of State

Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: S/S - Charles Hill
FROM: EUR - Richard Burt
SUBJECT: Items for Our Response to Andropov's Death

We are working on the following items of our response to Andropov's death:

- Condolence message from the President to Acting Soviet Head of State Kuznetsov
- Secretary's condolence to Gromyko
- Presidential statement for release by the White House
- Secretary's statement for use on TV
- Short memorandum to the President on our approach to dealing with Andropov's death
- Memorandum to President on substantive issues that must be resolved for substantive session in Moscow
- Working with White House on delegation
- Conferring with Embassy Moscow by secure line on current Soviet planning
- Checking with Soviet Embassy on plans for condolence book

Drafted: EUR/SOV: BLPascoe
2/10/84 #0455b

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

FOO-009/i #29

CN

NARA, DATE

6/2/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3/7/01



Department of State

ACTION MEMORANDUM
S/S

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EUR - Richard Burt

SUBJECT: Condolence Messages to Soviet Leaders

Attached are cables to our Embassy in Moscow containing condolence messages from the President to the Acting Head of State, Vasily Kuznetsov, and from you to Gromyko. I recommend that you sign them. Jack Matlock has already given NSC approval of the message from the President.

Attachments:

- Tab A - Presidential Message to Soviet Head of State
- Tab B - Your Message to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko

Drafted: EUR/SOV: RFSmith: jh (R)
02/10/84 Ext. 28720 #0461B
Clear: EUR/SOV: BLPascoe h
EUR: MPalmer

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EUR/SOV/SOBI:BLPASCOE.
02/10/84 EXT. 28720 {0458B}
SECRETARY

EUR:MPALMER
S:CHILL
S/S:

EUR:RBURT
NSC:JMATLOCK

NIACT/IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
IMMEDIATE LENINGRAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: -OADR

TAGS: ODIP, UR, US

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO SOVIET ACTING HEAD OF
STATE

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE.

2. BEGIN QUOTE: PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONDOLENCES ON THE
DEATH OF CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV. I ASK YOU TO CONVEY MY
SYMPATHIES TO THE ANDROPOV FAMILY.

AT THIS SOLEMN TIME, I WISH TO EMPHASIZE THE DEEP AND
HEARTFELT DESIRE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR WORLD
PEACE. WHILE OUR PERSPECTIVES MAY DIFFER, BOTH THE
SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE A VITAL INTEREST
IN AVOIDING WAR. WE WANT GENUINE COOPERATION WITH THE
SOVIET UNION TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER AND MORE
PEACEFUL PLACE FOR ALL MANKIND. AT THIS MOMENT IN
HISTORY, I INVITE THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND THE NEW SOVIET
LEADERSHIP TO JOIN WITH US IN THIS ENDEAVOR.

SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN 44

UNCLASSIFIED

BLP
MR
RB
CH
JM

UNCLASSIFIED

EUR/SOV:BLPASCOE:JH
01/10/84 EXT. 29559
SECRETARY

{04598}

EUR:MPALMER
S:CHILL
S/S:

EUR:RBURT

NIACT/IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

IMMEDIATE LENINGRAD

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: ODIP, US, UR

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER
GROMYKO

BLP

MP

RB
CH

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO SOVIET
FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

2. BEGIN TEXT: PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONDOLENCES ON THE
DEATH OF CHAIRMAN YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV. HIS
LOSS WILL, I AM SURE, BE FELT GREATLY BY YOU AND ALL OF
THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. IN THIS PERIOD OF MOURNING, I
WANT TO REAFFIRM OUR DESIRE FOR PEACEFUL AND
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.
PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH
RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE A MATTER OF THE HIGHEST
PRIORITY FOR MY COUNTRY. I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING
WITH YOU TOWARD THIS END.

SINCERELY, GEORGE P. SHULTZ. END TEXT. 44

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

The President has sent a message expressing his personal condolences to Mr. Kuznetsov, the Acting Soviet Chief of State, on the death of Chairman Andropov. In his statement, the President emphasized to the people and government of the USSR his desire for cooperation between the two countries in the search for a more peaceful world.

As the President reaffirmed in his address of January 16, the United States has sought and will continue to seek a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more productive and stable relationship. Our objective is not dialogue for its own sake, but a dialogue that produces real solutions to the many concrete problems that divide us.

There are, to be sure, fundamental differences between the American and Soviet systems and our respective political beliefs. But the American and Soviet peoples have a common interest in the avoidance of war and the reduction of arms. It is this need to preserve and strengthen the peace that is at the heart of U.S. policy. ~~The United States will defend its interests, but does not seek to threaten the Soviet Union.~~

The President's policy toward the Soviet Union seeks to achieve progress in three broad areas: developing ways to eliminate the use and the threat of force in international relations; significantly reducing the vast arms stockpiles in the world, particularly nuclear weapons; and establishing a better working relationship with Moscow characterized by greater cooperation and understanding and based on mutual restraint and respect.

At this time of transition in the Soviet Union, our two nations should look to the future in order to find ways to realize these goals. In the nuclear age, there is no alternative to dialogue.

The United States hopes that the Soviet leaders will work with us in this spirit, and take advantage of the opportunities at hand to find common ground and establish a mutually beneficial relationship.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ

The President is expressing his personal condolences to Mr. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on the death of Chairman Andropov. I am sending a similar message to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

At this time of transition in Moscow, let me reaffirm that our policy toward the Soviet Union continues to be based on the pursuit of a constructive and realistic dialogue aimed at building a more productive and stable relationship. As the President has stressed, we seek not merely to improve the atmosphere of our relations, but to find solutions to real problems. This applies, in particular, to the task of reaching equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements, and reducing the risk of war.

The President has emphasized to the people and government of the Soviet Union his desire for constructive cooperation between our two countries in the search for a more peaceful world. The United States hopes that the Soviet leaders will work with us to that end. We hope as well that the Soviet leadership will join us in taking advantage of the opportunities at hand to find common ground and establish a mutually beneficial relationship.



Department of State

ACTION MEMORANDUM
S/S

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

TO: The Secretary
FROM: EUR - Richard Burt
SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on Andropov

Attached is the memorandum to the President you requested this morning on our response to Andropov's death.

Attachment: As Stated

Drafted: EUR/SOV: BLPascoe
2/10/84 #0460b

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

Department of State
By LSI DATE 3/7/01

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz
SUBJECT: Our Public Response to Andropov's Death

With Andropov's death, our Soviet policy will again come under close scrutiny by the American public, our Allies, and the rest of the world. During this period, we will want to convey the sense that our policy is on the right track, that we intend to keep to our steady approach, and that we are open to cooperation and dialogue with the new Soviet leadership. We will want to use the opportunity in our statements here and in any substantive conversations in Moscow to show that we are prepared for a more constructive relationship.

While emphasizing our desire for an improvement, we should not foster any excessive optimism that U.S.-Soviet relations will change markedly with the change in leadership. We will be dealing with essentially the same collective group regardless of who emerges in the top position. In the immediate aftermath of Andropov's death, they will be wary of "pressure" on them from outside, and suspicious that strong public optimism from us is intended to constitute pressure. Thus, while we will want to project continuity and openness to new directions if the Soviets are prepared to move forward, we will not want to predict how the new leadership might react to our policy.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 100-00911 #30

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

CU NARA, DATE 6/21/06

Drafted:EUR/SOV:BLPascoe
1/10/84 x21452 (0460b)

Cleared:EUR:MPalmer
EUR:RBurt

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOD-009/1 #31

CW NARA. DATE 6/21/06

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: The Secretary

Subject: Substantive Approach to New Soviet Leadership

Beyond our public posture on Andropov's death, we also need to consider what to say to the new Soviet leadership on major policy issues. The first opportunity will be during the funeral. We don't yet know whether we will be meeting with a single new leader, or some temporary figurehead. In either case, we can convey the substance of our approach.

Our overall strategy should not be changed -- realism, strength and dialogue must remain the pillars of our approach. Andropov's death may provide a chance to get the dialogue moving. Some previous transition periods have found the Soviets more willing to talk and show flexibility; others have found them largely immobilized. At this stage we cannot tell what will happen, but our own actions will have some influence on the outcome. Therefore, while keeping public expectations low, it is in our interest to make clear to the Soviets we are interested in achieving real progress, thereby hastening and shaping their own decision-making process.

I believe three issues should be front and center in our initial contacts: START/INF, MBFR and Lebanon. Whether you or the Vice President heads our delegation, I recommend that we be in a position to indicate the following.

On START, we would reiterate that, when they are ready, we have ideas on concrete ways to narrow the differences between our respective positions. The common framework we are prepared to discuss would incorporate elements of the current proposals of both sides and permit forces that are not identical, while providing for a more stable strategic balance at lower levels.

On INF, we would indicate that our willingness to find a mutually acceptable framework for accord applies to intermediate-range as well as strategic nuclear forces. We have always recognized the interrelationship between these two classes of systems, although we have felt that separate negotiations on the two are more likely to be productive. We are thus prepared to address the full range of Soviet concerns.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

At the same time, we believe it important to move ahead on those aspects of the nuclear equation where early agreement appears attainable. We are prepared to consider any proposals they have to make in this regard.

On MBFR, it would be important to indicate that during the next round of negotiations in Vienna, the Western side will be prepared to introduce some new ideas. We should reiterate that if the Soviet Union demonstrates significant flexibility in meeting our serious concerns about assuring effective verification, they will find us flexible regarding data. This does not require that you make a decision on a specific option before the funeral (though we do need a decision next week in order to allow time for consultations with the Allies before the next round of MBFR opens on March 16th). You have my recommendation on which option will put some life into the Vienna process.

On regional issues and particularly Lebanon, we should point out to the new Soviet leadership the need to reduce the dangers of wider confrontation. We should mention that we have taken the initiative for discussions on a number of regional issues (Afghanistan, southern Africa, Lebanon), but that these discussions have not progressed. We are prepared to discuss the situation in Lebanon to see what parallel steps could be taken to bring about reconciliation.

Finally, we should keep open the possibility of some small steps in the bilateral relationship. It may turn out that progress on the major issues listed above will not be possible this year -- both due to the Soviet succession and a decision in Moscow to wait to see the outcome of our elections. But in recent weeks they have been willing at least to discuss a number of bilateral moves, i.e., hotline upgrade, maritime boundary. During the funeral I think we should indicate that we are ready to move ahead in bilateral relations assuming the Soviet side agrees. There are a number of possibilities here, particularly to increase direct contact with the Soviet people -- a theme of your January 16th speech and State of the Union address.

In sum, I recommend that in our initial contact with the new Soviet leadership we reaffirm our overall approach -- determination vigorously to protect our interests through realism and strength, and readiness to put new content into our dialogue.

Jack Thatlock



Department of State

ACTION MEMORANDUM
S/S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: The Secretary
FROM: EUR - Richard Burt
SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on Andropov

Attached is the memorandum to the President you requested this morning on our response to Andropov's death.

Attachment: As Stated

Drafted: EUR/SOV:BLPascoe
2/10/84 #0460b

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1977
by LOS NARA, Date 3/7/01

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz
SUBJECT: Our Public Response to Andropov's Death

With Andropov's death, our Soviet policy will again come under close scrutiny by the American public, our Allies, and the rest of the world. During this period, we will want to convey the sense that our policy is on the right track, that we intend to keep to our steady approach, and that we are open to cooperation and dialogue with the new Soviet leadership. We will want to use the opportunity in our statements here and in any substantive conversations in Moscow to show that we are prepared for a more constructive relationship.

While emphasizing our desire for an improvement, we should not foster any excessive optimism that U.S.-Soviet relations will change markedly with the change in leadership. We will be dealing with essentially the same collective group regardless of who emerges in the top position. In the immediate aftermath of Andropov's death, they will be wary of "pressure" on them from outside, and suspicious that strong public optimism from us is intended to constitute pressure. Thus, while we will want to project continuity and openness to new directions if the Soviets are prepared to move forward, we will not want to predict how the new leadership might react to our policy.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOU-009/1 #32

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

BY CU NARA, DATE 6/24/04

2

Drafted:EUR/SOV:BLPascoe
1/10/84 x21452 (0460b)

Cleared:EUR:MPalmer
EUR:RBurt

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
February 10, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JW*
SUBJECT: U.S. Representation at Andropov Funeral

Now that the Soviets have announced that the Andropov funeral will be held Tuesday, February 14, it would seem that the U.S. delegation will have to depart on Sunday, February 12 in order to arrive in Moscow on the 13th.

I understand from State that the President expressed reluctance to attend in a conversation with Secretary Shultz, since he did not want to seem to "pay homage" to a man of Andropov's character. The President's instinct is unquestionably right on the question of seeming to honor Andropov, but there are other factors which he probably should weigh before making a final decision. They are the following:

--Attending for the primary purpose of having a meeting with Chernenko (assuming he gets the nod over the weekend as the new General Secretary) would be consistent with his policy of dialogue;

--It would diminish domestic and Allied criticism that the President has never talked to the Soviet leader and reduce future pressure to go into an unprepared summit--while not pre-empting a real summit if developments should unexpectedly make one desirable;

--It would avoid seeming out of synch with those Western leaders who are going to the funeral (as of now, Kohl and Trudeau for sure, Thatcher probable, and Mitterand still a question mark).

--It would indicate clearly to the Soviet leadership that we are seriously interested in dealing with them.

It seems to me that these considerations somewhat outweigh the negative aspects, such as the implicit honor to Andropov's memory, and the risk of charges that he is playing politics. However, I think it would be well for him to wait until tomorrow morning, when more of the relevant facts will be clear, before making a final decision.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS E00-0091, #33

CW NARA, DATE 6/21/06

~~SECRET~~

2

Recommendation:

That, unless Secretary Shultz is strongly opposed, you discuss the question with the President and suggest that he think over and sleep on the question, with an eye to making a final decision tomorrow morning.

Approve 2-21

Disapprove _____

Handwritten signature/initials

~~SECRET~~

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

'84 FEB 10 10:33

MAIL

INIT

B

S/S #

84 FEB 10 10:39

URGENT

MESSAGE NO. 1803 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASS. No. Pages 2
FROM: A. VERSHBAW BURSON 692-8040 4225
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION White House Statement for Secretary's
Statement on Andropov Death (Drafts)

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Amb. Matlock</u>	<u>395-5112</u>	
	<u>NSC S/S</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☒ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: URGENT -
call for immediate

pick up.
Note: Not Yet Cleared by Bur & Secretary

S/S Officer: Burk Jed

DRAFT

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

The President is expressing his personal condolences to Mr. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on the death of Chairman Andropov. In his statement, the President emphasizes to the people and government of the USSR his desire for cooperation between the two countries in the search for a more peaceful world.

The influence of Chairman Andropov on the Soviet state was considerable. As the leader of the Soviet Union, he carried enormous responsibilities for the fate of the Soviet people and the world at large.

As the President reaffirmed in his address of January 16, the United States has sought and will continue to seek a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more productive and stable relationship. Our objective is not dialogue for its own sake, but a dialogue that produces real solutions to the many concrete problems that divide us.

There are, to be sure, fundamental differences between the American and Soviet systems and our respective political beliefs. But the American and Soviet peoples have a common interest in the avoidance of war and the limitation of the arms race. It is this need to preserve and strengthen the peace that is at the heart of U.S. deterrent policy. The U.S. will defend its interests, but does not seek to threaten the Soviet Union.

Since the beginning of this Administration, the President's policy toward the Soviet Union has sought to achieve progress in three broad areas: developing ways to eliminate the use and the threat of force in international relations; significantly reducing the vast arms stockpiles in the world, particularly nuclear weapons; and establishing a better working relationship with Moscow characterized by greater cooperation and understanding and based on mutual restraint and respect.

At this time of transition in the Soviet Union, our two nations should look to the future in order to find ways to realize these goals. In the nuclear age, there is no alternative to dialogue.

The United States hopes that the new Soviet leadership will work with us in this spirit, and take advantage of every opportunity to find common ground and establish a mutually beneficial relationship.

(0137M)

DRAFT

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ

The President is expressing his personal condolences to Mr. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on the death of Chairman Andropov. I am sending a similar message to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

At this time of transition in Moscow, let me reaffirm that our policy toward the Soviet Union continues to be based on the pursuit of a constructive and realistic dialogue aimed at building a more productive and stable relationship. As the President has stressed, we seek not merely to improve the atmosphere of our relations, but to find solutions to real problems. This applies, first of all, to the task of reaching equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements, and reducing the risk of war.

The President has emphasized to the people and government of the Soviet Union his desire for constructive cooperation between our two countries in the search for a more peaceful world. The United States hopes that the new Soviet leadership will work with us to that end. We hope as well that the new leadership will join us in taking advantage of every opportunity to find common ground and establish a mutually beneficial relationship.

(0138M)

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ANDROPOV FUNERAL DELEGATION

SUGGESTED PRESS STATEMENT

The President has today asked Vice President Bush to be his personal representative to the funeral of Soviet Chairman Yuriy Andropov. [The Vice President will be accompanied by Secretary Shultz and American Ambassador to the Soviet Union Arthur Hartman.] The President has asked the Vice President when in Moscow to extend the condolences and best wishes of the American people to the people of the Soviet Union and to express to them our strong desire for peace.

The President also has requested the Vice President to convey to the new Soviet leadership our hope for an improved dialogue and cooperation which can lead to a more constructive relationship between our two countries. [To this end, the Vice President is carrying a letter from the President emphasizing his personal commitment to the goal of improved relations based on mutual respect and serious dialogue on the issues between us.]

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Drafted: EUR/SOV: B4 Pascoe

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February 10, 1984

ANDROPOV FUNERAL DELEGATION

Q. Why did the President decide not to go to Moscow?

A. As you know, it is not usual American practice for the President to attend funerals of other leaders. In choosing the Vice President and Secretary Shultz to represent him, he ~~picked a~~ ^{wished} ~~team that will~~ convey his desire for more constructive relations with the Soviets accurately and authoritatively. I would also point out that he looks forward to his very important discussions with President Mubarak and King Hussein next week, and felt it would have been a shame to miss that opportunity to explore the possibilities for further progress toward peace in the Middle East.

Q. Does the President's refusal to go to Moscow mean he sees no need to deal personally with the Soviet leadership?

A. Of course not. The President has stated many times that he is ready to meet with Soviet leaders if our dialogue has shown that there is a chance for constructive results. That remains his position.

Q. What signal will the Soviets get from the fact that other foreign leaders like Chancellor Kohl are there but the President is not?

A. I would hope they would understand that we have a steady and consistent approach to the Soviet Union, and that the Vice President and Secretary Shultz enjoy the President's full confidence and will be speaking for him in Moscow.

Q. What message will the Vice President be carrying from the President?

A. It would not be appropriate to talk about the details of the President's private communications with the Soviets here, but you can be sure that it will convey the President's desire to work with the Soviets to reduce tensions, to reduce armaments and to increase mutual understanding in every area where they are willing to meet us halfway.

Q. (If asked in case of no Congressional representation) Why are no Congressional leaders included in the delegation?

A. Soviet practice is to invite only very small delegations for State funerals, and that was the determining factor in this case.

Q - Other members of Delegation?

A - Not decided yet.

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