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**Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files**  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files  
 OA/Box: 20  
 File Folder: Andropov (1)

Archivist: loj/loj  
 FOIA ID: F00-009, Skinner  
 Date: 7/29/04

DOCUMENT NO & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. letter	To Robert McFarlane, re paper, 1p <i>PART 6/21/06 NLSFOD-009/, #23</i>	2/14/84	<del>B1</del> <i>B3</i>
2. paper	Re Andropov, 2p <i>PART " " #24</i>	2/3/84	B1, <i>B3</i>
3. report	Re USSR, 1p <i>R " " #25</i>	2/3/84	B1
4. letter	Reagan to Chernenko (unsigned), 3p <i>R " " #26</i>	ND	B1

### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

NSC/S PROFILE

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*Andropov*

ID 8401322

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 15 FEB 84 16

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MCMAHON, J

DOC DATE 14 FEB 84

KEYWORDS. USSR

SUBJECT. ANDROPOV'S LEADERSHIP STYLE & STRATEGY

ACTION. FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

ROBINSON

FORTIER

*From  
pls file the 1st part  
of this under Andropov  
and the 2nd part  
under Soviet Jews*

COMMENTS

REF# 0136051

LOG

NSCIFID

( CB CB )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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1322

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

14 FEB 1964

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bud:

Thank you for the note on our recent paper entitled Soviet Thinking on the Possibility of Armed Confrontation with the United States. I also appreciated Jack Matlock's commentary that you forwarded and agree with him that an elaboration of Andropov's style and strategy would have helped. I have attached some additional comments on Jack's remarks from one of my senior Soviet analysts.

Sincerely,

*John N. McMahon*  
John N. McMahon

Acting Director of Central Intelligence

Attachments:

- Tab A - Comments
- Tab B - Intelligence Memorandum

83



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NLS F00-009/1 #23

By CH, NARA, Date 6/21/06

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3 February 1984

### Andropov's Leadership Style and Strategy

1. We would agree that the coercive measures employed by Stalin to improve the economy probably have some appeal to Andropov. Undoubtedly aware of the tensions that declining economic growth and inefficiency are generating in Soviet society, he seems to have set a course that combines regime firmness toward the population with greater rewards for hard work. It is an overall carrot and stick approach, albeit with the emphasis on the stick during Andropov's first year in office because of Brezhnev's inability to wrench productivity from the workplace. There is no doubt, moreover, that "conservative" elements in the party approve of Andropov's administrative measures (the discipline and anticorruption campaigns), but many Soviets would argue that these are needed prescriptions. That approval is likely to become more widespread since the measures appear to have contributed to an upturn in industrial productivity in 1983.

2. The stereotypical Russian image of Jews as profiteers may, in the present circumstances, cause anti-semitism to rise as part of the campaign for discipline in the economy. A similar campaign was conducted in the 1950s. There is, in fact, a notable increase in government-approved anti-semitic propaganda, which has taken the form of newspaper articles, broadcasts, and the widely-publicized (by Soviet standards) activities of the "Anti-Zionist Committee of Soviet

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NLS F00-00911 #24

By CH, NARA, Date 6/21/06

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B1, B3

Citizens." Although the Anti-Zionist Committee has not figured prominently in the Soviet media over the past several months, the Committee, staffed by people of Jewish ancestry, will probably serve as a mouthpiece for regime policy toward Soviet Jews in the future. We are also struck by the harshly anti-semitic article in Pravda on 17 January. This is the first time in recent memory that an article like this has appeared in such an authoritative forum. (See Tab B, our publication on the subject written some years ago, for more background.)

3. We agree that Russian nationalism is more pronounced, but this is not new with Andropov. Emerging demographic trends, which threaten to alter the ethnic balance of the population, the party and the military in favor of non-Russians, have engendered the growth of Russian nationalism since the late 1970s. In the face of foreign and domestic problems, Russian nationalism is also likely to increase. It is the traditional refuge of Soviet leaders in difficult circumstances. So far, however, recent Soviet leaders, including Andropov, have not moved away from the calculated blurring of Russian chauvinism and Soviet patriotism, stressing, as Stalin did, the former at the expense of the latter.

4. Clearly Andropov has a stake in the "appearance" of bilateral tension as long as it appears that the United States is the offending party. This would not be the first time that Soviet leaders have used international tensions to mobilize their population. Nevertheless, there is no necessary connection between what is essentially a propaganda strategy (e.g. US military threat, danger of war) and actual Soviet foreign policy behavior. There is no indication, for example, that the propaganda strategy is having an impact on operational foreign policy and, in fact, there are indications that the Soviets want to curb any further escalation in the spiral of tension. Moreover, we have seen other signs that the Soviets are telling their own people that the international environment is not that sour.

1254

file  
a

Dobriansky: )

February 13, 1984

Please Note:

The following message drafted by Paula Dobriansky and John Lenczowski (and cleared with State) was put on a 3x5" card for the President's use and hand-carried to the West Wing. The President left at 4:30 p.m. today to sign the Andropov condolence book at the Soviet Embassy. No memoranda were needed.

NOTED

fl

PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONDOLENCES ON THE  
DEATH OF CHAIRMAN ANDROPOV AND CONVEY MY  
SYMPATHIES TO HIS FAMILY. THE AMERICAN  
PEOPLE WANT TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIET  
PEOPLE TO DEVELOP A BETTER AND MORE  
PEACEFUL WORLD FOR ALL OF US.



S/S 8404443 <sup>1254</sup>  
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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February 13, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Andropov Condolence Book

The Department recommends that the President pay a call on the Soviet Embassy to sign the condolence book for Yuri Andropov. We believe such a gesture is important both because the President signed the Brezhnev condolence book fifteen months ago, and because it would reinforce our efforts to convey the President's readiness to establish a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. Secretary Shultz signed the condolence book on Friday.

The Soviet Embassy is receiving visitors to sign the condolence book today and tomorrow from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.

*Tometsinsky*  
for Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

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DECL: OADR

2/13/84

PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONDOLENCES ON THE  
DEATH OF CHAIRMAN ANDROPOV AND CONVEY MY  
SYMPATHIES TO HIS FAMILY. THE AMERICAN  
PEOPLE WANT TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIET  
PEOPLE TO DEVELOP A BETTER AND MORE  
PEACEFUL WORLD FOR ALL OF US.

THE AMERICAN  
PEOPLE WANT TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIET  
PEOPLE TO DEVELOP A BETTER AND MORE  
PEACEFUL WORLD FOR ALL OF US.

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FILE - ANDROPOV

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

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TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 043218

E.O. 12356 N/A  
TAGS: PGOV, UR, US  
SUBJECT: USG STATEMENTS ON DEATH OF SOVIET LEADER  
ANDROPOV

1. FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF USG STATEMENTS ISSUED  
FEBRUARY 10 ON DEATH OF SOVIET LEADER ANDROPOV:

2. CONDOLENCE MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO SOVIET ACTING  
HEAD OF STATE.

BEGIN TEXT: PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH  
OF CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET  
YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV. I ASK YOU TO CONVEY MY  
SYMPATHIES TO THE ANDROPOV FAMILY.

AT THIS SOLEMN TIME, I WISH TO EMPHASIZE THE DEEP AND  
HEARTFELT DESIRE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR WORLD  
PEACE. WHILE OUR PERSPECTIVES MAY DIFFER, BOTH THE  
SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE A VITAL  
INTEREST IN AVOIDING CONFLICT. WE WANT GENUINE  
COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO MAKE THE WORLD A  
BETTER AND MORE PEACEFUL PLACE FOR ALL MANKIND. AT  
THIS MOMENT IN HISTORY, I INVITE THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND  
THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO JOIN WITH US IN THIS

ENDEAVOR.

SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN. END TEXT.

3. CONDOLENCE MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ TO SOVIET  
FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

BEGIN TEXT: PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH  
OF CHAIRMAN YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV. HIS LOSS  
WILL, I AM SURE, BE FELT GREATLY BY YOU AND ALL OF THE  
SOVIET LEADERSHIP. IN THIS PERIOD OF MOURNING, I WANT  
TO REAFFIRM OUR DESIRE FOR PEACEFUL AND COOPERATIVE  
RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. PLEASE BE ASSURED  
THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO  
BE A MATTER OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITY FOR MY COUNTRY. I  
LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU TOWARD THIS END.

SINCERELY, GEORGE P. SHULTZ. END TEXT.

4. STATEMENT BY THE WHITE HOUSE.

BEGIN TEXT. AS THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED IN HIS JANUARY  
16 ADDRESS, THE UNITED STATES HAS SOUGHT AND WILL  
CONTINUE TO SEEK A CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC DIALOGUE  
WITH THE SOVIET UNION AIMED AT BUILDING A MORE  
PRODUCTIVE AND STABLE RELATIONSHIP. OUR OBJECTIVE IS  
NOT A DIALOGUE FOR ITS OWN SAKE, BUT A DIALOGUE WHICH  
PRODUCES REAL SOLUTIONS TO THE MANY CONCRETE PROBLEMS  
THAT DIVIDE US. THERE ARE TO BE SURE FUNDAMENTAL  
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET SYSTEMS AND  
OUR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL BELIEFS. BUT THE AMERICAN AND  
SOVIET PEOPLE HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN THE AVOIDANCE  
OF WAR AND THE REDUCTION OF ARMS. IT IS THIS NEED TO  
PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN THE PEACE THAT IS AT THE HEART  
OF U.S. POLICY.

THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION SEEKS TO  
ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN THREE BROAD AREAS: DEVELOPING WAYS  
TO ELIMINATE THE USE AND THE THREAT OF FORCE IN  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCING THE  
VAST ARMED STOCKPILES IN THE WORLD, PARTICULARLY  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS; AND FINALLY ESTABLISHING A BETTER  
WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW CHARACTERIZED BY  
GREATER COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING AND BASED ON  
MUTUAL RESTRAINT AND RESPECT. AT THIS TIME OF  
TRANSITION IN THE SOVIET UNION OUR TWO NATIONS SHOULD  
LOOK TO THE FUTURE IN ORDER TO FIND WAYS TO REALIZE  
THESE GOALS. IN THE NUCLEAR AGE THERE IS NO  
ALTERNATIVE TO DIALOGUE.

THE UNITED STATES HOPES THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS WILL  
WORK WITH US IN THIS SPIRIT AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE  
OPPORTUNITIES AT HAND TO FIND COMMON GROUND AND  
ESTABLISH A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP. END TEXT.

5. STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ.

BEGIN TEXT: THE PRESIDENT HAS EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL  
CONDOLENCES TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ON THE DEATH OF  
CHAIRMAN ANDROPOV, AND I HAVE SENT A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO  
FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

AT THIS TIME OF TRANSITION IN MOSCOW, LET ME REAFFIRM  
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET  
UNION. WE REMAIN READY FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE AND  
REALISTIC DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IN THIS  
NUCLEAR AGE, THE UNITED STATES WILL WORK TO BUILD A  
MORE STABLE AND MORE POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP. AS THE  
PRESIDENT HAS STRESSED, WE SEEK TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO  
REAL PROBLEMS, NOT JUST TO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE OF  
OUR RELATIONS. THIS APPLIES, IN PARTICULAR, TO THE  
TASK OF REACHING EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS  
FOR ARMS REDUCTION, AND REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR.

THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR TO THE PEOPLE AND  
GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION HIS DESIRE FOR  
CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. WE  
INVITE THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO WORK WITH US TO THAT  
END. THERE ARE OPPORTUNITIES AT HAND. LET US FIND  
COMMON GROUND AND LET US MAKE THE WORLD A SAFER PLACE.  
END TEXT.

6. STATEMENT BY THE WHITE HOUSE.

BEGIN TEXT. THE PRESIDENT TODAY HAS ASKED VICE  
PRESIDENT BUSH TO BE HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE  
FUNERAL OF SOVIET CHAIRMAN YURIY ANDROPOV. THE  
PRESIDENT HAS ASKED THE VICE PRESIDENT, WHEN IN MOSCOW,

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 3218 DTG: 120119Z FEB 84 PSN: 044398

TO EXTEND CONDOLENCES AND GOOD WISHES OF THE AMERICAN  
PEOPLE TO THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND TO EXPRESS  
TO THEM OUR STRONG DESIRE FOR PEACE.

THE PRESIDENT ALSO HAS REQUESTED THE VICE PRESIDENT TO  
CONVEY TO THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP OUR HOPE FOR AN  
IMPROVED DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION WHICH CAN LEAD TO A  
MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO  
COUNTRIES.

7. POST MAY SHARE ABOVE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS AS  
APPROPRIATE. SHULTZ

BT

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ANDROPOV

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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PAGE 01  
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TO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG NIACT IMMEDIATE 0974

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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WHITEHOUSE PLEASE PASS VICE PRESIDENT'S PLANE FOR SULLIVAN  
AND GREGG  
LUXEMBOURG FOR SULLIVAN AND GREGG WITH VICE PRESIDENT BUSH  
E.O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE) UR  
SUBJECT: DRAFT MOSCOW ARRIVAL STATEMENT

1. DRAFT ARRIVAL STATEMENT FOR MOSCOW FOLLOWS. PLEASE  
ADVISE FINAL APPROVED TEXT SO THAT EMBASSY CAN PREPARE  
COPIES FOR DISTRIBUTION TO PRESS.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

- "I HAVE COME TO MOSCOW ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT REAGAN  
AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES TO EXPRESS OUR CON-  
DOLENCES ON THE DEATH OF YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV.  
OUR SYMPATHIES ARE WITH THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND ESPECIALLY  
WITH THE ANDROPOV FAMILY AT THIS TIME OF SORROW.

- I ALSO WANT TO CONVEY AT THIS TIME THE ABIDING  
INTEREST OF MY GOVERNMENT IN PEACEFUL RELATIONS WITH THE  
SOVIET UNION. WE ARE TWO GREAT NATIONS. A SENSE OF  
REALISM REQUIRES US TO RECOGNIZE THAT WE HAVE DIFFERENCES.  
THAT SAME SENSE OF REALISM COMPELS US TO RESOLVE THOSE  
DIFFERENCES THROUGH NEGOTIATION AND MUTUAL RESTRAINT.

- SOME FORTY YEARS AGO A WAR BROUGHT THE AMERICAN  
AND SOVIET PEOPLES TOGETHER AS ALLIES IN A COMMON STRUGGLE.  
TODAY, LET OUR TWO NATIONS LOOK TO THE FUTURE AND RE-  
SOLVE THAT WE CAN REDUCE OUR MUTUAL SUSPICIONS AND FEARS,  
ESTABLISH A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE, AND FIND SOLUTIONS TO  
THE PROBLEMS WE FACE. THAT IS OUR OBJECTIVE.

- IT IS IN THAT SPIRIT THAT I HAVE COME TODAY." END TEXT.

3. DRAFT CLEARED BY WHITEHOUSE ADVANCE PARTY.  
HARTMAN  
BT

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FLCE ANDROPOV

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E.O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: ODIP, UR, US  
SUBJECT: ANDROPOV FUNERAL DELEGATIONS  
REF: STATE 43215

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS WHAT WE HAVE GLEANED FROM THE DEPARTMENT (REFTEL), FROM U.S. POSTS IN THIRD COUNTRIES, AND FROM OTHER COUNTRIES' EMBASSIES IN MOSCOW AS TO THE COMPOSITION OF THE DELEGATIONS TO ANDROPOV'S FUNERAL. THE INFORMATION IS COMPLETE (EXCEPT AS NOTED) AS OF 3 P.M. MOSCOW TIME FEBRUARY 12.

ANGOLA. PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS (PROBABLE).  
ARGENTINA. VICE PRESIDENT MARTINEZ AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS KELLY.  
AUSTRALIA. TREASURER KEATING.  
AUSTRIA. CHANCELLOR SINOWATZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER LANC.  
BELGIUM. VICE PRIME MINISTER GOL AND FOREIGN MINISTER TINDEMANS.  
BOTSWANA. MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MOGWE (PROBABLE).  
BRAZIL. MINISTER OF SOCIAL WELFARE BELTRAO.  
BULGARIA. CHAIRMAN ZHIVKOV.  
CANADA. PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU, DEPUTY MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL MARCHAND, PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE PM AXWORTHY.  
CAPE VERDE. MINISTER OF INTERIOR COL. DE CARVALHO.  
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. VICE PREMIER WAN LI AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN.  
COSTA RICA. NO SPECIAL DELEGATION.  
CUBA. FIDEL CASTRO.  
CYPRUS. PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU.  
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. PRESIDENT HUSAK.  
DENMARK. PRESIDENT HENRIK AND PRIME MINISTER POUL SCHLUTER.  
EGYPT. MAMDUH SALIM, AIDE TO PRESIDENT MUBAREK.  
ETHIOPIA. CHAIRMAN MENGISTU.

FINLAND. PRESIDENT KOIVISTO AND FOREIGN MINISTER VAYRYNEN.

FRANCE. PRIME MINISTER MAUROY, FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON AND PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTY ETIER.  
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. CHAIRMAN HONECKER.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. CHANCELLOR KOHL AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER.

GREAT BRITAIN. PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE AND PRIVATE SECRETARY FALL.

GREECE. PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU (PROBABLE)

GUYANA. A DELEGATION IS PLANNED BUT MEMBERS HAVE NOT YET BEEN SELECTED.

HUNGARY. FIRST SECRETARY KADAR.

ICELAND. PRIME MINISTER HERMANNSSON AND SECRETARY OF PM'S OFFICE BENEDIKTSSON.

INDIA. PRIME MINISTER GANDHI AND FOREIGN MINISTER RAO.  
BT

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HALEFOGLU (PROBABLE).  
UGANDA. PRIME MINISTER/MINISTER OF DEFENSE/MINISTER  
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS/MINISTER OF INTERIOR (ALL PROBABLE).  
VENEZUELA. AMBASSADOR TO USSR BERMUDEZ TO REPRESENT.  
YUGOSLAVIA. PRESIDENT SPILJAK, PRESIDENCY MEMBER  
MARKOVIC, AND FEDERAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEMBER SRBOVAN.  
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TAGS: ODIP, UR, US  
SUBJECT: ANDROPOV FUNERAL DELEGATIONS  
INDONESIA. FOREIGN MINISTER MOCHTAR.  
IRAQ. FOREIGN MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ (PROBABLE).  
IRELAND. PRESIDENT HILLERY AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS BARRY.  
ITALY. PRESIDENT PERTINI AND FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI.  
JAPAN. FOREIGN MINISTER ABE.  
JORDAN. COURT MINISTER ODEH, FOREIGN MINISTER AL-MASRI,  
AND CHIEF OF STAFF (MIL) ABU TALEB.  
KENYA. FOREIGN MINISTER MWANGALE.  
KUWAIT. MINISTER OF STATE FOR CABINET AFFAIRS ABDUL  
AL-AZIZ HUSAYN.  
LIBYA. MAJOR JALLOUD (PROBABLE).  
LUXEMBOURG. VICE PRESIDENT FLESCH (PROBABLE).  
MALI. MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS BEYE.  
NEPAL. FOREIGN MINISTER KHATRI.  
NETHERLANDS. FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DEN BROEK.  
NICARAGUA. JUNTA COORDINATOR ORTEGA, MINISTER OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS D ESCOTO, FSLN SECRETARY GENERAL NUNEZ.  
NORWAY. CROWN PRINCE HARALD AND PRIME MINISTER WILLOCH.  
PAKISTAN. PRESIDENT ZIA AND FOREIGN MINISTER KHAN.  
PHILIPPINES. FIRST LADY IMELDA MARCOS (PROBABLE).  
POLAND. CHAIRMAN JARUZELSKI.  
PORTUGAL. PRIME MINISTER SOARES.  
ROMANIA. PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU.  
SIERRA LEONE. FOREIGN MINISTER CONTEH AND HIGH  
COMMISSIONER IN LONDON.  
SINGAPORE. NO ONE EXPECTED.  
SPAIN. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER GUERRA AND FOREIGN MINISTER  
MORAN.  
SRI LANKA. MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAMEED.  
SWEDEN. PRIME MINISTER PALME AND THE CROWN PRINCE.  
SYRIA. PRESIDENT ASSAD (PROBABLE).  
TANZANIA. MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO KAWAWA.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - FEBRUARY 3, 1984

1. USSR: RUMORS OF A MARCH PLENUM

If the unconfirmed rumor of a Central Committee meeting in early March turns out to be true, it could be the occasion for Andropov's resignation. In the absence of indications that the Politburo has agreed on a successor, we are inclined to doubt that it has set a date for a plenum. If one has been scheduled, there should soon be information about it as the word spreads in the USSR.

\* \* \*

The next plenum would normally be just prior to the June meeting of the Supreme Soviet. A plenum in March would be for especially important business which could not wait.

--There appears to be no programmatic need for an early plenum. No theme such as agriculture or industrial management has been developed in party literature.

--A plenum to reorganize the government seems unlikely. If Premier Tikhonov--an old Brezhnev crony--is to step down, that would more logically be done in June when the Supreme Soviet would formally install a successor.

This leaves Andropov's health as a possible reason. A decision in late January to schedule a March plenum would imply that the Politburo concluded that Andropov could not recover and had to be replaced, but that his condition was not so dire that he would die sooner. We still do not know what Andropov's problem is, but a slow, degenerative disease could plausibly have led to such a judgment.

A decision to schedule a plenum because of Andropov's health would also imply that the Politburo has agreed on a successor (and has elected to move in a deliberate fashion to effect the transition). One version of the rumor names Gorbachev as the new general secretary. On balance, we doubt that such a decision has been reached:

--There has not been evidence of the kind of political jockeying one might have expected if such a decision were pending; and

--None of the status indicators--the number of nominations for the elections to the Supreme Soviet, for example--point to any member of the Politburo having new prominence as general secretary-elect.

Admittedly, our information on the state of Politburo consideration of a question like naming a successor is circumstantial and limited. If a plenum has in fact been scheduled, word of it will of necessity spread widely in the USSR and we can expect to hear more about it over the next few weeks.

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CAN NARA DATE 6/21/06

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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URGENT *BAK*

WASHFAX RECEIPT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**B**

S/S #

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFICATION

*Andropov*  
*Check with K. Kimmitt*  
84 FEB 11 AM 11:38

URGENT

MESSAGE NO. 1652 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 1

FROM: JCovey S/S 28448 7224  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION TELEGRAM TO MOSCOW: US Delegation to Andropov  
Funeral

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	1 - <del>Bob Kimmitt</del> <i>Martin</i>	456-2224	
	<del>NSC</del>		
	3 - <i>SDO</i>		
	<i>Matlock</i>		
	<i>Martin</i>		
	<i>Kimmitt</i>		

FOR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS: FOR URGENT CLEARANCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

S/S Officer: *JCovey*

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S



(State/BE)  
February 11, 1984  
10:00 a.m.

PRESIDENTIAL RADIO TALK: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AFTER ANDROPOV  
SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1984

I would like to speak to you about a subject always on the minds of Americans, but of particular interest today, in view of the death of Soviet leader Yuri Andropov -- our relations with the Soviet Union.

Changes of leadership have not happened often in the Soviet Union. Yuri Andropov was only the fifth Communist Party leader in the 66 years since the Russian Revolution. In recent months, he had been totally absent from public view, so his death did not come as a shock to the world. Nevertheless, the importance of the U.S.-Soviet relationship makes his passing away a time for reflection on where that relationship is heading.

The changes in Moscow are an opportunity for both nations to examine closely the current state of our relations, and to think about the future. We know that our relationship is not what we would like it to be. We have made no secret of our views as to the reasons why. What is needed now is for both sides to sit down and find ways of solving some of the problems that divide us.

In expressing my condolences to Mr. Andropov's family and to the Soviet government, I emphasized once again America's desire for genuine cooperation between our two countries. Together, we can help make the world a better, more peaceful place. This was also the message for the Soviet people in my address on Soviet-American relations last month.

In that speech, as in my private communications with the late Chairman Andropov, I stressed our commitment to a serious and intensive dialogue with the Soviet Union, one aimed at building a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship. This commitment remains firm, and Vice President Bush will lead our delegation to Moscow for Mr. Andropov's funeral. I hope there will be an opportunity for the Vice President to meet with the new General Secretary.

As we engage in discussions with Soviet leaders, we recognize the fundamental differences in our values and in our perspectives on many international issues. We must be realistic and not expect that these differences can be wished away.

But realism should also remind us that our two peoples share common bonds and interests. We are both relatively young nations with rich ethnic traditions and a pioneer philosophy. We have both experienced the terrible trauma of war; we have fought side-by-side in the victory over Nazi Germany. And while our governments have very different views, our sons and daughters have never fought each other. We must make sure they never do.

Avoiding war and reducing arms is the starting point in our relationship with the Soviet Union. But we seek to accomplish more. With a good faith effort on both sides, I believe the United States and the Soviet Union could begin rising above the mistrust and ill will that cloud our relations. We could establish a basis for greater mutual understanding and constructive cooperation. And there is no better time to make that good faith effort than now.

At this time of transition in the Soviet Union, our two nations should look to the future. We should find ways to work together to meet the challenge of preserving peace. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we talk to each other, discuss our differences and seek solutions to the many problems that divide us.

America is ready. We would welcome negotiations, and I repeat today what I have said before: We are prepared to meet the Soviets half-way in the search for mutually acceptable agreements.

I hope the leaders of the Soviet Union will work with us in the same spirit. I invite them to take advantage of the opportunities at hand to establish a more stable and constructive relationship. If the Soviet government wants peace, then there will be peace.

In recent days, millions of citizens inside the Soviet Union, the United States and countries throughout the world have been brought together by one great event -- the Winter Olympics. The competition is fierce and we cheer for the men and women on our respective teams. But we can and should celebrate the triumphs of all athletes who compete in the true spirit of sportsmanship and give the very best of themselves. And when each race or event is done, and our teams come together in friendship, we will remember that we are meant to be one family of nations.

We who are leaders in government have an obligation to strive for cooperation every bit as hard as our athletes who

reach within for the greatest efforts of their lives. If the Soviet government would join us in this spirit, then together, we could build a safer and far better world for the human family -- not just for today, but for generations to come.

Until next week, thanks for listening and God bless you.

This is the most comprehensive anticrime legislation in more than a decade. In the interest of true justice, it deserves full debate and a vote. Perhaps during this next week -- National Crime Prevention Week -- you might inquire from your Representative if he or she is ready to act -- and if not, why not.

Before I close, I want to ~~extend my condolences on the death of Premier Andropov and express my sympathies to the Andropov family and the Soviet people.~~ <sup>say that send a message to the Soviet people</sup> May I also repeat the heartfelt desire of the American people for world peace.

We want to work with the Soviet Union to build a safer and more peaceful world. I invite the Soviet people and the new Soviet leadership to join us in a spirit of constructive cooperation. Together, we can achieve much good.

Until next week, thanks for listening and God bless you.

CONCLUSION TO PRESIDENT'S  
SATURDAY RADIO ADDRESS

Before I conclude, I would like to make a few brief comments on the recent events in Moscow.

The death of Chairman Andropov, little more than a year after the passing of his predecessor Leonid Brezhnev, has focused the world's attention on the Soviet Union and America's relations with that great nation. In conveying my condolences to the Soviet government, I emphasized once again my desire for genuine cooperation between our two countries in order to make the world a better and more peaceful place for all mankind.

Last month, I gave a speech setting forth our policy toward the Soviet Union, and my hope for a more constructive working relationship with the Soviet government. We have, to be sure, important differences in our basic values and in our perspectives on many international issues. But our peoples have a common interest in avoiding war and reducing arms.

At this time of transition in the Soviet Union, our two nations should look to the future in order to find ways to realize these goals. In this nuclear age, there is no alternative to dialogue. The United States is firmly committed to a meaningful dialogue, one aimed at solving real problems. I hope the leaders of the Soviet Union will work with us in the same spirit, and take advantage of the opportunities at hand to establish a more stable and constructive relationship.

PRESIDENTIAL RADIO ADDRESS  
ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS AFTER ANDROPOV

I would like to speak to you today about a subject that is always on the minds of Americans, but is of particular interest today. That subject is our policy toward the Soviet Union in light of the recent events in Moscow.

Changes of leadership have ~~historically been infrequent~~ <sup>not happened often</sup> in the Soviet Union. Yuri Andropov was only the fifth Communist Party leader in the ~~66~~ years since the Russian Revolution. Despite his long absence from public view, his death -- like that of any world leader -- came as something of a surprise for us all. And because of the importance of the US-Soviet relationship, his death ~~brought with it increased uncertainties~~ <sup>inevitably makes us think</sup> about where that relationship is heading. X

The changes in Moscow are ~~also~~ an opportunity for both nations not just to look closely at the current state of our relations, but to think about the future. We know that our relationship is not what ~~it should be~~ <sup>we would like it to be</sup>. We have made no secret of our views as to the reasons why. What is needed now is for both sides ~~to move beyond recriminations and~~ to sit down and find ways of solving some of the problems that divide us.

In expressing my condolences to the Soviet government, I emphasized once again my desire for genuine cooperation between our two countries in order to make the world a better and more

peaceful place for all mankind. This was also the message for the Soviet people contained in my address on Soviet-American relations last month.

In that speech, as in my private communications with the late Chairman Andropov, I stressed my commitment to a serious and intensive dialogue with the Soviet Union, a dialogue aimed at building a more constructive working relationship between our two countries. Let me say today that this commitment remains firm. And as a demonstration of that commitment, The Vice President will lead our delegation to Moscow for Mr. Andropov's funeral. I hope there will be an opportunity <sup>for him</sup> to meet with the new General Secretary.

As we engage in discussions with Soviet leaders, we recognize the important differences in our basic values and in our perspectives on many international issues. We have no illusion that these differences will quickly disappear.

But we also believe it is important to remember that the American and Soviet peoples share a number of common bonds. We are both relatively young nations, with diverse ethnic traditions and a pioneer philosophy. Our peoples have together experienced the horrors of war, and fought shoulder-to-shoulder in the victory over Nazi Germany. Although we continue to

*different  
map*  
clash on the battlefield of ideas, our two peoples have never been at war with one another. ~~If we are wise,~~ There is no reason we ever should.

It is our common interest in avoiding war and reducing arms that serves as the starting point in our relationship with the Soviet Union. But we seek more than just this. We also hope to begin to overcome the mistrust and ill will that color our relations, and to establish a basis for greater mutual understanding and constructive cooperation.

At this time of transition in the Soviet Union, our two nations should look to the future in order to find ways to realize these goals. In this nuclear age, there is no alternative to dialogue. As I have stressed before, the United States will never retreat from the bargaining table, and is prepared to meet the Soviets half-way in the search for mutually acceptable agreements.

I hope the leaders of the Soviet Union will work with us in the same spirit, and take advantage of the opportunities at hand to establish a more stable and constructive relationship. If our two nations ~~are~~<sup>are</sup> up to the challenge, we should be able to build a safer world for all nations, and for generations to come.

Sent . . . 5

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Please accept my condolences on the death of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov.

Chairman Andropov had written to me on January 28, 1984, about the Soviet Government's concern for world peace and your willingness to pursue a dialogue aimed at solving some of the very real problems in our relations. I believe that this dialogue is so important that we should proceed with it as soon as your government is ready to do so. Therefore, I have requested Vice President Bush to deliver this letter to you.

As I made clear in my January 16 address, I have no higher goal than the establishment of a relationship between our two great nations characterized by constructive cooperation. Differences in our political beliefs and in our perspectives on international problems should not be an obstacle to efforts aimed at strengthening peace and building a productive working relationship. Indeed, in the nuclear age, they make such efforts indispensable.

In the months ahead, we will be ready to discuss with you the entire agenda of issues in which our two nations have an interest. We have specific ideas for moving the relationship forward. We will be interested in whatever ideas and proposals you may have to put forth.

One area where practical steps are possible is the reduction of strategic arms. When you are ready, we have ideas on concrete ways to narrow the differences between our respective positions. The common framework we are prepared to discuss would

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incorporate elements of the current proposals of both sides and permit forces that are not identical, while providing for a more stable strategic balance at lower levels.

We are prepared to talk about such a framework in diplomatic channels. But we also believe that we need to return to the negotiating table. This applies to intermediate range as well as strategic nuclear forces. Here too, the world expects us to resume our discussions and find solutions.

Another area where practical steps are possible is the Vienna negotiations on conventional force reductions. During the next round of negotiations in Vienna, the Western side will be prepared to introduce some new ideas. If the Soviet Union demonstrates significant flexibility in meeting our serious concerns about assuring effective verification, you will find us flexible regarding data.

A practical and business-like approach could also be helpful in reducing the dangers of wider confrontation in the many regional problems in which our two nations' interests are involved. We have had exchanges of views on southern Africa and on Afghanistan over the past several years, and more recently, Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Hartman have discussed Middle East issues at some length with Foreign Minister Gromyko. I see merit to further exchanges of views on developments in these areas.

We recently have had useful exchanges on a number of questions of bilateral interest. For my part, I am prepared to move ahead in the areas we already have under discussion and to open up new avenues of cooperation as well, assuming there is interest on your side.

Let me conclude by seeking to lay to rest some misunderstandings which may have arisen. The United States fully intends to defend our interests and those of our allies, but we do not seek to challenge the security of the Soviet Union

and its people. We are prepared to deal with you in a manner that could establish the basis for mutually acceptable and mutually advantageous solutions to some of our problems.

Sincerely,

Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko  
Secretary of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party  
of the Soviet Union  
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

The President has sent a message expressing his condolences to Mr. Kuznetsov, the Acting Soviet Chief of State, on the death of Chairman Andropov. In his message, the President emphasized to the people and government of the USSR his desire for cooperation between the two countries in the search for a more peaceful world.

As the President reaffirmed in his address of January 16, the United States has sought and will continue to seek a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more productive and stable relationship. Our objective is not dialogue for its own sake, but a dialogue that produces real solutions to the many concrete problems that divide us.

There are, to be sure, fundamental differences between the American and Soviet systems and our respective political beliefs. But the American and Soviet peoples have a common interest in the avoidance of war and the reduction of arms. It is this need to preserve and strengthen the peace that is at the heart of U.S. policy.

The President's policy toward the Soviet Union seeks to achieve progress in three broad areas: developing ways to eliminate the use and the threat of force in international relations; significantly reducing the vast arms stockpiles in the world, particularly nuclear weapons; and establishing a better working relationship with Moscow characterized by greater cooperation and understanding and based on mutual restraint and respect.

At this time of transition in the Soviet Union, our two nations should look to the future in order to find ways to realize these goals. In the nuclear age, there is no alternative to dialogue.

The United States hopes that the Soviet leader will work with us in this spirit, and take advantage of the opportunities at hand to find common ground and establish a mutually beneficial relationship.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ

The President is expressing his personal condolences to Mr. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on the death of Chairman Andropov. I am sending a similar message to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

At this time of transition in Moscow, let me reaffirm that our policy toward the Soviet Union continues to be based on the pursuit of a constructive and realistic dialogue aimed at building a more productive and stable relationship. As the President has stressed, we seek not merely to improve the atmosphere of our relations, but to find solutions to real problems. This applies, in particular, to the task of reaching equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements, and reducing the risk of war.

The President has emphasized to the people and government of the Soviet Union his desire for constructive cooperation between our two countries in the search for a more peaceful world. The United States hopes that the Soviet leaders will work with us to that end. We hope as well that the Soviet leadership will join us in taking advantage of the opportunities at hand to find common ground and establish a mutually beneficial relationship.

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## WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

The President has sent a message expressing his personal condolences to Mr. Kuznetsov, the Acting Soviet Chief of State, on the death of Chairman Andropov. In his statement, the President emphasized to the people and government of the USSR his desire for cooperation between the two countries in the search for a more peaceful world.

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There are, to be sure, fundamental differences between the American and Soviet systems and our respective political beliefs. But the American and Soviet peoples have a common interest in the avoidance of war and the reduction of arms. It is this need to preserve and strengthen the peace that is at the heart of U.S. policy. ~~The United States will defend its interests, but does not seek to threaten the Soviet Union.~~

The President's policy toward the Soviet Union seeks to achieve progress in three broad areas: developing ways to eliminate the use and the threat of force in international relations; significantly reducing the vast arms stockpiles in the world, particularly nuclear weapons; and establishing a better working relationship with Moscow characterized by greater cooperation and understanding and based on mutual restraint and respect.

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