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9168

FILE 1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 27, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *Carol Cleveland for*

SUBJECT: Letters of Support for the President in Geneva

The NSC has reviewed your draft response to letters of support for the President's meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva. We have suggested some changes to reflect the fact that the meeting is now behind us. We also suggest enclosing with the responses a copy of the President's November 21 address to Congress.

Attachments:

- Tab A Draft response to letters of support
- Tab B Suggested new draft
- Tab C The President's address to Congress
- Tab D Memo from Anne Higgins to Carol Cleveland
- Tab E Memo from David Chew to Anne Higgins
- Tab F Memo from Anne Higgins to David Chew

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



November 7, 1985

ANNE HIGGINS:

NSC should clear the text of any such letter. But given the nearness of the Geneva meeting, you might want to wait until it is over and do one response for all such letters.

Let me know what you decide.


David Chew



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



Date: 11-7-85
To: David Chew

We haven't gone
with this yet -
maybe we should
wait till the
next speech
+ include that -
- we can hold
letters -

Anne

ANNE HIGGINS
Special Assistant to the
President and Director
of Correspondence
Room 94, x7610



9168 4

ASH/COM/

[Faint handwritten notes]

AVH192D.851106

recently concluded

Thank you for your message to President Reagan and for offering him your thoughts and suggestions in connection with the upcoming Geneva Summit. Your expression of goodwill ~~as these talks approach is~~ much appreciated, and the President welcomed your good wishes for the Summit's success.

In his address to a commemorative session of the United Nations celebrating the 40th anniversary of its founding, the President described the hope of the United States for a fresh start in our relations with the Soviet Union. He discussed our desire to make progress on arms control, as well as on issues of human rights and regional conflict. The goal of U.S. efforts remains to free the entire world from the nuclear threat. In light of your interest, I am sending you a transcript of the President's address.

With the President's best wishes,

END. 10/24/85 ABTP

Suggested New Draft

Thank you for your message to President Reagan and for offering him your thoughts and suggestions in connection with the recently concluded Geneva summit. Your expression of good will was much appreciated and the President much appreciated your good wishes for the summit's success.

In his November 21 address to a joint session of Congress the President said that he went to Geneva for a fresh start in relations with the Soviet Union. He discussed our desire to make progress on arms control, as well as on issues of human rights and regional conflict. The goal of U.S. efforts remains to free the entire world from the nuclear threat. In light of your interest, I am sending you a transcript of the President's address.

With the President's best wishes.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

November 21, 1985

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
TO A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS

U.S. Capitol
Washington, D.C.

9:20 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, members of the Congress, distinguished guests, my fellow Americans:

It's great to be home, and Nancy and I thank you for this wonderful homecoming. And before I go on, I want to say a personal thank you to Nancy. She was an outstanding ambassador of good will for all of us. (Applause.) She didn't know I was going to say that.

Mr. Speaker, Senator Dole, I want you to know that your statements of support here were greatly appreciated. You can't imagine how much it means in dealing with the Soviets to have the Congress, the allies, and the American people firmly behind you. (Applause.)

I guess you know that I have just come from Geneva and talks with General Secretary Gorbachev. In the past few days, we spent over 15 hours in various meetings with the General Secretary and the members of his official party. And approximately 5 of those hours were talks between Mr. Gorbachev and myself, just one on one. That was the best part -- our fireside summit.

There will be, I know, a great deal of commentary and opinion as to what the meetings produced and what they were like. There were over 3,000 reporters in Geneva, so it's possible there will be 3,000 opinions on what happened, so -- (applause) -- maybe it's the old broadcaster in me but I decided to file my own report directly to you. (Applause.)

We met, as we had to meet. I called for a fresh start -- and we made that start. I can't claim we had a meeting of the minds on such fundamentals as ideology or national purpose -- but we understand each other better, and that's key to peace. I gained a better perspective; I feel he did, too.

It was a constructive meeting. So constructive, in fact, that I look forward to welcoming Mr. Gorbachev to the United States next year. (Applause.) And I have accepted his invitation to go to Moscow the following year. (Applause.) We arranged that out in the parking lot. (Applause.)

I found Mr. Gorbachev to be an energetic defender of Soviet policy. He was an eloquent speaker, and a good listener. Our subject matter was shaped by the facts of this century.

These past 40 years have not been an easy time for the West or for the world. You know the facts; there is no need to recite the historical record. Suffice it to say that the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R. We cannot assume that their ideology and purpose will change. This implies enduring competition. Our task is to assure that this competition remains peaceful. With all that divides us, we cannot afford to let confusion complicate things further. We must be clear with each other, and direct. We must pay each other the tribute of candor.

MORE

When I took the oath of office for the first time, we began dealing with the Soviet Union in a way that was more realistic than in, say, the recent past. And so, in a very real sense, preparations for the summit started not months ago but 5 years ago when, with the help of Congress, we began strengthening our economy, restoring our national will, and rebuilding our defenses and alliances. America is once again strong -- and our strength has given us the ability to speak with confidence and see that no true opportunity to advance freedom and peace is lost. (Applause.) We must not now abandon policies that work. I need your continued support to keep America strong.

That is the history behind the Geneva summit, and that is the context in which it occurred. And may I add that we were especially eager that our meetings give a push to important talks already under way on reducing nuclear weapons. On this subject it would be foolish not to go the extra mile -- or in this case the extra 4,000 miles.

We discussed the great issues of our time. I made clear before the first meeting that no question would be swept aside, no issue buried, just because either side found it uncomfortable or inconvenient.

I brought these questions to the summit and put them before Mr. Gorbachev.

We discussed nuclear arms and how to reduce them. I explained our proposals for equitable, verifiable, and deep reductions. I outlined my conviction that our proposals would make not just for a world that feels safer but one that is really is safer.

I am pleased to report tonight that General Secretary Gorbachev and I did make a measure of progress here. (Applause.) While we still have a long way to go, we're still heading in the right direction. We moved arms control forward from where we were last January, when the Soviets returned to the table. We are both instructing our negotiators to hasten their vital work. The world is waiting for results.

Specifically, we agreed in Geneva that each side should move to cut offensive nuclear arms by 50 percent in appropriate categories. In our joint statement we called for early progress on this, turning the talks toward our chief goal, offensive reductions. We called for an interim accord on intermediate-range nuclear forces, leading, I hope, to the complete elimination of this class of missiles. And all this with tough verification. (Applause.)

We also made progress in combatting together the spread of nuclear weapons, an arms control area in which we've cooperated effectively over the years. We are also opening a dialogue on combatting the spread and use of chemical weapons, while moving to ban them altogether. (Applause.) Other arms control dialogues -- in Vienna on conventional forces, and in Stockholm on lessening the chances for surprise attack in Europe -- also received a boost. And finally, we agreed to begin work on risk reduction centers, a decision that should give special satisfaction to Senators Nunn and Warner who so ably promoted this idea. (Applause.)

I described our Strategic Defense Initiative -- our research effort that envisions the possibility of defensive systems which could ultimately protect all national against the danger of nuclear war. This discussion produced a very direct exchange of views.

Mr. Gorbachev insisted that we might use a strategic defense system to put offensive weapons into space and establish nuclear superiority.

I made it clear that SDI has nothing to do with offensive weapons; that, instead, we are investigating non-nuclear defense systems that would only threaten offensive missiles, not people. If -- (applause) -- our research succeeds, it will bring much closer the safer, more stable world that we seek. Nations could defend themselves against missile attack, and mankind, at long last, escape the prison of mutual terror. And this is my dream.

So I welcomed the chance to tell Mr. Gorbachev that we are a nation that defends, rather than attacks, that our alliances are defensive, not offensive. We don't seek nuclear superiority. We do not seek a first strike advantage over the Soviet Union. Indeed, one of my fundamental arms control objectives is to get rid of first strike weapons altogether. And this is why -- (applause) -- this is why we've proposed a 50-percent reduction in the most threatening nuclear weapons, especially those that could carry out a first strike.

I went further in expressing our peaceful intentions. I described our proposal in the Geneva negotiations for a reciprocal program of open laboratories in strategic defense research. We're offering to permit Soviet experts to see first-hand that SDI does not involve offensive weapons. American scientists would be allowed to visit comparable facilities of the Soviet strategic defense program, which, in fact, has involved much more than research for many years.

Finally, I reassured Mr. Gorbachev on another point. I promised that if our research reveals that a defense against nuclear missiles is possible, we would sit down with our allies and the Soviet Union to see how together we could replace all strategic ballistic missiles with such a defense, which threatens no one.

We discussed threats to the peace in several regions of the world. I explained my proposals for a peace process to stop the wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, and Cambodia -- (applause) -- those places where insurgencies that speak for the people are pitted against regimes which obviously do not represent the will or the approval of the people. I tried to be very clear about where our sympathies lie; I believe I succeeded. (Applause.)

We discussed human rights. We Americans believe that history teaches no clearer lesson than this: Those countries which respect the rights of their own people tend, inevitably, to respect the rights of their neighbors. (Applause.) Human rights, therefore, is not an abstract moral issue -- it is a peace issue.

Finally, we discussed the barriers to communication between our societies, and I elaborated on my proposals for real people-to-people contacts on a wide scale.

Americans should know the people of the Soviet Union -- their hopes and fears and the facts of their lives. And citizens of the Soviet Union need to know of America's deep desire for peace and our unwavering attachment to freedom.

As you can see, our talks were wide ranging. And let me at this point tell you what we agreed upon and what we didn't.

We remain far apart on a number of issues, as had to be expected. However, we reached agreement on a number of matters, and, as I mentioned, we agreed to continue meeting and this is important and very good. (Applause.) There's always room for movement, action, and progress when people are talking to each other instead of about each other.

We've concluded a new agreement designed to bring the best of America's artists and academics to the Soviet Union. The exhibits that will be included in this exchange are one of the most effective ways for the average Soviet citizen to learn about our way of life. This agreement will also expand the opportunities for Americans to experience the Soviet people's rich cultural heritage -- because their artists and academics will be coming here.

We've also decided to go forward with a number of people-to-people initiatives that will go beyond greater contact not only between the political leaders of our two countries, but our respective students, teachers and others as well. We have emphasized youth exchanges. And this will help break down stereotypes, build friendships and, frankly, provide an alternative to propaganda.

We've agreed to establish a new Soviet Consulate in New York and a new American Consulate in Kiev. And this will bring a permanent U.S. presence to the Ukraine for the first time in decades. (Applause.)

And we have also, together with the government of Japan, concluded a Pacific Air Safety Agreement with the Soviet Union. This is designed to set up cooperative measures to improve civil air safety in that region of the Pacific. What happened before must never be allowed to happen there again. (Applause.)

And as a potential way of dealing with the energy needs of the world of the future, we have also advocated international cooperation to explore the feasibility of developing fusion energy.

All of these steps are part of a long-term effort to build a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union. No one ever said it could be easy. But we've come a long way.

As for Soviet expansionism in a number of regions of the world -- while there is little chance of immediate change, we will continue to support the heroic efforts of those who fight for freedom. But we have also agreed to continue -- and to intensify -- our meetings with the Soviets on this and other regional conflicts and to work toward political solutions.

We know the limits as well as the promise of summit meetings. This is, after all, the eleventh summit of the post-war era -- and still the differences endure. But we believe continued meetings between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union can help bridge those differences.

The fact is, every new day begins with possibilities; it's up to us to fill it with the things that move us toward progress and peace. Hope, therefore, is a realistic attitude -- and despair an uninteresting little vice.

And so: was our journey worthwhile?

Well, thirty years ago, when Ike -- President Eisenhower -- had just returned from a summit in Geneva, he said, "...the wide gulf that separates so far East and West is wide and deep." Well, today, three decades later, that is still true.

But, yes, this meeting was worthwhile for both sides. (Applause.) A new realism spawned the summit, the summit itself was a good start; and now our byword must be: Steady as we go.

I am, as you are, impatient for results. But goodwill and good hopes do not always yield lasting results. And quick fixes don't fix big problems.

Just as we must avoid illusions on our side, so we must dispel them on the Soviet side. I have made it clear to Mr. Gorbachev that we must reduce the mistrust and suspicions between us if we are to do such things as reduce arms, and this will take deeds, not words alone. And I believe he is in agreement.

Where do we go from here? Well, our desire for improved relations is strong. We're ready and eager for step-by-step progress. We know that peace is not just the absence of war. We don't want a phony peace or a frail peace; we didn't go in pursuit of some kind of illusory detente. We can't be satisfied with cosmetic improvements that won't stand the test of time. We want real peace.

As I flew back this evening, I had many thoughts. In just a few days families across America will gather to celebrate Thanksgiving. And again, as our forefathers who voyaged to America, we travelled to Geneva with peace as our goal and freedom as our guide. For there can be no greater good than the quest for peace and no finer purpose than the preservation of freedom. (Applause.)

It is 350 years since the first Thanksgiving, when Pilgrims and Indians huddled together on the edge of an unknown continent. And now here we are gathered together on the edge of an unknown future -- but, like our forefathers, really not so much afraid, but full of hope, and trusting in God, as ever.

Thank you for allowing me to talk to you this evening and God bless you all. (Applause.)

END

9:40 P.M. EST

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 26, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Letters of Support for President in Geneva

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Anne Higgins advising her that the NSC has reviewed her draft response to letters of support for the President's meeting with Gorbachev. We have suggested some adjustments to reflect the fact that the meeting has already taken place. We think it would be appropriate to enclose along with the responses a copy of the President's November 21 address to Congress.

Steve ~~Sestanovich~~ ^{TW} Sestanovich, Judy ^{n.a.} Mandel, Sven Kraemer, Steve Steiner, and Walt Ray ^{SS clear new draft} ~~Ray~~ concur.

RECOMMENDATION

Thay you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to Anne Higgins
Tab A	Draft response to letters of support
Tab B	Suggested new draft
Tab C	The President's address to Congress
Tab D	Memo from Anne Higgins to Carol Cleveland
Tab E	Memo from David Chew to Anne Higgins
Tab F	Memo from Anne Higgins to David Chew

~~Mastlock~~

9361

~~FILE~~
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 27, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *Concluded*

SUBJECT: Response to Organization for Rebirth of Ukraine

Attached at Tab A is a State Department draft response to Pawlo Dorozhynsky of the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine. We have reviewed the draft and suggested some minor changes to reflect that the Geneva meeting has already taken place. We recommend that a copy of the President's November 21 address to Congress be included among the suggested enclosures.

Attachments:

- Tab A State Department draft response
- Tab B State's suggested enclosures
- Tab C letter from Pawlo Dorozhynsky to Patrick Buchanan
- Tab D letter from Pawlo Dorozhynsky to the President
- Tab E tasking to State

9361
13

UNCLASSIFIED

(CLASSIFICATION)

S/S # 8532253

DATE November 15, 1985

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

FOR: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

TO: Mr. Patrick Buchanan FROM: Mr. P. Dorozhynsky
DATE: 10/4/85 SUBJECT: Reagan-Gorbachev
Meeting

WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: 10/31/85 NSC # 3 858145

THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

- A draft reply is attached
- A draft reply will be forwarded
- A translation is attached
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below
- Other

REMARKS:


Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

(CLASSIFICATION)

SUGGESTED RESPONSE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

14

Dear Mr. Dorozhynsky:

I am replying to your October 4 letter to President Reagan regarding preparations for the November 19-20 meeting between President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva.

The President's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev ^{should be viewed as} [is] part of our continuing effort[s] to construct a more stable and productive relationship with the Soviet Union. The Geneva meeting could ^{lead to new opportunities} [mark a moment of opportunity] in our relations. At the same time, we have no illusions about the difficulties of this task or the continuing differences between our two countries. Above all, we recognize that the ^{ultimate} success of the meeting in Geneva depends on Soviet willingness to work responsibly with us. If they are ready to meet us halfway, progress should be possible in all areas of our bilateral relationship.

Our policy toward the Soviet Union is based on the three principles of realism, strength, and dialogue. Over the past five years, we have applied these principles in an effort to

Mr. Pawlo Dorozhynsky, Chairman,
Central Executive Committee,
Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine, Inc.,
P.O. Box 4 Cooper Station,
New York, New York 10276.

build a more constructive relationship sustainable over the long term. Fundamental U.S. interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union are addressed in our four-part agenda: arms control, regional issues, economic and other bilateral issues, and human rights.

The U.S. Government has consistently condemned Soviet unwillingness to respect basic human rights. These measures are contrary to the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. We have strongly called for the Soviets to comply with their commitments in that agreement. We have made it unequivocally clear in virtually every high-level meeting with Soviet officials that their human rights violations are a serious obstacle to improved U.S.-Soviet relations. We will continue to insist the Soviets live up to their international commitments, including the Helsinki accords.

President Reagan [has announced his intention to] discussed the full range of issues affecting U.S.-Soviet relations, including human rights, during his November meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. As we prepare for that meeting, we welcome your views.

I am sending the enclosed material in the belief that you will find it of interest.

Sincerely,

Enclosures.

Current
Policy
No. 750

Arms Control, Strategic Stability, and Global Security



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Secretary Shultz before the North Atlantic Assembly, San Francisco, California, October 14, 1985.

My talk this morning is about our relations with the Soviet Union, a central issue for the Western democracies. But before I start on that, I want to say something about terrorism, because terrorism is the war we're fighting right now.

Terrorists and the regimes that support them aim to shatter our ideals and our principles, undermine our democratic life, and pull down civilization itself. We've learned some lessons in the few days just past. The event isn't over, but still while it's fresh in our minds, let me tell you three points that stand out in my own mind.

- First, it tells us something about terrorists—that they're animals, cowardly animals. These are not guerrillas. These are not fighters for some liberation movement. They select the helpless to torture and murder. They lack the guts to do battle, just as they lack the guts to seek justice and peace by negotiation. That's the first lesson. [Applause]

- It tells us that we must take action. If free peoples do not move against the terrorists, no one will stop them. We must have the courage to act without violence, if possible, but recognizing that violence sometimes cannot be avoided. If our dedication to that principle paralyzes us, all our principles will be in jeopardy. That's a little more sobering lesson, so I notice you didn't

clap. But it's an important lesson. We have to be ready to act.

- And, third, it tells us that the democracies must stand together in our own cause. Our nations are the founders and the defenders of the rule of law. The terrorists know and seek to turn that against us. They insist that we be rigorous in granting due process to the enemies of the rule of law, and, as they do, they seek to instill fear—the fear that anyone who captures and brings to justice a terrorist becomes a target of terrorism.

We must stand for the rule of law, but we must not let fear turn it into a key to the jailhouse door. If we of the democracies stand together against this scourge, we will defeat it, and our ideals and values will thrive and be safe. I think we are now starting to do that.

Arms Control

I have a lengthy statement here that deals principally with the arms control matters being discussed in Geneva right now. I know it is too long, but it is an effort to pull together in one place where we are and they are, so we can see just what the issues are. So I ask you to bear with me and take it as a compliment, as you run out of patience, that we have thought, the President has thought, that this audience was the appropriate one to lay out in a rather painstaking way just what this is all about as we see it.

For 40 years, the Western democracies have wrestled with the problem of relations with the Soviet Union. As

legislators, you know firsthand that democracies love peace and really do not like spending money on defense. But you also know how precious freedom and democracy are and, therefore, how important it is that we defend the values that we hold dear. We democracies know that freedom has enemies in this world. But we also know that the purpose of our defensive strength is peace. Therefore, we all conduct foreign policies whose aim is a more positive and constructive relationship between East and West.

Nearly 2 years ago, President Reagan offered the Soviet Union a challenge to begin building a more constructive relationship. He said:

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union . . . If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be peace.

Since that time, we have made a start. The Geneva and other arms control negotiations are underway. We have initiated a process for discussing ways to defuse regional tensions and manage our competition peacefully. We have urged the Soviet Union to take practical steps to fulfill its international commitments on human rights. We have advanced ideas for expanding contact and interchange between our two societies, to fashion the network of bilateral ties that is a necessary feature of any productive relationship between two countries. These are steps forward, but much more needs to be done. One of President Reagan's major goals when he meets next month with General Secretary Gorbachev is to discuss this entire

agenda, giving new impetus to all of these efforts.

Arms control, of course, is a key part of this agenda. It has been a focal point of our alliance deliberations for many years. Allied unity and support are a key to the success of our endeavors with the Soviet Union. And, indeed, Europe's security is one of the principal objectives at stake.

In Geneva today, American and Soviet negotiators are in the middle of a new round of talks. An American proposal for radical reductions in offensive nuclear arms has been on the table for some time. The Soviet Union has recently come forward with—and extensively publicized—a new counterproposal.

Let me review for you today where we stand, the United States and the Soviet Union, on the main issues in arms control.

Our Objectives in Arms Control

Let us start at the beginning. What is it we are trying to accomplish?

The purpose of arms control negotiations is not agreement for its own sake. A bad agreement could do harm. Loopholes could be a source of new mistrust; the structure of limitations could leave one side with special advantages that only leave the other less secure; loose limits could only legitimize an intensifying arms race in areas left open by the agreement. Saving money on weapons expenditure is, of course, a worthwhile goal, but it is not sufficient or even the main issue.

What we really want, in short, are measures that enhance security and reduce the risk of war. Arms control is not just a technical exercise; it has to be embedded in a policy and in an environment that reduce our real dangers and make the world safer. The rivalry between East and West is not the result of personalities or simple misunderstandings. It is grounded in fundamental moral differences about justice and freedom; it is reflected in political differences over a range of international problems. Weapons are the symptom of this struggle, not its cause. Arms reduction can help reduce tensions; yet expansionist Soviet behavior can so fuel insecurity and mistrust that, at the very least, the arms control process is undermined. Do not forget that it was Soviet geopolitical challenges—like intervention in Angola, Ethiopia, and most particularly Afghanistan—that derailed detente and the SALT II [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] Treaty in the 1970s.

Preventing a war means addressing not only these political conflicts but also the military postures of the two sides.

In the nuclear age, even more than in the past, force structure can shape not only how a conflict might be fought but, more importantly, whether or not a conflict would break out at all. President Reagan's program to rebuild our military strength is addressed to this problem.

The concept of strategic stability is a fundamental one. At various periods in history, war was prevented by a balance of power. The balance was not always stable, but much of the time it worked, deterring attack by denying the attacker his confidence in victory and posing the risk of counterattack. In the age of the ICBM—the intercontinental ballistic missile with thermonuclear warheads—security has had to rest largely on the threat of retaliation, since there has been no defense against these missiles. This form of deterrence—the mutual threat of mass destruction—is what Churchill called the balance of terror.

Is this balance stable? Will it remain stable in the face of the steady Soviet buildup of weaponry with first-strike potential? Or is the balance in danger of breaking down in crisis conditions? This is one of the central issues—if not *the* central issue—in arms control today. We cannot afford—as we have been tempted in the past—to assume that the balance is automatically stable. We have come to recognize that the vulnerability of a country's retaliatory forces, in a crisis, could put a premium on striking first, or preemptively, and thus magnify the dangers. Or it could call into question America's commitment to effectively support its allies against Soviet conventional attack.

This is why one of the key tests by which we judge arms control proposals is whether they will enhance strategic stability. The military balance that results from an agreement should be one that reduces the incentive for a first strike. It should enhance deterrence by ensuring that no first strike can succeed, that no one can be tempted by illusions of "victory." A stable environment reduces the incentive to build new weapons and enhances the incentive to reduce the level of arms. It defuses the tension and danger of any crisis that may occur. Thus an emphasis on strategic stability goes to the heart of reducing the danger of the outbreak of war.

We must also remember that the forces of history have cast the United States in the role of the most powerful member of an alliance of democracies. Any agreement we reach with the Soviet Union must enhance our allies' security as well as our own. Since 1945,

Soviet military power has cast its shadow over both Europe and Asia; this is a reality, as is the relentless buildup of Warsaw Pact forces, both nuclear and conventional. The Western concept of security, which has kept the peace in Europe for 40 years, is that of a close and permanent link between Western Europe and the United States. The American pledge to underwrite the defense of Europe is given concrete expression in the presence of American forces and American weapons in Europe, which make it a certainty that any Soviet attack on Europe engages us. Thus our strategic forces defend Europe as much as they defend the United States. This is what deters war, and it has worked. Arms control must enhance, not weaken, this dimension of deterrence.

We have other criteria for judging arms control proposals:

- An arms control agreement, to strengthen stability, should be based on equality, leaving both sides with equal or essentially equivalent levels of forces.
- An agreement should emphasize strategically significant reductions. Past agreements only codified existing levels or rechanneled the competition. It is time, now, to reverse the pattern of constant buildup; it is time to begin radical reductions.
- An arms control agreement must be verifiable. The Soviets' selective record of compliance with previous agreements unfortunately makes this indispensable. Radical reductions, in fact, can increase the incentive to cheat, since a balance at lower levels can more easily be tipped.

The U.S. Proposal

The United States has serious proposals now on the table at Geneva. We have been criticized for our restraint in the public relations field. But our proposals were not made for propaganda; they were made to make progress toward these central objectives. Our proposals cover reductions in strategic offensive forces; reduction or elimination of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces; and a serious dialogue on defensive weapons and the relationship between offense and defense. These issues are being discussed now in the Geneva negotiations in three separate but interrelated forums.

Strategic Arms Reduction. First, in the talks on strategic arms reduction, the United States has proposed radical reductions down to 5,000 ballistic-missile warheads on each side. This represents a cut of nearly 50% from the current

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level. We have proposed substantial reductions in the number and destructive power of ballistic missiles, and limits on heavy bombers, on the cruise missiles they carry.

The strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union are very different. The great majority of Soviet warheads and destructive power are concentrated on their large, land-based ICBMs. We have a more balanced approach, with as much emphasis on submarine-based missiles and bombers as on ICBMs. The Soviet force is designed for preemption, ours for retaliation. These differences greatly complicate the achievement of an equitable agreement. We are prepared to explore tradeoffs between areas of relative advantage—such as our advantage in bombers versus their advantage in ICBMs—to establish an overall balance.

Our proposal is comprehensive, but its core is a recognition that reductions should focus on the most destabilizing systems. Weapons like large, fixed, land-based ICBMs with multiple warheads, capable of destroying missile silos—these are the most powerful strategic weapons, the most rapid, the most provocative, the most capable of carrying out a preemptive strike, the most likely to tempt a hair-trigger response in a crisis.

The Soviets have over 300 heavy ICBMs; we at present have none. (Our first deployments of MX, a smaller missile but roughly comparable because of its accuracy, will begin late next year.) With their accuracy, destructive power, and multiple warheads, the Soviet weapons are capable of destroying virtually the entire land-based portion of our retaliatory force. For nearly a decade this category of weapons has been, for us, one of the central issues of arms control. One of the odd features of the current debate is that the Soviets would have us believe that this central issue has disappeared. It is as if the threat from these powerful weapons, which already exist in the hundreds, is somehow less important than research into new categories of systems which do not exist, will not exist for many years at best, and will not come into being at all unless research is successful in meeting stringent criteria we ourselves have set.

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces. The second negotiation in Geneva is about intermediate-range nuclear forces or INF. This negotiation is taking place because in 1977 the Soviet Union began deploying SS-20 intermediate-range missiles in the western U.S.S.R., aimed at our European allies, and in the Soviet Far East, aimed at our friends and

allies in East Asia. Today, there are 441 operational launchers deployed; with three warheads on a missile, that makes over 1,300 modern nuclear warheads aimed at the cities and defense facilities of our friends and allies.

In response—and, I repeat, in response—the Atlantic alliance decided in 1979 that it had no choice but to deploy weapons of its own in this category, as a deterrent, while seeking to negotiate with the Soviet Union on a formula for mutual restraint. The Soviets agreed to talk but have not negotiated on the basis of mutuality. They insisted on their right to a monopoly of longer range INF missiles; they waged an unprecedented campaign of political warfare to intimidate our allies into retreating from the NATO decision of 1979. Our allies—governments and legislatures—stood firm; NATO Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles began to be deployed in several allied countries in 1983—6 years after the SS-20 deployment began.

The United States proposed at Geneva that we agree to eliminate both sides' longer range land-based INF missiles on a global basis—eliminate. The Soviets refused. Then we proposed that both sides reduce to the lowest possible equal number of warheads. The Soviets still refuse. Our position is based on the principle of equality between the United States and the Soviet Union. And limits must be applied globally, since the SS-20 is a mobile missile and it is not our objective simply to shift the SS-20 threat from Europe to Asia.

The threat of the SS-20 goes to the heart of our commitment to our allies. These are weapons aimed at Europe—although they could be aimed at America. Their purpose is to “decouple,” that is, to separate you from us by intimidating you. The alliance's response is a united response, and a unifying response, in that it symbolizes once again that our destinies are tied together. The principle of collective security is thus confirmed and reinforced. Europe is safer, because deterrence is strengthened.

Defense and Space Arms. The third area of negotiation is that of defense and space arms. But the core issue is the same: the stability of deterrence.

The SALT I accords of 1972 limited antiballistic missile systems and were also a partial first step toward limiting offensive weapons. We continue to comply with them, provided the Soviet Union corrects its noncompliance and negotiates seriously in Geneva. We must remember, however, that those accords

of 13 years ago, and the hopes they engendered, were founded on certain assumptions. Developments since then have called those assumptions into question.

First of all, when the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty was signed, it was assumed that offensive weaponry would be reduced by further negotiations. In fact, offensive weapons proliferated. Each side now—and particularly the Soviet side—has vastly higher numbers than in 1972—vastly higher. We see the Soviet heavy ICBMs with a first-strike potential. On both sides we see offensive weapons of astonishing accuracy and with multiple warheads. The Soviets are developing two new varieties of ICBMs whose mobility makes them harder to identify and count. If we fail to respond to these trends, at some point in the future they could undermine the military balance on which deterrence is based.

Second, in the ABM Treaty we also assumed that we had set up critical barriers that would prevent any breakout, that is, any sudden and significant expansion of ABM systems in violation of the treaty. In fact, while the United States has dismantled even the one ABM complex that was permitted, the Soviets have taken full advantage of the deployments allowed by the treaty. And some Soviet activities are clear violations, such as the large radar at Krasnoyarsk, which raises a question of whether the Soviets might be planning a nationwide ABM system, negating the treaty entirely.

But technological advance, which helps create these new problems, also offers other possibilities. Methods of defense against ballistic missiles, which were relatively rudimentary in 1972, now offer new hope as a possible counter to the growing offensive threat. What if it were possible, even in this age of ballistic missiles, to block an attack, rather than simply suffer the attack and then retaliate? What if the balance of power could rest more on a mutual sense of security and less on a mutual threat of annihilation? Thus the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (or SDI), a research program to explore promising new technologies. Effective strategic defenses, able to intercept and destroy missiles before they reach their targets, would strengthen security. Even if far less than 100% perfect, such a defensive system would vastly complicate any aggressor's first-strike planning and frustrate any temptation to consider launching an attack.

In an age of anxieties about nuclear weapons, this should provide enormous hope for the future. As former Soviet

Premier Kosygin once eloquently stated, an antiballistic missile system "is intended not for killing people but for saving human lives."

The last few decades' emphasis on offensive strategies reflected the state of technology, not a law of nature. Mutual vulnerability was a fact of life, not a positive virtue. A new strategic equilibrium based on defensive technologies and sharply reduced offensive deployments on both sides could be the most stable and secure arrangement of all. It cannot be fully achieved without negotiations, and, therefore, we have sought the fullest dialogue on this subject with the Soviet Union—as well as with our allies. In fact, General Abrahamson, director of our SDI office [Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson, Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization], traveled to Geneva to take part in a briefing of the Soviet negotiators on our program, its potential and its prospects.

Our research program is and will continue to be consistent with the ABM Treaty. The treaty can be variously interpreted as to what kinds of development and testing are permitted, particularly with respect to future systems and components based on new physical principles. The treaty's text, the agreed statements accompanying it, the negotiating record, and official statements made since that time are subject to differing interpretations.

Because of the great potential contribution that SDI could make to our security, and because of our interest in a rigorous implementation of the ABM Treaty by both sides, we have devoted much attention to the question of how to interpret the treaty. It is our view, based on a careful analysis of the treaty text and the negotiating record, that a broader interpretation of our authority is fully justified. This is, however, a moot point; our SDI research program has been structured and, as the President has reaffirmed last Friday, will continue to be conducted in accordance with a restrictive interpretation of the treaty's obligations. Furthermore, any SDI deployment would be the subject of consultations with our allies and to discussion and negotiation, as appropriate, with the Soviets in accordance with the terms of the ABM Treaty.

Our policy thus reflects:

- The President's commitment to explore thoroughly the potential contribution of strategic defenses to peace and stability and his vision of a "balance of safety" replacing the "balance of terror."
- Our commitment to pursue the program as currently structured, which

is consistent with a restrictive interpretation of our obligations under the ABM Treaty.

• Our judgment that the SDI program, provided that it is consistently funded at the levels required, will be adequate to answer the question of whether a cost-effective and survivable defense against ballistic missiles is feasible.

In sharp contrast to Soviet behavior, our policy of restraint with respect to the conduct of the SDI program demonstrates by deeds U.S. seriousness and sincerity in seeking a more stable international environment.

The American proposals in Geneva are a comprehensive blueprint for reducing nuclear weapons, for strengthening deterrence, and for making the world safer. They are paralleled by other proposals in other forums:

- To strengthen safeguards and controls against the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities;
- To ban chemical weapons and to prevent chemical weapons proliferation;
- To stabilize the conventional military balance in Europe, by mutual and balanced reductions of forces, and by measures to reduce the risk of war by surprise attack, accident, or miscalculation, which would give concrete form to a reaffirmation of the principle of non-use of force.

This is President Reagan's arms control agenda—the most comprehensive arms control agenda of any president in our history.

The Soviet Counterproposal

Now we have, at long last, a Soviet counterproposal in Geneva. It could be a step forward and thus, in and of itself, represents a success for our alliance policies. The very fact that the Soviets have offered a new proposal is directly due to the patience, strength, and unity of the Western democracies. We have maintained our principles and our standards, and these, in turn, are carrying us farther than sceptics had believed possible.

Remember that for over a year in 1983 and 1984, the Soviets boycotted any negotiation of these issues. That effort to intimidate the alliance failed, just as their earlier efforts to block INF deployments failed. Continued alliance firmness and unity eventually brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table earlier this year. In these new talks, the Soviets stated in the most general terms that they agreed with us on the importance of offensive reductions. But they gave no specifics. Rather, they have

devoted their greatest effort to propaganda against SDI and held everything hostage to getting their way on SDI.

Two weeks ago, the Soviets did begin to offer specific and detailed ideas about deep cuts in offensive forces. We welcome this. While some of their ideas may indicate progress, altogether the new Soviet position, however, remains deeply flawed and self-serving. It would have a particularly dangerous impact on the security of our allies. Let me touch on the highlights.

The Soviet proposal is a combination of various bans, freezes, limitations, and reductions of some, but not all, offensive forces. Overall, the Soviets propose a reduction by 50% of each side's "delivery vehicles which can reach the territory of the other side." It's their definition.

The hooker is their definition of what they consider "relevant" systems—systems which can strike the territory of the other side. Under their definition American systems in Europe pointed toward the U.S.S.R. are constrained, while Soviet missiles and aircraft aimed at Europe are not. It would imply no necessary reduction of the SS-20 threat (which, incidentally, can reach Alaska) but calls for a unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. counter to that threat. I can think of nothing that would more smack of a U.S.-Soviet deal at Europe's expense, and we won't do that.

This one-sided definition is a step backward. It is the Soviet position of 1969, which the United States and its allies could not accept then or at any time since. It is not reflected in the SALT I accords or in SALT II or in the distinction between strategic and INF systems that was the basis of the Geneva negotiations from 1981 to 1983.

The Soviets also propose to limit what they call "nuclear charges" (that is, warheads and bombs) on strategic forces to 6,000. Of these 6,000 weapons no more than 60% could be on any one component (that is, ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or aircraft). This would limit the number of Soviet ICBM warheads to 3,600—but there is no commitment to reduce their most destabilizing heavy ICBMs, the SS-18s. Thus the Soviet proposal does not directly address the main problem of strategic stability. With deep reductions in U.S. systems, it would add to NATO's vulnerability and increase the significance of the Soviet advantage in hard-target-killer ICBMs.

The Soviets also propose to ban or severely limit all "new" nuclear delivery systems, defining as "new" those systems not tested as of an agreed date. Assuming the agreed date would not be in the past, such a ban would preclude

our Midgetman missile—which was recommended, as you remember, by the Scowcroft commission and which would add to stability—D-5 Trident submarine missile, and Stealth bomber. Oddly enough, it would allow the two new ICBMs (the SS-X-24 and the SS-25), the new submarine-launched ballistic missile, and the new Blackjack bomber they are now testing or deploying. It's a hell of a deal.

The Soviet position on INF is not totally clear. But to the extent that they now agree that an acceptable INF accord could be concluded separately—no longer held hostage to SDI and other issues—we would regard it as constructive. And implicit in their new position may be a grudging acceptance of the presence of some U.S. INF missiles in Europe defending our allies.

However, they propose a stop to all further deployments in Europe of intermediate-range nuclear forces. This would halt NATO's INF deployment at about 200 warheads—while they have about seven times as many SS-20 warheads already deployed. And it would permit unlimited new SS-20 deployments against our allies and friends in Asia.

The Soviets also ask to be "compensated" in these negotiations for the British and French strategic nuclear deterrents. This is not only part of their effort to undercut NATO's decision of 1979; it is also an effort to undercut support for British and French nuclear forces. Yet those forces represent those countries' determination to maintain their independence and their control over their own destiny in the face of the nuclear danger. Those independent forces contribute to deterrence and to Europe's security. Of course, in the context of deep U.S. and Soviet reductions, British and French forces could become a relatively larger part of the picture. And both countries have made clear that in that context they would consider discussions of their forces.

The Soviet proposal tabled in Geneva, finally, indicates that all limitations on offensive forces are contingent on banning SDI—banning not only its testing and deployment but also "scientific research." This is rather sweeping. Indeed, it flies in the face of the ABM Treaty, which puts no limits on research.

The problem is that, just as with SS-20s, the Soviets have not yet given

up their efforts to keep a unilateral advantage. They want to stop our program while they continue their own program in the same field. Behind the curtain that encloses Soviet society, free from the scrutiny or open debate we have in the West, a major Soviet strategic defense program has proceeded for decades. In the past 20 years, the Soviets have spent about as much on strategic defense—missile defense, civil defense, and air defense—as they have spent on strategic offense. They deploy the world's only operational ABM system and are continuing to modernize it. Their propaganda about the so-called militarization of space rings rather hollow when one considers that they have the world's most active military space program; last year they conducted about 100 space launches and nearly 80% of them were military in nature, while the United States had only about 20 total space launches. The Soviets also have the world's only extensively tested and fully operational antisatellite system. And their own research efforts into SDI technologies—high-energy lasers, particle-beam weapons, radio frequency weapons, and kinetic energy weapons—long antedate our own. Indeed, some of the Soviet scientists most active in signing declarations against our SDI program are themselves the men leading the Soviet military research in the same technologies.

I said it at the United Nations, and I will say it again: the Soviet leaders know full well their own programs in these fields. Their propaganda against American programs is blatantly one-sided and not to be taken seriously.

Aside from the central issues of the Geneva nuclear and space talks, the Soviets have taken constructive positions in some fields and less constructive positions in others.

In the struggle against nuclear proliferation, for example, they and we have worked together well. We welcome Mr. Gorbachev's expression of interest in working with us to check the spread of chemical weapons.

Their proposed moratorium on nuclear testing, however, was aimed more at invidiously publicizing the Hiroshima anniversary than at serious arms control. Let us remember that in 1962, after the Soviets had unilaterally broken an earlier joint moratorium on nuclear tests, President Kennedy said: "We know now enough about broken

negotiations, secret preparations, and the advantages gained from a long test series never to offer again an un-inspected moratorium." We have stressed over and over again the crucial importance of improving verification, whether with respect to the threshold test ban or any other more ambitious effort. We have on the table some precise and practical ways to move forward on verification. For example, we have proposed that they send experts to our nuclear test site to measure the yield of a nuclear test in order to provide better calibration of their instruments and thus more accurate verification.

The Soviets are also practitioners of vague, superficially attractive proposals like non-use of force, no-first-use of nuclear weapons, or nuclear-free zones. The problem with such ideas is that they are a kind of escapism—evading the reality of the political problems that give rise to conflict. Peace will ultimately depend on solving the political problems, not on high-sounding declarations. We recall the basic principles of U.S.-Soviet relations in 1972 and the 1973 agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. These accords stated the right principles—particularly the need to forswear the perpetual quest for unilateral advantage. The problem was not the principles but the performance. Soviet calls for the non-use or threat of force look rather unimpressive against the background of events in Afghanistan or Poland.

Prospects

In sum, the new Soviet positions on arms control could be a step forward but do not meet the basic criteria of strengthened stability, equality, strategically significant reductions, and increased verifiability. But we approach this positively. We are now in a new phase of the negotiations in which, if the Soviets are serious, real progress can be made. The President has given our negotiators unprecedented authority to explore ways of bridging differences. Whether or not there is genuine progress before the time of the President's meeting with Mr. Gorbachev, we at least are now both getting down to business.

You hear from the Soviets a lot of talk about the "increasing danger of war." This is propaganda designed to intimidate. Deterrence has kept the peace,

certainly in the NATO area. With the restoration of Western strength in the last few years, the world is really more stable and secure than it has been in a long time. It is when the West is weak that the world is a more dangerous place.

So we will pursue arms reductions, with seriousness and dedication, but also with realism.

We have a complex task. As the President has put it: "We must both defend freedom and preserve the peace. We must stand true to our principles and our friends while preventing a holocaust."

There is no escape from this dual responsibility. The world we seek is a world of both peace and freedom. Such

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a world is attainable if the democracies are true to themselves and steadfast of purpose. ■

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Arms Control, Strategic Stability, and Global Security



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Secretary Shultz before the North Atlantic Assembly, San Francisco, California, October 14, 1985.

My talk this morning is about our relations with the Soviet Union, a central issue for the Western democracies. But before I start on that, I want to say something about terrorism, because terrorism is the war we're fighting right now.

Terrorists and the regimes that support them aim to shatter our ideals and our principles, undermine our democratic life, and pull down civilization itself. We've learned some lessons in the few days just past. The event isn't over, but still while it's fresh in our minds, let me tell you three points that stand out in my own mind.

- First, it tells us something about terrorists—that they're animals, cowardly animals. These are not guerrillas. These are not fighters for some liberation movement. They select the helpless to torture and murder. They lack the guts to do battle, just as they lack the guts to seek justice and peace by negotiation. That's the first lesson. [Applause]

- It tells us that we must take action. If free peoples do not move against the terrorists, no one will stop them. We must have the courage to act without violence, if possible, but recognizing that violence sometimes cannot be avoided. If our dedication to that principle paralyzes us, all our principles will be in jeopardy. That's a little more sobering lesson, so I notice you didn't

clap. But it's an important lesson. We have to be ready to act.

- And, third, it tells us that the democracies must stand together in our own cause. Our nations are the founders and the defenders of the rule of law. The terrorists know and seek to turn that against us. They insist that we be rigorous in granting due process to the enemies of the rule of law, and, as they do, they seek to instill fear—the fear that anyone who captures and brings to justice a terrorist becomes a target of terrorism.

We must stand for the rule of law, but we must not let fear turn it into a key to the jailhouse door. If we of the democracies stand together against this scourge, we will defeat it, and our ideals and values will thrive and be safe. I think we are now starting to do that.

Arms Control

I have a lengthy statement here that deals principally with the arms control matters being discussed in Geneva right now. I know it is too long, but it is an effort to pull together in one place where we are and they are, so we can see just what the issues are. So I ask you to bear with me and take it as a compliment, as you run out of patience, that we have thought, the President has thought, that this audience was the appropriate one to lay out in a rather painstaking way just what this is all about as we see it.

For 40 years, the Western democracies have wrestled with the problem of relations with the Soviet Union. As

legislators, you know firsthand that democracies love peace and really do not like spending money on defense. But you also know how precious freedom and democracy are and, therefore, how important it is that we defend the values that we hold dear. We democracies know that freedom has enemies in this world. But we also know that the purpose of our defensive strength is peace. Therefore, we all conduct foreign policies whose aim is a more positive and constructive relationship between East and West.

Nearly 2 years ago, President Reagan offered the Soviet Union a challenge to begin building a more constructive relationship. He said:

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union . . . If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be peace.

Since that time, we have made a start. The Geneva and other arms control negotiations are underway. We have initiated a process for discussing ways to defuse regional tensions and manage our competition peacefully. We have urged the Soviet Union to take practical steps to fulfill its international commitments on human rights. We have advanced ideas for expanding contact and interchange between our two societies, to fashion the network of bilateral ties that is a necessary feature of any productive relationship between two countries. These are steps forward, but much more needs to be done. One of President Reagan's major goals when he meets next month with General Secretary Gorbachev is to discuss this entire



Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine (ODWU) Inc. USA

Office Address: 140-42 Second Ave., Room 23, New York, N.Y. 10003
Mail Address: Cooper Sta. P.O. Box 4, New York, N.Y. 10276 U.S.A.

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CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Mr. Patrick J. Buchanan
Assistant to the President
The White House Office
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

October 4, 1985

*Linna
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draft number
Pat*

Dear Mr. Buchanan:

In preparation for the upcoming summit between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev, we believe your office may find the enclosed letter to the President of interest.

Among the many concerns we share for the future welfare of the United States and the world, we feel that sound defense policy and human rights issues to be the most important. As we hope our President will not compromise on SDI research, we inherently trust President Reagan to dynamically defend the rights of those unable to speak for themselves held captive by Mr. Gorbachev, as he has so courageously done on the issue of abortion.

We commend and applaud your continuing efforts in support of human rights, and of our President. Keep up the good work!

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Pawlo Dorozhynsky

P. Dorozhynsky

Chairman, Central Executive Committee
Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine



Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine (ODWU) Inc. USA

Office Address: 140-42 Second Ave., Room 23, New York, N.Y. 10003
Mail Address: Cooper Sta. P.O. Box 4, New York, N.Y. 10276 U.S.A.

CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

October 4, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

We wish to share with you several most urgent considerations for inclusion in the agenda of your summit meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. The executive board of ODWU, representing our branches nation-wide, fully supports your "peace through strength" and strategic defense initiatives. We also believe that arms reduction must be based on verifiable agreements.

We respectfully ask you to share with Secretary Gorbachev the grave concerns of Americans who pray daily not only for the welfare of these United States of America, but also the welfare and freedom of the captive nations and people of Central and Eastern Europe, who are our natural allies. The following are among the vital concerns we request you to share:

1. In discussing the establishment of a European nuclear-free zone, we petition that the proposal be made that the territories of the western Soviet republics -- Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic countries -- be included into this zone. This proposal would greatly benefit the vital interests of the United States of America and those of our NATO allies.

If accepted, nuclear weapons will be removed from the immediate borders of European countries greatly decreasing risk of surprise attack. If rejected, the people of the western Soviet republics and the European countries dominated by the USSR would know that the U.S.A. and not the USSR is defending their interests.

Whatever Secretary Gorbachev's response, one may consider publicizing this proposal after the summit for its propaganda value to our NATO allies and our own citizens.

2. We urge you to appropriate significant time to the questions of human rights and non-compliance of the Helsinki Accords by the the Soviet Union. Among the many violations, the most flagrant are:

a) The people of Ukraine and other enslaved republics are not free to exercise their religious beliefs. Ukrainian has been banned as a liturgical language. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church were "banned" and forcibly included into the Russian Orthodox Church, and the followers of the Ukrainian churches are severely persecuted for their beliefs. Mr. J. Terelya and Rev. Y. Budzijnowsky of the Ukrainian Catholic Church are but few among the numerous examples of such persecution.

We implore you to request the immediate and general amnesty for and release of all clergy and believers who are incarcerated for their religious practices and beliefs, the return of children taken away from their parents because of the latter raising them in accordance with their religious beliefs, and the removal of the illegal and unjust prohibition of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and other denominations in the Ukrainian SSR.

b) The continued Soviet government policy of "merging of nations" to the attempt of bringing up the "soviet man" is, in reality, the policy of russifying the people of national republics. This is the liquidation of their culture, language and their separate, distinct ethnic and historically national identities. The effect of such policy is evident in the continued increase of schools and publications in the Russian language at the expense of Ukrainians and other non-Russians. Although 75% of Ukraine is Ukrainian, a mere 25% of available books are in Ukrainian.

The official Soviet census of 1970 and 1979 revealed that the rate of increase of the Russian population in the Ukrainian and other western Soviet republics is three times higher than the rate of increase of their native populations. This result is achieved by the deportation and forced resettlement of the western non-Russian population into Siberia and the USSR's northern regions. Such policy is nothing more than ethnocide and cultural genocide, which are in violation of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords.

Please request the release of V. Chornovil, Yu. Badzio and others who are illegally sentenced for opposing the policy of russification, and those imprisoned who strive for human rights.

c) The government of the Soviet Union creates extreme difficulties in maintaining contact between relatives who live in the USSR and those living in the West, and blocks any emigration of Ukrainians who would like to unite with their relatives in the West. Please request that all restrictions be lifted on the reunion of families, and on free emigration for all people regardless of nationality, religion or political beliefs.

We respectfully urge you to raise the question of the sick prisoners of conscience Yu. Shukhevych, D. Shumuk and others whose relatives in the West requested these prisoners' release to their

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custody for medical treatment, but their continued requests are denied by Soviet authorities. If there is no intervention on their behalf, they will meet their death in prisons, forced labor camps or internal exile, as happened recently to V. Stus, O. Tykhy, V. Sokolov, Yu. Lytvyn and V. Marchenko.

We hope that you will keep these most urgent matters in mind during the summit meeting with Secretary Gorbachev.

d) The members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring group, who were honored by your proclamation of September 21, 1982, are all imprisoned for their attempt to make the government of the Soviet Union live up to the Helsinki agreements. For their peaceful action all members of this group were sentenced to long terms of prison or internal exile. Some of them, such as 80 year-old Oksana Meshko and the wounded WW II veteran, and poet, M. Rudenko, are severely ill and need immediate medical treatment not available in the remote labor camps or areas of exile. Please request their expeditious release to their families' care in the Ukrainian Republic or to the care of the Ukrainian community in the West.

3. We also ask that you raise the issue of establishing an American Consulate in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. This would provide needed protection for those Americans who wish to visit their relatives in Ukraine. The Consulate would also provide counsel to those desiring to travel to the West. This strategically-placed consulate would serve United States interests in many beneficial ways.

4. Kindly consider also the illegal jamming of Voice of America and Radio Liberty short and medium-wave broadcasts. This violates ITU Conventions as well as the intent of the Helsinki Final Act to engender more free dissemination and exchange of information. The inspiration, encouragement and information provided by these broadcasts are invaluable to those behind the iron curtain, and are perhaps the most cost effective tool we have to offer in promulgating hope for freedom, sharing truth, news and free thoughts otherwise proscribed by repressive communist regimes.

If Secretary Gorbachev is so confident in his system of government, then he should not feel threatened by alternative information sources and be compelled to jam these broadcasts.

Mr. President, as you know, the United States is the world's last hope for preserving and promulgating liberty and freedom. The Soviet Union is dedicated to world conquest and oppressive domination, not just of nations but of its peoples. It is at war with the world, even if some choose not to acknowledge that war. It is indeed an evil empire dedicated to the destruction of every individual's God-given rights, which they would replace with Kremlin-given "rights" of privilege -- which they may or may not choose to grant.

Those enslaved by Moscow's tyranny look to us to speak for them where they cannot, to pray for them where they cannot, and to defend them where they cannot. Those future generations that risk being born into the fruits Secretary Gorbachev's labors will either come to bless us for having had the courage to resist tyranny, or curse us along with Secretary Gorbachev for having helped establish it.

Let us not disappoint those who depend on us. We call upon you, Mr. President, to continue your courageous and highly moral convictions without compromise. We implore you to remember to speak for and defend those who cannot themselves act.

We pray that God will grant you the health, strength, wisdom, tools and guidance that will both arm and shield you at the summit, and facilitate your every success.

Please feel free to contact me, should you or your staff require any further information, or if I can be of any service.

Sincerely,

Pawlo Dorozhynsky

P. Dorozhynsky

Chairman, Central Executive Committee
Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine

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THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

OCTOBER 31, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 858145

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED OCTOBER 4, 1985

TO: PATRICK BUCHANAN

FROM: MR. P. DOROZHYSKY
CHAIRMAN
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF
O. D. W. U.
POST OFFICE BOX 4 COOPER STATION
NEW YORK NY 10276

SUBJECT: SDI

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

*need SIS-I
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ID # 358145 29

F0006-09

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1 1

Name of Correspondent: P. Dorozhynsky

MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: SDI

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>PLKOJE</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>1285110128</u>			<u>1 1</u>
<u>99DOS</u>	D	<u>1285110128</u>	<u>AN</u>		<u>1 1</u>
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		<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
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Comments: _____

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President Reagan,
March 23, 1983

I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only purpose—one all people share—is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war.

Secretary of State Shultz,
January 31, 1985

The pace of technological advance now opens possibilities for new ways of strategic thinking—never an easy process. The vehemence of some of the criticism of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative seems to come less from the argument over technical feasibility—which future research will answer one way or another in an objective manner—than from the passionate defense of orthodox doctrine in the face of changing strategic realities. We are proceeding with SDI research because we see a positive and, indeed, revolutionary potential: defensive measures may become available that could render obsolete the threat of an offensive first strike. A new strategic equilibrium based on defensive technologies and sharply reduced offensive deployments is likely to be the most stable and secure arrangement of all.

Kenneth W. Dam,
Deputy Secretary of State,
January 14, 1985

The SDI puts primary emphasis on technologies that do not use nuclear weapons. This approach contrasts with the present Soviet ABM system, which relies on nuclear-armed interceptors.

Paul H. Nitze,
Special Adviser to the President
and the Secretary of State
on Arms Control Matters,
February 20, 1985

The present situation—in which the threat of massive nuclear retaliation is the ultimate sanction, the key element of deterrence and, thus, the basis for security and peace—is unsatisfactory. It has kept the peace for 40 years, but the potential costs of a breakdown are immense and, because of continuing massive Soviet deployments of both offensive and defensive weaponry, are not becoming less. If we can, we must find a more reliable basis for security and for peace.

Robert C. McFarlane,
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs,
March 7, 1985

In practical terms, a strategic defensive option must be cost effective. That is, it must be cheaper and easier to add defensive capability than offensive capability. Otherwise, there would be incentive to expand the offensive arms we seek to reduce. In addition, any defensive system must be sur-

vivable in the face of attack or else it could invite an effort to overwhelm it regardless of cost. The goal of strategic stability demands such high performance standards. . . .

We are ready, if the technology proves feasible and cost effective, to consider integration of defensive systems into the mix of forces of both sides. This would be in the context of a cooperative, balanced, and verifiable environment that reflects a balance of offensive and defensive forces in ways that reduce existing nuclear arsenals while enhancing security and stability. If our research proves the feasibility of the concepts, a negotiated transition period of many years with assurance of stability and security throughout will be essential. . . .

The last myth is that the Strategic Defense Initiative will complicate the arms control process. The truth is that it was the Strategic Defense Initiative, combined with the demonstrated resolve of the Western allies to modernize their strategic deterrent, which brought the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table.

Public Information Series • Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs • Office of Public Communication
Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • March 1985



The President's Strategic Defense Initiative

March 1985

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Background

In his March 23, 1983 address to the nation, President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Its purpose is to explore the potential of newly emerging technologies to support an effective defense against ballistic missiles—one that would strengthen deterrence and thereby increase our security and that of our allies. The program is designed to answer a number of basic scientific and engineering questions that must be addressed before the promise

What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?

President Reagan,
March 23, 1983

of these new technologies can be fully assessed. The SDI research program will provide a future President and Congress with the technical knowledge necessary for a decision in the early 1990s on whether to develop and deploy such advanced defensive systems. The focus of research is on non-nuclear defensive technologies.

A Multilayered Defense

Technologies being investigated in the SDI program may offer the possibility of providing a layered defense—that is, a defense that would use various techniques to

destroy attacking missiles during each phase of their flight.

- Some missiles might be destroyed in their boost phase—that is, shortly after their launch as they burn their engines and carry their payloads into space. Successful engagement in this phase also would destroy all the warheads carried by the missile.
- Those nuclear warheads surviving the boost phase could be attacked during the post-boost phase. During this phase we would target the post-boost vehicle, the device that sits on top of the missile and dispenses its warheads. If we were able to destroy this device, we could destroy all the warheads not yet released.
- Those warheads that were released and survived would travel for tens of minutes in space on their ballistic trajectories toward their targets. Although we would have to identify and destroy the individual warheads themselves, the relatively long mid-course phase of flight could provide enough time for defenses incorporating advanced technologies to do that.
- Finally, those warheads surviving the outer layers of defense could be attacked during the terminal phase as they approached the end of their ballistic flight.

Strengthening Deterrence

In order for advanced defenses to strengthen both deterrence and stability, they must, at a minimum, be able to destroy a sufficient portion of an aggressor's attacking forces to deny him confidence in the outcome. The combined effectiveness of the

defense provided by the multiple layers would not have to provide total protection in order to enhance deterrence significantly. An aggressor would be much less likely to initiate a nuclear conflict, even in a crisis, if he lacked confidence in his ability to succeed.

The defensive system also must be survivable. To achieve the required level of survivability, the system would not need to be invulnerable but would have to be sufficiently effective to fulfill its mission, even in the face of determined attacks against it. Without this characteristic, a defensive system could be rendered ineffective and thus invite a preemptive attack.

To discourage the proliferation of ballistic missile forces, the defensive system must be able to maintain effectiveness against the offense at less than the cost of developing offensive countermeasures necessary to overcome it. ABM systems in the past have lacked this essential capability, but the newly emerging technologies being pursued under SDI have great potential in this regard.

Soviet Program

SDI is a prudent response to the very active Soviet research and development program in strategic defenses; it provides insurance against a possible unilateral Soviet effort to develop and deploy an advanced defensive system. A unilateral Soviet deployment, along with the Soviet Union's massive offensive forces and its already impressive air and passive defense capabilities, would destroy the foundation on which deterrence has rested for 20 years.

SDI and Arms Control

The SDI research program is fully consistent with all U.S. treaty obligations, including the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems and components that are space based, air based, sea based, or mobile land based. However, that agreement permits research short of field testing on a prototype ABM system or component. This is the type of research that will be conducted under the SDI program.

At the U.S.-Soviet arms control talks in Geneva that began on March 12, we are discussing defensive and space arms as well as strategic and intermediate-range offensive systems. We hope to engage the Soviets in a constructive dialogue on strategic defense, including existing Soviet defenses.

SDI and the Allies

Because U.S. security is inextricably linked to that of our friends and allies, the SDI program will not be limited solely to an exploration of technologies with potential against intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It also will examine technologies with potential against shorter range ballistic missiles, such as Soviet SS-20s and others that are capable of striking the territory of our allies.

During the next several years, we will work closely with our allies to ensure that, in the event of any future decision to deploy defensive systems, allied as well as U.S. security would be enhanced. Close consultation with our allies will play an important part in any decision that is taken.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 26, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Response to Organization for Rebirth of Ukraine

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Sally Kelley forwarding a State Department draft response to Pawlo Dorozhynsky of the Organization for the Rebirth of the Ukraine. We have reviewed the draft and suggested some minor changes to reflect that the Geneva meeting has already taken place. We recommend that a copy of the President's November 21 address to Congress be included among the suggested enclosures.

Steve ^{SS}Sestanovich, Judyt Mandel, Bob ^{BS}Linhard, Gerald ^{GM}May, Steve ^{SS}Steiner, and Sven Kraemer ^{W-2} concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I for Sally Kelley.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to Sally Kelley
Tab A	State Department draft response
Tab B	State's suggested enclosures
Tab C	letter from Pawlo Dorozhynsky to Patrick Buchanan
Tab D	letter from Pawlo Dorozhynsky to the President
Tab E	tasking to State

Matlock

9169

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 27, 1985



MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

Consult Cleveland

SUBJECT: Draft Response to Human Rights Appeals

The NSC has reviewed the draft response to human rights appeals attached at Tab A. As indicated in the draft we recommend deleting a portion of paragraph three and making several minor changes.

Attachments:

Tab A Draft response to human rights appeals
Tab B Letters concerning human rights abuses in the Soviet Union

34
9366

Am...
/

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 12, 1985

SOVJEWRY

Thank you for your message to President Reagan requesting that he raise the plight of Soviet Jews during his discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. ✓

I can assure you that the President intends to keep human rights issues at the forefront of U.S. efforts to achieve progress in our relations with the Soviet Union. As he said in his radio address to the nation on October 19, "We must defend human rights everywhere, since countries which respect human rights are unlikely to unleash war or impose their will on others. And that's why we insist that the Helsinki Accords and other international commitments be observed." ✓

We recognize that the human rights situation in the Soviet Union has deteriorated in recent years. ~~Emigration of Soviet Jews has decreased from a peak of 51,000 in 1979 to below 900 in 1984. Soviet leaders have sanctioned renewed manifestations of anti-Semitism, a campaign of arrest and conviction of Hebrew teachers and others has intensified, and little progress has occurred in the cases of major human rights figures. The United States has used all available means to demonstrate to the Soviets that their human rights violations and persecution of religious groups are serious obstacles to improved relations between our two countries.~~

Used to lecture

will continue to underscore

You can be sure that the subjects you mentioned ^{were} ~~will be~~
among those raised in Geneva.

With the President's appreciation and best wishes,

Mush Oberman

~~6311 CROSS POINT ROAD - NILES, ILLINOIS 60648~~
3605 Woodhead Drive, Northbrook, Il. 60062

Oct. 23, 1985

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

When you meet Premier Gorbachev please remember the
plight of Soviet Jewry.

As the leader of the Free World you must speak out
for those whose minds and memories are free but whose
families are enslaved.

The future of the Jews of the Soviet Union and of
human rights is in your hands.

Sincerely,


M. D. Oberman

31

State University of New York at Albany

Administration 249, Albany, New York 12222

October 3, 1985

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
Washington, D.C.


Dear President Reagan:

Like millions of other Americans, we wish you well in your meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in November. It is a great occasion and we all pray that you will be successful in moving the world toward international peace.

Among many issues that involve the Soviet Union, one which gravely concerns all of us is the persecution of Jews in the Soviet Union, including the refusal of the Soviet government to grant permission for them to emigrate to the State of Israel.

I hope that in your meeting with Mr. Gorbachev you will raise the issue of freeing the millions of Jews still held captive in the Soviet Union. This is a matter of deep concern to all of us and to all of those who love freedom, and I know it is a concern of yours.

Sincerely,


Vincent O'Leary



SECOND GENERATION

The Martyrs Memorial & Museum of the Holocaust
An Organization of Children of Holocaust Survivors

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20036

October 8, 1985

Dear President Reagan:

We, Second Generation of the Martyrs' Memorial and Museum, are the largest of hundreds of worldwide groups of children of Holocaust survivors. We understand and recognize, more than most, the effects of restricting and abrogating human rights.

We strongly urge you to impress upon Mr. Gorbachev in November at your summit meeting that Soviet Jews who seek exit visas and those who chose to stay must not be used as political pawns. Human rights of Jews and all Russian people must remain foremost on your agenda as must an accounting for the whereabouts of the second of only two honorary citizens of the USA: Raoul Wallenberg.

There are very positive signs that, although immigration of Soviet Jewry is at about its lowest point since it began two decades ago, with only 700 exit visas being granted so far this year, a turnabout in Soviet policy is imminent. (This month, for the first time since 1967, Israeli citizens will be allowed to travel to the Soviet Union--using a Spanish visa.)

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT MUST KNOW THAT HUMAN RIGHTS WILL REMAIN CENTRAL TO U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

Sincerely,

ROSALIE HILLER
President
Second Generation

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Sacramento Jewish Community Relations Council

2351 Wyda Way, Sacramento, California 95825 • (916) 486-0906
P.O. Box 254589, Sacramento, California 95865

October 11, 1985

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- JEWISH FELLOWSHIP OF DAVIS
- JEWISH WAR VETERANS
- KENESSET ISRAEL TORAH CENTER
- MOSAIC LAW CONGREGATION
- NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN
- SUNRISE JEWISH CONGREGATION
- WOMEN'S AMERICAN ORT
- ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

STAFF

JCRC Director
ANNE EISENBERG

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear President Reagan:

The Jewish Community of Sacramento hopes that your meeting with Chairman Gorbachev will lead to an improvement in relations and lessening of tensions between this country and the Soviet Union.

We believe that it is of the utmost importance that you place the issue of human rights in the Soviet Union on the agenda for the upcoming summit meeting in Geneva. Central to the concept of human rights is the right to freely emigrate. Thus we appeal to you to urge the Soviet Government to stop their harrassment of the Jewish community in that country and allow Jews and other ethnic and religious minorities to freely emigrate. We also feel you should express the concern of the American people about the failure of the Soviet government to adhere to the human rights provisions in the Helsinki Accords to which the Soviet Union was a signatory.

We realize the importance of the upcoming summit meeting and hope that you and the new Soviet leader will reach a successful agreement that would improve human rights in the Soviet Union and serve the cause of world peace.

Sincerely,


Robert Dinsfriend, Chair
Oppressed Jewish Committee

cw

AFFILIATED WITH THE JEWISH FEDERATION OF SACRAMENTO

Member of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council
and the Jewish Public Affairs Committee of California



עם ישראל חי

ZIONIST CULTURAL SOCIETY OF MILL BASIN

40

6363 AVENUE U • BROOKLYN, N. Y. 11234 • Hlckory 4-6868

October 16, 1985

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The Honorable Ronald Reagan
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Reagan,

Twenty years ago, on May 11, 1965, some two hundred members of our congregation journeyed to Washington, D.C. and submitted the attached petition to the late President Lyndon B. Johnson. It was the deeply felt expression of our concern for our Jewish brethren imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain. We like to think that we played some role in opening wide the tear in the Iron Curtain through which many tens of thousands of Jews came to freedom.

Today, the curtain hangs tightly closed and again we must marshall every effort to bring new life, new hope for freedom to our fellow Jews who wish to be reunited with us.

On the eve of your meeting with Secretary Gorbachev, we call upon you, Mr. President, to reiterate your oft-expressed concern for Soviet Jewry and to insist firmly on the provisions of the Helsinki Agreement to which the Soviets are signators and to the basic human right of every person to be united with his family.

We are severly pained when we know of a Scharansky separated from his wife and in prison for over seven years for the "crime" of wishing to emigrate to Israel. And there are far too many like him who waste their best years in Soviet prisons and mental hospitals.

Mr. President, you are in the unique position to strike a great blow for human freedom. Please do not fail us.

Respectfully,

Alexander Schlesinger
Alex Schlesinger,
President, Zionist
Cultural Society

Rabbi David S. Halpern

AS:DH:mp

נצח ישראל לא ישקר

May 11, 1965

President Lyndon B. Johnson
White House, Washington

We who are assembled here in Washington the 13th day of May, 1965, to present you with a sacred MEZUZAH saved from the Nazis during years of persecution, believe it is our duty to speak out on the fate of our brothers in the Soviet Union.

Our Synagogue, the Flatbush Park Jewish Center, in conjunction with its affiliate, the Zionist Cultural Society of Mill Basin, held the first MASS RALLY to draw world attention to the plight of our Jewish brethren. This MASS PROTEST RALLY held in our Synagogue has since been repeated throughout the world.

In the name of humanity we demand of the Soviet government that it redress these wrongs and restore the rights of Jews and the Jewish community and to grant equality with other religious and nationality groups as required by Soviet constitution and law.

We appeal to the President of the United States Government and to the Congress of the United States to make the following demands upon the Government of the Soviet Union.

- 1) Reaffirm its constitutional provisions that prohibits anti-Semitism;
- 2) Eliminate discrimination against Jews in all areas of Soviet public life;
- 3) Outlaw the use of anti-Semitic propaganda;
- 4) Permit the full use of synagogues and private prayer meetings and the observance of sacred rites such as religious burial and circumcision;
- 5) Make possible the production and distribution of Bibles, prayer books and the full use of religious necessities such as matzohs and kosher food;
- 6) Permit Jews to make religious pilgrimages to the holy places in Israel;
- 7) Enable rabbinical students to study at seminaries and provide schools and other facilities for the study of Yiddish and Hebrew as well as Jewish history, literature and culture;
- 8) Permit writers, artists and other intellectuals to create for the encouragement of Jewish culture and artistic life such institutions as Yiddish newspapers, publishing houses and theatres;
- 9) Halt the discriminatory application of maximum penalties, including the death sentence, against Jews for alleged economic crimes;
- 10) Make it possible for Soviet Jews, who are members of families, separated as a result of the Nazi murders, to be reunited with their relatives abroad.

In conclusion we respectfully request that the Trade Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, now under study, should be conditional upon the Soviet Union agreeing to live up to these basic human and religious rights.

FLATBUSH PARK JEWISH CENTER

Rabbi David S. Halpern

President Solomon Wechsler

ZIONIST CULTURAL SOCIETY
OF MILL BASIN

Alexander Schlesinger
Member of Presidium

American League for
Russian Jews

Morris Brafman, Chairman

Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry

Jacob Birnbaum

42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


June 11, 1965

Dear Mr. Schlesinger:

This is to thank you and those connected with the Flatbush Park Jewish Center for the handsome plaque, designed with the Mezuzah, that Dr. Goldman accepted on my behalf. I am grateful for the kind thought that prompted this symbolic gift and accompanying statement, and hope you will convey my warm appreciation to all who participated in this presentation.

With cordial good wishes,

Sincerely,



Mr. Alexander Schlesinger
2054 East 63rd Street
Brooklyn 34, New York

B'nai Brith Messenger

67th
Year

FOUNDED 1897

TITLE REGISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE

"THE MIRROR OF SOUTHLAND JEWISH ACTIVITY SINCE LOCAL JEWRY BEGAN"

Year, No. 45 139 SOUTH HOPE STREET, LOS ANGELES 17, CALIFORNIA, Friday, Nov. 1, 1963 — MADISON 7-2001 \$5.00 per year, Single Copy 15¢

Bitter Memories Spur Activity—

Camp Survivor Plans Rally For Russian Jews

By DAVID HOROWITZ

B'nai Brith Messenger
Exclusive WUP Report

NEW YORK (WUP)—Alexander Schlesinger, a survivor of the Hitler death camps of Auschwitz and Birkenau and who had played an important role in an "underground railroad" which led to the redemption of many Jews from the Nazi murderers, has stirred New Yorkers into doing something about the Jews in the Soviet Union.

WORKING FEVERISHLY days and nights for several months, contacting Jewish leaders all through Greater New York, survivor Schlesinger succeeded in organizing a mass rally to protest the denial of

religious freedom and the persecution of Jews behind the Iron Curtain.

The anti-USSR rally will take place on Sunday afternoon, Nov. 3, at the Flatbush Jewish Center, Brooklyn. The Zionist Cultural Society of Mill Basin, a movement created at the initiative of Mr. Schlesinger, is sponsoring the event which will be addressed by prominent Rabbis, Zionist leaders and Government officials.

INTRIGUED BY Schlesinger's deep concern for his Soviet brethren and his dynamic initiative to organize the mass rally, this writer decided to interview the escapee of Hitler's death camps.

The amazing thing evolving out of the interview with the middle-aged Alexander Schlesinger at his successful Brooklyn meat establishment was the fact that all through the dark days of Auschwitz and Birkenau, when life was hanging in the balance, he never once lost his faith in God and in the rebirth of Israel. He had been an ardent Zionist all through his youth in Rumania.

"FOR MANY years since my redemption," he told the writer, "I have been doing a great deal of soul-searching and planning as to how best to go about helping the



6 B'NAI BRITH MESSENGER — Friday, November 1, 1963

Camp Survivor Plans Rally For Russian Jews

(Continued from Page 1)

unfortunate Jews enslaved behind the Iron Curtain."

His sparkling eyes betraying the tragedy he himself had lived through under Hitler, Schlesinger went on to say that he had become especially concerned with the plight of the Russian Jews when some time ago he had read a confidential document on Soviet Jews written by the militant Zionist leader Beinish Epstein, a member of the Zionist Actions Committee.

"THIS DOCUMENT," Schlesinger said, "was sent to the Zionist leaders throughout the

United States. It contained several recommendations proposing the organization of a public campaign on behalf of the Soviet Jews. More than four years have passed since this document was sent 'out,' Schlesinger added, "and the plight of the Soviet Jews has worsened. It is now evident that the Jewish leaders in the United States have failed in their responsibility to our brethren in Russia."

FULLY SENSING the peril facing the near 3,000,000 Jews in Russia, Schlesinger said that "the time for waiting and hoping is over. Experience has shown," he

stressed, "that the Russian Government is sensitive to American public opinion and I feel confident that the mass protest rally to be held by us here on Nov. 3 will signal the beginning of many such rallies throughout the country. Only by mobilizing American public opinion," he concluded, "can we hope to save Russian Jewry from cultural and religious genocide."

Serving on the Presidium of the Zionist Cultural Society of Mill Basin with Mr. Schlesinger are Rabbi David Spiegel, attorney George S. Meissner, and Jacob Rozenberg.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES • AFL-CIO
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Baltimore, Maryland 21230
301/837-7278
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1-800/962-2700
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October 21, 1985

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President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear President Reagan:

As the world looks forward in hope to the U.S.-Soviet Summit meeting in Geneva, we who have vehemently called for the alleviation of the plight of Soviet Jews are encouraged by your commitment to raise this issue in November when you meet with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

As you know, since Gorbachev's election to power, the condition of Soviet Jewry has continued to deteriorate. Emigration has virtually ended. Harassment, imprisonment and arrests of Jews seeking to emigrate or study their language and heritage have become increasingly frequent. Malicious acts of anti-Semitism are no longer isolated incidents but appear to be sanctioned by the government.

The Summit meeting is clearly an opportunity which must not be lost. Thousands of Jewish families in the Soviet Union are dependent upon our nation's dedication to democratic ideals. We hope, Mr. President, that you will do your utmost to seek an end to these people's undeserved suffering and urge Mr. Gorbachev to abide by the international agreements which bear his country's signature.

Sincerely,


Ernest B. Crofoot
Executive Director
Maryland Council 67
AFSCME, AFL-CIO

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45

5/

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(213) 552-6077

LEON S. ALSCHULER*
MARSHALL B. GROSSMAN*
BURT PINES*
MELVIN B. FLIEGEL*
BRUCE WARNER*
MARCO F. WEISS*
HENRY S. ZANGWILL*
FRANK KAPLAN*
MICHAEL J. BRILL*
KAREN KAPLOWITZ*
ROBERT A. SHLACHTER*
ROBERT B. OWENS*
WILLIAM S. SMALL*
MORTON R. FIELD
DENNIS A. KAHAN
JOHN H. MALMROSE
PAUL H. ROCHMES
LINDA GACH RAY
SANDRA J. CHAN
LAWRENCE W. BERGER
LINDA SUTTON
JEFFREY G. KICHAVEN
MICHAEL A. SHERMAN
SUSAN BRAUN RICE
MICHAEL L. CYBERS
JEFFREY A. MALDONADO
KIM ROBERT MAEROWITZ
MATTHEW D. NORMAN
JANET F. BEER
JOHN A. SCHWIMMER
SANDRA SLON
DEBRA A. STEGURA
*A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

October 18, 1985

OUR FILE NO.

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear President Reagan:

At your meeting with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva on November 19 and 20, you will have a number of extremely important and vital issues on your agenda. I trust that among these will be the matter of respect for human rights within the Soviet Union and particularly the issue of Soviet Jewry. I know that this issue of human rights has been a concern of yours for many years as well as the concern of thousands of Americans who enjoy those rights in this country. I urge you in your talks with Mr. Gorbachev to work toward a mutually acceptable solution to this problem.

Respectfully yours,


LEON S. ALSCHULER

LSA/sb

46

GORDON S. BODEK

October 17, 1985

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Mr. President:

Ten years ago the Soviets signed the Helsinki Accords which established certain human rights standards. Today we are witnessing a campaign to eradicate Jewish culture and education throughout the Soviet Union with a record number of arrests of Hebrew teachers. Emigration is virtually closed with only 700 leaving thus far this year and life for Soviet Jewry activists is one of constant harrasment.

May I express my deep appreciation for your concern on the Soviet Jewry issue and I hope you will continue to voice your specific concern for the deteriorating conditions facing Soviet Jews.

Peace can only be achieved when individual human rights are respected. I trust you will keep the issue of Soviet Jewry on the agenda in your discussions with Mr. Gorbachev and work toward a mutually effective solution.

Sincerely,



Gordon S. Bodek

GSB:lc

148 South Bristol Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90049



PACIFIC MUTUAL
PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

WILLIAM RICHARD BALKIN

LA SALLE BANK BUILDING
135 SOUTH LA SALLE STREET, SUITE 2360
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60603
TELEPHONE (312) 263-1700
CABLE: INSURIT NOW

October 18, 1985

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing you at this time because I believe you will go down in history as one of the greatest Presidents the United States has ever had. You seem to have the knack of getting out of very difficult situations. This makes you a very admirable person.

Our Rabbi, William H. Lebeau, of North Suburban Synagogue Beth El has asked every congregation member to write a letter to you so that when you meet with Premier Gorbachev you will please remember to talk with him about the plight of Soviet Jewry.

I know you will handle this in your own unique way. As the leader of the Free World you must speak out for those whose minds and memories are free but whose families are enslaved.

The future of the Jews of the Soviet Union and of human rights is in your hands. Please make the Soviet Union realize that they should once and for all make a clean break and let the people go.

I wish you a very pleasant, safe and successful journey. I know you will be able to relate to the Premier your thoughts about releasing the Jewish people from the Soviet Union. I have all the confidence and faith that you will do a great job.

Best wishes to you and your lovely wife, Nancy.

Sincerely,

William R. Balkin

WRB/rw

MEMBER, EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
20 YEARS WINNER, NATIONAL QUALITY AWARD
MEMBER, CHICAGO ASSOCIATION OF LIFE UNDERWRITERS
MEMBER, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LIFE UNDERWRITERS
SENIOR CONSULTANT, PCC FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPANY

48

ID # 333637

WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

F006

3:00 PM
from ORM

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 85107122

Name of Correspondent: Paul Tribble

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Urag you to take advantage of your upcoming summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev to address the Soviets' persecut of Jews, Christians and other religious believers.

ROUTE TO:		ACTION	DISPOSITION		
Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
LAOGLE		ORIGINATOR	85107122	MD	A 850729
ASDOS		Referral Note: R	850801		A 850812
LAOGLE		Referral Note: A	850815	B	C 850816
		Referral Note:	1 1		1 1
		Referral Note:	1 1		1 1
		Referral Note:			

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: Acknowledgement sent to all signees

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOP).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.

49

UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

'85 AUG 13 09:01

S/S 8522833

Date August 14, 1985

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Senator Trible
Date: July 19 Subject: US-Soviet Summit,
Issue of Religious Persecution in the Soviet Union
WH Referral Dated: August 2, 1985 NSC ID# 333637
(if any)

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State

Action Taken:

- A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- x An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks:

on
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

40
AUG 12 1985

Dear Senator Tribble:

I am writing in response to your July 19 letter to President Reagan requesting that he raise the plight of religious believers in the Soviet Union during his discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev in November.

As you know, the U.S. Government has consistently condemned Soviet restrictions on the free practice of religion. Such measures are contrary to the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, and we have strongly called for Soviet compliance with their own undertakings in that agreement. In virtually every high-level bilateral exchange we have had with the Soviets, we have made it unequivocally clear that their persecution of Jews, Christians and other religious believers is a serious obstacle to the improved relations with the Soviet Union that the United States seeks. Secretary Shultz underlined our deep concern over Soviet persecution of religious believers in his recent speech on the occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.

I can assure you that in his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, President Reagan intends to discuss the full range of issues impacting on U.S.-Soviet relations, including human rights. We welcome hearing your views and those of 19 of your Senate colleagues. We encourage you to supplement our efforts by bringing your own concerns over continuing Soviet persecution of religious believers directly to the attention of the Soviet authorities.

If we can be of assistance to you in this or any other matter, please do not hesitate to contact us.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,


James M. Montgomery
Acting Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

The Honorable
Paul S. Tribble, Jr.,
United States Senate.

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E
R E F E R R A L

AUGUST 2, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ATTN: WILL BALL

ACTION REQUESTED:
DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 333637

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED JULY 19, 1985

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: THE HONORABLE PAUL TRIBLE
UNITED STATES SENATE

WASHINGTON DC 20510

SUBJECT: URGE YOU TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF YOUR UPCOMING
SUMMIT MEETING WITH MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO
ADDRESS THE SOVIETS' PERSECUTION OF JEWS,
CHRISTIANS AND OTHER RELIGIOUS BELIEVERS.

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

52
July 29, 1985

Dear Senator Tribble:

Thank you for your July 19 letter to the President, cosigned by 19 of your colleagues, urging that the issue of religious freedom be placed on the agenda during talks between President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev.

As you know, the President shares your deep concern for the human rights of individuals throughout the world. On numerous occasions the United States Government has encouraged Soviet authorities to adopt a more favorable attitude in this respect. Unfortunately, the Soviets have not been responsive to our efforts. However, let me assure you that this issue continues to receive our attention, and I have conveyed your recommendation to the President's foreign policy advisers for further review.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Paul S. Tribble, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

cc: w/copy of inc to Will Ball, Cong Affrs, State - for
DIRECT response

MBO:KRJ:jfc (7MBOG)

Letter to all Congress

53

31.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 19, 1985

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We urge you to take advantage of your upcoming summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev to address the Soviets' persecution of Jews, Christians, and other religious believers.

As you know, the Soviet Union's attempts to suppress religious activities have been unrelenting. Despite its participation in the Helsinki Accords and other international human rights agreements, the U.S.S.R. steadfastly opposes most expressions of religious faith.

Repression by Soviet authorities not only limits the opportunity for worship, but also severely restricts access to religious instruction and religious texts. Moreover, the Soviets continue to imprison believers solely for practicing their faith.

The upcoming Soviet-American summit offers an opportunity to express America's outrage over the anti-religious policies of the U.S.S.R. In this, his first meeting with an American President, Mr. Gorbachev must be made aware that our commitment to religious freedom for people everywhere remains strong and steadfast.

The ongoing plight of Andrei Sakharov and Anatoly Shcharansky bears witness to the Soviets' hostility toward religion. So, too, does the persecution of Uli Edelshtein, Yosef Bernstein, Balys Gajauskas, Anna Chertkova, and countless others.

The release of these and other prisoners of conscience would be a welcome step toward improving Soviet-American relations. We urge you, during your meetings with Mr. Gorbachev, to press vigorously for these and other prisoners' freedom, and to argue for an end to Soviet persecution of all religious believers.

We pledge you our support in this important task.

Wick Lugar ✓

✓ Buttrick ✓

- ✓ Rudolph W. Perchuk ✓
- ✓ Warren B. Rudman ✓
- ✓ John J. Exon ✓
- ✓ John Nickles ✓
- ✓ Gary Hart ✓
- ✓ Strom Thurmond ✓
- ✓ David L. Boren ✓
- ✓ Frank R. Lautenberg ✓
- ✓ Larry Pressler ✓

- ✓ Jeremiah Denton ✓
- ✓ Mack Mattingly ✓
- ✓ Steve Symms ✓
- ✓ Frank H. Murkowski ✓
- ✓ Lauter Charles ✓
- ✓ Thad Cochran ✓
- ✓ Paul Sarbanes ✓
- ✓ Jane Jenning ✓
- ✓ Monte Alexander ✓

5

ID# 340895

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

FO006-09

10 OCT 1985

DATE RECEIVED: OCTOBER 09, 1985

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MOST REVEREND JOSEPH CARD. BERNARDIN

SUBJECT: URGES ADDRESSING THE SOVIET PERSECUTION OF
CHRISTIANS, JEWS AND OTHERS DURING UPCOMING
U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT MEETING

G. O. P.
From Room

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	DISPOSITION TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
DOUG HOLLADAY		ORG	85/10/09		C 85/10/15
Human Rights - State Dept.		A	85/10/18		a 85/10/29
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

PL MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

- *****
- | | | | |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| *ACTION CODES: | *DISPOSITION | *OUTGOING | * |
| * | * | *CORRESPONDENCE: | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION | *A-ANSWERED | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE | *C-COMPLETED | * CODE = A | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET | *S-SUSPENDED | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC | * | * OUTGOING | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY | * | * | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE | * | * | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY | * | * | * |
- *****

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KFFP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8530859

Date October 29, 1985

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Most Reverend Joseph Cardinal Bernardin
Date: 09/30/85 Subject: Urges addressing the Soviet persecution
of Christians, Jews and others during upcoming US-Soviet Summit meeti

WH Referral Dated: October 18, 1985 NSC ID# 340895
(if any)

The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks:


Nicholas Pratt
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)



Washington, D.C. 20520

51

Dear Cardinal Bernardin:

I have been asked to respond to your September 30 letter to President Reagan urging him to raise human rights during his meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva this November.

The issue of religious freedom in the USSR, and the rights and welfare of those who have been imprisoned for their religious activities, remain matters of fundamental concern to the United States Government.

President Reagan has announced his intention to raise all subjects affecting U.S.-Soviet relations in his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva, including human rights. As we continue our preparations for the November meeting, we appreciate hearing your views.

If we can be of assistance to you in this or any other matter, please do not hesitate to contact us.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Mark R. Parris
Director
Office of Soviet Union Affairs

His Eminence
Joseph Cardinal Bernardin,
Archibishop of Chicago,
Archdiocese of Chicago,
Post Office Box 1979,
Chicago, Illinois.

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

OCTOBER 18, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ATTN: HUMAN RIGHTS

ACTION REQUESTED:
APPROPRIATE ACTION

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 340895
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED SEPTEMBER 30, 1985
TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN
FROM: MOST REVEREND JOSEPH CARD. BERNARDIN
ARCHBISHOP OF CHICAGO
ARCHDIOCESE OF CHICAGO
POST OFFICE BOX 1979
CHICAGO IL 60690

SUBJECT: URGES ADDRESSING THE SOVIET PERSECUTION OF
CHRISTIANS, JEWS AND OTHERS DURING UPCOMING
U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT MEETING

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE



ARCHDIOCESE OF CHICAGO

POST OFFICE BOX 1979

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60690

85308

8530879

Office of the Archbishop

September 30, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

I urge you to use the opportunity of your upcoming summit meeting with Premier Gorbachev to address the Soviet persecution of Christians, Jews, prisoners of conscience and other religious believers.

Repression by Soviet authorities not only limits the opportunity for worship, but also severely restricts access to religious instructions and religious texts. The Soviets imprison believers solely for practicing their faith.

Many people in the Archdiocese of Chicago are of eastern European descent. They have relatives and friends in their homelands who are under Soviet oppression. They continue to work and pray for the restoration of human rights in the Soviet Union and in their native lands.

The largest group of Lithuanians outside of Lithuania live in our Archdiocese. They are particularly concerned about religious oppression in Lithuania and the persecution of prisoners of conscience and especially Mr. Balys Gajauskas. The health of Mr. Gajauskas is deteriorating severely. There is great urgency that every effort be made for his freedom.

I urge you to raise his cause and that of other prisoners of conscience in your meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. I pray for you and for God's blessing on your efforts in behalf of human and religious rights.

With cordial good wishes, I remain

Sincerely yours,

Joseph Card. Bernardin

Archbishop of Chicago

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

5
Mush Oberman

~~6311 GROSS POINT ROAD - NILES, ILLINOIS 60648~~

3605 Woodhead Drive, Northbrook, Il. 60062

60
Oct. 23, 1985

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

When you meet Premier Gorbachev please remember the
plight of Soviet Jewry.

As the leader of the Free World you must speak out
for those whose minds and memories are free but whose
families are enslaved.

The future of the Jews of the Soviet Union and of
human rights is in your hands.

Sincerely,



M. D. Oberman

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


June 11, 1965

Dear Mr. Schlesinger:

This is to thank you and those connected with the Flatbush Park Jewish Center for the handsome plaque, designed with the Mezuzah, that Dr. Goldman accepted on my behalf. I am grateful for the kind thought that prompted this symbolic gift and accompanying statement, and hope you will convey my warm appreciation to all who participated in this presentation.

With cordial good wishes,

Sincerely,



Mr. Alexander Schlesinger
2054 East 63rd Street
Brooklyn 34, New York

62

GORDON S. BODEK

October 17, 1985

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Mr. President:

Ten years ago the Soviets signed the Helsinki Accords which established certain human rights standards. Today we are witnessing a campaign to eradicate Jewish culture and education throughout the Soviet Union with a record number of arrests of Hebrew teachers. Emigration is virtually closed with only 700 leaving thus far this year and life for Soviet Jewry activists is one of constant harrasment.

May I express my deep appreciation for your concern on the Soviet Jewry issue and I hope you will continue to voice your specific concern for the deteriorating conditions facing Soviet Jews.

Peace can only be achieved when individual human rights are respected. I trust you will keep the issue of Soviet Jewry on the agenda in your discussions with Mr. Gorbachev and work toward a mutually effective solution.

Sincerely,



Gordon S. Bodek

GSB:lc

148 South Bristol Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90049

63

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 26, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JF*

SUBJECT: Draft Response to Human Rights Appeals

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Anne Higgins informing her that the NSC has reviewed her draft response to letters concerning human rights abuses in the Soviet Union (Tab A). As indicated on the draft we have suggested deleting part of paragraph three to avoid the appearance of lecturing the reader.

Steve *SS* Sestanovich, Judy *JM* Mandel, Jock *Ma* Covey, and Walt *WR* Raymond concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Anne Higgins
Tab A Draft response to human rights appeals
Tab B Letters concerning human rights abuses in the Soviet Union.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 27, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*

SUBJECT: Russian Word for Peace

In response to a letter to the President from a private citizen you asked whether it is true that the Russian words for peace and world are identical - they are. It is not, however, correct to say, as does the author of the letter, that when Russians say they want peace they really mean they want the world. It is perfectly clear to a Russian speaker from context and usage when the word means peace and when it means world.

On a smaller scale there are examples of this phenomenon - one word with two or more meanings - in English. It is clear only from context, for example, when one person asks another for a date whether he has in mind a fruit or a social engagement. Among native speakers, however, confusion over the difference is rare.

Attachments:

Tab A Memo from Anne Higgins
Tab B Letter from David Korn to the President

9100

us

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date:

11-4-85

NSC/S

To:

Carol Cleveland

anyone know
Russian up
there - is this
true?



ANNE HIGGINS
Special Assistant to the
President and Director
of Correspondence
Room 94, x7610

2932 DAVENPORT STREET, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

October 27, 1985

9100

44

The President,
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

It was very good seeing you last week in the White House. When in 1975 we met at Ted Cummings' home in Beverly Hills we have all predicted that you will make a great President.

Our predictions came true and indeed you are not only a great man but one of the few great Presidents our country had. You have the courage, the dignity, sincerity, leadership and the humility of a great man.

When I commented about the summit and the usage of Russian language you suggested that I write you, so here it is.

In Russian language the words for peace and the world are spelled and pronounced indentially, namely MIR and to pronounce it in English would be MEER.


So in effect when the Soviets use the word MEER they mean that they want the WORLD and not Peace. For example, the word VLADIMIR (VLADEEMEER) means the ruler of the world and not the ruler of the peace and that goes back to 11th century AD.

The Soviets always dominated and oppressed their people and continue trying to take over the world.

When I mentioned this to you, you wanted it in writing, so here it is.

Good luck in Geneva, and please remember, the Soviets need us more than we need them.

With best wishes to you and Mrs. Reagan,



David Korn

47

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 25, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN
FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SUBJECT: Russian Word for Peace

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Anne Higgins responding to her question over whether the Russian words for peace and world are identical. In effect, they are, but it is nonetheless clear to a Russian speaker from context and usage which is the intended meaning.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Anne Higgins at Tab I.

Approve *WMP* Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to Anne Higgins
- Tab A Memorandum from Anne Higgins to Carol Cleveland
- Tab B Letter to the President from David Korn